Professional Documents
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Prof. Avena
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DECISION
July 5, 2010
Courts, not being omniscient, can only strive to determine what actually
and truly transpired based on the evidence before it and the imperfect
rules that were designed to assist in establishing the truth in disputed
situations. Despite the difficulties in ascertaining the truth, the courts
must ultimately decide. In civil cases, its decision must rest on
preponderance of admissible evidence.
This petition for review assails the February 22, 2005 Decision1 and the
July 7, 2005 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No.
64105. The CA partially granted the appeal before it and modified the
June 22, 1999 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite,
Branch 20, which ordered the partition of two parcels of land among the
seven sets of plaintiffs (respondents herein).
Factual Antecedents
This case originated from a suit for partition and damages concerning
the two parcels of land denominated as Lot Nos. 730 and 879 of the
Carmona cadastre. Lot No. 730, with an area of 17,688 square meters,
was owned by Remigia Baylon who was married to Januario Loyola. Lot
No. 879, with an area of 10,278 square meters was owned by Januario
Loyola, the husband of Remigia Baylon. Januario and Remigia had seven
children, namely Conrado, Jose, Benjamin, Candida, Soledad, Cristeta and
Encarnacion, all surnamed Loyola.
The administration of the said lots was entrusted to Encarnacion LoyolaBautista. All the heirs of Januario and Remigia received their shares in
the fruits of the subject properties during Encarnacion's administration
thereof. With the latter's death on September 15, 1969, administration of
the subject properties was assumed by her daughter, Amelia Bautista-
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Hebron, who, after some time, started withholding the shares of Candida
and the heirs of Conrado. By the time partition of the said properties was
formally demanded on November 4, 1990, Candida was the only one still
living among the children of Januario and Remigia. The rest were
survived and represented by their respective descendants and children,
to wit:
1. Conrado Loyola, by his children, Ruben Loyola, now
substituted by his heirs, namely, Josefina, Edgardo, Evelyn,
Marina, Aure, Corazon and Joven Francisco, all surnamed Loyola,
and respondents Lorenzo Loyola, Candelaria Loyola, Flora
Loyola, Nicardo Loyola, Teresita Loyola-Alonza, Vicente Loyola
and Rosario Loyola-Lontoc;
2. Jose Loyola, by his children, respondents Serafin Loyola,
Bibiano Loyola, Roberto Loyola, Purita Loyola-Lebrudo and
Estela Loyola;
3. Benjamin Loyola, by his children, respondents Franco Loyola,
Angelo Loyola, Rafael Loyola, Senen Loyola, Perla Loyola-Abad,
Ma. Venus Loyola-Ronquillo, Armando Loyola as well as his
daughter-in-law by his son, Eduardo Loyola, respondent Carmen
Hermosa;
4. Soledad Loyola, by her children, respondents Ester Danico,
Eduardo Danico, Mercedita Danico, Honesto Danico, Emelita
Danico and Dante Danico;
5. Cristeta Loyola, by her children, respondents Efren Cabigan
and Isidro Cabigan; and
6. Encarnacion Loyola-Bautista, by her son, respondent Alfredo
Bautista, by petitioner Amelia Bautista-Hebron, and by her
daughter-in-law by her son, Alberto Bautista, respondent
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Issues
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They also contend that all the issues raised are factual in nature, and the
findings of fact of the CA are final and conclusive and thus, may not be
the subject of review by the Supreme Court, absent any of the recognized
exceptions to the said rule.
Petitioner's Arguments
Our Ruling
Petitioner contends that she has no affirmative allegation to prove,
hence, the burden of proof is on respondents and not on her. And if at all,
she has proven that Candida and the heirs of Conrado have relinquished
their respective shares.
She further contends that ownership of inherited properties does not fall
under Articles 321 and 323 of the Civil Code and thus, the properties
inherited by the children of Conrado can be alienated by their mother,
Victorina, in favor of petitioner's mother.
Petitioner also contends that her parol evidence proved the alleged
executed agreement of waiver of shares in the two subject inherited
properties in consideration of the educational and other financial
support extended by Encarnacion to Candida and Conrado's respective
families.1avvphi1
Finally, petitioner posits that Candida and the heirs of Conrado are
estopped by laches from asserting their entitlement to shares in the
subject properties.
Respondents' Arguments
On the other hand, respondents argue that Candida and the heirs of
Conrado have not relinquished their shares in the litigated properties.
They insist that the alleged agreement of relinquishment of shares
cannot be proved by parol evidence.
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by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof."10 Hence, we find no error committed by the CA when it
affirmed the ruling of the trial court that the burden was on petitioner to
establish her affirmative defense of waiver or sale of the shares of
Candida and the heirs of Conrado.
The defense of petitioner is that Candida and the heirs of Conrado have
waived or sold their shares in the subject properties. This alleged fact is
denied by the respondents. Hence, this is the fact that is at issue and this
alleged fact has to be proven by petitioner, who is the one who raised the
said alleged fact. The burden of proof of thedefense of waiver or sale is
on petitioner.
Whether petitioner has been able to prove the said fact is undoubtedly a
question of fact, not of law. It involves the weighing and calibration of
the evidence presented. In the absence of any of the exceptions that call
for the Court to do so, the Court will not disturb the factual findings of
the RTC that were affirmed by the CA in the present case.
Shares of Minor Children
The minor children of Conrado inherited by representation in the
properties of their grandparents Remigia and Januario. These children,
not their mother Victorina, were the co-owners of the inherited
properties. Victorina had no authority or had acted beyond her powers
in conveying, if she did indeed convey, to the petitioners mother the
undivided share of her minor children in the property involved in this
case. "The powers given to her by the laws as the natural guardian
covers only matters of administration and cannot include the power of
disposition. She should have first secured the permission of the court
before she alienated that portion of the property in question belonging
to her minor children."11 In a number of cases, where the guardians,
mothers or grandmothers, did not seek court approval of the sale of
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properties of their wards, minor children, the Court declared the sales
void.12
Although the CA inaccurately cited Articles 321 and 323 of the Civil
Code, its conclusion that Victorina had no capacity to relinquish her
children's shares in the inherited properties was, nevertheless, correct.
Evidence of Sale/Waiver of Shares in Real Properties
On this factual issue too, we find no reason to disturb the finding of the
CA affirming that of the RTC that petitioner failed to prove by
preponderance of evidence her alleged fact of relinquishment, by sale or
waiver, of the shares of Candida and the heirs of Conrado. Again, the
court has no duty to delve into and weigh the pieces of evidence
presented by the parties and passed upon by both the RTC and the CA
with consistent conclusions on this matter and absent the other
exceptions to the general rule. Nevertheless, we did so, but find no error
in the findings of the RTC and the CA on this issue.
The very sketchy and partly hearsay testimony of petitioner was
resoundingly rebutted by the testimonies of the respondents. The
hearsay letter of Soledad, self-serving entries of relinquishment in the
notebook of accounts and tampered notebook of educational expenses
hinting at a relinquishment of shares cannot be given weight. Moreover,
these were refuted by the presentation of document embodying the
notarized extrajudicial partition establishing no such relinquishment.
The evidence does not preponderate in favor of petitioner.
Absent a preponderance of evidence on the fact in issue of
relinquishment of shares, then Candida and the heirs of Conrado, as
admitted heirs of Remigia and Januario, are entitled to their shares in the
two subject properties.
Laches
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WHEREFORE the petition for review is DENIED. The February 22, 2005
Decision and the July 7, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV. No. 64105 are AFFIRMED.
In the present case, the book of accounts, showing the record of receipts
of some heirs of their shares, has repeated entries in Amelia's
handwriting that Candida and the heirs of Conrado are no longer entitled
to shares in the fruits of the properties in litigation because they have
sold or given their share in the said properties to Encarnacion. These
entries only prove that Amelia no longer recognized the entitlement of
Candida and the heirs of Conrado to their respective shares. It is relevant
to note however that the entries in the book of accounts started only on
July 17, 1986. Hence, there is definite proof of non-recognition by
petitioner of Candida and the heirs of Conrado's entitlement to shares in
the subject properties starting only on July 17, 1986. Before this time,
during the administration of the properties by Encarnacion LoyolaBautista and some undetermined number of years after her death,
Candida and the heirs of Conrado were proven to have been receiving
their shares in the fruits of the subject properties.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
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Footnotes
13
Rollo, pp. 39-52; penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De GuiaSalvador and concurred in by Associate Justices Conrado M.
Vasquez, Jr. and Aurora Santiago-Lagman.
1
Id. at 35-36.
Id. at 266.
Rollo, p. 51.
Id. at 106.
Records, p. 74.
Id. at 75.
10
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SECOND DIVISION
FACTS OF THE CASE
G.R. No. 155733
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was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of
Ramon Osorios and Felisa Delgados union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got
married is crucial to the claimants because the answer will determine
whether their successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule against
reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and illegitimate
relatives.13 If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly
married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood
brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the latters
intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of
absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families.
Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs
would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgados intestate estate, as
they would all be within the illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never
married. In support thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever
presented to establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the date or
place of the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa
retained the surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio.
Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida de Casamiento14 stated that
he was "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa
Delgado),15 significantly omitting any mention of the name and other
circumstances of his father.16 Nevertheless, oppositors (now
respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the alleged marriage
did not necessarily mean that no marriage ever took place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was
survived by Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives, the
petitioners herein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo
Rustia executed an affidavit of selfadjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.
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defect which nullified the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court
allowed the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent portion of our
decision33 read:
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from the Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Courts May 11, 1990
decision.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals34 partially set aside the trial
courts decision. Upon motion for reconsideration,35 the Court of Appeals
amended its earlier decision.36 The dispositive portion of the amended
decision read:
With the further modification, our assailed decision
is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the decision of the
trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is
hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of
Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of
Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the
intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion
referred to in this decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal
heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his
estate in accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the
intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the
late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as
administratrix of his estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo
Rustia in relation to the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to
the nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon his or her qualification
and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to
cease and desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates
and to turn over to the appointed administrator all her collections of the
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(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
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To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned
status of the cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon
Osorio must first be addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or
disputable. Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law
makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how strong, may
overturn them.48On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one of
which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the
absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado
and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to
rely on the disputable presumption of marriage even in the face of such
countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her
son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgados
and Caridad Concepcions Partida de Casamiento49 identifying Luis as
"hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).50
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame
the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon
Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa
Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo,
namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba,
Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado,51 were her
natural children.52
Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C;
then X and Y would be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood
relationship. Can they succeed each other reciprocally?
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estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at
the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to
participate in the inheritance.55 The records not being clear on this
matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving
brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of
her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia,56 they are entitled to inherit
from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil
Code:57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other
one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo
could not have validly adjudicated Josefas estate all to himself. Rule 74,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the
decedents entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed
only if he is the sole heir to the estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the
decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the
minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly
authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by
means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds,
and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of
partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the
estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of
deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
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not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the
original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenors claim.
