Professional Documents
Culture Documents
FACTS:
A complaint was filed by Emily Rose Go Ko Lim Chao against Municipality
of Hagonoy, Bulacan and chief executive Ople for the collection of sum of
money and damages. It was alleged that sometime in the middle of the
year 2000, Lim Chao doing business as KD Surplus, engaged in buying and
selling surplus trucks, heavy equipment, machinery, spare parts and
related supplies. She was contacted by Ople and they entered into an
agreement with the municipality for the delivery of motor vehicles,
which supposedly were needed to carry out certain developmental
undertakings in Hagonoy. Lim Chao claimed that because of Oples
earnest representation that funds had already been allocated for the
project, she agreed to deliver 21 motor vehicles whose value totaled
P5,820,000.00.
To prove this, she attached to the complaint copies of the bills of
showing that the items were consigned, delivered to and received by
petitioner municipality on different dates. However, despite having
made several deliveries, Ople allegedly did not heed respondents claim
for payment. Thus, she filed a complaint for the full payment of the said
amount with interest and damages and prayed for the issuance of
preliminary attachment against the municipality. The trial court issued a
writ of preliminary attachment directing the sheriff to "attach the estate,
real and personal properties" of the municipality.
The municipality filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the claim
on which the action had been brought was unenforceable under the
statute of frauds, pointing out that there was no written contract or
document that would evince the supposed agreement that they entered
into with the respondent. It also filed a motion to dissolve and discharge
the writ of preliminary attachment already issued, invoking, among
others, immunity of the state from suit. The municipality argued that as
a municipal corporation, it is immune from suit and it's properties are by
law exempt from execution and garnishment. Lim Chao on her part
counters that the municipality's claim of immunity from suit is negated
by the local government code which vests municipal corporations with
the power to sue and be sued. CA affirmed the trial court's orders.
ISSUE:
WON the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment against the
municipality of Hagonoy is valid.
HELD:
No. The universal rule is that when the state gives its consent to be sued
by private parties either by general or special laws, it may limit
claimant's action only up to the completion of the proceedings anterior
to the stage of execution and that the power of the courts ends when the
judgment is rendered. Municipality is immune from suit notwithstanding
the charter says it can sue and be sued. Since the government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to
satisfy judgments, it should be based on obvious considerations of public
policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriations as required by law.
FACTS:
In 1961, the Congress passed R.A. 3046, following the framing of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I), codifying
the sovereign rights of the state over their territorial sea. However, the
breadth of which was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during
UNCLOS II in 1960 were also futile.
In March 2009, the Congress amended R.A. 3046 by enacting R.A. 9522,
aiming to be compliant with UNCLOS III in 1984, which prescribes the
water-land ratio, length, and contour of the baselines of archipelagic
states like the Philippines. RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized
the location of some basepoints around the archipelago, and classified
the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and Scarborough Shoal as regimes of
islands generating their own applicable maritime zones.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
3.
HELD:
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their
respective capacities as "citizens, taxpayers or legislators," assail the
constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely:
(1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the
reach of the Philippine state's sovereign power, in violation of Article
1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of
1.
2.
3.
FACTS:
This court, however, holds that UNCLOS III has nothing to do with
the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty
regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones,
contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelves
Rafael Castillo. The governor and the haciendero Yigo, who appear
To
turn
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in
our
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just
The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann,
admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and deportation,
and prayed that the writ should not be granted because the
petitioners were not proper parties, because the action should
have been begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao,
Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did not
have any of the women under their custody or control, and because
their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city
of Manila.
women and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court
within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100).
RATIO:
1.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
HELD:
The petition was granted. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of
court for not following the order of the court to produce the body of the
On the second issue, the court believed that the true principle
should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the
court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and
thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be
compelled to do so. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and
exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left
untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to
set the individual at liberty.
In other words, If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under
no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of
Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same
means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents,
within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a
fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile
and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person
who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The
great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
ISSUE:
Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in
worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from
integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and
privatized?
RULING:
The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the
Philippine Senate of the Presidents ratification of the Agreement
establishing the WTO.
NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from
FACTS:
Petitioners Senators Taada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the
concurrence by the Philippine Senate of the Presidents ratification of
the international Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization
(WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of
the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to
qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods. Further, they contended
that the national treatment and parity provisions of the WTO
Agreement place nationals and products of member countries on the
same footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the
That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to
whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade
liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people
should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO
Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political
desire of a member.
