FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 149430-32. February 23, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CARMELO CATBAGAN, appellant.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who
resorted to self-defense.

The Case

Carmelo Catbagan appeals the May 19, 1999 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan (Branch 21), in Criminal Case
Nos. 1082-M-98, 1083-M-98 and 1099-M-98. In these cases, he was convicted of homicide, murder and frustrated murder, respectively.
The decretal portion of the RTC Decision reads as follows:
In sum and considering the foregoing findings, the Court hereby resolves and so states that the defense has not been able to overcome the moral
certainty established upon the accuseds culpability. Stated otherwise, the prosecution has successfully discharged its undertaking
herein. Accordingly, this Court finds and so holds that accused Carmelo Catbagan is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Homicide
in Crim. Case No. 1082-M-98, Murder in Crim. Case No. 10[8]3-M-98 and Frustrated Murder in Crim. Case No. 1099-M-98.
In Criminal Case No. 1082-M-98, the Court hereby credits the accused with the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense pursuant to
Article 13, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. In which event, what should be imposable as penalty is the minimum of Reclusion
Temporal. Considering the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused Carmelo Catbagan is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor maximum to fourteen (14) years of Reclusion Temporal minimum.
In Criminal Case No. 1083-M-98, absent any circumstance that would aggravate the commission of the crime, the accused is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua together with the accessory penalties.
In Criminal Case No. 1099-M-98, since the crime committed is Murder in its frustrated stage, it is the penalty next lower in degree that should be
imposed, which is Reclusion Temporal. However, with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused Carmelo Catbagan is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years of Prision Mayor medium to fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal medium.
In addition to the foregoing, the accused is also directed to pay the heirs of deceased Celso Suico the sum of P500,000.00 in loss of earning
capacity, P50,000.00 as indemnity for Suicos death, and the further sum ofP100,000.00 as and for moral damages. With respect to deceased Danilo
Lapidante, the accused is ordered to pay his heirs the sum P400,000.00 in loss of earning capacity, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for
Lapidantes death, the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages, and also the amount of P50,000.00 x x x for actual damages. Finally, respecting
complainant Ernesto Lacaden, the accused is directed to pay him the sum ofP50,000.00 as and for moral damages and the sum of P6,400.86 as actual
damages.
With costs against the accused.[2]
Except for the names of the victims, two (2) similarly worded criminal Informations [3] in Criminal Case Nos. 1082-M-98[4] and 1083-M98,[5] both dated July 21, 1998, charged appellant as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of March, 1998, in the [M]unicipality of San Jose del Monte, [P]rovince of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a gun, caliber .9MM pistol, and with intent to kill one x x x, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and shoot with the said caliber .9MM
pistol said x x x, hitting the latter on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds which directly caused the death
of the said x x x.[6]
For the third crime, the Information,[7] also dated July 21, 1998, charged appellant with frustrated murder allegedly committed in this
manner:
That on or about the 15th day of March, 1998, in the [M]unicipality of San Jose del Monte, [P]rovince of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a caliber .9MM pistol, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and shoot with the said caliber .9MM pistol one Ernesto
Lacaden y Tacata, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries, which ordinarily would have caused the death of the said Ernesto Lacaden y
Tacata, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Ernesto Lacaden y Tacata
which prevented his death.[8]
Appellant was arraigned on August 26, 1998 in Criminal Case Nos. 1082-M-98 and 1083-M-98. With the assistance of counsel de oficio,[9] he
pleaded not guilty to both charges.[10]Thereafter, he was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 1099-M-98, in which, with the assistance of his counsel de
oficio,[11] he also pleaded not guilty.[12]
Upon motion of appellant, the three cases were consolidated. After pretrial, trial on the merits ensued, and the lower court eventually
promulgated its assailed Decision. Counsel[13] for appellant filed the Notice of Appeal[14] on July 5, 1999, but upon discovering that it contained an
error in the designation of the court to which the case was being appealed, he filed an amended Notice of Appeal on September 10, 1999.[15]

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

In its Brief,[16] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecutions version of the facts as follows:
Danilo Lapidante, an employee of the Manila Water Company, held his birthday party on March 15, 1998, one day in advance of his actual
birthdate. That was intended to accommodate his many relatives and friends who trooped to his residence that Sunday at Block 5, Lot 28, Phase C1 Francisco Homes, Barangay Mulawin, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan Province. As it was already summertime, and on account of the big
attendance, the party had to be held in a vacant space within the fenced perimeter, with vehicular and pedestrian steel gates. In front thereof was a
narrow concrete street.
Inasmuch as Lapidante saw to it that drinks like gin and beer and appetizers were plenty, even before 10:00 A.M., inevitably, the revelers were
already displaying excitement. Some were engaged in singing over a karaoke, while one Sgt. Celso Suico of the Philippine Air Force and of the
elite Presidential Security Group, who lived in another phase of the subdivision, demonstrated his exuberance by firing shots into the air with his
Armalite rifle. Since the gunshots continued to ring out, and election gun ban was then in effect, the attention of Carmelo Catbagan, an investigator
of the Criminal Investigation Service, Philippine National Police, whose residential unit was just one block away south of the Lapidantes, was
called.
When, by 5:00 p.m., Catbagan went there to verify from the group who among them had been firing the rifle, no one of those within the fenced
area gave a positive answer. The embar[r]assed Catbagan left the place. Coincidentally, some minutes before that, Lapidante, driving his ownertype jeep, conducted home some of his guests. Accompanying him were Sgt. Suico and his companion Ernesto Jun Lacaden. Even as they
returned the Armalite to the PSGs residence at Phase M, Suico substituted it with a government-issued Springfield .45 caliber pistol which he
tucked to his waistband as they went back to rejoin the party.
By about 5:30 p.m., while the celebrants were being entertained with a song by the eldest daughter of Lapidante, Catbagan with [Zosimo] (Jess)
Fababier returned to Lapidantes place on board a motorized tricycle. This time, after he alighted on the street in front, when Catbagan inquired
about the gunshots of the Armalite, Sgt. Suico answered that Its nothing; its just a part of the celebration. Suddenly, a piece of stone hurled from
the direction of the celebrants house landed on a tree and thence to the body of Catbagan. Irritated and reacting thereto, the CIS agent directed
Fababier to look for the one who threw the stone.
At that moment, Sgt. Suico got out of the pedestrian steel gate and extended his hand towards Catbagan in the street as he introduced himself as
being a PSG. Completely ignoring the gesture of the latter, Catbagan drew out his .9mm automatic pistol and with both hands holding the gun,
fired successively at Suico, who when hit stretched out his hand, shouting Huwag (Dont) Pare. Despite this Catbagan fired more shots at the
victim who fell on the pavement, bloodied and dying from mortal wounds.
As the shots were fired, Jun Lacaden who was taking a nap on the front seat of the owner-type jeep parked on the other side of the street, in front
of the residential unit of Aida Villanueva, was abruptly awakened. Not fully aware of what happened, he disembarked therefrom without
knowing what to do. Unexpectedly, two shots were also fired at him by Catbagan. One bullet found its mark in the body of Jun Lacaden who then
fell down.
Almost simultaneously, Catbagan directed his attention to Lapidante who was then inside their compound in the vicinity of their steel main
gate. Upon the prompting of his wife Rosita for him to run and evade the assailant, the celebrant turned towards the main door of their house. But
before he could reach the safety of their abode, two rapid shots were aimed by Catbagan at him, one of which hit him in the upper part of his body.
After causing the mayhem, Catbagan then proceeded eastward to the main road. Thereupon, Charles Lacaden picked up the weapon of the PSG
man and threw it to a vacant lot somewhere at the rear of the house and lot of Lapidante. As a consequence of the injuries they sustained, Sgt.
Suico died on the spot; Lapidante later died in the hospital in Lagro, Quezon City; whereas Jun Lacaden had to be treated and confined at the East
Avenue Medical Center, Quezon City.
Police investigators went to the scene and there recovered some pieces of evidence.
The .45 caliber Springfield pistol of Suico was retrieved in a place at the back of the Lapidante residence. With a bullet vertically standing on the
chamber, it had misfired due to some vital defects. There were six (6) live ammunitions of the .45 caliber pistol excluding the vertical one. No
empty shell of .45 caliber pistol were recovered. There were nine (9) empty shells of the .9 mm pistol; and a deformed slug of the same weapon,
aside from many shells from the Armalite rifle.
Upon examination of Sgt. Suicos body, Dr. Dominic Aguda of the National Bureau of Investigation found four (4) gunshot wounds, to wit:
No. 1 - left upper chest;
No. 2 - left chest above left nipple;
No. 3 - left anterior portion of forearm;
No. 4 - right palm (inside)
Dr. Aguda concluded that the victim died from massive bleeding of the four injuries. The most fatal was wound No. 1 as it perforated the aorta
and the right upper lung. Death therefrom was instantaneous. He opined that this wound was inflicted in a level from a higher plane, whereas the
others may have been inflicted on some level with the victim. Suico died of massive bleeding.
As regards the victim Lapidante, as shown by Dr. Agudas schematic sketch and the post-mortem autopsy report, the entry wound was at the left
side of the back, exiting at the right anterior portion of the chest in a forward and upward trajection. The bullet hit the upper left tube of the left
lung and then penetrated the upper lobe of the right lung. The victim also died from massive bleeding.
From the shapes and measurement of the wound of entry, Dr. Aguda stated that the (weapon) firearm used in the shooting of the two victims
were probably the same, they being approximately 1 x 1 cm.
With respect to Jun Lacaden, Dr. Cristina Atienza of the East Avenue Medical Center found that he was hit at the right side of the back, the
scapular and the bullet exited at the uppermost part of the left arm, near the armpit. She said that as the slug entered the thoracic cavity, they had
to insert a tube to evacuate blood. Said victim was confined for more than one week, and it would have taken another 30 days for the victim to
resume his usual activity.[17]

Version of the Defense

Appellant argues that he was justified in shooting the victims, as he was merely defending himself and fulfilling his sworn duties. On the
basis of these justifying circumstances, he insists on his acquittal. In his Brief,[18] he summarizes his version of the facts as follows:
The defense had a different version of the circumstances that led to the shooting incident on March 15, 1998. On said date, between 9:00 and 11:00
in the morning, ERNESTO PURBOS heard successive gunshots coming from the residence of Danilo Lapidante at San Francisco Homes, San Jose
del Monte, Bulacan. The gunshots numbered about ten (10) in the span of two (2) hours. Alarmed and scared, as there were children then playing
in the vicinity, he went to the house of Carmelo Catbagan to report the gun firing incident. He pleaded Catbagan, known in their place as a
policeman, to maintain the peace in the neighborhood. He was worried that the children might be hit accidentally by the revelry. Catbagan
retorted not to mind the revelers, as they were just drinking. He then went home.
At around 4:00 in the afternoon, he again heard successive gunshots coming from the house of the Lapidantes. The gunshots were louder and
rapid in succession. Fearing for the safety of the children playing in the vicinity, he again proceeded to the house of Catbagan, pleading the latter
to pacify or maintain order in the place. Catbagan replied that he would call the attention of the Barangay Captain and advised him to go home.
ZOSIMO PAVABIER corroborated the testimony of witness Ernesto Purbos. On March 15, 1998, between the hours of 9:00 and past 11:00 in the
morning, he heard several gunshots coming from the house of Danilo Lapidante. The reverberating gunshots were again heard at around 4:00 in
the afternoon, prompting him to go out to the street to observe the commotion. In the street, he saw children playing as well as a group of his
neighbors talking about the gunshots coming from the house of the Lapidantes. The neighbors were complaining that the children might be
accidentally hit and that there was a gunban. On his way home, he met Carmelo Catbagan, who asked if he would accompany him to the barangay
captain to report the incident. Catbagan was then limping and there was something bulging in his waist. They proceeded to the house of the
barangay captain onboard a tricycle. Upon reaching the place, the wife of the barangay captain informed them that her husband left for the police
precinct and instructed them to proceed to the house of the Lapidantes as the barangay captain might be already there. Catbagan then told him to
proceed to the barangay hall to call upon the tanods, but the place was closed. They then proceeded to the house of Danilo Lapidante.
At the residence of the Lapidantes, they found several persons engaged in a drinking session. Catbagan then introduced himself as a CIS and
inquired who fired the firearm. The merrymakers ignored Catbagan and continued their merrymaking. Seconds later, somebody threw a fist sized
stone at Catbagan, hitting the lat[t]er on the shoulder. The stone came from the side of the kitchen of the Lapidantes. Catbagan directed him to
find out who threw the stone. After he had taken five steps, he saw Danilo Lapidante emerge from the side of the kitchen, rushing towards
Catbagan. About the same moment, Jun Lacaden and Celso Suico were likewise proceeding towards the gate. Lacaden then went on the side of
Catbagan, who was stepping backward, while Suico, uttering that he is a PSG, drew his .45 caliber pistol and cocked it. Instinctively, Catbagan
drew his gun and fired at Suico, hitting the latter with three shots. Lacaden, who was attacking Catbagan from the side, was shot by the latter
once. Seeing what happened to his companion, Danilo Lapidante hurriedly retreated towards his house, shouting repeatedly akina iyong
mahaba. Catbagan made one shot upward, yelling at Lapidante, pare, pare, huwag kang tatakbo. As Lapidante continued proceeding towards
his house, Catbagan fired at him once. Taken aback by the sudden turn of events, he retreated towards his house and just peeped over the
window. He then saw Catbagan rushing towards his own house, gather his children and leave. At around 6:30 in the evening, he was picked-up
by police authorities for investigation.
JONATHAN BELLOSILLO, the Barangay captain of Barangay Mulawin, Francisco Homes San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, confirmed that a
complaint/report was made by Carmelo Catbagan at his home office, anent a gunfiring incident, at around 4:30 in the afternoon of March 15,
1998. The Barangay Captain likewise testified on the several complaints he received against Danilo Lapidante, for conducting gambling and Jun
Lacaden, for mauling incidents.
The accused, CARMELO CATBAGAN, testifying on his behalf, averred that he is a regular agent of the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (CIDG), with a rank of Crime Investigator I. As a regular agent of the CIDG, he was issued two (2) official firearms, a 9MM Jericho pistol
and a.38 caliber revolver. His principal duties were to protect the innocent against deception, [and] against violence, arrest felons, and in general,
to respond to all calls for public assistance.
On March 15, 1998, he was at his residence at Block 5, Lot 11, Phase 6-1, Francisco Homes, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, tending to his five (5)
children. His wife was then in the province. At around 9:00 to 11:00 in the morning, he heard several burst[s] of gunfire coming from the direction
of the rear portion of his house. A neighbor, Ernesto Purbos, then came to his house complaining about the gunshots. Manong Erning wailed
that the gunshots might accidentally hit the children playing in the street. Having told from where the gunshots came from, he pacified the
complainant telling him that the revelers were just engaged in merrymaking and that they will just stop later on. Ernesto Purbos then went home.
The peace in the vicinity was again disturbed at around 4:00 in the afternoon of the same day. Loud burst of rapid gunshots, to the tune of the
song Lets Go, were again heard coming from the same direction as that in the morning. From his experience, he knew that the firearm used was
an armalite (M-16). Two of their neighbors came to him complaining about the gunshots. He advised them to go to the barangay captain and he
will just follow after finishing his chores. He then heard a woman scream, complaining that the shots were being directed towards the firewall of
the house neighboring that of the Lapidantes. Ernesto Purbos likewise returned, echoing his previous complaint about the gunshots. He assured
Purbos that he would act on his complaint, but first he would go to the barangay captain to report the incident. He then got his service firearm and
went out. On his way to the house of the barangay captain, he met Zosimo Pavabier, who likewise complained of the gunshots. He asked Pavabier
to accompany him and the two of them proceeded to the house of the said official. When they reached their destination, however, the wife of the
barangay official told them that her husband has gone to the Police on the Block Headquarter. Learning the purpose of their visit, the wife told
them to just proceed to the vicinity in question as her husband might already be there. On their way, they went by the barangay hall to fetch some
tanods, but the place was closed. They then proceeded to the house of the Lapidantes.
Upon reaching the house of the Lapidantes, Catbagan and Pavabier noticed that the Barangay Captain was not yet there. They likewise noticed
that there were several persons having a drinking spree inside the compound. Catbagan introduced himself as a CIS and inquired upon the group
who fired the gunshots. The merrymakers, however, ignored him and laughed. As he was telling the group that: Dont you know there are many
residents here and you might hit somebody, a fist sized stone was thrown which hit his left shoulder. The stone came from the rear of the house of
the Lapidantes. Alerted by the hostility of the crowd, he instructed Pavabier to look for the one who threw the stone at him. As Pavabier was
about to comply with his instructions, Danilo Lapidante emerged from the side of his house and rushed to where he was standing, uttering: ano ba
ang problema pare? About the same time, two more persons suddenly came out of the compound of the Lapidantes, rushing and encircling
him. One of the aggressors, Ernesto Lacaden, was toting an ice-pick on one hand and positioned himself at his side. The other, whose identity he
did not kn[o]w at that moment, went straight to him, drew a gun from his waist and cocked it, after which, aimed the pistol at him, uttering Pare
PSG ito, in an arrogant voice. Threatened of his safety, he drew his own gun while stepping backward and fired at the aggressors.
Simultaneously, Danilo Lapidante retreated towards his house, shouting: Akina yung mahaba, yung mahaba, while Jun Lacaden attacked him
coming from the side, with the ice-pick. Catbagan side stepped and fired a shot at Lacaden before turning his attention at Lapidante. He fired a
warning shot, uttering: Tumigil ka, huwag kang kikilos. Lapidante, however, did not heed Catbagans warning and continued rushing towards
his house, as if to get something. Fearing that Lapidante might be able to get hold of the long gun, Catbagan fired a shot at him once.
Concerned for his safety and that of his family, Catbagan brought his five children to the house of his sister in Malabon, Metro Manila. He then
surrendered himself and his firearms to his superior officer at the CIDG Office.

ATTY. VIRGILIO PABLICO Y TABALBA, Chief of the CIDG Legal Office and immediate superior of the accused, testified on the latters official
duties and functions as well as his voluntary surrender on March 16, 1998[.] Accordingly, accused Carmelo Catbagan was appointed as a regular
and non-organic member of the CIDG, with a rank of Criminal Investigator I. His official functions include the authority to conduct investigation
of cases involving violations of the Revised Penal Code and other special laws, to effect arrest and to conduct search in accordance with existing
rules, to take sworn statements and to appear as a witness in appropriate forum. As a regular agent, Catbagan was issued and authorized to carry
a firearm. The issued firearm to Catbagan was a 9MM Jericho pistol, with Serial No. 000748. Catbagan, as a CIDG agent, was likewise deputized
by the COMELEC and granted an exemption to carry firearm during election period.
On March 15, 1998, at around 8:00 to 10:00 in the evening, he received a telephone call from Agent Catbagan, informing him that he was involved
in a shooting incident, wherein he was able to shoot three (3) persons. Two (2) of the protagonists allegedly died and the other was wounded and
taken to a hospital. Catbagan intimated that he wanted to be put under his custody as soon as a he made arrangements for his childrens
security. On March 16, 1998, at around 1:00 in the afternoon, Catbagan presented himself to Police Superintendent Edgardo Acua together with
his service firearm.[19]

Ruling of the Trial Court

The RTC held that appellant did not know who had fired the gunshots at Lapidantes party; thus, he could not claim that he had gone there
to perform his duty to make an arrest. Consequently, it brushed aside his defense of fulfillment of duty, or lawful exercise of a right or office. It did
not give credence, either, to his invocation of self-defense.
With respect to Celso Suico in Criminal Case No. 1082-M-98, the trial court ruled that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim, but that the means employed to repel such aggression was unreasonable. It entertain[ed] serious doubts on the right of the [appellant] to
continue firing at Suico after the latter was dispossessed of his gun due to the injuries received from the gunfire of the assailant. [20] It credited
appellant with incomplete self-defense, because he supposedly lost the right to kill or even wound the victim after the unlawful aggression had
ceased.
The RTC refused to qualify the crime against Suico. Ruling that there had been no evident premeditation and treachery in the killing, it
found appellant guilty only of the crime of homicide.
As regards the victim Danilo Lapidante in Criminal Case No. 1083-M-98, he was undisputedly unarmed, as he was inside his own premises - within his fenced front yard -- at the time of the incident. Thus, the lower court found no act of aggression on his part. It held that the belief on
the part of [appellant] that the victim was about to retrieve a rifle from the doorside of the house, existed only in his imagination.[21] Consequently,
there was no moment for [appellant] to validly state that his own life [was] in imminent danger from Lapidante. [22]
Aside from rejecting self-defense, the trial court also held that treachery had attended the killing, because the unarmed victim had
unexpectedly been shot while his back was towards appellant.
Finally, in Criminal Case No. 1099-M-98, the court a quo found that Ernesto Lacaden had been shot in the back, apparently while in the act of
fleeing from the fury of gunfire from [appellant]. [23] It did not accept the allegation that the victim had been carrying an ice pick at the time of the
shooting. Nonetheless, it explained that even if he indeed had one at the time, he could not have done any real harm to appellant who was just too
far from him. Absent any clear and convincing proof that Lacaden committed unlawful aggression, self-defense -- whether complete or incomplete
-- could not be appreciated.
The RTC found the crime against Lacaden to be qualified by treachery, as he had not posed any imminent danger to appellant. It ruled that
treachery was proven by the following circumstances: (1) the fact that the victim was running away from the scene of the crime; and (2) appellants
use of his .9 mm automatic pistol, a lethal weapon used to wound the formers vital organs. Since death did not ensue by reason of causes
independent of the will of appellant, the court a quo found him guilty of frustrated murder.
Hence, this appeal.[24]

The Issues

Before us, appellant assigns to the trial court the following alleged errors for our consideration:
I
The court a quo gravely erred in finding accused-appellant Carmelo Catbagan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged in Criminal
Case Nos. 1082-M-98, 1083-M-98 and 1099-M-98, respectively.
II
The court a quo gravely erred in failing to rule that accused-appellant Carmelo Catbagan acted in the fulfillment of his sworn duties and/or acted
in self-defense in the commission of the offenses charged.
III
Granting arguendo that the accused-appellants guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt, the court a quo still committed a reversible error in not
considering the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in the imposition of the appropriate penalties for the offenses
proved during the trial.[25]
In sum, the issues to be resolved are as follows: 1) whether appellant was justified in shooting the victims as a direct result of his fulfillment
of a lawful duty and self-defense; 2) whether he could be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender; and 3) whether the
characterization of the crimes and penalties imposed by the trial court was correct.

The Courts Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious.

First Issue:

Fulfillment of a Lawful Duty

In criminal cases, the prosecution has the burden of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. But once the commission
of the act charged is admitted, the burden of proof shifts to the accused, who must now prove the elements of the justifying circumstances cited.[26]
Appellant invokes his lawful performance of duty as one such circumstance, arguing that his presence at the scene of the incident,
prompted by the complaints in their neighborhood and his own personal knowledge relative to the wanton discharge of a firearm, the effectivity of
the election gun ban, his coordination with the authorities of the barangay, and the inquiry he made to the revellers, were all in consonance with
the legitimate performance of a sworn duty.[27] Citing these specific facts, he argues that he was justified in shooting the victims. In effect, his
contention is that, being a regular agent of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the Philippine National Police (PNP), he was
justified in maintaining public order, as well as in protecting and securing life and property.
Although he is correct in arguing that he had the legal obligation to maintain peace and order, he was not justified in shooting the
victims. Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right
or office does not incur any criminal liability. Two requisites must concur before this defense can prosper: 1) the accused must have acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense committed should have been the
necessary consequence of such lawful exercise.[28]
These requisites are absent in this case. Appellant was not performing his duties at the time of the shooting, because the men he shot had not
been indiscriminately firing guns in his presence, as he alleges. Further, as found by the RTC, nothing was mentioned in [his] direct testimony
that he was there to effect an arrest.[29] Said the trial court:
While he might have heard of gunfire, since there is no proof to the effect that Catbagan had personal knowledge that it was Suico who had been
firing the Armalite, under no circumstances may it be said that the accused was justifiably there to perform the duty of making the arrest in
accordance with existing laws and rules.[30]
At most, appellant was in the house of the Lapidantes to determine who had fired the gunshots that were heard by the neighborhood. But
the fatal injuries that he inflicted on the victims were not a necessary consequence of the performance of his duty as a police officer.
Indeed, his presence at the scene of the incident [was] all in the legitimate performance and fulfillment of a sworn duty. [31] He was dutybound to find out who had fired the gun that day and to maintain peace and order in the neighborhood. But his act of shooting of the victims
cannot be justified. His presence at the scene of the incident should be distinguished from his act of shootingthem.
Appellant cites People v. Cabrera[32] to support his argument that he was performing his duty and was thus justified in shooting the
victims. There is an important distinction between the present case and Cabrera. In the latter, the disturbance had been created by the victim in the
presence of the accused, who therefore had the duty to immediately intervene and subdue the former, who was causing danger. In the present case,
appellant had no personal knowledge of who had fired the gunshots. Thus, his duty at the time was simply to determine who was the subject of
the complaints of the residents of the village. It was never shown, though, that the shooting was in furtherance of or was a necessary consequence
of his performance of such duty.
To be sure, the right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last resort, and under circumstances indicating that the
offender cannot otherwise be taken without bloodshed. The law does not clothe police officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to
kill. It may be true that police officers sometimes find themselves in a dilemma when pressured by a situation where an immediate and decisive,
but legal, action is needed. However, it must be stressed that the judgment and discretion of police officers in the performance of their duties must
be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits. In the absence of a clear and legal provision to the contrary, they
must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and within the spirit and purpose of the law. [33]

Second Issue:
Self-Defense

Appellant also invokes the principle of standing ones ground when in the right. Allegedly, since he had the right to be where he was, the
law does not require him to step aside when his assailant is rapidly advancing upon him with a deadly weapon.[34] We clarify. Article 11 of the
RPC provides:
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:
First.

Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself."
In self-defense, proof by clear and convincing evidence is incumbent upon the accused. [35] Appellant cannot rely on the weakness of the
evidence for the prosecution, which can hardly be disbelieved after he himself admitted that he had shot the victims. [36] A judicial confession
constitutes evidence of a high order, on the presumption that no sane person would deliberately confess to the commission of an act unless moved
by the desire to reveal the truth.[37]
As the RTC correctly did, we should look at the circumstances of the shooting in the case of each victim.

Circumstances Surrounding
the Death of Suico

The first requisite of self-defense is unlawful aggression by the person who is eventually injured or killed by the accused.
This Court is convinced that the RTCs finding of unlawful aggression on the part of Suico is supported by the records, and we see no reason
to disturb those findings. Ruled the lower court:
Under the given situation wherein the Sergeant cocking the pistol was one who was trained, and skilled in the handling of guns, plus the fact that
he was drunk, the Court cannot blame accused Catbagan to believe and fear that Suico would attack him in that mock introduction.[38]

The prosecution presented, in fact, conflicting accounts of how Suico had been shot. The shooting allegedly happened after he had offered a
handshake to appellant,[39] according to Rosita Lapidante, the wife of another victim. On the other hand, Charlie Lacaden, the brother of still
another victim, gave testimony that conflicted with hers. Suico was allegedly shot by appellant when the former turned his back to the latter.
On the other hand, appellant[40] and Defense Witness Zosimo Pavabier[41] positively and consistently testified that it was Suico who had first
drawn and aimed his gun at appellant. This assertion was confirmed by the physical evidence that the victims gun had a live bullet sandwiched
between its breechblock and chamber.[42] This fact proves that the gun was cocked and fired, but that the bullet was jammed in the process.
The prosecution tried to explain this occurrence by inconsistent and incongruous statements. According to the testimony of Rosita, Charlie
took the gun from Suicos belly then aimed it at appellant, but the gun did not fire because it was defective. [43] According to the testimony of
Charlie, on the other hand, he took the gun because he was afraid that appellant would come back, but that he later threw it towards the rear
portion of the house.[44] Thus, the RTC concluded:
As regards the proof that Suicos gun misfired due to vital defects in its mechanism, the Court suspects that the firearm was tampered with to create
the scenario that the PSG man was without fault. In fact, Mrs. Lapidante and Charles Lacadens testimonies regarding what was done to the gun after
the incident are in conflict with each other.[45] (Italics supplied)
Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. [46] In case of threat, it must
be offensive and strong, positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury -- as in this case. Thus, Suicos act of aiming a cocked gun at
appellant is sufficient unlawful aggression.
The second element of self-defense -- reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it -- requires the following: 1) a
necessity of the course of action taken by the person making the defense and 2) a necessity of the means used. Both the course of action taken and
the means used must be reasonable.[47]
Appellant argues that he was justified in wounding Suico, because the latter was armed with a deadlier weapon and was still persistently
aggressive after being shot the first time. The former maintains that [t]he fact that [he] struck one blow more than [what] was absolutely
[necessary] to save his own life, or that he failed to hold his hand so as to avoid inflicting a fatal wound where a less severe stroke might have
served the purpose, would not [negate] self-defense, because [he], in the heat of an encounter at close quarters, was not in a position to reflect
coolly or to wait after each blow to determine the effects thereof. [48]
The means employed by the person invoking self-defense is reasonable if equivalent to the means of attack used by the original
aggressor.[49] Whether or not the means of self-defense is reasonable depends upon the nature or quality of the weapon, the physical condition, the
character, the size and other circumstances of the aggressor; as well as those of the person who invokes self-defense; and also the place and the
occasion of the assault.[50]
The RTC made a definitive finding on the unreasonableness of the means employed by appellant as follows:
However, what followed, as testified by witnesses was that Catbagan continued firing even while Suico was pleading Huwag pare! with
outstretched hand and open palm of his right hand. While the accused asserted that he had to fire his gun and hit Suico with more shots to totally
disable him, the same cannot be believed by the Court, if we take stock of Dr. Agudas testimony that with the injured arm and that on the chest
being inflicted with the first double tap shots; the victim would have had much difficulty to retaliate. In fact, Catbagan himself stated on
clarification questions that the .45 caliber gun of the victim fell already so that the threat of continued aggression was no longer present.
xxx

xxx

xxx

On this point, the Court entertains serious doubts on the right of the accused to continue firing at Suico after the latter was dispossessed of his gun
due to the injuries received from the gunfire of the assailant. Additionally, we cannot accept as credible Catbagans statement that he had to fire
again at Suico inasmuch as the latter had stooped acting to pick up his own pistol from the pavement. If ever the victim was positioned that way, it
was more of the impact of the bullets that hit him. The logical explanation can be derived from the presence of the entry wound in the inside of
Suicos right palm.[51]
These findings are well-supported by the evidence on record. Clearly, the nature and the number of gunshot wounds -- debilitating, fatal
and multiple -- inflicted by appellant on the deceased shows that the means employed by the former was not reasonable and commensurate to the
unlawful aggression of the latter. The unreasonableness becomes even more apparent from the fact, duly admitted by appellant himself, that Suico
had obviously been inebriated at the time of the aggression. It would have thus been easier for the former to have subdued the victim without
resorting to excessive means.
Finally, as to the element of lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense, appellant has sufficiently
established that he went to the house of the Lapidantes to find out who had fired the gunshots earlier that day. There was therefore absolutely no
provocation from him, either by unjust conduct or by incitement, that would justify Suicos acts of cocking and aiming a gun at him.
Not having proven all the elements of self-defense, appellant cannot use it to justify sufficiently his fatal shooting of Suico. Having proven a
majority of the elements, however, the former may still be credited with a mitigating circumstance in accordance with Article 13[52] of the RPC.

Circumstances Surrounding
the Shooting of Lapidante

With respect to Lapidante, he allegedly rushed towards his house to get hold of the mahaba, so appellant had no other recourse but to shoot
him. The purpose of the victim in rushing towards his house was supposedly to recover the advantage he had previously enjoyed. Hence, it is
argued that unlawful aggression was present.
We disagree with appellants averments. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger
thereof. Such aggression refers to an attack that has actually broken out or materialized or is at the very least clearly imminent; it cannot consist
merely of any oral threat or intimidating stance or posture. [53]
In this case, the RTC was categorical in ruling that the perceived danger was more in the mind of appellant than in reality. The
circumstances did not point to any actual or imminent peril to his life, limb or right. On the part of Lapidante, the act of running towards his house
can hardly be characterized as unlawful aggression. It could not have imperiled appellants life.
In a previous case,[54] this Court ruled that a threat even if made with a weapon or the belief that a person [is] about to be attacked, is not
sufficient, but that it is necessary that the intent be ostensibly revealed by an act of aggression or by some external acts showing the commencement
of actual and material unlawful aggression.[55] We agree with the RTCs ratiocination, which we quote:
With respect to the incident involving the victim Lapidante, it is not disputed that he was unarmed as he was inside his own premises within the
fenced area in front of his house. What acts of aggression against Catbagan which he did are not apparent to us. To this Court, the belief on the
part of Catbagan that the victim was about to retrieve a rifle from the doorside of the house, existed only in his imagination.

Aside from its intrinsic ambiguity, the claims of the defense witnesses about the alleged utterance of Lapidante about Ang mahaba! an[g]
mahaba! do not sit well with this Court. Indeed, we are not convinced that he could have uttered that statement since the evidence points to the
fact that he and his friends had just arrived from another phase of the subdivision upon having delivered thereat, the Armalite of Suico. On the
contrary, Lapidante appeared to have been gripped by fear and was obviously trying to escape from harm. Indeed, there was no moment for
Catbagan to validly state that his own life [was] in imminent danger from Lapidante.[56]
Neither do we accept the contention that unlawful aggression by Lapidante was shown by his act of rushing towards his house for the
purpose of taking a more advantageous position. Referred to here is the rule that if it is clear that the purpose of the aggressor in retreating -- or, as
in this case, Lapidantes rushing towards his house -- is to take a more advantageous position to ensure the success of the attack already begun, the
unlawful aggression is considered still continuing; and the one resorting to self-defense has a right to pursue and disable the former.[57]
Obviously, this rule does not apply to Lapidante, because 1) there was no clear purpose in his act of retreating to take a more advantageous
position; and 2) since he never attacked appellant in the first place, the former could not have begun any unlawful aggression and, hence, would
not have had any reason to take a more advantageous position. How could there have been a continuation of something that had never been
started? If any aggression was begun in this case, it was by Suico, not by Lapidante.
Hence, no unlawful aggression by Lapidante was shown. Because the presence thereof is a statutory and doctrinal conditio sine qua non of the
justifying circumstance of self-defense[58] -- complete or incomplete -- we need not examine the presence of the other requisites.

Circumstances Surrounding
the Shooting of Lacaden

Appellant asserts that Lacaden attacked him with an ice pick from the side. Allegedly, this act clearly showed unlawful aggression on the
latters part. All the pieces of evidence on record, however, point to the absence thereof.
Most crucial is the position of the gunshot wound. As testified to by the doctor who had treated the victim, its point of entry was on the right
side of the back, just below the scapula.[59] This incontestable fact belies the claim of appellant that he was attacked by Lacaden with an ice
pick. Such attack would have required the latter to face him; and, logically, a gunshot entry wound would have been in the front -- not in the back
-- portion of Lacadens body. The wound in the back of the victim clearly shows that he was shot while his back was turned to appellant. Hence,
there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the former.
Neither was any ice pick presented in the proceedings before the RTC. Appellant maintains that his testimony, coupled with that of
Pavabier, is sufficient to establish the existence of the weapon. But the prosecution witnesses, including the victim himself, testified otherwise -that there was no unlawful aggression during the incident, much less with the use of an ice pick. The RTC held thus:
In the case of Jun Lacaden, he was shot in the back which could only corroborate the evidence to the effect that he was also in the act of fleeing
from the fury of gunfire from Catbagan. As to the allegation of the latter that Jun Lacaden had an icepick, that claim is rather nebulous. Firstly, as
veteran criminal investigator, he should have taken, kept and presented that said instrument to augment his legal excuse. Secondly, if really there
was one, it is rather surprising why he did not demand Jun Lacaden for its surrender initially as he passed thru the pedestrian steel door and
subsequently while the latter had positioned himself near the owner-type jeep.
More importantly, granting that Jun Lacaden had an icepick, and/or had any design to launch an attack against Catbagan, the former was just too
far a distance away to do real harm to the accused. From 6-7 meters, as clarified from the accused himself, it is ridiculous for us to believe that Jun
Lacaden could stab him. More so because the accused himself testified that the two arms of Jun Lacaden were raised upward which is not to
mention that Catbagan had already demonstrated his proficiency and accuracy in the use of his .9 mm automatic pistol. Thus, there was, like that
of Lapidante, no occasion to find as existing, the element of unlawful aggression.[60]
Appellant has presented no sufficient reason to overturn these conclusive findings of the trial court. Aside from being completely in accord
with logic and human experience, they are too solid to be debunked by him.

Third Issue:
Voluntary Surrender

Finally, appellant argues that even on the assumption that his guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt, he is still entitled to a mitigating
circumstance. According to him, he voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after the occurrence of the incident, a fact not only uncontroverted
but even admitted by the prosecution.
For voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following elements must concur: 1) the offender has not been actually arrested; 2)
the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and 3) the surrender was voluntary. [61] It is sufficient that that act be spontaneous and
clearly indicative of the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, because there is either an acknowledgement of guilt or a desire to save
the authorities the trouble and the expense that would necessarily be incurred in searching for and capturing the culprit.[62]
It was established that on the night after the shooting incident, appellant called up his immediate supervisor, Atty. Virgilio Pablico, to tell
him about the incident that had occurred that afternoon and to convey the formers intention to surrender. [63] The following day, appellant
surrendered himself and his firearm to Police Supt. Edgardo Acua, the chief of the Assistant Directorate for Intelligence. [64] This surrender is
evidenced by a Progress Report[65] signed by Police Chief Superintendent Efren Quimpo Fernandez.
At the time of his surrender, appellant had not actually been arrested. He surrendered himself and his firearm to a person in authority, the
chief of the Assistant Directorate for Intelligence of the Philippine National Police. Finally, the surrender was voluntary and spontaneous; it thus
showed an intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities. In fact, in the aforementioned Progress Report, appellant had given the same
narration of events he later gave in court; moreover, he owned responsibility for the shooting. Thus, we credit him with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Final Issue:
Crimes and Penalties

Appellant was convicted of homicide, murder, and frustrated murder for the shooting of Suico, Lapidante and Lacaden, respectively. In
determining the crimes committed and in imposing the proper penalties, it is necessary to look into the qualifying circumstances alleged in the
three Informations. Treachery and evident premeditation were both alleged; thus, there is a need to ascertain their presence or absence in the
commission of the acts, in order to determine the crimes committed by appellant.