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next
of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as
such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next
of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that the administration be granted
to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it
may be granted to such other person as the court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is
the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed.71 The order of
preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators,
specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
represented in the management of the estates,72 a situation which
obtains here.
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RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Asscociate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
Prof. Avena
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairmans Attestation, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the above
decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
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10
11
Footnotes
Oppositors in SP Case No. 97668 with the RTC Manila, Branch
55.
1
14
Rollo, p. 1262.
15
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29
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This petition was initially filed with the Supreme Court but
was referred to the Court of Appeals, the latter having
concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court over the
petition.
30
18
Under the old Civil Code, which was in effect at the time of
Guillerma Rustias birth in 1920, she was an illegitimate
child, not a natural child, since she was born of parents who at
the time of conception were disqualified to marry each other.
19
20
Rollo, p. 920.
21
32
33
22
23
Rollo, p. 1149.
24
36
35
26
38
27
Id.
39
Rollo, p. 1266.
28
40
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43
44
46
48
49
Rollo, p. 1262.
50
57
56
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Under the old Civil Code, which was in effect at the time of
Guillerma Rustias birth in 1920, she is an illegitimate child, not a
natural child, since she was born of parents who, at the time of
conception, were disqualified to marry each other.
58
70
71
59
Art. 284 of the new Civil Code provided that the mother is
obliged to recognize her natural child in any of the cases referred
to in Art. 283.
61
62
63
64
This was provided in Article 285 of the new Civil Code and
carried over to Article 175 of the Family Code. While there are
exceptions to this rule, Guillermas case does not fall within the
exceptions.
65
67
68
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CUEVAS, J.:
In this special civil action of certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction, petitioners assail respondent Judge Malcolm G. Sarmiento's
denial of their Motion to Dismiss filed in the nature of demurrer to
evidence in Criminal Case No. 808 for Estafa entitled "PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. FE BAUTISTA, MILAGROS CORPUS and TERESITA
VERGERE ", pending before the defunct Court of First Instance of
Pampanga Branch I.
An information charging Fe Bautista, Milagros Corpus and Teresita
Vergere with estafa was filed before the sala of Judge Malcolm G.
Sarmiento. The third accused, Teresita Vergere, was granted a separate
trial. To prove its case, the prosecution presented during the trial the
private complainant, Dr. Leticia C. Yap, as its only witness. Thereafter,
petitioners, believing the prosecution failed to prove their guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, moved to dismissal the case by way of demurrer to
the evidence.
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106 Cal.
App. 95. 6
There is no denying that in a criminal case, unless the guilt of the
accused is established by proof beyond reasonable doubt, he is entitled
to an acquittal. But when the trial court denies petitioners' motion to
dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that the
prosecution had established a prima facie case against them, they
assume a definite burden. It becomes incumbent upon petitioners to
adduce evidence to meet and nullify, if not overthrow, the prima facie
case against them. 7 This is due to the shift in the burden of evidence, and
not of the burden of proof as petitioners would seem to believe.
When a prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a criminal
case, as in the case at bar, the burden of proof does not shift to the
defense. It remains throughout the trial with the party upon whom it is
imposedthe prosecution. It is the burden of evidence which shifts from
party to party depending upon the exigencies of the case in the course of
the trial. 8 This burden of going forward with the evidence is met by
evidence which balances that introduced by the prosecution. Then the
burden shifts back.
A prima facie case need not be countered by a preponderance of
evidence nor by evidence of greater weight. Defendant's evidence which
equalizes the weight of plaintiff's evidence or puts the case in equipoise
is sufficient. As a result, plaintiff will have to go forward with the proof.
Should it happen that at the trial the weight of evidence is equally
balanced or at equilibrium and presumptions operate against plaintiff
who has the burden of proof, he cannot prevail. 9
In the case at bar, the order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss,
required them to present their evidence. They refused and/or failed to
do so. This justified an inference of their guilt. The inevitable result was
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The Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga where this
case is now assigned, is hereby ordered to continue immediately with
the trial of Criminal Case No. 808 until its final disposition.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Escolin and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Aquino (Chairman), J., in the result.
Footnotes
1 Annex "B".
2 Annex "C".
3 Annex "D".
4 Gamboa vs. Victoriano, 90 SCRA 40.
5 Co Chuan Seng vs. CA, 128 SCRA 308
6 Words & Phrases Permanent Edition 33, p. 545.
7 Moran Rules of Court, Vol. III, pp. 542-543; People vs.
Upao Moro 101 Phil. 1226.
8 Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1970
Ed., p. 795
9 20 Am. Jur. 1102-03.
10 84 Phil. 525.
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CARPIO, J.:
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 23 June 2000
Decision2 and the 7 November 2001 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 21450. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 30
September 1997 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
50 ("trial court") in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-135055-56. The trial court
found Coverdale Abarquez y Evangelista ("Abarquez") guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the crime of homicide in Criminal
Case No. 94-135055.
The Charge
The prosecution charged Abarquez with the crimes of homicide and
attempted homicide in two Informations,5 as follows:
Criminal Case No. 94-135055
Prof. Avena
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Abarquez entered a plea of not guilty to both charges. The cases were
tried jointly.
The Version of the Prosecution
On 21 November 1993 at 2:00 p.m., Jose Buenjijo Paz8 ("Paz"), Ricardo
Quejong ("Quejong") and their friends were in the house of one Boyet at
3342 San Jose St., Sta. Mesa, Manila. They were drinking liquor in
celebration of the birthday of Boyets son. About 7:45 p.m., Paz and
Quejong decided to go home. Boyet Tong, Abarquezs son Bardie and
Sonito Masula ("Masula") joined Paz and Quejong. They proceeded
towards the exit of San Jose St.
Meanwhile, about six or seven meters away from Boyets house, Alberto
Almojuela also known as Bitoy ("Almojuela"), a certain Ising and
Abarquez also known as Dale, were likewise drinking liquor in front of
Almojuelas house. As the group of Paz was passing towards the main
road, Almojuela and his companions blocked their path.
Almojuela asked Paz, "Are you brave?" Paz replied, "Why?" Almojuela
got angry and attacked Paz with a knife. Paz parried the attack with his
left arm but sustained an injury. Abarquez held Paz on both shoulders
while Bardie pacified Almojuela. Paz asked Abarquez, "What is
our atraso, we were going home, why did you block our way?" Abarquez
answered, "Masyado kang matapang. Tumigil ka na, tumigil ka na."
Almojuela then confronted Quejong and they had an altercation,
followed by a scuffle. Paz tried to get away from Abarquez who
continued restraining him. Upon seeing Almojuela and Quejong fall on
the ground, Paz struggled to free himself from Abarquez. Paz
approached Quejong and found him already bloodied. It turned out the
Almojuela stabbed Quejong with a knife. Paz tried to pull up Quejong but
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failed. Paz left Quejong and ran instead towards the exit of San Jose St. to
ask for help. While Paz was running away, he heard Abarquez shout,
"You left your companion already wounded!"
When Paz and his companions returned, they found Quejong still on the
ground. Almojuela and Abarquez were still in the area. Paz and his
companions brought Quejong to the UST Hospital. They next proceeded
to Police Precinct No. 4 to report the incident. However, there was
nobody in the precinct. With Kagawad Villanio Usorio, Paz went to the
WPD General Headquarters to report the incident. At the WPD General
Headquarters, they learned that Quejong died at the UST Hospital. Paz
then had his injury treated by Dr. Vic Managuelod at Jose Reyes
Memorial Hospital. The medico-legal certificate showed that Paz
sustained a 3-cm. lacerated wound on his left forearm.
About 9:15 p.m., while SPO1 Danilo Vidad ("SPO1 Vidad") was at the
WPD Homicide Division, his station received a call from the UST Hospital
informing them of the death of Quejong. SPO1 Vidad and PO3 Ed Co went
to the UST Hospital morgue and investigated the incident. They learned
that Almojuela, assisted by Abarquez, stabbed Quejong. Upon the
execution of sworn statements by Paz and Masula, SPO1 Vidad booked
Almojuela and Abarquez for homicide and frustrated homicide and
prepared the referral letter to the inquest prosecutor.
Abarquez voluntarily appeared at the police station. Almojuela
voluntarily surrendered to one SPO4 Soriano at Police Station No. 10 and
was turned over to the WPD Homicide Division.
Dr. Antonio Rebosa9 ("Dr. Rebosa"), a medico-legal consultant at UST
Hospital, conducted the post-mortem examination and autopsy on
Quejong. Dr. Rebosa reported that Quejong sustained two stab wounds
and suffered from massive hemorrhage due to penetrating stab wounds
to the heart and left lung. According to Dr. Rebosa, a sharp instrument
probably caused the wound. Dr. Rebosa also reported that Quejong
Prof. Avena
sustained abrasions and contusions on the right upper body, the wrist
and on the lower extremities.
The Version of the Defense
Abarquez countered that on 21 November 1993, he was in his residence
at 3363 San Jose St., Sta. Mesa, Manila. About 7:30 p.m., Almojuelas wife
informed him that the group of Paz was challenging Almojuela to a
fistfight. Abarquez, being a barangay kagawad, proceeded to Almojuelas
house. Almojuelas house was about twenty meters away from
Abarquezs house. When he arrived at Almojuelas house, Abarquez saw
Almojuela on the ground being strangled by Quejong. Paz was holding
Almojuelas waist and boxing him at the stomach. Masula was near
Almojuelas head holding a piece of stone as if waiting for a chance to hit
him. Abarquez shouted at the group to stop. The group did not heed
Abarquez, forcing him to fire a warning shot into the air. Still, the group
did not heed Abarquez who then fired a second warning shot. Paz,
Quejong, and Masula scampered away.
Almojuela told Abarquez that he was merely trying to stop the group of
Paz from smoking marijuana. Almojuela then went inside his house
while Abarquez went home. On his way home, Abarquez met the Chief
Tanod of the barangay and two kagawads. Kagawad Rudy Lego ("Lego")
advised him to report the incident to the police. They all proceeded to
Precinct No. 4 where Lego reported the incident to the desk officer. The
desk officer told them that a person had been stabbed. When Abarquez
reached their house, he saw policemen and media men with their
barangay chairman. He informed them that he had just reported the
incident. Upon the request of SPO1 Vidad, Abarquez then went to the
police station to shed light on the incident.
Almojuela testified that he was inside his house when his daughter
informed him that there was marijuana smoke coming to their window.
He went outside to look for the source of the smoke and saw Quejong,
Page 29 of 107
Paz, and Masula smoking marijuana. Almojuela asked the group to move
away as there were children inside the house. He was on his way back to
the house when Quejong tried to strangle him. Later, Almojuela heard a
gunshot. He also heard Abarquez shouting, "Tumigil na kayo." Quejong,
Masula, and Paz ran away.
Winfred Evangelista10 ("Evangelista") testified that he was resting in
front of his house when he heard a commotion. He noticed that Paz and
Quejong were quarreling. Evangelista saw Paz kicking Almojuela.