IBP vs ZAMORA
Declaration of Principles and State Policies, civilian supremacy over
military
FACTS:
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on
constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the Marines) to
join the Philippine National Police (the PNP) in visibility patrols around
IBP filed a petition to annul the LOI and declare the deployment of the
Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
1. WON the President's factual determination of the necessity of
calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.
2. WON the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
violate the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the
military. *
*mao ni ang important issue
the metro.
HELD:
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metropolitan Manila,
President Estrada, in verbal directive, ordered PNP and the marines to
conduct joint visibility patrols for crime prevention and suppression.
Secretary of National Defense, Chief of Staff of AFP and Chief of PNP and
Secretary of Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute said
order.
The joint patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, was placed under the
leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila. Letter if Instruction was
formulated through Chief Police Superintendent Aglipay. LOI detailed the
patrol's concepts, purpose and mission.
IBP anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of
law and constitution, but they asserted no other basis in its support of its
locus standi (legal standing). Their invocation is solely on their duty to
preserve the rule of law. It is not sufficient to clothe its standing and it is
just a general interest which is shared by other groups.
The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, to wit:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can
exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate
case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at
the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis
mota of the case.
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary
power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court
may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there
is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of
the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places
the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare
martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply
lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and
review without any qualification.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full
discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed
forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents
ISSUE:
OPOSA vs. FACTORAN (1993)
Declaration of Principles and State Policies
FACTS:
This is a class suit filed by 44 minors, through their parents, claiming that
they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn"
against the Secretary of the DENR. The petition bears upon the right of
Did the children have the legal standing to file the case?
HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children
had the legal standing to file the case based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility. Their right to a healthy environment
also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared national policy of the
"new restored democracy" and the people's will as expressed in the 1987
Constitution. The decree is said to have a "gambling objective" and there
is contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII
and Section 3 (2) of Article XIV, of the present Constitution.
franchise under P.D. 1067 B also dated January 1, 1977 "to establish,
and State Policies of the Constitution and not under the Bill of Rights, it
does not follow that it is less important than any of the rights
enumerated in the latter:
[it] concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation,
the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments
and constitutions.
The right is linked to the constitutional right to health, is fundamental,
constitutionalised, self-executing and judicially enforceable. It
imposes the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner Basco
being also the Chairman of the Committee on Laws of the City Council of
Manila), can question and seek the annulment of PD 1869 on the alleged
grounds mentioned above.
The court stated that the petitioners were able to file a class suit both
HELD:
FACTS:
Petitioners, Atty. Humberto Basco, seek to annul the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter PD 1869,
because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order. They
FACTS:
Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
President on December 17, 2003. Respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioners Certificate of
Candidacy in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. COMELEC
declared Pamatong and 35 others nuisance candidates who could not
wage a nationwide campaign. Petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions
which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to equal access to
opportunities for public service under Section 26, Article 2 of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
WON the constitutional provision ensuring equal access to opportunities
for public service grants a constitutional right to run or hold public
office.
HELD:
No. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. Also, the equal access provision is a subsumed part of
Article 2 of the Constitution. The provisions under the Article are
generally considered not self executing.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public
office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically
on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code on Nuisance Candidates and outlined instances
wherein the COMELEC may motu proporio refuse to give due course to or
cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.
HELD:
NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the
standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on
real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually
involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is
not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs.
Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law
of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON
CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed
upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question
in any future action between the same parties involving a different cause
of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when
substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding
involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form
separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is
free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of
the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous
decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing.
STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional
question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the
petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.
Category B
Category C
US$7,500,000.00 or more
Category
D
On October 11, 2000, Espina, together with the other members of the
House of Representatives, filed a petition assailing the constitutionality
of R.A. 8762 on the following grounds:
a)
FACTS:
On March 7, 2000, President Joseph Estrada signed into law R.A. 8762,
or the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000, expressly repealing R.A.
1180 which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in the
retail business in the Philippines. The new law, however, now allows
them to do so under the following categories:
Category A
b)
c)
d)
e)
b)
c)
d)
fact that they are members of Congress since they made no claim
that the law infringes on their right as legislators.