To establish treachery, the following must be proven: 1) the employment of such means of execution as would give the person attacked no
opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and 2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution. [66] It is also the running case law
that where treachery is alleged, the manner of attack must be proven.[67] Such attack must be sudden and unexpected and without the slightest
provocation on the part of the victim, who is thus deprived of any real chance for self-defense, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime
without risk to the aggressor.[68]
With respect to the shooting of Suico, there was no treachery. The shooting was perpetrated in a frontal encounter as shown by the location
of his wounds. Appellant did not make any deliberate, surprise attack against him or consciously adopt a treacherous mode thereof. As
established, he shot the victim after the latter had aimed, cocked and fired a gun at him.
As to the shooting of Lapidante, the RTC qualified the crime to murder because of the presence of treachery. According to the trial court, the
shooting was unexpected, he was unarmed, and his back was turned towards appellant when the incident occurred. Treachery was also
appreciated in the shooting and wounding of Lacaden, since he had been shot at the back. Further, even if he had posed no imminent danger to
appellant, the former was nevertheless shot with a .9 mm automatic pistol -- a lethal weapon. For this act, the latter was convicted of frustrated
murder.
The mere fact that the attack against Lapidante and Lacaden was perpetrated when their backs were turned did not by itself constitute
treachery or alevosia.[69] Whether the mode of attack was consciously adopted, and whether there was risk to the offender, must be taken into
account.[70] Treachery cannot be considered when there is no evidence that the accused had resolved to commit the crime prior to the moment of the
killing; or that the death of the victim was the result of premeditation, calculation or reflection. [71]
In this case, it is evident that the decision to shoot Lapidante and Lacaden was suddenly arrived at after the confrontation with Suico had
already occurred. Even if the positions of the victims were vulnerable, there was still no treachery, as appellant did not deliberately adopt such
mode of attack. Its presence was negated by the fact that the shootings had sprung from the unexpected turn of events. The treacherous character
of the means employed does not depend upon its result, but upon the means itself -- upon appellants purpose in employing it.[72]
Treachery cannot be appreciated where, as in this case, there is nothing in the records that shows that appellant pondered upon the mode or
method of attack to ensure the wounding and the killing of the victims; or to remove or diminish any risk to himself that might arise from the
defense that they might make.[73] His decision to shoot them was clearly sudden. In the absence of treachery, the killing of Lapidante and the
wounding of Lacaden cannot be qualified to murder and frustrated murder, respectively.
The allegation of evident premeditation was correctly rejected by the lower court. For this aggravating circumstance to be appreciated, the
following must be proven: 1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; 2) an overt act manifestly indicating that the accused clung
to such determination; and, 3) between the decision and the execution, a sufficient lapse of time that allowed time to reflect upon the consequences
of the act contemplated.[74] None of these elements has been established in the case at bar.
Undeniably, the shooting of the victims was done without any prior plan to kill or attack them. As previously stated, appellant began
shooting at them after a cocked gun had been aimed and fired at him. This fact negates any finding that he had already previously conceived the
shooting, and that he then manifestly clung to his determination to commit the crime after a sufficient lapse of time.
Having rejected both treachery and evident premeditation in the killing of Suico and Lapidante, we hold appellant guilty only of homicide in
both cases. But for the shooting of Lacaden, a careful review must be made of the crime that was actually committed. The RTC charged him with
frustrated murder and found him guilty thereof; but, as ruled above, no qualifying circumstance was proven. Thus, his crime can only be frustrated
homicide, in which evidence of intent to kill is essential, however.[75] It bears stressing that such intent determines whether the infliction of injuries
should be punished as attempted or frustrated murder, homicide or parricide; or as consummated physical injuries. [76]
Homicidal intent must be evidenced by acts that, at the time of their execution, are unmistakably calculated to produce the death of the
victim by adequate means.[77]
The principal and essential element of attempted or frustrated homicide or murder is the assailants intent to take the life of the person
attacked.[78] Such intent must be proved clearly and convincingly, so as to exclude reasonable doubt thereof. [79]
Although the injury sustained by Lacaden was inflicted by appellant, the facts do not support a finding that the latter had been impelled by
an intent to injure to the point of killing the former. The intent to kill is absent in this case. It was found that the shooting was sudden and
unexpected, having been brought about by a confrontation between appellant and Suico and the commotion that ensued. The absence of such
intent was, in fact, even more apparent in the testimony of appellant, who said therein that he did not even look at the victim anymore. The
formers attention was concentrated on the latter, who was shouting, Ang mahaba, ang mahaba![80]
The intent to kill, an essential element of the offense of frustrated or attempted homicide, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence
and with the same degree of certainty as that required of the other elements of the crime.[81] The inference that such intent existed should not be
drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove it beyond reasonable doubt. If it was absent but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not
frustrated murder, but only physical injuries.[82] In this case, the expert opinion of the doctor who treated Lacaden was that it would take the latter
thirty days to heal and recover from the lone gunshot wound and to resume his normal work. [83] Thus, a finding of less serious physical
injuries[84] is proper.
Although the charge in the instant case is frustrated murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of less serious physical injuries may be
made, considering that the essential ingredients of this lesser offense are necessarily included in or form part of those constituting the graver
one.[85] In the same manner, a conviction may be for slight or serious physical injuries in a prosecution for homicide or murder, inasmuch as the
infliction of the former, when carried out to the utmost degree, could lead to the latter offense. Such conviction may be made, without intent to kill
-- an essential element of the crime of homicide or murder.[86]
To summarize, in Criminal Case No. 1082-M-98, appellant is found guilty of homicide, for which the penalty prescribed is reclusion
temporal.[87] Since he proved a majority of the elements of self-defense -- unlawful aggression and lack of sufficient provocation -- the penalty
prescribed by law may be lowered by two degrees[88] to prision correccional. Considering further the presence of the generic mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its minimum period. [89] The Indeterminate Sentence
Law is applicable in this case. Hence appellant should be sentenced to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall be that which
may properly be imposed under the Revised Penal Code; and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by the Code -- in this case, arresto mayor.
In Criminal Case No. 1083-M-98, appellant is found guilty of homicide, for which the penalty prescribed by law is reclusion temporal.[90] Again,
considering the presence of the generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be
imposed in its minimum period.[91] The Indeterminate Sentence Law is also applicable to this case. Hence, appellant should be sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall be that which may properly be imposed under the Revised Penal Code; and the
minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code -- in this case, prision mayor.
Finally, as to Criminal Case No. 1099-M-98, appellant is found guilty of less serious physical injuries, for which the penalty prescribed by law
is arresto mayor. Again, considering the presence of the generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any aggravating
circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its minimum period
Coming now to pecuniary liabilities, the heirs of the victims Suico and Lapidante in Criminal Case Nos. 1082-M-98 and 1083-M-98,
respectively, are entitled to a fixed sum representing civil indemnity for death. Death indemnity is currently fixed at P50,000.[92] This kind of civil
indemnity is separate and distinct from other forms of indemnity for damages and is automatically awarded without need of further proof other
than the fact of death and the responsibility of the accused therefor.

Proof of moral damages was presented through the testimony of Lapidantes wife. The RTCs award of such damages herein is excessive,
however, considering that it is not meant to enrich an injured party. [93] Hence, in Criminal Case No. 1083-M-98, the amount thereof should be
reduced to P50,000. In the other two cases, there being no proof of moral damages, the award therefor is deleted. Moral damages cannot be
granted in the absence of proof.[94]
It is also proper to award compensation to the heirs of the victims for loss of earning capacity, pursuant to Article 2206 of the Civil
Code.[95] The documents presented, coupled with the testimonies of Elsie Suico and Rosita Lapidante, are sufficient bases for the award.
At the time of his death, Suico, forty-four (44) years old,[96] was receiving a monthly take-home pay of P942.70,[97] as proven and admitted. To
compute his net earnings, we multiply this amount by 12 to get his annual income; then deduct the reasonable and necessary living expenses
which, in the absence of contrary evidence, is pegged at 50 percent of the earnings. Applying the formula Net earning capacity = [2/3 x (80 age
at time of death) x (gross annual income reasonable and necessary living expenses)],[98] we arrive at a loss of earning capacity ofP135,748.80.
Applying the same formula to Lapidante who was thirty-five (35) years old[99] at the time of his death, with a monthly take-home pay
of P10,004.24[100] and an additional income of P1,000.00 for slaughtering pigs,[101] we arrive at a loss of earning capacity of P1,980,763.20. His heirs
are also entitled to actual damages in the amount of P13,850 for hospital and funeral expenses. These expenses are supported by receipts.[102] The
receipt[103] for the amount of P6,000 -- which also mentions a remaining payable balance of P6,500 -- was not properly identified and characterized;
thus, we should exclude it from the award of actual damages.
Finally, with respect to the civil indemnities for Lacaden, the award for actual damages -- for hospitalization and medicines -- should
be P4,589.86, as only this amount was properly covered by receipts. [104] The amount of P1,831, allegedly for hospital services, was included in a list
presented by the victim, but was not properly supported by any receipt or record; thus, we cannot grant such amount.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED and the assailed Decision MODIFIED. In Criminal Case No. 1082-M-98, Appellant Carmelo
Catbagan is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and is SENTENCED to a prison term of one (1) month and one (1) day arresto
mayor as minimum; to one (1) year and six (6) months of prision correccional as maximum. In Criminal Case No. 1083-M-98, he is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and SENTENCED to a prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. In Criminal Case No. 1099-M-98, he is found guilty of less serious physical injuries
and SENTENCED to a prison term of one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor.
Appellant is also ORDERED to pay the following amounts: 1) to the legal heirs of Suico, P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto and P135,748.80 for
loss of earning capacity; 2) to the legal heirs of Lapidante, P13,850 for actual damages, P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as moral damages,
and P1,980,763.20 for loss of earning capacity; and 3) to Lacaden, P4,589.86 for actual damages. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4445

February 28, 1955

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MANUEL BERONILLA, FILIPINO VELASCO, POLICARPIO PACULDO, and JACINTO ADRIATICO, defendants-appellants.
Agripino A. Brillantes, Valera, Eufemio and Bernardez for appellants.
Prospero C. Sanidad and Claro M. Recto for defendant.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jaime R. de los Angeles and Martiniano P. Vivo for appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is an appeal by accused Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Abra (Criminal Case No. 70) convicting them of murder for the execution of Arsenio Borjal in the evening of April 18, 1945, in the town
of La Paz , Province of Abra.
Arsenio Borjal was the elected mayor of La Paz, Abra, at the outbreak of war, and continued to serve as Mayor during the Japanese occupation,
until March 10, 1943, when he moved to Bangued because of an attempt upon his life by unknown persons. On December 18, 1944, appellant
Manuel Beronilla was appointed Military Mayor of La Paz by Lt. Col. R. H. Arnold, regimental commander of the 15th Infantry, Philippine Army,
operating as a guerrilla unit in the province of Abra. Simultaneously with his appointment as Military Mayor, Beronilla received copy of a
memorandum issued by Lt. Col. Arnold to all Military Mayors in Northern Luzon, authorizing them "to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to try
persons accused of treason, espionage, or the aiding and abetting (of ) the enemy" (Exhibit 9). He also received from the Headquarters of the 15th
Infantry a list of all puppet government officials of the province of Abra (which included Arsenio Borjal, puppet mayor of La Paz), with a
memorandum instructing all Military Mayors to investigate said persons and gather against them complaints from people of the municipality for
collaboration with the enemy (Exhibit 12-a).
Sometime in March, 1945, while the operations for the liberation of the province of Abra were in progress, Arsenio Borjal returned to La Paz with
his family in order to escape the bombing of Bangued. Beronilla, pursuant to his instructions, placed Borjal under custody and asked the residents
of La Paz to file complaints against him. In no time, charges of espionage, aiding the enemy, and abuse of authority were filed against Borjal; a 12man jury was appointed by Beronilla, composed of Jesus Labuguen as chairman, and Benjamin Adriatico, Andres Afos, Juanito Casal, Santiago
Casal, Benjamin Abella, Servillano Afos, Mariano Ajel, Felimon Labuguen, Felix Murphy, Pedro Turqueza, and Delfin Labuguen as members;
while Felix Alverne and Juan Balmaceda were named prosecutors, Policarpio Paculdo as clerk of the jury, and Lino Inovermo as counsel for the
accused. Later, Atty. Jovito Barreras voluntarily appeared and served as counsel for Borjal. Sgt. Esteban Cabanos observed the proceedings for
several days upon instructions of Headquarters, 15th Infantry. The trial lasted 19 days up to April 10, 1945; the jury found Borjal guilty on all
accounts and imposed upon him instruction from his superiors. Mayor Beronilla forwarded the records of the case to the Headquarters of the 15th
Infantry for review. Said records were returned by Lt. Col. Arnold to Beronilla on April 18, 1945 with the following instructions:
HEADQUARTERS 3RD MILITARY DISTRICT
15TH INFANTRY, USAFIP
In the Field
16 April 1945

Msg. No. 337

Subject: Arsenio Borjal, Charges Against
To: Military Mayor of La Paz, Abra.
1. Returned herewith are the papers on the case of Arsenio Borjal.
2. This is a matter best handled by your government and whatever disposition you make of the case is hereby approved.
(Sgd.) R. H. ARNOLD
Lieut.-Colonel, 15th Inf., PA
Commanding
Received April 18, 1945, 10:35 a.m.
(Sgd.) MANUEL BERONILLA
Military Mayor, La Paz, Abra
(Exhibit 8, 8-a)
and on the night of the same day, April 18, 1945, Beronilla ordered the execution of Borjal. Jacinto Adriatico acted as executioner and Antonio
Palope as grave digger. Father Luding of the Roman Catholic Church was asked to administer the last confession to the prisoner, while Father
Filipino Velasco of the Aglipayan Church performed the last rites over Borjal's remains. Immediately after the execution, Beronilla reported the
matter to Col. Arnold who in reply to Beronilla's report, sent him the following message:
HEADQUARTERS 3RD MILITARY DISTRICT
15TH INFANTRY, USAFIP
In the Field
22 April 1945

Msg. No. 398

Subject: Report and information Re Borjal case
To: Military Mayor Beronilla
1. Received your letter dated 18 April 1945, subject, above.
2. My request that you withhold action in this case was only dictated because of a query from Higher Headquarters regarding same.
Actually, I believe there was no doubt as to the treasonable acts of the accused Arsenio Borjal and I know that your trial was absolutely
impartial and fair. Consequently, I Can only compliment you for your impartial independent way of handling the whole case.
(Sgd.) R. H. ARNOLD
Lieut.-Colonel, 15th Inf., PA
Commanding
Received April 26, 1947 7:00 a.m.
(Sgd.) MANUEL BERONILLA
Military Mayor, La Paz, Abra
(Exhibit 21, 21-a)
Two years thereafter, Manuel Beronilla as military mayor, Policarpio Paculdo as Clerk of the jury, Felix Alverne and Juan Balmaceda as
prosecutors, Jesus Labuguen, Delfin Labuguen, Filemon Labuguen, Servillano Afos, Andres Afos, Benjamin Adriatico, Juanito Casel, Santiago
Casel, Mariano Ajel, Felix Murphy, Benjamin Abella, and Pedro Turqueza as members of the jury, Jacinto Adriatico as executioner, Severo Afos as
grave digger, and Father Filipino Velasco as an alleged conspirator, were indicted in the Court of First Instance of Abra for murder, for allegedly
conspiring and confederating in the execution of Arsenio Borjal. Soon thereafter, the late President Manuel A. Roxas issued Executive Proclamation
No. 8, granting amnesty to all persons who committed acts penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy
against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy. Defendant Jesus Labuguen, then a master sergeant in the Philippine Army, applied for and
was granted amnesty by the Amnesty Commission, Armed Forces of the Philippines (Records, pp. 618-20). The rest of the defendant filed their
application for amnesty with the Second Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, who denied their application on the ground that the crime had been
inspired by purely personal motives, and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Abra for trial on the merits.
Upon motion of defense counsel, the case against defendant Jesus Labuguen, who had been granted amnesty by the Amnesty Commission of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, was ordered provisionally dismissed: defendant Juan Balmaceda was discharged from the information so that he
might be utilized as state witness, although actually he was not called to testify; while the case against defendants Antonio Palope (the grave
digger) and Demetrio Afos( a boloman) was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence.
Trial proceeded against the rest of the defendants; and on July 10, 1950, the Court below rendered judgment, acquitting the members of the jury
and the grave digger Antonio Palope on the ground that they did not participated in the killing of Arsenio Borjal; acquitting defendants Jesus
Labuguen, Felix Alverne, Severo Afos, and Lauro Parado upon insufficiency of evidence to establish their participation in the crime; but convicting
defendants Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico as conspirator and co-principals of the crime of murder,
and sentencing them to suffer imprisonment of from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day ofreclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of
Arsenio Borjal jointly and severally in the amount of P4,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each to pay one fourth of the
costs. In convicting said defendants the Court a quo found that while the crime committed by them fell within the provisions of the Amnesty
Proclamation, they were not entitled to the benefits thereof because the crime was committed after the expiration of the time limit fixed by the
amnesty proclamation;: i.e., that the deceased Arsenio Borjal was executed after the liberation of La Paz, Abra.
In view of the sentence meted by the Court below, the accused Beronilla, Paculdo, Velasco and Adriatico appealed to this Court.
The records are ample to sustain the claim of the defense that the arrest, prosecution and trial of the late Arsenio Borjal were done pursuant to
express orders of the 15th Infantry Headquarters. (Exhibit 9 and 12-a), instructing all military mayors under its jurisdiction to gather evidence

against puppet officials and to appoint juries of at least 12 bolomen to try the accused and find them guilty by two thirds vote. It is to be noted that
Arsenio Borjal was specifically named in the list of civilian officials to be prosecuted (Exhibit 12-b).
In truth, the prosecution does not seriously dispute that the trial and sentencing of Borjal was done in accordance with instructions of superior
military authorities, altho it point to irregularities that were due more to ignorance of legal processes than personal animosity against Borjal. The
state, however, predicates its case principally on the existence of the radiogram Exhibit H from Col. Volckmann, overall area commander, to Lt.
Col. Arnold, specifically calling attention to the illegality of Borjal's conviction and sentence, and which the prosecution claims was known to the
accused Beronilla. Said message is as follows:
"Message:
VOLCKMANN TO ARNOLD CLN UNDERSTAND THAT MUNICIPALITIES OF ABRA HAVE ORGANIZED JURY SYSTEM PD
BELIEVE THAT THIS BODY IS ILLEGAL AND CANNOT TRY PUNISHMENTS THEREOF PD SPECIFIC INSTANCE IS BROUGHT TO
YOUR ATTENTION FRO PROPER AND IMMEDIATE ACTION ON ONE ARSENIO BORJAL OF LA PAZ WHO HAS BEEN TRIED
CMA CONVICTED AND SENTENCED TO BE HANGED PD REPORT ACTION TAKEN BY YOU ON THIS MATTER PD MSG BEGINS
CLN"
(EXH. H)
The crucial question thus becomes whether or not this message, originally sent to Arnold's quarters in San Esteban, Ilocos Sur, was relayed by the
latter to appellant Beronilla in La Paz, Abra, on the morning of April 18, 1945, together with the package of records of Borjal's trial that was
admittedly returned to and received by Beronilla on that date, after review thereof by Arnold (Exhibit 8-8-a). Obviously, if the Volckmann message
was known to Beronilla, his ordering the execution of Borjal on the night of April 18, 1945 can not be justified.
We have carefully examined the evidence on this important issue, and find no satisfactory proof that Beronilla did actually receive the radiogram
Exhibit H or any copy thereof. The accused roundly denied it. The messenger, or "runner", Pedro Molina could not state what papers were enclosed
in the package he delivered to Beronilla on that morning in question, nor could Francisco Bayquen (or Bayken), who claimed to have been present
at the delivery of the message, state the contents thereof.
The only witness who asserted that Beronilla received and read the Volckmann message, Exhibit H, was Rafael Balmaceda, a relative of Borjal, who
claimed to have been, as Beronilla's bodyguard, present at the receipt of the message and to have read it over Beronilla's shoulder. This testimony,
however, can not be accorded credence, for the reason that in the affidavit executed by this witness before Fiscal Antonio of Abra (Exhibit 4),
Balmaceda failed to make any mention of the reading, or even the receipt, of the message. In the affidavit, he stated:
Q. In your capacity as policeman, do you know of any usual occurrence that transpired in La Paz, Abra? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you state what is the event? A. On April 17, 1945, I was assigned as guard at the Presidencia where Mayor Arsenio Borjal is
confined. On the 18th of April, 1945, six bolomen came to me while I was on duty as guard, that Mayor Borjal should be tied, on orders of
Mayor Beronilla, Mayor Borjal wanted to know the reason why he would be tied, as he had not yet learned of the decision of the jury
against him. Mayor Borjal wrote a note to Mayor Beronilla, asking the reason for his being ordered to be tied. I personally delivered the
note of Borjal to Mayor Beronilla. Mayor Beronilla did not answer the note, but instead told me that I should tie Mayor Borjal, as
tomorrow he would die, as he cannot escape. I returned to the Presidencia, and Mayor Borjal was tied, as that was the ordered of Mayor
Beronilla.
The plain import of the affidavit is that the witness Rafael Balmaceda was not with Beronilla when the message arrived, otherwise Beronilla would
have given him his orders direct, as he (Balmaceda) testified later at the trial. Moreover, it is difficult to believe that having learned of the contents
of the Volckmann message, Balmaceda should not have relayed it to Borjal , or to some member of the latter's family, considering that they were
relatives. In addition to Balmaceda was contradicted by Bayken, another prosecution witness, as to the hatching of the alleged conspiracy to kill
Borjal. Balmaceda claimed that the accused-appellants decided to kill Borjal in the early evening of April 18, while Bayken testified that the
agreement was made about ten o'clock in the morning, shortly after the accused had denied Borjal's petition to be allowed to hear mass.
Upon the other hand, Beronilla's conduct belies his receipt of the Volckmann message. Had he executed Borjal in violation of superior orders, he
would not have dared to report it to Arnold's headquarters on the very same day, April 18th, 1945, as he did (Exhibit 20), half an hour after the
execution. And what is even more important, if Borjal was executed contrary to instructions, how could Lt. Colonel Arnold on April 21, 1945, write
in reply (Exhibit 21, 21-a) "I can only compliment you for your impartial but independent way of handling the whole case" instead of berating
Beronilla and ordering his court martial for disobedience?
Our conclusion is that Lt. Col. Arnold, for some reason that can not now be ascertained, failed to transmit the Volckmann message to Beronilla.
And this being so, the charge of criminal conspiracy to do away with Borjal must be rejected, because the accused had no need to conspire against a
man who was, to their knowledge, duly sentenced to death.
The state claims that the appellants held grudges against the late Borjal. Even so, it has been already decided that the concurrence of personal
hatred and collaboration with the enemy as motives for a liquidation does not operate to exclude the case from the benefits of the Amnesty claimed
by appellants, since then "it may not be held that the manslaughter stemmed from purely personal motives" (People vs. Barrioquinto,* G. R. Nos. L2011 and 2267, June 30, 1951). Actually, the conduct of the appellants does not dispose that these appellants were impelled by malice (dolo). The
arrest and trial of Borjal were made upon express orders of the higher command; the appellants allowed Borjal to be defended by counsel, one of
them (attorney Jovito Barreras) chosen by Borjal's sister; the trial lasted nineteen (19) days; it was suspended when doubts arose about its legality,
and it was not resumed until headquarters (then in Langangilang, Abra) authorized its resumption and sent an observer (Esteban Cabanos, of the
S-5) to the proceedings, and whose suggestions on procedure were followed; and when the verdict of guilty was rendered and death sentence
imposed, the records were sent to Arnold's headquarters for review, and Borjal was not punished until the records were returned eight days later
with the statement of Arnold that "whatever disposition you make of the case is hereby approved" (Exhibit 8), which on its face was an assent to
the verdict and the sentence. The lower Court, after finding that the late Arsenio Borjal had really committed treasonable acts, (causing soldiers and
civilians to be tortured, and hidden American officers to be captured by the Japanese) expressly declared that "the Court is convinced that it was
not for political or personal reason that the accused decided to kill Arsenio Borjal" (Decision, p. 9; Record, p. 727).
It appearing that the charge is the heinous crime of murder, and that the accused-appellants acted upon orders, of a superior officers that they, as
military subordinates, could not question, and obeyed in good faith, without being aware of their illegality, without any fault or negligence on their
part, we can not say that criminal intent has been established (U. S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil., 507; Peo. vs. Pacana, 47 Phil., 48; Sent. of the Tribunal
Supremo of Spain, 3 July 1886; 7 January 1901; 24 March 1900; 21 Feb. 1921; 25 March 1929). Actus non facit reum nisi mens si rea.
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such
negligence or indifference to duty or to consequence, as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit reum, nisi
mens rea-a crime is not committed if the minds of the person performing the act complained of be innocent. (U. S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil.,
507).

But even assuming that the accused-appellant did commit crime with they are charged, the Court below should not have denied their claim to the
benefits of the Guerrilla Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 (42 Off. Gaz., 2072)on the ground that the slaying of Arsenio Borjal took place after actual
liberation of the area from enemy control and occupation. The evidence on record regarding the date of liberation of La Paz, Abra, is contradictory.
The Military Amnesty Commission that decided the case of one of the original accused Jesus Labuguen, held that La Paz, Abra, was liberated on
July 1, 1945, according to its records; and this finding was accepted by Judge Letargo when he dismissed the case against said accused on March 15,
1949. On the other hand, Judge Bocar and Hilario, who subsequently took cognizance of the case, relied on Department Order No. 25, of the
Department of the Interior, dated August 12, 1948, setting the liberation of the Province of Abra on April 4, 1945, fifteen days before Borjal was
slain. The two dates are not strictly contradictory; but given the benefit of the Presidential directive to the Amnesty Commissions (Adm. Order No.
11, of October 2, 1946) that "any reasonable doubt as to whether a given case falls within the (amnesty) proclamation shall be resolved in favor of
the accused" (42 Off. Gaz., 2360), as was done in People vs. Gajo, Phil., 107 46 Off. Gaz., (No. 12) p. 6093.
For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the appellants are acquitted, with costs de oficio.
EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 150542-87. February 3, 2004]

PEOPLE

OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, appellee,
ORGANISTA y ANDRES, appellants.

vs.

OLIVER

AREVALO

JR. y ABANILLA,

and

HERMINIGILDO

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Appellant is accused of multiple rape by two or more persons, for which Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death. Since the Information did not allege any aggravating circumstance, the proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion
perpetua, not death.

The Case

For automatic review before this Court is the October 26, 2001 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City (Branch 62) in
Criminal Case Nos. 01-419 to 01-464, finding Oliver Arevalo Jr. and Herminigildo Organista guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 42 and 32 counts of
rape, respectively. The decretal portion of the Decision is worded as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Oliver A. Arevalo in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-419 to 01-423, 01-425 to 01-428, 01-430 to
01-441, 01-442 to 01-446, 01-448 to 01-451, 01-453 to 01-464, and accused Herminigildo A. Organista in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-419 to 01-422, 01-442
to 01-445, and 01-441 and 01-464 GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape defined under Art. 266-A, par. 1(a) in relation to Art. 266-B,
par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353, and imposes upon them the maximum penalty of death in each case. Each of
the two accused is hereby ordered to pay complainants Regina G. Acu[]a and Ruth F. Acosta P75,000.00 each as civil indemnity.
Considering the outrage, humiliation, distress and trauma suffered by the two complainants from the dastardly act of the two accused, the Court
orders the accused Arevalo to pay Regina Acu[]a and Ruth AcostaP200,000.00 each and accused Organista to pay the two complainants P50,000.00
each as moral damages pursuant to Article 2219(3) in relation to Article 2217 of the Civil Code.
Accused Arevalo is further ordered to pay exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 to each of the two complainants to deter others with
perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behaviors from committing the act.
For failure of the prosecution to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of accused Oliver A. Arevalo in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-424 and 01447, and 01-429 and 01-452, and accused Herminigildo A. Organista in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-423 to 01-440 and 01-446 to 01-463, they are hereby
ACQUITTED in said cases.[2]
A total of forty-six (46) separate Informations[3] were filed against appellants. For the rape of Regina Acua, they were charged as follows:

Criminal Case No. 01-419

That on or about the 23rd day of January, 2001, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with John Does and mutually helping and aiding with one another, by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully [and] feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant REGINA
ACU[]A y GUTIERREZ, without her consent and against her will. [4]
The Informations[5] in Criminal Case Nos. 01-420 to 01-441 contain allegations identical to the above Information, differing only with respect
to the dates of the commission of the alleged rapes.
For the rape of Ruth Acosta, appellants were charged as follows:

Criminal Case No. 01-442

That on or about the 23rd day of January, 2001, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with John Does and mutually helping and aiding with one another, by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant RUTH
ACOSTA y FILLAS, without her consent and against her will.[6]

Again, the Informations[7] in Criminal Case Nos. 01-443 to 01-464 contain allegations identical to the above Information, differing only with
respect to the dates of the commission of the alleged rapes.
Upon their arraignment on March 19, 2001,[8] appellants, with the assistance of their counsel,[9] pleaded not guilty to all charges. After trial in
due course, the court a quo rendered the assailed Decision.

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecutions version of the facts in the following manner:
Regina G. Acu[]a was a jobless 22-year old married woman residing in Payatas, Quezon City. On January 23, 2001, between three oclock and
four oclock in the afternoon, she was walking down Manggahan St. in Fairview, Quezon City, looking for a job. As she went along, appellant
Arevalo, a stranger, approached and asked her what her problem was. She replied that she was looking for a job. Appellant Arevalo told Regina
that he could get her a job as saleslady. Regina said that if the place of work was far, she was not interested. Appellant Arevalo told her not to
worry, as the workplace was not far, and that nothing wrong would happen to her. Regina did not believe him.
While they were talking, a car stopped in front of them. Suddenly, appellant Arevalo placed a white handkerchief on Reginas face and boarded
her on the vehicle. Regina could not remember what happened next. She could not even recall whether she slept or lost consciousness. All she
knew was that when she woke up, she was already lying on a bed inside a room. It was nighttime.
In the room, Regina saw appellant Arevalo and a fat lady whom he identified as Rose, his atsay or helper. Regina later learned that Roses real
name was Ruth Acosta. Ruth looked like she was in a state of shock, or, tulala.
Appellant Arevalo left momentarily. When he came back, he forcibly took off Reginas clothes. Regina asked him what he was doing, and he
replied that what he would do would only take a while. Appellant Arevalo then undressed himself. When Regina saw this, she pleaded with him
to take pity on her and to release her, as her husband may have been worrying for her already. Appellant Arevalo repeated that it would not take
long. Regina shouted for help. But nobody heard her, as appellant Arevalo had closed the door and windows. While she was shouting, appellant
Arevalo raised her feet and forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina.
As Regina lay on the bed, she kept on shouting and resisting appellant Arevalos sexual assault. At one point, she was able to free herself from
him and run. But he caught up with her, grabbed her hair, banged her head against the wall and threw her back to the bed, where he continued to
ravish her. Rose, or Ruth Acosta, was looking on helplessly, crying while Regina was being violated.
From that night onward until February 14, 2001, Regina would be wearing nothing almost all the time, for she would be ravished for what seemed
like almost every day and every hour.
On January 24, 2001, an unidentified man raped Regina in the same room. Before raping her[,] however, the man paid appellant Arevalo a sum of
money. Regina could not see the mans face, as appellant Arevalo had blindfolded her. But she heard the man tell appellant Arevalo, Pare, itong
bayad.
The unidentified man made Regina take different sexual positions even as she resisted. At one time, he inserted his penis into her anus; at
another, he inserted his finger and later, his penis, into her vagina. Thereafter, appellant Arevalo made her eat the mans penis. Regina struggled
hard to free herself from the mans clutches, but she was no match for him.
When the man had left, appellant Arevalo took off Reginas blindfold. Regina saw him counting the money the man had paid him. Thereafter,
appellant Arevalo ravished Regina himself. When he was finished, appellant Arevalo again sold Regina to another unidentified man, who
proceeded to have sex with her. By this time, Regina was no longer shouting for help because no one could hear or help her anyway.
On January 25, 2001, appellant Arevalo again blindfolded Regina and let other men ravish her for a fee while he stood guard outside the door of
his house. The first man who had sex with Regina inserted his penis into her vagina while he was on top of her, covering her mouth with his hand
because she was noisy. Regina kept shouting for help, but nobody heard her. So she just cried and cried and threw punches at the man, but he
would not stop ravishing her. To keep her from resisting, the man pointed a knife at her neck and threatened to kill her. When the man was
through, another man followed. By then, Regina was no longer putting up any resistance because she was afraid and at the same time, already
very weak. Around six (6) men raped her in succession that day, but she could only recognize appellant Arevalo among them.
On January 26, 2001, appellant Arevalo forced the two (2) women to take drugs. Appellant Arevalo made Regina sniff the smoke of a powdered
substance or tawas wrapped in a foil. When she refused, he threatened to slash her neck. He also made the girls take tablets which Regina later
discovered to be birth control pills.
Thereafter, appellant Arevalo inserted his penis into Reginas vagina. While he was raping her, he ran the point of his knife up and down her
body, from her breasts to her vagina. Regina was very afraid.
After appellant Arevalo had reached a climax, he blindfolded Ruth and made her have sex with many other men.
On January 27, 2001, appellant Arevalo ravished Regina again in a similar manner as the previous days. By then, Regina was very weak.
On many occasions during her first five (5) days in captivity, and even thereafter, Regina tried to escape, but appellant Arevalo would always
catch up with her and hurt her. He would tie up her hands and hang her while having sex with her. Whenever he left the house, he would lock it
from the outside to prevent Regina and Ruth from leaving. Although appellant Arevalo would buy the girls food, Regina oftentimes refused to eat,
because she knew that the food was bought with the money appellant Arevalo earned from peddling their bodies.
On January 28, 2001, appellant Arevalo brought Regina to another place. She did not know where the place was because she was dizzy with the
drugs he had made her use.
On January 29, 2001, appellant Arevalo drugged Regina again. Thereafter, he had sexual intercourse with her. Regina begged him to let her go
home because her husband was waiting for her, but her plea fell on deaf ears. Many other men ravished Regina that day.

On January 30, 2001, appellant Arevalo forced Regina to make a choice between marijuana and tawas. When Regina refused to choose, he
threatened to slash her throat. Afraid, Regina finally chose tawas. Appellant Arevalo told her to take it so that she would not feel the pain in her
vagina, which was already bleeding. Thereafter, appellant Arevalo raped her.
On January 31, 2001, appellant Arevalo had forcible sexual intercourse with Regina again. Thereafter, not content with putting his fingers into her
private part, appellant Arevalo inserted a lighted cigarette inside. Although Regina was taking the drug appellant Arevalo forced her to use, she
still felt the pain in her vagina caused by the hot cigarette.
On February 1, 2001, after forcibly copulating with Regina yet another time, appellant Arevalo sold her again to other men.
On the night of February 2, 2001, appellant Arevalo again moved Regina to another place which she could not remember, because she was dizzy
then. Although there were other passengers on the public utility jeepney that they took on the way to the place, Regina could not ask for help, as
appellant Arevalo was poking a knife at her back inside her t-shirt the whole time and had earlier warned her that he would kill her if she
shouted. They arrived at a concrete house which had a vulcanizing shop at the ground floor. When they were inside the building, appellant
Arevalo blindfolded Regina and hanged her by the hands. Regina heard womens voices, but she was not sure whether they were real or came
from the television set in the room. That night, Regina was again raped by unidentified persons. Appellant Arevalo and Regina left the place at
half past midnight.
From February 3 up to February 5, 2001, appellant Arevalo continued to subject [her] to his bestial designs. Each time, he succeeded in inserting
his penis into her vagina and in consummating the intercourse. Regina no longer put up any resistance because her body had been rendered very
weak from her days of endless ravishment.
On February 6, 2001, Regina fell ill with fever, and Ruth took care of her. Reginas illness did not stop appellant Arevalo from molesting her that
day. Before she was raped, Regina begged appellant Arevalo to allow her to call her parents and even offered him any sum of money as he
desired, but he slapped her, saying that he needed her body and not her money. He also told Ruth to slap her, and so Ruth slapped her.
On February 7, 2001, Regina could only beg appellant Arevalo to take pity on her. She was chilling and she tried to push him away, to no avail,
for once again, appellant Arevalo successfully penetrated her private organ.
On February 8, 2001, Regina discovered that she had a venereal disease, or tulo. But this did not spare her from appellant Arevalos carnal
greed. She stopped resisting him, for her body had long been worn down by ceaseless abuse.
Reginas ordeal continued from February 9 up to February 14, 2001. Every single day, appellant Arevalo would ravish her without letup.
On February 14, 2001, appellant Organista, a friend and neighbor of appellant Arevalo, also had a taste of Reginas flesh. After appellant Arevalo
stripped her naked, appellant Organista made his move. Regina pushed him away as he approached her, but appellant Arevalo teased him,
saying, kaya mo yan pre. Appellant Organista proceeded to insert his penis into Reginas vagina while she lay down on the floor, with appellant
Arevalo looking on. After appellant Organista was finished, appellant Arevalo took over in ravishing Regina and succeeded in penetrating her as
well.
Ruth F. Acosta, a native of Bukidnon, left her family for Manila when she was about eighteen (18) years old. Her highest educational attainment
was the third grade of primary school. Unable to find any relatives in Manila, she ended up loitering and sleeping on the streets of Luneta.
On January 23, 2001, about a year she had left the province, Ruth Acosta met appellant Oliver Arevalo at the Luneta park. It was around six
oclock in the evening. Appellant Arevalo told Ruth that he could help her find a job and invited her to go with him. Ruth went with appellant
Arevalo and they boarded a jeepney. They arrived at (what turned out to be) appellant Arevalos house in Pembo, Makati, a few hours later.
Upon entering the house, appellant Arevalo pushed Ruth Acosta to the bed and stripped off her clothes. Thereafter, appellant Arevalo removed
his own clothes and forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina. Ruth could not recall what happened immediately thereafter, except that she felt
pain in her private part. She was also bleeding badly, for she had just lost her virginity to her assailant.
That same evening, after she was ravished by appellant Arevalo, Ruth was raped by appellant Arevalos friend and neighbor, herein appellant
Organista, in the same room.
The following day, January 24, 2001, appellant Arevalo raped Ruth Acosta again. He took off his clothes, undressed Ruth, and inserted his penis
into her vagina, causing her to feel pain. While she was being raped, Ruth attempted to resist appellant Arevalo by pulling backwards her two
hands with clenched fists, but her resistance was futile.
On January 25, 2001, appellant Arevalo forcibly had sexual intercourse with Ruth again on his bed. He inserted his organ into her private part,
and once more, she felt pain. Many other men raped Ruth in the same room that night after paying a fee to appellant Arevalo, but she could not
identify said men because she was blindfolded by him. She recognized appellant Organista, though, as one of those who raped her while she was
blindfolded because she was able to hold his beard while he was ravishing her and she was already familiar with his face.
On January 26, 2001, appellants Organista and Arevalo took turns in raping Ruth. Appellant Organista removed Ruths clothes, after which,
appellant Arevalo had forcible sexual intercourse with her. Try as she might to resist the two (2) men, she was easily overpowered by them. After
appellant Arevalo was through with Ruth, he left the room. Appellant Organista then proceeded to defile her, inserting his penis into her
vagina. As a result of her ravishment by the two (2) men, Ruth experienced pain whenever she urinated.
The next day, January 27, 2001, appellant Arevalo blindfolded Ruth. Thereafter, she was raped successively by several unidentified men.
On January 28, 2001, appellants Arevalo and Organista forced Ruth to take drugs. Next, appellant Arevalo blindfolded Ruth. Thereafter, several
unidentified men raped Ruth, one after the other, in appellant Arevalos room. Before sexually abusing her, each of these men paid a fee to
appellant Arevalo. Ruth knew this, because she would hear the men say to him, Pare bayad or Pare ito na ang pambayad.
On January 29, 2001, appellant Arevalo vented his carnal desire on Ruth again. After undressing Ruth, he had forcible sexual intercourse with her
on his bed.
On January 30, 2001, appellant Arevalo forced himself upon Ruth once more. While appellant Arevalo was raping her, appellant Organista, who
was visiting, merely looked on and did nothing to stop his friend and neighbor. After appellant Arevalo had ejaculated, appellant Organista took
over, ravishing Ruth until he, too, succeeded in discharging his semen on her. While this was going on, appellant Arevalo merely stood by,
laughing.