Abarquez arrived to break up the fight but he was told not to interfere.
Abarquez was forced to fire a warning shot and the persons involved in
the commotion ran away.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Decision11 dated 30 September 1997, the trial court found
Abarquez guilty as an accomplice in the crime of homicide. The trial
court held that the prosecution failed to prove that Abarquez was a coconspirator of Almojuela in the killing of Quejong. Hence, Abarquez
could not be convicted as a principal in the crime of homicide. However,
the trial court ruled that Abarquez, in holding and restraining Paz,
prevented the latter from helping Quejong and allowed Almojuela to
pursue his criminal act without resistance.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 94-135055, this Court finds the
accused, Coverdale Abarquez, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of homicide only as accomplice and hereby sentences him to suffer
an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision
correccional to ten (10) years of prision mayor. In Criminal Case No. 94135056, the accused is hereby acquitted.
With costs de oficio.
Prof. Avena
SO ORDERED.12
Page 30 of 107
Abarquez appealed the trial courts Decision before the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of This Court
Decision13
In its
of 23 June 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
courts Decision. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court in giving
more credence to the testimony of Paz. The Court of Appeals held that
the prosecution was able to establish that Abarquez aided Almojuela in
fatally stabbing Quejong. The Court of Appeals rejected Abarquezs
allegation that he was merely at the crime scene to pacify the quarreling
parties.
In its 7 November 2001 Resolution,14 the Court of Appeals denied
Abarquezs motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
The issues15 Abarquez raises before the Court may be summarized as
follows:
1. Whether the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt;
2. Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in
giving more credence to the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses.
Abarquez alleges that the prosecutions evidence does not satisfy the test
of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support his conviction as an
accomplice. He further alleges that there was a misapprehension of facts
and that the trial court and the Court of Appeals reached their
Prof. Avena
Indeed, in one case, the Court ruled that the mere presence of the
accused at the crime scene cannot be interpreted to mean that he
committed the crime charged.21
Here, in convicting Abarquez, the trial court and the Court of Appeals
relied mainly on the testimony of Paz. Paz testified that he was held by
Abarquez on the shoulders, thus preventing him from helping Quejong
who was grappling with Almojuela. Paz testified:
Page 31 of 107
q. Now, you said Bitoy and Ricky were moving, what happened in the
course of grappling, if any?
You testified that Ricky and Bitoy were grappling each other, what
happened in the course of grappling? (sic)
a. They fell to the ground, sir.
q. After that what happened next, if any?
a. When I saw them fall I struggle and I was able to release from the hold
of Dale and I approach the two. I saw Ricky blooded so I was trying to
pull him, sir. (sic)
q. You said you saw Ricky blooded, why was he blooded? (sic)
a. He was stabbed by Bitoy, sir.
a. I was intending to help Ricky but I was held back by Dale, sir.
q. And how this Dale hold you?
a. He held my two shoulders, sir.
q. And did you see what instrument did Bitoy used in stabbing Ricky or
Ricardo? (sic)
a. It was a knife, sir. (Witness indicating a length about 6 inches
including the handle).
PROSECUTOR F. G. SUPNET:
I would like to make it of record demonstrated being held by the accused
holding both shoulders, your Honor.
q. Now, when this Dale Abarquez held both on your shoulders, what
happened next, if any?
q. Now, you said also that while the two were grappling while you were
trying to free yourself from the hold Dale Abarquez, "Pinagalitan kayo",
in what way or manner did Dale Abarquez reprimanded you? (sic)
a. You Jose is too brave, sir. (sic)22
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Avena
a. Yes, sir.
ATTY. GASCON:
Page 32 of 107
The accused told you Joey tumigil ka na, Joey tumigil ka na because you
were trying to attack Bitoy, is it not?
a. How can I be charged, he was the one holding the knife, sir. (sic)
a. Yes, sir.
q. So what was the reason why the accused restrained you and told you
Joey tumigal ka na, Joey tumigil ka na. What would be the reason?
COURT:
q. And he was holding your shoulder to pacify you and Bitoy from
further quarrelling you, is it not?
Does the Court get from you that you are trying to explain to Bitoy when
the accused tried to hold you and prevent you?
a. Yes, sir.
q. How can you demonstrate how you were held on the shoulder by
Abarquez?
q. That is why the reason you concluded that the accused is not pacifying
you but to stop you from helping the victim?
ATTY. GASCON:
a. Yes, sir.
Make I make it of record your Honor that the interpreter act as the
witness while the witness act as the accused demonstrating holding both
hands of interpreter preventing the witness and saying Joey tumigil ka
na, joey tumigil ka na.
COURT:
q. How many times?
Prof. Avena
Page 33 of 107
Prof. Avena
Page 34 of 107
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Footnotes
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Asscociate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Rollo, p. 31.
CA Rollo, p. 7.
Ibid., p. 8.
10
Prof. Avena
11
Supra note 4.
26
12
27
13
Supra note 2.
Page 35 of 107
CA Rollo, p. 11.
14
Supra note 3.
15
Rollo, p. 13.
29
16
17
28
20
22
24
25
Prof. Avena
Page 36 of 107
SECOND DIVISION
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
G.R. No. 182460
March 9, 2010
Prof. Avena
the adopted son of Felicidad, occupied one room in the house. At around
3:30 p.m. of 24 March 2004, appellant was having a drinking spree with
his cousin Herminio and brothers-in-law Joey Viduya and Ricky Viduya
(Ricky) in front of their house. Appellant and Herminio were arguing
over the matter of caring for Felicidad while the latter was confined in
the hospital. Ricky tried to mediate between the two. Appellant was then
seen going inside the house to get a bolo. When he emerged from the
house ten (10) minutes later, he ran after Herminio but the latter
managed to escape unscathed. Appellant again went back to the house. 5
Meanwhile, after pacifying appellant and Herminio, Ricky resumed
drinking. A few minutes later, he saw smoke coming from the room of
appellant. As Ricky was about to enter the house, he met appellant at the
door. Appellant apparently tried to stab Ricky but was unsuccessful.
Ricky witnessed appellant stab Felicidad and Alicia.6
Herminio, who had since come back to the drinking table, also saw the
smoke. He peeped through the small window of the house and witnessed
appellant burning some clothes and boxes in the sala. Herminio
immediately went inside the house to save his personal belongings.
Upon emerging from the house, Herminio saw his mother, Alicia,
bloodied.7
Alicia testifies that she was sitting on a chair near the toilet when she
saw smoke coming out of appellant's room. Before she could react,
appellant came charging at her and stabbed her. She sustained wounds
on her upper thigh, arms, below her breast and on her ear. Alicia was
still able to ask for help, and her daughter-in-law brought her to the
hospital.8
Eulogio heard a commotion while he was cooking in the second floor of
the house. When Eulogio went down, he already saw smoke coming from
the room of appellant. He then saw Felicidad near the comfort room
located outside the house and was bleeding from her mouth. As he was
Page 37 of 107
about to help Felicidad, he met appellant who was then holding a knife.
Eulogio immediately ran away.9
Upon seeing Herminio, appellant immediately attacked him with a knife.
However, Herminio and Ricky were able to pin appellant down. Before
they could retaliate, the barangay captain arrived at the scene.10 As a
result, eight (8) houses were razed.
Inspector Ferdinand Formacion responded to the fire incident and saw
four (4) houses were already burned. After putting out the fire, he and
the arson investigator conducted an ocular investigation and invited
witnesses to the police station to submit their sworn statements. SPO2
Rodolfo Lomboy, chief investigator of Philippine National Police Bauang
Police Station, was told by witnesses that appellant intentionally set the
boxes on fire inside the house.11
Eulogio estimated the value of his house at P250,000.00,12 while another
sister of Felicidad, Pacita Quilates, presented a receipt covering the
burial expenses for Felicidad, amounting to P10,000.00.13
An autopsy was performed on Felicidad, and it was disclosed that she
died from "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to third degree burns
involving 90% of body surface to include underlying tissues and
organs."14
Appellant was the lone witness for the defense. He stated that while he
was having a drinking spree, he saw Felicidad go inside the house to get
a glass of water. He followed her and gave her water. He noticed
Felicidad light a gas lamp. He then went back to his friends and resumed
drinking. He got into a heated argument with Herminio. The latter struck
him in the head. He immediately went inside the house to get a weapon.
He was able to get a bolo, went back outside and hit Herminio. The latter
ran away and appellant chased him. Appellant met Alicia and confronted
her about the actuations of Herminio. But Alicia cursed him. Appellant
Prof. Avena
thereafter hit her with the knife. Appellant then fell on the ground and
lost consciousness because, apparently, he was struck by something in
the back.15 Appellant denied setting the house on fire.16
On 30 May 2006, decision was rendered by the RTC, finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson and frustrated homicide, thus:
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2979-Bg., the Court FINDS and
DECLARES the accused JESSIE VILLEGAS MURCIA, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of arson as charged and defined under
Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, and he
is hereby sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of death; to indemnify
the heirs of the victim Felicidad Quilates, the amount of Php50,000.00 as
moral damages; Php50,000.00 as death indemnity; Php10,000.00 as
actual damages and another Php10,000.00 as temperate damages.
Further, the accused is ordered to indemnify Eulogio Quilates the
amount of P250,000.00, representing the value of the burned house.
In Crim. Case No. 2980-Bg., the Court likewise FINDS and DECLARES the
accused JESSIE VILLEGAS MURCIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of frustrated homicide as charged and he is hereby sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS of prision
correccional as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS ofprision mayor as
maximum; to pay the victim Alicia Q. Manlupig the amount of
Php10,000.00 as temperate damages; and to pay the costs.1avvphi1
In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited with his
preventive imprisonment under the terms and conditions, provided for
by Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Let the record of Crim. Case No. 2979-Bg. be sent to the Court of Appeals
for automatic review.17
Page 38 of 107
The trial court found that the corpus delicti in arson, as well as the
identity of the perpetrator, were established beyond reasonable doubt
by the prosecution. While there was no evidence to directly link
appellant to the crime, the trial court relied on circumstantial evidence.
In view of the penalty imposed, the case was forwarded to the Court of
Appeals for automatic review and judgment.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's findings but reduced the
penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal, which was given due course by the
Court of Appeals on 22 January 2008. In a Resolution18 dated 7 July
2008, this Court required the parties to simultaneously submit their
respective supplemental briefs. Appellant and the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) both filed their manifestations,19stating that they would
no longer file any supplemental briefs and instead adopt their respective
briefs.
Appellant admitted to the crime of frustrated homicide, hence the review
is limited to the crime of arson.
Appellant maintains his innocence of the charge of arson. He questions
the credibility of some witnesses and specifically imputes ill-motive on
the part of Herminio in testifying against him, especially after their
fight.20Appellant submits that the testimonies of witnesses, which failed
to turn into a coherent whole, did not prove the identity of the
perpetrator.21
On the other hand, the OSG banks on circumstantial evidence, as relied
to by the trial court, to prove the guilt of appellant.22 The OSG vouches
for the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and avers that their
testimonies have proven the corpus delicti and warrant appellant's
conviction.23
Prof. Avena
Page 39 of 107
Prof. Avena
Indeed, appellant was last seen inside the house before the fire started.
