Consti2 Cases

LETICIA DIONA, represented by her attorney-in-fact,
MARCELINA DIONA vs. BALAGUE.

GR No. 173559, January 7, 2013
PONENTE: JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO
(DUE PROCESS CLAUSE)
FACTS:
On March 2, 1991, respondents obtained a loan for forty five thousand pesos from petitioner, payable in
six months and secured by a real estate mortgage over their property located in Marulas, Valenzuela.
When the debt became due, respondents failed to pay, notwithstanding the demand, hence, the petitioner
filed a complaint in the RTC praying that respondents be ordered to, inter alia, pay petitioner their
obligation plus interest at twelve percent per annum.
Owing to the failure of respondents to file an Answer, the RTC declared them in default and proceeded to
allow petitioner to present evidence ex-parte. In due course, a decision was rendered ordering respondents
to pay the petitioner their principal obligation plus interest at the rate of five percent per month. A writ of
execution was subsequently served upon respondents, but because it could not be served, the land was
auctioned.
On December 17, 2001, respondents filed a Motion to Correct Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale
on the basis that the petitioner only claimed an interest rate of twelve percent per annum, but the RTC
rendered a decision ordering respondents to pay interest at the rate of five percent per month or sixty
percent per annum that caused the debt to balloon.
The RTC subsequently granted the motion and amended judgment. The petitioner went to the CA where
she argued that while the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering an interest rate of five percent per
month, the same could not be reduced to twelve percent per annum. Respondents also filed a case at the
CA and was given due course. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC judgment violated the right to due process of the respondents.
RULING:
The Court ruled that the assailed RTC judgment, specifically, the portion fixing the interest rate, was in
violation of the right to due process of the respondent. The judgment had given the petitioner a relief that
was not prayed for in the original complaint. The grant of a relief that was neither prayed for nor
supported by evidence is a violation of the due process of the party against whom the judgment is to be
enforced.
NELSON VALENO y LUCITO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 192050, January 9, 2013
PONENTE: JUSTICE PEREZ
(RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURE)
FACTS:
On March 12, 2004, and equipped with a search warrant, a group of policemen arrived at the house of the
petitioner with two barangay officials to enforce the search warrant, and before entering the house, the
police commander instructed his men to show their hands so as to prevent any implication that they had
intended to plant evidence.
The search which was conducted while the petitioner was with his wife and outside of the house
yielded a black bag which contained white granules that were later positively identified as shabu.
Subsequently, trials on the merit ensued, and after due course, petitioner was convicted by the trial court
for illegal possession of prohibited drugs. On appeal before the CA, the CA affirmed the decision of the
trial court and the aggrieved petitioner now comes before the Supreme Court, hence, this petition
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence seized by the police officers were obtained through an unlawful search and
seizure.
RULING:
The Court ruled in the negative. There was nothing irregular in the search of the house of the petitioner,
even if the petitioner waited outside the house while the search was being conducted as claimed by some
witnesses. According to Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, the presence of at least two witnesses
of sufficient age is sufficient, and the presence of the two barangay officials during the search was never
contradicted by the petitioner.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS

AND HIGHWAYS vs. HEIRS OF SPOUSES PEDRO
GR No. 181218, January 28, 2013
(POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN)
FACTS:
Pedro Bautista and Valentina Malabanan are the registered owners of a parcel of land located in Lipa
City. Sometime in the year 2000, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Public
Works and Highways, acquired a thirty six meter portion of the land at one thousand three hundred pesos
per square meter for use in the Southern Tagalog Arterial Road Tollway Project. Petitioner sought an
additional one thousand one hundred fifty square meters at one hundred pesos per square meter, but the
spouses refused.
On July 7, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint for expropriation with the RTC of Lipa City. During the
proceedings, the spouses died and are thus substituted by the respondents. In due course, the trial court
rendered a decision pegging the fair market value at one thousand nine hundred sixty pesos per square
meter. Aggrieved, the petitioner interposed an appeal with the CA, which affirmed the decision of the
RTC, hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court had failed to follow the standards enumerated in Section 5 of RA 8974 in
arriving at the pegged fair market value.
RULING:
The Court ruled that there is no violation. The standards enumerated in Section 5 of RA 8974 are mere
guidelines that the trial court may or may not follow in its fixing of the fair market value. The trial court
has discretion in fixing the fair market value of a property subject to expropriation and in this regard they
may disregard in totality the report of the appointed board of commissioners.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs.

SPOUSES RODOLFO ZABALA and LILIA BAYLON
GR No.173520, January 30, 2013
FACTS:
This controversy arose from a parcel of land owned by respondents. Power lines of the petitioners had
traversed this property and the issue now is the amount of just compensation to be paid to respondents.
In October 27, 1994, petitioners filed a complaint for eminent domain against the respondents.
Subsequently, a commission appointed by the RTC of Balanga City submitted a report wherein they
recommended a just compensation of one hundred fifty pesos per square meter. On June 28, 2004, the
RTC rendered a decision where it found that petitioner has the lawful right to take property upon payment
of just compensation which the RTC pegged at one hundred fifty pesos per square meter.
The petitioner disagreed with the decision of the RTC, specifically, the just compensation, arguing that it
is not supported by documentary evidence and lifted the case for review at the CA. The CA, after due
deliberations, affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this appeal, wherein petitioner argued that the RTC and the CA erred in the fixing of the amount
for just compensation considering that it is not supported by documentary evidence. Further, petitioner
argued that since the transmission lines do not impair the use of the property in question, it is only
necessary under RA6395, Section 3A that the petitioner pay easement fees which should not exceed
ten percent under the same law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents are entitled to the recommended fair market value recommended by the
commission considering that it is not supported by documentary evidence.
RULING:
The Court ruled that courts have the power to determine just compensation and that no legislative action
could deny the courts their constitutional power to do so. Legislative statures and Executive issuances
regarding the payment of just compensation are, at best, mere guidelines for the courts to follow in
determining the amount of just compensation.
On the issue of the amount of just compensation, it is the court that has the discretion to fix the amount,
and it appear that it had done just that in this case when it fixed one hundred fifty pesos. Under the Rules
of Court, the trial court may reject or accept the commissioners report which is purely advisory.
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SPOUSES JESUS L. CABAHUG AND CORONACION M. CABAHUG vs.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
GR No. 186069, January 30, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioners are owners of two parcels of land located in Leyte and are among the defendants in an
expropriation suit filed by herein respondent. That suit was later dismissed when respondent opted to
settle with the landowners by paying ten percent of the value of their property as an easement fee in
accordance with Section 3A of RA 6395.
On November 9, 1996, a Right of Way Grant in favor of respondent was granted by the petitioner. On
September 21, 1998, petitioners filed a complaint for payment of just compensation, damages, and
attorneys fees against herein respondent in the RTC on the basis that they have been totally deprived of
use of portions of the land in question. The RTC rendered a decision favoring the petitioners.
Aggrieved, the respondent elevated the case to the CA, which ruled in favor of respondents. Their motion
for reconsideration having been denied, the petitioners now come before the Supreme Court, hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in upholding Section 3A of RA 6395.
RULING:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. The determination of just compensation in cases of expropriation could
not be curtailed by executive directives or legislative statues, the discretion belongs to the trial court. Any
valuation for just compensation laid down in statutes could only serve as guidelines in the determination
of just compensation.
DON DJOWEL SALES y ABALAHIN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 191023, February 6, 2013
PONENTE: JUSTICE VILLARAMA
FACTS:
On May 24, 2003, petitioner was about to board a Cebu Pacific plane bound for Kalibo, Aklan. As he
passed through airport security, petitioner was frisked by a male security guard who felt something
slightly bulging in the right pocket of the short pants of the petitioner. Eventually, this bulge was revealed
to be two rolled paper sticks with dried marijuana leaves/fruiting tops.
Subsequently, petitioner was arrested, and in his trial interposed a different story than that of the
prosecution, claiming that the paper sticks were planted on him. After due course, the trial court convicted
petitioner for violation of Section 11 of RA 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC,
holding that the body search conducted upon the petitioner was a valid warrantless search pursuant to
routine security procedures allowed by law.
Aggrieved, petitioner now comes before the Supreme Court to question his conviction, hence, this
petition.
ISSUES:
a.) Whether or not the warrantless search conducted upon the petitioner is a valid search.
b.) Whether or not the right to equal protection of the petitioner has been violated when he was
singled out and asked to spread his arms.
RULING:
a.) The Court ruled that the warrantless search was valid. Persons may lose their right against
searches and seizures by exposing their person or property to the public in a manner reflecting the
lack of subjective expectation of privacy, and such is expected in airport security.
b.) The Court ruled in the negative. It found no irregularity with the way that the search of the person
of the appellant was conducted despite the fact that the metal detector rendered no beeping sound
when appellant crossed it. Appellant was only subjected to a more thorough search after he was
frisked and the person who was frisking him felt the bulge in his pocket. Further, the reluctance of
the appellant to reveal the contents of his pocket created suspicion in the mind of the officers.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LINDA ALVIZ y YATCO,

and ELIZABETH DE LA VEGA y BAUTISTA
GR No. 177158, February 6, 2013
PONENTE: JUSTICE LEONARDO- DE CASTRO
FACTS:
On February 4, 2003, a confidential informant arrived at Police Station One, La Loma, Quezon City.
Subsequently, a buy-bust operation was conducted, and the appellants were arrested. After due trial, the
RTC convicted appellants for violation of Section 5, Article II, RA 9165.
Appellants appealed their case to the CA, which affirmed the conviction. Aggrieved, appellants elevated
their case to the Supreme Court, but subsequent to this, appellant Linda executed a Motion for
Withdrawal of Appeal which was subsequently granted, hence, the case, as it concerns her, is now
considered close.
Appellant Elizabeth insists that she was arrested without a warrant because none of the circumstances
mentioned in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court was attendant of the circumstances of her arrest.
She further argued that any evidence obtained from her or her co-accused was a fruit of the poisonous
tree.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right of the appellants against unreasonable searches and seizures were violated.
RULING:
The Court found the search valid. The trial court had believed the version of the prosecution that the
appellants were caught in flagrante delicto, and as a rule, the factual findings of the trial court involving
credibility are accorded great respect. The evidence gathered and presented by the prosecution are
therefore valid despite the fact that the arrest was without warrant. Under Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court, a police officer could arrest without warrant if a crime is being committed in front of him, such
as in this case.
RAMON MARTINEZ y GOCO/RAMON GOCO y MARTINEZ @ MON

vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 198694, February 13, 2013
PONENTE: JUSTICE PERLAS BERNABE
FACTS:
On the evening of December 29, 2007, the tranquility of a routine police foot patrol within the city of
Manila was disturbed by the shouts of a man cursing. For purported violation of a city ordinance
regarding breaches of the peace, herein petitioner was arrested by the roving police foot patrol and was
asked to empty his pockets. Subsequently, police were able to recover from the petitioner a plastic bag
containing white substance that was later confirmed to be shabu.
Consequently, petitioner was charged with violating Section 11(3) of RA 9615. The RTC, after due
course, rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty as charged and upholding the validity of the
warrantless search and arrest of the petitioner. Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed before the CA, which
affirmed the decision of the RTC, also upholding the warrantless search and arrest of the petitioner.
Petitioner now comes before the Supreme Court, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search of petitioner is a valid warrantless search pursuant to a crime being committed
in the presence of police officers.
RULING:
The court ruled in the negative. Evidence seized during warrantless searches that are later proven to be
void cannot be accepted as evidence, though there exists some exemptions to the exclusionary rule. One
of those exemptions is when the search is affected following a valid arrest when the perpetrator was
caught in flagrante delicto. In this case, petitioner was searched after he allegedly violated a municipal
ordinance for breaching the peace. A perusal of the transcript, however, revealed that petitioner was in a
crowded and noisy area when the alleged incident occurred. Further, he was not threatening, assaulting,
beating, or using violence against another. His words that he allegedly shouted are not slanderous,
threatening or abusive, and thus could not have been that which the ordinance in question intended to
prevent. All told, no probable cause exists to justify the warrantless arrest of the petitioner, thus, there was
no valid warrantless search of the person of the petitioner.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. RAMOS S. CAGUIOA, Presiding Judge,

Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Region, Olongapo City
GR No. 174385, February 20, 2013
PONENTE: JUSTICE BRION
(DUE PROCESS CLAUSE)
FACTS:
Petitioners in this case are importers and dealers licensed to operate within Subic Special Economic and
Freeport Zone and thus are granted certain tax exemptions. RA 9334 was passed and from Section 6
thereof, the SBMA issue a memorandum directing its various departments to implement the said
provision. Said provision requires the payment of additional duties and taxes in lieu with tobacco and
alcohol products importation. Petitioners applied for a TRO and preliminary injunction against the
Finance Secretary to stay the implementation of the said provision. Respondent judge granted the
application for preliminary mandatory injunction despite opposition from the Republic. Subsequently,
respondent judge issued the preliminary injunction. The Republic subsequently filed a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court. Respondents filed before respondent judge motions to intervene.
Without acting on the Republics Motion to Suspend Proceedings, respondent judge granted the motion of
private respondents. The Republic moved to reconsider on the ground that it had been denied due process
because it never received copies of the private respondents motions and complaints-in-intervention. The
respondent judge denied the objection of the Republic on the ground that the records show that the
Republic had received copies of the motions and complaints-in-intervention because there is no
restraining order issued. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge violated the right to due process of the Republic.
RULING:
The Court ruled that there was a violation of due process. Records had shown that the OSG had not
received copies of the private respondents motions and complaints-in-intervention; yet, they had been
allowed to intervene in the case. A Motion to Intervene is a motion that requires prior notice to the other
side so that the other side could oppose the motion. Due Process is anchored on the opportunity to be
heard, and in this case, with no notice to the Republic, it is clear that the Republic could not be heard,
thus, there is a violation of due process.
RAMONCITA O. SENADOR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 201620, March 6, 2013
PONENTE: JUSTICE VELASCO, JR.
(RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE
AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST A PERON)
FACTS:
Petitioner, under a Trust Receipt Agreement, obtained from private respondent various jewelries
amounting to more than seven hundred thousand pesos for the purpose of selling the same on a
consignment basis, and to return the same if not sold or to remit the proceeds thereof. However, despite
repeated demands, petitioner failed to remit the proceeds or to return the jewelries which led to the filing
of a criminal complaint against petitioner. During the preliminary investigation, the petitioner turned over
a check to the partner of the private respondent, but said check was subsequently dishonored for being
drawn against a closed account. During trial, petitioner refused to testify, relying instead on the defense
that the facts alleged in the Information and the facts proven and established during the trial differ. She
asserted that the person who had made the demand. According to the petitioner, the complainant in the
Information went by the name of Cynthia Jaime, but during trial, the private complainant went by the
name of Rita Jaime. After due course, the RTC rendered a decision convicting the petitioner. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, and a subsequent Motion for Reconsideration from the
petitioner was denied by the appellate court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an error in the designation in the Information violates the accused constitutional right to
be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against her.
RULING:
The Court ruled in the negative. The variance between the allegations of the Information and the evidence
offered by the prosecution does not, by itself, entitle the accuse to an acquittal, more so if the variance
only relates to the designation of the offended party which is a mere formal defect. Such defect does not
violate the substantial right of the accused. In offenses against property, if the subject matter is specific
and identifiable, an error in the designation of the offended party is immaterial. In this case, the subject
matter is specific, identifiable, and evidence by a trust receipt, therefore, the error in the designation of the
offended party is immaterial.
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HON. MA. LOURDES C. FERNANDO, in her capacity as

City Mayor of Marikina City vs. ST. SCHOLASTICAS COLLEGE
GR. No. 161107, March 12, 2013
PONENTE: JUSTICE MENDOZA
(POLICE POWER, POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN,
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE, RIGHT TO PRIVACY)
FACTS:
Respondent St. Scholasticas College is the owner of four parcels of land located in Marikina Heights.
The property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence built over thirty years ago.
On September 30, 1994, petitioners who are officials of the city government of Marikina City enacted
Ordinance No. 192 entitled Regulating the Construction of Walls and Fences in the City of Marikina.
Subsequently, or on April 2, 2000, petitioner sent a letter to respondents ordering them to demolish their
wall and to move it back six meters to provide for parking space that the public may use on holidays and
weekends. Respondents requested for time to comply, but said request was turned down by the then
mayor.
Aggrieved, respondent filed for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, and said
petition was granted by the RTC of Marikina City, ordering herein petitioners to permanently cease and
desist from implementing Ordinance No. 192 on the property of respondent.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the RTC, hence, this petition.
Specifically, Sections 3(1) and 5 of the Ordinance in question are relevant. Section 3(1) prescribes that
fences should be no more than one meter in height, be an open fence type, and at least eighty percent seethrough. Section 5 prescribes a five meter parking allowance.
ISSUES:
a.) Whether or not Ordinance No. 192 is a proper exercise of Police Power.
b.) Whether or not Ordinance No. 192 is an exercise of the power of the City of the Power of Eminent
Domain.
c.) Whether or not Ordinance No. 192 is a violation of the Due Process Clause.
d.) Whether or not Ordinance No. 192 violates the right to privacy of the respondents.
RULING:
a.) The Court ruled that Ordinance No. 192, Section 5 is not a proper exercise of Police Power. The
Court found Ordinance No. 192, Section 5 to be oppressive since it would divest private property
rights for the solely aesthetic purposes. It has been held that the State, under the guise of Police
11
Power, may not divest private property owners of their property for the sole purpose of preserving
or enhancing the community. Section 5, Ordinance No. 192 is not a valid exercise of Police Power
for having failed the rational relationship test on account of it being oppressive.
The Court ruled that Ordinance No. 192, Section 3(1) is not a proper exercise of Police Power.
The Court found that Ordinance No. 192 also failed the rational relationship test because the
petitioners failed to show the reasonable relation between the police measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment.
b.) The Court ruled that Ordinance No. 192 is a proper exercise of Eminent Domain. The taking of the
property in question would benefit the public and the argument of the petitioner that the property
in question would remain in the ownership of the respondent holds no water given that the
respondent no longer has any say as to what they could do with the property in question.
c.) The Court ruled that Ordinance No. 192 is a violation of the Due Process Clause. The Ordinance
authorizes an arbitrary intrusion into private rights that the city government could take private
property at any time that it wants at the strength of an invalid invocation of Police Power and is
thus, a violation of due process. Respondents would not have been given a chance to be heard
before property could be taken from them.
d.) The Court ruled that Ordinance No. 192 is a violation of the Right to Privacy. Section 3(1) of
Ordinance No. 192 which requires that fences should be at least 80% see-through would violate
the right of the people inside the property specifically the Benedictine Nuns whose residence
was built into the property against intrusion. Governmental powers should stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of its citizens.
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Spouses NERIO and SOLEDAD PADOR, and REY PADOR vs.

Barangay Captain and Barangay Tanod of Barangay Tabunan, Cebu City
GR No. 183460, March 12, 2013
PONENTE: CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO
(PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO)
FACTS:
Petitioner asserts that on March 17, 2008, on suspicion of the petitioner being a marijuana planter,
respondents Alivio, Revales, and Alimorin raided his ampalaya farm to search for marijuana leaves but
found none. After the raid, petitioners received letters for a conference from respondent barangay captain,
which they refer to their counsel who advised them not to attend. Petitioners then sent a letter-reply to the
barangay captain, but he allegedly refuse to sign for it after he had read it. The actions of the respondent
compelled the petitioners to file for the issuance of a writ of amparo.
After due course, the RTC issued the Writ and directed the respondents to make a verified return.
Subsequent to the filing of their return, the RTC denied petitioners the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.
Dissatisfied, the petitioners raised the issue to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Writ of Amparo is called for in favor of the petitioners.
RULING:
The Court ruled in the negative. To be entitled to the privilege of the Writ of Amparo, the applicant must
prove by substantial evidence that there is a threat to their life, liberty, and security by unlawful action.
The cause of action of the petitioner was anchored on allegations that the trial court had found to be
hearsay and speculation, surmises, and conjectures that respondents had sufficiently explained. There
being no threat to their life, liberty and security by unlawful action, the application for the privilege of the
Writ of Amparo is not warranted.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs. NAZARENO VILLAREAL y LUALHATI
GR No. 201363, March 18, 2013
FACTS:
On December 25, 2006, appellant was arrested by a policeman who was on his way home for allegedly
holding and scrutinizing in his hand a packet of shabu while said policeman as about eight to ten meters
away from him and riding his motorcycle. Upon inspection at the PNP Crime Laboratory, the plastic
sachet containing 0.03 grams of a white crystalline substance tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. Appellant had been arrested before by the same officer for illegal
possession.
Consequently, appellant was charged with violating Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. After due trial,
appellant was convicted of the RTC. On appeal before the CA, the decision of the RTC was affirmed and
the CA found that the arrest is a clear case of an in flagrante delicto arrest. The CA concluded that the
appellant had exhibited an overt or strange act that would reasonably arouse suspicion, aggravated by the
fact that he had been arrested before by the same man.
Aggrieved, the appellant elevated his case before the Supreme Court, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest of the appellant was proper.
RULING:
The Court ruled in the negative. On the basis of the testimony of the arresting officer, it was established
that he had seen the appellant from a distance of about eight to ten meters while riding a motorcycle. The
Court found it inconceivable even assuming that the arresting officer has a perfect vision that he had
seen a miniscule amount of shabu given those circumstances. That the same officer had arrested appellant
many times before for illegal possession does not warrant sufficient cause to conclude that the appellant
was doing something illegal. Personal knowledge as referenced to in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court does not refer to past criminal records, that would be insufficient to form the basis of a warrantless
arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

CHAD MANANSALA y LAGMAN
GR No. 175939, April 3, 2013
(RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE
AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST A PERSON)
FACTS:
On October 18, 1994, the Philippine National Police conducted a test-buy operation against appellant, a
suspected drug dealer. Armed with a search warrant, the police conducted a search of the house of
appelant, and the search yielded seven hundred fifty kilograms of marijuana leaves.
Subsequently, trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution filed motion to amend the information,
changing the charge from illegal sale of prohibited drugs under Section 4 of RA 6425 to illegal possession
of prohibited drugs under Section 8 of RA 6425, but the Court took no action on this motion.
After due course, the RTC convicted appellant for illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8
of RA 6425. Appellant interposed frame-up as defense and claimed that there was no valid warrant when
he was arrested.
On appeal, the appellant raised the issue of the lack of a valid warrant, inter alia. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC and the aggrieved appellant elevated the case to the Supreme Court, hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the fact that the respondent was charged with violation of Section 4 of RA 6425 in the
original information and was convicted for violation of Section 8 of the same law is a violation of his
right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.
RULING:
The Court ruled that the conviction does not violate the right of the appellant to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation against him. It is true that appellant was initially charged with a violation of
Section 4 of RA 6425 and that this was not amended, however, that same information had given him
notice that he is to be charged for possessing more or less seven hundred fifty kilograms of marijuana
leaves. The crime of illegal sale absorbed the crime of illegal possession and as such, he had been given
sufficient notice.
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PELIZOY REALTY CORPORATION, represented herein by its president,

GREGORY K. Loy vs. THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET
GR No. 183137, April 10, 2013
PONENTE: JUSTICE LEONEN
(POWER OF TAXATION)
FACTS:
On December 8, 2005, the Provincial Board of the Province of Benguet approved Provincial Tax
Ordinance No. 05-107, otherwise known as the Benguet Revenue Code of 2005. Section 59 Article X of
the tax ordinance levied a ten percent amusement tax on gross receipts from admissions to resorts,
swimming pools, bath houses, tourist spots, and hot springs.
Petitioner filed a petition before the Secretary of Justice arguing that Section 59 of the assailed revenue
code is ultra vires on the part of the Provincial Board. Owing to the failure of the Secretary of Justice to
act on the petition, a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction before the Regional Trial Court of
Benguet, on the position that Section 59, Article X of the ordinance is in violation of the limitation of
taxing powers of Local Government Units, specifically, against percentage taxes, which the assailed tax
is, according to the petitioner.
On December 10, 2007, the RTC dismissed the Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction for lack of
merit. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the present petition before the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not local government units could impose a tax.
RULING:
The Court ruled in the negative. The power to tax is an attribute of sovereignty and as such, is inherent in
the state. Such, however, is not true for the mere territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of
the Philippines. The power of a province to tax is, therefore, limited to the extent that such power is
delegated to it by either the Constitution or by statute.
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IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA
IN FAVOR OF NORIEL RODRIGUEZ
GR No. 191805-193160, April 16, 2013
(PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO)
FACTS:
On September 6, 2009, herein petitioner Noriel Rodriguez was allegedly abducted by soldiers from the
17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division. He was allegedly detained and tortured by his abductors
until September 17, 2009. Pursuant to an order to the Ombudsman to take action, Ombudsman Conchita
Carpio-Morales sent a letter to the Court asking for more time with which to submit a report citing that
Noriel Rodriguez and his family had refused to cooperate for security reasons.
On January 6, 2012, respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration, citing that they could not be
charged because they had not been named as having performed, permitted, authorized, condoned or
allowed the commission of any act or incurrence omission which would violate or threaten with violation
the right to life, liberty, and security of petitioner-respondents and his family.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in granting the privilege of the Writ of Amparo to petitioner.
RULING:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. The Writ of Amparo partakes of a summary proceeding that requires
only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent relief available to the petitioner.
The Court found that the respondents had violated the right of the petitioner to security when they made a
visual recording of his house, as well as the photos of his relatives. More importantly, the respondents had
failed to conduct a fair and effective investigation similarly amounted to a violation of, or threat to
petitioners right to life, liberty and security. Violations to the right of life, liberty and security may also
be incurred by omissions on the part of public officials tasked with investigating. The Writ of Amparo
includes this omission.
17
ADONIS vs. SUPERINTENDENT TESORO