On January 31, 2001, appellant Arevalo sexually abused Ruth yet another time, piercing her womanhood and bringing himself to a climax. Other
men followed in raping her that night in appellant Arevalos room, but she could not see them because appellant Arevalo had covered her eyes.
The following day, February 1, 2001, five (5) men raped Ruth in succession in the same room after paying a sum to appellant Arevalo. Once again,
she could not see their faces because appellant Arevalo had blindfolded her.
On February 2, 2001, appellants Arevalo and Organista took turns in raping Ruth in appellant Arevalos room. Ruth knew that both men had
reached a climax after forcibly copulating with her, for her vagina was very wet with their semen.
On February 3, 2001, appellant Arevalo slapped Ruth, pulled her hair, inserted his penis into her vagina and ravished her until he
ejaculated. Appellant Organista followed, similarly unleashing his seminal fluid on the hapless woman upon reaching a climax, while appellant
Arevalo looked on and held her down. Ruths ordeal did not end at this point, for she was subsequently raped by several other men after paying
appellant Arevalo one hundred pesos (P100.00) each.
On February 4, 2001, appellants Arevalo and Organista again raped Ruth in the same room. Appellant Organista had forcible sexual intercourse
with Ruth until he ejaculated; he also forced her to eat his penis. Appellant Arevalo followed, inserting his penis into her private part, causing it to
hurt. He also ejaculated his semen on her.
In addition, appellant Arevalo, as with previous dates, sold Ruth to many other men that day. All of them sexually abused her after each paying
appellant Arevalo one hundred pesos (P100.00).
On February 5, 2001, appellant Arevalo once more peddled Ruth and Regina to unidentified persons who each paid him one hundred pesos
(P100.00). Appellant Arevalo also forcibly copulated with the two (2) women that day. Additionally, appellant Organista ravished Ruth to the
point of ejaculation while appellant Arevalo watched. Ruth could only lie helpless while she was being raped by appellants, as they were too
strong for her.
On February 6, 2001, appellants Arevalo and Organista raped Ruth again. Appellant Organista ravished Ruth first, undressing her, inserting his
manhood into her as she lay on appellant Arevalos bed, and helping himself to an orgasm while leaving Ruth in pain. Appellant Arevalo then
took over, defiling her as well. Thereafter, he blindfolded her and sold her for sex to other unidentified men.
On February 7 and 8, 2001, appellant Arevalo repeated his ravishment of the helpless woman until he ejaculated on her.
Thereafter, appellant Arevalo blindfolded Ruth and sold her flesh to many other men. Again, Ruth knew this, for she heard them say to him,
Pare bayad and she also heard him talking to them.
On February 9, 2001, appellant Arevalo blindfolded the two (2) women and sold their sexual services to several men. Appellant Arevalo warned
Ruth that he had already killed a man before, and she believed him; hence, she did not dare remove her blindfold because she was afraid of him.
On February 10, 2001, appellant Arevalo forcibly consummated his lust on Ruth once more. He also let other men ravish her for a fee.
On February 11, 2001, several men paid appellant Arevalo to have sex with the two (2) women. Appellant Arevalo himself did not spare Ruth,
penetrating her maidenhood yet another time until he was satisfied.
On February 12, 13, and 14, 2001, appellant Arevalo again peddled the women to other men for sex. Appellants Arevalo and Organista were not
to be outdone, for they, too, ravished Ruth on February 12 and 13, 2001.
On the night of February 14, 2001, after they had fulfilled their lustful designs on the two (2) women and prostituted them to other men,
appellants Arevalo and Organista had a drinking spree in the formers room. Thereafter, they fell asleep. Regina Acu[]a got the key to the door
from appellant Arevalos pocket, dragged Ruth Acosta with her, and together they escaped. Regina and Ruth then reported their horrifying ordeal
to the Makati police. It was around 9:30 in the evening.
That same evening, a team of Makati policemen and barangay tanods went to appellant Arevalos house accompanied by the Regina and
Ruth. They knocked on the door. When appellant Arevalo opened the door, he was immediately identified by the women as their
ravisher. Appellant Arevalo tried to escape, but he was quickly arrested by the police. Thereafter, the police and the two (2) women proceeded to
appellant Organistas residence which appellant Arevalo had readily pinpointed to them. The police knocked on the door and appellant Organista
opened it. Again, the two (2) women quickly identified him as their other rapist. The moment he saw the policemen and the women, appellant
Organista also tried to escape, but the police immediately apprehended him.
The following day, the private complainants were physically examined by Dr. Miriam S. Guialani, the deputy chief of the Womens Crisis and
Child Protection Center of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Camp Crame, Quezon City.
Dr. Guialani found infected erosions or abrasions at the 8 and 9 oclock positions in the labial fold of Reginas external genitalia, most likely
caused by constant friction. She also noted hematoma, infection and fresh lacerations in the hymen at the 2 and 4 oclock positions. In addition, the
hymen was very very red and swollen, indicating that it had been subjected to force and violence. There was also a foul-smelling yellowish vaginal
discharge strongly indicative of a sexually transmitted disease. On the whole, Dr. Guialani noted that the genital findings show clear evidence of
previous penetrating trauma.
On the other hand, Dr. Guialani found healed lacerations at the 4, 7 and 8 oclock positions in Ruths hymen. She also noted edema and swelling
at the hymenal rim and its mucosal tissues. Dr. Guialani similarly reported that Ruths genital findings show clear evidence of previous
trauma.[10] (Citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

On the other hand, the defense presented the following version of the facts:
OLIVER AREVALO testified that since December 27, 2000, he was in Ormoc, Leyte with his wife and two (2) children. On February 10, 2001, he
went back to Manila to borrow money from his brother Tony to put up a sari-sari store but he was asked by his brothers secretary to come back on
February 13, 2001 so he went back to his brothers house but his brother referred him to their elder brother at Project 6, Quezon City. He was only
given P500.00. At around 4:00 oclock p.m., he proceeded to Luneta where policemen were arresting vagrants at that time. The two (2) women,
Ruth and Apple, referring to complainants Acosta and Acu[]a, were arrested. He helped them by giving them food and clothing. They went with

him to Makati and arrived at their house at around 11:30 p.m. The next day, February 12, 2001, the two (2) women were hungry again and Acosta
was asking for transportation fare. He brought them to Organistas house and the latter gave P10.00 to Acosta. The two (2) women left at around
1:30 in the afternoon. He had a drinking spree with Organista at his house. At around 1:00 in the morning, he saw policemen together with the
two (2) women and one of the policemen boxed him, so he pointed Organistas house to them.
HERMINIGILDO ORGANISTA could not remember where he was from January 23, to 26, 2001 because he was treated with ECI for about five
(5) times at the National Mental Health Hospital since 1983. He claimed that said treatment has the tendency of weakening or affecting ones
memory. He corroborated the testimony of accused Arevalo that he only gave P10.00 for the food of Acosta.
AVELINA ORGANISTA testified that her son was treated at the National Mental Health in 1983. His last examination was in 1997. After said
examination, her son could no longer work because they have to bind him because he was uncontrollable. He even threatened her that he would
kill her when she opposed what he was doing. On the dates of the alleged rapes, her son was at home with her.
DR. PIA ALMA DE JESUS of the National Center for Mental Health testified that she first saw accused Organista for treatment on April 11,
2001. She learned from the hospital records that said accused had been mentally ill since 1982 or 1983 and had 23 admissions at the mental
hospital. During his last admission, he was given oral medication to control his psychotic symptoms like illusions and hallucination. Failure to
regularly take said medication could cause a relapse that would render him [unfit] for trial.
JESUS OCAMPO, driver and all around helper of accused Arevalos brother, Tony, testified that he usually see Arevalo on Tuesdays as the latter
used to ask money from Tony.[11] (Citations omitted)

Ruling of the Trial Court

The RTC found Arevalo and Organista guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 42 and 32 counts of rape, respectively -- committed from January
23, 2001 to February 14, 2001.
The positive and straightforward testimonies of the victims, corroborated by medical reports, sufficiently proved the guilt of
appellants. Having closely observed the demeanor of the victims during trial, the lower court found them credible. It found evidence that they
had suffered extreme trauma, pain, humiliation and distress. It held that there was no ill motivation on their part to impute such serious offenses
to appellants.
The RTC found many inconsistencies in the defenses of denial and alibi resorted to by Arevalo. First, he could not state with certainty
whether he and his family had left for Ormoc City or for Valencia, Leyte, when the rapes were committed. He failed to present bus tickets to
support his claim, notwithstanding his manifestation during the trial that he would present them before the court. Second, the trial court was
puzzled by his testimony that, because his brother came home early from work on Tuesdays, on those days he had to go to the latters house, which
served as both office and residence. Third, on cross-examination, the brothers helper contradicted Arevalo by testifying that the former had not
seen the latter in the house on February 10, 2001, the date on which one of the rapes had supposedly taken place. Fourth, the residence of the
brother of Arevalo turned out to be located in Project 2, Quezon City, not in Project 3 as the latter repeatedly testified to.
The defense of insanity proffered by Organista likewise failed to convince the trial court. He presented his mother who testified that he was
not of sound mind, and that he had never left her side ever since he was a young boy. He contradicted her, however, when he declared on the
stand that he was an electrician and a mason by vocation. According to him, during the period 1999 to March 2001 when he engaged in his
vocation, he never received any complaints on his behavior from the people he constantly worked or associated with.
Although Organista was indeed confined at the National Center for Mental Health, the period of his confinement did not include the period
of the commission of the rapes, as he was last discharged from the Center in 1997. Moreover, he failed to prove his claimed insanity during or near
the time of the commission thereof.
On the contrary, when the arresting policemen, together with the victims, proceeded to his house, Organista tried to escape. His reaction
was indicative of guilt and awareness of the wrong he had inflicted on the victims.
Hence, this automatic review before us.[12]

The Issues

Appellants raise the following errors for our consideration:

I
The lower court erred in not appreciating the exempting circumstance of insanity interposed by Accused-appellant Herminigildo Organista
despite strong and convincing evidence presented to prove the same.
II
The lower court erred in finding that conspiracy existed between the Accused-appellants.
III
The lower court erred in imposing upon x x x Accused-appellant Herminigildo Organista the supreme penalty of death notwithstanding the
presence of a mitigating circumstance.
IV
The lower court erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death upon Accused-appellants on the assumption that they are guilty of the crime
charged.[13]
Simply put, appellants arguments hinge on the following: (1) the trial court failed to appreciate Organistas defense of insanity; (2) no
conspiracy existed between appellants; and (3) they should have been found guilty of simple, not qualified, rape.
For clarity, we shall discuss in reverse order the issues raised by appellants.

The Courts Ruling

Appellants are guilty of simple, not qualified, rape; hence, the penalty for each count should be reduced from death to reclusion perpetua.

First Issue:
Proper Crime and Penalty

Appellants maintain that the evidence of the prosecution is weak, and that their defense of alibi and denial should have entitled them to an
acquittal. Organista adds that, assuming they were guilty, he should have been entitled to the mitigating circumstance of illness that diminishes an
offenders exercise of will power, pursuant to Article 13(9)[14] of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellants contend that the Informations did not allege with specificity that two persons had raped the victims. Therefore, they
argue, the rapes should not have been qualified and they should not have been sentenced to death, which is the higher penalty provided under
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, the penalty for each conviction of rape should have been reclusion perpetua.
The contentions of appellants are partly meritorious. While their respective defenses of denial, alibi and insanity must fail, we find them
guilty only of simple, not qualified, rape.

Alibi and Denial

The positive, consistent and straightforward testimonies of the victims sufficiently established appellants culpability. Well-settled is the rule
that denial and alibi, being weak defenses, cannot overcome the positive testimonies of the offended parties.[15]
In order to merit credibility, denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability,[16] which herein appellants failed to show. And
in order for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that they were at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also
that it was physically impossible for them to be at the locus delicti or its immediate vicinity.[17]
In the present case, appellants failed to demonstrate this fact. Without presenting any evidence to support his bare assertion,[18] Arevalo
merely testified that he was in Ormoc, Leyte, from December 27, 2000, to February 10, 2001. He said that the bus ticket evidencing his trip to Leyte
on December 27, 2000, was with his wife, while the return ticket to Manila on February 10, 2001, was with his brother. To corroborate his
testimony, he manifested that he would present the tickets in court after retrieving them,[19] but he failed to do so.
On the other hand, the mother of Organista averred that her son had stayed with her during the entire period of the commission of the
rapes. But since their house was near Arevalos, or the place where the rapes were committed, then it would not have been unlikely for him to be
in the vicinity at the time of the rapes.
The victims testimonies, corroborated by the results of the medical examination, convincingly proved that appellants were the
perpetrators. It is a time-tested rule that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by the trial court,
because it had the opportunity to observe them firsthand and to note their demeanor and conduct on the witness stand. [20] For this reason, its
findings on such matters, absent any arbitrariness or oversight of facts or circumstances of weight and substance, are final and conclusive upon this
Court.[21] It is likewise well-settled that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has
been committed; and when her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on the basis thereof. [22]
After a painstaking review of the records of the case, we find no cogent reason to disturb the trial courts findings on the credibility of the
witnesses. When in open court they positively identified appellants as their rapists, the trial court rightly declared:
The Court has closely observed the demeanor of the two complainants and did not find any ill-motive on their part to impute a serious offense
against the two accused. Clearly evident were the trauma, pain, humiliation and distress on the part of Acu[]a and the state of daze or shock
Acosta was in. x x x.[27]
Nevertheless, though appellants are guilty of raping the victims, modifications have to be made regarding the counts of rape for which each
of them should be held liable.
From January 23 to 26, 2001,[28] only Arevalo, not Organista, should be held liable for the rapes of Acua. A careful review of the
records[29] shows that she identified only Arevalo as her rapist on those dates.
For the rapes committed against Acosta on January 23, 25 and 26, 2001, [30] her testimony confirmed that both appellants had raped her
separately.[31] It was not established, however, that Organista had raped her on January 24, 2001; [32] therefore, only Arevalo should have been
convicted for the rape on that date.
Acua, on the other hand, clearly testified[33] that Organista had raped her only on February 14, 2001.[34] She further testified that after raping
her, Organista had subsequently raped Acosta.[35]But Acosta was silent on whether she was raped by Organista on that date. [36] Because she was the
best person to say whether he had raped her on that date, and she was silent on the matter, we resolve the doubt in his favor and acquit him of the
offense that he allegedly committed on that date.
Regarding the other counts of rape, we find no reason to disturb the trial courts findings. For the rape of Acua, Arevalo is found guilty of
simple rape under Criminal Case Nos. 01-419 to 423, 01-425 to 01-428 and 01-430 to 01-441. He is likewise found guilty of the rape of Acosta in
Criminal Case Nos. 01-442 to 01-446, 01-448 to 01-451 and 01-0453 to 01-464.
On the other hand, for the rape of Acua, Organista is found guilty of simple rape under Criminal Case Nos. 01-441. He is also found guilty
of the rape of Acosta in Criminal Case Nos. 01-442, 01-444 to 01-445 and 01-464.

Criminal Liability

The trial court erred, however, in imposing the penalty of death upon appellants when it appreciated the circumstance of rape by two or
more persons twice -- once as a qualifying, then as an aggravating, circumstance.
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

xxx

xxx

x x x.

From the above, whenever the crime committed is simple rape, the penalty to be imposed is the single penalty of reclusion perpetua. On the
other hand, whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death.
We must note, however, that the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, requires that the complaint or
information should state the qualifying and the aggravating circumstances with specificity. [37] In the present case, no aggravating circumstance
was alleged in the Informations. Hence, the lesser penalty should be applied, as the Court held inPeople v. Sabredo:[38]
The imposable penalty for rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua. But where the
rape is committed with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the imposable penalty ranges from reclusion perpetua to death. The use
of the bladed weapon already qualified the rape. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the crucial factor in determining whether appellant
should be meted the death penalty is the presence of an aggravating circumstance which attended the commission of the crime. A perusal of the
records shows that none of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code was alleged and proven by the
prosecution. Where there is no aggravating circumstance proved in the commission of the offense, the lesser penalty shall be applied.[39]

Second Issue:
Conspiracy

Appellants contend that conspiracy did not attend the rapes committed from January 23 to 26 and on February 14, 2001.
This contention is partly meritorious.
Without specifying whether it was referring to Acua or Acosta, the trial court declared that appellants were in conspiracy in the rapes
committed from January 23 to 26 and on February 14, 2001. From the records, however, it seems that no such conspiracy took place when
appellants separately raped Acosta on those dates. To be appreciated, conspiracy must be shown to have been committed as clearly and
convincingly as the offense itself.[40]

The Rape of Regina Acua

As regards Acua, there was conspiracy only during the rape that occurred on February 14, 2001. We reiterate that, from the records,[41] her
account of the rapes that happened from January 23 to 26, 2001 shows that only Arevalo, not Organista, raped her. Furthermore, no conspiracy
attended the rapes on those dates.
On February 14, 2001, both appellants raped her.[42] It was Arevalo who removed her clothes before Organista raped her. [43] Moreover, when
the latter advanced towards her and she pushed him away, Arevalo -- who was standing inside the same room all the while -- kept egging him on
by saying, Kaya mo yan pre. The latter continued until he consummated his bestial attack upon the victim.
We have held that an overt act in furtherance of conspiracy may consist of lending moral assistance to the co-conspirators even through ones
mere presence at the scene of the crime.[44] In the present case (Criminal Case No. 01-441), Arevalos presence and words encouraged Organista to
pursue his savage designs.

The Rape of Ruth Acosta

The records of the rape of Acosta from January 23 to 26 and on February 14, 2001, do not support the finding of conspiracy.
On January 23, 2001,[45] appellants separately raped her one after the other, but only Arevalo raped her on January 24, 2001. [46] On January
25[47] and 26,[48] appellants again separately raped her one after the other, but it was only Arevalo who raped her on February 14, 2001.[49]

Third Issue:
Insanity

Organista argues that the trial court erred in not exempting him from criminal liability, even though he was insane or completely deprived of
intelligence during the commission of the rapes. He avers that his insanity may be deduced from the following:
First, he cannot remember the events that transpired from January 23 to February 14, 2001, because the treatments he has been undergoing at
the National Center for Mental Health since 1983 have weakened his memory.
Second, Dr. Pia Alma de Jesus of the National Center for Mental Health testified that he had displayed psychotic symptoms like
hallucinations and delusions. She opined that his failure to take his medications regularly could have caused his relapse.
Third, the behavior and actuations he exhibited before and after the rapes were manifestations of mental instability. As testified to by his
mother, he was violent and destructive to the extent of habitually setting their home furniture on fire. He even threatened to kill her when she
confronted him on his behavior.
Fourth, the New Bilibid Prison, where he is presently locked up, certified that he still suffers from chronic schizophrenia.
We are not persuaded.
The law presumes everyone to be sane.[50] The accused who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity incurs the burden of proving
it.[51] To be adjudged insane under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, he or she must have been completely deprived of reason or discernment
and freedom of the will at the time the crime was committed. [52] For such deprivation to be ascertained, it is but proper to receive evidence during a
reasonable period before or after the commission of the crime, for the mind -- its thoughts, motives and emotions -- may be fathomed only by
examining whether the external acts conform with those of people of sound minds.[53]
In the present case, while Organista had indeed been confined at the National Center for Mental Health for treatment, it does not necessarily
follow that he still suffered from schizophrenia during the period of the rapes. No convincing evidence was presented by the defense to show that
he had not been in his right mind, or that he had acted under the influence of a sudden attack of insanity, or that he had generally been regarded as
insane around the time of the commission of the acts attributed to him. Well-settled is the rule that an inquiry into the mental state of the accused
should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the act under prosecution was committed.[54] Mere prior confinement in a
mental institution does not prove that the perpetrator was deprived of reason at the time the crimes were committed.[55]

It must be noted that Organista had been discharged from the mental hospital well before the period of the rapes. We have held that if the
insanity is only occasional or intermittent, the presumption of its continuance does not arise. [56] One who relies on insanity proved at another time
must prove its existence also at the time of the commission of the offense.[57]
To prove his claimed insanity, Organista presented, as an expert witness on his mental condition, Dr. Pia Alma S. de Jesus of the National
Center for Mental Health. It is important to note that she only began treating him beginning April 2001, or two months after the rape
incidents,[58] upon orders of the trial court. Referring to hospital records, she narrated that he had been mentally ill since 1982 or 1983 and had been
admitted to the Center a total of 23 times. [59] Prior to the rapes, his last confinement had been from October 27 to December 1, 1997, [60] again for
schizophrenia. Likewise noteworthy is the fact that this period covering his last admission and discharge prior to the rapes was outside that of the
commission thereof -- January 23 to February 14, 2001. Dr. De Jesus further testified that Organista had already been considered treated on the date
of his discharge in 1997.[61] Though she opined that a patient who did not continue to take medications could suffer a relapse, she did not
categorically state whether Organista had suffered such a relapse before the commissions of the rape.
On the other hand, the prosecution has sufficiently established that Organista knew exactly what he was doing. His going to the house of
Arevalo and either directly or indispensably cooperating with him -- day after day to ravish the victims -- could not have been the act of one so
insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent. On February 14, 2001, specifically, Organista continued to ravish Acua after being
coaxed by Arevalo, Kaya mo yan pre.[62] That Organista persisted in the act all the way to its consummation leaves no doubt that it was voluntary,
conscious and deliberate. Moreover, his attempt to flee when the police officers came to arrest him shows that he knew that what he had done was
condemnable.
Furthermore, Organistas claimed amnesia does not preclude culpability. This charade is evidently a desperate ploy for exculpation. Failure
to remember does not in itself prove the existence of such mental condition at the time the crime was committed. [63]
The testimony of Organista himself militates against his credibility and puts his purported amnesia into serious question. During trial, he
said that he could not remember where he had been from January 23 to 26, 2001. Surprisingly, he could remember perfectly well the number of
times he had been treated at the National Center for Mental Health since 1983, what procedure he had gone through each time he was treated, the
kind of medicine he had been given, the number of times Appellant Arevalo had borrowed money from him without paying, the total amount of
money he had lent the former, and the resentment the latter had often felt whenever his friend would not repay him. Moreover, he could narrate in
complete detail his fabricated story of how he had allegedly met the victims on February 14, 2001, and lent them money only to be later arrested for
rape.[64] The prosecution aptly point out that his selective amnesia and mental dishonesty speak eloquently of his total lack of credibility on the
witness stand.
Finally, Organista is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code, because it was not shown that
his mental illness at the time immediately preceding or at the very moment of the commission of the crime diminished his will power.

Civil Liability

The trial courts award of damages should be modified. Prevailing jurisprudence holds that for each count of simple rape, the victim should
be awarded P50,000 as civil indemnity and another P50,000 as moral damages for the injury evidently suffered. [65] This Court has granted moral
damages to victims of rape without need of proof other than the fact of rape, which by itself shows the factual basis for the award.[66] The award
of P100,000 to each of the victims by way of exemplary damages should be deleted, because no aggravating circumstance was proven.
WHEREFORE, the October 26, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 62), finding appellants guilty of qualified
rape, is MODIFIED.
The Court finds Oliver Arevalo y Abanilla Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of SIMPLE RAPE. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 01-419 to 01-423, 01-425 to 01-428, 01-430 to 01-446, 01-448 to 01-451 and 01-453 to
01-464. Furthermore, he is hereby ordered to pay the following:
1. To Regina Acua, the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages for each count of rape in Criminal Case Nos.
01-419 to 01-423, 01-425 to 01-428, and 01-430 to 01-441
2. To Ruth Acosta, the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages for each count of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 01442 to 01-446, 01-448 to 01-451 and 01-453 to 01-464
Herminigildo Organista y Andres is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of SIMPLE RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 01-441 to 01-442 and 01-444 to 01-445. He is likewise ordered to pay the following:
1. To Regina Acua the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages for each count of rape in Criminal Case No. 01441
2. To Ruth Acosta, the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 by way of moral damages for each count of rape in Criminal Case
Nos. 01-442, 01-444 and 01-445
With respect to Criminal Case No. 01-441, both appellants are found guilty of two (2) counts of rape, for which the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count is meted out to them.
Finally, Herminigildo Organista y Andres is ACQUITTED in Criminal Case Nos. 01-419 to 01-422 and 01-443 and 01-464.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 46539

September 27, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VALENTIN DOQUEA, defendant-appellant.
Primicias, Abad, Mencias and Castillo for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor-General Concepcion and Assistant Attorney Paredes, Jr., for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:

The accused-appellant, who is a minor, was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, for having killed Juan Ragojos by
stabbing him in the breast with a knife on November 19, 1938, in the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan. The court, after trying the case, held that the
accused acted with discernment in committing the act imputed to him and, proceeding in accordance with the provisions of article 80 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 99, ordered him to be sent to the Training School for Boys to remain therein until he
reaches the age of majority. From this order the accused interposed an appeal alleging that the court erred in holding that he had acted with
discernment and in not having dismissal the case.
On the date of the crime, the appellant was exactly thirteen years, nine months and five days old. The incident that gave rise to the aggression
committed by him on the deceased is narrated in the appealed order as follows:
Between 1 and 2 o'clock in the afternoon of November 19, 1938, the now deceased Juan Ragojos and one Epifanio Rarang were playing
volleyball in the yard of the intermediate school of the municipality of Sual, Province of Pangasinan. The herein accused, who was also in
said yard, intervened and, catching the ball, tossed it at Juan Ragojos, hitting him on the stomach. For this act of the accused, Juan
Ragojos chased him around the yard and, upon overtaking him, slapped him on the nape. Said accused then turned against the deceased
assuming a threatening attitude, for which the reason said deceased struck him on the mouth with his fist, returning immediately to the
place where Epifanio Rarang was in order to continue playing with him. The accused, offended by what he considered an abuse on the
part of Juan Ragojos, who was taller and more robust than he, looked around the yard for a stone with which to attack the now deceased
Juan Ragojos, but finding none, he approached a cousin of his named Romualdo Cocal, to ask the latter to lend him his knife. Epifanio
Rarang, who had heard what the accused had been asking his cousin, told the latter not to give the accused his knife because he might
attack Juan Ragojos with it. The accused, however, succeeded in taking possession of the knife which was in a pocket of his cousin's
pants. Once in possession of the knife, Valentin Doquea approached Juan Ragojos and challenged the latter to give him another blow
with his fist, to which the deceased answered that he did not want to do so because he (Juan Ragojos) was bigger that the accused. Juan
Ragojos, ignorant of the intentions of the accused, continued playing and, while he was thus unprepared and in the act of stopping the
ball with his two hands, the accused stabbed him in the chest with the knife which he carried.
The order also contains the following conclusions and findings of fact which we are not at liberty to alter, not being called upon or authorized to do
so, in view of the nature of the appeal before us, by section 138 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3:
Taking into account the fact that when the accused Valentin Doquea committed the crime in question, he was a 7th grade pupil in the
intermediate school of the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan, and as such pupil, he was one of the brightest in said school and was a
captain of a company of the cadet corps thereof, and during the time he was studying therein he always obtained excellent marks, this
court is convinced that the accused, in committing the crime, acted with discernment and was conscious of the nature and consequences
of his act, and so also has this court observed at the time said accused was testifying in his behalf during the trial of this case.
The proven facts, as stated by the lower court in the appealed order, convinces us that the appeal taken from said order is absolutely unfounded,
because it is error to determine discernment by the means resorted to by the attorney for the defense, as discussed by him in his brief. He claims
that to determine whether or not a minor acted with discernment, we must take into consideration not only the facts and circumstances which gave
rise to the act committed by the minor, but also his state of mind at the time the crime was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal
for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment. It is clear that the
attorney for the defense mistakes the discernment referred to in article 12, subsection 3, of the Revised Penal Code, for premeditation, or at least for
lack of intention which, as a mitigating circumstance, is included among other mitigating circumstances in article 13 of said Code. The discernment
that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act
prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be
determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude,
the very comportment and behaviour of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial
(U.S. vs. Maralit, 36 Phil., 155). This was done by the trial court, and the conclusion arrived at by it is correct.
Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.
epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-482

February 25, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BIENVENIDO NOCUM, defendant-appellant.
Severino P. Izon for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor Umali for appellee.
BENGZON, J.:
For having discharged a gun and accidentally killed Eugenio Francisco, the defendant Bienvenido Nocum, aliasBembe, was tried in the Court of
First Instance Manila, before the Honorable Alfonso Felix, judge. Found guilty of homicide through reckless negligence, he appealed in due course.
According to the evidence, about 9 o'clock in the evening of November 21, 1945, there was a fistic fight between Federico Bautista and Vicente
Aurencio at the corner of Mayhaligue and Magdalena Streets, City of Manila. Desiring to stop the encounter, defendant shouted at the combatants.
As these paid him no attention, he drew a .45 caliber pistol and shot twice at the air. The bout continued, however; so he fired another shot at the
ground, but unfortunately the bullet ricocheted and hit Eugenio Francisco, an innocent by-stander, resident of the place. The wounded man was
promptly carried to the St. Luke's Hospital where he expired soon after.
The above paragraph is a composite and abridged statement of the declarations of several witnesses (Jesus Santos, Vicente and Juan Aurencio and
Ramon Gagui) in connection with defendant's confession Exhibit F.1 But his attorney, assailing the validity of said confession in the ground of
involuntariness, contends in this Court that in asmuch as the corpus delicti had not been demonstrated by evidence dehors that document, his client
should be absolved, pursuant to several pertinent decisions. (United States vs. De la Cruz, 2 Phil., 148; and People vs. Bantagan, 54 Phil., 834.)
Particular attention has been given to these points. Yet there is competent proof establishing the fact that, during the affray, pistol detonations were
heard, and that one of the bullets produced the tragic death of Eugenio Francisco, whose photograph is Exhibit B. That is proof of the corpus delicti,
i. e.,proof of violent death, whether or not feloniously caused. (See Moran, Law of Evidence, Revised Edition, pp. 108, 109; People vs. Mones, 58
Phil., 46.) The confession Exhibit F served to identify the person who fired those shots and committed the offense.

We feel no inclination to reject such confession, because the uncorroborated and implausible testimony of the accused, alleging he had been
manhandled before signing this document, about which he knew nothing, could not definitely overcome the positive assertions of Pablo Montilla
of the Manila Police Department (before whom Exhibit F had been executed) that no force or intimidation had been employed on Nocum, who
willingly signed it "after propounding to him all the questions and explaining to him the contents" thereof. The impartiality of that officer of the
law has not been shaken by the lone testimony of herein appellant, which, as explained in the People's brief, deserves no credence. Nocum said in
court that he signed Exhibit F when Montilla told him "it was simply a proof that they arrested me" (p. 27, t.s.n.). This is inconsistent with the
alleged third-degree methods. If he was forced, deceit was unneccessary. And yet, he could not be deceived thusly, because he was no illiterate,
being seventh grader.
Anyway, the trial judge had the chance to see the opposing witnesses, and to observe their demeanor on the stand; and in the conflict of their
statements we will not interfere with his judgment, unless the record discloses some important circumstance which was overlooked, (United States
vs. Remigio, 37 Phil., 599; United States vs. Maralit, 36 Phil., 155), it being the peculiar province of trial courts to resolve questions relating to the
credibility of witnesses. (United States vs. Pico, 15 Phil., 549.)
The mishap should be classed as homicide through reckless imprudence, the slaying having been unintentional (cf. People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939;
and United States vs. Reodique, 32 Phil., 458). It is apparent the defendant wilfully discharged his gun for which he exhibited no license, by the
way without taking the precautions demanded by the circumstance that the district was populated, and the likehood that his bullet would
glance over the hard pavement of the Manila thoroughfare.
A landowner surprise a youngster in the act of stealing some fruit in his orchard. To scare the intruder he fired a shotgun aiming at the foliage of a
cherry tree. The shot scattered and a pellet injured the boy, who was standing under the tree. That was reckless negligence, the Spanish Supreme
Court decided. (Sent. June 20, 1900, Viada, 5th ed., Vol. 7, p. 14.)
The penalty imposed on the appellant is 2 months and 1 day to 1 year and 1 day, indemnity of P2,000 with subsidiary imprisonment, and costs. It is
within the limits authorized by law. (Article 365, Rev. Penal Code, and Act No. 4103.) (Act No. 284.)
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24781 May 29, 1970

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CARLOS FERNANDO alias COMMANDER "BOB," defendant-appellant.
Maximo V. Cuesta, J and Cipriano Manansala for defendant appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Teodulo R. Dino for plaintiff-appellee.

