The Sleipner Platform Accident

Bernt Jakobsen, Dr Eng.

Finn Rosendahi, Civil Eng.
Norwegian Contractors a.s.. Stabbek. Norway

crete platform which did not deviate

significantly from earlier platforms of
the Condeep type.
However, this structure suffered a major leakage and sank in the Gansfjord
off Stavanger early in the morning of
August 23, 1991. Although huge, the
losses were only material. Thanks to
the presence of mind of all those on
the scene at the time of the accident,
all

14 people onboard the platform

were rescued without injuries.

Immediately following the accident,

on the very same day, the operator of
the Sleipner Field and the designer!
builder of the GBS each established
independent investigation committees

Fig. 1: Artist's vieic: SleipnerA Platform

Introduction
The Sleipner Field development in the
North Sea is the key to the enormous
Troll gas contract which will meet up

to 10% of the western Europe's gas

demand over a period of some 30
years. The Sleipner platform alone
covers the first three years of this con-

tract. the largest multinational trade

contract ever entered into by Norwegian companies. Timely start-up of gas

deliveries was seen as a critical first

the draft was 97.5 m. The day before.

the platform had been down to 90 m.
then to 77 m for repair of minor leakages in the B3 and C6 shafts before the

test run was continued in a normal

manner. No unusual events had been
reported before the accidental leakage
started.

Investigation Methodology
Based on underwater inspections, it
was very soon apparent that the structure had been so completely demolished by the accident that no physical
evidence would be found to clarify its
cause.

to determine the circumstances related

to the accident and its probable cause.
Due to the gas delivery commitments.
it was extremely important to identify
the causes of the accident as quickly as
possible, thus enabling start-up of construction of a second GBS.

working methodology that aimed at

establishing a series of events which

On the day following the accident, at

the request of the operator, a construction plan for a new platform was presented. The planning and preparation

ble causes. with subsequent elimination of the unlikely ones, as well as

forming a likely hypothesis for the
cause of the accident supported by an-

for the new platform and the investiga-

alytical calculations.

The designer!contractor's investigation committee therefore chose a

logically fit physical causes to the eyewitness observations. This methodology included identification of all possi-

tion into the causes of the accident

thus proceeded in parallel. On the assumption that the cause of the accident
would be quickly found, the operator
secured the necessary agreements in
principle from their partners to start
the rebuilding.

step in realizing this contract and a test

of the credibility of Norway as a reli-

able European energy partner. First

delivery of gas was set to begin on October 1, 1993.

The gravity base structure (GBS) of

the Sleipner A platform (Fig. 1) was a
cornerstone of the Sleipner development. It was the twelfth in a series of
GBS platforms designed and built b'
the contractor for use in the exploitation of hydrocarbons in the North Sea.
The platform was going to operate in
82 m of water and had 24 caisson cells

of which four extended upwards to

form the deck-supporting shafts. A
view of one of the shafts with mechan-

ical outfitting is given in Fig. 2. The

Sleipner A Platform was a typical con190

Lessons from Structural Failures

The Accident
When the accident occurred, the platform was undergoing a controlled ballast test operation prior to deck mating, which was going to take place on
September 1. The purpose of such a

test run is to check the structure for

minor leakages. to test the mechanical
equipment under real operations and

to familiarize the personnel with the

operating systems.

From the first sign of the accident, a

deep bang-like sound in the D3 shaft,
it took 18'/2 minutes before the platform disappeared from the surface of
the sea. When ingress of water started,

Fig. 2: D3 s/ia ft

Structural Engineering International 3/94

Probable Cause
The investigation identified only one
area with significant weaknesses: the
tricell walls and their supports towards
the cell joints (Fig. 3). Calculations also
showed that the load at the time of the
accident was at or near the ultimate capacity of these walls. Upper and lower
boundary estimates of the capacity of

the walls were 1.2 and 0.8 times the

real failure load, respectively.

In this phase, the tricells communicat-

Fig. 3: Tricell wall where failure occurred

Fig. 4: Finite element nodel

pacitv to about 350 m3!min and also

caused the mentioned sudden drop of
the water pressure in the tricell immediately following the formation of the

crack width of 3040 mm corresponds

to the water ingress experienced.

ed directly with the surrounding sea

through a 500 mm diameter hole in the
slab at the top of the tricell. The differ-

ential water pressure over the major

parts of the tricell walls of the main
cells was 67 m waterhead at the time of
failure.