Eulogio and Ricky saw smoke emanating from the room of appellant.
Herminio testified that he saw appellant burning clothes in his room.
Appellant then went on a stabbing rampage while the house was on fire.
While nobody directly saw appellant burn the house, these
circumstances would yield to a logical conclusion that the fire that
gutted eight (8) houses was authored by appellant.
Necessarily, the issue narrows down to credibility of the witnesses.
Worthy of reiteration is the doctrine that on matters involving the
credibility of witnesses, the trial court is in the best position to assess
the credibility of witnesses since it has observed firsthand their
demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. Absent any
showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which would
appear to have been overlooked and, if considered, could affect the
outcome of the case, the factual findings and assessment on the
credibility of a witness made by the trial court remain binding on an
appellate tribunal.29
In this case, We find no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the
lower courts.
Appellant imputes ill-motive on the part of Herminio. This Court does
not discount the fact that there was a fight between appellant and
Herminio which preceded the occurrence of the fire. However, it cannot
be presumed that Herminio will automatically give a false testimony
against appellant. His testimony, having withstood cross-examination,
has passed the scrutiny of the lower courts and was held to be credible.
The lower courts found appellant liable under Article 320(1) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7659.
It may not be amiss to point out that there are actually two categories of
arson, namely: Destructive Arson under Article 320 of the Revised Penal
Code and Simple Arson under Presidential Decree No. 1316. Said
Page 40 of 107
Prof. Avena
Page 41 of 107
Prof. Avena
Id. at 29.
15
16
17
CA rollo, p. 107.
18
Rollo, p. 22.
19
Page 42 of 107
Footnotes
Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando,
with Associate Justices Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente and Enrico A.
Lanzanas concurring. Rollo, pp. 2-15.
1
Id. at 1.
20
Id. at 207-208.
21
Id. at 93.
22
Id. at 126-127.
Id. at 6-8.
23
Id. at 125.
Id. at 17-20.
24
10
Records, p. 178.
Id. at 20-21.
11
12
27
13
Records, p. 173.
26
Prof. Avena
31
Id. at 328.
33
34
Id. at 29.
Page 43 of 107
Prof. Avena
Page 44 of 107
Cruz, hitting the latter on her trunk and on the different parts of her
body, thereby inflicting upon her serious physical injuries which directly
caused her death.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, Victoriano, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded
not guilty to the offense charged.6Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
In the course of the trial, two varying versions arose.
Version of the Prosecution
Joel Song (Joel) testified that between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m. on August 18,
2002, he and two others, including the aunt of Victoriano, were playing a
card game known as tong-its just three to four arms length away from
the latters house.
While playing, Joel saw Victoriano punching and kicking his wife, herein
victim Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz7(Anna), in front of their house. Joel
knew the wifes name as "Joan." Victoriano then dragged Anna inside the
house by pulling the latter's hair, then slammed the door. Joel overheard
the couple shouting while they were already inside the house.8
Suddenly, Victoriano and Anna came out of the house, together with
their young daughter. Victoriano was behind Anna, with his arms
wrapped around her. He asked for Joels help. Joel noticed blood spurting
out of Annas mouth. He took the couples daughter and gave her to
Victoriano's aunt. He then went with them to the Bulacan Provincial
Hospital (hospital) on board a tricycle. However, Anna died.9
On the same day, at about 6:30 p.m., Senior Police Officers 1 Condrado
Umali and Eligio Jose, responding to the call of duty, went to the hospital
for investigation. There, Victoriano was turned over to the police officers
by the hospital's security guard on duty.10
Prof. Avena
Page 45 of 107
Prof. Avena
Page 46 of 107
carried the injured body of his wife; that he sought for help after the
accident; and that he brought her to the hospital for medical treatment.
Furthermore, Victoriano asseverated that he was very drunk at the time.
Thus, he prayed that these mitigating circumstances be appreciated in
his favor.
Our Ruling
The crime of Parricide is defined and punished under Article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), to wit:
Art. 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or
descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be
punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
SO ORDERED.16
Victoriano claims that Joel's testimony coincides with his own, which
refers to the slapping incident that occurred outside their house. It does
Prof. Avena
not at all point to him as the actual perpetrator of the crime. Thus,
Victoriano submits that Joels testimony is merely circumstantial.
But circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction, as we ruled in
People v. Castillo:20
Direct evidence of the commission of the offense is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusions and finding of guilt.
Conviction can be had on the basis of circumstantial evidence provided
that: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of
circumstantial evidence which will suffice in a given case, all the
circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every
other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances proved
should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one fair and
reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is
the guilty person. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean the
degree of proof excluding the possibility of error and producing absolute
certainty. Only moral certainty or "that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind" is required.21
In this case, we note the presence of the requisites for circumstantial
evidence to sustain a conviction. First, immediately preceding the killing,
Victoriano physically maltreated his wife, not merely by slapping her as
he claimed, but by repeatedly punching and kicking her. Second, it was
Victoriano who violently dragged the victim inside their house, by
pulling her hair. Third, in Dr. Viray's Report, Anna sustained injuries in
different parts of her body due to Victoriano's acts of physical abuse.
Fourth, the location and extent of the wound indicated Victoriano's
intent to kill the victim. The Report revealed that the victim sustained a
Page 47 of 107
fatal stab wound, lacerating the upper lobe of her right lung, a vital
organ. The extent of the physical injury inflicted on the deceased
manifests Victoriano's intention to extinguish life. Fifth, as found by both
the RTC and the CA, only Victoriano and Anna were inside the house,
other than their young daughter.1avvphi1 Thus, it can be said with
certitude that Victoriano was the lone assailant. Sixth, we have held that
the act of carrying the body of a wounded victim and bringing her to the
hospital as Victoriano did does not manifest innocence.1avvphi1 It
could merely be an indication of repentance or contrition on his part.22
The foregoing circumstances are proven facts, and the Court finds no
reason to discredit Joels testimony and Dr. Viray's Report. Besides, wellentrenched is the rule that the trial court's assessment of the credibility
of witnesses is accorded great respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal, inasmuch as the court below was in a position to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying. The Court does not find any
arbitrariness or
error on the part of the RTC as would warrant a deviation from this wellentrenched rule.23
Even if, for the sake of argument, we consider Victorianos claim that the
injury sustained by his wife was caused by an accident, without fault or
intention of causing it, it is clear that Victoriano was not performing a
lawful act at the time of the incident. Before an accused may be
exempted from criminal liability by the invocation of Article 12
(paragraph 4) of the RPC, the following elements must concur: (1) a
person is performing a lawful act (2) with due care, and (3) he causes an
injury to another by mere accident and (4) without any fault or intention
of causing it. For an accident to become an exempting circumstance, the
act that causes the injury has to be lawful.24Victoriano's act of physically
maltreating his spouse is definitely not a lawful act. To say otherwise
would be a travesty -- a gross affront to our existing laws on violence
Prof. Avena
against women. Thus, we fully agree with the apt findings of the CA, to
wit:
With the foregoing avowal, We find that the death of appellants wife
was not caused by mere accident. An accident is an occurrence that
"happens outside the sway of our will, and although it comes about
through some act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly
foreseeable consequences." It connotes the absence of criminal intent.
Intent is a mental state, the existence of which is shown by a persons
overt acts.
In the case at bench, evidence disclosed that appellant started beating
his wife outside their house and was even the one who dragged her
inside. This, to Our mind, contradicts his theory that he only pushed her
so as to go out of the house to avoid any further quarrel. Such
incongruity whittles down appellants defense that he did not
deliberately kill his wife.25
Finally, a person pleading intoxication to mitigate penalty must present
proof of having taken a quantity of alcoholic beverage prior to the
commission of the crime, sufficient to produce the effect of obfuscating
reason.26 In short, the defense must show that the intoxication is not
habitual, and not subsequent to a plan to commit a felony, and that the
accused's drunkenness affected his mental faculties. In this case, the
absence of any independent proof that his alcohol intake affected his
mental faculties militate against Victorianos claim that he was so
intoxicated at the time he committed the crime to mitigate his liability.27
Page 48 of 107
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Prof. Avena
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1
Page 49 of 107
Records, p. 1.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 4.
10
11
Records, p. 68.
12
Id. at 69.
13
14
15
Records, p. 120.
16
17
Prof. Avena
18
Id. at 28-32.
19
20
21
Id. at 225, citing People v. Nepomuceno, Jr., 298 SCRA 450, 462
(1998).
22
23
24
25
Supra note 2, at 9.
26
Page 50 of 107
Prof. Avena
Page 51 of 107
Cruz, hitting the latter on her trunk and on the different parts of her
body, thereby inflicting upon her serious physical injuries which directly
caused her death.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, Victoriano, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded
not guilty to the offense charged.6Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
In the course of the trial, two varying versions arose.
Version of the Prosecution
Joel Song (Joel) testified that between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m. on August 18,
2002, he and two others, including the aunt of Victoriano, were playing a
card game known as tong-its just three to four arms length away from
the latters house.
While playing, Joel saw Victoriano punching and kicking his wife, herein
victim Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz7(Anna), in front of their house. Joel
knew the wifes name as "Joan." Victoriano then dragged Anna inside the
house by pulling the latter's hair, then slammed the door. Joel overheard
the couple shouting while they were already inside the house.8
Suddenly, Victoriano and Anna came out of the house, together with
their young daughter. Victoriano was behind Anna, with his arms
wrapped around her. He asked for Joels help. Joel noticed blood spurting
out of Annas mouth. He took the couples daughter and gave her to
Victoriano's aunt. He then went with them to the Bulacan Provincial
Hospital (hospital) on board a tricycle. However, Anna died.9
On the same day, at about 6:30 p.m., Senior Police Officers 1 Condrado
Umali and Eligio Jose, responding to the call of duty, went to the hospital
for investigation. There, Victoriano was turned over to the police officers
by the hospital's security guard on duty.10
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Page 52 of 107
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Page 53 of 107
carried the injured body of his wife; that he sought for help after the
accident; and that he brought her to the hospital for medical treatment.
Furthermore, Victoriano asseverated that he was very drunk at the time.
Thus, he prayed that these mitigating circumstances be appreciated in
his favor.
Our Ruling
The crime of Parricide is defined and punished under Article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), to wit:
Art. 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or
descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be
punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
SO ORDERED.16
Victoriano claims that Joel's testimony coincides with his own, which
refers to the slapping incident that occurred outside their house. It does
Prof. Avena
not at all point to him as the actual perpetrator of the crime. Thus,
Victoriano submits that Joels testimony is merely circumstantial.
But circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction, as we ruled in
People v. Castillo:20
Direct evidence of the commission of the offense is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusions and finding of guilt.