TEEHANKEE, J.:
Appeal from the sentence of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court on the accused-appellant for the crime of murder.
The accused was charged with the crime of murder before the Court of First Instance of Tarlac under the following information:
That on or about March 30, 1961, at nighttime, in the Municipality of Bamban, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Carlos Fernando alias "Bob," together with Francisco Ronquillo
alias Commander "Manly," (Deceased) and Mario Salonga (at large), confederating, conspiring and helping one another, with
malice aforethought and the deliberate intent to take the life of Bienvenido Laxamana, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treacherously attack the latter with pistols caliber 45, thereby inflicting upon the said Bienvenido Laxamana,
mortal wounds on different parts of his body which directly caused his instantaneous death.
After trial, the trial court found the accused guilty as charged, on the strength of his two confessions, consisting of his 4-page written sworn
statement taken on June 16, 1961 by Capt. Pedro Acierto of the First Philippine Constabulary Zone, 1 soon after his capture on June 12, 1961 in an
encounter in Barrio Balibago between Dau and Mabalacat, Pampanga, between PC troops and Huks led by HMB Commander Francisco Ronquillo
alias Commander Manly who was killed, and his 3-page testimony at the preliminary examination of the criminal complaint for murder conducted
on July 19, 1961 by Judge Pompeyo S. Tiglao of the Municipal Court of Bamban, Tarlac, 2 as well as of his own testimony at the hearing of March 11,
1965 as the lone defense witness on his own behalf, at which he, freely admitted his participation in the murder. 3
The trial court found the facts as follows: "(O) n the evening of March 30, 1961, at about 7:00 o'clock, Bienvenido Laxamana was inside a store of one
Honoria Atienza next to his house on the same side of the street in the poblacion of Bamban, Tarlac. He was then, sitting and eating peanuts. While
in that position, Mario Salonga alias 'Manding,' who is still at large, and the accused Carlos Fernando alias 'Bob,' without any warning, suddenly
and unexpectedly fired shots with their .45 caliber pistols at Laxamana. The duo then departed, leaving their victim sprawled outside the store.
Salonga and Fernando were members of the Hukbalahap Organization. Before going to Bamban, Tarlac, on the evening of the
incident, they were somewhere within the jurisdiction of Angeles City where they received instruction from one of their
commanders, Francisco Ronquillo alias Commander Manly,' to liquidate Laxamana. The motive was that the latter, while an
officer of the civilian guards, had ordered the killing of a relative of Commander "Manly" and the beating up of the father of
Salonga. Fernando and Salonga went to Bamban from Angeles City by walking all along between sugar cane field. After the
killing of Laxamana, they also decamped together the same route.
The victim, Bienvenido Laxamana, was married to Remedios L. Laxamana. Two daughters were born out of their wedlock, the
elder of whom is 13 years old. Before his death, Laxamana was a member of the Central Azucareras de Tarlac Planters'

Association of that province. When his brother-in-law, the late Sinforoso Lomboy, was the Municipal Mayor of Bamban
sometime in 1950, he became a member of the civilian guards or the Civilian Commando Unit (CCU) in that town with the
rank of captain.
That evening of March 30, 1961, Mrs. Laxamana came from the Catholic church of Bamban with her elder daughter,
Bernadette. While on her way home and when the distance from her house was about thirty meters, she heard the firing of
shots. She took cover in one stores; and after the firing had ceased, she went out and hurriedly proceeded to her home. In front
of the store of Honoria Atienza she saw her husband sprawled on the ground full of blood. She was not able to come close to
him because somebody held her back. A jeep arrived where her husband was placed but not long thereafter he was brought
back already dead.
Dr. Honorato Navarro, municipal health officer of Bamban Tarlac, made the autopsy of the victim's cadaver or the same night of the murder, and
per his necropsy report, 4 the victim cited of "hemorrhage, massive, secondary to GUNSHOT WOUNDS, multiple (23) in neck, chest, and back,
lumbar region, and upper and lower extremities," many of which were mortal wounds hitting vital organs in the neck such as the carotid artery
and the vagus nerve, both lungs and the liver, kidneys and intestines in the lumber region.
The trial court rejected the accused's testimony at the trial that he did not fire any shot at the victim but merely stood guard outside the store, and
that his role, after Salonga had ceased firing at the victim was to fire three shots in the air as a signal for them to depart, thus: "(T)he Court
entertains a very serious doubt on the veracity of the above-mentioned statement of the accused because the same is contrary to what he stated
when he was first investigated by the P.C. after his apprehension. Portion of his written statement (Exh. F-1) reads as follows:
12. T Natupad ba naman ninyo ang iniutos ni Comdr. FRANCISCO RONQUILLO na patayin si
BIENVENIDO LAXAMANA?
S Opo napatay namin sa pamamagitan ng pagbaril sa kanya nuong gabing iyon ng ika-30 ng Marzo,
1961.
13. T Anong clase ng baril ang inyong ginamit sa pagpatay kay LAXAMANA?
S Pareho po kaming gumamit ng Pistola calibre 45. Si MARIO SALONGA alias MANDING na aking
kasama ay nakapagpaputok ng humigit kumulang sa labing-dalawa at ako naman ay tatlong putok.
14. T Sinabi mong natupad ninyo ang utos ni Comdr. FRANCISCO RONQUILLO alias Commander
MANLY, na patayin si Bienvenido Laxamana, natatandaan mo ba kung saan lugar ninyo binaril at pinatay
ang taong naturan?
S Duon po sa loob ng isang tindahan sa Poblacion, Bamban, Tarlac, na ang may-ari sa naturang
tindahan ay hindi ko kilala.
The answer of the accused to the above-quoted question No. 13 to the effect that he and Salonga both used .45 caliber pistols in
killing Laxamana, with Salonga firing twelve shots and he, three shots, conveys no other idea, than that the three shots he fired
were directed at the victim and not upwards into the air. The Court is inclined to believe that this statement is the one in
keeping with the truth, taking into consideration the determination of the accused to participate in the killing of Laxamana and
the number of gunshot wounds found on the latter's body.
At any rate, the trial court further held, there was no doubt as to the existence of conspiracy between the accused and Salonga, as the accused
actively participated in the criminal design of Salonga and acted in concert with him, granting arguendo that the accused merely stood guard for
Salonga and that Salonga alone inflicted the 23 gunshot wounds on the victim.
The trial court likewise rejected the accused's contention that he should be punished only for the crime of rebellion as the murder was in pursuance
of the Huks rebellion movement, since the motive for the killing of the victim was personal, to avenge the alleged killing of a relative of
Commander Manly and the alleged maltreatment of the father of Salonga, supposedly ordered by the victim. The trial court further pointed out
that while the victim had been an officer of the civilian guards in Bamban, that was more than ten years ago in 1950, and the victim was an
ordinary civilian when he was shot in cold blood.
The trial court found that "(F)rom the testimony of the accused himself on the witness stand, it clearly appears that the firing of the shots which
snuffed out the life of Laxamana was sudden and unexpected, without any risk to the assailant which might have proceeded from the defense of
the victim. The crime, therefore, committed by the accused is murder, qualified by treachery," and therefore rendered the following verdict:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused CARLOS FERNANDO alias COMMANDER "BOB" guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and in
view of the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime, hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of
Bienvenido Laxamana in the sum of P6,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in view of the nature of
the principal penalty imposed, and to pay the costs.
In this appeal, the accused-appellant assigns as error the trial court's rejection of his contentions that his participation in the murder was in
furtherance of the Huk movement and that he should have been held by virtue of his Huk membership to have acted under the compulsion of an
irresistible force and/or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. He further assigns as error the trial court's denial
of his motion to dismiss the case filed on November 4, 1963, after the prosecution had rested its case, on the ground of double jeopardy, on the
ground of his previous conviction on August 31, 1961 by the Pampanga Court in another case 5of the crime of simple rebellion, on his entering of
plea of guilty.
We find the trial court's rulings to be in accordance with the evidence and the law.
1. Appellant's contention that because he and Salonga as members of the Hukbalahap organization had received from Commander Manly the
order to liquidate the victim, the murder committed by them should have been held in furtherance of and absorbed by the crime of rebellion, and
that they should have been instead charged for rebellion, is untenable. The record is bereft of any evidence that the murder was committed as a
necessary means to commit rebellion or in furtherance thereof. The victim had no established connection with the government at the time. 6 As
emphasized in People vs. Paz 7 besides, "(T)hat the killing was in pursuance of the Huk rebellion is a matter of mitigation or defense that the accused
has the burden of proving clearly and satisfactorily." Far from discharging the burden, appellant himself revealed in his unrepudiated written
confessions that the killing was inspired by personal motives of avenging the alleged killing of a relative of Commander Manly and the alleged
maltreatment of Salonga's father, as ordered by the victim Laxamana, and cannot be deemed absorbed by the rebellion and should be separately
prosecuted. 8 As held inHernandez, supra, 9 the mere fact that the accused is a member of the Hukbalahap organization "is no reason why all his acts

and misdeeds should be considered in furtherance of or absorbed by rebellion." Appellant's contention that Commander Manly's personal motive
did not apply to him and that he merely obeyed as "a mere 'soldier' of the HMB is of no avail either in the face of his awareness of an acquiescence
to the personal motivation and the void of any evidence that the murder was necessary to the rebellion or in furtherance thereof.
Accused next asks the Court to "take judicial notice of the fact that the Hukbalahap or HMB organization deal with its members who disobey or
refuse to carry out its orders in the most severe manner. A member who disobeys or refuses to carry out its order may be liquidated or given
another form of severe punishment." On this tenuous premise, he claims that by virtue of his Huk membership, his participation in the murder of
the victim should have been deemed to be an act under the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear
of an equal or greater injury as to exempt, him from criminal liability. 10
Justice Moreland long set the norm for the application of these exempting circumstances: "...before a force can be considered to be an irresistible
one, it must produce, such an effect upon the individual that, in spite of all resistance, it reduces him to a mere instrument and, as such, incapable
of committing a crime. It must be such that, in spite of the resistance of the person on whom it operates, it compels his members to act and his mind
to obey. He must act not only without will but against his will. Such a force can never consist in anything which springs primarily from the man himself; it
must be a force which act upon him from the outside and by means of a third person. In order that one may take advantage of subdivision 10 of
article 8 and allege with success that he acted under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, it must appear that the threat
that which caused the uncontrollable fear related to a crime of such gravity and so imminent that it must safely be said that the ordinary run of men would have
been governed by it. And the evil threatened must be greater than, or at least equal to, that which he is compelled to cause." 11
2. Accused dismally failed to show that he acted "not only without will but against will." On the contrary, he testified that he joined the
Hukbalahap organization since, December 28, 1950 "because it is a good organization." 12 The record is devoid even of any claim of the accused that
any threats were made upon him or that he acted under uncontrollable fear. He was not under any physical or moral compulsion when according
to his own version at the trial, he freely stood on guard outside the store while his companion Salonga went inside and shot the victim. At his
preliminary examination before Judge Tiglao, he further testified that his role as guard was to fight off any persons who might come to the aid of
the victim Laxamana. 13 And without any physical or moral compulsion, after the killing, he and Salonga, according to his own testimony at the
same preliminary examination, returned to report the same to Commander Manly at Barrio Kutid, Angeles, Pampanga and accept his
congratulations and thanks. 14
3. The last principal error assigned by accused that the trial court should have dismissed the present case by virtue of his previous conviction for
rebellion on August 31, 1961 is without merit.
The accused, even before his apprehension in the encounter with the PC troops on June 12, 1961, already faced the criminal charge of rebellion in
an information filed on October 17, 1960 against him and several others before the Pampanga Court of First Instance. 15 After his apprehension, he
entered a plea of guilty to the charge and was sentenced to six years, eight months and one day of prision mayor per the decision handed down by
the Pampanga court on August 31, 1961.
The murder of Laxamana for which the accused stands charged in the present case was committed on March 30, 1961. The criminal complaint
therefor was filed with the municipal court of Bamban, Tarlac on July 19, 1961 and after the records were forwarded on September 14, 1962 to the
trial court, the murder information was filed on November 29, 1962.
There clearly can be no double jeopardy, because the murder of Laxamana on March 30, 1961 could not have been possibly included as one of the
specific counts in the information for rebellion filed against the accused on October 17, 1960, as the murder had not yet been committed then.
Furthermore, the acts constituting the crime of rebellion were committed in the province of Pampanga where the accused was charged therefor,
while the murder of Laxamana for which the accused is charged in the present case was committed in the province of Tarlac over which the
Pampanga court had no jurisdiction. 16 Finally, as the murder here had been shown to have been committed furtherance of the rebellion but for
personal vengeance, it could not be deemed absorbed by the crime of rebellion but had to be separately charged and punished. 17
In resume, even going upon the accused's own version at the trial that he merely stood guard while his companion Salonga went inside the store
and killed the victim, and that thereafter he fired three shots in the air as a signal for them to part and return to their camp, the trial court correctly
held this to constitute more than adequate. Proof of his participation as conspirator and of his responsibility as co-principal in the murder. 18 In the
absence of evidence that, the killing, qualified by treachery, was attended by any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the trial court correctly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The indemnity to the heirs of the victim is increased to P12,000.00. 19
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the modification that the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Bienvenido
Laxamana is increased to P12,000.00. With costs against the accused-appellant.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13025

December 29, 1959

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TEODULO ROGSDO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for appellee.
Alfredo G. Fernando for appellant Teodoro Rogado.
Angel C. Facundo for the appellants.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

On September 25, 1956, Teodulo Togado, alias Commander Sulit, Isaac Orenia, alias Commander Lawin, Domingo Golfo, alias Eser, Cresencio
Arsenal, alias Sako, Pedro Merin, alias Abling, Francisco Racoma, aliasManeng, Pio Mercurio, alias Abling, Francisco Racoma, alias Rolando,
Nemesio Arsolacia, alias Noli, and Conrado Devesa, alias Donato, were charged with murder before the Court of First Instance of Laguna for killing
of one Salvador Areza. They all pleaded not guilty.
During the trial and after several witnesses for the prosecution have testified, Francisco Racoma and Conrado Devesa were excluded from the
information upon motion of the fiscal to be utilized as government witnesses. Later, upon motion also of the fiscal, the charge was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence with respect to accused Nemesio Arsolacia, Maximo Cerebo and Pedro Merin. Then counsel for the remaining accused
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the killing of the deceased was accomplished by them in furtherance of the huk movement, but the
motion was denied.
Upon resumption of the trial, counsel for Teodulo Rogado and Pio Mercurio moved for separate trial on the ground that their defense is
incompatible with the defense of their co-accused, which motion was granted by the trial court. And when both parties have submitted the case for
decision, the trial court found the accused Rogado, Orenia, Golfeo and Arsenal guilty as principals of the crime charged and sentenced them to
suffer the supreme penalty of death, while it found Pio Mercurio guilty merely as accomplice and sentenced him to the penalty of from 8 years and
21 days of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years 19 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal as maximum, with the corresponding accessory
penalties provided for by law. Each of the four principals was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6,000.00 and the
accomplice in the amount of P2,000.00, and all to pay their proportionate share of the costs.
Pio Mercurio having failed to file his brief, this case is before this Court only for the review of the decision rendered against the accused Rogado,
Orenia, Golfeo and Arsenal which imposes upon them the penalty of death.
On July 12, 1956, Salvador Areza, a farmer residing in Lilio, Laguna, left his house carrying with him a bolo on lots scabbard to gather firewood in
his farm in barrio Bubukal. When he failed to return home that day, his wife Lydia Nudal went out to search for him. She was accompanied by
some armed men, the mayor, and a sanitary health officer, and after a brief search, they found the decapitated body of her husband in an
uninhabited place in Bubukal about half kilometer away from the road. The gruesome find revealed that Areza's head was totally severed from his
body with his hands tied together. The health officer, Dr. Dominador L. Gomez, found the body to be in state of decomposition, which led him to
conclude that the deceased must have died three to five days prior to his discovery. Areza's bolo and his scabbard were also found near his body.
It appears that on July 12, 1956, Teodulo Rogado, alias Commander Sulit, Isaac Orenia, alias Commander Lawin, Domingo Golfeo, alias Eser
Cresencio Arsenal, alias Sako, Pedro Merin, alias Nestor, Maximo Cerebo, aliasManeng, Pio Mercurio, alias Abling, Nemesio Arsolacia, alias Noli,
Francisco Racoma, alias Rolando, and Conrado Devesa, alias Donato, were on their way from barrio Sta. Lucia, Nagcarlan, to the municipality of
Lilio, Laguna. They lost their way, and as they were looking for someone from whom they should get information as to their whereabouts they met
Salvador Areza whom Racoma and Deveza approached. Upon their inquiry, Areza informed them that they were in barrio Bubukal, municipality
of Lilio; that there was an army camp stationed nearby; and that the soldiers occasionally go on patrol to the barrios.
The information was reported to commander Sulit (Rogado) who in turn ordered that Areza be brought to him. After talking with him, Rogado
asked Areza to lead the way for them, but Areza refused saying that he had much work to do, and besides he had a carabao with him. after a brief
talk with Orenia, alias Commander Lawin, rogado told Racoma that they were taking along Areza and that if he should refuse, he should be tied,
which instruction Racoma relayed to his two companions, Merin and arsenal, telling them to be prepared in case Areza would give them a fight.
Thereupon, Racoma approached Areza and asked if he could barrow from him his bolo. Areza obliged. When Areza refused to go with them, Pio
Mercurio dragged him along, and as he refused, Golfeo struck him with the butt of his gun.
After walking a short distance, Mercurio tied Areza's hands behind him. Areza protested telling Mercurio that he had not done anything wrong,
whereupon Golfeo gave him a fist blow on his stomach. After walking some distance, a command to stop was heard and so they stopped. Racoma
then approached Rogado and told him that they should release Areza at night but rogado told him that Areza should be killed and when Racoma
returned to the group he found that Areza was being assaulted by Orenia and Golfeo. At this moment, Racoma heard Rogado saying, in the
vernacular, "Kill him now so we can proceed." Areza was then taken to a secluded place quite far from the road, which was thick forest about 20 or
30 meters away from the group, and there Golfeo ordered Areza to lie down. With Areza's bolo and ignoring the plea for mercy of their victim,
Golfeo gave him a blow on the neck as he lay face down and with his hands still tied behind. With the same bolo, Arsenal also gave the victim
another blow on the neck which completely severed the head from the body.
On September 20, 1956, Pedro Merin, a member of the group who surrendered to the authorities, made a sworn statement before the Justice of the
Peace of Nagcarlan, Laguna, stating therein that Salvador Areza was killed by Ezer and Sako upon order of Commander Sulit. Domingo Golfeo
also made a sworn statement before the justice of the Peace of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, admitting his participation in the killing of Areza upon order of
Commander Sulit. On September 21, 1956, Cresencio Arsenal also made a written statement before the Mayor of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, admitting that
he was one of those who killed Areza. Both Domingo Golfeo and Cresencio Arsenal, while admitting their participation in the killing of the
deceased, claimed in exculpation that they acted under the pressure of an irresistible force in that they merely obeyed the order of their
Commander, Rogado aliasCommander Sulit, who would have killed them if they disobeyed his order. The other appellants merely contended that
the killing was done in furtherance of the huk rebellion.lawphi1.net
Their is no doubt that the unfortunate victim met his death in the hands of the accused who decided to take his life because of his stubborn refusal
to obey their command that he lead their way to the place they wanted to go in order that they may not be exposed and caught by the agents of the
law who were stationed in a nearby municipality. The only question to be determined is whether the defense they have set up is sufficient to
exonerate them from liability.
As regard accused Domingo Golfeo, The evidence is clear that it was he who first struck Areza with the butt of his gun hitting him on the side of
his body, then gave him a fist blow on his stomach, and after he had been taken to a secluded place, it was he who ordered Areza to lie down in the
fashion adopted by the Kempetai during the gloomy days of Japanese occupation and in that position gave him a blow on the back of the neck
which almost severed his head from the body. His participation in the killing of Areza cannot therefore be doubted. His only defense is that he did
so in obedience to the order of his commander, and because he acted under the influence of uncontrollable fear, he should be exempt from criminal
responsibility.
The defense of Golfeo is clearly untenable not only because of the well-settled rule that obedience to an order of a superior will only justify an act
which otherwise would be criminal when the order is for a lawful purpose, but also because the circumstances under which Golfeo participated in
the torture and liquidation of Areza cannot in any way justify his claim that he acted under an uncontrollable fear of being punished by his
superiors if he disobeyed their order. In the first place, at the time of the killing, Golfeo was armed with automatic carbine such that he could have
protected himself from any retaliation on the part of his superiors if they should threaten to punish him if he disobeyed their order to kill Areza. In
the second place, the evidence shows that Areza was brought to a secluded place quite far from that where his superiors were at the time and in
such a predicament, he and companion Arsenal could have escaped with Areza to void the ire of their superiors. The fact that he carried out their
order although his superiors were at some distance from him and that without pity and compunction he struck his victim in a Kempetai fashion
show that he acted on the matter not involuntarily or under the pressure of fear of force, as he claims, but out of his own free will and with the
desire to collaborate with the criminal design of his superiors. In the circumstances, we find that the trial court did not err in finding him
responsible for the death of Areza as co-principal by direct participation.

The same situation obtained with regard to Cresencio Arsenal. It appears that he was one of those ordered by Rogado to kill Areza and in
obedience to such order he had a direct participation in the killing. It was he and Golfeo who brought Areza to a secluded place and once there he
helped Golfeo in killing him with the same bolo which was taken from the victim himself. Thus, it appears that after Golfeo had given the first
blow on the back of the neck of Areza as he lay face down on the ground, Arsenal took the bolo himself and gave the fatal blow which completely
severed the head of Areza from his body. There is therefore no doubt that Arsenal directly cooperated with Golfeo in carrying out the concerted
plan of killing Areza because of the hostile attitude he adopted in denying them the help they demanded from him. Since Arsenal to those existing
in the case of Golfeo, his claim of obedience and fear of retaliation if he disobeyed his superiors' order cannot also be entertained.
The other defense of appellants refers to their theory that they killed Areza not for personal motive but in furtherance of the huk rebellion and so, if
any liability they have, it is only for rebellion and for murder as they are charged. And having already been prosecuted and convicted of the crime
of rebellion in Criminal Case No. SP-137 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, their prosecution in the instant case would constitute double
jeopardy.
to begin with, it should be stated that while this Court ruled in People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil., 515, 52 Off. Gaz., No. 11, p. 5506, that there is no
complex crime of rebellion with murder because the latter offense is absorbed by the former, however, a distinction was made in the case of People
vs. Geronimo, 100 Phil., 90, 53, Off. Gaz., No. 1, p. 68, where we held that if the killing is inspired by personal motive such killing is not absorbed by
the rebellion but may be the subject of separate prosecution. In the second place, we find that the acts with which appellants now charged do not
appear included in the information for rebellion in Criminal Case No. SP-137, for in the case they were merely accused of having risen and taken
up arms against the Philippine constabulary, Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces and other military detachments of the government,
without specifying the particular acts committed against private persons or civilians which may be said to have been undertaken in furtherance of
the huk rebellion. It is not, therefore, correct to say, as appellants now claim, that the act in question is already included or absorbed in the rebellion
charge filed against them in said criminal case.
On the other hand, the pretense that the killing of Areza by appellants was done in furtherance of the huk rebellion is preposterous considering the
fact that Areza was a mere farmer who had no connection whatsoever with any law-enforcement agency of the government. The pertinent question
that arises is: Why was he taken killed and brutally beheaded by appellant?
The answer is well given in the following interesting observation of the trial court:
According to the testimony of the prosecution witness, Francisco Racoma, Salvador Areza was maltreated, tied and killed because the
latter refused to lead and guide the group of Rogado to the road when he was asked by the latter to do so, Rogado's men were lost in the
mountains of Lilio and they needed somebody to help them find the way out of the place. They came upon Areza working in his farm.
Rogado asked him to lead the way and Areza refused saying that he had much work to do and he could not leave his carabao. Angered
and irked by such stubborn refusal, Rogado after conferring with his co-defendant Orenia gave the order to take Areza along and to kill
him. The killing of Areza was done solely to satisfy the anger of the leader, rogado, who being used to the blind obedience of his men
could not tolerate the refusal of Areza to carry out his wishes and desires. The rebellious movement of the group had nothing to gain by
Atienza's death. On the contrary, Rogado and his group needed Areza alive in order that they could utilize him as their guide while they
were in the mountains of Lilio. There is no question that they could have easily at the point of their thompsons, carbines and garands,
forced Areza to lead the way. But they did not do so, because at that time Rogado was not so much interested in finding the path to the
road; what concerned him most was to teach a lesson and a hard one at that, to Salvador Areza for having the timerity of saying "no" to
his wish and request. Surely, to kill a person under those circumstances is obviously outside of the political intent of the Hukbalahap
movement. The huks rise up in arms because they mistakenly believe that by doing so they can have desired changes in the political,
social, and economic life of this country. But to accomplish such a purpose, the death of innocent civilians like Salvador Areza is
unquestionably unnecessary. When the killing is done solely for the purpose of answering the lust to kill or of satisfying angered
feelings, thwarted desires of leaders and followers of the Hukbalahap movement, such a killing must receive its due punishment at the
hands of our courts which are called upon to do justice not only to the living but just as well to the dead.
An attempt was made by appellants to show that Areza was killed because he threatened to inform the Army of their presence in the neighborhood
where he met them. Such attempt, however, is ridiculous, for Areza, being then alone and confronted with a group of armed men, could not have
hurled such a threat without catering immediate death. As the trial court aptly observed: "This Court cannot believe that Areza would have been
such a fool to tell that band of armed Huks that he would give them away to the Army. It is reasonable to presume that any sane person would
have seen the danger of making such statement under the circumstances, for that would have been sure death."
The trial court found that the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstances of treachery, aggravated by abuse of superior strength and
the fact that it happened in an uninhabited place, for which reason it imposed upon appellants to supreme penalty of death. While some members
of the Court agree to the existence of the above aggravating circumstances, others however doubt if they could be entertained in the case of
appellants who, as members of the Hukbalahap organization, rightly or wrongly, were of the belief that they were justified in doing what they had
done because Areza committed something inimical to the purposes of their organization. At any rate, the requisite number of votes for the
application of the supreme penalty not having been obtained, the only alternative is to impose upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
With this modification, we affirm the decision appealed from all other respects, with costs against appellants.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6082

March 18, 1911

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ISIDRO VICENTILLO, defendant-appellant.
C.W. Ney for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
CARSON, J.:

The defendant in this case was found guilty in the court below of the crime of "illegal and arbitrary detention" of the complaining witness for a
period of three days, and sentenced to pay a fine of 625 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the
trial.
We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case there can be no doubt of the lawful authority of the defendant, in the exercise of his
functions as municipal president, to make arrest of the complaining witness which resulted in his alleged unlawful detention. As we understand
the evidence, the alleged offense with which the complaining witness in this case was charged was committed by him in the presence of the
municipal president, who must be held to have had all the usual powers of a police officer for the making of arrest without warrant, under the
doctrine laid down in the case of U.S. vs. Fortaleza (12 Phil. Rep., 472).
The judgment of conviction of the court below must therefore be reversed, unless the evidence discloses that having made the arrest, the defendant
arbitrarily and without legal authority, as it is alleged, cause the complaining witness to be detained for a period of three days without having him
brought before the proper judicial authority for the investigation and trial of the charge on which he was arrested. But so far as we can gather from
the extremely meagre record in this case the arrested man was in fact brought before a justice of the peace as soon as "practicable" after his arrest.
True, three days were expended in doing, so, but it was conclusively proven at the trial that at the time of the arrest neither the local justice of the
peace nor his auxiliary were in the municipality, and to reach the justice of the peace of either of the two adjoining municipalities, it was necessary
to take a long journey by boat. The evidence discloses, moreover, that with all practicable dispatch, the prisoner was forwarded first to one and
then to the other of the adjoining municipalities for trial, the failure to secure trial on the first occasion being due to the fact that the written
complaint, which was intrusted to the policeman in charge of the prisoner, was either lost or stolen. It does not appear why the prisoner was not
sent to the same municipality on both occasions, but in the absence of proof we must assume that in this respect the officers in charge were
controlled by local conditions, changes in the weather, or the like, which, as appears from the uncontradicted evidence of record, made the journey
by boats safer and more commodious sometimes to one and sometimes to the other of the two adjoining municipalities.
It may be that the defendant was not friendly to the arrested man, and that he was not sorry to see him exposed to considerable inconvenience and
delay in the proceedings incident to his trial, but there is nothing in this record upon which to base a finding that his defendant caused the arrest
and the subsequent detention of the prisoner otherwise than in the due performance of his official duties; and there can be no doubt of his lawfully
authority in the premises. The trial judge lays great stress upon the trivial nature of the offense for which the arrest was made, but keeping in mind
the fact that there was no judicial officer in the remote community where the incident occurred at the time of the arrest, and no certainty of the
early return of the absent justice of the peace, or his auxiliary, we are not prepared to hold, in the absence of all the evidence on this point that in a
particular case of a defiance of local authority by the willful violation of a local ordinance, it was not necessary, or at least expedient, to make an
arrest and send the offender forthwith to the justice of the peace of a neighboring municipality, if only to convince all would-be offenders that the
forces of law and order were supreme, even in the absence of the local municipal judicial officers.
The judgment of the lower court convicting and sentencing the defendant must be reversed and he is hereby acquitted of the offense with which he
is charged, with the costs in both instances de oficio. So ordered

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4445
February 28, 1955
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANUEL BERONILLA, FILIPINO VELASCO, POLICARPIO PACULDO, and JACINTO ADRIATICO, defendants-appellants.
Agripino A. Brillantes, Valera, Eufemio and Bernardez for appellants.
Prospero C. Sanidad and Claro M. Recto for defendant.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jaime R. de los Angeles and Martiniano P. Vivo for appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is an appeal by accused Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Abra (Criminal Case No. 70) convicting them of murder for the execution of Arsenio Borjal in the evening of April 18, 1945, in the town
of La Paz , Province of Abra.
Arsenio Borjal was the elected mayor of La Paz, Abra, at the outbreak of war, and continued to serve as Mayor during the Japanese occupation,
until March 10, 1943, when he moved to Bangued because of an attempt upon his life by unknown persons. On December 18, 1944, appellant
Manuel Beronilla was appointed Military Mayor of La Paz by Lt. Col. R. H. Arnold, regimental commander of the 15th Infantry, Philippine Army,
operating as a guerrilla unit in the province of Abra. Simultaneously with his appointment as Military Mayor, Beronilla received copy of a
memorandum issued by Lt. Col. Arnold to all Military Mayors in Northern Luzon, authorizing them "to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to try
persons accused of treason, espionage, or the aiding and abetting (of ) the enemy" (Exhibit 9). He also received from the Headquarters of the 15th
Infantry a list of all puppet government officials of the province of Abra (which included Arsenio Borjal, puppet mayor of La Paz), with a
memorandum instructing all Military Mayors to investigate said persons and gather against them complaints from people of the municipality for
collaboration with the enemy (Exhibit 12-a).
Sometime in March, 1945, while the operations for the liberation of the province of Abra were in progress, Arsenio Borjal returned to La Paz with
his family in order to escape the bombing of Bangued. Beronilla, pursuant to his instructions, placed Borjal under custody and asked the residents
of La Paz to file complaints against him. In no time, charges of espionage, aiding the enemy, and abuse of authority were filed against Borjal; a 12man jury was appointed by Beronilla, composed of Jesus Labuguen as chairman, and Benjamin Adriatico, Andres Afos, Juanito Casal, Santiago
Casal, Benjamin Abella, Servillano Afos, Mariano Ajel, Felimon Labuguen, Felix Murphy, Pedro Turqueza, and Delfin Labuguen as members;
while Felix Alverne and Juan Balmaceda were named prosecutors, Policarpio Paculdo as clerk of the jury, and Lino Inovermo as counsel for the
accused. Later, Atty. Jovito Barreras voluntarily appeared and served as counsel for Borjal. Sgt. Esteban Cabanos observed the proceedings for
several days upon instructions of Headquarters, 15th Infantry. The trial lasted 19 days up to April 10, 1945; the jury found Borjal guilty on all
accounts and imposed upon him instruction from his superiors. Mayor Beronilla forwarded the records of the case to the Headquarters of the 15th
Infantry for review. Said records were returned by Lt. Col. Arnold to Beronilla on April 18, 1945 with the following instructions:
HEADQUARTERS 3RD MILITARY DISTRICT
15TH INFANTRY, USAFIP
In the Field
16 April 1945
Msg. No. 337
Subject: Arsenio Borjal, Charges Against
To: Military Mayor of La Paz, Abra.
1. Returned herewith are the papers on the case of Arsenio Borjal.
2. This is a matter best handled by your government and whatever disposition you make of the case is hereby approved.
(Sgd.) R. H. ARNOLD
Lieut.-Colonel, 15th Inf., PA
Commanding
Received April 18, 1945, 10:35 a.m.
(Sgd.) MANUEL BERONILLA
Military Mayor, La Paz, Abra

(Exhibit 8, 8-a)
and on the night of the same day, April 18, 1945, Beronilla ordered the execution of Borjal. Jacinto Adriatico acted as executioner and Antonio
Palope as grave digger. Father Luding of the Roman Catholic Church was asked to administer the last confession to the prisoner, while Father
Filipino Velasco of the Aglipayan Church performed the last rites over Borjal's remains. Immediately after the execution, Beronilla reported the
matter to Col. Arnold who in reply to Beronilla's report, sent him the following message:
HEADQUARTERS 3RD MILITARY DISTRICT
15TH INFANTRY, USAFIP
In the Field
22 April 1945
Msg. No. 398
Subject: Report and information Re Borjal case
To: Military Mayor Beronilla
1. Received your letter dated 18 April 1945, subject, above.
2. My request that you withhold action in this case was only dictated because of a query from Higher Headquarters regarding same. Actually, I
believe there was no doubt as to the treasonable acts of the accused Arsenio Borjal and I know that your trial was absolutely impartial and fair.
Consequently, I Can only compliment you for your impartial independent way of handling the whole case.
(Sgd.) R. H. ARNOLD
Lieut.-Colonel, 15th Inf., PA
Commanding
Received April 26, 1947 7:00 a.m.
(Sgd.) MANUEL BERONILLA
Military Mayor, La Paz, Abra
(Exhibit 21, 21-a)
Two years thereafter, Manuel Beronilla as military mayor, Policarpio Paculdo as Clerk of the jury, Felix Alverne and Juan Balmaceda as
prosecutors, Jesus Labuguen, Delfin Labuguen, Filemon Labuguen, Servillano Afos, Andres Afos, Benjamin Adriatico, Juanito Casel, Santiago
Casel, Mariano Ajel, Felix Murphy, Benjamin Abella, and Pedro Turqueza as members of the jury, Jacinto Adriatico as executioner, Severo Afos as
grave digger, and Father Filipino Velasco as an alleged conspirator, were indicted in the Court of First Instance of Abra for murder, for allegedly
conspiring and confederating in the execution of Arsenio Borjal. Soon thereafter, the late President Manuel A. Roxas issued Executive Proclamation
No. 8, granting amnesty to all persons who committed acts penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy
against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy. Defendant Jesus Labuguen, then a master sergeant in the Philippine Army, applied for and
was granted amnesty by the Amnesty Commission, Armed Forces of the Philippines (Records, pp. 618-20). The rest of the defendant filed their
application for amnesty with the Second Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, who denied their application on the ground that the crime had been
inspired by purely personal motives, and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Abra for trial on the merits.
Upon motion of defense counsel, the case against defendant Jesus Labuguen, who had been granted amnesty by the Amnesty Commission of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, was ordered provisionally dismissed: defendant Juan Balmaceda was discharged from the information so that he
might be utilized as state witness, although actually he was not called to testify; while the case against defendants Antonio Palope (the grave
digger) and Demetrio Afos( a boloman) was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence.
Trial proceeded against the rest of the defendants; and on July 10, 1950, the Court below rendered judgment, acquitting the members of the jury
and the grave digger Antonio Palope on the ground that they did not participated in the killing of Arsenio Borjal; acquitting defendants Jesus
Labuguen, Felix Alverne, Severo Afos, and Lauro Parado upon insufficiency of evidence to establish their participation in the crime; but convicting
defendants Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico as conspirator and co-principals of the crime of murder,
and sentencing them to suffer imprisonment of from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day ofreclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of
Arsenio Borjal jointly and severally in the amount of P4,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each to pay one fourth of the
costs. In convicting said defendants the Court a quo found that while the crime committed by them fell within the provisions of the Amnesty
Proclamation, they were not entitled to the benefits thereof because the crime was committed after the expiration of the time limit fixed by the
amnesty proclamation;: i.e., that the deceased Arsenio Borjal was executed after the liberation of La Paz, Abra.
In view of the sentence meted by the Court below, the accused Beronilla, Paculdo, Velasco and Adriatico appealed to this Court.
The records are ample to sustain the claim of the defense that the arrest, prosecution and trial of the late Arsenio Borjal were done pursuant to
express orders of the 15th Infantry Headquarters. (Exhibit 9 and 12-a), instructing all military mayors under its jurisdiction to gather evidence
against puppet officials and to appoint juries of at least 12 bolomen to try the accused and find them guilty by two thirds vote. It is to be noted that
Arsenio Borjal was specifically named in the list of civilian officials to be prosecuted (Exhibit 12-b).
In truth, the prosecution does not seriously dispute that the trial and sentencing of Borjal was done in accordance with instructions of superior
military authorities, altho it point to irregularities that were due more to ignorance of legal processes than personal animosity against Borjal. The
state, however, predicates its case principally on the existence of the radiogram Exhibit H from Col. Volckmann, overall area commander, to Lt.
Col. Arnold, specifically calling attention to the illegality of Borjal's conviction and sentence, and which the prosecution claims was known to the
accused Beronilla. Said message is as follows:
"Message:
VOLCKMANN TO ARNOLD CLN UNDERSTAND THAT MUNICIPALITIES OF ABRA HAVE ORGANIZED JURY SYSTEM PD BELIEVE THAT
THIS BODY IS ILLEGAL AND CANNOT TRY PUNISHMENTS THEREOF PD SPECIFIC INSTANCE IS BROUGHT TO YOUR ATTENTION FRO
PROPER AND IMMEDIATE ACTION ON ONE ARSENIO BORJAL OF LA PAZ WHO HAS BEEN TRIED CMA CONVICTED AND SENTENCED
TO BE HANGED PD REPORT ACTION TAKEN BY YOU ON THIS MATTER PD MSG BEGINS CLN"
(EXH. H)
The crucial question thus becomes whether or not this message, originally sent to Arnold's quarters in San Esteban, Ilocos Sur, was relayed by the
latter to appellant Beronilla in La Paz, Abra, on the morning of April 18, 1945, together with the package of records of Borjal's trial that was
admittedly returned to and received by Beronilla on that date, after review thereof by Arnold (Exhibit 8-8-a). Obviously, if the Volckmann message
was known to Beronilla, his ordering the execution of Borjal on the night of April 18, 1945 can not be justified.
We have carefully examined the evidence on this important issue, and find no satisfactory proof that Beronilla did actually receive the radiogram
Exhibit H or any copy thereof. The accused roundly denied it. The messenger, or "runner", Pedro Molina could not state what papers were enclosed
in the package he delivered to Beronilla on that morning in question, nor could Francisco Bayquen (or Bayken), who claimed to have been present
at the delivery of the message, state the contents thereof.
The only witness who asserted that Beronilla received and read the Volckmann message, Exhibit H, was Rafael Balmaceda, a relative of Borjal, who
claimed to have been, as Beronilla's bodyguard, present at the receipt of the message and to have read it over Beronilla's shoulder. This testimony,
however, can not be accorded credence, for the reason that in the affidavit executed by this witness before Fiscal Antonio of Abra (Exhibit 4),
Balmaceda failed to make any mention of the reading, or even the receipt, of the message. In the affidavit, he stated:
Q. In your capacity as policeman, do you know of any usual occurrence that transpired in La Paz, Abra? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you state what is the event? A. On April 17, 1945, I was assigned as guard at the Presidencia where Mayor Arsenio Borjal is confined. On
the 18th of April, 1945, six bolomen came to me while I was on duty as guard, that Mayor Borjal should be tied, on orders of Mayor Beronilla,
Mayor Borjal wanted to know the reason why he would be tied, as he had not yet learned of the decision of the jury against him. Mayor Borjal
wrote a note to Mayor Beronilla, asking the reason for his being ordered to be tied. I personally delivered the note of Borjal to Mayor Beronilla.
Mayor Beronilla did not answer the note, but instead told me that I should tie Mayor Borjal, as tomorrow he would die, as he cannot escape. I
returned to the Presidencia, and Mayor Borjal was tied, as that was the ordered of Mayor Beronilla.
The plain import of the affidavit is that the witness Rafael Balmaceda was not with Beronilla when the message arrived, otherwise Beronilla would
have given him his orders direct, as he (Balmaceda) testified later at the trial. Moreover, it is difficult to believe that having learned of the contents
of the Volckmann message, Balmaceda should not have relayed it to Borjal , or to some member of the latter's family, considering that they were
relatives. In addition to Balmaceda was contradicted by Bayken, another prosecution witness, as to the hatching of the alleged conspiracy to kill
Borjal. Balmaceda claimed that the accused-appellants decided to kill Borjal in the early evening of April 18, while Bayken testified that the
agreement was made about ten o'clock in the morning, shortly after the accused had denied Borjal's petition to be allowed to hear mass.

