8:14-cv-02421 #11

Case 8:14-cv-02421-MSS-AEP Document 11 Filed 12/03/14 Page 1 of 6 PageID 39
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Tampa Division
UNITED STATES EQUAL

EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v.
LAKELAND EYE CLINIC, P.A.,
Defendant
CASE NO. 8:14-cv-2421-T35 AEP
UNOPPOSED MOTION OF BRANDI BRANSON TO

INTERVENE AS OF RIGHT AND JOIN CLAIMS AS PLAINTIFF
Brandi Branson (Plaintiff/Intervenor), by her undersigned counsel, moves pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) to intervene in this matter as plaintiff and moves pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 18 to join state law claims which form the same case or controversy, and state as
grounds thereof:
1. Plaintiff/Intervenor makes this Motion to Intervene pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)
which provides that [o]n a timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene
who: (1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute.
Plaintiff/Intervenor is granted an unconditional right to intervene in this action by
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f).
2. Plaintiff/Intervenor also moves under Fed. R. Civ. P. 18 to join her state law claims
arising out of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution.
3. Plaintiff/Intervenor was previously employed by Defendant.
4. Plaintiff/Intervenor was terminated by Defendant, and thereafter timely filed a Charge
of Discrimination with the EEOC alleging that she was discriminated against in
violation of Title VII and other federal and state statutes.
5. After conducting an investigation, the EEOC determined that Defendant had
discriminated against Plaintiff/Intervenor in violation of Title VII and other federal
statutes.
6. The EEOC initiated this action against Defendant under the enforcement authority
granted it by Title VII to remedy what it had concluded were the illegal
discriminatory acts of Defendant against Plaintiff/Intervenor.
7. As an aggrieved party, Plaintiff/Intervenor has a statutory right to intervene in this
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1) ([t]he person or persons aggrieved shall
have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the Commission.).
8. Under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Plaintiff/Intervenor has the right to
challenge
Defendants
discriminatory
conduct
under
state
employment
nondiscrimination laws which mirror Title VII. Wright v. Sanderstein Investments,

LLC, 914 F.Supp.2d 1273, 1286 (N.D. Fla. 2012) citing Woodham v. Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 929 So.2d 891, 894 (Fla. 2002).
9. Though the EEOC has enforcement authority granted to it by Title VII, these powers
are limited to enforcement of federal laws. This means that without joinder of
Plaintiff/Intervenors state law claims to this action she would have to pursue a
judicial proceeding in state court that would focus on the same common nucleus of
operative fact that Plaintiff/Intervenor would ordinarily expect to be tried in the same
judicial proceeding as enforcement of her rights under the Title VII action brought by
the EEOC.
10. Under Fed. R. Civ. P 24(a) a party has a right to intervene if the applicant has a
claim or interest in the case. Rule 24 reads in pertinent part:
[u]pon timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who: (1)
is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or (2)
claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject
of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its
interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
11. Intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2) must be granted when four
requirements are met: (1) the application to intervene is timely; (2) the applicant
has an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the
action; (3) the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action, as a
practical matter, may impede or impair his ability to protect that interest; and (4)
the applicant's interest will not be represented adequately by the existing parties to
the suit. Fox v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 519 F.3d 1298, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 2008);
Sierra Club, Inc. v. Leavitt, 488 F.3d 904, 910 (11th Cir. 2007); EEOC v. Dimare
Ruskin, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136846, *5-*9 (M.D. Fla. 2011)
12. This motion is timely made. No Scheduling Order has entered, no scheduling
conference has been held, nor any discovery conducted. There is no prejudice to
Defendant. Plaintiff/Intervenor would be prejudiced if this application were denied, as
a result of her inability to bring suit upon common questions of law and fact and the
duplication of effort neccesary as a result.
13. Brandi Branson has an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the
subject of the action, as she is named in the EEOC complaint and identified as an
aggrieved party to the litigation.
14. Ms. Bransons interests will not be adequately represented by existing parties, as Ms.
Branson has other viable causes of action which will not be heard because not set
forth in the Complaint filed by the EEOC.
15. Pursuant to Rule 24 and Rule 18, a copy of Plaintiff/Intervenors proposed Complaint
In Intervention is being filed herewith.
WHEREFORE, Brandi Branson respectfully requests entry of an Order granting her
leave to intervene and join state law claims in this matter as Plaintiff/Intervenor and
acceptance of her Complaint in Intervention as filed as of the date of the Courts Order.
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of December 2014.
RULE 3.01(g) CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Rule 3.01(g), Local Rules, United States District Court, Middle
District of Florida, the undersigned has conferred with counsel for the Defendant and is
authorized to represent that the Defendant does not oppose the entry of an order granting
this motion.
Dated: December 3, 2014