G.R No. 182855, June 5, 2013
PONENTE: JUSTICE REYES
(PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS)
FACTS:
Adonis was convicted by the Regional Trial Court for Libel, filed against him by then Representative
Prospero Nograles. He began serving his sentence at the Davao Prisons and Penal Farm on February 20,
2007. A second libel case was likewise filed against Adonis by Jeanette L. Leuterio, pending before the
RTC of Davao City. The Board of Pardons and Parole issued an order for the Discharge on Parole of
seven inmates in various jails in the country, which included Adonis. The said document was received by
the City Parole and Probation Office of Davao. Meanwhile, Supreme Court issued Administrative
Circular, the subject of which is the Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the
Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases. In view of these developments, Adonis filed with the RTC
Branch 17 a Motion to Reopen Case, praying for his immediate release from detention and for the
modification of his sentence to payment of fine pursuant to the said Circular. In the criminal case before
the RTC Branch 14, Adonis moved for his provisional release from detention. The motion was granted.
Adonis filed the instant petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his liberty was
restrained by the respondent for no valid reason.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Adonis is entitled to Writ of Habeas Corpus.
RULING:
Adonis is not entitled to the said writ. The writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint and as an effective defense of personal freedom. It is issued only for the lone
purpose of obtaining relief for those illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient legal basis. It is
not issued when the person is in custody because of a judicial process or a valid judgment. In the instant
case, Adonis was convicted for libel by the RTCWhile it is true that a convict may be released from
prison on parole when he had served the minimum period of his sentence; the pendency of another
criminal case, however, is a ground for the disqualification of such convict from being released on parole.
Notably, at the time he was granted the parole, the second libel case was pending before the RTC Branch
14. In fact, even when the instant petition was filed, Criminal Case No. 48719-01 was still pending. The
issuance of the writ under such circumstance was, therefore, proscribed. There was basis for the
respondent to deny his immediate release at that time.
18
RODRIGO RONTOS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R 188024, June 5, 2013
PONENTE: CHIEFJUSTICE SERENO
FACTS:
Caloocan North City Police conducted surveillance in Camarin, Caloocan City because of reports of
illegal drug activity in the said area. When they got there, PO1 Pacis and PO1 Labaclado noticed
petitioner standing about five meters away from them, apparently preoccupied with scrutinizing two
plastic sachets in his hand. Upon coming closer, they saw that the plastic sachets appeared to contain a
white crystalline substance similar to shabu. PO1 Pacis approached petitioner and confiscated the plastic
sachets. Thereafter, he introduced himself as a police officer and informed petitioner of the offense the
latter had committed. The two police officers informed petitioner of his constitutional rights, while he just
remained silent. PO1 Pacis marked the plastic sachets and placed them in a makeshift envelope. A
laboratory examination was done and it was proven that the plastic sachets confiscated were indeed shabu.
He was charged and convicted of violation of R.A. 9165. On appeal, petitioner contended that, since his
warrantless arrest was illegal, the allegedly confiscated items were inadmissible in evidence. He further
claimed that the police officers failed to faithfully comply with the procedure for ensuring the identity and
integrity of the plastic sachets containing shabu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest is illegal.
RULING:
No. His failure to question the legality of his arrest before entering his plea during arraignment operated
as a waiver of that defense. It has been ruled time and again that an accused is estopped from assailing
any irregularity with regard to his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the
information against him on this ground before his arraignment. In his arraignment before the trial court,
petitioner never raised any issue and instead freely and voluntarily pleaded Not Guilty to the offense
charged. Thus, he was estopped from raising the issue of the legality of his arrest before the trial court,
more so on appeal before the CA or the Supreme Court. However, on the basis of the non-observance of
the rules of procedure for handling illegal drug items, we resolve to acquit petitioner on the ground of
reasonable doubt. The case against the accused hinges on the ability of the prosecution to prove that the
illegal drug presented in court is the same one that was recovered from the accused upon his arrest.
19
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE ARMANDO CERVANTES et.al.

G.R. No. 191752, June 10, 2013
(INADMISSIBLITY OF EVIDENCE)
FACTS:
The National Bureau of Investigation received information from an asset that the group of Cachuela was
involved in the robbery of Weapons System Corporation and in the killing of one of its employees; and
that Cachuela had been looking for prospective buyers of firearms. The NBI formed an entrapment team
and proceeded to Bacoor, Cavite to execute the operation. Upon their arrival, Nabilgas approached them
and told them that he had been sent by Cachuela and Ibaez to look for buyers of firearms. The police
introduced themselves and told Nabilgas that they were conducting an entrapment operation against the
suspects of the robbery at WSC. Nabilgas surrendered to the police, and gave the names of the other
persons involved in the crime. Thereafter, the asset contacted Cachuela and informed him that Nabilgas
had already talked to the buyers, and that they would like to see the firearms being sold. Cachuela set up a
meeting with the buyers at a gasoline station in Cavite. NBI Special Investigator, Supervising Agent and
the asset went to the agreed place. Cachuela came and talked to them, and brought them inside his house
where Cachuela showed them several firearms. When the agents inquired from Cachuela whether the
firearms had legal documentation, the latter sensed that the meeting was a set-up. The NBI agents arrested
Cachuela before he could make any move. The agents recovered four firearms from Cachuelas house. At
the NBI Main Office, Zaldy, WSC employee, pointed to the appellants, during a police line-up, as the
persons responsible for the robbery at WSC and for the killing of Rex. Nabilgas also executed a
handwritten confession implicating the appellants and Zaldy in the crime.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the out-of-court identification and extrajudicial confession were inadmissible in evidence.
RULING:
It were inadmissible in evidence. Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It
is done through show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face-to face with the witness for
identification. It is done through mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the
suspect. It is also done through line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons
lined up for the purpose. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of
suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors,
viz.: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description, given by the witness; (4) the level of
20
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and
the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. In the present case, the
Special Investigator merely stated that Zaldy, during a police line-up, identified the appellants as the
persons involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of Rex. He did not state when the line-up took
place; how this line-up had been conducted; who were the persons in the line-up with the appellants (if
there were indeed other persons included in the line-up); and whether the line-up was confined to persons
of the same height and built as the appellants. He likewise did not indicate who accompanied Zaldy before
and during the line-up, and whether there had been the possibility of prior or contemporaneous improper
insinuations on Zaldy regarding the appearance of the appellants. There is no way exists for the courts to
evaluate the factors used in determining the admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identifications,
such as the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification. Further, Nabilgas
extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence. The Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial
confession, to be admissible, must satisfy the following requirements: (1) the confession must be
voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of
the confessant's choice; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing. Nabilgas confession was
not made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel. There was also nothing in the
records to show whether Nabilgas confession was made voluntarily, and whether he fully understood the
nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession and its impact on his constitutional rights. In
addition, the extrajudicial confession of Nabilgas was not corroborated by a witness who was present at
the time the written confession was made.
21
ALPS TRANSPORTATION and/or ALFREDO E. PEREZ vs.

ELPIDIO M. RODRIGUEZ,
G. R. No. 186732, June 13, 2013
(DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE)
FACTS:
During the course of his employment as a bus conductor, Rodriguez, who entered into an employment
contract with Contact Tours Manpower and was assigned to work with petitioner bus company, ALPS
transportation, was found to have committed irregularities on April 26, 2003, October 12, 2003, and
January 26, 2005. The latest irregularity report dated January 26, 2005 stated that he had collected bus
fares without issuing corresponding tickets to passengers. The report was annotated with the word
Terminate. Rodriguez alleged that he was dismissed from his employment on January 27, 2005, or the
day after the issuance of the last irregularity report. However, he did not receive any written notice of
termination. He went back to the bus company a number of times, but it refused to readmit him. On
August 11, 2005, Rodriguez filed before the labor arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rodriguez was validly dismissed
RULING:
No. Rodriguez has been illegally dismissed. For a dismissal to be valid, the rule is that the employer must
comply with both substantive and procedural due process requirements. Substantive due process requires
that the dismissal must be pursuant to either a just or an authorized cause under Articles 282, 283 or 284
of the Labor Code. Procedural due process, on the other hand, mandates that the employer must observe
the twin requirements of notice and hearing before a dismissal can be effected. Here, the January 26, 2005
irregularity report, which served as the basis of his dismissal, may only be considered as an
unsubstantiated allegation if unsupported by substantial evidence. Thus, we rule that petitioners have
failed to prove that the termination of Rodriguezs employment was due to a just cause. On the issue of
procedural due process, both parties are in agreement that Rodriguez was not given a written notice
specifying the grounds for his termination and giving him a reasonable opportunity to explain his side; a
hearing which would have given him the opportunity to respond to the charge and present evidence in his
favor; and a written notice of termination indicating that after considering all the circumstances,
management has concluded that his dismissal is warranted. Clearly, therefore, the inescapable conclusion
is that procedural due process is wanting in the case at bar.
22
PRIVATIZATION and MANAGEMENT OFFICE vs. STRATEGIC ALLIANCE

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and/or PHILIPPINE ESTATE CORPORATION
G.R. No. 200402, June 13, 2013
(RIGHT TO INFORMATION)
FACTS:
As established by Administrative Order No. 397 the indebtedness or PNCC to various government
financial institutions was transferred to the National Government through the Committee on Privatization
or Asset Privatization Trust and the Bureau of Treasury pursuant to Proclamation No. 504 and
Administrative Order No. 64. Consequently, APT slated the privatization of PNCC in order to generate
maximum cash recovery for the government. Thus, it announced the holding of a public bidding on
October 2000 involving the as is, where is basis package sale of stocks, receivables, and securities
owned by the National Government in the PNCC. On the said date, APT conducted the bid. It first
declared that Dong-A Consortium, Pacific Infrastructure Development International, and Philippine
Exporters Confederation qualified as bidders. Thereafter, it announced that the indicative price of the
PNCC properties was seven billion pesos. The bidders were shocked with the valuation. Relying on their
own due diligence examinations, they protested that the indicative price was too high, considering the
financial statements and bid documents given by APT. Notwithstanding their protests, APT continued
with the bidding and opened the bid envelopes. Nonetheless, none of the bid offers met the indicative
price. The highest bidder filed a complaint after some discussions and the trial court explained that since
competitive public bidding is vested with public interest, it then follows that the government has an
affirmative duty to disclose its reasons for rejecting a bid. The court concluded that the refusal to explain
the indicative price constituted a violation of the publics right to information and the States policy of full
transparency in transactions involving public interest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right of information of the bidder was violated
RULING:
Yes, the right to information of the bidder was violated when APT did not disclose the basis for the
indicative price. However, the said right cannot be used as a ground to direct the issuance of the Notice of
Award to Dong-A Consortium. Under the ASBR, respondent must at least match the indicative price in
order to win. The right to information allows the public to hold public officials accountable to the people
and aids them in engaging in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and
their effective implementation. By itself, it does not extend to causing the award of the sale of government
23
assets in failed public biddings. Thus, assuming that Dong-A Consortium may access the records for the
purpose of validating the indicative price under the right to information, it does not follow that respondent
is entitled to the award. The Court cannot condone the incongruous interpretation of the courts a quo that
the publics right to information merits both an explanation of the indicative price and an automatic award
of the bid to Dong-A Consortium.
24
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VIRGINIA PALMARES, et.al.