Upon the other hand, Beronilla's conduct belies his receipt of the Volckmann message. Had he executed Borjal in violation of superior orders, he
would not have dared to report it to Arnold's headquarters on the very same day, April 18th, 1945, as he did (Exhibit 20), half an hour after the
execution. And what is even more important, if Borjal was executed contrary to instructions, how could Lt. Colonel Arnold on April 21, 1945, write
in reply (Exhibit 21, 21-a) "I can only compliment you for your impartial but independent way of handling the whole case" instead of berating
Beronilla and ordering his court martial for disobedience?
Our conclusion is that Lt. Col. Arnold, for some reason that can not now be ascertained, failed to transmit the Volckmann message to Beronilla.
And this being so, the charge of criminal conspiracy to do away with Borjal must be rejected, because the accused had no need to conspire against a
man who was, to their knowledge, duly sentenced to death.
The state claims that the appellants held grudges against the late Borjal. Even so, it has been already decided that the concurrence of personal
hatred and collaboration with the enemy as motives for a liquidation does not operate to exclude the case from the benefits of the Amnesty claimed
by appellants, since then "it may not be held that the manslaughter stemmed from purely personal motives" (People vs. Barrioquinto,* G. R. Nos. L2011 and 2267, June 30, 1951). Actually, the conduct of the appellants does not dispose that these appellants were impelled by malice (dolo). The
arrest and trial of Borjal were made upon express orders of the higher command; the appellants allowed Borjal to be defended by counsel, one of
them (attorney Jovito Barreras) chosen by Borjal's sister; the trial lasted nineteen (19) days; it was suspended when doubts arose about its legality,
and it was not resumed until headquarters (then in Langangilang, Abra) authorized its resumption and sent an observer (Esteban Cabanos, of the
S-5) to the proceedings, and whose suggestions on procedure were followed; and when the verdict of guilty was rendered and death sentence
imposed, the records were sent to Arnold's headquarters for review, and Borjal was not punished until the records were returned eight days later
with the statement of Arnold that "whatever disposition you make of the case is hereby approved" (Exhibit 8), which on its face was an assent to
the verdict and the sentence. The lower Court, after finding that the late Arsenio Borjal had really committed treasonable acts, (causing soldiers and
civilians to be tortured, and hidden American officers to be captured by the Japanese) expressly declared that "the Court is convinced that it was
not for political or personal reason that the accused decided to kill Arsenio Borjal" (Decision, p. 9; Record, p. 727).
It appearing that the charge is the heinous crime of murder, and that the accused-appellants acted upon orders, of a superior officers that they, as
military subordinates, could not question, and obeyed in good faith, without being aware of their illegality, without any fault or negligence on their
part, we can not say that criminal intent has been established (U. S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil., 507; Peo. vs. Pacana, 47 Phil., 48; Sent. of the Tribunal
Supremo of Spain, 3 July 1886; 7 January 1901; 24 March 1900; 21 Feb. 1921; 25 March 1929). Actus non facit reum nisi mens si rea.
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or
indifference to duty or to consequence, as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea-a crime is not
committed if the minds of the person performing the act complained of be innocent. (U. S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil., 507).
But even assuming that the accused-appellant did commit crime with they are charged, the Court below should not have denied their claim to the
benefits of the Guerrilla Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 (42 Off. Gaz., 2072)on the ground that the slaying of Arsenio Borjal took place after actual
liberation of the area from enemy control and occupation. The evidence on record regarding the date of liberation of La Paz, Abra, is contradictory.
The Military Amnesty Commission that decided the case of one of the original accused Jesus Labuguen, held that La Paz, Abra, was liberated on
July 1, 1945, according to its records; and this finding was accepted by Judge Letargo when he dismissed the case against said accused on March 15,
1949. On the other hand, Judge Bocar and Hilario, who subsequently took cognizance of the case, relied on Department Order No. 25, of the
Department of the Interior, dated August 12, 1948, setting the liberation of the Province of Abra on April 4, 1945, fifteen days before Borjal was
slain. The two dates are not strictly contradictory; but given the benefit of the Presidential directive to the Amnesty Commissions (Adm. Order No.
11, of October 2, 1946) that "any reasonable doubt as to whether a given case falls within the (amnesty) proclamation shall be resolved in favor of
the accused" (42 Off. Gaz., 2360), as was done in People vs. Gajo, Phil., 107 46 Off. Gaz., (No. 12) p. 6093.
For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the appellants are acquitted, with costs de oficio.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 150542-87. February 3, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. OLIVER AREVALO JR. y ABANILLA, and HERMINIGILDO
ORGANISTA y ANDRES, appellants.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Appellant is accused of multiple rape by two or more persons, for which Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death. Since the Information did not allege any aggravating circumstance, the proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion
perpetua, not death.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the October 26, 2001 Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City (Branch 62) in Criminal
Case Nos. 01-419 to 01-464, finding Oliver Arevalo Jr. and Herminigildo Organista guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 42 and 32 counts of rape,
respectively. The decretal portion of the Decision is worded as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Oliver A. Arevalo in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-419 to 01-423, 01-425 to 01-428, 01-430 to
01-441, 01-442 to 01-446, 01-448 to 01-451, 01-453 to 01-464, and accused Herminigildo A. Organista in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-419 to 01-422, 01-442
to 01-445, and 01-441 and 01-464 GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape defined under Art. 266-A, par. 1(a) in relation to Art. 266-B,
par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353, and imposes upon them the maximum penalty of death in each case. Each of
the two accused is hereby ordered to pay complainants Regina G. Acu[]a and Ruth F. Acosta P75,000.00 each as civil indemnity.
Considering the outrage, humiliation, distress and trauma suffered by the two complainants from the dastardly act of the two accused, the Court
orders the accused Arevalo to pay Regina Acu[]a and Ruth Acosta P200,000.00 each and accused Organista to pay the two
complainants P50,000.00 each as moral damages pursuant to Article 2219(3) in relation to Article 2217 of the Civil Code.
Accused Arevalo is further ordered to pay exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 to each of the two complainants to deter others with
perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behaviors from committing the act.
For failure of the prosecution to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of accused Oliver A. Arevalo in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-424 and 01447, and 01-429 and 01-452, and accused Herminigildo A. Organista in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-423 to 01-440 and 01-446 to 01-463, they are hereby
ACQUITTED in said cases.[2]
A total of forty-six (46) separate Informations[3] were filed against appellants. For the rape of Regina Acua, they were charged as follows:
Criminal Case No. 01-419
That on or about the 23rd day of January, 2001, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with John Does and mutually helping and aiding with one another, by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully [and] feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant REGINA
ACU[]A y GUTIERREZ, without her consent and against her will. [4]
The Informations[5] in Criminal Case Nos. 01-420 to 01-441 contain allegations identical to the above Information, differing only with respect to the
dates of the commission of the alleged rapes.
For the rape of Ruth Acosta, appellants were charged as follows:
Criminal Case No. 01-442
That on or about the 23rd day of January, 2001, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with John Does and mutually helping and aiding with one another, by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant RUTH
ACOSTA y FILLAS, without her consent and against her will.[6]
Again, the Informations[7] in Criminal Case Nos. 01-443 to 01-464 contain allegations identical to the above Information, differing only with respect
to the dates of the commission of the alleged rapes.
Upon their arraignment on March 19, 2001,[8] appellants, with the assistance of their counsel,[9] pleaded not guilty to all charges. After trial in due
course, the court a quo rendered the assailed Decision.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecutions version of the facts in the following manner:
Regina G. Acu[]a was a jobless 22-year old married woman residing in Payatas, Quezon City. On January 23, 2001, between three oclock and
four oclock in the afternoon, she was walking down Manggahan St. in Fairview, Quezon City, looking for a job. As she went along, appellant
Arevalo, a stranger, approached and asked her what her problem was. She replied that she was looking for a job. Appellant Arevalo told Regina

that he could get her a job as saleslady. Regina said that if the place of work was far, she was not interested. Appellant Arevalo told her not to
worry, as the workplace was not far, and that nothing wrong would happen to her. Regina did not believe him.
While they were talking, a car stopped in front of them. Suddenly, appellant Arevalo placed a white handkerchief on Reginas face and boarded
her on the vehicle. Regina could not remember what happened next. She could not even recall whether she slept or lost consciousness. All she
knew was that when she woke up, she was already lying on a bed inside a room. It was nighttime.
In the room, Regina saw appellant Arevalo and a fat lady whom he identified as Rose, his atsay or helper. Regina later learned that Roses real
name was Ruth Acosta. Ruth looked like she was in a state of shock, or, tulala.
Appellant Arevalo left momentarily. When he came back, he forcibly took off Reginas clothes. Regina asked him what he was doing, and he
replied that what he would do would only take a while. Appellant Arevalo then undressed himself. When Regina saw this, she pleaded with him
to take pity on her and to release her, as her husband may have been worrying for her already. Appellant Arevalo repeated that it would not take
long. Regina shouted for help. But nobody heard her, as appellant Arevalo had closed the door and windows. While she was shouting, appellant
Arevalo raised her feet and forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina.
As Regina lay on the bed, she kept on shouting and resisting appellant Arevalos sexual assault. At one point, she was able to free herself from
him and run. But he caught up with her, grabbed her hair, banged her head against the wall and threw her back to the bed, where he continued to
ravish her. Rose, or Ruth Acosta, was looking on helplessly, crying while Regina was being violated.
From that night onward until February 14, 2001, Regina would be wearing nothing almost all the time, for she would be ravished for what seemed
like almost every day and every hour.
On January 24, 2001, an unidentified man raped Regina in the same room. Before raping her[,] however, the man paid appellant Arevalo a sum of
money. Regina could not see the mans face, as appellant Arevalo had blindfolded her. But she heard the man tell appellant Arevalo, Pare, itong
bayad.
The unidentified man made Regina take different sexual positions even as she resisted. At one time, he inserted his penis into her anus; at
another, he inserted his finger and later, his penis, into her vagina. Thereafter, appellant Arevalo made her eat the mans penis. Regina struggled
hard to free herself from the mans clutches, but she was no match for him.
When the man had left, appellant Arevalo took off Reginas blindfold. Regina saw him counting the money the man had paid him. Thereafter,
appellant Arevalo ravished Regina himself. When he was finished, appellant Arevalo again sold Regina to another unidentified man, who
proceeded to have sex with her. By this time, Regina was no longer shouting for help because no one could hear or help her anyway.
On January 25, 2001, appellant Arevalo again blindfolded Regina and let other men ravish her for a fee while he stood guard outside the door of
his house. The first man who had sex with Regina inserted his penis into her vagina while he was on top of her, covering her mouth with his hand
because she was noisy. Regina kept shouting for help, but nobody heard her. So she just cried and cried and threw punches at the man, but he
would not stop ravishing her. To keep her from resisting, the man pointed a knife at her neck and threatened to kill her. When the man was
through, another man followed. By then, Regina was no longer putting up any resistance because she was afraid and at the same time, already
very weak. Around six (6) men raped her in succession that day, but she could only recognize appellant Arevalo among them.
On January 26, 2001, appellant Arevalo forced the two (2) women to take drugs. Appellant Arevalo made Regina sniff the smoke of a powdered
substance or tawas wrapped in a foil. When she refused, he threatened to slash her neck. He also made the girls take tablets which Regina later
discovered to be birth control pills.
Thereafter, appellant Arevalo inserted his penis into Reginas vagina. While he was raping her, he ran the point of his knife up and down her
body, from her breasts to her vagina. Regina was very afraid.
After appellant Arevalo had reached a climax, he blindfolded Ruth and made her have sex with many other men.
On January 27, 2001, appellant Arevalo ravished Regina again in a similar manner as the previous days. By then, Regina was very weak.
On many occasions during her first five (5) days in captivity, and even thereafter, Regina tried to escape, but appellant Arevalo would always
catch up with her and hurt her. He would tie up her hands and hang her while having sex with her. Whenever he left the house, he would lock it
from the outside to prevent Regina and Ruth from leaving. Although appellant Arevalo would buy the girls food, Regina oftentimes refused to eat,
because she knew that the food was bought with the money appellant Arevalo earned from peddling their bodies.
On January 28, 2001, appellant Arevalo brought Regina to another place. She did not know where the place was because she was dizzy with the
drugs he had made her use.
On January 29, 2001, appellant Arevalo drugged Regina again. Thereafter, he had sexual intercourse with her. Regina begged him to let her go
home because her husband was waiting for her, but her plea fell on deaf ears. Many other men ravished Regina that day.
On January 30, 2001, appellant Arevalo forced Regina to make a choice between marijuana and tawas. When Regina refused to choose, he
threatened to slash her throat. Afraid, Regina finally chose tawas. Appellant Arevalo told her to take it so that she would not feel the pain in her
vagina, which was already bleeding. Thereafter, appellant Arevalo raped her.
On January 31, 2001, appellant Arevalo had forcible sexual intercourse with Regina again. Thereafter, not content with putting his fingers into her
private part, appellant Arevalo inserted a lighted cigarette inside. Although Regina was taking the drug appellant Arevalo forced her to use, she
still felt the pain in her vagina caused by the hot cigarette.
On February 1, 2001, after forcibly copulating with Regina yet another time, appellant Arevalo sold her again to other men.
On the night of February 2, 2001, appellant Arevalo again moved Regina to another place which she could not remember, because she was dizzy
then. Although there were other passengers on the public utility jeepney that they took on the way to the place, Regina could not ask for help, as
appellant Arevalo was poking a knife at her back inside her t-shirt the whole time and had earlier warned her that he would kill her if she
shouted. They arrived at a concrete house which had a vulcanizing shop at the ground floor. When they were inside the building, appellant
Arevalo blindfolded Regina and hanged her by the hands. Regina heard womens voices, but she was not sure whether they were real or came
from the television set in the room. That night, Regina was again raped by unidentified persons. Appellant Arevalo and Regina left the place at
half past midnight.
From February 3 up to February 5, 2001, appellant Arevalo continued to subject [her] to his bestial designs. Each time, he succeeded in inserting
his penis into her vagina and in consummating the intercourse. Regina no longer put up any resistance because her body had been rendered very
weak from her days of endless ravishment.
On February 6, 2001, Regina fell ill with fever, and Ruth took care of her. Reginas illness did not stop appellant Arevalo from molesting her that
day. Before she was raped, Regina begged appellant Arevalo to allow her to call her parents and even offered him any sum of money as he
desired, but he slapped her, saying that he needed her body and not her money. He also told Ruth to slap her, and so Ruth slapped her.
On February 7, 2001, Regina could only beg appellant Arevalo to take pity on her. She was chilling and she tried to push him away, to no avail,
for once again, appellant Arevalo successfully penetrated her private organ.
On February 8, 2001, Regina discovered that she had a venereal disease, or tulo. But this did not spare her from appellant Arevalos carnal
greed. She stopped resisting him, for her body had long been worn down by ceaseless abuse.
Reginas ordeal continued from February 9 up to February 14, 2001. Every single day, appellant Arevalo would ravish her without letup.
On February 14, 2001, appellant Organista, a friend and neighbor of appellant Arevalo, also had a taste of Reginas flesh. After appellant Arevalo
stripped her naked, appellant Organista made his move. Regina pushed him away as he approached her, but appellant Arevalo teased him, saying,
kaya mo yan pre. Appellant Organista proceeded to insert his penis into Reginas vagina while she lay down on the floor, with appellant Arevalo
looking on. After appellant Organista was finished, appellant Arevalo took over in ravishing Regina and succeeded in penetrating her as well.
Ruth F. Acosta, a native of Bukidnon, left her family for Manila when she was about eighteen (18) years old. Her highest educational attainment
was the third grade of primary school. Unable to find any relatives in Manila, she ended up loitering and sleeping on the streets of Luneta.
On January 23, 2001, about a year she had left the province, Ruth Acosta met appellant Oliver Arevalo at the Luneta park. It was around six
oclock in the evening. Appellant Arevalo told Ruth that he could help her find a job and invited her to go with him. Ruth went with appellant
Arevalo and they boarded a jeepney. They arrived at (what turned out to be) appellant Arevalos house in Pembo, Makati, a few hours later.
Upon entering the house, appellant Arevalo pushed Ruth Acosta to the bed and stripped off her clothes. Thereafter, appellant Arevalo removed
his own clothes and forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina. Ruth could not recall what happened immediately thereafter, except that she felt
pain in her private part. She was also bleeding badly, for she had just lost her virginity to her assailant.
That same evening, after she was ravished by appellant Arevalo, Ruth was raped by appellant Arevalos friend and neighbor, herein appellant
Organista, in the same room.
The following day, January 24, 2001, appellant Arevalo raped Ruth Acosta again. He took off his clothes, undressed Ruth, and inserted his penis
into her vagina, causing her to feel pain. While she was being raped, Ruth attempted to resist appellant Arevalo by pulling backwards her two
hands with clenched fists, but her resistance was futile.

On January 25, 2001, appellant Arevalo forcibly had sexual intercourse with Ruth again on his bed. He inserted his organ into her private part,
and once more, she felt pain. Many other men raped Ruth in the same room that night after paying a fee to appellant Arevalo, but she could not
identify said men because she was blindfolded by him. She recognized appellant Organista, though, as one of those who raped her while she was
blindfolded because she was able to hold his beard while he was ravishing her and she was already familiar with his face.
On January 26, 2001, appellants Organista and Arevalo took turns in raping Ruth. Appellant Organista removed Ruths clothes, after which,
appellant Arevalo had forcible sexual intercourse with her. Try as she might to resist the two (2) men, she was easily overpowered by them. After
appellant Arevalo was through with Ruth, he left the room. Appellant Organista then proceeded to defile her, inserting his penis into her
vagina. As a result of her ravishment by the two (2) men, Ruth experienced pain whenever she urinated.
The next day, January 27, 2001, appellant Arevalo blindfolded Ruth. Thereafter, she was raped successively by several unidentified men.
On January 28, 2001, appellants Arevalo and Organista forced Ruth to take drugs. Next, appellant Arevalo blindfolded Ruth. Thereafter, several
unidentified men raped Ruth, one after the other, in appellant Arevalos room. Before sexually abusing her, each of these men paid a fee to
appellant Arevalo. Ruth knew this, because she would hear the men say to him, Pare bayad or Pare ito na ang pambayad.
On January 29, 2001, appellant Arevalo vented his carnal desire on Ruth again. After undressing Ruth, he had forcible sexual intercourse with her
on his bed.
On January 30, 2001, appellant Arevalo forced himself upon Ruth once more. While appellant Arevalo was raping her, appellant Organista, who
was visiting, merely looked on and did nothing to stop his friend and neighbor. After appellant Arevalo had ejaculated, appellant Organista took
over, ravishing Ruth until he, too, succeeded in discharging his semen on her. While this was going on, appellant Arevalo merely stood by,
laughing.
On January 31, 2001, appellant Arevalo sexually abused Ruth yet another time, piercing her womanhood and bringing himself to a climax. Other
men followed in raping her that night in appellant Arevalos room, but she could not see them because appellant Arevalo had covered her eyes.
The following day, February 1, 2001, five (5) men raped Ruth in succession in the same room after paying a sum to appellant Arevalo. Once again,
she could not see their faces because appellant Arevalo had blindfolded her.
On February 2, 2001, appellants Arevalo and Organista took turns in raping Ruth in appellant Arevalos room. Ruth knew that both men had
reached a climax after forcibly copulating with her, for her vagina was very wet with their semen.
On February 3, 2001, appellant Arevalo slapped Ruth, pulled her hair, inserted his penis into her vagina and ravished her until he
ejaculated. Appellant Organista followed, similarly unleashing his seminal fluid on the hapless woman upon reaching a climax, while appellant
Arevalo looked on and held her down. Ruths ordeal did not end at this point, for she was subsequently raped by several other men after paying
appellant Arevalo one hundred pesos (P100.00) each.
On February 4, 2001, appellants Arevalo and Organista again raped Ruth in the same room. Appellant Organista had forcible sexual intercourse
with Ruth until he ejaculated; he also forced her to eat his penis. Appellant Arevalo followed, inserting his penis into her private part, causing it to
hurt. He also ejaculated his semen on her.
In addition, appellant Arevalo, as with previous dates, sold Ruth to many other men that day. All of them sexually abused her after each paying
appellant Arevalo one hundred pesos (P100.00).
On February 5, 2001, appellant Arevalo once more peddled Ruth and Regina to unidentified persons who each paid him one hundred pesos
(P100.00). Appellant Arevalo also forcibly copulated with the two (2) women that day. Additionally, appellant Organista ravished Ruth to the
point of ejaculation while appellant Arevalo watched. Ruth could only lie helpless while she was being raped by appellants, as they were too
strong for her.
On February 6, 2001, appellants Arevalo and Organista raped Ruth again. Appellant Organista ravished Ruth first, undressing her, inserting his
manhood into her as she lay on appellant Arevalos bed, and helping himself to an orgasm while leaving Ruth in pain. Appellant Arevalo then
took over, defiling her as well. Thereafter, he blindfolded her and sold her for sex to other unidentified men.
On February 7 and 8, 2001, appellant Arevalo repeated his ravishment of the helpless woman until he ejaculated on her.
Thereafter, appellant Arevalo blindfolded Ruth and sold her flesh to many other men. Again, Ruth knew this, for she heard them say to him,
Pare bayad and she also heard him talking to them.
On February 9, 2001, appellant Arevalo blindfolded the two (2) women and sold their sexual services to several men. Appellant Arevalo warned
Ruth that he had already killed a man before, and she believed him; hence, she did not dare remove her blindfold because she was afraid of him.
On February 10, 2001, appellant Arevalo forcibly consummated his lust on Ruth once more. He also let other men ravish her for a fee.
On February 11, 2001, several men paid appellant Arevalo to have sex with the two (2) women. Appellant Arevalo himself did not spare Ruth,
penetrating her maidenhood yet another time until he was satisfied.
On February 12, 13, and 14, 2001, appellant Arevalo again peddled the women to other men for sex. Appellants Arevalo and Organista were not
to be outdone, for they, too, ravished Ruth on February 12 and 13, 2001.
On the night of February 14, 2001, after they had fulfilled their lustful designs on the two (2) women and prostituted them to other men,
appellants Arevalo and Organista had a drinking spree in the formers room. Thereafter, they fell asleep. Regina Acu[]a got the key to the door
from appellant Arevalos pocket, dragged Ruth Acosta with her, and together they escaped. Regina and Ruth then reported their horrifying ordeal
to the Makati police. It was around 9:30 in the evening.
That same evening, a team of Makati policemen and barangay tanods went to appellant Arevalos house accompanied by the Regina and
Ruth. They knocked on the door. When appellant Arevalo opened the door, he was immediately identified by the women as their
ravisher. Appellant Arevalo tried to escape, but he was quickly arrested by the police. Thereafter, the police and the two (2) women proceeded to
appellant Organistas residence which appellant Arevalo had readily pinpointed to them. The police knocked on the door and appellant Organista
opened it. Again, the two (2) women quickly identified him as their other rapist. The moment he saw the policemen and the women, appellant
Organista also tried to escape, but the police immediately apprehended him.
The following day, the private complainants were physically examined by Dr. Miriam S. Guialani, the deputy chief of the Womens Crisis and
Child Protection Center of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Camp Crame, Quezon City.
Dr. Guialani found infected erosions or abrasions at the 8 and 9 oclock positions in the labial fold of Reginas external genitalia, most likely
caused by constant friction. She also noted hematoma, infection and fresh lacerations in the hymen at the 2 and 4 oclock positions. In addition, the
hymen was very very red and swollen, indicating that it had been subjected to force and violence. There was also a foul-smelling yellowish vaginal
discharge strongly indicative of a sexually transmitted disease. On the whole, Dr. Guialani noted that the genital findings show clear evidence of
previous penetrating trauma.
On the other hand, Dr. Guialani found healed lacerations at the 4, 7 and 8 oclock positions in Ruths hymen. She also noted edema and swelling
at the hymenal rim and its mucosal tissues. Dr. Guialani similarly reported that Ruths genital findings show clear evidence of previous
trauma.[10] (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, the defense presented the following version of the facts:
OLIVER AREVALO testified that since December 27, 2000, he was in Ormoc, Leyte with his wife and two (2) children. On February 10, 2001, he
went back to Manila to borrow money from his brother Tony to put up a sari-sari store but he was asked by his brothers secretary to come back on
February 13, 2001 so he went back to his brothers house but his brother referred him to their elder brother at Project 6, Quezon City. He was only
given P500.00. At around 4:00 oclock p.m., he proceeded to Luneta where policemen were arresting vagrants at that time. The two (2) women,
Ruth and Apple, referring to complainants Acosta and Acu[]a, were arrested. He helped them by giving them food and clothing. They went with
him to Makati and arrived at their house at around 11:30 p.m. The next day, February 12, 2001, the two (2) women were hungry again and Acosta
was asking for transportation fare. He brought them to Organistas house and the latter gave P10.00 to Acosta. The two (2) women left at around
1:30 in the afternoon. He had a drinking spree with Organista at his house. At around 1:00 in the morning, he saw policemen together with the
two (2) women and one of the policemen boxed him, so he pointed Organistas house to them.
HERMINIGILDO ORGANISTA could not remember where he was from January 23, to 26, 2001 because he was treated with ECI for about five
(5) times at the National Mental Health Hospital since 1983. He claimed that said treatment has the tendency of weakening or affecting ones
memory. He corroborated the testimony of accused Arevalo that he only gave P10.00 for the food of Acosta.
AVELINA ORGANISTA testified that her son was treated at the National Mental Health in 1983. His last examination was in 1997. After said
examination, her son could no longer work because they have to bind him because he was uncontrollable. He even threatened her that he would
kill her when she opposed what he was doing. On the dates of the alleged rapes, her son was at home with her.
DR. PIA ALMA DE JESUS of the National Center for Mental Health testified that she first saw accused Organista for treatment on April 11,
2001. She learned from the hospital records that said accused had been mentally ill since 1982 or 1983 and had 23 admissions at the mental
hospital. During his last admission, he was given oral medication to control his psychotic symptoms like illusions and hallucination. Failure to
regularly take said medication could cause a relapse that would render him [unfit] for trial.

JESUS OCAMPO, driver and all around helper of accused Arevalos brother, Tony, testified that he usually see Arevalo on Tuesdays as the latter
used to ask money from Tony.[11] (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC found Arevalo and Organista guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 42 and 32 counts of rape, respectively -- committed from January 23,
2001 to February 14, 2001.
The positive and straightforward testimonies of the victims, corroborated by medical reports, sufficiently proved the guilt of appellants. Having
closely observed the demeanor of the victims during trial, the lower court found them credible. It found evidence that they had suffered extreme
trauma, pain, humiliation and distress. It held that there was no ill motivation on their part to impute such serious offenses to appellants.
The RTC found many inconsistencies in the defenses of denial and alibi resorted to by Arevalo. First, he could not state with certainty whether he
and his family had left for Ormoc City or for Valencia, Leyte, when the rapes were committed. He failed to present bus tickets to support his claim,
notwithstanding his manifestation during the trial that he would present them before the court. Second, the trial court was puzzled by his
testimony that, because his brother came home early from work on Tuesdays, on those days he had to go to the latters house, which served as both
office and residence. Third, on cross-examination, the brothers helper contradicted Arevalo by testifying that the former had not seen the latter in
the house on February 10, 2001, the date on which one of the rapes had supposedly taken place. Fourth, the residence of the brother of Arevalo
turned out to be located in Project 2, Quezon City, not in Project 3 as the latter repeatedly testified to.
The defense of insanity proffered by Organista likewise failed to convince the trial court. He presented his mother who testified that he was not of
sound mind, and that he had never left her side ever since he was a young boy. He contradicted her, however, when he declared on the stand that
he was an electrician and a mason by vocation. According to him, during the period 1999 to March 2001 when he engaged in his vocation, he never
received any complaints on his behavior from the people he constantly worked or associated with.
Although Organista was indeed confined at the National Center for Mental Health, the period of his confinement did not include the period of the
commission of the rapes, as he was last discharged from the Center in 1997. Moreover, he failed to prove his claimed insanity during or near the
time of the commission thereof.
On the contrary, when the arresting policemen, together with the victims, proceeded to his house, Organista tried to escape. His reaction was
indicative of guilt and awareness of the wrong he had inflicted on the victims.
Hence, this automatic review before us.[12]
The Issues
Appellants raise the following errors for our consideration:
I
The lower court erred in not appreciating the exempting circumstance of insanity interposed by Accused-appellant Herminigildo Organista
despite strong and convincing evidence presented to prove the same.
II
The lower court erred in finding that conspiracy existed between the Accused-appellants.
III
The lower court erred in imposing upon x x x Accused-appellant Herminigildo Organista the supreme penalty of death notwithstanding the
presence of a mitigating circumstance.
IV
The lower court erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death upon Accused-appellants on the assumption that they are guilty of the crime
charged.[13]
Simply put, appellants arguments hinge on the following: (1) the trial court failed to appreciate Organistas defense of insanity; (2) no conspiracy
existed between appellants; and (3) they should have been found guilty of simple, not qualified, rape.
For clarity, we shall discuss in reverse order the issues raised by appellants.
The Courts Ruling
Appellants are guilty of simple, not qualified, rape; hence, the penalty for each count should be reduced from death to reclusion perpetua.
First Issue:
Proper Crime and Penalty
Appellants maintain that the evidence of the prosecution is weak, and that their defense of alibi and denial should have entitled them to an
acquittal. Organista adds that, assuming they were guilty, he should have been entitled to the mitigating circumstance of illness that diminishes an
offenders exercise of will power, pursuant to Article 13(9)[14] of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellants contend that the Informations did not allege with specificity that two persons had raped the victims. Therefore, they argue,
the rapes should not have been qualified and they should not have been sentenced to death, which is the higher penalty provided under Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, the penalty for each conviction of rape should have been reclusion perpetua.
The contentions of appellants are partly meritorious. While their respective defenses of denial, alibi and insanity must fail, we find them guilty
only of simple, not qualified, rape.
Alibi and Denial
The positive, consistent and straightforward testimonies of the victims sufficiently established appellants culpability. Well-settled is the rule that
denial and alibi, being weak defenses, cannot overcome the positive testimonies of the offended parties.[15]
In order to merit credibility, denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability,[16] which herein appellants failed to show. And in
order for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that they were at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also
that it was physically impossible for them to be at the locus delicti or its immediate vicinity.[17]
In the present case, appellants failed to demonstrate this fact. Without presenting any evidence to support his bare assertion,[18] Arevalo merely
testified that he was in Ormoc, Leyte, from December 27, 2000, to February 10, 2001. He said that the bus ticket evidencing his trip to Leyte on
December 27, 2000, was with his wife, while the return ticket to Manila on February 10, 2001, was with his brother. To corroborate his testimony,
he manifested that he would present the tickets in court after retrieving them,[19] but he failed to do so.
On the other hand, the mother of Organista averred that her son had stayed with her during the entire period of the commission of the rapes. But
since their house was near Arevalos, or the place where the rapes were committed, then it would not have been unlikely for him to be in the
vicinity at the time of the rapes.
The victims testimonies, corroborated by the results of the medical examination, convincingly proved that appellants were the perpetrators. It is a
time-tested rule that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by the trial court, because it had the
opportunity to observe them firsthand and to note their demeanor and conduct on the witness stand. [20] For this reason, its findings on such
matters, absent any arbitrariness or oversight of facts or circumstances of weight and substance, are final and conclusive upon this Court.[21] It is
likewise well-settled that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been
committed; and when her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on the basis thereof.[22]
On the rapes committed against her on January 23 and 24, 2001, Acua testified as follows:
Q: You said you were raped on January 23, 2001 and it was Oliver Arevalo who raped you. Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court how this
was done?
A: During that night when Oliver came back, he forcibly took off my clothes including my short pants.
Q: And after Oliver took off your clothes and short pants, what else did he do, if he did anything?
A: I asked him Kuya, what will you do? Why are you taking off my clothes?
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q: After that, what did he do when you shouted for help?
A: He approached me and he forcibly raised my feet and inserted his penis into my vagina. I shouted, pleaded for help.
Q: Was Oliver successful in having his penis penetrate your female organ?
A: Yes, sir. x x x.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q: So do you recall how long you were raped by Oliver?
A: It started January 23 up to February 14, 2001, sir.
Q: And where did these other sexual assaults after January 23, 2001 meaning January 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, February 1 up to Feb[ruary]
14, 2001 happened?
A: In the house of Oliver.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q: At noon, ikaw ay walang damit mula ulo hanggang paa?

A: Opo.
Q: Iyon din ang gumahasa sa iyo?
A: Si Oliver po.
Q: Paano mo nalaman, nakapiring ka?
A: Noong tina[n]ggalan niya ako ng piring ay si Oliver naman po ang sumunod.
Court:
Q: Ang ibig mong sabihin ay matapos yung ibang tao na gahasain ka ay sumunod naman si Oliver noong January 24?
A: Opo.[23]
On the rapes that occurred from January 25 to 27, 2001, she testified thus:
Q: So on January 25, 2001, you are saying that it was not Oliver Arevalo who raped you but somebody else only that person whom you could not
identify gave payment to Oliver to have sexual intercourse with you? Is that what you are saying?
A: Yes, sir. But after that person, he was the one who would follow in raping me, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q: Who sexually assaulted you on January 26, 2001?
A: Oliver Arevalo, sir.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to accused Oliver Arevalo.
FISCAL NAOLA:
Q: And how did he sexually assault you on January 26, 2001?
A: I was naked at that time and he was poking the knife on me.
INTERPRETER:
Witness demonstrating pointing from her breast down to her private part.
FISCAL NAOLA:
Q: At that time that Oliver Arevalo, Jr. was poking a knife from your breast down to your private organ, were you wearing anything?
A: None, sir.
Q: So what else happened after that poking of a bladed weapon?
A: After that, he raped me.
Q: When you said [he] raped you, you mean he inserted his penis into your female organ?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And was he able to reach climax? Meaning, was he able to complete the copulation?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q: Lets go now to the incident on January 27, 2001 which is the 5th day. Tell us, was any rape committed on you on January 27, 2001?
A: Yes, sir, everyday. I do not know whats happening already because patang-pata na ang katawan ko.
Q: And could you recall if Oliver Arevalo, Jr. raped you on January 27, 2001, the 5th day of your being in his house?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And could you recall how did this happen?
A: I could recall that everyday he was raping me.
Q: At what time was this rape being committed?
A: I do not know because from what I could recall, everytime somebody would use me, he would follow.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q: So you are positively certain that on January 27, 2001, the 5th day of your being in the house of Oliver Arevalo that accused Oliver Arevalo
raped you?
A: Yes, sir.[24]
On the rapes from January 29 to February 14, 2001, she narrated the events as follows:
Q: Mrs. Witness, you stopped last time on the date January 29, 2001 which is the 7 th day of your being in the house of accused Oliver Arevalo, Jr.,
the question is, please tell the Honorable Court what happened to you on January 29, 2001 in the house of Oliver Arevalo, Jr. in Makati City?
A: Oliver Arevalo forced me to take drugs and then he used me, they were plenty, sir.
Q: And when you said you were used, are you referring [to] being abused sexually?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was Oliver Arevalo successful in having sexual intercourse with you?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q: And was Oliver Arevalo successful in having sexual intercourse with you on January 30, 2001?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did he finish having sexual intercourse with you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Lets now go to January 31, 2001. Now, what happened to you on January 31, 2001?
A: He also used me during that day, sir, x x x.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q: Lets now go to February 1, 2001, what happened to you on February 1, 2001?
A: He again raped me and then sold me again to other male persons.
Q: And was Oliver Arevalo, Jr. successful in having sexual intercourse with you on February 1, 2001?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And did he finish?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q: What happened to you on February 3 at the house of Oliver Arevalo in Makati City?
A: I was also raped, sir, by Oliver Arevalo.
Q: Was he successful in raping you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did he finish?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What were you wearing at the time you [were] being raped?
A: None, sir, nothing.
Q: What about Oliver Arevalo, what was he wearing?
A: Nothing also, sir.
Q: Were you lying down when you were being raped?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you resist him when you were being raped?
A: I did not resist him already, sir, because I was patampata na po ang katawan ko.
Q: How about on February 4, 2001, what happened to you?
A: Also the same, sir, I am not resisting already I am just crying.
Q: Were you raped on February 4, 2001?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who raped you?
A: Oliver Arevalo, sir.
Q: What were you wearing at the time that you [were] being raped?
A: Nothing, sir.
Q: How about Oliver Arevalo, what was he wearing?

A: Nothing also, sir.

Q: Did he finish?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: On February 5, 2001, what happened to you?
A: The same with February 4, sir.
Q: Meaning, Oliver Arevalo raped you also?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What were you wearing at the time that you [were] being raped?
A: Nothing also, sir.
Q: How about Oliver Arevalo, what was he wearing?
A: Nothing also, sir.
Q: Did he finish and fulfilled raping you on February 5, 2001?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Meaning he was able to insert and penetrate his penis to your private parts, is that what you mean?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: On February 6, 2001, what happened to you, Mrs. Witness?
A: I was sick last February 6, sir.
Q: February 6, you got sick. Do you recall what illness or sickness is this?
A: I had fever during that time and it was Rose who was taking care of me.
Q: Were you raped on February 6, 2001?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who raped you?
A: Oliver, sir.
Q: What were you wearing when you [were] raped?
A: Nothing, sir.
Q: What about Oliver Arevalo, what was he wearing?
A: Nothing also, sir.
Q: Before you were raped, did you tell him that you were sick?
A: No, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q: How about on February 7, 2001, what happened to you?
A: I was also raped by Oliver.
Q: Was he successful?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did he finish?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What were you wearing at the time that he raped you?
A: Nothing, sir.
Q: How about Oliver Arevalo, what was he wearing?
A: Nothing also, sir.
Q: What position were you at the time that you [were] being raped, were you lying down?
A: Lying down, sir.
Q: On the floor or on the bed?
A: On the bed, sir.
Q: Did you resist him on February 7, 2001?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you do to him on February 7, 2001?
A: I told him to pity me parang awa mo na.
INTERPRETER:
Witness demonstrating that she was chilling and she was pushing the accused.
FISCAL NAOLA:
Q: Were you successful in pushing him?
A: No, sir.
Q: And Oliver Arevalo was able to have his penis penetrate you private parts?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How about on February 8, 2001, what happened to you?
A: I had a disease, sir, tulo.
Q: Aside from having that vaginal disease on February 8, 2001, what else if any happened to you if you recall?
A: I was used again by Oliver, sir.
Q: Did he finish?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What were you wearing at the time that he raped you?
A: Nothing, sir.
Q: How about Oliver Arevalo, what was he wearing?
A: Nothing also, sir.
Q: Did you resist him?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why, why not?
A: Patampata na po ang katawan ko nanghihina na po ako.
Q: How about on February 9, 2001, what happened to you if any did happen to you?
A: Also like that, sir, up to February 14, I was being raped everyday.
Q: So, from words you are saying the remaining days February 9 to February 14 you were not allowed to leave the house of Oliver Arevalo, Jr.?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And during those days aside from you and Rose, were there any other person who were able to enter that house?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who?
COURT:
Witness pointing to a man also in yellow shirt and when asked he identified himself as Herminigildo Organista.
FISCAL NAOLA:
Q: Could you recall, Mrs. Witness, on what date did Herminigildo Organista enter the house of Oliver Arevalo, Jr. in Makati City?
A: On February 14, sir.
Q: Do you know that February 14 is Valentines Day?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So what happened to you on February 14, 2001 in the house of Oliver Arevalo, Jr. [on] Valentines Day?
A: I was raped by two (2) persons, Oliver and Herminigildo.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q: Who first raped you on February 14, 2001, Valentines Day?
A: Herminigildo, sir.
Q: He was the first one?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who were present if any when he raped you?