Respectfully submitted,
s/ J. Kemp Brinson
J.Kemp Brinson
Fla. Bar No. 752541
The Brinson Firm kbrinson@brinsonfirm.com
P.O. Box 582
Winter Haven, FL 33882
Phone: 863-288-0234
Fax: 863-508-7684
Attorney for Plaintiff/Intervenor
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on December 3, 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing with the
Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system, which will automatically serve all
counsel of record.
s/ J. Kemp Brinson
J. Kemp Brinson Fla. Bar No. 752541
P.O. Box 582
Phone: 863-288-0234
Fax: 863-508-7684
Case 8:14-cv-02421-MSS-AEP Document 11-1 Filed 12/03/14 Page 1 of 20 PageID 45
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Tampa Division
UNITED STATES EQUAL

EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v.
LAKELAND EYE CLINIC, P.A.,
CASE NO. 8:14-cv-2421-T35 AEP
Defendant.
BRANDI BRANSONS
COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.,
Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 1981a et seq., and the Florida Civil
Rights Act of 1992, Fla. Stat. 760.01 et seq., to correct unlawful employment practices
on the basis of sex and to provide appropriate relief to Brandi Branson (Ms. Branson or
Plaintiff/Intervenor) who was adversely affected by such practices. As alleged with
greater particularity below, Defendant Lakeland Eye Clinic, P.A. (Lakeland Clinic or
Defendant) terminated Ms. Branson, a transgender woman, because of sex.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331 because the
action is based on Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq., a federal statute, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. 1337 because the action is based on a federal statute regulating
commerce, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1343 because the action is based on
deprivation of the Plaintiff/Intervenors right under color of state law as against a
federal law providing for equal rights
2. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367 because the
Florida Civil Rights Act claims form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution.
3. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the unlawful
employment practices are alleged to have been committed in Lakeland, Polk County,
Florida, located within the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida.
4. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida is the proper forum
in which to litigate the claims of Plaintiff/Intervenor because Defendant has a
physical presence in Lakeland, Polk County, Florida, and Ms. Branson has performed
all relevant work for Lakeland Clinic at that location.
PARTIES
5. Plaintiff the Equal Employment and Opportunity Commission (EEOC or
Plaintiff) is the agency of the United States of America charged with the
administration, interpretation, and enforcement of Title VII, and is expressly
authorized to bring this action by Section 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
2000e-5(f)(1) and (3).
6. Plaintiff/Intervenor is a citizen of the State of Florida and is a real party in interest.
Specifically, Plaintiff/Intervenor is the person who suffered the discrimination that is
the basis of the EEOCs lawsuit against Defendant Lakeland Clinic.
7. At all relevant times to this lawsuit, Defendant Lakeland Clinic has continuously been
a Florida professional corporation doing business in the State of Florida and the City
of Lakeland, and has continuously had at least 15 employees.
8. At all relevant times to this lawsuit, Defendant Lakeland Clinic has continuously been
an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of
Sections 701(b), (g), and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b), (g), and (h).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
9. Defendant employs seven physicians who perform refractive, corneal, and cataract
surgery and treat retinal diseases. It is owned by Dr. Kevin Dorsett, an
ophthalmologist.
10. In or about early 2010, Defendant decided to add a hearing division to the eye clinic.
Defendant hired Physicians Hearing Services, Inc. (PHSI), a staffing company that
specializes in hearing services, to provide candidates for the position of Director of

