#2

RE: MISSING EXHIBITS AND COURT PROPERTIES IN REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,

RANCH 4, PANABO CITY, DAVAO DEL NORTE
A.M. No. 10-2-41-RTC
February 27, 2013
Carpio, J.
FACTS: This administrative case arose from a letter dated May 7, 2009 sent by Atty. Jacquelyn A.
Labustro-Ciarcia (Atty. Labustro-Ciarcia), Clerk of Court of the Panabo City RTC, Branch 4, to the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA). In said letter, Atty. Labustro-Garcia said that she conducted an inventory
and discovered some missing items from their court. Atty. Labustro-Garcia also asked for advice on the
proper action to take regarding the missing items.
In a memorandum dated June 29, 2009, Deputy Court Administrator Nimfa C. Vilches (DCA Vilches)
directed Presiding Judge Jesus L. Grageda (Judge Grageda) of the RTC and Atty. Labustro-Garcia to (1)
furnish the OCA with a list of the missing exhibits and properties; (2) conduct an audit and inventory of
criminal cases; (3) conduct an inventory of court properties; (4) investigate the circumstances of the
missing exhibits and properties; and (5) take necessary measures to prevent a similar occurrence.
On 25 November 2009, Judge Grageda compulsorily retired. The OCA later found that there is no
sufficient proof of missing items in the RTC. However, it found Judge Grageda liable for a different
offense: a failure on his part to conduct an investigation on the matter [of the missing items], or at the
very least, to report to the [Supreme] Court any action taken to verify or of any measures adopted to
prevent loss of exhibits and court properties, without waiting for a directive. The OCA recommended
that Judge Grageda be held liable for violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars, and be
fined P20,000.
ISSUE: Should Judge Grageda be held liable?
RULING: NO.
The OCA submitted its memorandum to then Acting Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio on July 10, 2012
more than two years and seven months after Judge Grageda compulsorily retired. During his
incumbency, Judge Grageda was never given the chance to explain the alleged violation of Supreme
Court rules, directives and circulars. Up to the present, the OCA has not commenced any formal
investigation or asked Judge Grageda to comment on the matter. Thus, the complaint against Judge
Grageda must be dismissed.
In order for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative case, the complaint must be filed
during the incumbency of the respondent. Once jurisdiction is acquired, it is not lost by reason of
respondents cessation from office.
In the present case, Judge Gragedas compulsory retirement divested the OCA of its right to institute a
new administrative case against him after his compulsory retirement. The Court can no longer acquire
administrative jurisdiction over Judge Grageda by filing a new administrative case against him after he
has ceased to be a public official. The remedy, if necessary, is to file the appropriate civil or criminal case
against Judge Grageda for the alleged transgression.

Moreover, aside from the bare allegation in Atty. Labustro-Garcias May 2009 letter that, The presiding
judge merely told me that I am not liable for those lost items, there is no other proof that Judge
Grageda violated any Supreme Court rule, directive, or circular. In fact, in its 18 April 2012
memorandum, the OCA found that, contrary to Atty. Labustro-Garcias allegation, there is actually no
missing item. In order to hold Judge Grageda liable, there must be substantial evidence that he
committed an offense. Otherwise, the presumption is that he regularly performed his duties.

#15
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM vs. PARAMOUNT HOLDINGS EQUITIES, INC.
G.R. No. 176838
June 13, 2013
Reyes, J.
FACTS: The case stems from the petition docketed as DARAB Case No. R 0403-0009-02, filed with the
Office of the Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD) by the DAR. The petition sought to nullify the sale to the
respondents of several parcels of land.
The PARO argued that the properties were agricultural land yet their sale was effected without a DAR
Clearance as required under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL; R.A. No. 6657). Allegedly,
the PARO came to know of the transactions only after he had received a directive from the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform to investigate the matter, following the latters receipt of a letter-request from persons
who claimed to be the tenant-farmers of the properties previous owners. The respondents opposed the
petition, contending that since the matter involves an administrative implementation of R.A. No. 6657,
the case is cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, not the DARAB.
The PARAD issued a Resolution dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The DARs motion for
reconsideration was denied, prompting the filing of an appeal with the DARAB.
The DARAB granted the appeal, ruling inter alia that the DARAB has the jurisdiction over the case, since
its jurisdiction under Circular No. 2 covers the cancellation of deeds of conveyance and corresponding
transfer certificates of title over agricultural lands. The denial of the respondents motion for
reconsideration led to the filing of a petition with the CA which annulled and set aside the decision and
resolution of the DARAB. The CA emphasized that the DARABs jurisdiction over the dispute should be
determined by the allegations made in the petition. Since the action was essentially for the nullification
of the subject properties sale, it did not involve an agrarian suit that is within the DARABs jurisdiction.
DARs motion for reconsideration was denied hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Does the DARAB has jurisdiction over the dispute that seeks the nullification of the subject
properties sale?
RULING: NO.
The jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited under the law, as it was created under Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 129-A specifically to assume powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian

reform cases under E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No. 129-A. Significantly, it was organized under the Office of
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. The limitation on the authority of it to mere agrarian reform matters
is only consistent with the extent of DARs quasi-judicial powers under R.A. No. 6657 and E.O. No. 229
[...] to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters [and] all matters involving implementation of
agrarian reform[. T]he jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB is only limited to cases involving
agrarian disputes, including incidents arising from the implementation of agrarian laws.
Basic is the rule that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial office or government
agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material
allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for irrespective of whether the petitioner or
complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. Upon the Courts perusal of the records, it has
determined that the PAROs petition with the PARAD failed to indicate an agrarian dispute. Specifically,
the PAROs petition failed to sufficiently allege any tenurial or agrarian relations that affect the subject
parcels of land.
[N]ot every sale or transfer of agricultural land would warrant DARABs exercise of its jurisdiction. The
law is specific that the property must be shown to be under the coverage of agrarian reform laws.

#28
FRANKLIN ALEJANDRO vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FACT-FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU
G.R. No. 173121
April 3, 2013
Brion, J.
FACTS: The Head of the Non-Revenue Water Reduction Department of the Manila Water Services, Inc.
(MWSI) received a report that Mico Car Wash (MICO), an establishment owned by Alfredo Rap
Alejandro, has been illegally opening an MWSI fire hydrant and using it to operate its car-wash business
in Binondo, Manila. Acting on this report, the MWSI, in coordination with the Philippine National Police
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG), conducted an anti-water pilferage operation
against MICO.
During the anti-water pilferage operation, the PNP-CIDG discovered that MICOs car-wash boys indeed
had been illegally getting water from an MWSI fire hydrant. The PNP-CIDG arrested the car-wash boys
and confiscated the containers used in getting water. At this point, the petitioner, Alfredos father and
the Barangay Chairman of Barangay 293, Zone 28, Binondo, Manila (Alejandro), interfered with the PNPCIDGs operation by ordering several men to unload the confiscated containers. This intervention caused
further commotion and created an opportunity for the apprehended car-wash boys to escape.
The Office of the Ombudsman Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau, after conducting its initial
investigation, filed with the Office of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman an administrative complaint
against Alejandro for his blatant refusal to recognize a joint legitimate police activity, and for his
unwarranted intervention. In its decision, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman found Alejandro guilty
of grave misconduct and ordered his dismissal from the service. The Deputy Ombudsman ruled that
Alejandro cannot overextend his authority as Barangay Chairman and induce other people to disrespect
proper authorities. The Deputy Ombudsman also added that Alejandro had tolerated the illegal acts of

MICOs car-wash boys. Alejandro filed a motion for reconsideration which the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman denied.
Alejandro appealed to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The CA
dismissed the petition for premature filing and ruled that Alejandro failed to exhaust proper
administrative remedies because he did not appeal the Deputy Ombudsmans decision to the
Ombudsman. Alejandro moved for the reconsideration of the CA ruling, which the CA denied.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires a request for
reconsideration from the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman to the Ombudsman for the purpose
of a Rule 43 review; and
(2) Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over elective officials and has the power
to order their dismissal from the service.
RULING:
(1) NO.
[T]he doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies [] states that when there is a
procedure for administrative review, [] appeal, or reconsideration, the courts []will not
entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the
appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed
in the administrative forum.
Administrative Order No. 07 did not provide for another appeal from the decision of the Deputy
Ombudsman to the Ombudsman. It simply requires that a motion for reconsideration or a
petition for certiorari may be filed in all other cases where the penalty imposed is not one
involving public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month, or a fine
equivalent to one (1) month salary. This post-judgment remedy is merely an opportunity for the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, or the Office of the Ombudsman, to correct itself in certain
cases. To our mind, the petitioner has fully exhausted all administrative remedies when he filed
his motion for reconsideration on the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman. There is no further
need to review the case at the administrative level since the Deputy Ombudsman has already
acted on the case and he was acting for and in behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman.
(2) YES.
The Office of the Ombudsman was created by no less than the Constitution. It is tasked to
exercise disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials, save only for
impeachable officers. While Section 21 of The Ombudsman Act and the Local Government Code
both provide for the procedure to discipline elective officials, the seeming conflicts between the
two laws have been resolved in cases decided by [the Supreme] Court.
In Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole, [the Court] pointed out that there is nothing in the Local Government
Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of
the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent

[] as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other. The two laws may be
reconciled by understanding the primary jurisdiction and concurrent jurisdiction of the Office of
the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or
employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction extends only to public officials occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher. Consequently, as [the Court] held in Office of the
Ombudsman v. Rodriguez, any act or omission of a public officer or employee occupying a salary
grade lower than 27 is within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and of the regular
courts or other investigative agencies.
In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining
authorities, the body where the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the
case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
In this case, the petitioner is a Barangay Chairman, occupying a position corresponding to salary
grade 14. Under RA 7160, the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan has disciplinary
authority over any elective barangay official[.] Since the complaint against the petitioner was
initially filed with the Office of the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction is to
the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan whose exercise of jurisdiction is concurrent.
(As regards the substantive issue in this case, the Supreme Court ruled that Alejandro was indeed guilty
of grave misconduct, thereby affirming the CAs decision.)

#41
JOSE U. PUA and BENJAMIN HANBEN U. PUA vs. CITIBANK, N. A.
G.R. No. 180064
September 16, 2013
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS: Petitioners filed before the RTC a Complaint for declaration of nullity of contract and sums of
money with damages against respondent. In their complaint, petitioners alleged that they had been
depositors of Citibank Binondo Branch (Citibank Binondo) since 1996. Sometime in 1999, Citibank
Binondos Branch Manager invited Jose to a dinner party where he was introduced to several officers of
Citibank Hongkong Branch (Citibank Hongkong). A few months after, Chingyee Yau (Yau), Vice-President
of Citibank Hongkong, came to the Philippines to sell securities to Jose who had to open an account with
Citibank Hongkong as one of the conditions for the sale. Later on, petitioners discovered that the
securities sold to them were not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and that
the terms and conditions covering the subscription were not likewise submitted to the SEC for
evaluation, approval, and registration. Asserting that respondents actions are in violation of the
Securities Regulations Code (SRC; RA 8799), they assailed the validity of the subscription agreements
and the terms and conditions thereof for being contrary to law and/or public policy.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss alleging inter alia that petitioners complaint should be dismissed
outright for violation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It pointed out that the merits of the case

would largely depend on the issue of whether or not there was a violation of the SRC, in particular,
whether or not there was a sale of unregistered securities thus, the case should have been filed with
the SEC first and not directly before the RTC.
Petitioners opposed, maintaining that the RTC has jurisdiction over their complaint by virtue of Section
63 of the SRC expressly providing that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all suits to
recover damages pursuant to Sections 56 to 61 of the same law.
The RTC denied respondents motion to dismiss. It noted that petitioners complaint is for declaration of
nullity of contract and sums of money with damages and, as such, it has jurisdiction to hear and decide
upon the case even if it involves the alleged sale of securities.
Respondent filed an omnibus motion praying, among others, for there consideration of the aforesaid
ruling, which petitioners, in turn, opposed. The RTC denied respondents omnibus motion with respect
to its prayer for reconsideration. Dissatisfied, respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.
The CA reversed and set aside the RTCs orders and dismissed petitioners complaint for violation of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Citing the case of Baviera v. Paglinawan, the CA opined that all
complaints involving violations of the SRC should be first filed before the SEC. Aggrieved, petitioners
moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners action falls within the primary jurisdiction of the SEC.
RULING: NO.
Petitioners reiterate their original position that the SRC itself provides that civil cases for damages
arising from violations of the same law fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial courts.
At the outset, the Court observes that respondent erroneously relied on the Baviera ruling to support its
position that all complaints involving purported violations of the SRC should be first referred to the SEC.
A careful reading of the Baviera case would reveal that the same involves a criminal prosecution of a
purported violator of the SRC, and not a civil suit such as the case at bar.
[I]t is a fundamental rule in procedural law that jurisdiction is conferred by law; it cannot be inferred but
must be explicitly stated therein. Thus, when Congress confers exclusive jurisdiction to a judicial or
quasi-judicial entity over certain matters by law, this, absent any other indication to the contrary,
evinces its intent to exclude other bodies from exercising the same.
It is apparent that the SRC provisions governing criminal suits are separate and distinct from those which
pertain to civil suits. [] Section 53 of the SRC governs criminal suits[;] Sections 56 [to] 63 of the SRC
pertain to civil suits. [Section 63 of the SRC provides that] cases falling under Section 57 of the SRC,
which pertain to civil liabilities arising from violations of the requirements for offers to sell or the sale of
securities, as well as other civil suits under Sections 56 [to] 61 of the SRC shall be exclusively brought
before the Regional Trial Courts.