A: Oliver Arevalo, sir.
Q: The two (2) of them were there?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And how did Herminigildo Organista raped you on February 14, 2001?
A: He inserted his private parts to my vagina, sir.
Q: Before that, did you resist him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How did you resist Herminigildo Organista?
A: I pushed him, sir.
Q: Were you successful in pushing him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And after pushing him, what happened next if anything else happened?
A: Oliver said kaya mo yan pre, then what he did was he inserted his private parts to my private parts, sir.
Q: Now tell us, what were you wearing at the time that Herminigildo Organista inserted his penis to your private parts?
A: Nothing, sir.
Q: Who removed your clothing before Herminigildo Organista was able to have his penis x x x insert[ed] to your private parts?
A: Oliver Arevalo, sir.
Q: Oliver Arevalo removed your clothing?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were you wearing bra and panty at that time before you [were] raped?
A: None, sir.
Q: Only your clothes?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of clothes is this, duster or pants and blouse?
A: T-shirt only, sir.
Q: How about your lower portion, what were you wearing?
A: Nothing, sir.
Q: Only T-shirt?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And after Oliver Arevalo, Jr. removed your T-shirt, what happened to you?
A: I was raped by Herminigildo Organista.
Q: In what position were you at the time that you [were] being raped by Herminigildo Organista?
A: Lying down on the floor, sir.
Q: Not on the bed?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was Herminigildo Organista successful in having you raped on February 14, 2001?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did he finish?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: At the time that you [were] being raped, were you blindfolded?
A: No, sir.
Q: How about Oliver Arevalo, where was he at the time that you [were] being raped by Herminigildo Organista?
A: At the bed, sir.
Q: And what was he doing?
A: He [was] just looking, sir.
Q: Looking at the both of you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And he did not do anything to prevent Herminigildo Organista from completing and successfully penetrating his penis to your private parts?
A: Nothing, sir.
Q: So, after Herminigildo Organista finished and successfully completed having intercourse with you, what else happened if anything happened
on February 14, 2001?
A: It was followed by Oliver Arevalo, Jr.
Q: Was he successful in having you raped on February 14, 2001?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was his penis able to penetrate your private parts?
A: Yes, sir.[25]
On the other hand, on the rapes committed against her from January 23 to February 13, 2001, Acosta testified as follows:
COURT:
Sabihin mo nga sa hukuman kung papano ka o bakit nandoon sa bahay ni Oliver nuong 23 ng Enero taong kasalukuyan?
A Naglalakad po ako sa Luneta nakasalubong ko siya. Ang sabi po niya sa akin ipapasok niya ako sa trabaho.
Q Ano ang sumunod na pangyayari ng sabihin sa iyo ni Oliver na ipapasok ka niya ng trabaho samantalang ikaw ay nasa Luneta?
A Ihahanap daw po niya ako ng trabaho.
Q Proceed.
FISCAL NAOLA:
Q Nung sabihin niya sa iyo na ihahanap ka niya ng trabaho, ano pa ang sumunod na pangyayari?
A Sinakay po niya ako sa jeep.
Q Nung nakasakay na kayo sa jeep, saan kayo nagtungo? Saan kayo pumunta?
A Sa bahay po ni Oliver.
Q Sabihin mo sa [kagalang-galang] na Hukom kung alam mo kung saan yung bahay ni Oliver.
A Sa Makati, Cembo.
Q Nung dumating kayo sa bahay ni Oliver doon sa Makati, ano ang nangyari kung meron man?
A Tinulak po ako sa kama.
COURT:
Q Anong oras ka dumating sa bahay ni Oliver?
A Hindi ko na po maalala.
Q Maari mo bang sabihin kung gabi o araw?
A Gabi, po.
Q Ikaw ba nung makasalubong mo si Oliver sa Luneta ay gabi rin?
A Opo.
Q Proceed.
FISCAL NAOLA:
Q Pagkatapos kang itulak ni Oliver sa kama, ano pa ang sumunod na nangyari kung meron pa?
A Hinubad po yung t-shirt ko, shorts, panty at bra.
Q Ikaw bay lumaban sa kanya habang hinuhubad ang iyong shorts, panty at bra?
A Malakas po siya.
Q Ano pa ang sumunod na pangyayari matapos kang hubaran ni Oliver ng iyong shorts, panty at bra?
A Pinasok po niya yung titi niya sa ano ko.
Q Yung sinasabi mong ano mo, ito ba yung iyong ari?
A Opo.

Q At matapos ipasok ni Oliver ang kanyang titi sa iyong ari, ano pa ang sumunod na nangyari?
A Hindi ko po matandaan.
Q Ano ang iyong naramdaman nung ipinasok ni Oliver ang kanyang titi sa iyong ari?
A Masakit, po.
Q Si Oliver naman, naaalala mo pa ba kung ano ang suot ni Oliver, kung meron man nuong pinagsasamantalahan ka niya?
A Wala po.
Q Ibig mong sabihin siya ay hubo at hubad?
A Opo.
Q Pagkatapos nitong Enero 23 taong kasalukuyan 2001, meron pa bang ibang pagkakataon na ikaw ay ginahasa ni Oliver?
A Opo.
Q Ilang beses kung natatandaan mo?
A Maraming beses, po.
Q Pagkatapos nitong Enero 23 taong kasalukuyan, kinabukasan January 24, 2001, masasabi mo ba sa kagalang-galang na Hukom kung nanatili
ka roon sa bahay ni Oliver?
A Opo.
Q Puede bang sabihin mo sa kagalang-galang na Hukom kung mayroong nangyari sa iyo kinabukasan January 24, 2001?
A Opo.
Q Ano ang nangyari sa iyo?
A Ni-rape po ako.
Q Nino?
A Oliver po.
Q Itong Oliver na sinasabi mo, ito rin ba yung Oliver na itinuro mo kanina?
A Opo.
Q Nung ni-rape ka ni Oliver sino ang nandoon sa bahay niya kung natatandaan mo?
A Wala po.
Q Kilala mo ba itong isang taong nagngangalang Herminigildo Organista?
A Opo.
Q Kung narito siya sa loob, puede bang ituro mo siya?
A (Witness pointing to accused Organista.)
Q Itong si Herminigildo Organista, naroon ba sa bahay ni Oliver nang dumating ka noong January 23, 2001?
A Opo.
Q May kinalaman ba siya, kung meron man, sa ginawang panggagahasa sa iyo ni Oliver nuong January 23, 2001?
A Ni-rape rin po niya ako.
Q Kailan?
A Nuon pong January 23.
Q Sinong naunang mang-rape sa iyo, si Oliver o si Herminigildo noong January 23, 2001?
A Si Oliver po.
Q Pagkatapos ni Oliver sinong sumunod?
A Si Lito po.
Q Itong sinasabi mong Lito, nandirito ba sa loob ng hukuman?
A Opo.
Q Puede bang ituro mo yung sinasabi mong taong nang-rape sa iyo na ang ngalan ay Lito?
A (Witness pointing to accused Herminigildo Organista again.)
Q Ibig mong sabihin ay dalawang beses kang ginahasa nuong January 23, 2001. Una ni Oliver Arevalo at pangalawa Herminigildo Organista,
tama ba yon?
A Opo.
Q Sinabi mo rin na nung sumunod na araw January 24, ginahasa ka rin ni Oliver, tama ba?
A Opo.
xxx
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xxx
Q Pagkatapos nuong January 24, 2001, meron pa bang nangyari kung meron man nuong January 25?
A Opo.
Q Sabihin mo sa kagalang-galang na Hukom kung ano ang nangyari sa iyo?
A Ni-rape po niya ako.
Q Sinong nang-rape sa iyo?
A Si Lito po.
Q Ito rin yung Litong itinuro mo kanina?
A Opo.
COURT:
Q Paano mo nalaman na Lito ang palayaw niya?
A Nung nahuli na po sila.
Q Continue.
FISCAL NAOLA:
Q Pero ang mukha niya natatandaan mo?
A Opo may balbas po siya.
Q Nung ni-rape ka ni Lito o ni Herminigildo Organista nuong January 25, 2001, meron bang ibang tao doon sa bahay?
A Meron po.
Q Sabihin mo sa Hukom kung sino?
A Hindi ko po kilala kasi po nakapiring ang mga mata ko.
Q Papaano mo nasabi na si Lito ang gumahasa sa iyo kung nakapiring ang mga mata mo?
A May balbas po siya.
Q Nakita mo ba siya nitong January 25, 2001?
A Nahawakan ko lang po ang balbas niya.
Q Oo nahawakan mo nga pero nakita mo ba siya nuong January 25, 2001, itong sinasabi mong Lito?
A Opo.
Q Bukod kay Lito meron pa bang gumahasa sa iyo nuong January 25, 2001?
A Binebenta po kami.
Q Si Oliver Arevalo, Jr., ginahasa ka rin ba niya nuong January 25, 2001?
A Opo.
Q Sinong nauna, si Lito o Herminigildo Organista o si Oliver Arevalo?
A Si Oliver po.
Q At ang sumunod si Lito o si Herminigildo Organista?
A Opo.
Q Nung sinabi mong si Oliver ang naunang nanggahasa, nagtagumpay ba siya sa kanyang panggagahasa?
A Opo.
Q Anong naramdaman mo nuong ginagahasa ka ni Oliver?
A Masakit po ang ari ko.
Q Nasaan ka nung ginagahasa ka niya, sa kama ba o nasa sahig?
A Nasa kama po.
Q Ilan kayo sa kama nung ginagahasa ka ni Oliver?
A Isa po.

Q Ibig mong sabihin ikaw lang at si Oliver?

A Opo.
Q Nung sumunod na araw January 26, puede bang sabihin mo sa kagalang-galang na Hukom kung may nangyari sa iyo?
A Opo.
Q Anong nangyari sa iyo?
A Ni-rape po.
Q Sinong nang-rape sa iyo?
A Si Oliver po.
Q Bukod kay Oliver, bukod sa pangre-rape ni Oliver, meron pa bang nangyari sa iyo?
A Opo.
Q Ano yon, pakisabi mo sa hukuman?
A Si Lito po.
Q Anong ginawa niya sa iyo?
A Rape din po.
Q Ikaw bay nakahubad noon nang ni-rape ka ni Oliver?
A Opo.
Q Sino ang naghubad sa iyo?
A Si Lito po.
Q Matapos kang hubaran ni Lito ni-rape ka ni Oliver, yon ba ang ibig mong sabihin?
A Opo.
Q Ikaw ba ay lumaban kay Lito o kay Oliver?
A Malakas po silang dalawa.
Q Matapos kang gahasain ni Oliver sino ang sumunod?
A Si Lito po.
Q Nagtagumpay ba si Lito sa panggagahasa sa iyo?
A Opo.
Q Ibig mong sabihin naipasok niya ang ari niya sa ari mo ganoon ba?
A Opo.
Q Ano ang naramdaman mo nung ipasok ang ari niya sa ari mo?
A Masakit po ang pag-ihi ko.
xxx
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Q Nuong January 29, may naaalala ka ba kung may nangyari sa iyo?
A Rape din po.
Q Sino ang nang-rape sa iyo nung January 29, 2001?
A Oliver po.
Q Bukod kay Oliver meron pa bang ibang nang-rape sa iyo nuong January 29?
A Hindi ko po nakilala.
Q Nagtagumpay ba si Oliver sa panggagahasa sa iyo nung January 29?
A Opo.
Q Ikaw bay hubad nung nangyari yon?
A Opo.
Q Sino ang naghubad ng iyong damit nuong January 29?
A Si Oliver po.
Q Nung ginahasa ka ni Oliver nung January 29, ano naman ang suot mo, kung meron man?
A Wala po.
Q Sino ang nag-alis ng iyong kasuotan nung January 29?
A Si Oliver po.
Q Lumaban ka ba kay Oliver nung ginagahasa ka niya nung January 29?
A Malakas po siya.
Q Bukod kay Oliver meron pa bang ibang gumahasa sa iyo nung January 29?
A Hindi ko po kilala kasi may takip po ang mga mata ko.
Q Ang nakilala mo lang ay si Oliver?
A Opo.
Q Saan ka ginahasa ni Oliver, sa sahig ba, sa kama o saan?
A Sa kama po.
Q Dumako tayo sa January 30. Natatandaan mo ba kung may gumahasa sa iyo nuong January 30?
A Opo.
Q Sabihin mo nga sa kagalang-galang na Hukom kung ano nangyari sa iyo nuong January 30, 2001?
A Rape po.
Q Sino ang nang-rape sa iyo?
A Oliver po.
Q Sino pa bukod kay Oliver, kung meron man?
A Si Lito po.
Q Sino ang naunang nang-rape sa iyo nung January 30, si Lito o si Oliver?
A Si Oliver po.
Q Nung nire-rape ka ni Oliver nung January 30, natatandaan mo ba kung nasaan si Lito?
A Opo.
Q Nasaan siya?
A Pumunta po siya sa bahay ni Oliver?
Q Habang nire-rape ka ni Oliver sa kama, nasaan si Lito?
A Nanonood po.
Q Bakit mo nasabing nanonood siya, nakita mo ba siya?
A Opo.
Q Pinigilan ba niya si Oliver habang ginagahasa ka niya?
A Hindi po.
Q Ikaw, hinawakan ka ba ni Lito habang nire-rape ka ni Oliver?
A Opo.
Q Saan ka hinawakan ni Lito habang ginagahasa ka ni Oliver?
A Sa kamay po.
Q Ilang kamay ang hinawakan sa iyo ni Lito?
A Dalawa po.
Q At nakatapos ba si Oliver ng panggagahasa sa iyo nung January 30?
A Opo.
Q Papano mo nasabing nakatapos si Oliver?
A Basa na po.
Q Alin ang basa na?
A Ang ari ko po.
Q Matapos kang gahasain ni Oliver at naramdaman mong basa na ang ari mo, ang sumunod namang gumahasa sa iyo ay si Lito, ganon ba?
A Opo.
Q Nagtagumpay ba si Lito sa panggagahasa sa iyo?

A Opo.
Q Nakatapos ba siya?
A Opo.
Q Papano mo nalaman na nakatapos si Lito ng panggagahasa sa iyo?
A Nilabasan din po.
Q Si Lito?
A Opo.
Q Habang ginagahasa ka ni Lito nandon din ba si Oliver?
A Opo.
Q Anong ginawa sa iyo ni Oliver habang ginagahasa ka ni Lito?
A Tumatawa po.
Q Bukod sa tumatawa si Oliver habang ginagahasa ka ni Lito, hinawakan ka ba niya sa kamay o sa ibang bahagi ng iyong katawan kung
natatandaan mo?
A Kamay po at paa.
Q Hinawakan ni Oliver?
A Opo.
Q Matapos kang gahasain ni Lito nong January 30, 2001, natatandaan mo ba kung may nangyari sa iyo nung sumunod na araw nung January 31,
2001?
A Opo.
Q Ano ang nangyari sa iyo nung January 31, 2001?
A Rape din po.
Q Sinong nang-rape sa iyo?
A Oliver po.
Q Nagtagumpay ba siya sa panggagahasa sa iyo nung January 31, 2001?
A Opo.
Q Nakatapos ba siya?
A Opo.
Q Papano mo nasabi na natapos si Oliver ng panggagahasa sa iyo?
A Basa na po ang ari ko.
Q Bukod kay Oliver Arevalo, meron pa bang nanggahasa sa iyo nung January 31, 2001?
A Opo.
Q Sino ang nanggagahasa sa iyo bukod kay Oliver?
A Hindi ko po makilala kasi may takip ang mga mata ko.
Q So ang natatandaan mo lang ay si Oliver?
A Opo.
Q Nung sinabi mong nagtagumpay at natapos si Oliver sa panggagahasa sa iyo, puede bang sabihin mo sa Hukom kung ang ari niya ay naipasok
niya sa ari mo?
A Opo.
Q Naramdaman mo ba nang ipasok ni Oliver yung ari niya sa ari mo?
A Opo.
Q Itinulak mo ba siya habang ginagahasa ka niya?
A Malakas po siya.
Q Hindi mo siya naitulak?
A Hindi po.
Q Meron ka bang damit noon o hubot hubad ka habang ginagahasa ka nung January 31, 2001.
A Wala na po.
Q Sinong nag-alis sa iyo ng damit mo nung January 31, 2001?
A Si Oliver po.
Q Si Oliver naman ano ang damit niya, siya ba ay may damit o wala nung January 31, 2001.
A Wala po.
Q So ibig mong sabihin ikaw at si Oliver ay parehong hubot hubad nung ginagahasa ka niya[?]
A Opo.
Q Saan ka niya ginahasa, sa kama ba o sa sahig, o sa anong lugar ng bahay?
A Sa kama po.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q Sino ang nanggahasa sa iyo noong February 2, 2001?
A Si Oliver at si Lito po.
Q Nagtagumpay ba si Oliver ng panggagahasa sa iyo?
A Opo kaming dalawa po ni Regina.
Q Matapos kang gahasain ni Oliver, at nagtagumpay siya, sino pa ang gumahasa sa iyo, kung meron man?
A Hindi ko po kilala kasi may takip ang mga mata ko.
Q Natatandaan mo ba kung nandoon si Herminigildo Organista noong February 2, 2001, habang ginagahasa ka ni Oliver Arevalo?
A Opo.
Q Anong ginagawa niya habang ginagahasa ka ni Oliver?
A Wala po.
Q Nanonood siya?
A Opo.
Q Hinawakan ba niya ang kamay mo o paa, ni Herminigildo?
A Opo.
Q Noong February 2, 2001?
A Opo.
Q Meron ka ba noong piring o takip sa mata?
A Opo.
Q Papano mo nalaman na hinawakan ang kamay mo o paa ni Herminigildo gayong may takip ang iyong mga mata?
A Naramdaman ko po.
Q Ikaw bay may suot na damit habang ginagahasa ka ni Oliver nung February 2, 2001?
A Wala po.
Q Sinong nag-alis ng damit mo?
A Si Oliver po.
Q Lumaban ka ba sa kanya habang inalisan ka ng damit?
A Malakas po siya.
Q Ano naman ang suot ni Oliver nung ginahasa ka niya nung February 2?
A Wala po.
Q Nakatapos ba si Oliver sa panggagahasa sa iyo nung February 2?
A Opo.
Q Papano mo nalaman na nakatapos si Oliver?
A Basa na po ang ari ko.
Q Ano naman ang nararamdaman mo habang pinapasok ni Oliver ang ari niya sa ari mo?
A Masakit po.
Q Bukod kay Oliver meron pa bang gumahasa sa iyo nuong February 2, 2001?

A Opo. Si Lito po.

Q Pagkatapos ni Oliver ginahasa ka ni Lito?
A Opo.
Q Nagtagumpay ba si Lito o Herminigildo Organista sa panggagahasa sa iyo nung February 2, 2001?
A Opo.
Q Nakatapos ba siya?
A Opo.
Q Bakit mo nasabi na nakatapos si Lito ng panggagahasa sa iyo?
A Naramdaman ko pong basa.
Q Ang ano?
A Ang ari ko po.
Q Nasaan si Oliver habang ginagahasa ka ni Herminigildo?
A Nanonood po.
Q Bukod sa panonood, meron ba siyang ginawa kung meron man habang ginagahasa ka ni Lito?
A Hinawakan po ang kamay ko.
Q Dumako tayo sa sumunod na araw February 3, 2001. Natatandaan mo ba kung may nangyari sa iyo nuong February 3, 2001?
A Opo.
Q Ano ang nangyari sa iyo?
A Ni-rape po kami ni Regina.
Q Sino ang nang-rape sa inyo?
A Si Oliver at si Lito po.
Q Nuong February 3, 2001, sino ang unang nang-rape sa iyo?
A Oliver po.
Q Saang lugar ka niya ni-rape?
A Sa bahay po niya.
Q Saang parte ng bahay?
A Cembo, Makati.
Q Oo, pero saan ba sa kama, sa sahig.?
A Sa kama po.
Q Lumaban ka ba kay Oliver bago ka niya ginahasa nuong February 3?
A Malakas po siya.
Q Sinasaktan ka ba niya?
A Opo.
Q Sa papanong paraan?
A Sampal po.
Q Ano pa kung meron?
A Sabunot po.
Q Ano pa kung meron?
A Wala na po.
Q Pagkatapos kang sampalin at sabunutan ano ang ginagawa sa iyo ni Oliver?
A Ni-rape po niya ako.
Q Sigurado ka ba diyan?
A Opo.
Q Si Oliver naman, meron ba siyang damit nung ginagahasa ka niya?
A Wala na po.
Q Nakita mo ba nung nag-alis siya ng damit?
A Nakita ko po wala na siyang damit.
Q Matapos kang hubaran at nakita mo siyang wala ng damit, ano naman ang sumunod na nangyari?
A Pinasok po ang ari niya sa akin.
Q Nakatapos ba siya?
A Opo.
Q Papano mo nasabi na nakatapos si Oliver sa panggagahasa sa iyo nung February 3, 2001?
A Basa na po ang ari ko.
Q Pagkatapos na naramdaman mo na basa na ang ari mo ano ang sumunod na nangyari?
A Ni-rape po ako.
Q Nino?
A Lito, po.
Q Meron ba siyang suot na damit nuong ni-rape ka ni Lito?
A Wala na po.
Q Nakita mo ba ng maghubad si Lito?
A Opo.
Q Nakatapos ba si Lito ng panggagahasa sa iyo?
A Opo.
Q Papano mo nalaman na nakatapos si Lito ng panggagahasa sa iyo?
A Basa na po ang ari ko.
Q Nasaan naman si Oliver habang ginagahasa ka ni Lito?
A Nanonood po.
Q Hinawakan ba niya ang kamay mo o paa mo?
A Opo.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q Sino ang nang-rape sa iyo nuong February 4, 2001?
A Si Oliver po.
Q Nagtagumpay ba si Oliver nuong February 4?
A Opo.
Q Saang lugar ka ng bahay niya ni-rape?
A Sa kama po.
Q May damit ka ba ng gahasain ka ni Oliver?
A Wala na po.
Q Sino ang nag-alis sa iyo ng iyong damit?
A Si Oliver po.
Q Si Oliver, meron ba siyang damit nang gahasain ka noong February 4?
A Wala na po.
Q Nagtagumpay ba siya ng panggagahasa sa iyo nung February 4?
A Opo.
Q Nakatapos ba siya?
A Opo.
Q Papano mo nasabi na nakatapos siya sa panggagahasa sa iyo nuong February 4?
A Basa na po ang ari ko.
Q Papano mo nasabi na basa na ang ari mo?
A Naramdaman ko po.

Q Naipasok ba ni Oliver ang ari niya sa ari mo nuong February 4?

A Opo.
Q Papano mo nasabi na napasok niya yung ari niya sa ari mo?
A Masakit na po.
Q Masakit ang alin?
A Ang ari ko po.
Q Lumaban ka ba sa kaniya habang ginagahasa ka niya?
A Malakas po siya.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q Hindi ka ginahasa ni Herminigildo nung February 4?
A Opo.
Q Opo ginahasa o opo hindi?
A Opo ginahasa po.
Q Ginahasa din?
A Opo.
Q Sinong nauna, si Oliver o si Herminigildo?
A Si Lito po ang nauna.
Q Pagkatapos ni Lito si Oliver?
A Opo.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q Si Lito o Herminigildo, ni-rape ka ba niya nung February 5, 2001?
A Opo.
Q Nagtagumpay ba si Oliver sa pag-rape sa iyo nung February 5, 2001?
A Opo.
Q Paano mo nalaman na nakatapos ng panggagahasa sa iyo?
A Basa na po ang ari ko.
Q Sinabi mo na ni-rape ka ni Lito nung February 5, 2001, nagtagumpay ba si Lito?
A Opo.
Q Nakatapos ba siya ng panggagahasa sa iyo?
A Opo.
Q Pano mo nalaman na nakatapos siya nung February 5, 2001?
A Basa na po ang ari ko.
Q Pano mo nalaman na basa na ang ari mo?
A Naramdaman ko po.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q Dumako tayo sa February 6, 2001. Natatandaan mo ba kung may nangyari sa iyo nung araw na iyon?
A Dalawa po kami ni Regina.
Q Ano ang nangyari sa iyo at kay Regina?
A Rape po.
Q Sino ang nang-rape sa iyo at kay Regina?
A Si Oliver at si Lito po.
Q Sino ang naunang nang-rape sa iyo nung February 6 si Oliver o si Herminigildo?
A Si Lito po.
Q Nagtagumpay ba si Herminigildo sa panggagahasa sa iyo nung February 6, 2001?
A Opo.
Q Nakatapos ba siya?
A Opo.
Q May damit ka ba o hubad ka nung ginagahasa ka nung February 6, 2001?
A Wala na po.
Q Sinong nagtanggal sa iyo ng damit?
A Lito po.
Q Lumaban ka ba sa kaniya habang tinatanggalan ka niya ng damit?
A Malakas po siya.
Q Matapos kang tanggalan ng damit ni Lito nung February 6, ano ang ginawa niya sa iyo?
A Pinasok po ang ari niya sa ari ko.
Q Ikaw bay nasa kama o sa sahig, o sang lugar ka ng bahay nandon?
A Sa kama po.
Q Matapos maipasok ni Lito ang ari niya sa ari mo ano ang naramdaman mo?
A Masakit po.
Q Nakatapos ba si Lito sa panggagahasa nung February 6, 2001?
A Opo.
Q Bakit mo nasabing nakatapos siya?
A Basa po ang ari ko.
Q Sino ang sumunod na gumahasa sa iyo nung February 6 pagkatapos ni Lito, kung meron man?
A Si Regina na po.
Q Ang ginahasa?
A Opo.
Q Nino?
A Ni Lito.
Q Doon muna tayo sa panggagahasa sa iyo. Nung pagkatapos ni Lito na gahasain ka, meron pa bang ibang gumahasa sa iyo?
A Opo.
Q Sinong gumahasa sa iyo matapos kang gahasain ni Lito?
A Oliver po.
Q Nagtagumpay ba si Oliver ng panggagahasa sa iyo?
A Opo.
Q Nakatapos ba siya?
A Opo.
Q Papano mo nalaman na nakatapos si Oliver ng panggagahasa sa iyo?
A Nabasa po ang ari ko.
Q Lumaban ka ba kay Oliver?
A Malakas po sila.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q Dumako tayo sa February 7. Natatandaan mo ba kung may nangyari sa iyo nuong February 7, 2001?
A Opo.
Q Ano ang nangyari sa iyo nuong February 7, 2001?
A Ni-rape po kami ni Regina.
Q Sinong nang-rape sa inyo?
A Oliver at Lito po.
Q Sino ang naunang nang-rape sa iyo nuong February 7, 2001, si Oliver o si Herminigildo?
A Oliver po.

Q Nakatapos ba siya?
A Opo.
Q Paano mo nalaman na nakatapos siya nuong February 7, 2001?
A Basa na po.
Q Ang alin?
A Ang ari ko po.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q Dumako tayo sa February 8. Natatandaan mo ba kung may nangyari sa iyo nuong February 8?
A Kami po ni Regina.
Q Anong nangyari sa inyong dalawa ni Regina[?]
A Magdamag po.
Q Magdamag na ano ang nangyari?
A Rape po.
Q Sinong nang-rape?
A Si Oliver at si Lito po.
Q Sinong naunang mang-rape sa iyo noong February 8, 2001?
A Si Oliver po.
Q Nagtagumpay ba si Oliver ng pangre-rape sa iyo noong February 8, 2001?
A Opo.
Q Nakatapos ba siya?
A Opo.
Q Papano mo nalaman na nakatapos siya?
A Basa na po ang ari ko.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q Dumako tayo sa February 10, 2001. Natatandaan mo ba kung may nangyari sa iyo?
A Ginagahasa kami ni Regina gabi-gabi.
Q Nino?
A Yung mga nagbayad po.
Q Ginahasa ka ba ni Oliver nuong February 10, 2001?
A Opo.
Q Nagtagumpay ba si Oliver sa panggagahasa sa iyo noong February 10?
A Opo.
Q Nakatapos ba siya?
A Opo.
Q Saan ka niya ginahasa, sa sahig, sa kama, saan?
A Sa kama.
Q May damit ka ba nung ginahasa ka ni Oliver?
A Wala po.
Q Sinong nag-alis sa iyo ng damit nuong February 10?
A Oliver po.
Q Lumaban ka ba sa kaniya habang inaalisan ka ng damit noong February 10?
A Malakas po siya.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q Ginahasa ka ba ni Oliver nuong February 11, 2001?
A Opo.
Q Nagtagumpay ba si Oliver sa panggagahasa sa iyo noong February 11?
A Opo.
Q Nakatapos ba siya?
A Opo.
Q Saan ka niya ginahasa, sa sahig, sa kama, saan?
A Sa kama po.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q Anong natatandaan mong nangyari sa iyo noong February 12?
A Ginagahasa kami ni Regina.
COURT:
Q Ilan ang nang-rape sa inyo nong February 12?
A Marami po.
Q Noong February 11, 13.
A Marami po.
Q Noong February 14?
A Marami rin po.
Q Samakatuwid, yung ginawa sa inyo nuong February 11 ay ginawa rin sa inyo noong February 12, 13 and 14?
A Opo.
Q Proceed.
FISCAL NAOLA:
Q Nitong February 12, natatandaan mo ba kung doon sa maraming iyon ay kasama si Oliver Arevalo?
A Opo.
Q Si Herminigildo o si Lito, kasama ba si Lito sa marami?
A Opo.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q Noong February 13, 2001, natatandaan mo ba kung merong nangyari sa iyo?
A Opo.
Q Sabihin mo nga sa kagalang-galang na Hukom kung ano ang nangyari sa iyo nuong February 13, 2001?
A Binenta po kami ni Regina.
Q Sino ang nagbenta sa inyo?
A Si Oliver po.
Q Pero ginahasa ka ba ni Oliver bukod sa taong pinagbentahan niya?
A Opo.
Q Nagtagumpay ba si Oliver sa panggagahasa sa iyo noong February 13?
A Opo.
Q Si Lito ginahasa ka ba noong February 13?
A Opo.
Q Nung matapos kang gahasain ni Oliver, noong February 13, 2001, ang ibig mong sabihin binenta ka?
A Opo.[26]
After a painstaking review of the records of the case, we find no cogent reason to disturb the trial courts findings on the credibility of the
witnesses. When in open court they positively identified appellants as their rapists, the trial court rightly declared:
The Court has closely observed the demeanor of the two complainants and did not find any ill-motive on their part to impute a serious offense
against the two accused. Clearly evident were the trauma, pain, humiliation and distress on the part of Acu[]a and the state of daze or shock
Acosta was in. x x x.[27]

Nevertheless, though appellants are guilty of raping the victims, modifications have to be made regarding the counts of rape for which each of
them should be held liable.
From January 23 to 26, 2001,[28] only Arevalo, not Organista, should be held liable for the rapes of Acua. A careful review of the records[29] shows
that she identified only Arevalo as her rapist on those dates.
For the rapes committed against Acosta on January 23, 25 and 26, 2001, [30] her testimony confirmed that both appellants had raped her
separately.[31] It was not established, however, that Organista had raped her on January 24, 2001;[32] therefore, only Arevalo should have been
convicted for the rape on that date.
Acua, on the other hand, clearly testified[33] that Organista had raped her only on February 14, 2001.[34] She further testified that after raping her,
Organista had subsequently raped Acosta.[35] But Acosta was silent on whether she was raped by Organista on that date.[36] Because she was the
best person to say whether he had raped her on that date, and she was silent on the matter, we resolve the doubt in his favor and acquit him of the
offense that he allegedly committed on that date.
Regarding the other counts of rape, we find no reason to disturb the trial courts findings. For the rape of Acua, Arevalo is found guilty of simple
rape under Criminal Case Nos. 01-419 to 423, 01-425 to 01-428 and 01-430 to 01-441. He is likewise found guilty of the rape of Acosta in Criminal
Case Nos. 01-442 to 01-446, 01-448 to 01-451 and 01-0453 to 01-464.
On the other hand, for the rape of Acua, Organista is found guilty of simple rape under Criminal Case Nos. 01-441. He is also found guilty of the
rape of Acosta in Criminal Case Nos. 01-442, 01-444 to 01-445 and 01-464.
Criminal Liability
The trial court erred, however, in imposing the penalty of death upon appellants when it appreciated the circumstance of rape by two or more
persons twice -- once as a qualifying, then as an aggravating, circumstance.
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
xxx
xxx
x x x.
From the above, whenever the crime committed is simple rape, the penalty to be imposed is the single penalty of reclusion perpetua. On the other
hand, whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
We must note, however, that the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, requires that the complaint or
information should state the qualifying and the aggravating circumstances with specificity.[37] In the present case, no aggravating circumstance
was alleged in the Informations. Hence, the lesser penalty should be applied, as the Court held in People v. Sabredo:[38]
The imposable penalty for rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua. But where the
rape is committed with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the imposable penalty ranges from reclusion perpetua to death. The use
of the bladed weapon already qualified the rape. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the crucial factor in determining whether appellant
should be meted the death penalty is the presence of an aggravating circumstance which attended the commission of the crime. A perusal of the
records shows that none of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code was alleged and proven by the
prosecution. Where there is no aggravating circumstance proved in the commission of the offense, the lesser penalty shall be applied. [39]
Second Issue:
Conspiracy
Appellants contend that conspiracy did not attend the rapes committed from January 23 to 26 and on February 14, 2001.
This contention is partly meritorious.
Without specifying whether it was referring to Acua or Acosta, the trial court declared that appellants were in conspiracy in the rapes committed
from January 23 to 26 and on February 14, 2001. From the records, however, it seems that no such conspiracy took place when appellants
separately raped Acosta on those dates. To be appreciated, conspiracy must be shown to have been committed as clearly and convincingly as the
offense itself.[40]
The Rape of Regina Acua
As regards Acua, there was conspiracy only during the rape that occurred on February 14, 2001. We reiterate that, from the records,[41] her
account of the rapes that happened from January 23 to 26, 2001 shows that only Arevalo, not Organista, raped her. Furthermore, no conspiracy
attended the rapes on those dates.
On February 14, 2001, both appellants raped her.[42] It was Arevalo who removed her clothes before Organista raped her.[43] Moreover, when the
latter advanced towards her and she pushed him away, Arevalo -- who was standing inside the same room all the while -- kept egging him on by
saying, Kaya mo yan pre. The latter continued until he consummated his bestial attack upon the victim.
We have held that an overt act in furtherance of conspiracy may consist of lending moral assistance to the co-conspirators even through ones mere
presence at the scene of the crime.[44] In the present case (Criminal Case No. 01-441), Arevalos presence and words encouraged Organista to pursue
his savage designs.
The Rape of Ruth Acosta
The records of the rape of Acosta from January 23 to 26 and on February 14, 2001, do not support the finding of conspiracy.
On January 23, 2001,[45] appellants separately raped her one after the other, but only Arevalo raped her on January 24, 2001.[46] On January 25[47] and
26,[48] appellants again separately raped her one after the other, but it was only Arevalo who raped her on February 14, 2001. [49]
Third Issue:
Insanity
Organista argues that the trial court erred in not exempting him from criminal liability, even though he was insane or completely deprived of
intelligence during the commission of the rapes. He avers that his insanity may be deduced from the following:
First, he cannot remember the events that transpired from January 23 to February 14, 2001, because the treatments he has been undergoing at the
National Center for Mental Health since 1983 have weakened his memory.
Second, Dr. Pia Alma de Jesus of the National Center for Mental Health testified that he had displayed psychotic symptoms like hallucinations and
delusions. She opined that his failure to take his medications regularly could have caused his relapse.
Third, the behavior and actuations he exhibited before and after the rapes were manifestations of mental instability. As testified to by his mother,
he was violent and destructive to the extent of habitually setting their home furniture on fire. He even threatened to kill her when she confronted
him on his behavior.
Fourth, the New Bilibid Prison, where he is presently locked up, certified that he still suffers from chronic schizophrenia.
We are not persuaded.
The law presumes everyone to be sane.[50] The accused who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity incurs the burden of proving it.[51] To be
adjudged insane under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, he or she must have been completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom
of the will at the time the crime was committed.[52] For such deprivation to be ascertained, it is but proper to receive evidence during a reasonable
period before or after the commission of the crime, for the mind -- its thoughts, motives and emotions -- may be fathomed only by examining
whether the external acts conform with those of people of sound minds. [53]
In the present case, while Organista had indeed been confined at the National Center for Mental Health for treatment, it does not necessarily follow
that he still suffered from schizophrenia during the period of the rapes. No convincing evidence was presented by the defense to show that he had
not been in his right mind, or that he had acted under the influence of a sudden attack of insanity, or that he had generally been regarded as insane
around the time of the commission of the acts attributed to him. Well-settled is the rule that an inquiry into the mental state of the accused should
relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the act under prosecution was committed.[54] Mere prior confinement in a mental
institution does not prove that the perpetrator was deprived of reason at the time the crimes were committed. [55]
It must be noted that Organista had been discharged from the mental hospital well before the period of the rapes. We have held that if the insanity
is only occasional or intermittent, the presumption of its continuance does not arise.[56] One who relies on insanity proved at another time must
prove its existence also at the time of the commission of the offense.[57]
To prove his claimed insanity, Organista presented, as an expert witness on his mental condition, Dr. Pia Alma S. de Jesus of the National Center
for Mental Health. It is important to note that she only began treating him beginning April 2001, or two months after the rape incidents, [58] upon
orders of the trial court. Referring to hospital records, she narrated that he had been mentally ill since 1982 or 1983 and had been admitted to the
Center a total of 23 times.[59] Prior to the rapes, his last confinement had been from October 27 to December 1, 1997,[60]again for
schizophrenia. Likewise noteworthy is the fact that this period covering his last admission and discharge prior to the rapes was outside that of the
commission thereof -- January 23 to February 14, 2001. Dr. De Jesus further testified that Organista had already been considered treated on the date
of his discharge in 1997.[61] Though she opined that a patient who did not continue to take medications could suffer a relapse, she did not
categorically state whether Organista had suffered such a relapse before the commissions of the rape.

