Akrasia (Weakness of Will, Lack of Self-Control) in Aristotles Texts

Main Texts and Themes

Aristotles longest and most in-depth discussion of akrasia occurs in Nicomachean Ethics book 7. Other
important discussions occur in different books of the Nicomachean Ethics and in several other texts:

Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, 3.1, 3.2, 5.8 (the last implicitly)

Eudemian Ethics 2.7, 2.8, 2.10, 7.6
On the Soul 3.9, 3.10, 3.11
Problems 28

In the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle dialectically canvasses many of the opinions about akrasia similarly set
out and then discussed in the Nicomachean Ethics akrasia was a matter of some dispute or debate.
There are several main (and some recurring) themes worked out in Aristotles account of akrasia.
Internal conflict between a passionate, emotional, or desirous part, and a rational, principled part
of the person
Distinction between a state of moral viciousness (kakia) and the state (or occasions of) akrasia,
differing by the condition of the rational part, and by whether choice (prohairesis) is involved.
Distinction between a state (or occasions) of enkratia, i.e. self-control, and a state (or occasions)
of akrasia
A (semi-Socratic) treatment of akrasia in terms of knowledge and some sort of failure to use the
knowledge one possesses
Akrasia in relation to desire for physical pleasure as the paradigmatic form, distinguished from
other object-specific modes of akrasia
A distinction between two modes of akrasia: rashness (propeteia) and weakness (asthenia)
A distinction between the opposed pair enkratia-akrasia and the other opposed pair karteriamalakia (endurance-softness), depending on whether it is pleasure or pain which is being resisted.

The Conflict within the Akratic Person

Aristotle seems pretty clear that in akrasia some type of conflict occurs within the akratic person a
conflict between different parts or faculties of the human soul. In general, one can say that this conflict:
takes place between a non-rational or less-rational part and a rational part
would seem to between something primarily desiderative and something primarily rational
involves a discord between reason and desire, compulsion of one part, and some pain or regret
What, however, are the terms or sides of the conflict as Aristotle actually frames it? Consider:
N. E. 1.13
N.E. 3.2, 7.7, 7.8, E.E. 2.8
D.A. 3.10
E.E. 2.7, 2.8, DA. 3.10
E.E. 2.8
N.E. 7. 7
N.E. 7.3

hormai (impulse)
epithumia (desire for pleasure)
orexis (desire, affectivity)
epithumia (and thumos)
orexis
phantasia (imagination)
pathos (emotion, desire)

vs
vs
vs
vs
vs
vs.
vs.

logos or ton logon ekhon

prohairesis (moral choice)
boulsis (rational desire, wish)
logismon (reasoning)
logos
logos
epistems

Note: orexis is Aristotles broadest term for desire or affectivity. He typically divides it into three
modes: epithumia, thumos, and boulsis but orexis also encompasses prohairesis and pathos.

Copyright Gregory B. Sadler, ReasonIO, 2012

Akrasia (Weakness of Will, Lack of Self-Control) in Aristotles Texts

Comparing Moral States
Akrasia and Enkratia can be placed on a spectrum, in which they fall between Virtue and Vice. Several
key differences between these states bear upon the parts of the soul and their good or bad conditions:

Virtue

Enkratia

Akrasia

Vice

Rational Part

Rational Part

Rational Part

Rational Part

(very) good state

in decent state

in decent state

corrupted state

conflicts with, and

imposes rule on

conflicts with,
and loses out to

harmonizes with
(sort of. . . )

Affective Part

Affective Part

Affective Part

Affective Part

well-ordered state

disordered state

disordered state

corrupted state

harmonizes with

Moral Goodness

Moral Badness

In akrasia, the higher, more rational part of the person which determines what ought to be done -- is
functioning and is well-informed or knowledgeable (to some degree), and it comes into conflict with the
lower, more affective, less rational part of the person -- which urges something else, even the opposite.
The reason why this conflict exists a conflict also experienced by the enkratic person is precisely
because the rational part is in a good enough state or condition, but the affective part is in a bad condition.
So, they are bound to end up in conflict when determinate situations arise which arouse desire or affect.
The big question then is why the akratic person gives in to the lower against the higher, following desire
or affectivity in opposition to reason (or rational desire or moral choice) which should govern their action.

Two Modes of Akrasia

One explanation lies in Aristotles distinction between two modes of akrasia: Rashness and Weakness.

Rashness
(propeteia)

Weakness
(asthenia)

do not engage in deliberation or reasoning in response to the situation, or their

own desire, painful or pleasurable matter
they could ready themselves by seeing the situation coming and then reasoning
instead, they are led or driven by passion (pathos)
like a person who gets drunk quicker than others, with less wine
do engage in deliberation or reasoning in response to the situation, or their own
desire, painful or pleasurable matter
through passion (pathos), they do not remain within (m emmenontes) what they
had decided or resolved
give in to smaller temptations of pleasure and pain than do others

Copyright Gregory B. Sadler, ReasonIO, 2012

Akrasia (Weakness of Will, Lack of Self-Control) in Aristotles Texts

Akrasia and (Lack of) Knowledge
In Nicomachean Ethics book 7, Aristotle suggests that akrasia may also be due to and understood as a
lack of knowledge about moral matters on the part of the akratic person. He discusses four sorts of this:

Akrasia type 1:

Aristotle distinguishes between two senses of knowing.

a) a person can possess knowledge, and be using or exercising that knowledge
b) a person can possess knowledge, but not be using the knowledge possessed
The relevant distinction has to do with whether the knowledge is being regarded, or
whether one is conscious of it (therounta)

Akrasia type 2:

Aristotle introduces the practical syllogism, composed of premises of two types

a) universal premises (to katholou)
b) particular premises (kata meros)
It is possible for a person to know the universal premise(s), but not the
particular(s), or not to be using the particular(s)
Additionally, he notes that even universal premises are composed of terms (which
may not all be known equally well)

Akrasia type 3:

A person can have knowledge and not use it when in certain states
a) when a person is asleep, insane, or drunk
b) when a person is in one of the passions
In what seems almost an afterthought, he adds that thumos and epithumia
aphrodisin and certain other (passions) of this sort modify the body, sometimes
causing insanity
People in such a state may be able to verbally articulate language of knowledge,
but they do not (fully or at all) understand what they are saying like students who
are in process of learning, or like actors speaking their lines

Akrasia type 4:

A person can have more than one practical syllogism currently engaged, but one of
them (the worse one) has the force of desire behind it. Example:
One should not taste (things of X sort) All sweet things are pleasant
(minor premise)
That thing A is pleasant (desire engaged)
I should avoid that thing A
I should taste A
Aristotle writes of this as acting under a principle or reasoning but not the right
one in this case (kata sumbebkos . . . ti orthi logi)

It is worth considering: Are these all completely distinct from each other?
Also worth noting: Aristotle does not commit himself to the view that all akrasia involves ignorance of
some type. Although he does admit that we seem to be going along the path (sumbainein) that Socrates
was seeking (eztei), he ends the discussion by saying: let that be enough said about whether acting
akratically is compatible with (endekhetai) knowing or not, and knowing in what manner (ps)

Copyright Gregory B. Sadler, ReasonIO, 2012