G.R. No. 192890, June 17, 2013
PONENTE: JUSTICE PERLAS-BERNABE
(JUST COMPENSATION)
FACTS:
Respondents inherited a 19.98-hectare agricultural land located in Barangay Tagubang, Passi City, Iloilo.
In 1995, they voluntarily offered the land for sale to the government pursuant to the Comprehensive
Agrarian Law of 1988. Accordingly, the Department of Agrarian Reform acquired 19.1071 hectares of the
entire area, which was valued by Land Bank of the Philippines at P440,355.92. Respondents, however,
rejected said amount. Consequently, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board conducted
summary proceedings to determine just compensation for the land, but it resolved to adopt LBP's
valuation. Hence, the same amount was deposited to respondents' credit as provisional compensation for
the land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the compensation fixed is being in accordance with the legally prescribed valuation
factors under the Comprehensive Agrarian Law
RULING:
No, the compensation is below the prescribed valuation. The principal basis of the computation for just
compensation is Section 17 of RA 6657, which enumerates the following factors to guide the special
agrarian courts in the determination thereof: (1) the acquisition cost of the land; (2) the current value of
the properties; (3) its nature, actual use, and income; (4) the sworn valuation by the owner; (5) the tax
declarations; (6) the assessment made by government assessors; (7) the social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property; and (8) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, if any.
Pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 4922 of the same law, the DAR translated these factors
into a basic formula. In the instant case, the trial court found to be unrealistically low the total valuation
by LBP and the DAR in the amount of P440,355.92, which was computed on the basis of DAR AO No. 6,
Series of 1992, as amended by DAR AO No. 11, Series of 1994. It then merely proceeded to add said
valuation to the market value of the subject land as appearing in the 1997 Tax Declaration, and used the
average of such values to fix the just compensation at P669,962.53.
25
REPUBLIC GAS CORPORATION et. al. vs. PETRON CORPORATION et.al

G.R. No. 194062, June 17, 2013
PONENTE: JUSTICE PERALTA
(PROBABLE CAUSE)
FACTS:
LPG Dealers Associations, such as the Shellane Dealers Association, Inc., Petron Gasul Dealers
Association, Inc. and Totalgaz Dealers Association, received reports that certain entities were engaged in
the unauthorized refilling, sale and distribution of LPG cylinders bearing the registered tradenames and
trademarks of the petitioners. An investigation was thereafter conducted, particularly within the areas of
Caloocan, Malabon, Novaliches and Valenzuela, which showed that several persons and/or
establishments, including REGASCO, were suspected of having violated provisions of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 33. The surveillance revealed that REGASCO LPG Refilling Plant in Malabon was engaged in the
refilling and sale of LPG cylinders bearing the registered marks of the petitioners without authority from
the latter. NBI operatives then conducted a test-buy operation with the former and a confidential asset
going undercover. They brought with them four empty LPG cylinders bearing the trademarks of
SHELLANE and GASUL and included the same with the purchase of J&S, a REGASCOs regular
customer. Inside REGASCOs refilling plant, they witnessed that REGASCOs employees carried the
empty LPG cylinders to a refilling station and refilled the LPG empty cylinders.
ISSUE:
Whether or not probable cause exists to hold petitioners liable for the crimes of trademark infringement
and unfair competition.
RULING:
Yes, there is probable cause. Mere unauthorized use of a container bearing a registered trademark in
connection with the sale, distribution or advertising of goods or services which is likely to cause
confusion, mistake or deception among the buyers or consumers can be considered as trademark
infringement. Here, petitioners have actually committed trademark infringement when they refilled,
without the respondents consent, the LPG containers bearing the registered marks of the respondents. As
noted by respondents, petitioners acts will inevitably confuse the consuming public, since they have no
way of knowing that the gas contained in the LPG tanks bearing respondents marks is in reality not the
latters LPG product after the same had been illegally refilled. The public will then be led to believe that
petitioners are authorized refillers and distributors of respondents LPG products, considering that they
are accepting empty containers of respondents and refilling them for resale. On the other hand, unfair
competition has been defined as the passing off or attempting to pass off upon the public of the goods or
26
business of one person as the goods or business of another with the end and probable effect of deceiving
the public. In the present case, respondents pertinently observed that by refilling and selling LPG
cylinders bearing their registered marks, petitioners are selling goods by giving them the general
appearance of goods of another manufacturer.
27
JESUS C. GARCIA vs. JUDGE RAY ALAN T. DRILON

G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013
(DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE)
FACTS:
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was eleven years
her senior. They have three children.
Petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant,
controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He was often jealous of the fact
that his attractive wife still catches the eye of some men, at one point threatening that he would have any
man eyeing her killed. Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager
of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to the
affair when private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of
fights that left private respondent physically and emotionally wounded. In 2005, while at home, she
attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her to the
hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven days in which time petitioner never bothered
to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. When private respondent informed the management of
Robinson's Bank that she intends to file charges against the bank manager, petitioner got angry with her
for jeopardizing the manager's job. He then told private respondent that he was leaving her for good.
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would take her
children from her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously warned her that if she
goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo. The RTC issued a temporary
restraining order and temporary protection order. Petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a petition
for prohibition, with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal protection clauses, and
(2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being an unwanted product of an invalid
law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause and runs
counter to the due process clause of the constitution.
RULING:
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. The distinction between men and
women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women
and children. The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and
28
prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of

Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures
focused on women does not discriminate against men. Petitioner's contention, therefore, that R.A. 9262 is
discriminatory and that it is an anti-male, husband-bashing, and hate-men law deserves scant
consideration. Relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the
same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid. Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the
existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and
security of women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse. There is likewise no merit to
the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC
may likewise be committed against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship. Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word person who has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. There need not be any fear that the
judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore,
be challenged as violative of the right to due process. The victim is required not only to verify the
allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition. The respondent of a
petition for protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity
to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being stripped of family, property, guns, money,
children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what
happened is a mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in
the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense.
"To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings.
29
CARLOS L. TANENGGEE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013
(CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION)
FACTS:
Five separate Information for estafa through falsification of commercial documents were filed against
petitioner. The said Information portray the same mode of commission of the crime as in Criminal Case
No. 98-163806 but differ with respect to the numbers of the checks and promissory notes involved and
the dates and amounts. In the middle of January 1998, two (2) Metrobank auditors conducted an audit of
the Commercio Branch for more than a week. Thereafter or on 26 January 1998, appellant was asked by
Elvira Ong-Chan, senior vice president of Metrobank, to report to the Head Office on the following day.
When appellant arrived at the said office, he was surprised that there were seven other people present: two
senior branch officers, two bank lawyers, two policemen (one in uniform and the other in plain clothes),
and a representative of the Internal Affairs unit of the bank, Valentino Elevado. Appellant claimed that
Elevado asked him to sign a paper in connection with the audit investigation; that he inquired what he was
made to sign but was not offered any explanation; that he was intimidated to sign and was threatened by
the police that he will be brought to the precinct if he will not sign; that he was not able to consult a
lawyer since he was not apprised of the purpose of the meeting; and that just to get it over with he
signed the paper which turned out to be a confession. After the said meeting, appellant went to see Tan at
his office but was unable to find the latter. He also tried to phone him but to no avail. He asserts that said
written statement was taken in violation of his rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution,
particularly of his right to remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed of the first two rights.
Hence, the same should not have been admitted in evidence against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the written statement executed by the appellant is admissible in evidence.
RULING:
Yes, it is admissible in evidence. The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or
confession of guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and the OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation.
In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled written statement regarding
an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not
initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank; and, (2)
petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant manner during the
30
questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial investigation and to have been
deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his written statement. Moreover, his written
statement was found to have been executed freely and consciously. The pertinent details he narrated in his
statement were of such nature and quality that only a perpetrator of the crime could furnish. Also, the fact
that petitioner did not raise a whimper of protest and file any charges, criminal or administrative, against
the investigator and the two policemen present who allegedly intimidated him and forced him to sign
negate his bare assertions of compulsion and intimidation. It is a settled rule that where the defendant did
not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal or administrative action
against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of violence was presented, his extrajudicial
statement shall be considered as having been voluntarily executed.
31
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MONICA MENDOZA

G.R. No. 191267, June 26, 2013
(WARRANTLESS ARREST)
FACTS:
PO2 dela Cruz testified that their confidential informant arrived at their office reporting that a certain alias
Monica, who turned out to be accused-appellant, was involved in the rampant sale of illegal drugs along
PNR South Compound, Makati City. Their Action Officer formed a buy-bust team led by SPO1 Jose
Magallanes to effect the arrest of accused-appellant. A briefing was conducted regarding the antinarcotics operation and PO2 dela Cruz was designated as poseur-buyer. PO2 dela Cruz further testified
that upon arrival at the said area the informant accompanied him to where accused-appellant was.
Thereafter the informant introduced him to accused-appellant as a person in need of shabu. At this
instance, he conveyed his intentions of buying two hundred pesos worth of shabu to accused-appellant.
He then gave the Php200.00 pesos buy-bust money to accused-appellant who in turn, gave one plastic
sachet containing suspected shabu to him. The transaction having been consummated, he then made a
motion of giving a high five to accused-appellant which was the pre-arranged signal for the rest of the
back-up team. Operations back-up PO2 Sangel then approached the area of transaction, introduced
himself as a police officer and placed accused-appellant under arrest. Accused-appellant was apprised of
the nature of the arrest and of her constitutional rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the seized dangerous drugs were inadmissible as evidence being the products of unlawful
arrest
RULING:
The warrantless arrest conducted on accused-appellant was valid. Paragraph (a) of Section 5, is commonly
known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to
be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act
is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. In the instant case, the prosecution
completely and fully established that accused-appellant was arrested in flagrante delicto. At any rate,
accused-appellant failed to raise any objection to the manner of her arrest before arraignment. She is now
estopped from assailing the legality of her arrest as she waived any irregularity, if any, that may have
tainted her arrest.
32
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMAN ZAFRA

G.R. No. 197363, JUNE 26, 2013
PONENTE: JUSTICE LEONARDO- DE CASTRO
(PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE)
FACTS:
AAA testified that her father, Zafra, started molesting her when she was around 13 or 14 years old. He
used to insert his finger in her vagina and mash her breasts, which progressed into actual sexual
intercourse when she was about 15. AAA claimed that her mother knew what her father was doing to her
but did nothing to stop it. Aside from her best friend in school, AAA told no one about her ordeal for fear
of her father, that her mother would not side with her, and that rumors about her would spread. Sometime
in November 2001 however, she moved to her aunts house, after she was again raped by Zafra. Zafra was
charged and convicted of qualified rape. He filed a Petition stating the error on the part of the RTC and
CA for relying on AAAs inconsistent testimony and thereafter convicting him despite the prosecutions
failure to rebut the presumption that he is innocent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite the failure of the prosecution to
overthrow the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favour.
RULING:
Inconsistencies on the testimony given by the victim do not impair her credibility and consequently, do
not negatively affect her case in relation to the accuseds constitutional presumption of innocence. The
Supreme Court has been regular in its declaration that [i]nconsistencies in a rape victims testimony do
not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the
essential fact of the commission of rape. Thus, Zafras attempt to discredit AAAs testimony that he
raped her on December 14, 2001 must ultimately fail for his failure to show solid grounds on which to
impeach it.
33
SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING vs.

ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY
G.R. No. 179736, JUNE 26, 2013
(RIGHT TO PRIVACY)
FACTS:
Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Basak, City
of Mandaue, Cebu. The respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo)
located adjacent to the property of petitioners. The respondents constructed an auto-repair shop building
(Aldo Goodyear Servitec). In April 2005, Aldo filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages
with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO against the petitioners who were constructing a fence without a
valid permit and that the said construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent to
petitioners property. The court denied Aldos application for preliminary injunction for failure to
substantiate its allegations. Later, in order to get evidence to support the said case, respondents illegally
set-up and installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras facing
petitioners property and respondents, through their employees and without the consent of petitioners, also
took pictures of petitioners on-going construction. On the other hand, the petitioners asserted that the
acts of respondents violate their right to privacy. Thus, petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to
remove the video surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a violation of petitioners right to privacy.
RULING:
Yes, there is. In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the reasonable
expectation of privacy test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy and whether the expectation has been violated. In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are
installed practically everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these
cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the
consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these
cameras be used to pry into the privacy of anothers residence or business office. In this case, considered
that petitioners have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their property, whether they use it as a
business office or as a residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing
petitioners property or covering a significant portion thereof, without their consent, is a clear violation of
their right to privacy. As we see then, the issuance of a preliminary injunction was justified.
34
VIRGINIA DE LOS SANTOS DIO, et. al. vs. JUDGE RAMON S. CAGUIOA/
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TIMOTHY J. DESMOND
G.R. No. 178947/G.R. No. 179079, June 26, 2013
(PROBABLE CAUSE)
FACTS:
These two cases are borne out by the following facts, to wit: (1) Desmond, as the Chairman and Chief
Executive Office of SBMEI and in order to persuade Dio to invest, represented that he possessed the
necessary influence, expertise and resources for the project knowing the same to be false as he never had
the capital for the project as borne out by his correspondences with Dio; and (2) Dio fell for these
misrepresentations and the lure of profit offered by Desmond, thereby being induced to invest the
amounts of $1,150,000.00 and $1,000,000.00 to the damage and prejudice of her company. Eventually,
after Dio was ousted as Director and Treasurer of SBMEI, she filed, on April 19, 2004, two criminal
complaints (subject criminal complaints) for estafa (a) through false pretenses under Article 315(1)(b) of
the Revised Penal Code26 (RPC); and (b) with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence through
misappropriation or conversion under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC, both against Desmond. After the
preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution, finding probable cause against
Desmond for the aforementioned crimes. The City Prosecutor stated that the elements of the crimes
charged were thus established, namely Dio parted with her money upon the prodding and enticement of
respondent on the false pretense that he had the capacity and resources for the proposed project. In the
end, Dio was not able to get her money back, thus causing her damage and prejudice. Moreover, such
defraudation or misappropriation having been committed by Desmond through his company SBMEI
involving funds solicited from Dio as a member of the general public in contravention of the public
interest, the probable cause clearly exists to indict Desmond for the crime of Estafa under Article 315
(1)(b) and (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to PD No. 1689. Aggrieved, Desmond filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, as well as a Motion to Withdraw Filed Information. However, withdrew the
same and filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause. The Court Appeals affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court which ruled in favor of Desmond.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it
dismissed the subject information for lack of probable cause
RULING:
The petitions are meritorious. Determination of probable cause may be either executive or judicial. The
first is made by the public prosecutor, during a preliminary investigation, where he is given broad
35
discretion to determine whether probable cause exists for the purpose of filing criminal information in
court. The second is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued
against the accused. In this respect, the judge must satisfy himself that, on the basis of the evidence
submitted, there is a necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice. If the judge, therefore, finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest
warrant. This prerogative is granted by no less than the Constitution which provides that no warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Applying these
principles, the Court finds that the RTCs immediate dismissal, as affirmed by the CA, was improper as
the standard of clear lack of probable cause was not observed. In this case, records show that certain
essential facts namely, (a) whether or not Desmond committed false representations that induced Dio to
invest in Ocean Adventure; and (b) whether or not Desmond utilized the funds invested by Dio solely for
the Miracle Beach Project for purposes different from what was agreed upon remain controverted. As
such, it cannot be said that the absence of the elements of the crime of estafa under Article 315(2)(a) and
315(1)(b) of the RPC had already been established, thus rendering the RTCs immediate dismissal of the
case highly inappropriate.
36
THE HEIRS OF SPOUSES DOMINGO TRIA and CONSORCIA CAMANO TRIA vs. LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
G.R. No. 170245, July 1, 2013
(JUST COMPENSATION)
FACTS:
During their lifetime, the deceased spouses Domingo Tria and Consorcia Camano owned a parcel of
agricultural land located at Sangay, Camarines Sur. By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27, which
mandated the emancipation of tenant-farmers from the bondage of the soil, the Government, sometime in
1972, took a sizeable portion of the deceased spouses property with a total area of 25.3830 hectares.
Thereafter, respondent Department of Agrarian Reform undertook the distribution and eventual transfer of
the property to thirty tenant beneficiariesPursuant to Section 2 of Executive Order No. 228, respondent
Land Bank of the Philippines made an offer on November 23, 1990 to pay petitioners, by way of
compensation for the land, the total amount of P182,549.98, broken down as follows: P18,549.98 of
which would be in cash, and the remaining P164,000.00 to be satisfied in the form of LBP Bonds. Not
satisfied with the LBPs valuation of their property, petitioners rejected their offer and filed a Complaint
before the Regional Trial Court of Naga City claiming that the just compensation for their property is
P2,700,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the valuation of the property for purposes of determining just compensation should be
based on the Government Support Price at the time the property was taken in 1972
RULING:
Based on the several decided cases in which the Court found it more equitable to determine just
compensation based on the value of said property at the time of payment. Considering that the present
case involves a similar factual milieu as the aforementioned cases, the Court deems it more equitable to
determine just compensation due the petitioners using values pursuant to the standard laid down in
Section 17 of RA No. 6657. Here, the property of the deceased spouses was placed under the land reform
program in October 1972, and since then the land was parceled out and distributed to some 30 tenantbeneficiaries by respondents without effecting immediate and prompt payment. Clearly, the tenantbeneficiaries have already benefited from the land, while petitioners wait in vain to be paid.
Unfortunately, it was only 19 years after the land was distributed by respondents that there was an action
on the part of respondents to pay petitioners.
37
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and

DISTRICT ENGINEER CELESTINO R. CONTRERAS vs.
SPOUSES HERACLEO and RAMONA TECSON
G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013
(JUST COMPENSATION)
FACTS:
Respondent spouses Heracleo and Ramona Tecson are co-owners of a parcel of land with an area of 7,268
square meters located in San Pablo, Malolos, Bulacan. Said parcel of land was among the properties taken
by the government sometime in 1940 without the owners consent and without the necessary
expropriation proceedings and used for the construction of the MacArthur Highway. Respondents
demanded the payment of the fair market value of the subject parcel of land. Then District Engineer of the
First Bulacan Engineering District of Department of Public Works and Highways, offered to pay the
subject land at the rate of P0.70 per square meter per Resolution of the Provincial Appraisal Committee of
Bulacan. Unsatisfied with the offer, respondents demanded for the return of their property or the payment
of compensation at the current fair market value. As their demand remained unheard, respondents filed a
Complaint for recovery of possession with damages against petitioners, praying that they be restored to
the possession of the subject parcel of land. Respondents claimed that the subject parcel of land was
assessed at P2,543,800.00. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the following grounds:
(1) that the suit is against the State which may not be sued without its consent; (2) that the case has
already prescribed;
ISSUE:
Whether or not the claim of the respondents has already prescribed.
RULING:
No. Laches is principally a doctrine of equity which is applied to avoid recognizing a right when to do so
would result in a clearly inequitable situation or in an injustice. This doctrine finds no application in this
case, since there is nothing inequitable in giving due course to respondents claim. Both equity and the
law direct that a property owner should be compensated if his property is taken for public use. Neither
shall prescription bar respondents claim following the long-standing rule that where private property is
taken by the Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto either through expropriation or
negotiated sale, the owners action to recover the land or the value thereof does not prescribe.
jurisprudence clearly provides for the remedies available to a landowner. The owner may recover his
property if its return is feasible or, if it is not, the aggrieved owner may demand payment of just
compensation for the land taken. For failure of respondents to question the lack of expropriation
38
proceedings for a long period of time, they are deemed to have waived and are estopped from assailing
the power of the government to expropriate or the public use for which the power was exercised. What is
left to respondents is the right of compensation.
39
FERNANDO M. ESPINO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G. R. No. 188217, July 3, 2013
(RIGHT TO KNOW THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION)
FACTS:
The accused was a senior sales executive in charge of liaising with import coordinators of the company
Kuehne and Nagel, Inc. His duties included the delivery of its commissions to the import coordinators. On
October 2002, the Fiscals Office of Paranaque charged the accused with six counts of estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) for allegedly rediscounting checks that were meant to be paid to the
companys import coordinators. During trial, the prosecution presented witnesses who testified to the fact
that the endorsements of the payee on six checks were forged, and that the checks were rediscounted by
the accuseds aunt-in-law. After trial, the RTC convicted the accused of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a). In response, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the trial court committed
a grave error in convicting him of estafa under paragraph 2(a), which was different from paragraph 1(b) of
Article 315 under which he had been charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right of the accused to know the nature and cause of the accusation against him was
violated
RULING:
No. The said right of the accused was not violated. Article 3, Section 14, paragraph 2 of the 1987
Constitution, requires the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
in order to adequately and responsively prepare his defense. The prosecutor is not required, however, to
be absolutely accurate in designating the offense by its formal name in the law. The fiscals statement in
the Information specifying the charges as estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, did not
bind the trial court insofar as the characterization of the nature of the accusation was concerned. The
statement never limited the RTCs discretion to read the Information in the context of the facts alleged.
The Information in this case may be interpreted as charging the accused with both estafa under paragraph
1 (b) and estafa under paragraph 2(a). It is a basic and fundamental principle of criminal law that one act
can give rise to two offenses, all the more when a single offense has multiple modes of commission.
40
HEIRS OF NUMERIANO MIRANDA, SR. vs. PABLO R. MIRANDA

G.R. No. 17963, July 8, 2013
(PROBABLE CAUSE)
FACTS:
Petitioners representing themselves as the heirs of Numeriano Miranda, Sr., filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, a Complain for Annulment of Titles and Specific Performance against the
heirs of Pedro Miranda, the heir of Tranquilino Miranda, and the spouses respondent Pablo Miranda and
Aida Lorenzo. The RTC ruled in favor of the latter. Petitioners did not file any appeal hence the Decision
became final and executory. On December 11, 2001, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution, which was not
implemented. Respondent filed with the RTC a Petition for Revival of Judgment. Petitioners opposed the
revival of judgment assailing, among others, the jurisdiction of the RTC to take cognizance of the Petition
for Revival of Judgment. RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. The latter filed a Notice of Appeal which
was subsequently opposed by the petitioners on the ground that the decision has long become final and
executory.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an action for revival of judgment is appealable
RULING:
Not appealable. It is basic and elementary that a Notice of Appeal should be filed within fifteen days
from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. In this case, however, the counsel for
petitioners filed the Notice of Appeal via a private courier, a mode of filing not provided in the Rules.
Though not prohibited by the Rules, we cannot consider the filing of petitioners Notice of Appeal via
LBC timely filed. It is established jurisprudence that the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letterforwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court; instead, the date of
actual receipt by the court is deemed the date of filing of that pleading. Records show that the Notice of
Appeal was mailed on the 15th day and was received by the court on the 16th day or one day beyond the
reglementary period.
41
RAFAEL L. COSCOLLUELA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES// EDWIN N. NACIONALES et. al. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 191411, G.R. No. 191871, July 15, 2013
PONENTE: JUSTICE PERLAS-BERNABE
(SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASE)
FACTS:
On November 9, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas received a letter-complaint dated
November 7, 2001 from Peoples Graftwatch, requesting for assistance to investigate the anomalous
purchase of medical and agricultural equipment for the Province in the amount of P20,000,000.00 which
allegedly happened around a month before Coscolluela stepped down from office. Acting on the lettercomplaint, the Case Building Team of the Office of the Ombudsman conducted its investigation, resulting
in the issuance of a Final Evaluation Report dated April 16, 2002 which upgraded the complaint into a
criminal case against petitioners. Consequently, petitioners filed their respective counter-affidavits. On
March 27, 2003, the Information was prepared and signed by Caares and submitted to Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas Primo C. Miro for recommendation. Miro recommended the approval of the
Information on June 5, 2003. However, the final approval of Acting Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro
came only on May 21, 2009, and on June 19, 2009, the Information was filed before the SB. On July 9,
2009, Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash, arguing, among others, that his constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases was violated as the criminal charges against him were resolved only after almost eight
years since the complaint was instituted. Nacionales, Malvas, and Amugod later adopted Coscolluelas
motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not his constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was violated
RULING:
Yes. The said right was violated. Hence, in the determination of whether the defendant has been denied
his right to a speedy disposition of a case, the following factors may be considered and balanced: (1) the
length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. In this case, the preliminary investigation proceedings
against the petitioners were not terminated upon Caares preparation of the March 27, 2003 Resolution
and Information but rather, only at the time Casimiro finally approved the same for filing with the SB. In
this regard, the proceedings were terminated only on May 21, 2009, or almost eight years after the filing
of the complaint. Also, there appears to be no justifiable basis as to why the Office of the Ombudsman
could not have earlier resolved the preliminary investigation proceedings against the petitioners. Records
42
show that they could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case because they were unaware that
the investigation against them was still on-going. They were only informed of the March 27, 2003
Resolution and Information against them only after the lapse of six long years, or when they received a
copy of the latter after its filing with the SB on June 19, 2009. In this regard, they could have reasonably
assumed that the proceedings against them have already been terminated. This serves as a plausible reason
as to why petitioners never followed-up on the case altogether.
43
POLICE SENIOR SUPERINTENDENT DIMAPINTO MACAWADIB vs. THE PHILIPPINE

NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTORATE FOR PERSONNEL AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT
G.R. No. 186610, July 29, 2013
(REVIVAL OF JUDGMENT)
FACTS:
On July 30, 2001, pursuant to Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, the Chief of
Directorial Staff of the Philippine National Police issued General Order No. 1168, enumerating the names
of commissioned officers who were subject to compulsory retirement on various dates in the month of
January 2002 by virtue of their attainment of the compulsory retirement age of 56. Among the names
included in the said Order was that of petitioner, who was supposed to retire on January 11, 2002, as the
files of the PNP Records indicate that he was born on January 11, 1946. On September 3, 2001, petitioner
filed an application for late registration of his birth with the Municipal Civil Registrar's Office of
Mulondo, Lanao del Sur. In the said application, petitioner swore under oath that he was born on January
11, 1956. The application was, subsequently, approved. On October 15, 2001, petitioner filed with the
RTC of Marawi City a Petition for Correction of Entry in the Public Service Records Regarding the Birth
Date. Subsequently, the RTC issued an Entry of Final Judgment indicating therein that its Decision in
favor of the petitioner has become final and executory on March 13, 2002. On January 8, 2008, herein
respondent filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the CA, seeking to nullify the abovementioned Decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Decision by the RTC was final and executor.
RULING:
No. It was not final and executory. The Court cannot help but entertain serious doubts on the veracity of
petitioner's claim that he was indeed born in 1956. The late registration of petitioner's certificate of live
birth on September 3, 2001 was made forty-five years after his supposed birth and a mere 34 days after
the PNP's issuance of its Order for his compulsory retirement. He had all the time to make such
registration but why did he do it only when he was about to retire? Suffice it to say that considering that
the assailed decision of the RTC is null and void, the same could not have attained finality. Settled is the
rule that a void judgment cannot attain finality and its execution has no basis in law.
44
THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ, MIRANDA AND ASEOCHE vs.