Conviction can be had on the basis of circumstantial evidence provided
that: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of
circumstantial evidence which will suffice in a given case, all the
circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every
other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances proved
should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one fair and
reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is
the guilty person. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean the
degree of proof excluding the possibility of error and producing absolute
certainty. Only moral certainty or "that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind" is required.21
In this case, we note the presence of the requisites for circumstantial
evidence to sustain a conviction. First, immediately preceding the killing,
Victoriano physically maltreated his wife, not merely by slapping her as
he claimed, but by repeatedly punching and kicking her. Second, it was
Victoriano who violently dragged the victim inside their house, by
pulling her hair. Third, in Dr. Viray's Report, Anna sustained injuries in
different parts of her body due to Victoriano's acts of physical abuse.
Fourth, the location and extent of the wound indicated Victoriano's
intent to kill the victim. The Report revealed that the victim sustained a
Page 54 of 107
fatal stab wound, lacerating the upper lobe of her right lung, a vital
organ. The extent of the physical injury inflicted on the deceased
manifests Victoriano's intention to extinguish life. Fifth, as found by both
the RTC and the CA, only Victoriano and Anna were inside the house,
other than their young daughter.1avvphi1 Thus, it can be said with
certitude that Victoriano was the lone assailant. Sixth, we have held that
the act of carrying the body of a wounded victim and bringing her to the
hospital as Victoriano did does not manifest innocence.1avvphi1 It
could merely be an indication of repentance or contrition on his part.22
The foregoing circumstances are proven facts, and the Court finds no
reason to discredit Joels testimony and Dr. Viray's Report. Besides, wellentrenched is the rule that the trial court's assessment of the credibility
of witnesses is accorded great respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal, inasmuch as the court below was in a position to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying. The Court does not find any
arbitrariness or
error on the part of the RTC as would warrant a deviation from this wellentrenched rule.23
Even if, for the sake of argument, we consider Victorianos claim that the
injury sustained by his wife was caused by an accident, without fault or
intention of causing it, it is clear that Victoriano was not performing a
lawful act at the time of the incident. Before an accused may be
exempted from criminal liability by the invocation of Article 12
(paragraph 4) of the RPC, the following elements must concur: (1) a
person is performing a lawful act (2) with due care, and (3) he causes an
injury to another by mere accident and (4) without any fault or intention
of causing it. For an accident to become an exempting circumstance, the
act that causes the injury has to be lawful.24Victoriano's act of physically
maltreating his spouse is definitely not a lawful act. To say otherwise
would be a travesty -- a gross affront to our existing laws on violence
Prof. Avena
against women. Thus, we fully agree with the apt findings of the CA, to
wit:
With the foregoing avowal, We find that the death of appellants wife
was not caused by mere accident. An accident is an occurrence that
"happens outside the sway of our will, and although it comes about
through some act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly
foreseeable consequences." It connotes the absence of criminal intent.
Intent is a mental state, the existence of which is shown by a persons
overt acts.
In the case at bench, evidence disclosed that appellant started beating
his wife outside their house and was even the one who dragged her
inside. This, to Our mind, contradicts his theory that he only pushed her
so as to go out of the house to avoid any further quarrel. Such
incongruity whittles down appellants defense that he did not
deliberately kill his wife.25
Finally, a person pleading intoxication to mitigate penalty must present
proof of having taken a quantity of alcoholic beverage prior to the
commission of the crime, sufficient to produce the effect of obfuscating
reason.26 In short, the defense must show that the intoxication is not
habitual, and not subsequent to a plan to commit a felony, and that the
accused's drunkenness affected his mental faculties. In this case, the
absence of any independent proof that his alcohol intake affected his
mental faculties militate against Victorianos claim that he was so
intoxicated at the time he committed the crime to mitigate his liability.27
Page 55 of 107
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Prof. Avena
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1
Page 56 of 107
Records, p. 1.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 4.
10
11
Records, p. 68.
12
Id. at 69.
13
14
15
Records, p. 120.
16
17
Prof. Avena
18
Id. at 28-32.
19
20
21
Id. at 225, citing People v. Nepomuceno, Jr., 298 SCRA 450, 462
(1998).
22
23
24
25
Supra note 2, at 9.
26
Page 57 of 107
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Page 58 of 107
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him where he came from. He replied that he was looking for AAA.
Appellant became nervous, dropped his torch and hurriedly left. Later
that evening, he and some relatives and neighbors found AAA's lifeless
body several meters away from Cabague's house.9
Dr. Galindez, Municipal Health Officer of Placer, Masbate, declared that
he conducted a post-mortem examination on AAA's corpse. His findings
are as follows10:
POSTMORTEM EXAMINATION FINDINGS:
Page 59 of 107
- (+) cystocele.
1. Asphyxia 2o strangulation
2. Rape11
Prof. Avena
Dr. Galindez stated that the confluent hematoma (wound no. 11) around
AAA's neck and shoulder indicated suffocation. He said that AAA died of
asphyxia secondary to strangulation.12
He also concluded that AAA was raped as shown by the following
observations: (1) enlargement of AAA's cervical area; (2) second-degree
burns in AAA's labia majora (wound no. 15); (3) second-degree burns in
AAA's left and right thighs (wound nos. 16 and 17); (4) multiple nail
marks in AAA's buttocks (wound no. 18); and (5) the presence of human
spermatozoa in AAA's vagina.13
The prosecution also proffered documentary evidence to bolster the
testimonies of its witnesses, to wit: (a) affidavit of Cabague (Exhibit
A);14 (2) affidavit of BBB (Exhibit B);15 and (3) post-mortem examination
report signed and issued by Dr. Galindez (Exhibit C).16
For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of appellant and
Maricar Notarion (Maricar). Appellant denied the foregoing accusation
and pointed to a certain Solomon Monsanto (Monsanto) as the real
perpetrator.
Appellant testified that on 25 July 2001, at about 4:30 p.m., he was at his
farm tending his carabao. Later, he saw Monsanto standing beside the
lifeless body of AAA which was lying on the ground. Monsanto
approached him, poked a gun at him, and threatened to kill him and his
family if he would report what he saw. Subsequently, appellant was
arrested and charged with raping and killing AAA.17
Maricar, daughter of appellant, narrated that on 25 July 2001, at about
4:30 in the afternoon, she and appellant went to their farm to fetch their
carabao. Thereafter, she and appellant saw Monsanto hack and shoot
AAA. Monsanto approached appellant and poked a gun at the latter.
Monsanto warned appellant not to tell anyone of the incident or he and
Page 60 of 107
his family would be killed. She and appellant then hurriedly went
home.18
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision on 23 January 2006 convicting
appellant of the special complex crime of rape with homicide. Appellant
was sentenced to death. He was also ordered to pay the heirs of AAA the
amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages. The dispositive portion
of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, beyond reasonable doubt, the Court finds the
accused, RICARDO NOTARION, guilty of the special complex
crime of Rape with Homicide falling under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 4111 and RA 7659 and
accordingly sentences him to suffer the SUPREME PENALTY OF
DEATH.
Accused is ordered to pay the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS as civil indemnity; FIFTY
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) pesos as moral damages and
exemplary damages of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS to
the heirs of the victim.19
Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 24 August 2007, the
appellate court promulgated its Decision affirming with modifications
the RTC Decision. It held that the death penalty imposed by the RTC on
appellant should be reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to Section
2(a) of Republic Act No. 9346 with appellant not eligible for parole
under the said law. It also ruled that although the heirs of AAA were not
entitled to actual damages because they did not present proof thereof,
such as receipts for funeral and burial expenses, they were, nonetheless,
entitled to temperate damages in the amount ofP25,000.00, since it was
reasonable to expect that the heirs of AAA incurred funeral and burial
Prof. Avena
Page 61 of 107
Apropos the first issue, appellant maintains that his testimony pointing
to Monsanto as the one who raped and killed AAA is more credible than
the testimony of Cabague.24
In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses, this
Court is guided by the following well-settled principles: (1) the
reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the lower court, unless
there is a showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that may affect the
result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality, as it had the
opportunity to examine their demeanor when they testified on the
witness stand; and (3) a witness who testifies in a clear, positive and
convincing manner is a credible witness.25
We have gone over the testimony of Cabague and found no cogent
reason to overturn the RTC's ruling finding Cabague's testimony
credible. Cabague testified in a clear and truthful manner that he saw
appellant and AAA inside his house on the day and time of the incident.
Appellant then was putting on his shorts while AAA was slumped
motionless on the floor near appellant. Appellant approached him and
pointed a knife at him. Appellant warned him not to tell anyone of what
he saw or he would kill him, his wife and his relatives. Terrified, Cabague
and his wife immediately left their house and proceeded to his brother's
house where they spent the whole night.26
BBB and Dr. Galindez corroborated the testimony of Cabague on its
relevant points.
Further, the above-mentioned testimonies are consistent with the
documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution. The RTC and the
Court of Appeals found the testimonies of Cabague, BBB and Dr. Galindez
to be consistent and honest. Both courts did not find any ill motive on
the part of the prosecution witnesses.
Prof. Avena
Page 62 of 107
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Page 63 of 107
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Footnotes
Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico with Associate
Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Arturo G. Tayag, concurring;
rollo, pp. 2-10.
Page 64 of 107
Records, p. 1.
Records, p. 1.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 10-13.
10
11
Records, p. 26.
12
13
Id. at 6-7.
14
Records, p. 13.
15
Id. at 14.
Prof. Avena
Page 65 of 107
16
Id. at 26.
32
CA rollo, p. 44.
17
33
Id. at 46.
18
34
19
CA rollo, p. 24.
20
Rollo, p. 9.
35
21
Id.
22
23
24
37
38
39
40
26
27
28
29
42
43
Id. at 3.
TSN, 12 August 2004, p. 4; TSN, 13 January 2005, p. 4.
Article 2230, New Civil Code: In criminal offenses, exemplary
damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from
fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
44
30
Id. at 5.
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Page 66 of 107
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Page 67 of 107
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At roughly 3:30 p.m. of the same day, Vickys sister BBB saw Soriano,
whom she later similarly recalled was in yellow t-shirt and pants, pass
by her house as he walked to the direction of Wao. It was also around the
same time that she was expecting her eight-year-old daughter, AAA, to
take the same shortcut on her way home from harvesting palay.9
Thereafter, at approximately 6:00 p.m., BBB asked for help in looking for
AAA. The other residents assisted in the search, which lasted until
midnight and turned out to be unsuccessful.10
On 1 January 1999, about 8:00 a.m., Tomas Bearneza (Tomas), the
husband of Vicky, found the lifeless body of AAA in a canal along the
shortcut. The victim was naked except for her shorts, which loosely hung
below her knees. Her face and breast revealed bite marks.11
The health physician of the Wao District Hospital, Dr. Calico Haji Ali (Dr.