The petition does not involve any justiciable controversy.
Petitioners claim that, as members of Congress, they represent
the small retail vendors in their respective districts but the
petition does not allege that the subject law violates the rights of
those vendors.
Petitioners could not specify how the new law violates the
constitutional provisions they cite. Sections 9, 19, and 20 of
Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing provisions that
are judicially demandable.
The Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition
of foreign investments.
ISSUES:
1. WON petitioner lawmakers have the legal standing to challenge the
constitutionality of R.A. 8762; and
2. WON R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional.
HELD:
1. The long settled rule is that he who challenges the validity of a law
must have locus standi or a legal standing to do so. More particularly,
he must show that he has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the law he
complains of.
Here, there is no clear premise showing that the implementation of
the Retail Trade Liberalization Act prejudices petitioners or inflicts
damages on them, either as taxpayers or as legislators.
FACTS:
The respondent, Chule Y. Lim, is an illegitimate daughter of a Chinese
father and a Filipina mother, who never got married due to a prior
subsisting marriage of her father. The respondent petitioned that there
were few mistakes as to her citizenship and identity, to wit:
1. That her surname Yu was misspelled as Yo. She has been using
Yu in all of her school records and in her marriage certificate.
2. That her fathers name in her birth record was written as Yo Diu To
(Co Tian) when it should have been Yu Dio To (Co Tian).
3. That her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have
been Filipino considering that her father and mother got married.
4. That she was entered as a legitimate child on her birth certificate
when in fact, it should have been illegitimate. Both the trial court
and Court of Appeals granted the respondents petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the correction of
the citizenship of respondent Chule Y. Lim from Chinese to
Filipino despite the fact that respondent never demonstrated any
compliance with the legal requirements for election of citizenship.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in allowing respondent to
continue using her fathers surname despite its finding that
respondent is an illegitimate child.
HELD:
1.
No. The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the
constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority as mandated in Article IV, Section 1(3)
of the 1935 Constitution and Section 1 of the Commonwealth Act
No. 625. The Supreme Court held that the two above provisions only
apply to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of the
respondent, who was an illegitimate child, considering that her
parents never got married. By being an illegitimate child of a
Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon
birth, and as such, there was no more need for her to validly elect
Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Also, she
registered as a voter inside the country when she reached 18 years
old. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in
2.
FACTS:
Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.
(FPJ) filed his certificate of candidacy on 31 December 2003 for the
residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence
before death. Considering that the allegations of petitioners are not
substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have been benefited
from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in
stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
HELD:
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the claim of the respondent of his Filipino Nationality is
valid.
HELD:
To support his contention that respondent Florencio Mallare is not a
Filipino, the Commissioner of Immigration presented: Respondent and his
brothers and sisters had failed to establish their claim to Philippine
citizenship; the death certificate of Esteban Mallare dated June 7, 1945,
wherein he was reported to be of Chinese nationality; the birth
certificates of respondent, his brothers and sisters stating that their
father was a Chinese citizen, born in Amoy, China, and wherein
respondent was reported to be a Chinese, born in Macalelon, Quezon;
respondent's alien certificate of registration, dated August 25, 1950.
Upon the other hand, respondent submitted the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Quezon in Civil Case No. 329-G, dated November 18,
1959, upholding the validity of a contract of sale, an order by the Acting
Commissioner of Immigration, canceling respondent's alien certificate of
registration on the strength of the court's decision in Civil Case No. 329G; identification certificate No. 11712 issued by the Bureau of
Immigration, declaring respondent "as a citizen of the Philippines by
birth being the legitimate son of Esteban Mallare, a Filipino citizen as
'per order of this office dated 8 June 1960 CEBNO 4223-R'"; final order of
the Court of First Instance of Quezon, dated November 28, 1960, in
Special Proceedings No. 3925, ordering the Municipal Treasurer of
Macalelon, Quezon, to correct the entry in the Registry of Birth book of
the municipality by changing respondent's nationality from "Chinese" to
"Filipino"; respondent's affidavit dated October 7, 1961 showing him to
be a registered voter of Macalelon, Quezon; respondent's passport issued
on March 5, 1962, showing that he is a citizen of the Philippines; opinion
of the Solicitor General, dated July 25, 1962, recognizing respondent