Hearing Services. PHSI recommended Ms. Branson for the position.
11. On or about July 6, 2010 Defendant interviewed and hired Ms. Branson as Director
of Hearing Services. At the time of hire, Ms. Branson presented as male (e.g., used a
traditionally male name, wore male attire, responded to male pronouns, and otherwise
appeared to conform to traditional male gender norms).
12. At the time of hire, Defendants written description of the Director of Hearing
Services position did not include responsibility for any specific sales target. Likewise,
Ms. Branson was not notified at the time of hire orally or otherwise that as Director of
Hearing Services she was responsible for a particular sales target.
13. Upon information and belief, at the time of hire and for the duration of Ms.
Bransons tenure at Lakeland Clinic, Defendants employer-provided health care plan
included an explicit exclusion of all gender-affirming treatment for transgender
persons, including psychological, hormonal, and surgical care otherwise available to
nontransgender plan enrollees.
14. Ms. Branson provided hearing services to patients who were referred to her by
Defendants physicians, and these referrals were Ms. Bransons only source of
patients.
15. Ms. Branson performed the duties of her position successfully.
16. In or about late February 2011, Ms. Branson began wearing feminine attire to work,
including make-up and womens tailored clothing. Ms. Branson observed that coworkers snickered, rolled their eyes, and withdrew from social interactions with her in
response to her changing appearance and female gender expression. This was based
on gender stereotyping. Defendant was made aware of this conduct.
17. In or about April 2011, Defendants managers, acting within the course of their
duties for Defendant, requested a meeting with Ms. Branson, wherein Defendant
confronted Ms. Branson about her changing appearance and female gender
expression. Ms. Branson then informed Defendant that she was undergoing a gender
transition from male to female and that she would be changing her first name to
Brandi.
18. Following this meeting, Defendants managers and employees made derogatory
comments about Ms. Bransons gendered appearance, and the ostracism by Bransons
co-workers intensified. This was based on gender stereotyping. Defendant was made
aware of this conduct.
19. From about April 2011, until her termination, all but one of Defendants physicians
stopped referring patients to Ms. Branson for hearing services, thereby depriving her
of her client base. This was based on animus due to Ms. Bransons gender, gender
identity or expression, and/or gender transition.
20. On or about April 2011, the Administrator of Lakeland Clinic, Janet Townsend,
indicated, by words and tone of voice to Ms. Branson and others that Townsend and
Defendant were not supportive of Ms. Bransons gender transition. This was based on
gender stereotyping.
21. Townsend also indicated that she and Lakeland Clinic considered Ms. Bransons
appearance and gender expression to be problematic. This was based on gender
stereotyping.
22. On or about April 2011, Townsend discussed Ms. Bransons gender transition with
tech clinician Donna Martin, asking Martin What do you think of this
Michael/Michele [sic.] thing? Townsend then indicated her disapproval of Bransons
gender transition, warning Martin that next time Ill be more careful in my
interviewing skills. This was based on gender stereotyping. Shortly thereafter,
Martin told Branson about the conversation with Townsend. Martin told Branson that,
based on her conversation with Townsend, both Townsend and the Defendant
disapproved of Bransons gender transition and gender identity and expression.
23. On or about June 10, 2011, Townsend called a meeting with Ms. Branson. During
the meeting Townsend told Ms. Branson that she had failed to meet her sales targets.
Townsend went on to say that because of declining sales, Defendant was eliminating
the Director of Hearing Services position. Townsend told Ms. Branson that Defendant
would not hire an employee to replace her since it was closing its hearing services
division. However, no such sales targets existed or were communicated to Ms.
Branson prior to this meeting.
24. At the time of her termination, Ms. Branson was successfully performing the
expressly contracted duties of her position.
25. On or about August 2011, Defendant hired a replacement for Ms. Branson and
continued to operate its hearing services division. Ms. Branson was replaced by a
male employee who was not a member of the same protected category as Ms.
Branson.
26. Defendant did not have a policy barring discrimination based on gender identity or
expression, transgender identity, or gender stereotyping.
27. As a result of the foregoing, Ms. Branson suffered damages.
28. Within 300 days of the occurrences alleged herein, Brandi Branson timely filed a
charge with the EEOC and the Florida Commission on Human Relations alleging
violations of Title VII by Defendant Lakeland Clinic, and has exhausted her
administrative remedies. This suit is brought within one year of the administrative
determination of this case. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit
have been fulfilled.
CAUSES OF ACTION
COUNT 1:
The Defendant Subjected Plaintiff/Intervenor to Harassment and a
Hostile Work Environment in Violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
29. Plaintiff/Intervenor realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in
paragraphs 128.
30. Plaintiff/Intervenor incorporates by reference the allegations stated in paragraphs 1
28 of the Complaint filed by the United States Equal Employment Commission.
31. Ms. Branson was subjected to harassment and a hostile working environment based
on her gender, gender identity and expression, and gender transition as detailed
above.
32. This harassment and hostile working environment was severe, based on the nature of
the harassment, including statements expressing animus towards her gender, gender
identity and expression, and gender transition during the 300 days prior to Ms.
Bransons EEOC complaint, and prior statements as part of a continuing course of
conduct by Defendant and Defendants managers and employees, all of which were
designed to and were likely to humiliate her, and which did have that effect on Ms.
Branson.
33. This harassment and hostile working environment was pervasive during the 300 days
prior to Ms. Bransons EEOC complaint, based on the many incidents of harassment,
including many negative statements about her gender, gender identity and expression,
and gender transition as well as prior statements and restrictions as part of a
continuing course of conduct by Defendant and Defendants managers and
employees, all of which were because of Ms. Bransons gender, gender identity and
expression.
34. The effect of the harassment and hostile working environment complained of above
has been to deprive Ms. Branson of equal employment opportunities and otherwise
adversely affect her status as an employee because of her sex in violation of Title VII
and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
35. Defendant was on notice of said practices and hostile working environment because
Defendants managers, including Plaintiff/Intervenors direct supervisors, participated
in and witnessed said practices.
Defendant complained, orally and in writing, to Defendants managers regarding said
practices.
37. Defendant failed and refused to investigate and take prompt and effective action
regarding said practices.
38. Defendant failed and refused to investigate and take prompt and effective action to
stop the hostile working environment.
39. Ms. Branson was threatened with and subjected to tangible employment actions and
materially adverse employment actions by Defendant.
40. By creating, condoning and perpetuating a hostile work environment because of Ms.
Bransons gender, gender identity, and gender expression Defendant has acted
intentionally, maliciously, and/or recklessly with regard to her legally protected
rights.
41. As a direct and proximate result of the acts complained of herein, Ms. Branson has
suffered and will continue to suffer loss of compensation and benefits, mental and
emotional distress, humiliation, loss of reputation, loss of enjoyment of life and other
pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses.
42. By reason of the discrimination suffered by Plaintiff/Intervenor, she is entitled to all