Ali), examined the body of AAA. He observed the presence of human bite
marks on the right side of her face and on her left breast.12 According to
his examination, she was raped and her death was caused by
drowning.13
According to the mayor of Wao, Elvino C. Balicao (Mayor Balicao),
Soriano confessed to being under the influence of alcohol when the latter
killed AAA, but denied having raped her.14
On 2 January 1999, the Chief Investigator of Wao, Senior Police Officer 4
Edwin B. Bacerra, Sr. (SPO4 Bacerra), questioned Soriano. Because there
were no lawyers available and Soriano claimed to be a minor, a
representative from the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), Mercedes Oyangoren (Oyangoren), assisted him during the
investigation. He admitted therein that he saw AAA near the canal. She
tried to run away, but he caught up with her. She then started shouting
for help, prompting him to panic and choke her. Thereafter, he removed
her clothes, bit her left breast and threw her into the water. These
Page 68 of 107
statements were reduced into writing and signed by both Soriano and
Oyangoren.15
Facts According to the Defense
Soriano averred that at 8:00 a.m. on 31 December 1998 at Hibayas
house, he and three other men drank Tanduay while they roasted a pig.
By 2:00 p.m., they had transferred to the house of Quinatadcan, where
they had a couple of beers.16 At around 3:30 p.m., Soriano claimed that
he was not quite drunk when he went home using the shortcut to
Wao.17 He was home by 5:00 p.m.18
Some policemen came to his house the following morning. Thinking that
he was being hired to harvest corn, he voluntarily submitted himself to
them. However, he was detained at the police headquarters.19
Soriano claimed that, without informing him of the contents of the
document, SPO4 Bacerra made him sign it in front of Oyangoren. Mayor
Balicao purportedly questioned Soriano inside the formers vehicle,
threatened him that he would be fed to the crocodiles if he would not
confess, and promised to help him if he would admit to having
perpetrated the crime. Allegedly for these reasons, Soriano confessed to
killing AAA.20
Upon the filing of an Information for rape with homicide against Soriano,
the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3200-99 and raffled to the
Regional Trial Court, 10th Judicial Region, Marawi City, Branch 10 (RTC
Br. 10). It later rendered a Decision finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the
death penalty.21 He was likewise ordered to pay the heirs of AAA in the
amount of P100,000 in civil indemnity and P50,000 in moral damages.22
After the case was elevated for automatic review, the CA affirmed the
ruling of the trial court, but modified the sentence of Soriano to the
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Page 69 of 107
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Page 70 of 107
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only probable suspect, considering that his garments were not found
anywhere near the scene of the crime, but at his own home.
As a consequence, the circumstances borne out by the records are
severely insufficient to establish the culpability of Soriano as one may
reasonably extrapolate other possible scenarios other than those
pointing to his guilt. The evidence in this case having fallen short of the
standard of moral certainty, any doubt on the guilt of the accused should
be considered in favor of his acquittal. The law enforcers' missteps in the
performance of the investigation and the prosecuting attorney's careless
presentation of the evidence cannot lead to any other conclusion other
than that there are doubts as to the guilt of the accused.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision issued by the CA in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 00474-MIN dated 22 October 2009 finding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. He is ordered to be
immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is being confined for
another lawful cause. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate
implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is -directed to
report to this Court within five (5) days from his receipt of this Decision,
the action he has taken.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice, Chairperson
Page 71 of 107
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Id. at 12-13.
CA rollo, p. 8.
Rollo, p. 5, CA Decision.
Id. at 5-6.
WE CONCUR:
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Prof. Avena
Id. at 6.
24
Id.
25
Id.
Id. at 14-15.
10
Page 72 of 107
Id. at 32-35.
Id.
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
27
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 7.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 7-8.
18
Id. at 8.
19
Id.
29
20
Id.
30
xxxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of
this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
28
22
Id. at 32-33.
23
Id.
CA rollo, p. 30.
32
Rollo, p. 11.
Prof. Avena
Page 73 of 107
reduction of the penalties we imposed upon the latter on the ground that
he was a minor at the time the crimes were committed.
A brief review of the pertinent facts is imperative.
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 138874-75
Prof. Avena
Page 74 of 107
Prof. Avena
Page 75 of 107
xxx
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but
always in the proper period.
Thus, the imposable penalty on James Andrew, by reason of his minority,
is one degree lower than the statutory penalty. The penalty for the
special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape, being death, one degree lower therefrom is reclusion
perpetua.5 On the other hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping and
serious illegal detention is reclusion perpetua to death. One degree lower
therefrom is reclusion temporal.6 There being no aggravating and
mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on James Andrew
is reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve
(12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum.7
Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua should be imposed upon James Andrew; while in Criminal Case
No. CBU-45304, the imposable penalty upon him is twelve (12) years of
prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. Our
Decision dated February 3, 2004 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, James Andrew Uy is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; while in Criminal Case No. CBU45304, the penalty of twelve (12) years ofprision mayor in its maximum
period, as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its
medium period, as maximum.
Prof. Avena
SO ORDERED.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARESSANTIAGO
Associate Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVALGUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Page 76 of 107
Footnotes
Siegel, Senna, Juvenile Deliquency, Theory, Practice and Law,
7th Edition, at 20.
1
Prof. Avena
Page 77 of 107
Prof. Avena
Page 78 of 107
the purchased lot is covered by Tax Declaration No. 2386 and is bounded
by lots owned by the following persons: in the north, by Apolonio
Santos; in the east, by Apolonio Santos and Eleuterio Santiago; in the
south, by Eleuterio Santiago; and in the west, by Apolonio Santos.
Petitioners further allege that the purchased lot is also described in the
year 2000 Tax Declaration/Property Index Number 020-04-006-030103 in the name of Emilia de Guzman, with the following boundaries:
lots 1468 and 1469 in the north; Lots 1303 and 1304 in the south; Lot
1306 in the east; and Lot 1301 in the west.
The property was enclosed within concrete posts and barbed wires
when it was sold to petitioners. From the time of purchase, they
occupied the lot without interruption and devoted it to rice cultivation.
In 1995, they filed before the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) an Application for Free Patent, as well as a Petition
with the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) to rectify the Cadastral Survey of Lot 1306, Cad 332, Bocaue
Cadastre, for the purpose of excluding a portion of their land from Lot
1306-B, which was then being claimed by Pedro Lazaros heirs.
Subsequently, petitioners tenant and hired laborers were prevented
from working on the subject land by Emiliano Parulan (Emiliano), son of
Pablo Parulan (Pablo), whose heirs are named respondents herein.
Petitioners discovered that a 2,171 square meter portion of their land
was included in the 5,677 square meter lot registered under Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. T-048-EP (EP No. 189669)4 issued in the
name of Pablo on 17 December 1999 and registered with the Register of
Deeds on 5 January 2000.
Petitioners referred the matter to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office
(PARO) Legal Officer I of Baliuag, Bulacan, Homer Abraham, Jr. The latter
issued a Report and Recommendation5 dated 26 October 2000 to Miguel
Mendoza, the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of PARO, Baliuag, Bulacan,
recommending the filing by the Magno spouses of a necessary petition
Prof. Avena
Page 79 of 107
Prof. Avena
After the parties filed their respective pleadings with the attached
Affidavits of witnesses and other evidence, the PARAD issued a
Decision21 dated 26 February 2003 granting the Petition. Relying on the
Tax Declarations in the name of Emilia, the PARAD noted that Emilia had
owned a 1.5 ha. riceland in Biang 1st, which she sold to petitioners.
Meanwhile, the Rice and Corn Production Survey and the report of ARPT
Mariano showed that the contested lot was actually being tilled by
Renato de Guzman, the son of Mariano de Guzman, who was the
registered tenant of Emilia. Thus, the PARAD concluded that in the EP
issued in favor of Pablo, there were technical errors that encroached
upon petitioners property. The dispositive portion of the PARAD
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in the
following manner:
1. Ordering the correction and cancellation of OCT No. T-048-EP
in the name of Pablo Parulan;
2. Ordering the correction of the approved subdivision plan of
Lot 1306; Cad. 322, Bocaue, Cadastre Cad-03-012347-AR;
3. Ordering the DAR to conduct the necessary subdivision survey
of Lot 4558 in the presence of both party-claimants to coincide
with the actual and real possession and status of actual claimants
of the two adjacent lots;
4. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Guiginto, Bulacan, to effect
the correction and cancellation of EP No. 048 and register of the
correct EP that will be issued by the DAR covering the corrected
lot.
All other claims and counter claims by the parties are hereby dismissed
for lack of merit.
Page 80 of 107
SO ORDERED.
Private respondents appealed22 the PARAD Decision to the DARAB.
On 22 February 2007, the DARAB issued a Decision23 reversing the
PARAD, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated
February 26, 2003 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
Judgment rendered:
1. DISMISSING the instant petition for correction and/or
cancellation of OCT No. T-048-EP (EP No. 189669) for lack of
merit;
2. DECLARING the lot in question as part and parcel of lot 1306
as surveyed for Pablo Parulan ("Annex I");
3. MAINTAINING and AFFIRMING the validity and integrity of
OCT No. T-048-EP (EP No. 189669) in the name of the late Pablo
Parulan;
4. ORDERING petitioners-appellees to vacate the premises in
question and surrender the possession and cultivation thereof to
herein private respondent heirs of the late Pablo Parulan.
Moreover, petitioners-appellees are likewise ordered to remove
the fence they have constructed on the lot in question at their
own expense.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the
DARAB in its Resolution24 dated 2 July 2007.
Prof. Avena
Page 81 of 107
As correctly held by the DARAB and the CA, petitioners have failed to
adduce substantial evidence to establish that the contested lot was part
of their property.
However, the DARAB and the CA were not swayed by these tax
declarations, and rightly so. As we held in Republic v. dela Paz,33
Well settled is the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when
not supported by any other evidence. The fact that the disputed property
may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the
applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-interest does not
necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of
ownership.
A further examination of the tax declarations further confirms their lack
of probative value.
As observed by the CA, Tax Declaration No. 2386 for the year 1967, like
the 1972 Deed of Sale between petitioners and Emilia, did not contain
any technical description of the property. Hence, these documents fail to
establish ownership over the contested lot by Emilia or petitioners.
Prof. Avena
Page 82 of 107
On the other hand, the Tax Declaration for the year 2000 with Property
Index Number 020-04-006-03-010 showed that petitioners land is
bound on the east by lot 1306. Hence, the DARAB logically concluded
that lot 1306, of which the contested lot is a part of, is outside the
boundaries of petitioners land. Notably too, both the DARAB and the CA
found it curious that the 2000 Tax Declaration was still in the name of
Emilia, considering that petitioners were supposed to have bought the
land from her 27 years ago. If petitioners exercise ownership over the
land since 1972 when they purchased the same, it is they who should
have been paying the realty tax thereon.