The reasons for the weaknesses and

correspondingly reduced load-bearing
capacity were recognized to be:

However, the horizontal axial membrane compression force, a result of

the external water pressure on the

caisson, would be reduced by some

the sinking rate

shock-like nature of the failure: one

initial bang, sudden shock vibra-

Unfavorable geometrical shaping of

4050% in the neighboring tricell walls

some finite elements in the global

as a consequence of a failure in one

analysis (Fig. 4). In conjunction with

wall. When such a membrane force in

a concrete wall is reduced, the capacity
of the wall to withstand lateral loads or
shear forces, such as water pressure, is
also reduced. Propagation of failure to

two or more additional bangs

disturbance to the water surface in

one or more tricell walls around the

D3 shaft was therefore likely. Thus,
water ingress capacity corresponding
to the sinking rate, 500 m3/min, was

mist

the subsequent post-processing of

the analysis results, this led to underestimation of the shear forces at

initial crack.

The described failure mechanism is in

agreement with the following evewitness observations:

the wall supports by some 45%.

Inadequate design of the haunches
at the cell joints, which support the

tricell walls. This led to T-headed

bars that were too short (Fig. 5,i and
the absence of stirrups in the joints.

The loading also gave rise to cracks

that in turn were subjected to ambient
water pressure in the tricell. creating
higher forces at the supports than actu-

available. This failure mode may also

explain the two bangs that were heard
during the accident.
It was concluded that a failure mode as

ally were calculated. Severe cracks

shown in Fig. 6 had taken place in at

least two of the tricell walls in the D3

could then develop in the haunch behind the T-headed bars, leading to ro-

shaft over a height of some 8 m. A

tions in platform

the shaft
'waterfall'-like sound
little water ingress into the D3 shaft

before the second bang.

Two independent analyses of the most

probable leakage elements were performed based on a systematic investigation of possible locations of the leak

and all observed evidence. Both reports conclude that the most credible
areas for the leakage was in the tricell
walls.

tation of the wall support and in-

The operator's investigation commit-

creased span length of the wall. Final

failure was believed to take place as
crushing of the concrete at the intersection between the tricell wall and the

tee arrived at the same conclusions, reported 15 October 1991. These conclusions were accepted as the cause of the

cell joint.

building the GBS could then be taken.

accident and the decision to start re-

As soon as this failure was triggered at

one weak spot in the support, it probably spread upwards and downwards in

an immediate fashion. This propagation was arrested by a sudden drop in

the water pressure in the tricell follow-

ing the failure, combined with improved shear capacity due to increased

axial membrane compression forces

above and below the failed area. Calculations show that a total crack length
of 78 m seems reasonable.

The 'bottleneck' at the 500 mm diameter hole in the roof of the tricell most
likely restricted the water ingress CaStructural Engineering International 3/94

Fig. 5: T-headed bars

Fig. 6: Assumed failure mode

Lessons from Structural Failures

191

Structural Collapse Scenario

The numerical simulations of the sinking phase indicated that it took about
60 s from when water started to sluice

into the D3 shaft over the top of the

shaft until the platform disappeared
from the sea surface. The sinking velocity was very low until it gained pace
as the platform approached the
seafloor at a speed of about 5 mIs.

Recordings indicate that there had

been a series of smaller structural failures before the final destruction of the

platform. The failures starting about

45 seconds after the platform disappeared from the sea surface.

The severe disruption may be explained by the following hypothesis:

After implosion of the caisson. the

large volume of air about 150000 m3,

having been 'protected' by the struc-

Fig. 8: Full scale test

Fig. 9: Failure mode

ture. and thus under atmospheric pressure all of a sudden became exposed
to the external water pressure, say, 15

bar. A vast amount of energy was

stored in the compressed air, subsequently being released as the air 'bub-

Supporting Model Tests

hence followed by an explosive action,

In the winter of 1992, two different

types of model tests were performed.
The aim was to prove the already es-

which may have led to the final destruction. An upper bound estimate

tablished failure mode and to demonstrate that it logically fit the eyewitness

ble' expanded. The implosion was

for the stored energy in the air volume

is about S x 10' Nm.

observations.