ATTY. JOSEJINA C. FRIA
G.R. 183014, August 7, 2013
PONENTE: JUSTICE PERLAS- BERNABE
(PROBABLE CAUSE)
FACTS:
The Law Firm was engaged as counsel by the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 03-110 instituted before Branch
203. On July 29, 2005, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, prompting the defendant in the
same case to appeal. However, Branch 203 disallowed the appeal and consequently ordered that a writ of
execution be issued to enforce the foregoing judgment. Due to the denial of the defendants motion for
reconsideration, the July 29, 2005 judgment became final and executory. In its Complaint-Affidavit dated,
The Law Firm alleged that as early as April 4, 2006, it had been following up on the issuance of a writ of
execution to implement the July 29, 2005 judgment. However, Atty. Fria vehemently refused to perform
her ministerial duty of issuing said writ. Atty. Fria, consequently, was indicted for the crime of Open
Disobedience. However, the same was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in sustaining the MTCs dismissal of the case for Open Disobedience
against Atty. Fria, for lack of probable cause
RULING:
The case for Open Disobedience was properly dismissed. Judges power to immediately dismiss a
criminal case would only be warranted when the lack of probable cause is clear. The dismissal ought to be
sustained since the records clearly disclose the unmistakable absence of the integral elements of the crime
of Open Disobedience. While the first element, i.e., that the offender is a judicial or executive officer,
concurs in view of Atty. Frias position as Branch Clerk of Court, the second and third elements of the
crime evidently remain wanting. The second element of the crime of Open Disobedience is that there is a
judgment, decision, or order of a superior authority made within the scope of its jurisdiction and issued
with all legal formalities. In this case, all the proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-110 have been regarded as
null and void due to Branch 203s lack of jurisdiction over the said case. The third element of the crime,
i.e., that the offender, without any legal justification, openly refuses to execute the said judgment,
decision, or order, which he is duty bound to obey, cannot equally exist. Indubitably, without any
jurisdiction, there would be no legal order for Atty. Fria to implement or, conversely, disobey. Besides, as
the MTC correctly observed, there lies ample legal justifications that prevented Atty. Fria from
immediately issuing a writ of execution.
45
ROSENDO R. CORALES and DR. RODOLFO R. ANGELES vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 186613, August 27, 2013
(JUDICIAL DETERMINATION)
FACTS:
In his first term as local chief executive, petitioner Corales appointed petitioner Dr. Angeles to the
position of Municipal Administrator, whose appointment was unanimously approved by the Sangguniang
Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna. During his second and third terms as municipal mayor, petitioner Corales
renewed the appointment of petitioner Dr. Angeles. But, on these times, the Sangguniang Bayan
disapproved petitioner Dr. Angeles appointment. Even so, petitioner Dr. Angeles continued to discharge
the functions and duties of a Municipal Administrator for which he received his annual salary. Following
an audit on various local disbursements, Maximo Andal, the Provincial State Auditor of Laguna, issued
an Audit Observation Memorandum. One of the things stated in the Memorandum is that nonetheless, it
is not the Municipality of Nagcarlan that should be made liable to pay for petitioner Dr. Angeles salary;
instead, it is petitioner Corales, being the appointing authority; a post audit of payrolls pertaining to the
payment of salaries, allowances and other incentives of petitioner Dr. Angeles from July 15 2001 up to
May 31, 2006; and in view thereof, it is recommended that an appropriate Notice of Disallowance be
issued for the payment of salary expenses incurred without legal basis by the Municipality of Nagcarlan.
Instead of submitting his comment or reply thereon, petitioner Corales, together with petitioner Dr.
Angeles, opted to file a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus against Andal and the then members of
the Sangguniang Bayan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the facts and circumstances surrounding the suit for prohibition is not yet ripe for judicial
determination.
RULING:
Petitioners contention is untenable. To exercise the power of judicial review, the following must be
present: (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the question must
be ripe for adjudication; and (3) the person challenging must have the standing. Relatively, question
must be ripe for adjudication. A question is considered ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. From the foregoing, it is
beyond doubt that the issuance of an AOM is, indeed, an initial step in the conduct of an investigative
audit considering that after its issuance there are still several steps to be conducted before a final
46
conclusion can be made or before the proper action can be had against the Auditee. There is, therefore, no
basis for petitioner Corales claim that his comment thereon would be a mere formality.
47
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GILBERT REYES WAGAS

G.R. No. 157943, September, 4, 2013
PONENTE: JUSTICE BERSAMIN
(PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE)
FACTS:
Ligaray testified that Wagas placed an order for 200 bags of rice over the telephone. He and his wife did
not agree at first to the proposed payment of the order by postdated check, but because of Wagas
assurance that he would not disappoint them and that he had the means to pay them because he had a
lending business and money in the bank, they yielded and accepted the order. Thereafter, he released the
goods to Wagas and at the same time received Bank of the Philippine Islands Check No. 0011003 for
P200,000.00 payable to cash and postdated May 8, 1997. He later deposited the check with Solid Bank,
his depository bank, but the check was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. He called Wagas about
the matter, and the latter told him that he would pay upon his return to Cebu. However, despite repeated
demands, Wagas did not pay him. Wagas appeals his conviction for estafa under the decision rendered on
July 11, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court in Cebu. Wagas admitted having issued BPI Check No.
0011003 to Caada, his brother-in-law, not to Ligaray. He denied having any telephone conversation or
any dealings with Ligaray. He explained that the check was intended as payment for a portion of Caadas
property that he wanted to buy, but when the sale did not push through, he did not anymore fund the
check. Nonetheless, Wagas was convicted for estafa.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accuseds constitutional presumption of innocence was violated
RULING:
Yes, the said right was violated. The presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the Prosecution to
demonstrate the guilt and not for the accused to establish innocence. Indeed, the accused, being presumed
innocent, carries no burden of proof on his or her shoulders. For this reason, the first duty of the
Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal. For even if the commission
of the crime can be established, without competent proof of the identity of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, there can be no conviction. In this case, the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt
that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check. The accused, to be guilty of estafa as
charged, must have used the check in order to defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud
or deceit, not the mere issuance of the worthless check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply
because he had issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still clearly show that it
had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by means of the check. Ligaray admitted that it
48
was Caada who received the rice from him and who delivered the check to him. Considering that the
records are bereft of any showing that Caada was then acting on behalf of Wagas, the RTC had no
factual and legal bases to conclude and find that Caada had been acting for Wagas. This lack of factual
and legal bases for the RTC to infer so obtained despite Wagas being Caadas brother-in-law. Lastly, it
is only fair that the caller be reliably identified first before a telephone communication is accorded
probative weight.
49
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

G.R. No. 203039, September, 11, 2013
PONENTE: JUSTICE CARPIO
(EMINENT DOMAIN)
FACTS:
The Department of Public Works and Highways filed a case for expropriation against portions of the
properties of Bank of the Philippine Islands and of Bayani Villanueva situated in Pamplona, Las Pias
City. DPWH needed 281 square meters of BPIs lot and 177 square meters from Villanuevas lot for the
construction of the Zapote-Alabang Fly-Over. Neither BPI nor Villanueva objected to the propriety of the
expropriation. Hence, the trial court constituted a Board of Commissioners to determine the just
compensation. In their Report, the Board of Commissioners recommended the amount of 40,000.00 per
square meter as the fair market value. Thereafter, the trial court in its Decision set the fair market value at
40,000.00 per square meter. Meanwhile, BPI filed a Motion for Partial New Trial to determine the just
compensation of its building, which was not included in the Decision that fixed the just compensation for
the parcels of land. The same was granted by the RTC and thereafter by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the additional just compensation for BPIs building in the amount fixed therefor is
unfounded and without legal basis
RULING:
No. The additional just compensation is with legal basis. The States power of eminent domain is limited
by the constitutional mandate that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. In this case, petitioner questions the appellate courts Decision affirming the trial courts
Order granting additional just compensation for consequential damages for BPIs building. Petitioner
contends that BPIs building was never taken by petitioner, and that to award consequential damages
for the building was unfounded and without legal basis. This is untenable. No actual taking of the building
is necessary to grant consequential damages. Consequential damages are awarded if as a result of the
expropriation, the remaining property of the owner suffers from impairment or decrease in value. Hence,
there was proper basis for the determination of just compensation for the building for consequential
damages.
50
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS

G.R 183110, October 7, 2013
(CITIZENSHIP)
FACTS:
Azucena, filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur. After all the
jurisdictional requirements mandated by Section 97 of Commonwealth Act 473 or the Naturalization Law
had been complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known profitable trade.
Finding the grounds relied upon by the OSG to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied said Motion.
Thereafter, the hearing for the reception of Azucenas evidence was then set. During the hearing, it was
only Azucena who presented evidence. RTC granted the Petition for Naturalization. The OSG filed an
Omnibus Motion stating that the ex-parte presentation of evidence violates the Naturalization Law for it
requires public hearing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ex-parte presentation of evidence violates the Naturalization Law
RULING:
No. It is not a violation of the Naturalization Law. Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine
citizenship through either judicial naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under
Republic Act No. 9139 , third option, called derivative naturalization, which is available to alien women
married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473. There is no proceeding authorized by
the law or by the Rules of Court, for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Such
judicial declaration of citizenship cannot even be decreed pursuant to an alternative prayer therefor in a
naturalization proceeding. This case however is not a Petition for judicial declaration of Philippine
citizenship but rather a Petition for judicial naturalization under CA 473. In the first, the petitioner
believes he is a Filipino citizen and asks a court to declare or confirm his status as a Philippine citizen. In
the second, the petitioner acknowledges he is an alien, and seeks judicial approval to acquire the privilege
of becoming a Philippine citizen based on requirements required under CA 473. Azucena has clearly
proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of that privilege, and this Court
will not stand in the way of making her a part of a truly Filipino family.
51
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs JONAS GUILLEN Y ATIENZA

G.R. No. 191756, November 25, 2013
(RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT)
FACTS:
As per the prosecution, it was around 12 midnight, AAA was inside her house waiting for her husband to
arrive when a man knocked from the door. When AAA opened the said door, accused Atienza forced his
way to the house, turned off the lights, removed each others clothes and succeeded raping the victim.
After the rape was consummated, AAA went outside and sought assistance from her sister-in-law. The
latter called the police and since Atienza was just the neighbor of AAA, he was easily identified and
arrested. Thereafter, a criminal complaint for rape was filed against AAA. The RTC and even the CA
rendered a judgment convicting appellant of the said crime. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused was violated when the latter
just remained silent and passive when being confronted by AAA at the police precinct.
RULING:
Yes. The accuseds silence should not be used against him as he was exercising his constitutional right to
remain silent. It should be borne in mind that when appellant was brought to the police
station, he was already a suspect to the crime of rape. As such, he was already under custodial
investigation. When appellant remained silent when confronted by the accusation of AAA at the police
station, he was exercising his basic and fundamental right to remain silent. At that stage, his silence
should not be taken against him. Thus, it was error on the part of the trial court to state that appellants
silence should be deemed as implied admission of guilt. In fact, this right cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel and any admission obtained in violation of this rule shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
However, the court agrees with the judgment made by the trial court and as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals finding appellant guilty of the crime of rape. The trial courts Decision convicting appellant of
rape was anchored not solely on his silence and so-called implied admission. More importantly, it was
based on the testimony of AAA which, standing alone, is sufficient to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
52
BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND PERRY L. PE

Vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 206794, November 26, 2013
(DUE PROCESS AND RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT)
FACTS:
The Petitioners, Bankers Association of the Philippines and Perry L. Pe, assail the constitutionality and
legality of the respondent Commission on Elections' (Comelec's) Resolution No. 96881 dated May 7,
2013, entitled "In the Matter of Implementing a Money Ban to Deter and Prevent Vote-Buying in
Connection with the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections (Money Ban Resolution).The petitioners
included a prayer for the issuance of a status quo ante/temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin its implementation. According to the petitioners, the Money Ban
Resolution violates an individuals due process rights because it unduly and unreasonably restricts and
prohibits the withdrawal, possession and transportation of cash. The prohibition effectively curtails a
range of legitimate activities, and hampers and prejudices property rights. Though the intent (i.e., to curb
vote-buying and selling) is laudable, the means employed is not reasonably necessary and is oppressive
on an individuals rights. Lastly, the argued that the said resolution violates a persons constitutional right
to be presumed innocent because it declares that all cash being transported and carried exceeding
P500,000.00 shall be presumed for the purpose of vote-buying and electoral fraud in violation of the
money ban. On the part of Comelec, they argue that it has the constitutional authority to supervise and
regulate banks and other financial entities as enshrined under the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Is the said resolution constitutional?
RULING:
Yes. The case was dismissed due to being moot and academic. However, one of recognized exception to
the said doctrine is when the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The Court notes that
Comelec did not make any parallel move on or about the May 13, 2013 elections to address the evil that
its Money Ban Resolution sought to avoid and, in fact, it did not issue a similar resolution for the October
28, 2013 barangay elections. If the May 13, 2013 elections had come and gone without any need for the
measures the assailed Resolution put in place and if no such measure was necessary in the elections that
immediately followed (i.e., the October 28, 2013 barangay elections), we believe that it is now premature
53
for the Court to assume that a similar Money Ban Resolution would be issued in the succeeding elections
such that we now have to consider the legality of the Comelec measure that is presently assailed.
Further, the court considers it significant that the BSP and the Monetary Board continue to possess full
and sufficient authority to address the Comelecs concerns and to limit banking transactions to legitimate
purposes without need for any formal Comelec resolution if and when the need arises. Congress, too, at
this point should have taken note of this case and has the plenary authority, through its law making
powers, to address the circumstances and evils the Money Ban Resolution sought to address. In other
words, Congress can very well act to consider the required measures for future elections, thus rendering
unnecessary further action on the merits of the assailed Money Ban Resolution at this point.
54
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. AND LA FUNERARIA PAZ- SUCAT, INC.

VS SECRETARY OF DSWD
G.R. No. 175356, December 13, 2013
(POLICE POWER)
FACTS:
Herein Petitioners assail the constitutionality of section 4 of RA 9257 and the implementing rules and
regulations issued by DSWD as far as it allows business establishments to claim the 20% discount given
to senior citizens as a tax deduction on the ground that it runs afoul with the Constitutional requirement
the no private property shall be taken without just compensation. To support their contention, they cited
the cases of Central Luzon Corporation where it was ruled that the 20% discount privilege constitutes
taking of private property for public use without just compensation, and the Carlos Superdrug Corporation
vs DSW, where it was acknowledged that the tax deduction scheme does not meet the constitutional
requirement. On the part of the respondents, they contend that the case does not present a justiciable
controversy and they (petitioners) failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality of the assailed law.
ISSUE:
Is the said law constitutional?
RULING:
Yes, the validity of the 20% senior citizen discount and tax deduction scheme under RA 9257, as an
exercise of police power of the state, has already been settled in Carlos Superdrug Corporation. The law is
a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare
for its object .Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general
terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits.
We have to remember that the assailed law, by imposing a senior citizen discount, does not take any of
the properties used by a business establishment. Second, rather than a taking of property, the law is treated
to regulate the prices of goods and services being sold to senior citizens by mandating a 20% discount.
Third, because the law impacts the prices of the goods or services of a particular establishment relative to
its sales to senior citizens, its profits or income/gross sales are affected. The extent of the impact would,
however, depend on the profit margin of the business establishment on a particular good or service. But
note that since not all customers of a business establishment are senior citizens, the business
establishment may continue to earn P1.00 from non-senior citizens which, in turn, can offset any loss
arising from sales to senior citizens. Fourth, when the law imposes the 20% discount in favor of senior
55
citizens, it does not prevent the business establishment from revising its pricing strategy. By revising its
pricing strategy, a business establishment can recoup any reduction of profits or income/gross sales which
would otherwise arise from the giving of the 20% discount.
As to its nature and effects, the 20% discount is a regulation affecting the ability of private establishments
to price their products and services relative to a special class of individuals, senior citizens, for which the
Constitution affords preferential concern. In turn, this affects the amount of profits or income/gross sales
that a private establishment can derive from senior citizens.
Lastly, petitioners were not able to prove that the 20% discount will be unreasonable, oppressive and
confiscatory. No evidence, such as a financial report, to establish the impact of the 20% discount on the
overall profitability of the petitioners was presented in order to show that they would be operating at a
loss due to the subject regulation.
56
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAY MONTEVIRGEN Y ORAZAGA

G.R. No. 189840, December 11, 2013
FACTS:
Appellant Montevirgen was indicted before the trial court for an information charging him of illegal
possession and selling and distribution of Shabu after a buy bust operation conducted by the Makati
Police officers. He, however, contends that there was non-compliance with the requirements for the
proper custody of seized dangerous drugs under RA 9165.
ISSUE:
Does failure to Physically Inventory and Photograph the shabu after seizure and confiscation fatal to the
prosecution of the appellant?
RULING:
No, it is not fatal, the failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required
physical inventory and take photograph of the objects confiscated does not ipso facto render inadmissible
in evidence the items seized. There is a proviso in the implementing rules stating that when it is shown
that there exist justifiable grounds and proof that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence have
been preserved, the seized items can still be used in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.
In the present case, the prosecution was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the shabu.
PO3 Ruiz, the poseur-buyer and apprehending officer, marked the seized items in front of appellant, the
barangay captain and other members of the buy-bust team, immediately after the consummation of the
drug transaction. He then delivered the seized items to the duty investigator, who in turn sent the same to
the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination on the same day. During trial, PO3 Ruiz was able to identify
the said markings and explain how they were made.
Therefore, there was no hiatus or confusion in the confiscation, handling, custody and examination of the
shabu. The illegal drugs that were confiscated from appellant, taken to the police headquarters, subjected
to qualitative examination at the crime laboratory, and finally introduced in evidence against appellant
were the same illegal drugs that were confiscated from him when he was caught in flagrante delicto
selling and possessing the same.
57
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No.188165, December 11, 2013
(SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES)
FACTS:
Congressman Villarama of Bulacan, in his privilege speech, revealed the so called 2 million dollar man,
a high ranking official allegedly receiving bribery. With this, the President ordered that the same be
investigated. After investigation, it was found out that there exists a probable cause to charge the then
Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez of violations of RA 3019 and robbery under Art 293 of the Revised
Penal Code. Trial ensued and the court rendered a judgment in favour of Perez.
ISSUE:
Was there a violation of the respondents rights to speedy disposition of cases?
RULING:
Yes. The Sandiganbayan did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in finding that there had been an
inordinate delay in the resolution of the charge against the respondents. The constitutional right to a
speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties
in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasijudicial hearings. While the concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible, such that a mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient, the right to the speedy disposition of a case,
like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated when the proceedings are attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried.
The acts of the respondents that the Office of the Ombudsman investigated had supposedly occurred in
the period from February 13, 2001 to February 23, 2001. Yet, the criminal complaint came to be initiated
only on November 25, 2002 when Ombudsman Marcelo requested PAGC to provide his office with the
documents relevant to the expos of Cong. Villarama. It was only on November 6, 2006, however, when
the Special Panel created to investigate Cong. Jimenezs criminal complaint issued the Joint Resolution
recommending that the criminal informations be filed against the respondents. Ombudsman Gutierrez
approved the Joint Resolution only on January 5, 2007.93The Special Panel issued the second Joint
Resolution denying the respondents motion for reconsideration on January 25, 2008, and Ombudsman
Gutierrez approved this resolution only on April 15, 2008. In sum, the fact-finding investigation and
preliminary investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman lasted nearly five years and five months.
It is clear from the foregoing that the Office of the Ombudsman had taken an unusually long period of
timejust to investigate the criminal complaint and to determine whether to criminally charge the
respondents in the Sandiganbayan. Such long delay was inordinate and oppressive, and constituted under
the peculiar circumstances of the case an outright violation of the respondents right under the
Constitution to the speedy disposition of their cases.
58
GEORGE ANTIQUERA vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 180661, December 11, 2013
PONENTE: JUSTICE ABAD
FACTS:
Antiquera was charged before the courts of illegal possession of drugs. This rooted from a warrantless
arrest and a subsequent search made by Police officers upon sighting through an ajar door of the accused
engaged in pot session. Both the lower court and the Court of Appeals rendered a judgment convicting
Antiquera on the ground that the latters arrest results from a valid warrantless arrest.
ISSUE:
Was the search and arrest valid?
RULING:
No. The circumstances surrounding the case does not fall under the in flagrante delicto arrest. The
police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men suddenly rush out of 107
David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had been committed, the natural thing for
them to do was to give chase to the jeep that the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a
patrol car and a tricycle. Running after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers
instead gave priority to the house even when they heard no cry for help from it and the police officers did
not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they
peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it.
Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of
accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was
illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal.16Consequently, the various drug
paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having
proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus
delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused.
59
PHESCHEM INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION vs.

ATTY. SURIGAO AND VILLARDO
A.C. No. 8269, December 11, 2013
PONENTE: JUSTICE REYES
(POLICE POWER)
FACTS:
A disbarment case has been filed by Petitioner Pheschem against Respondent lawyers when the lawyers
themselves joined in blocking the Corporations trucks from hauling out limestone to its manufacturing
plant in another part of town. According to Respondents, Pheschem was not able to comply with the
requirements laid down in the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) duly issued by the DENR.
With this, the Sanguniang Bayan of Palompon issued a resolution opposing any re-application for an ECC
by Pheschem. The Lawyers were suspended for 1 month and so they brought the case to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Was the resolution issued by the Sanguniang Bayan a valid exercise of police power?
RULING:
Yes. The State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police power to local government
units, as agencies of the State, in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of
theircreation.36Thisdelegation is embodied in the general welfare clause, Section16,37of
R.A.No.7160.Police power is essentially regulatory in nature, and the power to issue licenses or grant
business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this
power.38Consistent with this principle, the CA held in the aforesaid petitions that the quarry permit
issued by the Governor of Leyte to Pheschem is contingent on its compliance with the terms and
conditions of the ECC. Thus, the quarry permit cannot be said to have vested in Pheschem an absolute,
unconditional right to quarry or to mine, such that if it fails to comply with any of the terms and
conditions of the ECC, there would be no right to quarry or mine to speak of. The CA stressed that a
license or permit is not a contract between the sovereign and the grantee, but a special privilege, a
permission or authority to do what would be within its terms; that it is neither vested nor permanent that
can at no time be withdrawn or taken back by the grant
.
The local government unit exercises governmental powers and performs governmental duties as an
agency of the national government. Thus, in relation to Section 16 of R.A. No. 7160, Section 447 of the
Local Government Code, which enumerates the powers, duties and functions of the municipality, grants
the Sangguniang Bayan the power to, among other things, enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants.
60
WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION AND

CHERRYLL YU vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 161106, January 13, 2013
FACTS:
Police Chief Inspector Villegas filed applications for search warrants on the premises of World Wide Web
Corporation. The application alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass operations,
which amounted to theft and violation of P.D. No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of
Water, Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other
Acts), to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).
According to Rivera, a legitimate international long distance call should pass through the local exchange
or public switch telephone network (PSTN)on to the toll center of one of the international gateway
facilities Decision 3G.R. Nos. 161106 & 161266 (IGFs)7in the Philippines.8The call is then transmitted
to the other country through voice circuits ,either via fiber optic submarine cable or microwave radio
using satellite facilities, and passes the toll center of one of the IGFs in the destination country. The toll
center would then meter the call, which will pass through the PSTN of the called number to complete the
circuit. In contrast, petitioners were able to provide international long distance call services to any part of
the world by using PLDTs telephone lines, but bypassing its IGF.
Due to this, a search warrant was duly issued and resulted to the seizure of over a hundred items including
15 CPUs, 10 monitors, numerous wires, cables, diskettes and files and a laptop computer. Petitioners
filed their motion to quash the warrant which was granted by the RTC. However, the said quashal was
reversed by the CA. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Were the search warrants issued are in the nature of a general warrant?
RULING:
No. The requirement of particularity in the description of things to be seized is fulfilled when the items
described in the search warrant bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is sought. In the
present case, considering that items that looked like innocuous goods were being used to pursue an
illegal operation that amounts to theft, law enforcement officers would be hard put to secure a search
warrant if they were required to pinpoint items with one hundred percent precision. In People v. Veloso,
the court pronounced that the police should not be hindered in the performance of their duties, which are
difficult enough of performance under the best of conditions, by superficial adherence to technicality or
far-fetched judicial interference
A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of the things to be seized when
the things described are limited to those that bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is
being issued.
To the courts mind, PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to be searched as
identified in the warrants and the crime of theft of its telephone services and business. Prior to the
application for the search warrants, Rivera conducted ocular inspection of the premises of petitioners and
was then able to confirm that they had "utilized various telecommunications equipment consisting of
computers, lines, cables, a 1tennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers, PABX or switching equipment, a d
61
support equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other documentary records to support
the illegal toll bypass operations.
62
DENNIS VILLAREAL vs. CONSUELO ALIGA