legal and equitable remedies available under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq. and
Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 1981a.
COUNT 2:
The Defendant Subjected Plaintiff/Intervenor to Harassment and a
Hostile Work Environment in Violation of the Florida Civil Rights
Act of 1992.
paragraphs 128.
45. Ms. Branson was subjected to harassment and a hostile working environment based
on her gender, gender identity and expression, and gender transition as detailed
above.
46. This harassment and hostile working environment was severe, based on the nature of
the harassment, including statements expressing animus towards her gender, gender
identity and expression, and gender transition during the one year prior to Ms.
Bransons administrative complaint, and prior statements as part of a continuing
course of conduct by Defendant and Defendants managers and employees, all of
which were designed to and were likely to humiliate her, and which did have that
effect on Ms. Branson.
10
47. This harassment and hostile working environment was pervasive during the one year
prior to Ms. Bransons administrative complaint, based on the many incidents of
harassment, including many negative statements about her gender, gender identity
and expression, and gender transition as well as prior statements and restrictions as
part of a continuing course of conduct by Defendant and Defendants managers and
employees, all of which were because of Ms. Bransons gender, gender identity and
expression.
48. The effect of the harassment and hostile working environment complained of above
has been to deprive Ms. Branson of equal employment opportunities and otherwise
adversely affect her status as an employee because of her sex in violation of the
Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Fla. Stat. 760.01 et seq.
Defendants managers, including Plaintiff/Intervenors direct supervisors, participated
in and witnessed said practices.
Plaintiff/Intervenor and others complained, orally and in writing, to Defendants
managers regarding said practices.
51. Defendant failed and refused to investigate and take prompt and effective action
regarding said practices.
52. Defendant failed and refused to investigate and take prompt and effective action to
stop the hostile working environment.
11
53. Ms. Branson was threatened with and subjected to tangible employment actions and
materially adverse employment actions by Defendant.
54. By creating, condoning and perpetuating a hostile work environment because of Ms.
Bransons gender, gender identity, and gender expression Defendant has acted
rights.
legal and equitable remedies available under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992,
Fla. Stat. 760.01 et seq.
COUNT 3:
The Defendant Wrongfully Terminated Plaintiff/Intervenor Because
of Her Gender, Gender Identity, and Gender Expression in Violation
of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Title I of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.
paragraphs 128.
12
59. Ms. Bransons coworkers and Defendants managers openly ridiculed her gender
identity and expression, appearance, and gender transition in the four month period
leading up to her termination.
60. Townsend, Ms. Bransons direct supervisor, made repeated negative comments about
Ms. Bransons gender, gender identity and expression as well as her gender transition
to Ms. Branson privately, to Ms. Branson when Defendants other employees were
present, as well as to Defendant employees when Ms. Branson was not present.
When Townsend made these disparaging remarks, she asserted that Defendant shared
the same opinions.
61. As described above, direct supervisor Townsend indicated to one of Defendants
employees that she would be hyper-vigilant in screening candidates for positions with
Defendant, suggesting this would ensure a person of Ms. Bransons protected class
was not hired in the future.
62. As described above, when Townsend fired Ms. Branson, Townsend indicated that the
hearing services department would be eliminated because of flagging sales.
Townsend also indicated that Ms. Branson had failed to meet target sales goals,
suggesting the elimination of Ms. Bransons department and position was a result of
Ms. Bransons failure to meet the terms of her employment. Townsend also stated
that Defendant would not fill Ms. Bransons position since the hearing services
department was being eliminated.
63. As described above, at the time of hire, Ms. Bransons position did not have target
sales goals.
13
64. As described above, Defendant did not close the hearing services department.
65. As described above, Defendant hired a male who conformed to traditional male
gender norms to replace Ms. Branson.
66. By permitting and condoning Townsends decision to terminate Ms. Branson despite
Townsends past open ridicule of Ms. Bransons gender, gender identity and
expression, and gender transition Defendant has acted intentionally, maliciously,
and/or recklessly with regard to her legally protected rights.
67. By permitting and condoning Townsends decision to terminate Ms. Branson in part
or in whole because Ms. Branson did not meet personal sales targets that had not
previously existed or been communicated to Ms. Branson, Defendant has acted
rights.
68. The reason given by Defendant for Ms. Bransons termination was a pretext for sex
discrimination.
69. Defendants decision to terminate Ms. Branson was because of her sex, and/or sex
was a motivating factor in the decision to terminate her.
14