On the other hand, the prosecution has sufficiently established that Organista knew exactly what he was doing. His going to the house of Arevalo
and either directly or indispensably cooperating with him -- day after day to ravish the victims -- could not have been the act of one so insane as to
be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent. On February 14, 2001, specifically, Organista continued to ravish Acua after being coaxed by
Arevalo, Kaya mo yan pre.[62] That Organista persisted in the act all the way to its consummation leaves no doubt that it was voluntary, conscious
and deliberate. Moreover, his attempt to flee when the police officers came to arrest him shows that he knew that what he had done was
condemnable.
Furthermore, Organistas claimed amnesia does not preclude culpability. This charade is evidently a desperate ploy for exculpation. Failure to
remember does not in itself prove the existence of such mental condition at the time the crime was committed. [63]
The testimony of Organista himself militates against his credibility and puts his purported amnesia into serious question. During trial, he said that
he could not remember where he had been from January 23 to 26, 2001. Surprisingly, he could remember perfectly well the number of times he had
been treated at the National Center for Mental Health since 1983, what procedure he had gone through each time he was treated, the kind of
medicine he had been given, the number of times Appellant Arevalo had borrowed money from him without paying, the total amount of money he
had lent the former, and the resentment the latter had often felt whenever his friend would not repay him. Moreover, he could narrate in complete
detail his fabricated story of how he had allegedly met the victims on February 14, 2001, and lent them money only to be later arrested for
rape.[64] The prosecution aptly point out that his selective amnesia and mental dishonesty speak eloquently of his total lack of credibility on the
witness stand.
Finally, Organista is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code, because it was not shown that his
mental illness at the time immediately preceding or at the very moment of the commission of the crime diminished his will power.
Civil Liability
The trial courts award of damages should be modified. Prevailing jurisprudence holds that for each count of simple rape, the victim should be
awarded P50,000 as civil indemnity and another P50,000 as moral damages for the injury evidently suffered.[65] This Court has granted moral
damages to victims of rape without need of proof other than the fact of rape, which by itself shows the factual basis for the award.[66] The award
of P100,000 to each of the victims by way of exemplary damages should be deleted, because no aggravating circumstance was proven.
WHEREFORE, the October 26, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 62), finding appellants guilty of qualified rape,
is MODIFIED.
The Court finds Oliver Arevalo y Abanilla Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of SIMPLE RAPE. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 01-419 to 01-423, 01-425 to 01-428, 01-430 to 01-446, 01-448 to 01-451 and 01-453 to 01464. Furthermore, he is hereby ordered to pay the following:
1. To Regina Acua, the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages for each count of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 01-419 to
01-423, 01-425 to 01-428, and 01-430 to 01-441
2. To Ruth Acosta, the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages for each count of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 01-442 to
01-446, 01-448 to 01-451 and 01-453 to 01-464
Herminigildo Organista y Andres is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of SIMPLE RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 01-441 to 01-442 and 01-444 to 01-445. He is likewise ordered to pay the following:
1. To Regina Acua the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages for each count of rape in Criminal Case No. 01-441
2. To Ruth Acosta, the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 by way of moral damages for each count of rape in Criminal Case Nos.
01-442, 01-444 and 01-445
With respect to Criminal Case No. 01-441, both appellants are found guilty of two (2) counts of rape, for which the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count is meted out to them.
Finally, Herminigildo Organista y Andres is ACQUITTED in Criminal Case Nos. 01-419 to 01-422 and 01-443 and 01-464.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 46539
September 27, 1939
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VALENTIN DOQUEA, defendant-appellant.
Primicias, Abad, Mencias and Castillo for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor-General Concepcion and Assistant Attorney Paredes, Jr., for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
The accused-appellant, who is a minor, was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, for having killed Juan Ragojos by
stabbing him in the breast with a knife on November 19, 1938, in the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan. The court, after trying the case, held that the
accused acted with discernment in committing the act imputed to him and, proceeding in accordance with the provisions of article 80 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 99, ordered him to be sent to the Training School for Boys to remain therein until he
reaches the age of majority. From this order the accused interposed an appeal alleging that the court erred in holding that he had acted with
discernment and in not having dismissal the case.
On the date of the crime, the appellant was exactly thirteen years, nine months and five days old. The incident that gave rise to the aggression
committed by him on the deceased is narrated in the appealed order as follows:
Between 1 and 2 o'clock in the afternoon of November 19, 1938, the now deceased Juan Ragojos and one Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in
the yard of the intermediate school of the municipality of Sual, Province of Pangasinan. The herein accused, who was also in said yard, intervened
and, catching the ball, tossed it at Juan Ragojos, hitting him on the stomach. For this act of the accused, Juan Ragojos chased him around the yard
and, upon overtaking him, slapped him on the nape. Said accused then turned against the deceased assuming a threatening attitude, for which the
reason said deceased struck him on the mouth with his fist, returning immediately to the place where Epifanio Rarang was in order to continue
playing with him. The accused, offended by what he considered an abuse on the part of Juan Ragojos, who was taller and more robust than he,
looked around the yard for a stone with which to attack the now deceased Juan Ragojos, but finding none, he approached a cousin of his named
Romualdo Cocal, to ask the latter to lend him his knife. Epifanio Rarang, who had heard what the accused had been asking his cousin, told the
latter not to give the accused his knife because he might attack Juan Ragojos with it. The accused, however, succeeded in taking possession of the
knife which was in a pocket of his cousin's pants. Once in possession of the knife, Valentin Doquea approached Juan Ragojos and challenged the
latter to give him another blow with his fist, to which the deceased answered that he did not want to do so because he (Juan Ragojos) was bigger
that the accused. Juan Ragojos, ignorant of the intentions of the accused, continued playing and, while he was thus unprepared and in the act of
stopping the ball with his two hands, the accused stabbed him in the chest with the knife which he carried.
The order also contains the following conclusions and findings of fact which we are not at liberty to alter, not being called upon or authorized to do
so, in view of the nature of the appeal before us, by section 138 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3:
Taking into account the fact that when the accused Valentin Doquea committed the crime in question, he was a 7th grade pupil in the
intermediate school of the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan, and as such pupil, he was one of the brightest in said school and was a captain of a
company of the cadet corps thereof, and during the time he was studying therein he always obtained excellent marks, this court is convinced that
the accused, in committing the crime, acted with discernment and was conscious of the nature and consequences of his act, and so also has this
court observed at the time said accused was testifying in his behalf during the trial of this case.
The proven facts, as stated by the lower court in the appealed order, convinces us that the appeal taken from said order is absolutely unfounded,
because it is error to determine discernment by the means resorted to by the attorney for the defense, as discussed by him in his brief. He claims
that to determine whether or not a minor acted with discernment, we must take into consideration not only the facts and circumstances which gave
rise to the act committed by the minor, but also his state of mind at the time the crime was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal
for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment. It is clear that the
attorney for the defense mistakes the discernment referred to in article 12, subsection 3, of the Revised Penal Code, for premeditation, or at least for
lack of intention which, as a mitigating circumstance, is included among other mitigating circumstances in article 13 of said Code. The discernment
that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act
prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be
determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude,

the very comportment and behaviour of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial
(U.S. vs. Maralit, 36 Phil., 155). This was done by the trial court, and the conclusion arrived at by it is correct.
Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-482
February 25, 1947
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BIENVENIDO NOCUM, defendant-appellant.
Severino P. Izon for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor Umali for appellee.
BENGZON, J.:
For having discharged a gun and accidentally killed Eugenio Francisco, the defendant Bienvenido Nocum, aliasBembe, was tried in the Court of
First Instance Manila, before the Honorable Alfonso Felix, judge. Found guilty of homicide through reckless negligence, he appealed in due course.
According to the evidence, about 9 o'clock in the evening of November 21, 1945, there was a fistic fight between Federico Bautista and Vicente
Aurencio at the corner of Mayhaligue and Magdalena Streets, City of Manila. Desiring to stop the encounter, defendant shouted at the combatants.
As these paid him no attention, he drew a .45 caliber pistol and shot twice at the air. The bout continued, however; so he fired another shot at the
ground, but unfortunately the bullet ricocheted and hit Eugenio Francisco, an innocent by-stander, resident of the place. The wounded man was
promptly carried to the St. Luke's Hospital where he expired soon after.
The above paragraph is a composite and abridged statement of the declarations of several witnesses (Jesus Santos, Vicente and Juan Aurencio and
Ramon Gagui) in connection with defendant's confession Exhibit F.1 But his attorney, assailing the validity of said confession in the ground of
involuntariness, contends in this Court that in asmuch as the corpus delicti had not been demonstrated by evidence dehors that document, his client
should be absolved, pursuant to several pertinent decisions. (United States vs. De la Cruz, 2 Phil., 148; and People vs. Bantagan, 54 Phil., 834.)
Particular attention has been given to these points. Yet there is competent proof establishing the fact that, during the affray, pistol detonations were
heard, and that one of the bullets produced the tragic death of Eugenio Francisco, whose photograph is Exhibit B. That is proof of the corpus delicti,
i. e.,proof of violent death, whether or not feloniously caused. (See Moran, Law of Evidence, Revised Edition, pp. 108, 109; People vs. Mones, 58
Phil., 46.) The confession Exhibit F served to identify the person who fired those shots and committed the offense.
We feel no inclination to reject such confession, because the uncorroborated and implausible testimony of the accused, alleging he had been
manhandled before signing this document, about which he knew nothing, could not definitely overcome the positive assertions of Pablo Montilla
of the Manila Police Department (before whom Exhibit F had been executed) that no force or intimidation had been employed on Nocum, who
willingly signed it "after propounding to him all the questions and explaining to him the contents" thereof. The impartiality of that officer of the
law has not been shaken by the lone testimony of herein appellant, which, as explained in the People's brief, deserves no credence. Nocum said in
court that he signed Exhibit F when Montilla told him "it was simply a proof that they arrested me" (p. 27, t.s.n.). This is inconsistent with the
alleged third-degree methods. If he was forced, deceit was unneccessary. And yet, he could not be deceived thusly, because he was no illiterate,
being seventh grader.
Anyway, the trial judge had the chance to see the opposing witnesses, and to observe their demeanor on the stand; and in the conflict of their
statements we will not interfere with his judgment, unless the record discloses some important circumstance which was overlooked, (United States
vs. Remigio, 37 Phil., 599; United States vs. Maralit, 36 Phil., 155), it being the peculiar province of trial courts to resolve questions relating to the
credibility of witnesses. (United States vs. Pico, 15 Phil., 549.)
The mishap should be classed as homicide through reckless imprudence, the slaying having been unintentional (cf. People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939;
and United States vs. Reodique, 32 Phil., 458). It is apparent the defendant wilfully discharged his gun for which he exhibited no license, by the
way without taking the precautions demanded by the circumstance that the district was populated, and the likehood that his bullet would
glance over the hard pavement of the Manila thoroughfare.
A landowner surprise a youngster in the act of stealing some fruit in his orchard. To scare the intruder he fired a shotgun aiming at the foliage of a
cherry tree. The shot scattered and a pellet injured the boy, who was standing under the tree. That was reckless negligence, the Spanish Supreme
Court decided. (Sent. June 20, 1900, Viada, 5th ed., Vol. 7, p. 14.)
The penalty imposed on the appellant is 2 months and 1 day to 1 year and 1 day, indemnity of P2,000 with subsidiary imprisonment, and costs. It is
within the limits authorized by law. (Article 365, Rev. Penal Code, and Act No. 4103.) (Act No. 284.)
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24781 May 29, 1970
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CARLOS FERNANDO alias COMMANDER "BOB," defendant-appellant.
Maximo V. Cuesta, J and Cipriano Manansala for defendant appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Teodulo R. Dino for plaintiff-appellee.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Appeal from the sentence of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court on the accused-appellant for the crime of murder.
The accused was charged with the crime of murder before the Court of First Instance of Tarlac under the following information:
That on or about March 30, 1961, at nighttime, in the Municipality of Bamban, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Carlos Fernando alias "Bob," together with Francisco Ronquillo alias Commander "Manly," (Deceased)
and Mario Salonga (at large), confederating, conspiring and helping one another, with malice aforethought and the deliberate intent to take the life
of Bienvenido Laxamana, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treacherously attack the latter with pistols caliber 45, thereby
inflicting upon the said Bienvenido Laxamana, mortal wounds on different parts of his body which directly caused his instantaneous death.
After trial, the trial court found the accused guilty as charged, on the strength of his two confessions, consisting of his 4-page written sworn
statement taken on June 16, 1961 by Capt. Pedro Acierto of the First Philippine Constabulary Zone, 1 soon after his capture on June 12, 1961 in an
encounter in Barrio Balibago between Dau and Mabalacat, Pampanga, between PC troops and Huks led by HMB Commander Francisco Ronquillo
alias Commander Manly who was killed, and his 3-page testimony at the preliminary examination of the criminal complaint for murder conducted
on July 19, 1961 by Judge Pompeyo S. Tiglao of the Municipal Court of Bamban, Tarlac, 2 as well as of his own testimony at the hearing of March 11,
1965 as the lone defense witness on his own behalf, at which he, freely admitted his participation in the murder. 3
The trial court found the facts as follows: "(O) n the evening of March 30, 1961, at about 7:00 o'clock, Bienvenido Laxamana was inside a store of one
Honoria Atienza next to his house on the same side of the street in the poblacion of Bamban, Tarlac. He was then, sitting and eating peanuts. While
in that position, Mario Salonga alias 'Manding,' who is still at large, and the accused Carlos Fernando alias 'Bob,' without any warning, suddenly
and unexpectedly fired shots with their .45 caliber pistols at Laxamana. The duo then departed, leaving their victim sprawled outside the store.
Salonga and Fernando were members of the Hukbalahap Organization. Before going to Bamban, Tarlac, on the evening of the incident, they were
somewhere within the jurisdiction of Angeles City where they received instruction from one of their commanders, Francisco Ronquillo alias
Commander Manly,' to liquidate Laxamana. The motive was that the latter, while an officer of the civilian guards, had ordered the killing of a
relative of Commander "Manly" and the beating up of the father of Salonga. Fernando and Salonga went to Bamban from Angeles City by walking
all along between sugar cane field. After the killing of Laxamana, they also decamped together the same route.
The victim, Bienvenido Laxamana, was married to Remedios L. Laxamana. Two daughters were born out of their wedlock, the elder of whom is 13
years old. Before his death, Laxamana was a member of the Central Azucareras de Tarlac Planters' Association of that province. When his brotherin-law, the late Sinforoso Lomboy, was the Municipal Mayor of Bamban sometime in 1950, he became a member of the civilian guards or the
Civilian Commando Unit (CCU) in that town with the rank of captain.

That evening of March 30, 1961, Mrs. Laxamana came from the Catholic church of Bamban with her elder daughter, Bernadette. While on her way
home and when the distance from her house was about thirty meters, she heard the firing of shots. She took cover in one stores; and after the firing
had ceased, she went out and hurriedly proceeded to her home. In front of the store of Honoria Atienza she saw her husband sprawled on the
ground full of blood. She was not able to come close to him because somebody held her back. A jeep arrived where her husband was placed but not
long thereafter he was brought back already dead.
Dr. Honorato Navarro, municipal health officer of Bamban Tarlac, made the autopsy of the victim's cadaver or the same night of the murder, and
per his necropsy report, 4 the victim cited of "hemorrhage, massive, secondary to GUNSHOT WOUNDS, multiple (23) in neck, chest, and back,
lumbar region, and upper and lower extremities," many of which were mortal wounds hitting vital organs in the neck such as the carotid artery
and the vagus nerve, both lungs and the liver, kidneys and intestines in the lumber region.
The trial court rejected the accused's testimony at the trial that he did not fire any shot at the victim but merely stood guard outside the store, and
that his role, after Salonga had ceased firing at the victim was to fire three shots in the air as a signal for them to depart, thus: "(T)he Court
entertains a very serious doubt on the veracity of the above-mentioned statement of the accused because the same is contrary to what he stated
when he was first investigated by the P.C. after his apprehension. Portion of his written statement (Exh. F-1) reads as follows:
12. T Natupad ba naman ninyo ang iniutos ni Comdr. FRANCISCO RONQUILLO na patayin si BIENVENIDO LAXAMANA?
S Opo napatay namin sa pamamagitan ng pagbaril sa kanya nuong gabing iyon ng ika-30 ng Marzo, 1961.
13. T Anong clase ng baril ang inyong ginamit sa pagpatay kay LAXAMANA?
S Pareho po kaming gumamit ng Pistola calibre 45. Si MARIO SALONGA alias MANDING na aking kasama ay nakapagpaputok ng humigit
kumulang sa labing-dalawa at ako naman ay tatlong putok.
14. T Sinabi mong natupad ninyo ang utos ni Comdr. FRANCISCO RONQUILLO alias Commander MANLY, na patayin si Bienvenido
Laxamana, natatandaan mo ba kung saan lugar ninyo binaril at pinatay ang taong naturan?
S Duon po sa loob ng isang tindahan sa Poblacion, Bamban, Tarlac, na ang may-ari sa naturang tindahan ay hindi ko kilala.
The answer of the accused to the above-quoted question No. 13 to the effect that he and Salonga both used .45 caliber pistols in killing Laxamana,
with Salonga firing twelve shots and he, three shots, conveys no other idea, than that the three shots he fired were directed at the victim and not
upwards into the air. The Court is inclined to believe that this statement is the one in keeping with the truth, taking into consideration the
determination of the accused to participate in the killing of Laxamana and the number of gunshot wounds found on the latter's body.
At any rate, the trial court further held, there was no doubt as to the existence of conspiracy between the accused and Salonga, as the accused
actively participated in the criminal design of Salonga and acted in concert with him, granting arguendo that the accused merely stood guard for
Salonga and that Salonga alone inflicted the 23 gunshot wounds on the victim.
The trial court likewise rejected the accused's contention that he should be punished only for the crime of rebellion as the murder was in pursuance
of the Huks rebellion movement, since the motive for the killing of the victim was personal, to avenge the alleged killing of a relative of
Commander Manly and the alleged maltreatment of the father of Salonga, supposedly ordered by the victim. The trial court further pointed out
that while the victim had been an officer of the civilian guards in Bamban, that was more than ten years ago in 1950, and the victim was an
ordinary civilian when he was shot in cold blood.
The trial court found that "(F)rom the testimony of the accused himself on the witness stand, it clearly appears that the firing of the shots which
snuffed out the life of Laxamana was sudden and unexpected, without any risk to the assailant which might have proceeded from the defense of
the victim. The crime, therefore, committed by the accused is murder, qualified by treachery," and therefore rendered the following verdict:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused CARLOS FERNANDO alias COMMANDER "BOB" guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of MURDER defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and in view of the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory
penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of Bienvenido Laxamana in the sum of P6,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency in view of the nature of the principal penalty imposed, and to pay the costs.
In this appeal, the accused-appellant assigns as error the trial court's rejection of his contentions that his participation in the murder was in
furtherance of the Huk movement and that he should have been held by virtue of his Huk membership to have acted under the compulsion of an
irresistible force and/or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. He further assigns as error the trial court's denial
of his motion to dismiss the case filed on November 4, 1963, after the prosecution had rested its case, on the ground of double jeopardy, on the
ground of his previous conviction on August 31, 1961 by the Pampanga Court in another case 5of the crime of simple rebellion, on his entering of
plea of guilty.
We find the trial court's rulings to be in accordance with the evidence and the law.
1. Appellant's contention that because he and Salonga as members of the Hukbalahap organization had received from Commander Manly the
order to liquidate the victim, the murder committed by them should have been held in furtherance of and absorbed by the crime of rebellion, and
that they should have been instead charged for rebellion, is untenable. The record is bereft of any evidence that the murder was committed as a
necessary means to commit rebellion or in furtherance thereof. The victim had no established connection with the government at the time. 6 As
emphasized in People vs. Paz 7 besides, "(T)hat the killing was in pursuance of the Huk rebellion is a matter of mitigation or defense that the accused
has the burden of proving clearly and satisfactorily." Far from discharging the burden, appellant himself revealed in his unrepudiated written
confessions that the killing was inspired by personal motives of avenging the alleged killing of a relative of Commander Manly and the alleged
maltreatment of Salonga's father, as ordered by the victim Laxamana, and cannot be deemed absorbed by the rebellion and should be separately
prosecuted. 8 As held in Hernandez, supra, 9 the mere fact that the accused is a member of the Hukbalahap organization "is no reason why all his acts
and misdeeds should be considered in furtherance of or absorbed by rebellion." Appellant's contention that Commander Manly's personal motive
did not apply to him and that he merely obeyed as "a mere 'soldier' of the HMB is of no avail either in the face of his awareness of an acquiescence
to the personal motivation and the void of any evidence that the murder was necessary to the rebellion or in furtherance thereof.
Accused next asks the Court to "take judicial notice of the fact that the Hukbalahap or HMB organization deal with its members who disobey or
refuse to carry out its orders in the most severe manner. A member who disobeys or refuses to carry out its order may be liquidated or given
another form of severe punishment." On this tenuous premise, he claims that by virtue of his Huk membership, his participation in the murder of
the victim should have been deemed to be an act under the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear
of an equal or greater injury as to exempt, him from criminal liability. 10
Justice Moreland long set the norm for the application of these exempting circumstances: "...before a force can be considered to be an irresistible
one, it must produce, such an effect upon the individual that, in spite of all resistance, it reduces him to a mere instrument and, as such, incapable
of committing a crime. It must be such that, in spite of the resistance of the person on whom it operates, it compels his members to act and his mind
to obey. He must act not only without will but against his will. Such a force can never consist in anything which springs primarily from the man himself; it
must be a force which act upon him from the outside and by means of a third person. In order that one may take advantage of subdivision 10 of
article 8 and allege with success that he acted under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, it must appear that the threat
that which caused the uncontrollable fear related to a crime of such gravity and so imminent that it must safely be said that the ordinary run of men would have
been governed by it. And the evil threatened must be greater than, or at least equal to, that which he is compelled to cause." 11
2. Accused dismally failed to show that he acted "not only without will but against will." On the contrary, he testified that he joined the
Hukbalahap organization since, December 28, 1950 "because it is a good organization." 12 The record is devoid even of any claim of the accused that
any threats were made upon him or that he acted under uncontrollable fear. He was not under any physical or moral compulsion when according
to his own version at the trial, he freely stood on guard outside the store while his companion Salonga went inside and shot the victim. At his
preliminary examination before Judge Tiglao, he further testified that his role as guard was to fight off any persons who might come to the aid of
the victim Laxamana. 13 And without any physical or moral compulsion, after the killing, he and Salonga, according to his own testimony at the
same preliminary examination, returned to report the same to Commander Manly at Barrio Kutid, Angeles, Pampanga and accept his
congratulations and thanks. 14
3. The last principal error assigned by accused that the trial court should have dismissed the present case by virtue of his previous conviction for
rebellion on August 31, 1961 is without merit.
The accused, even before his apprehension in the encounter with the PC troops on June 12, 1961, already faced the criminal charge of rebellion in
an information filed on October 17, 1960 against him and several others before the Pampanga Court of First Instance. 15 After his apprehension, he
entered a plea of guilty to the charge and was sentenced to six years, eight months and one day of prision mayor per the decision handed down by
the Pampanga court on August 31, 1961.
The murder of Laxamana for which the accused stands charged in the present case was committed on March 30, 1961. The criminal complaint
therefor was filed with the municipal court of Bamban, Tarlac on July 19, 1961 and after the records were forwarded on September 14, 1962 to the
trial court, the murder information was filed on November 29, 1962.

There clearly can be no double jeopardy, because the murder of Laxamana on March 30, 1961 could not have been possibly included as one of the
specific counts in the information for rebellion filed against the accused on October 17, 1960, as the murder had not yet been committed then.
Furthermore, the acts constituting the crime of rebellion were committed in the province of Pampanga where the accused was charged therefor,
while the murder of Laxamana for which the accused is charged in the present case was committed in the province of Tarlac over which the
Pampanga court had no jurisdiction. 16 Finally, as the murder here had been shown to have been committed furtherance of the rebellion but for
personal vengeance, it could not be deemed absorbed by the crime of rebellion but had to be separately charged and punished. 17
In resume, even going upon the accused's own version at the trial that he merely stood guard while his companion Salonga went inside the store
and killed the victim, and that thereafter he fired three shots in the air as a signal for them to part and return to their camp, the trial court correctly
held this to constitute more than adequate. Proof of his participation as conspirator and of his responsibility as co-principal in the murder. 18 In the
absence of evidence that, the killing, qualified by treachery, was attended by any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the trial court correctly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The indemnity to the heirs of the victim is increased to P12,000.00. 19
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the modification that the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Bienvenido
Laxamana is increased to P12,000.00. With costs against the accused-appellant.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13025
December 29, 1959
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TEODULO ROGSDO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for appellee.
Alfredo G. Fernando for appellant Teodoro Rogado.
Angel C. Facundo for the appellants.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On September 25, 1956, Teodulo Togado, alias Commander Sulit, Isaac Orenia, alias Commander Lawin, Domingo Golfo, alias Eser, Cresencio
Arsenal, alias Sako, Pedro Merin, alias Abling, Francisco Racoma, aliasManeng, Pio Mercurio, alias Abling, Francisco Racoma, alias Rolando,
Nemesio Arsolacia, alias Noli, and Conrado Devesa, alias Donato, were charged with murder before the Court of First Instance of Laguna for killing
of one Salvador Areza. They all pleaded not guilty.
During the trial and after several witnesses for the prosecution have testified, Francisco Racoma and Conrado Devesa were excluded from the
information upon motion of the fiscal to be utilized as government witnesses. Later, upon motion also of the fiscal, the charge was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence with respect to accused Nemesio Arsolacia, Maximo Cerebo and Pedro Merin. Then counsel for the remaining accused
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the killing of the deceased was accomplished by them in furtherance of the huk movement, but the
motion was denied.
Upon resumption of the trial, counsel for Teodulo Rogado and Pio Mercurio moved for separate trial on the ground that their defense is
incompatible with the defense of their co-accused, which motion was granted by the trial court. And when both parties have submitted the case for
decision, the trial court found the accused Rogado, Orenia, Golfeo and Arsenal guilty as principals of the crime charged and sentenced them to
suffer the supreme penalty of death, while it found Pio Mercurio guilty merely as accomplice and sentenced him to the penalty of from 8 years and
21 days of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years 19 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal as maximum, with the corresponding accessory
penalties provided for by law. Each of the four principals was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6,000.00 and the
accomplice in the amount of P2,000.00, and all to pay their proportionate share of the costs.
Pio Mercurio having failed to file his brief, this case is before this Court only for the review of the decision rendered against the accused Rogado,
Orenia, Golfeo and Arsenal which imposes upon them the penalty of death.
On July 12, 1956, Salvador Areza, a farmer residing in Lilio, Laguna, left his house carrying with him a bolo on lots scabbard to gather firewood in
his farm in barrio Bubukal. When he failed to return home that day, his wife Lydia Nudal went out to search for him. She was accompanied by
some armed men, the mayor, and a sanitary health officer, and after a brief search, they found the decapitated body of her husband in an
uninhabited place in Bubukal about half kilometer away from the road. The gruesome find revealed that Areza's head was totally severed from his
body with his hands tied together. The health officer, Dr. Dominador L. Gomez, found the body to be in state of decomposition, which led him to
conclude that the deceased must have died three to five days prior to his discovery. Areza's bolo and his scabbard were also found near his body.
It appears that on July 12, 1956, Teodulo Rogado, alias Commander Sulit, Isaac Orenia, alias Commander Lawin, Domingo Golfeo, alias Eser
Cresencio Arsenal, alias Sako, Pedro Merin, alias Nestor, Maximo Cerebo, aliasManeng, Pio Mercurio, alias Abling, Nemesio Arsolacia, alias Noli,
Francisco Racoma, alias Rolando, and Conrado Devesa, alias Donato, were on their way from barrio Sta. Lucia, Nagcarlan, to the municipality of
Lilio, Laguna. They lost their way, and as they were looking for someone from whom they should get information as to their whereabouts they met
Salvador Areza whom Racoma and Deveza approached. Upon their inquiry, Areza informed them that they were in barrio Bubukal, municipality
of Lilio; that there was an army camp stationed nearby; and that the soldiers occasionally go on patrol to the barrios.
The information was reported to commander Sulit (Rogado) who in turn ordered that Areza be brought to him. After talking with him, Rogado
asked Areza to lead the way for them, but Areza refused saying that he had much work to do, and besides he had a carabao with him. after a brief
talk with Orenia, alias Commander Lawin, rogado told Racoma that they were taking along Areza and that if he should refuse, he should be tied,
which instruction Racoma relayed to his two companions, Merin and arsenal, telling them to be prepared in case Areza would give them a fight.
Thereupon, Racoma approached Areza and asked if he could barrow from him his bolo. Areza obliged. When Areza refused to go with them, Pio
Mercurio dragged him along, and as he refused, Golfeo struck him with the butt of his gun.
After walking a short distance, Mercurio tied Areza's hands behind him. Areza protested telling Mercurio that he had not done anything wrong,
whereupon Golfeo gave him a fist blow on his stomach. After walking some distance, a command to stop was heard and so they stopped. Racoma
then approached Rogado and told him that they should release Areza at night but rogado told him that Areza should be killed and when Racoma
returned to the group he found that Areza was being assaulted by Orenia and Golfeo. At this moment, Racoma heard Rogado saying, in the
vernacular, "Kill him now so we can proceed." Areza was then taken to a secluded place quite far from the road, which was thick forest about 20 or
30 meters away from the group, and there Golfeo ordered Areza to lie down. With Areza's bolo and ignoring the plea for mercy of their victim,
Golfeo gave him a blow on the neck as he lay face down and with his hands still tied behind. With the same bolo, Arsenal also gave the victim
another blow on the neck which completely severed the head from the body.
On September 20, 1956, Pedro Merin, a member of the group who surrendered to the authorities, made a sworn statement before the Justice of the
Peace of Nagcarlan, Laguna, stating therein that Salvador Areza was killed by Ezer and Sako upon order of Commander Sulit. Domingo Golfeo
also made a sworn statement before the justice of the Peace of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, admitting his participation in the killing of Areza upon order of
Commander Sulit. On September 21, 1956, Cresencio Arsenal also made a written statement before the Mayor of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, admitting that
he was one of those who killed Areza. Both Domingo Golfeo and Cresencio Arsenal, while admitting their participation in the killing of the
deceased, claimed in exculpation that they acted under the pressure of an irresistible force in that they merely obeyed the order of their
Commander, Rogado aliasCommander Sulit, who would have killed them if they disobeyed his order. The other appellants merely contended that
the killing was done in furtherance of the huk rebellion.lawphi1.net
Their is no doubt that the unfortunate victim met his death in the hands of the accused who decided to take his life because of his stubborn refusal
to obey their command that he lead their way to the place they wanted to go in order that they may not be exposed and caught by the agents of the
law who were stationed in a nearby municipality. The only question to be determined is whether the defense they have set up is sufficient to
exonerate them from liability.
As regard accused Domingo Golfeo, The evidence is clear that it was he who first struck Areza with the butt of his gun hitting him on the side of
his body, then gave him a fist blow on his stomach, and after he had been taken to a secluded place, it was he who ordered Areza to lie down in the
fashion adopted by the Kempetai during the gloomy days of Japanese occupation and in that position gave him a blow on the back of the neck
which almost severed his head from the body. His participation in the killing of Areza cannot therefore be doubted. His only defense is that he did
so in obedience to the order of his commander, and because he acted under the influence of uncontrollable fear, he should be exempt from criminal
responsibility.
The defense of Golfeo is clearly untenable not only because of the well-settled rule that obedience to an order of a superior will only justify an act
which otherwise would be criminal when the order is for a lawful purpose, but also because the circumstances under which Golfeo participated in
the torture and liquidation of Areza cannot in any way justify his claim that he acted under an uncontrollable fear of being punished by his

superiors if he disobeyed their order. In the first place, at the time of the killing, Golfeo was armed with automatic carbine such that he could have
protected himself from any retaliation on the part of his superiors if they should threaten to punish him if he disobeyed their order to kill Areza. In
the second place, the evidence shows that Areza was brought to a secluded place quite far from that where his superiors were at the time and in
such a predicament, he and companion Arsenal could have escaped with Areza to void the ire of their superiors. The fact that he carried out their
order although his superiors were at some distance from him and that without pity and compunction he struck his victim in a Kempetai fashion
show that he acted on the matter not involuntarily or under the pressure of fear of force, as he claims, but out of his own free will and with the
desire to collaborate with the criminal design of his superiors. In the circumstances, we find that the trial court did not err in finding him
responsible for the death of Areza as co-principal by direct participation.
The same situation obtained with regard to Cresencio Arsenal. It appears that he was one of those ordered by Rogado to kill Areza and in
obedience to such order he had a direct participation in the killing. It was he and Golfeo who brought Areza to a secluded place and once there he
helped Golfeo in killing him with the same bolo which was taken from the victim himself. Thus, it appears that after Golfeo had given the first
blow on the back of the neck of Areza as he lay face down on the ground, Arsenal took the bolo himself and gave the fatal blow which completely
severed the head of Areza from his body. There is therefore no doubt that Arsenal directly cooperated with Golfeo in carrying out the concerted
plan of killing Areza because of the hostile attitude he adopted in denying them the help they demanded from him. Since Arsenal to those existing
in the case of Golfeo, his claim of obedience and fear of retaliation if he disobeyed his superiors' order cannot also be entertained.
The other defense of appellants refers to their theory that they killed Areza not for personal motive but in furtherance of the huk rebellion and so, if
any liability they have, it is only for rebellion and for murder as they are charged. And having already been prosecuted and convicted of the crime
of rebellion in Criminal Case No. SP-137 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, their prosecution in the instant case would constitute double
jeopardy.
to begin with, it should be stated that while this Court ruled in People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil., 515, 52 Off. Gaz., No. 11, p. 5506, that there is no
complex crime of rebellion with murder because the latter offense is absorbed by the former, however, a distinction was made in the case of People
vs. Geronimo, 100 Phil., 90, 53, Off. Gaz., No. 1, p. 68, where we held that if the killing is inspired by personal motive such killing is not absorbed by
the rebellion but may be the subject of separate prosecution. In the second place, we find that the acts with which appellants now charged do not
appear included in the information for rebellion in Criminal Case No. SP-137, for in the case they were merely accused of having risen and taken
up arms against the Philippine constabulary, Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces and other military detachments of the government,
without specifying the particular acts committed against private persons or civilians which may be said to have been undertaken in furtherance of
the huk rebellion. It is not, therefore, correct to say, as appellants now claim, that the act in question is already included or absorbed in the rebellion
charge filed against them in said criminal case.
On the other hand, the pretense that the killing of Areza by appellants was done in furtherance of the huk rebellion is preposterous considering the
fact that Areza was a mere farmer who had no connection whatsoever with any law-enforcement agency of the government. The pertinent question
that arises is: Why was he taken killed and brutally beheaded by appellant?
The answer is well given in the following interesting observation of the trial court:
According to the testimony of the prosecution witness, Francisco Racoma, Salvador Areza was maltreated, tied and killed because the latter refused
to lead and guide the group of Rogado to the road when he was asked by the latter to do so, Rogado's men were lost in the mountains of Lilio and
they needed somebody to help them find the way out of the place. They came upon Areza working in his farm. Rogado asked him to lead the way
and Areza refused saying that he had much work to do and he could not leave his carabao. Angered and irked by such stubborn refusal, Rogado
after conferring with his co-defendant Orenia gave the order to take Areza along and to kill him. The killing of Areza was done solely to satisfy the
anger of the leader, rogado, who being used to the blind obedience of his men could not tolerate the refusal of Areza to carry out his wishes and
desires. The rebellious movement of the group had nothing to gain by Atienza's death. On the contrary, Rogado and his group needed Areza alive
in order that they could utilize him as their guide while they were in the mountains of Lilio. There is no question that they could have easily at the
point of their thompsons, carbines and garands, forced Areza to lead the way. But they did not do so, because at that time Rogado was not so much
interested in finding the path to the road; what concerned him most was to teach a lesson and a hard one at that, to Salvador Areza for having the
timerity of saying "no" to his wish and request. Surely, to kill a person under those circumstances is obviously outside of the political intent of the
Hukbalahap movement. The huks rise up in arms because they mistakenly believe that by doing so they can have desired changes in the political,
social, and economic life of this country. But to accomplish such a purpose, the death of innocent civilians like Salvador Areza is unquestionably
unnecessary. When the killing is done solely for the purpose of answering the lust to kill or of satisfying angered feelings, thwarted desires of
leaders and followers of the Hukbalahap movement, such a killing must receive its due punishment at the hands of our courts which are called
upon to do justice not only to the living but just as well to the dead.
An attempt was made by appellants to show that Areza was killed because he threatened to inform the Army of their presence in the neighborhood
where he met them. Such attempt, however, is ridiculous, for Areza, being then alone and confronted with a group of armed men, could not have
hurled such a threat without catering immediate death. As the trial court aptly observed: "This Court cannot believe that Areza would have been
such a fool to tell that band of armed Huks that he would give them away to the Army. It is reasonable to presume that any sane person would
have seen the danger of making such statement under the circumstances, for that would have been sure death."
The trial court found that the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstances of treachery, aggravated by abuse of superior strength and
the fact that it happened in an uninhabited place, for which reason it imposed upon appellants to supreme penalty of death. While some members
of the Court agree to the existence of the above aggravating circumstances, others however doubt if they could be entertained in the case of
appellants who, as members of the Hukbalahap organization, rightly or wrongly, were of the belief that they were justified in doing what they had
done because Areza committed something inimical to the purposes of their organization. At any rate, the requisite number of votes for the
application of the supreme penalty not having been obtained, the only alternative is to impose upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
With this modification, we affirm the decision appealed from all other respects, with costs against appellants.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6082
March 18, 1911
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISIDRO VICENTILLO, defendant-appellant.
C.W. Ney for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The defendant in this case was found guilty in the court below of the crime of "illegal and arbitrary detention" of the complaining witness for a
period of three days, and sentenced to pay a fine of 625 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the
trial.
We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case there can be no doubt of the lawful authority of the defendant, in the exercise of his
functions as municipal president, to make arrest of the complaining witness which resulted in his alleged unlawful detention. As we understand
the evidence, the alleged offense with which the complaining witness in this case was charged was committed by him in the presence of the
municipal president, who must be held to have had all the usual powers of a police officer for the making of arrest without warrant, under the
doctrine laid down in the case of U.S. vs. Fortaleza (12 Phil. Rep., 472).
The judgment of conviction of the court below must therefore be reversed, unless the evidence discloses that having made the arrest, the defendant
arbitrarily and without legal authority, as it is alleged, cause the complaining witness to be detained for a period of three days without having him
brought before the proper judicial authority for the investigation and trial of the charge on which he was arrested. But so far as we can gather from
the extremely meagre record in this case the arrested man was in fact brought before a justice of the peace as soon as "practicable" after his arrest.
True, three days were expended in doing, so, but it was conclusively proven at the trial that at the time of the arrest neither the local justice of the
peace nor his auxiliary were in the municipality, and to reach the justice of the peace of either of the two adjoining municipalities, it was necessary
to take a long journey by boat. The evidence discloses, moreover, that with all practicable dispatch, the prisoner was forwarded first to one and
then to the other of the adjoining municipalities for trial, the failure to secure trial on the first occasion being due to the fact that the written
complaint, which was intrusted to the policeman in charge of the prisoner, was either lost or stolen. It does not appear why the prisoner was not
sent to the same municipality on both occasions, but in the absence of proof we must assume that in this respect the officers in charge were
controlled by local conditions, changes in the weather, or the like, which, as appears from the uncontradicted evidence of record, made the journey
by boats safer and more commodious sometimes to one and sometimes to the other of the two adjoining municipalities.