Whether the final failure was initiated

by the high external hydrostatic pressure, the high dynamic water pressure
it ap-

several possible water leakage scenarios which might have caused the sinking. A total of 14 tests were performed,
including water inflow through some

proached the sea floor, or by impact

against the sea bed is difficult to tell.
Characteristics of the recorded seis-

of the penetrations in the shaft, the

conductor penetrations in the lower
dome and also through one or two

mograms. as well as the wide distribution of the structure's parts on the sea

cracks in the tricell walls. In all experiments with two cracks, it appeared that

bed, suggest that the platform has

the largest disturbances of the water

surface occurred at the point where

underneath the platform as

been destroyed during sinking and before it hit the sea floor.

One series of model tests examined

the two jets met each other. The position of this point was a function of the

velocity and flux of each of the two

cracks. Tests with inflow through one
crack also resulted in surface disturbances. The conclusion of the tests was
that a few different scenarios could be

Lessons from Structural Failures

pressure by a cut-out test element

loaded by jacks, as in the present case
is a significant simplification of the
reality. However, much ingenuity was
put into designing a loading procedure

that resembled the real situation as

closely as possible.

A total of 10 specimens were tested.

The failure mode of the test specimens

was in excellent agreement with the

mode anticipated, as seen by comparing Figs. 6 and 9. Three of the tests
were designed to simulate the real situation of the Sleipner A structure. The

failure loads for these tests when expressed as equivalent differential water pressure were: 71 m. 71 m and 76 m
of waterhead.

These agree excellently with the corresponding number for the real Sleipner

A platform. 67 m of waterhead, although the very close agreement may

be seen as somewhat coincidental in
light of the simplifications made in the

walls as described above.

tests.

The second model test was a structural

test in scale 1:1 of a section of the tn-

The tests are, altogether, regarded as a

full confirmation of both the failure

mode and the failure load anticipated
in advance.

In addition tests were performed to

In one specimen the T-headed bar was

elongated 25 cm on both sides. i.e.. in
total a 50 cm longer bar. This increased

provide the basis for improved design

the failure load to 125 m waterhead,

mode and failure load of the walls.

192

It is appreciated that representing the

whole structure subjected to water

in agreement with the observations,

among them a failure in the tricell

cell walls and the adjacent cell joint

(Figs. 7, 8). The primary purpose of
these tests were to verify the failure

Fig. 7: Test specimen

and design models for the supporting

joints of such walls.

Structural Engineering Internalional 3/94

_____________________________
____________________

corresponding to about a 70% increase. It is thus very likely that this

small change of the reinforcement detail would have prevented the Sleipner
accident. Two specimens were, in addition. strengthened with numerous stirrups both in the tricell wall and also in
the joint. The failure load was in this
case increased to 150 and 160 m waterhead.

Conclusions
The failure mode described in October
1991 by two independent investigation

committees is in agreement with the

eyewitness observations of the accident. On that basis, the decision was
taken to rebuild the concrete structure.

In the winter and spring of 1992 several tests, both hydrodynamic and structural. were performed. These tests fullv supported the findings of the investigating committees.

dustry they managed to bring the project to a successful completion.

Construction of the new platform was

accomplished at an accelerated pace,
reducing the construction schedule by

accident with its clear potential for

breach of contract had been turned

Sales-quality gas in the required quan-

tities was flowing from the Sleipner

platform on October 1. 1993. A grave

compared with the first GBS. The new

into a demonstration of efficiency and

reliability. The accident illustrates the
need for experienced engineers with a

GBS was ready for mating with the

trained eye to supervise the design

deck structure almost a week ahead of

schedule on 1 May 1993. The operator.
for its part, had to significantly adjust
its production scheme for the Sleipner
Field. including building a new riser

process.

platform and undersea equipment.

The authors wish to thank Statoil. the

Through close and positive cooperation with the Norwegian offshore in-

Sleipner Field's operator. for giving

15 months (a 45% reduction) when

Acknowledgement

their permission to publish this paper.

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