Also, we do not lose sight of the fact that the 2000 Tax Declaration was
made only after the subject EP/OCT had already been issued. A mere tax
declaration cannot defeat a certificate of title.34
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
Prof. Avena
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
The assailed Court of Appeals (CA) Fifth Division Decision was
penned by Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by
Justices Jose C. Mendoza (now a Member of this Court) and
Arturo G. Tayag, rollo, pp. 35-45.
Id. at 86-89.
Id. at 109.
10
Id. at 110.
11
Id. at 111.
12
Id. at 112.
13
Id. at 113.
14
Id. at 114.
15
16
Id. at 120-121.
17
Id. at 119.
18
Page 83 of 107
19
Id. at 119.
Id. at 81.
20
Id. at 121.
Id. at 84-85.
21
Id. at 90-91.
Prof. Avena
24
25
See note 1.
26
Rollo, p. 47.
28
29
30
33
34
Page 84 of 107
Prof. Avena
March 6, 2013
Page 85 of 107
coordinate first with her office before depositing any other check. She
also offered to replace Metrobank Check 917604197 with a manager's
check but failed to do so.
In November 2005, Sehwani tried to follow up with San Mateo but she
never returned his call. On November 7, 2005, he deposited Metrobank
Check 917604206 dated July 21, 2005 but San Mateo made a stop
payment order. On November 11, 2005, he received a letter from San
Mateo apologizing for her failure to pay with a promise to communicate
on November 21, 2005. Since San Mateo failed to make payments,
Sehwani deposited the remaining checks which were all dishonored
because the account had been closed. Sehwani attempted to contact San
Mateo but she never responded. He also sent demand letters to her last
known address but she still failed to pay the value of the checks.
On November 23, 2005, Sehwanis counsel sent a demand letter to San
Mateos residence at Greenhills, San Juan but the security guard of the
townhouse complex refused to accept the letter in compliance with San
Mateos order. Thus, the liaison officer left the letter with the security
guard with the instruction to deliver the same to San Mateo. Thereafter,
he sent a copy of the demand letter to San Mateo by registered mail
which was returned to his counsels office with the notation "N/S Party
Out 12/12/05" and that San Mateo did not claim it despite three notices
to her dated December 12, 2005, December 22, 2005, and January 2,
2006, respectively.
On June 5, 2006, San Mateo was charged with 11 counts of violation of
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) 22. During trial, she claimed that she has an
agreement with Sehwani not to deposit her checks unless she gave a go
signal. But Sehwani ignored this agreement and deposited the nine
checks which resulted in the closure of her account.
On August 27, 2009, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Taguig City,
Branch 74 found San Mateo guilty of 10 counts of violation of B.P. 22. She
Prof. Avena
Page 86 of 107
and the RTC that all the elements for violation of B.P. 22 had been
sufficiently proven to convict San Mateo of the said crime.
On May 30, 2012, San Mateo filed a motion for reconsideration. On July
16, 2012, the Court granted the motion and reinstated the petition.
We grant the petition.
It is a settled rule that the remedy of appeal through a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court contemplates
only errors of law and not errors of fact.2 The issues of: (1) whether or
not the subject checks were issued for valuable consideration; and (2)
whether or not the demand letter sent by Sehwani constituted the notice
of dishonor required under B.P. 22, are factual matters that belong to the
proper determination of the MeTC, the RTC and the CA. But when such
courts have overlooked certain facts and circumstances which, if taken
into account, would materially affect the result of the case, this Court
may re-examine their findings of facts.3
To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements
must be present: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to
apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer,
or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment.4
In this case, the third element is present and had been adequately
established. With respect to the first element, the Court gives full faith
and credit to the findings of the lower courts that the checks were issued
for value since San Mateo herself admitted that she drew and issued the
same as payment for the yarns she ordered from ITSP. Besides, the Court
Prof. Avena
Page 87 of 107
It has been the consistent ruling of this Court that receipts for registered
letters including return receipts do not themselves prove receipt; they
must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters,
claimed to be a notice of dishonor.9 To be sure, the presentation of the
registry card with an unauthenticated signature, does not meet the
required proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused received such
notice. It is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of
dishonor was sent to the accused. The prosecution must also prove
actual receipt of said notice, because the fact of service provided for in
the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the
accused.10
In King v. People,11 the complainant sent the accused a demand letter via
registered mail. But the records showed that the accused did not receive
it. The postmaster likewise certified that the letter was returned to
sender. Yet despite the clear import of the postmasters certification, the
prosecution did not adduce proof that the accused received the post
office notice but unjustifiably refused to claim the registered mail. The
Court held that it was possible that the drawee bank sent the accused a
notice of dishonor, but the prosecution did not present evidence that the
bank did send it, or that the accused actually received it. It was also
possible that the accused was trying to flee from the complainant by
staying in different addresses. But speculations and possibilities cannot
take the place of proof. The conviction must rest on proof beyond
reasonable doubt.12
Since there is insufficient proof that San Mateo actually received the
notice of dishonor, the presumption that she knew of the insufficiency of
her funds cannot arise. For this reason, the Court cannot convict her with
moral certainty of violation of B.P. 22.
Nevertheless, San Mateos acquittal does not entail the extinguishment of
her civil liability for the dishonored checks.13 An acquittal based on lack
of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not preclude the award of civil
Prof. Avena
damages.14 For this reason, the trial courts directive for San Mateo to
pay the civil liability in the amount ofP134,275.00 representing the total
value of the 11 checks plus 12% interest per annum from the time the
said sum became due and demandable until fully paid, stands.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition. The assailed Decision
dated August 23, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 33434
finding petitioner Erlinda C. San Mateo guilty of 10 counts of violation of
B.P. 22 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Erlinda C. San Mateo is
hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that her guilt has not been
established beyond reasonable doubt. She is ordered, however, to
indemnify the complainant, ITSP International, Incorporated,
represented by its Vice-President for Operations Ravin A. Sehwani, the
amount of P 134,275.00 representing the total value of the 11 checks
plus 12% interest per annum from the time the said sum became due
and demandable until fully paid.
Page 88 of 107
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court's Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision ad been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Footnotes
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Llenado v. People, G.R. No. 193279, March 14, 2012, 668 SCRA
330, 333.
2
Prof. Avena
Sia v. People, G.R. No. 149695, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 206,
226.
8
Alferez v. People, G.R. No. 182301, January 31, 2011, 641 SCRA
116, 123-124.
10
11
12
Id. at 710.
14
Page 89 of 107
Prof. Avena
Page 90 of 107
Prof. Avena
Page 91 of 107
On January 20, 2014 the Court affirmed the CAs Decision. It held that,
despite a few deviations from the required procedure, the prosecution
sufficiently proved the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items.
Prosecutor Pajarito:
A: Yes Maam.
Q: If this one sachet of shabu be shown to you, the one which you said
sold to you by Sukarno will you recognize it?
Prof. Avena
Page 92 of 107
A: Yes Maam.
A: Yes Maam.
Q: Do you agree?
A: Yes Maam.
A: I can not recall Maam if as poseur buyer for how many times.
xxxx
Atty. Talip:
Q: Mr. witness, regarding the discrepancy, you said there was no buy
bust operation, do you agree to the letter RR-1 could have been written
by anybody else?
A: Yes Maam.
Q: Thats why you mention a while ago, that what you place is RR only?
SPO1 Roca may have truly marked the item of shabu he seized from
accused Sukarno as "RR" which he insisted he did. Someone else,
therefore, replaced the item by another one, now marked as "RR-1."
Indeed, Roca has not ruled out the possibility that the latter marking on
the shabu item presented in court may have been made by someone else.
This leads the Court to conclude that there may have been switching of
evidence in the selling charge. Guilt in that charge has not, therefore,
been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
A: Yes Maam.
xxxx
Prosecutor Pajarito:
Q: Mr. witness on that day November 25, 2004 there was only how many
sachet did you have from your possession?
A: Only one sachet Maam.
Prof. Avena
Page 93 of 107
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I ce1iify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Footnotes
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
People v. Relato, G.R. No. 173794, January 18, 2012, 663 SCRA
260, 270.
2
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Id. at 134.
Id.
Prof. Avena
Page 94 of 107
part of the accused to use the said amount for the renewal of licenses
and permits for all complainants brancheslocated in Manila, but
[Gamboa], once in possession of the said amount, with intent to gain and
abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to her own personal
use and benefit said amount of P78,208.95 as a consequence thereof[,]
complainant paid the total amount ofP85,187.00 for the renewal of the
licenses and permits of its branches in Manila and that [Gamboa] refused
and/or failed and still refuses and/or fails to account or return said
amount despite demand from complainant, to the damage and prejudice
of the latter in the total amount of P163,395.95.3
Upon arraignment on 28 September 2000, Gamboa pleaded not guilty.
At the trial, the prosecution presented four (4) witnesses: (1) Felicidad
Samson (Samson), Operations Head of (private complainant)
Tambunting Finance Services Pawnshop, Inc. (TFS); (2) Knestor Jose Y.
Godino (Godino), the Human Resource Manager of TFS at the time of the
incident in question subject of this criminal case; (3) Estrella Cuyno,
Liaison Officer of TFS; and (4) Liberty Toledo, formerAssistant City
Treasurer Chief of the License & Permit Division of the Cityof Manila,
now the City Treasurer of Manila. The following facts were testified to:
Gamboas job function, as the liaison officer of TFS, included the
processing and securing of the necessary government permits and
licenses of all branches of TFS in Metro Manila. In that regard, Gamboa
received from TFS the money allotment therefor in the total amount of
247,117.25. The money allotment included the sum ofP81,000.00 to
cover the renewal and processing of government licenses and permits of
twelve (12) of TFS branches in the City of Manila.
Gamboas receipt of the amount of P81,000.00 was evidenced by a
Request for Payment dated 18 January 1999 signed by her and approved
by TFS President, a certain Ongsiako. Witness Samson, Operations Head
Prof. Avena
Page 95 of 107
Prof. Avena
Page 96 of 107
Prof. Avena
Page 97 of 107
asserted that the licenses and permits of all the branches of TFS in the
City of Manila had already been paid for as of 20 January 1999.
reckoned from the rendition of the judgment until fully paid (Article
2211, NCC). Costs against [Gamboa].6
At the appeal stage before the Court of Appeals, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) joined Gamboas stance of innocence and prayed for the
reversal and setting aside of the trial courts judgment of conviction. The
OSG filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Appellees Brief arguing the absence
of the element of misappropriation because Gamboa simply followed
instructions when she gave the monies to Lito Jacinto for the renewal of
TFS branches business permits and licenses. Ultimately for the OSG, the
fact that the business licenses and permits were apparently not paid
does not establish misappropriation or conversion by Gamboa of the
monies allotted therefor.
Additionally, on the assumption that she indeed turned over the amount
of P45,587.65 to Jacinto, she failed to establish the fact that she is
authorized to do so by private complainant TFS. This notwithstanding
however, insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned, she is
only to be held accountable of P81,000.00 proven to be received by her.