legal and equitable remedies available under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq. and
Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 1981a.
COUNT 4:
The Defendant Wrongfully Terminated Plaintiff/Intervenor Because
of Her Gender, Gender Identity, and Gender Expression in Violation
of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992.
paragraphs 128.
74. Ms. Bransons coworkers and Defendants managers openly ridiculed her gender
identity and expression, appearance, and gender transition in the four month period
leading up to her termination.
75. Townsend, Ms. Bransons direct supervisor, made repeated negative comments about
Ms. Bransons gender, gender identity and expression as well as her gender transition
to Branson privately, to Ms. Branson when Defendants other employees were
present, as well as to Defendant employees when Ms. Branson was not present.
When Townsend made these disparaging remarks, she asserted that Defendant shared
the same opinion.
76. As described above, direct supervisor Townsend indicated to one of Defendants
employees that she would be hyper vigilant in screening candidates for positions with
15
Defendant, suggesting this would ensure a person of Ms. Bransons protected class
was not hired in the future.
77. As described above, when Townsend fired Ms. Branson, Townsend indicated that the
hearing services department would be eliminated because of flagging sales.
Townsend also indicated that Ms. Branson had failed to meet target sales goals,
suggesting the elimination of Ms. Bransons department and position was a result of
Ms. Bransons failure to meet the terms of her employment. Townsend also stated
that Defendant would not fill Ms. Bransons position since the hearing services
department was being eliminated.
78. As described above, at the time of hire, Ms. Bransons position did not have target
sales goals.
79. As described above, Defendant did not close the hearing services department.
80. As described above, Defendant hired a male who conformed to traditional male
gender norms to replace Ms. Branson.
81. By permitting and condoning Townsends decision to terminate Ms. Branson despite
Townsends past open ridicule of Ms. Bransons gender, gender identity and
expression, and gender transition Defendant has acted intentionally, maliciously,
and/or recklessly.
82. By permitting and condoning Townsends decision to terminate Ms. Branson on part
or on whole because Ms. Branson did not meet personal sales targets that had not
previously existed or been communicated to Ms. Branson, Defendant has acted
16

rights.
83. By its termination of Plaintiff/Intervenor because of Ms. Bransons gender, gender
identity, and gender expression, Defendant has acted intentionally, maliciously,
recklessly with regard to her legally protected rights.
84. The reason given by Defendant for Ms. Bransons termination was a pretext for sex
discrimination.
85. Defendants decision to terminate Ms. Branson was because of her sex, and/or sex
was a motivating factor in the decision to terminate her.
legal and equitable remedies available under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992,
Fla. Stat. 760.01 et seq.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff/Intervenor respectfully requests that this Court:
A.
Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant Lakeland Clinic, its