G.R. No. 166995, January 13, 2014
(DOUBLE JEOPARDY)
FACTS:
Villareal is the President and and General Manager of Dentrade, Inc. He maintains checking accounts
with the China Bank. These checking accounts are under the custody of Respondent Aliga. Aliga will be
the one to personally prepare the checks by typing its contents and submits them to villareal for his
signature. Sometime in October 1996, Villareal was surprised to know that there were large encashments
reflected on the checks in typewritten form and this was made without his authority. Upon counsels
advice, Villareal went and asked the NBI to investigate on the matter. Upon investigation, it points out
that it was Respondent who falsified the checks. On her part, respondent said that, upon arrest, she was
never informed of her constitutional right to be silent and to be assisted by counsel and that she was not in
charge of the checks but Martinez and Perez. The RTC convicted her of the crime charged. However, the
CA reversed the same on the grounds of: (1) her admission or confession of guilt before the NBI
authorities, which already qualifies as a custodial investigation, is inadmissible in evidence because she
was not informed of her rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of her own choice; and (2)the totality of the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is
insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Does the judgment of acquittal by CA amount to a final one such that double jeopardy would attach?
RULING:
Yes. First, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules should have been filed instead of herein
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.The People may assail a judgment of acquittal only via
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. If the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely
calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right of the accused
against double jeopardy would be violated.
Second, a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable,
and immediately executory upon its promulgation. However, the rule against double jeopardy is not
without exceptions, which are: (1) Where there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a
finding of a mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion. Unfortunately for petitioner,
neither of the exceptions was present in this case. There is no deprivation of due process or a mistrial. In
fact, petitioner did not make any allegation to that effect. What the records show is that during the trial,
both parties had more than sufficient occasions to be heard and to present their evidence. The same is true
during the appeal before the CA. The State, represented by the OSG, was not deprived of a fair
opportunity to prove its case AND no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the CA. It could not
be said that its judgment was issued without jurisdiction, and, for this reason, void. Again, petitioner did
not even allege that the CA gravely abused its discretion. Instead, what he asserted was that the CA
gravely erred in the evaluation and assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. Certainly, what
he questioned was the purported errors of judgment or those involving misappreciation of evidence or
errors of law, which, as aforesaid, cannot be raised and be reviewed in a Rule 65 petition. To repeat ,a
writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave abuse
of discretion, not those which call for the evaluation of evidence and factual findings.
63
SATURNINO OCAMPO vs. HONORABLE EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding

Judge of the RTC of Hilongos Leyte
G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014
FACTS:
Police Chief Inspector Almaden of the PNP and Staff Judge Advocate Captain Tiu of the Philippine
Army sent 12 undated letters to the provincial prosecutor of Leyte. The letters requests for appropriate
legal action on 12 complaint- affidavits attached therewith accusing 71named members of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP of murder. The letters also narrated The letters narrated that on 26 August 2006,
elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army discovered a mass grave site of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte. Recovered from the grave
site were 67 severely deteriorated skeletal remains believed to be victims of Operation VD. On the basis
of the affidavits, Prosecutor Vivero issued a subpoena requiring among others, petitioners to submit their
counter-affidavits and those of their witnesses. The Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information
and the same was filed before the RTC. Judge Abando, to whom the case was assigned, issued an Order
finding Probable cause. He also ordered for the issuance of warrant of arrest against them. Petitioner
Ocampo now questions the legality of Judge Abandos act contending that there was no probable cause in
lieu of the issuance of the warrant.
ISSUE:
Was the warrant of arrest validly issued by Judge Abando?
RULING:
Yes. Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested. Although the Constitution provides that probable
cause shall be determined by the judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof.
In fact, the judges personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and
indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest. It is enough that the judge
personally evaluates the prosecutors report and supporting documents showing the existence of probable
cause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the basis of his
evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the prosecutor's resolution and require the submission
of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence. The determination of probable
64
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of
Judge Abando as the trial judge.
Here, the allegations of petitioners point to factual matters indicated in the affidavits of the complainants
and witnesses as bases for the contention that there was no probable cause for petitioners indictment for
multiple murder or for the issuance of warrants for their arrest. As stated above, the trial judges
appreciation of the evidence and conclusion of facts based thereon are not interfered with in the absence
of grave abuse of discretion. Again, he sufficiently complies with the requirement of personal
determination if he reviews the Information and the documents attached thereto, and on the basis thereof
forms a belief that the accused is probably guilty of the crime with which he is being charged.
65
LUCENA D. DEMAALA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 173523, February 19, 2014
(DUE PROCES CLAUSE)
FACTS:
Petitioner Lucena Demaala is the Municipal Mayor of Narra, Palawan, and is accused for violations of
RA 3019, which case is pending before the Sandiganbayan. Later on, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to suspend the accused pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 3019, wherein
suspension is mandatory. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion. Demaala filed a Motion for
Reconsideration saying that the motion to suspend should have been filed earlier and not when the
prosecution is about to conclude the presentation of evidence. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner now goes before the Supreme Court arguing that
Sandiganabayans denial of his motion is irregular on the ground that she was deprived of the opportunity
to be heard.
ISSUE:
Was the petitioners right to due process violated when the Sandiganbayan denied her motion for
reconsideration?
RULING:
No. there was nothing procedurally irregular in the issuance of the assailed May 23, 2006 Resolution by
the Sandiganbayan. The contention that petitioner was deprived of her day in court is plainly specious; it
simply does not follow. Where a party was afforded the opportunity to participate in the proceedings, yet
he failed to do so, he cannot be allowed later on to claim that he was deprived of his day in court. It
should be said that petitioner was accorded ample opportunity to be heard through her pleadings. Her
excuse that she no longer bothered to go to court on April 26, 2006since she had no business to be
there is unavailing. By being absent at the April 21, 2006 hearing, petitioner did not consider the
prosecutions manifestation and motion to reset trial as related to her pending Motion for Reconsideration.
Thus, it was incumbent upon her to have attended the hearing of her own motion on April 26, 2006. Her
absence at said hearing was inexcusable, and the Sandiganbayan was therefore justified in considering the
matter submitted for resolution based on the pleadings submitted.
66
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DPWH vs

ORTIGAS AND COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
G.R. No. 171496, March 3, 2014
PONENTE: JUSTICE LEONEN
(JUST COMPENSATION)
FACTS:
Upon the request of the Department of Public Works and Highways, respondent Ortigas caused the
segregation of its property into five lots and reserved one portion for road widening for the C-5
flyover project.2 It designated Lot 5-B-2-A, a 1,445-square-meter portion of its property, for the road
widening of Ortigas Avenue. Ortigas also caused the annotation of the term road widening on its
title. The title was then inscribed with an encumbrance that it was for road widening and subject to
Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree. When the lots were
further subdivided, Ortigas filed with the RTC a petition for authority to sell to the government one of
the subdivided lots and the same was granted. Petitioner Republic though the OSG filed an opposition
contending that respondents property can only be conveyed by virtue of a donation to the government,
citing Section 50 of PD 1529 (Property Registration Decree) and the same was denied. They brought the
matter to the appellate courts, but to no avail, their petition was denied. Hence, this present case to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Does the case fall under expropriation proceedings?
RULING:
Yes. Sec. 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 does not apply in a case that is the proper subject of
an expropriation proceeding. Respondent Ortigas may sell its property to the government. It must be
compensated because its property was taken and utilized for public road purpose. Petitioner Republic of
the Philippines reliance on Section 50 of the Property Registration Decree is erroneous. Section 50
contemplates roads and streets in a subdivided property, not public thoroughfares built on a private
property that was taken from an owner for public purpose. A public thoroughfare is not a subdivision road
or street.
More importantly, when there is taking of private property for some public purpose, the owner of the
property taken is entitled to be compensated. There is taking when the following elements are present:
67
1.The government must enter the private property; 2.The entrance into the private property must be
indefinite or permanent; 3.There is color of legal authority in the entry into the property; 4.The property is
devoted to public use or purpose; 5.The use of property for public use removed from the owner all
beneficial enjoyment of the property.
All of the above elements are present in this case. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines construction of a
road a permanent structure on respondent Ortigas property for the use of the general public is an
obvious permanent entry on petitioner Republic of the Philippines part. Given that the road was
constructed for general public use stamps it with public character, and coursing the entry through the
Department of Public Works and Highways gives it a color of legal authority.
68
SESBRENO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 160689, March 26 2014
FACTS:
VECO is a public utility corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. It is
engaged in the sale and distribution of electricity within Metropolitan Cebu. Sesbreo was one of
VECOs customers under the metered service contract they had entered into. To ensure that its electric
meters were properly functioning, and that none of it meters had been tampered with, VECO employed
respondents Engr. Felipe Constantino and Ronald Arcilla as violation of contract (VOC) inspectors. It
happened one afternoon when the inspectors were conducting a routine inspection of the houses at La
Paloma Village, Libangon Cebu City, including Petitioners house, for illegal connections, meter
tampering, seals, conduit pipes, jumpers, writing connections and meter installatios. It so happened that
upon entering Sesbrenos house, they saw the meters turned upside down. The VOC took photographs of
the same and asked permission if they can enter the house to see the electric load that Petitioner has been
consuming. Sesbreno, on his part, challenged the search made by the VOC team. According to him, there
was no permission whatsoever given prior to the entry of the inspection team. He now claims for damages
for the breach of contract made by VECO.
ISSUE:
Was Sesbrenos right against unlawful search violated so much so that he is entitled to recover damages?
RULING:
No. The constitutional guaranty against unlawful searches and seizures is intended as a restraint against
the Government and its agents tasked with law enforcement. It is to be invoked only to ensure freedom
from arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of State power. worth noting that the VOC inspectors decided to
enter the main premises only after finding the meter of Sesbreo turned upside down, hanging and
its disc not rotating. Their doing so would enable them to determine the unbilled electricity consumed by
his household. The circumstances justified their decision, and their inspection of the main premises was a
continuation of the authorized entry. There was no question then that their ability to determine the
unbilled electricity called for them to see for themselves the usage of electricity inside. Not being agents
of the State, they did not have to first obtain a search warrant to do so.
69

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LETICIA DIONA, represented by her attorney-in-fact,

MARCELINA DIONA vs. BALAGUE.

NELSON VALENO y LUCITO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs.

SPOUSES JESUS L. CABAHUG AND CORONACION M. CABAHUG vs.

DON DJOWEL SALES y ABALAHIN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LINDA ALVIZ y YATCO,

RAMON MARTINEZ y GOCO/RAMON GOCO y MARTINEZ @ MON

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. RAMOS S. CAGUIOA, Presiding Judge,

RAMONCITA O. SENADOR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

HON. MA. LOURDES C. FERNANDO, in her capacity as

Spouses NERIO and SOLEDAD PADOR, and REY PADOR vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

PELIZOY REALTY CORPORATION, represented herein by its president,

ADONIS vs. SUPERINTENDENT TESORO

RODRIGO RONTOS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE ARMANDO CERVANTES et.al.

ALPS TRANSPORTATION and/or ALFREDO E. PEREZ vs.

PRIVATIZATION and MANAGEMENT OFFICE vs. STRATEGIC ALLIANCE

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VIRGINIA PALMARES, et.al.

REPUBLIC GAS CORPORATION et. al. vs. PETRON CORPORATION et.al

JESUS C. GARCIA vs. JUDGE RAY ALAN T. DRILON

Petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant,

prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of

CARLOS L. TANENGGEE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MONICA MENDOZA

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMAN ZAFRA

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING vs.

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and

FERNANDO M. ESPINO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

HEIRS OF NUMERIANO MIRANDA, SR. vs. PABLO R. MIRANDA

RAFAEL L. COSCOLLUELA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE

POLICE SENIOR SUPERINTENDENT DIMAPINTO MACAWADIB vs. THE PHILIPPINE

THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ, MIRANDA AND ASEOCHE vs.

ROSENDO R. CORALES and DR. RODOLFO R. ANGELES vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GILBERT REYES WAGAS

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs JONAS GUILLEN Y ATIENZA

BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND PERRY L. PE

MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. AND LA FUNERARIA PAZ- SUCAT, INC.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAY MONTEVIRGEN Y ORAZAGA

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

GEORGE ANTIQUERA vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

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WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION AND

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SATURNINO OCAMPO vs. HONORABLE EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding

LUCENA D. DEMAALA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

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