The amount of P74,690.00 subsequently paid by TFS to the City
Government of Manila for its licenses and permits cannot be charged to
the accused as she did not benefit from this and it is the obligation of TFS
to pay its licenses and permits fees in order to legally operate its
business.
xxxx
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is rendered finding the accused
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Estafa under
paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, sentencing her
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment under an indeterminate sentence
of four (4) years[,] two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccionalas minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as
maximum with all the accessory penalties provided by law. She is
further ordered to pay the private complainant TFS Pawnshop
Incorporated the sum ofP81,000.00 representing the amount
misappropriated by her plus interest at the rate of six (6%) to be
The Court of Appeals agreed with the findings of the RTC. Extensively
delving on Gamboas defense that there was no misappropriation since
she turned over the amount of P45,587.65 and P24,000.00 to Lito Jacinto
as instructed by her superior, the Court of Appeals reviewed the case,
thus:
It likewise bears stressing that prior to the filing of the instant estafa
case, [Gamboa] was requested inseveral instances by TFS, oral and
written, to liquidate the cash advances made by her, but, she failed to do
so.
In [Gamboas] effort to exculpate herself from criminal liability, she
belatedly claimed during her direct examination in court that she gave
the amount of P45,587.65 as payment for the renewal of the business
permits and licenses and P24,000.00 as mobilization fee to one Lito
Jacinto, allegedly an employee of the Office of the City Mayor of Manila
who was assigned at the Mayors Permits and License Division, in order
to expedite the processing thereof. This was allegedly upon the express
instruction of her superior, Estrella Cuyno, that she deal directly with
Lito Jacinto, TFS contact person in Manila City Hall. To prove the actual
Prof. Avena
Page 98 of 107
Neither did the defense present the original or xerox copy of Exhibit "6"
before the court a quo for marking during the pre-trial held on
November 14, 2000. In addition, it was only during the direct
examination of [Gamboa] on July 30, 2002 that she raised for the first
time Exhibit "6" as a defense by passing the blame to oneLito Jacinto. She
never raised the said defense at the earliest opportunetime when she
made a liquidation report of her cash advances. Further, she again failed
to raise the said defense before the Office of the Prosecutor of Makati
City during the preliminary investigation. If indeed she was innocent of
the crime charged, ordinary human behavior dictates that she should
have divulged the said information to her superiors or the investigating
public prosecutor of such fact. Her failure to do so casts serious doubt on
her credibility.
As to [Gamboas] administrative complaint filed before the Office of the
City Mayor against Lito Jacinto, [Gamboa] did not make any follow-up on
the status of the case nor take any further action in connection
therewith. And, as to [Gamboas] criminal complaint for estafa against
Lito Jacinto which was filed before the City Prosecutor of Manila, the
same was dimissed upon [Gamboas] motion to withdraw the same
without prejudice. No further action was likewise taken by [Gamboa] to
pursue her claim against Lito Jacinto.
Thus, the asseveration of the OSG that [Gamboa] should be acquitted
because she was able to prove the fact of receipt of the money by Lito
Jacinto, must necessarily fail.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby
DENIED. The Decision dated May 18, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 145, Makati City in Criminal Case No. 00-526 is AFFIRMED with
modification in that [Gamboa] is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum,
Prof. Avena
Page 99 of 107
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DELIBERATELY IGNORED THE
MANIFESTATION IN LIEU OF APPELLANTS BRIEF OF THE PEOPLES
COUNSEL, THE OSG, WHICH PRAYED FOR [GAMOBAS] ACQUITTAL[.]8
In essence, Gamboa asks for her acquittal since the prosecution did not
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Gamboa, backed by the OSG,
maintains that the element of misappropriation or conversion in the
crime of Estafaunder paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code was not met: she turned over the monies for the processing of the
renewal of TFS business permits and licenses to Lito Jacinto as has been
the practice in the Tambunting Group of Companies.
While the Manifestation in Lieu of Appellees Brief of the OSG did call for
attention, we remain unconvinced.
The pass on arguments of the OSG follows:
Petitioner did not ipso facto commit the crime of estafa through
conversion or misappropriation by delivering the jewelry to a subagent
for sale on commission basis. We are unable to agree with the lower
courts conclusion that this fact alone is sufficient ground for holding
that petitioner disposed of the jewelry "as if it were hers, thereby
committing conversion and clear breach of trust."
It must be pointed out that the law on agency in our jurisdiction allows
the appointment by an agent of a substitute or sub-agent in the absence
of an express agreement to the contrary between the agent and the
principal. In the case at bar, the appointment of Labrador as petitioners
sub-agent was not expressly prohibited by Quilatan, as the
acknowledgement receipt, Exhibit B, does not contain any such
limitation. Neither does it appear that petitioner was verbally forbidden
by Quilatan from passing on the jewelry to another person before the
acknowledgement receipt was executed or at any other time. Thus, it
cannot be said that petitioners act of entrusting the jewelry to Labrador
is characterized by abuse of confidence because such an act was not
proscribed and is, in fact, legally sanctioned.
Prof. Avena
Thus, the next question that must be settled is whether the evidence
upholds [Gamboas] claim of delivery by her to Lito Jacinto of the money
intended to be paid to secure permits and licenses from the City of
Manila, or at least create a reasonable doubt that she misappropriated
the money given to her by TFS.
Notably, in the instant case, [Gamboa] is claiming that not only is she not
prohibited from delivering the amount to Lito Jacinto, but under TFS
practice and as well as by direct orders of her superiors, she is actually
mandated to give such amount to him for the release of TFS business
permits. x x x. Thus, she should not be held liable for Lito Jacintos failure
to remit such amount to the City Government of Manila.
Apart from her testimony, [Gamboa] presented various documentary
evidences. Exhibit "5" x x x, for instance, is a TFS voucher denominated
as Request for Payment, dated January 18, 1999, wherein the company
vice president, Ramon Louis Carlos Tambunting, signed his approval for
the release of 45,587.65 to [Gamboa] for payment of business permits
for TFS branches in Manila. Exhibit "5" contains detailed information as
to the original assessment, the amount compromised and the resulting
amount to be paid for each branch in Manila.
[Gamboa] likewise presented Exhibit "6" x x x, the same Request for
Payment Form as in Exhibit "5" but without the signature of Ramon
Louis Carlos Tambunting. Instead the purported signature of Lito Jacinto
appears therein acknowledging the receipt of P45,526.65 [sic] to be paid
for the release of business permits of TFS.
There seems to be no doubt that TFS deals with contact persons within
the City Government of Manila such as Lito Jacinto to facilitate the
release of its business permits for some consideration which TFS terms
as "Mobilization Fee." Exhibit "27" x x x is a request for payment form
Prof. Avena
Prof. Avena
Contrary to the OSGs assertion, Gamboa was not confused on what she
was being made to account for, as she categorically denied that: (1) she
failed to pay the Mayors permit for different branches; (2) the
documents attesting to the fact that its payment are in her possession;
and (3) some of the permits are only yet to be released.
Again, we refer to the appellate courts solid reasoning:
Neither did the defense present the original or xerox copy of Exhibit "6"
before the court a quo for marking during the pre-trial held on
November 14, 2000. In addition, it was only during the direct
examination of [Gamboa] on July 30, 2002 that she raised for the first
time Exhibit "6" as a defense by passing the blame to one Lito Jacinto.
She never raised the said defense at the earliest opportune time when
she made a liquidation report of her cash advances. Further, she again
failed to raise the said defense before the Office of the Prosecutor of
Makati City during the preliminary investigation. If indeed she was
innocent of the crime charged, ordinary human behavior dictates that
she should have divulged the said information to her superiors or the
investigating public prosecutor of such fact. Her failure to do so casts
serious doubt on her credibility.16
The lack of certainty in the amount demanded by TFS merely puts into
question the actual amount that was misappropriated and the damage
on TFS, but not the fact of Gamboas misappropriation. However, we still
find, as the lower courts did, that the amount of P81,000.00 was
sufficiently established by the prosecution through the positive
testimony of Samson backed by documentary evidence:
ATTY. MARCELO
xxxx
A. All the cash that have to be disbursed comes from me [sic].
Prof. Avena
A. All the expenses in the office like the transportation of the messenger
and all the needs in the office I was the one who prepared the payments.
A. This refers to her cash advances intended for the permits and licenses
for the Manila branches.
Q. This Request for Payment Form has been approved by the authorized
signatory, were you able to give that amount to her as requested?
A. Yes, Maam.
A. Yes, Maam.
Q. How?
A. I have my own notebook for the Petty Cash.
Q. What proof do you have that you were able to give Jean Gamboa this
amount?
A. Yes, Maam.
A. For every transaction that she has[,] she will consult me.
xxxx
A. If ever she needs money to pay the permits and licenses[,] she has to
go to me to get for the cash advances.
xxxx
INTERPRETER
Witness is handling a notebook with a caption school notes.
ATTY. MARCELO
Q. You have handed to me a notebook, where in particular is this entry
for P81,000.00?
A. This is the one, Maam.
INTERPRETER
ATTY. MARCELO
Witness is pointing to the entry P81,000.00 after which the name Jean
Gamboa, her signature and the date January 19, 1999.
Prof. Avena
Q. Mrs. Witness, in the answer of the accused in her Counter Affidavit she
stated that she already liquidated that. In fact, that appears also in your
notebook this liquidation, what can you say about that?
A. Because the receipts which she submitted according to the City
Treasurers of Manila were not valid, these are assessment only.17
Prof. Avena
Accordingly, this Court finds it proper to impose the penalty of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.1wphi1
The court a quo likewise correctly awarded by way of civil indemnity the
sum of P81,000.00 plus interest at the rate of six percent (6%) to be
reckoned from the rendition of the judgment until fully paid in view of
existing jurisprudence in that the quantification of the amount
misappropriated was only reasonably ascertained during the trial of the
instant case.20
The minimum penalty imposed by the appellate court is within the
maximum term of six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21)
days to eight (8) years of prision mayor and the maximum penalty
imposed resulted in a total of five (5) years, an additional one (1) year
for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of the P22,000.00, for a total of
thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal.
We note that the appellate courts award of civil indemnity plus interest
at the rate of six percent (6%) reckoned from the rendition of judgment
until fully paid remains correct with the advent of Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas Circular No. 79921 pegging the rate of interest allowed in
judgments back to six percent (6%).
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. CR. No. 30354 dated 30 January 2009 is AFFIRMED.
Petitioner Jean D. Gamboa is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal,
as maximum.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Prof. Avena
11
12
13
14
Id. at 394.
15
Id. at 84.
16
Id. at 75.
17
Id. at 77-78.
18
Id. at 87-88.
19
Id. at 81.
20
Id. at 80-81.
21
Footnotes
* Per Raffle dated 7 April 2014.
Penned by Presiding Judge Cesar D. Santamaria. Rollo, pp. 8288.
1
Id. at 60.
Id. at 86-88.
Id. at 72-81.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 383-389.
Prof. Avena
http://www.bsp.gov.ph/downloads/regulations/attach
ments/2013/c799.pdf last visited 21 March 2014.