officers, successors, assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation
with it, from engaging in any employment practice which discriminates on the
17
basis of gender, gender identity and expression, and gender

transition, including but not limited to discharging its trans employees
because of their gender, gender identity and expression, and gender
transition, any other employment practice which discriminates on the
basis of their protected status;
B.
Order Defendant Lakeland Clinic to institute and carry out polices, practices,
and programs which provide equal employment opportunities for transgender
persons, and which eradicate the effects of past unlawful employment
practices;
C.
Order Defendant Lakeland Clinic to make whole Brandi Branson, by

providing appropriate backpay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be
determined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the
effects of Defedant's unlawful employment practices, including but not
limited to, frontpay;
D.
Order Defendant Lakeland Clinic to make whole Brandi Branson, by

providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting from
the unlawful employment practices described in paragraphs above, including
but not limited to job search expenses and medical expenses not covered by
the Employers employee benefit plan, in amounts to be determined at trial;
E.
Order Defendant Lakeland Clinic to make whole Brandi Branson by providing

compensation for past and future nonpecuniary losses resulting from the
unlawful employment practices complained of, including but not limited to,
18
emotional pain and suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life, and

humiliation, in amounts to be determined at trial;
F.
Order Defendant Lakeland Clinic to pay Brandi Branson punitive damages for
its intentional, malicious and/or reckless conduct described above, in amounts
to be determined at trial;
G.
Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the
public interest; and
H.
Award Plaintiff/Intervenor her costs of this action and reasonable and

necessary attorneys fees.
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Plaintiff/Intervenor requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by her complaint.

Respectfully submitted,
s/ J. Kemp Brinson
J. Kemp Brinson Fla Bar No. 752541
P.O. Box 582
Phone: 863-288-0234
Fax: 863-508-7684
19
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on this 3rd day of December, 2014, the forgoing Complaint in
Intervention was filed with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, and was served
upon counsel of record by all parties to this proceeding by electronic notification.
s/ J. Kemp Brinson
J. Kemp Brinson Fla Bar No. 752541
P.O. Box 582
Phone: 863-288-0234
Fax: 863-508-7684

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Case 8:14-cv-02421-MSS-AEP Document 11 Filed 12/03/14 Page 1 of 6 PageID 39

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

UNITED STATES EQUAL

CASE NO. 8:14-cv-2421-T35 AEP

UNOPPOSED MOTION OF BRANDI BRANSON TO

Case 8:14-cv-02421-MSS-AEP Document 11 Filed 12/03/14 Page 2 of 6 PageID 40

nondiscrimination laws which mirror Title VII. Wright v. Sanderstein Investments,

Case 8:14-cv-02421-MSS-AEP Document 11 Filed 12/03/14 Page 3 of 6 PageID 41

Case 8:14-cv-02421-MSS-AEP Document 11 Filed 12/03/14 Page 4 of 6 PageID 42

RULE 3.01(g) CERTIFICATION

Case 8:14-cv-02421-MSS-AEP Document 11 Filed 12/03/14 Page 5 of 6 PageID 43

Dated: December 3, 2014

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Case 8:14-cv-02421-MSS-AEP Document 11-1 Filed 12/03/14 Page 1 of 20 PageID 45

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

UNITED STATES EQUAL

CASE NO. 8:14-cv-2421-T35 AEP

Case 8:14-cv-02421-MSS-AEP Document 11-1 Filed 12/03/14 Page 2 of 20 PageID 46

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

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specializes in hearing services, to provide candidates for the position of Director of

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42. By reason of the discrimination suffered by Plaintiff/Intervenor, she is entitled to all

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71. By reason of the discrimination suffered by Plaintiff/Intervenor, she is entitled to all

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intentionally, maliciously, and/or recklessly with regard to her legally protected

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant Lakeland Clinic, its

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basis of gender, gender identity and expression, and gender

Order Defendant Lakeland Clinic to make whole Brandi Branson, by

Order Defendant Lakeland Clinic to make whole Brandi Branson, by

Order Defendant Lakeland Clinic to make whole Brandi Branson by providing

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emotional pain and suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life, and

Award Plaintiff/Intervenor her costs of this action and reasonable and

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Dated: December 3, 2014

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