MENDOZA vs.

ARRIETA
FACTS: A three-way vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao, Bulacan, involving a
Mercedez Benz owned and driven by petitioner; a private jeep owned and driven by respondent Salazar and a
gravel and sand truck owned by respondent Timbol and driven by Montoya. As a consequence of this
mishap, two separate information for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against
Salazar and Montoya. The case against truck driver Montoya was for causing damage to the jeep owned by
Salazar by hitting at the right rear portion thereby causing the jeep to hit and bump an oncoming car, which
happened to be petitioners Mercedes Benz. The case against Salazar was for causing damage to the Mercedes
Benz.
The CFI of Bulacan rendered a judgment finding Montoya guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
damage to property through reckless imprudence and acquitting Salazar from the offense charged against
him. Mendoza was not awarded damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only
against Salazar.
After the termination of the criminal cases, petitioner filed a civil case with the CFI of Manila against Salazar
and Timbol who were joined as defendants for identification for the damages sustained by his car as a result
of the collision involving their vehicles. Timbol filed a motion to Dismiss this case on the grounds that the
Complaint is barred by a prior judgment in the criminal cases and that it fails to state a cause of action.
Respondent judge then dismissed the Complaint.
Petitioner sought before the SC the review of this dismissal.
ISSUE: WON petitioner Mendoza may still file a separate civil action against Timbol and Salazar.
RULING: Petitioner Mendoza may file separate civil action only against Timbol. The respondent judge erred
in dismissing the case against Timbol on the ground that it is barred by prior judgment in the criminal cases
and that it fails to state a cause of action. Well settled it the rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar
to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur:
1. It must be a final judgment
2. It must have been rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
over the parties
3. It must be a judgment on the merits
4. There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, identity of
subject matter and identity of cause of action.
It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata are present. However, there is no identity of cause
of action between the previous criminal case and this present civil case. In the criminal case, truck-driver
Montoya was not prosecuted for damage to petitioners car but for damage to the jeep and neither was the
petitioner a party in the said case. The petitioners cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on
quasi-delict is evident from the recitals in the complaint.
With regard to the case against Salazar, who was acquitted in the criminal case, presents a different picture
altogether. Clear is the trial courts pronouncement that under the facts of the case, Salazar cannot be held
liable for damages sustained by petitioners car. In other words, the fact from which the civil might arise did
not exist. Inasmuch as petitioners cause of action as against Salazar is ex-delictu, founded on Article 100 of

the Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be held to have been extinguished in consonance with Section
3(c) Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.

MERCED vs. DIEZ

FACTS: This is a petition for a writ of certiorari with prohibition to prohibit the judge presiding the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental from proceeding further in the Criminal Case involving Abundio Merced
as the defendant until after final termination of the civil case for the annulment of the marriage of petitioner
Merced with Elizabeth Ceasar.
Complainant alleged that Elizabeth and her relatives forced, threatened and intimidated him to sign an
affidavit that he and Elizabeth had been living together as husband and wife for over five years, which is not
true. This affidavit was used by the defendant in securing their marriage of exceptional character without the
need for marriage license. He was also forced by defendants relatives into entering the marriage with her on
21 August 1957 before the Municipal Judge and immediately after the celebration of the marriage, plaintiff
left defendant and never lived with her. Merced prays for annulment of the marriage and for moral damages.
In her answer, Elizabeth denied petitioners allegations and her defense was that neither she nor her relatives
know of plaintiffs previous marriage to Eufrocina Tan. Elizabeth then filed a criminal complaint for bigamy
against plaintiff.
Merced filed a motion to hold trial of said criminal case on the ground that the civil action involves facts
which if proved will determine his innocence. The court first granted it but later on upon motion for
reconsideration, this order was set aside.
ISSUE: WON an action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question in a prosecution for bigamy.
RULING: Yes. Prejudicial question has been defined to be that which arises in a case, the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. In order that a person may be held guilty of the said crime for bigamy, the second and
subsequent marriage must have all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsistence of
the first marriage.
The question of the validity of the second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial question because determination
of the validity of the second marriage is determinable in the civil action and must precede the criminal action
for bigamy. In order that petitioner be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the marriage which she contracted
for the second time with Elizabeth Ceasar, must first be declared valid. But its validity has been questioned in
the civil action. The first civil action must first be decided before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed.
Prohibition is granted.
LANDICHO vs. RELOVA
FACTS: It was alleged in the information that petitioner being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay,
which marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contract
a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia. Lourdes Pasia filed before the CFI of Batangas an action seeking to
declare her marriage to the petitioner as null and void ab initio because of alleged use of force, threats,
intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and because of it bigamous character. Petitioner as defendant in

said case, filed a third-party complaint, against the third-party Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that
his marriage with the said third-party defendant be declared null and void on the ground that by means of
threats, force and intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract arriage with her before the Justice
of Peace of Makati, Rizal.
Petitioner moved to suspend the hearing of the bigamy case pending the decision on the question of the
validity of the two marriages involved in the pending civil suit. Respondent judge denied this motion for lack
of merit.
ISSUE: WON there is a prejudicial question in this case.
RULING: There is none. The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages into by the accused in a
bigamy case does not mean that prejudicial questions are automatically raised in said civil actions as to
warrant the suspension of the criminal case for bigamy. Even on the assumption that the first marriage was
null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the
criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must
be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can
it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. In
this case, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable.
Petition for certiorari is denied.

DONATO vs. LUNA

FACTS: The City Fiscal of Manila acting through Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor filed an
information for bigamy against petitioner Donato with the CFI of Manila. This information was based on the
complaint of private respondent Paz Abayan.
Before petitioners arraignment, private respondent filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila a civil action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner based on the ground that
private respondent consented to entering into the marriage, which was petitioner Donatos second one, since
she had no previous knowledge that petitioner was already married to a certain Rosalinda Magluping.
Donatos answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since it
was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were
employed by private respondent to obtain petitioners consent to the marriage. However, prior to the
solemnization of the second marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived together and deported
themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of the wedlock for a period of at least five years for
which reason the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code.
Petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the said case contending that the civil case seeking
annulment of his second marriage filed by private respondent raises a prejudicial question which must first be
determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed.
ISSUE: WON the civil case filed by private respondent seeking the annulment of petitioners second
marriage raises a prejudicial question.

RULING: No. The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the bar. It must be noted that the
issue before the Juvenile and domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is
not determinative of petitioner Donatos guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy.
Petitioners argument that the second marriage should have been declared null and void on the ground of
force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed against him by private respondent only sometime later
when he was required to answer the civil action for annulment of the second marriage. Petitioner has not
even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second marriage had been obtained by the use of threats,
force, and intimidation.
Petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of marriage can
be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the
petitioners consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence and intimidation in order to
establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the
basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar.
Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal
case.
QUIMIGUING vs. ICAO
FACTS: Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her
complaint it was averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential
relations; that defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several
times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts
and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00
per month, damages and attorney's fees.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not
allege that the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion
and dismissed the complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had
later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was
allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly
to SC.
ISSUE: WON the trial court judge erred in dismissing the case for lack of cause of action since child is not
yet born.
RULING: Yes. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its
own for all purposes favourable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee
(whose paternity is deedmed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is just
a conceived child, even if as yet unborn may receive donations as prescribed by Art 742 of the same code,
and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the
institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the testator (Article
854 of the Civil Code).