It may be that the defendant was not friendly to the arrested man, and that he was not sorry to see him exposed to considerable inconvenience and
delay in the proceedings incident to his trial, but there is nothing in this record upon which to base a finding that his defendant caused the arrest
and the subsequent detention of the prisoner otherwise than in the due performance of his official duties; and there can be no doubt of his lawfully
authority in the premises. The trial judge lays great stress upon the trivial nature of the offense for which the arrest was made, but keeping in mind
the fact that there was no judicial officer in the remote community where the incident occurred at the time of the arrest, and no certainty of the
early return of the absent justice of the peace, or his auxiliary, we are not prepared to hold, in the absence of all the evidence on this point that in a
particular case of a defiance of local authority by the willful violation of a local ordinance, it was not necessary, or at least expedient, to make an
arrest and send the offender forthwith to the justice of the peace of a neighboring municipality, if only to convince all would-be offenders that the
forces of law and order were supreme, even in the absence of the local municipal judicial officers.
The judgment of the lower court convicting and sentencing the defendant must be reversed and he is hereby acquitted of the offense with which he
is charged, with the costs in both instances de oficio. So ordered.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139759. January 14, 2005]
DANILO DANNY MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the petition for review on certiorari seeking the modification of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated June 29, 1999, in
CA-G.R. CR No. 21536, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Laoag City, in Criminal Case No. 7190. In this
case the trial court convicted accused Danilo Mendoza, petitioner herein, for homicide wherein the victim was Alfonso Nisperos. Petitioner does
not seek an acquittal but merely prays that the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense be considered in his favor.
The Information charging petitioner with homicide is quoted as follows:
That on 23 November, 1994, in the evening at Brgy. 19, San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab ALFONSO NISPEROS on the different
parts of his body which caused his death few moments thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon being arraigned on March 23, 1995, petitioner pleaded Not Guilty.
However, on July 11, 1995, petitioner manifested, through counsel, his desire to change his plea to that of guilty and to prove the privileged
mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense.
Thus, on July 25, 1995, petitioner was re-arraigned and he entered a plea of guilty.
Evidence for the prosecution show that on November 23, 1994, one Willy Baluyot celebrated his birthday at his residence in Barangay 19, San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. Among those invited were Danilo Mendoza, petitioner, Alfonso Nisperos, Gervacio Pascua, William Kiskis, Manuel dela
Cruz, Jr., Erwin Vergara, and Nelson Romana.
During the party, Erwin Vergara got inebriated and had to be brought to a nearby hut by Alfonso Nisperos and Willy Baluyot to shake off the
effects of his intoxication.
When the duo returned, petitioner suddenly smashed a pitcher of water on the table and shouted, Bullshit! You are always asking us to
drink. The group was taken aback. Alfonso Nisperos asked petitioner, Why, Mang Danny, why should we be the ones to quarrel?
Petitioner then went to his house about 40 to 45 meters away.
The group was still talking about petitioners outburst when Daniel Nisperos, a brother of Alfonso Nisperos, joined them. Daniel noticed that
petitioners mother was displeased since the group was discussing her sons behavior. She feared that something untoward might happen. This
caused the party to break up and the Nisperos brothers headed for home. They were accompanied by their mother, Loreta Nisperos.
After sometime, Alfonso Nisperos stepped out of his house to get some soup. When he returned, he told his mother Loreta that he saw a person
near their cow tied to a tamarind tree. Alfonso then went out again to check on the person he saw.
After a short while, Loreta suddenly heard Alfonso screaming, Mother, help me!
Loreta rushed to her son. She found him lying, face down, with petitioner on top of him, stabbing him with a knife.
Loreta then approached petitioner, pleading to him not to kill her son. But instead of heeding her plea, he suddenly attacked her with his knife,
hitting her right arm. Petitioner then dashed away from the scene.
Danilo brought his brother, Alfonso, to the Batac General Hospital in Batac, Ilocos Norte where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Petitioner testified that the victim was the aggressor who attacked him with a knife. Thus, he was forced to kill him with his own knife in order to
defend himself.
On July 8, 1997, the trial court rendered its Decision convicting petitioner of homicide and sentencing him to suffer six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as a minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as a maximum, having taken into consideration
his plea of guilty. Petitioner was also ordered to pay the heirs of the victimP50,000.00 as damages.
On appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 21536, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the trial court.
Hence, the instant recourse.
The sole issue for our resolution is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that when petitioner committed the crime charged, the
privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense was present.
Petitioner, in his petition, relies on Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code quoted as follows:
ART. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable. A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law
shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from
criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in articles 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall
impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or
lacking.
Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in holding that the witnesses for the prosecution who are close relatives of the victim are credible.
Petitioner also contends that the prosecution failed to prove any motive on his part in stabbing the victim.
Petitioner likewise faults the prosecution for its failure to present the knife used in attacking the victim.
In incomplete self-defense, unlawful aggression must be present, it being an indispensable requisite. What is absent is either one or both of the last
requisites, to wit: reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and, lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.[2]
Just as in complete self-defense, the burden of proof is upon petitioner to prove the elements of incomplete self-defense. It follows that he should
have proved before the trial court that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. As found by the trial court, petitioner, to establish
this element, testified that during that drinking spree, he had an altercation with Willy Baluyot, the birthday celebrant. Feeling bad, he (petitioner)
slammed the table with a pitcher containing water. Then he left. At a distance, he heard the victim calling him. When they were close to each
other, the victim blamed him for his conduct. He apologized but the victim started stabbing him with a knife. He tried to parry the attack as he
retreated. That moment, his back was against a wall. He then grappled for the knife which he was able to wrench from the victim. They rolled
over on the ground. At that point, he repeatedly stabbed the victim with his own knife.
The prosecution, to prove that petitioner was the aggressor presented Loreta Nisperos, victims mother, who testified as follows:
Q: And when you proceeded to that madre tree, what did you see?
A:
My son was already lying flat on the ground facing the ground and this Danilo was on top of him and stabbing him.
Q:
You said that you saw Danilo stabbing your son, what instrument did he use in stabbing your son?
A: Knife (immuko).
Q: Can you approximate the time, what time was that?
A: Between the hours of 8:00 and 9:00 oclock.
Q: It was already nighttime and it was dark?
A:
It was moonlight and there was also a light near the place where they were drinking.
Q:
From the place where you saw Danilo Mendoza stabbing your son and the location of the bulb or the light, how far was it?
ATTY. BELLO:
There is no need of this question because the accused admitted that he stabbed the victim.
ASST. PROVL PROS. MOLINA:
x x x
Q:
When you saw Danilo Mendoza stabbing your son, what did you tell him?
A:
I pleaded to him saying, Danilo, Danilo, Danilo, please do not kill him.

Q: Upon saying those words, what happened next?

A:
My son was able to move a little bit northward.
Q: And where did the accused go?
A: He still followed him.
Q:
And when the accused followed your son, what did the accused do?
A: When I went near them, he also stabbed me.
Q: And what portion of your body was stabbed?
A: This one, sir. (Witness pointing to her right arm).
As stated by the Solicitor General in the appellees brief, petitioner was not defending himself from any attack but was himself the aggressor
against the victim and his mother.
The trial court did not believe petitioners testimony. Neither did the Court of Appeals. It bears stressing that factual findings of trial courts are
accorded respect by appellate courts unless certain facts have been overlooked which, if considered, could affect the result of the case.[3] This
exception is not present here.
We thus agree with the Court of Appeals that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. This element being absent, petitioner
cannot be accorded the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals, sustaining the judgment of the trial court, is AFFIRMED, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

JOAQUIN E. DAVID, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 111168-69 | 1998-06-17
DECISION
MENDOZA, J:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner Joaquin E. David was charged, in two separate
informations, with homicide and frustrated homicide for the fatal shooting of Noel Nora and the serious wounding of the latter's brother, Narciso
Nora, Jr., on March 28, 1981, in Malabon, Metro Manila.
After trial, petitioner was found guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the decision, dated August 17, 1988, of the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City reads: 1
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide under Articles 249 and 64(1) of the Revised
Penal Code, and for the crime of Frustrated Homicide under Articles 249 and 50, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance in both cases,
and hereby sentences the accused,
For the crime of Homicide, to suffer an indeterminate sentence of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to
SIXTEEN (16) YEARS of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum;
For the crime of Frustrated Homicide, to suffer an indeterminate sentence of TWO (2) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as
minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum.
And ordering the accused:
(1) To indemnify the heirs of Noel Nora the sum of P30,000.00 for the death of Noel Nora
P37,000.00 for actual damages
P30,000.00 for moral damages
P20,000.00 for and as attorney's fees
or a total sum of P117,000.00;
(2) Further, to indemnify Narciso Nora the sum of P8,728.00 for actual damages
P20,000.00 for moral damages
or a total sum of P28,000.00
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its decision 2 rendered on October 29, 1992, modified the sentence after crediting petitioner with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. 3
The penalty prescribed by law for homicide is reclusion temporal. Since there is one (1) mitigating and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty
should be imposed in the [sic] its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the range of penalty next lower to that prescribed
by the Revised Penal Code for the offense is prision mayor. For the crime of Homicide, the penalty is therefore modified to a minimum of 10 years
and 1 day of prision mayor to a maximum of 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal.
As to the crime of Frustrated Homicide, the same is likewise modified to a minimum of 4 years and 1 day of prision correccional to a maximum of 6
years and 1 day of prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, except for the modifications above indicated, the rest of the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.
SO ORDERED.
On July 29, 1992, the appellate court further modified the sentence on petitioner on the ground that the evidence did not show that he had a police
record or that he was incorrigible. The dispositive portion of the court's resolution 4 stated:
WHEREFORE, except for the penalties imposed which is hereby modified to read as follows: 1) for the crime of Homicide with one mitigating
circumstance - the penalty ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum and twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal as maximum; and 2) for the crime of frustrated homicide with one mitigating circumstance - six (6) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Still not satisfied, petitioner brought this appeal from the decision, as modified, of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner contends that 5 I.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ELEMENTS OF SELF-DEFENSE

HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED BY PETITIONER BY EVIDENCE WHICH IS CLEAR, SUFFICIENT, SATISFACTORY, CREDIBLE, CONVINCING,
COMPETENT AND PERSUASIVE.
II.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE EXCULPATORY FACTS IN FAVOR
OF THE PETITIONER WHICH IF DULY CONSIDERED WOULD HAVE COMPLETELY EXONERATED PETITIONER FROM THE CRIMES
CHARGED.
III.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT IF THERE WAS NO COMPLETE SELFDEFENSE, THEN AT THE VERY LEAST THERE IS IN THIS CASE AN INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE. STILL, IF PETITIONER'S DEFENSE IS
DISBELIEVED, OTHER MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD BE APPRECIATED IN PETITIONER'S FAVOR.
IV.
THE DECISION OF THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.
The prosecution evidence in this case is as follows:
On March 28, 1981, at about 10:00 p.m., while the Nora brothers Arturo, Arnel, Noel and Narciso were walking along Flerida Street in Malabon,
Metro Manila on their way home to Capitan Tiago Street, they saw petitioner near the compound of his house. Noel Nora, the deceased, confronted
him about derogatory remarks allegedly made by the latter. Petitioner ran to his house to get a gun. When the Nora brothers reached the
intersection of Flerida and Capitan Tiago Streets, he shouted at them "Putang ina ninyo (You sons of a bitch)" and other epithets, and then fired
four times at them. One shot hit Noel, killing him. Another shot hit Narciso Nora on the ankle. Another nearly hit the zipper of Arturo Nora.
Petitioner claimed self-defense. He alleged that on the night in question, he went to the corner of Flerida and Capitan Tiago Streets because Noel
Nora had earlier challenged him to a fight. However, upon reaching the place, he found that Noel had brought along his three (3) brothers and
other companions who ganged up on him. Petitioner claimed that Noel Nora stabbed him with a knife, hitting him on the left arm and that the
group could have stabbed him several times more had he not been able to dodge their blows. He said when he tried to run away, the victim's
brothers held both his arms while Narciso hit him with a piece of wood on the thighs and buttocks and the others boxed him on the abdomen.
Petitioner said he was able to run away, but the Nora brothers chased him, shouting, "We will enter your house and we will kill you." Petitioner
therefore took the .38 caliber gun of his father (who was a policeman) from the cabinet on the ground floor of their house.
Petitioner went out of the house. The Nora brothers, who were just five (5) steps away from the door of their house, ran after seeing that petitioner
had a gun. But after running to the other side of the street, they hurled stones at petitioner and shouted derogatory words at him. Petitioner
claimed he afterward went inside the compound, but he slipped, whereupon the Nora brothers advanced toward him. He warned them not to get
near, but they kept coming closer, for which reason petitioner fired at them. Petitioner was then from four (4) to five (5) meters away from the
group. Petitioner afterward went inside their house and gave the gun to his mother.
In rejecting petitioner's claim of self-defense, the Court of Appeals said: 6
The bone of contention in this case centers on the issue of self-defense. The trial court, in denying the same, ruled that since there was no unlawful
aggression immediately preceeding [sic] the shooting of the victims, the claim of self-defense to justify the acts of the accused is unavailing.
For its part, the appellant contends that the lower court erred in its appreciation of the evidence and testimony of witnesses relative to the locus of
the shooting incident. The appellant claims that notwithstanding the direct contradiction made by defense witnesses regarding the locus of the
crime, the same does not in any way diminish the credibility of appellant's story and his claim of self-defense.
The contention is devoid of merit. In this case, the issue with respect to the locus of the crime is determinative not only of the place of its
commission. More importantly, it is decisive in determining the existence of unlawful aggression as justification for appellant's claim of selfdefense.
The facts of the case and the evidence presented during the trial reveal that the shooting of the victims happened outside the residential compound
of the accused. No matter how the defense try to belabour the issue by claiming in its reply brief that there were in fact two (2) compounds - the
residence of the accused being a small compound within the bigger compound of his relatives' residence and that the victims were shot inside this
big section albeit outside the residential compound of the accused, the evident fact remains that the victims were shot not in the vicinity of
appellant's residence as claimed by the defense but in the streets, after the accused has taken his father's gun from their house. Noteworthy is the
testimony of defendant's mother to the effect that:
Court:
The Court would like to ask. Was your son outside or inside the gate of your compound when you went to verify the shots?
Witness:
He was about to enter the gate of our compound.
Court:
When you say he was about to enter the gate of the compound, he was coming from the outside of the compound of course?
Witness:
He was outside the gate of our compound.
(TSN, 11 November 1987 p. 13)
The accused who claims self-defense must prove its elements clearly and convincingly. The rationale is because such proceeds from the admission
of the accused that he killed or wounded another, which is a felony, for which he should be criminally liable unless he established to the
satisfaction of the Court the fact of legitimate defense (Castanares v. Court of Appeals, 92 SCRA 567)
As correctly appreciated by the trial court, the evidence established that there was in fact no immediate unlawful aggression to warrant the acts of
the accused in shooting the victims. While the accused was indeed mauled and beaten up by the deceased and his companions, the aggression
stopped when the accused was able to free himself from the assault of the group and thereafter sought refuge in their house. An act of aggression,
when its author does not persist in his purpose or when he discontinues his attitude to the extent that the object of his attack is no longer in peril is
not unlawful aggression warranting self-defense (People v. Macariola, 120 SCRA 92)
Having sought refuge in their house after the aggression had ceased, the accused should have desisted from stepping out of their abode with his
father's gun. In going after the deceased and his companions after the unlawful aggression ceased to exist, the act of the accused became retaliatory
in nature, done for the purpose of avenging whatever pain and injuries he had suffered from the hands of the victims. Consequently, the same
cannot be considered as constituting self-defense for the act to repel the unlawful aggression must immediately follow such unlawful aggression
(US v. Ferrer, 1 Phil. 56).
First. Petitioner contends that the unlawful aggression of the Noras and their group did not cease and that the finding of the Court of Appeals that

it did is contrary to the evidence, particularly the testimonies of Inocencio Antonio and Florthelito Vergara.
Petitioner omits to mention the testimonies of his two other witnesses, Eduardo Bartolo and Pilar David, on which the trial court and the Court of
Appeals relied for their finding that there was no longer any unlawful aggression when petitioner shot the victims. Bartolo testified that on March
28, 1981, he heard shots and the sound of stones being hurled. When he stepped out of his house to find out what was going on, he saw petitioner
near the gate of their compound, aiming his gun at the Nora brothers. For her part, Pilar David, mother of petitioner, told the court that because she
heard gunshots, she went to the gate of their compound to see what was going on. She said she saw petitioner getting inside the gate of the
compound.
Another defense witness, Inocencio Antonio, testified that the victims were rushing toward petitioner when they were at the corner of Flerida and
Kapitan Tiago Streets. Antonio said:
ATTY. CRESCINI: [Defense Lawyer]
Q. Where were those teenagers numbering 5 to 6 at that time that Jake David was about to fire those two (2) last shots?
A. At the corner of Flerida and Kapitan Tiago Streets and they were rushing towards Jake David, sir. 7
The testimonies of these witnesses belie petitioner's claim that he shot the Nora brothers because they had come dangerously close to getting inside
their house, having in fact entered their compound. Indeed, only Florthelito Vergara corroborated petitioner's testimony that he shot the victims
because they had come close to their house by getting inside their compound.
The defense tries to explain the contrary testimonies of the witnesses by pointing out that there are actually two compounds - a big compound
fronting Flerida Street, which is occupied by his uncles' houses, and a small one in which petitioner's parents live. It claims that petitioner shot the
Noras outside the small, but inside the big, compound. But, as the Court of Appeals held: 8
. . . No matter how the defense try to belabor the issue by claiming in its reply brief that there were in fact two (2) compounds . . . the evident fact
remains that the victims were shot not in the vicinity of appellant's residence as claimed by the defense but in the streets . . .
Petitioner contends that between the prosecution testimony and his testimony which is corroborated by two disinterested witnesses for the defense,
their testimonies should be preferred. He cites the ruling in People v. Quiritan: 9
In a serious charge of murder, the guilt of the accused cannot be predicated on delayed and even inconclusive testimonies of alleged eyewitnesses
which manifest signs of fabrication.
But, in that case, the delay in producing the witnesses (two years), coupled with the generally weak and confusing testimonies given by them,
showed that their statements had been concocted. There is nothing to show that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses in this case were
fabricated. The Quiritan case is a very different case from that at bar.
Findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect because it has the opportunity to observe the deportment of
the witnesses and their manner of testifying. 10 The decision of the trial court in this case is notable for its painstaking analysis of the evidence of
the parties. Its conclusion that the prosecution witnesses were more credible than the defense witnesses should be upheld in the absence of proof
that it has overlooked certain important matters as to the credibility of the witnesses.
In shooting the victims, petitioner was not acting to protect himself but retaliating for the insult and physical violence he had received at the hands
of the victims and their group. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party has already ceased when the accused attacks him.
In self-defense, the aggression still exists when the aggressor is injured or disabled by the person making the defense. 11
In this case, defense witness Inocencio Antonio said that the victims and their companions were already running away because they saw petitioner
armed with a gun. The unlawful aggression had thus already ceased when the latter fired at them. As Antonio testified:
ATTY. CRESCINI:
Q. Now, what did those teenagers, do after Jake David fired two (2) warning shots in the air?
A. They were frightened and retreated towards Flerida Street and some at Kapitan Tiago Street, sir.
Q. How about Jake David, what did he do when those teenagers ran some to Flerida Street and other [sic] at Kapitan Tiago Street?
A. He advanced up to the corner of Flerida and Capitan Tiago Street, sir. 12
An act of aggression, when its author does not persist in his purpose, or when he discontinues his attitude to the extent that the object of his attack
is no longer in peril, is not unlawful aggression warranting self-defense. 13
Second. Petitioner claims that the appellate court failed to consider exculpatory facts in his favor.
1. Petitioner claims he was injured and that his injuries, although minor, show that he was attacked by the Noras, for which reason he filed a
complaint for frustrated homicide against them in the fiscal's office.
This fact was not overlooked by the appellate court. However, it found that "While the accused was indeed mauled and beaten up by the deceased
and his companions, the aggression stopped when the accused was able to free himself from the assault of the group and thereafter sought refuge
in his house." 14
2. Petitioner felt depressed after the shooting. He vomited and could not eat and had to be hospitalized. These circumstances show that he is not a
killer at heart and certainly not the villain that the lower court pictured him to be. Furthermore, petitioner was so afraid he had to close his eyes in
firing his gun. Proof of this is that Narciso Nora was only hit at the ankle.
The undisputed fact is that the petitioner fired four shots, one a warning shot and three others directed at the victims. Two (2) of the three (3) shots
directed against the victims hit their marks. One bullet killed Noel Nora and the other almost killed Narciso Nora, Jr. If the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses is to be believed, the third bullet almost hit the zipper of Arturo Nora. This fact belies petitioner's assertion that he fired the
gun with his eyes closed and only to defend himself.
The fact that one shot hit Noel Nora on the chest, while the other hit Narciso, Jr. only on the ankle, could be due to petitioner's nervousness and
unsteady hand, but not to the fact that he did not really mean to shoot them.
Petitioner said he fired warning shots even as he warned them not to come near because, up to the last moment, he did not want to shoot the
victims. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals gave no weight to this claim, apparently because of the inconsistency in the testimonies of the
defense witnesses. Petitioner said he fired only one warning shot:
ATTY. CRESCINI:
Q. You declared that when you saw them approaching and taking advantage of your having slipped, they were armed and you felt very afraid and
nervous, what did you do when you saw them approaching?

WITNESS JOAQUIN DAVID

A. I fired the gun upwards. 15
But defense witness Inocencio Antonio said petitioner fired two warning shots:
ATTY. CRESCINI:
Q. Now according to you, he came out with a gun and fired two (2) shots, in what direction, did he fire those two (2) shots?
A. In the air, warning shots.
Q. Now what did those teenagers, do after Jake David fired two (2) warning shots in the air?
A. They were frightened and retreated towards Flerida Street and some at Kapitan Tiago Street, sir. 16
Antonio later tried to correct his mistake but in doing so, only succeeded in showing that he had lied. Testifying again on October 29, 1985, Antonio
said:
ATTY. CRESCINI:
Q. You also testified during the last hearing that you heard two (2) warning shots on the evening of March 28, 1981, do you remember that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What made you say that there were, I am referring to the first two (2) warning shots, what made you say that they were warning shots?
A. I remember that I did not hear two (2) shots but only one, sir.
Q. What made you say that the one (1) shot was a warning shot?
A. Because the gun was pointing upward, sir. 17
The inconsistency in the testimonies of the defense witnesses so undermined their credibility that both trial court and the Court of Appeals
disregarded the testimonies.
3. It is claimed that petitioner is effeminate while in contrast, the deceased Noel Nora, his brother Lito, and a John Doe were bullies who, even at a
very young age, had already been charged with slight physical injuries in two cases filed in the Municipal Court of Malabon.
The purpose is apparently to show the bad moral character and troublesome nature of the deceased and his brothers, and thereby to show the
improbability of the offenses charged pursuant to Rule 130, 51 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. It is true that where self-defense is claimed
and the character of the slaying is doubtful, evidence of the violent and dangerous character of the deceased is admissible for the purpose of
determining whether the deceased or the accused was the aggressor. 18 The fact, however, is that the cases filed against the deceased had been
dismissed. No inference of the violent character of the victims can be drawn from the mere fact that criminal cases had been filed against one of
them.
Third. It is argued that, at any rate, petitioner should have been given credit for incomplete self-defense. It is not stated what element of selfdefense is absent to make it incomplete. Be that as it may, our finding that there was no longer any unlawful aggression when petitioner shot the
victims rules out the possibility of self-defense, whether complete or incomplete.
Petitioner further contends that certain mitigating circumstances, besides voluntary surrender, should have been considered in his favor, to wit: (a)
that sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act; 19 (b) that he acted in the immediate
vindication of a grave offense committed against him; 20 (c) that he acted upon an impulse so powerful as to produce passion or obfuscation. 21
The mitigating circumstance of having acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense may be appreciated. As the trial court and the Court of
Appeals found, the petitioner had been beaten up by the Noras and their companions. Although the unlawful aggression had ceased when
petitioner shot the Nora brothers, it was nonetheless a grave offense for the vindication of which petitioner may be given the benefit of a mitigating
circumstance. As petitioner's mother testified: 22
ATTY. RODRIGUEZ: [Private Prosecutor]
Q. Did you ask your son who fired the shots?
A. I told him, "Ikaw ba, Jake?" I told him, "Are you the one?" "Pinagtulung-tulungan nila po ako kasi."
But the mitigating circumstances of passion or obfuscation and sufficient provocation cannot be considered apart from the circumstance of
vindication of a grave offense. These circumstances all arose from one and the same incident, i.e., the attack on the petitioner by the victims and
their companions, so that they should be considered as one mitigating circumstance. 23
Nor is the fact that petitioner has not shown himself to be incorrigible a ground for reducing the penalty on him, as the Court of Appeals held in its
resolution on the motion for reconsideration. This is a ground for suspension of judgment of youthful offenders, i.e., those over 9 but under 18
years of age, 24 which of course could no longer be ordered since at the time the trial court rendered its decision petitioner was already over 18
years of age. Clearly, this is not a mitigating circumstance and should not be used as basis for reducing the penalty.
One circumstance not raised by the defense but evident from the record of this case is minority. In his statement to the police given on April 2,
1981, petitioner gave his personal circumstances as follows: "Joaquin David y Ejercito, 17 taong gulang, 2nd year college, binata at naninirahan sa
12-C Flerida St., Acacia, Malabon, Metro Manila". 25 At the hearing on November 11, 1987, petitioner's mother stated that he was 16 or 17 years old
when the shooting incident happened:
ATTY. RODRIGUEZ:
Q. You know for a fact that your son Jake being only 17 on March . . .
A. 16 or 17.
Q. Because he was only 16 or 17, as a young man and quite curious, you know for a fact that sometimes your son got hold of it?
A. I never saw him hold the gun of his father. I never for an instance saw him hold the gun of his father. 26
When the petitioner testified on March 11, 1987, he gave his age at that time as 22 years old. 27
It is thus clear that on March, 28, 1981, when the crime was committed, he was only 17 years old. We have held in many cases 28 that if the accused
alleges minority and the prosecution does not disprove his claim by contrary evidence, such allegation can be accepted as a fact. Thus, in United
States v. Bergantino, 29 the accused testified that she was below 15 when the crime was committed. This was corroborated by her mother and her
husband. No other evidence, such as the baptismal certificate, was presented to support this claim. The prosecution did not offer any contradictory
evidence. This Court held:
While the evidence upon this point is not entirely satisfactory, yet it is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt upon this material question in the case,

to the benefit of which the defendant is entitled. The baptismal certificate or other evidence of this character would have been much more
satisfactory to the court, and, if obtainable, should have been introduced. Neither the prosecution nor the defendant saw fit to introduce such
evidence.
Any doubt in respect of the age of the accused is resolved in his favor. In United States v. Barbicho, 30 it was held.
In regard to the doubt as to whether the accused is over or under 18 years of age, and in the absence of proof that on the day he committed the
crime he was 18 years old, he must perforce be considered as still under that age, and therefore, the mitigating circumstance mentioned in
paragraph No. 2 of article 9 of the code should be applied in his favor . . .
In United States v. Agadas, 31 this Court similarly held:
While it is true that in the instant case Rosario testified that he was 17 years of age, yet the trial court reached the conclusion, judging from the
personal appearance of Rosario, that "he is a youth 18 or 19 years old." Applying the rule enunciated in the case just cited, we must conclude that
there exists a reasonable doubt, at least, with reference to the question whether Rosario was, in fact, 18 years of age at the time the robbery was
committed. This doubt must be resolved in favor of the defendant . . .
There are therefore present in this case the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and two ordinary mitigating circumstances (voluntary
surrender and immediate vindication of a grave offense). Because of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty
of reclusion temporal should be reduced by one degree to prision mayor, pursuant to Art. 68 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty of prision
mayor should further be reduced to prision correccional because of the presence of two ordinary mitigating circumstances without any aggravating
circumstance, pursuant to Art. 64, par. 5 of the same Code. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner should be made to suffer
imprisonment, the minimum of which should be within the range of arresto mayor and the maximum of which within the range of prision
correccional.
On the other hand, for the crime of frustrated homicide, the penalty imposable for the consummated crime of homicide should be reduced by one
degree, i.e., to prision mayor. Because of the presence of one privileged mitigating circumstance and two ordinary mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance, the penalty of prision mayor should be reduced by two degrees, i.e., to arresto mayor.
With respect to the award of damages, the amount of P30,000 awarded as indemnity for the death of Noel Nora should be increased to P50,000.00
pursuant to current rulings. 32 But the award of P37,000.00 for actual damages should be reduced to P22,000.00. As held in Fuentes, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, 33 only expenses supported by receipts and which appear to have been actually expended in connection with the death of the victim
should be allowed. The award of actual damages cannot be based on the allegation of a witness without any tangible document to support such
claim. In this case, only P22,000.00 is supported by a receipt (Exh. X) for funeral expenses.
The amount of moral damages (P30,000.00) and attorney's fees (P20,000.00) appear to be reasonable and may therefore be allowed.
With respect to the damages awarded for the shooting of Narciso Nora, Jr., the award of P8,728 as actual damages should be reduced to P1,928.65
as the receipts (Exhs. Y and Z) presented show the payment of this amount only to the National Orthopedic Hospital.
The award of P20,000.00 as moral damages appears to be just and reasonable and therefore should be allowed under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that, for the crime of homicide, the petitioner is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 6 years of prision correccional, as maximum, and, for
the crime of frustrated homicide, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of 6 months of arresto mayor.
In addition, petitioner is hereby ordered to pay the following:
1. To the heirs of the deceased Noel Nora, the sums of P50,000.00, as indemnity for the death of Noel Nora; P22,000.00, as actual damages;
P30,000.00, as moral damages, and P20,000.00, as attorney's fees;
2. The sums of P1,928.65, as actual damages, and P20,000.00, as moral damages and P20,000.00, as attorney's fees to Narciso Nora, Jr. for wounding
the latter.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 149538. July 26, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. VINCENT HENRY CHUA, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Alegria Marie Antonette L. Luciano filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court in Angeles City, Pampanga for the confinement of her son,
appellant Vincent Henry Chua, in a drug rehabilitation center for drug dependents. On May 20, 1994, the trial court issued an Order granting the
petition and ordering the confinement of the dependent at the Gabay Diwa DrugRehabilitation Center in Angeles City.[1] However, on June 18,
1994, the appellant escaped from the center. The trial court, thereafter, issued an Order recommitting him to the center onJune 24, 1994,[2] but he
again escaped.
On August 24, 1994, Magalang, Pampanga celebrated its town fiesta and there was a carnival in Barangay San Nicolas II, Magalang. A closed
structure called Wall of Danger[3] was constructed inside the carnival grounds where stunts were performed.[4] The operator of the carnival,
Alfonso Verances, had a tent inside the grounds where he and the following helpers slept: Francis Ryan Manabat, who was about twelve years old,
Rodelio Santos, Michael (Vandolph) Santiago, Romeo Ignacio (Verances) and Jun Estanislao. Danilo Bondoc, who was then about eleven years old,
would go to the carnival grounds and would even run errands for the helpers.
At about 1:00 a.m. on August 28, 1994, Manabat was awakened when he heard a woman shouting, Magnanakaw! Magnanakaw! Santiago, Ignacio
and Estanislao were also roused from their sleep. They asked who the robber was and the woman replied that the culprit was a boy. Santiago,
Estanislao and Ignacio found Bondoc hiding in the ticket booth. They tied his feet and hands with a rope and forced him to confess, but Bondoc did
not relent.
Momentarily, the appellant arrived and brought Bondoc to a covered structure where he was kept hanging from the top of the ladder. He placed a
live electric wire on Bondocs palms and forced the latter to confess to stealing from the woman. The boy still refused to confess. The appellant
untied Bondoc and brought him to a booth where darts are thrown at balloons. He then ordered Ignacio, Santiago and Estanislao to guard
Bondoc. The appellant then got a shovel and dug a knee-deep pit near the wall of their house which abutted the carnival grounds. Bondoc was
able to flee, but stepped on a G.I. sheet which created noise. The appellant ran after him and brought the boy back to the covered structure. The
appellant then repeatedly boxed the boy and hit the latter with a piece of wood (dos por dos) on the neck and jaw. Bondoc fell, barely conscious.
Santos, who by then, had also been awakened by the commotion, saw the appellant hitting Bondoc with the piece of wood. The appellant then
brought the boy to the pit and buried him alive. The appellant then ordered Manabat, Ignacio, Santiago, Estanislao and Santos to disperse, and
warned them not to divulge the incident to anyone; otherwise, they would be his next victim. The five helpers went back to sleep.
In the meantime, on August 29, 1994, the RTC issued an Order for the recommitment of the appellant to the rehabilitation center. [5] A warrant for
his arrest for robbery was also issued by the RTC in People vs. Henry Chua, Criminal Case No. 94-08-58.[6]
On September 1, 1994, Ignacio reported the death of Bondoc, at the hands of the appellant, to Jun Sia, a radio commentator and a reporter of the
Central Luzon Times, and the latters co-worker, Bernie Chavit. He also reported the killing to the policemen of Police Station No. 1
in Angeles City. Sia, Chavit and SPO2 Celso de Castro and some policemen of the Magalang police station rushed to the carnival grounds and had
the cadaver of Bondoc exhumed. Photographs of the exhumation and the cadaver were taken. [7] The policemen then arrested the appellant and
brought him to the police station where Ignacio gave a sworn statement to SPO4 Leonardo C. de Leon identifying and pointing to the appellant as
the assailant.[8]

Dr. Suzette Yalung, the Municipal Health Officer, performed an autopsy of the cadaver of Bondoc and signed her Report containing her
findings, viz:
GENERAL APPEARANCE: Body in a state of decomposition.
HEENT: Caved-in fracture of (L) fronto-parietal area of the skull, caved-in fracture of left lower jaw (+) 6-inch curvilinear abrasion, (longitudinal)
on (L) anterior neck, (+) fracture of cervical vertebrae.
CHEST/ABDOMEN: (+) discoloration & bloaching (sic) all over, body in a state of decomposition.
EXTREMITIES: No fracture, all extremities in flexed position.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardio-respiratory arrest due to asphyxiation and severe hemorrhage [Fracture of cervical vertebrae, (L) lower jaw & (L)
fronto-parietal area of the skull.][9]
On September 8, 1994, an Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 57, charging Chua with murder. The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 28th day of August 1994, in Brgy. San Nicolas II, Municipality of Magalang, Province of Pampanga, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, abuse of superior strength and cruelty,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, box and hit with a piece of wood, a 12-year-old minor Danilo Bondoc y
Ponay, without justifiable reason therefor and as a result of the continuous assault on the person of Danilo Bondoc y Ponay by the accused, said
Danilo Bondoc y Ponay sustained fatal and serious physical injuries all over his body and accused, thereafter, threw the body of said Danilo
Bondoc y Ponay into a hole dug by the accused and covered the same, resulting to the death of said Danilo Bondoc y Ponay shortly thereafter, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Danilo Bondoc y Ponay.
Contrary to law.[10]
The appellant, assisted by counsel, was duly arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty.
The Case for the Appellant
The appellant admitted to being at the scene of the crime, but claimed that Bondocs assailants were Ignacio, Santiago and Estanislao. He testified
that at about past midnight ofAugust 28, 1994, he was in the office of the manager at the carnival grounds at Marves Subdivision, where he and his
parents and the Chief of Police of Magalang, resided. He was playingtongking with the helpers of the carnival. He left for a while and when he
returned, saw his cousin, Jomar Basa, and Romeo Ignacio, inside the covered structure talking about Bondoc who was hanging at the top of the
ladder. He wanted the boy released, but Ignacio refused and assured him that nothing would happen to the boy. Ignacio tied up Bondoc and
brought him to the dart balloon booth. Ignacio also kicked Bondoc and ordered Santiago and Estanislao to tie up Bondoc. Santiago and
Estanislao did as they were told, and forced him to lie down on his stomach. When he remonstrated to Ignacio, the latter went out to the covered
structure and took a .45 caliber gun. Ignacio warned him not to interfere with the carnival helpers. He toldSantiago to give biscuits to the boy, but
Estanislao objected and even warned him that he was a police officer.
The appellant then left, hearing Bondocs cries as he walked away. When he returned to the place, he saw the boy being kicked on his feet and
palms by Estanislao and Santiago. He asked that Bondoc be released, but his request went unheeded. On orders of Ignacio, Estanislao got a shovel,
and dug a hole with Santiagos help, while Ignacio watched over Bondoc. Bondoc was able to run away, but stepped on a G.I. sheet which created
noise and alerted the three. Ignacio, Santiago and Estanislao ran after the boy, collared him and brought him to the covered structure where he was
electrocuted by Ignacio with a wire that Santiago produced. The appellant protested to this, but Ignacio told him that even if he protested, he
would still be implicated anyway.
By this time, the commotion had attracted several bystanders, male and female. Ignacio covered Bondocs mouth with a handkerchief which was
supplied by Santiago. The boy was then brought to a hole where Ignacio hit him with a piece of wood. Bondoc fell into the hole, whereupon
Ignacio buried him. On orders of Ignacio, Santiago and Estanislao placed garbage on top of the boys grave. Ignacio warned the appellant that if
he revealed the incident to others, he would be implicated. The appellant then went home and slept. He was awakened by his uncle, Jerry
Luciano, who told him that policemen were looking for him. He was brought to the police station where he was detained and charged for the
death of Bondoc.
Jomar Basa corroborated, in part, the appellants testimony, but testified that the helpers in the carnival grounds, aside from Ignacio, Santiago and
Estanislao, as well as Darwin David and Oliver Santos, witnessed the crime. He also saw Bondoc being tied and kicked. He asked Ignacio to turn
over custody of Bondoc to him, but Ignacio refused. He left the carnival grounds along with Santos and David. When they returned, they saw
Lovely Ignacio, Romeo Ignacios wife, and asked where the boys body was, and the latter replied that Bondoc had gone home already.
The appellant presented Rodolfo La Madrid, Geoffrey Alegre, Oliver Santos, Macario Paulino, Jocelyn Roberto and Rufino Ang, to corroborate his
testimony and fortify his defense.
After trial, the court rendered judgment convicting the appellant of the crime charged. The court declared that the appellant was a minor when the
crime was committed; hence, was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Vincent Henry Chua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, the Court hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of 17 YEARS, 4 MONTHS and 1 DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as minimum, to RECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum,
with full credit of his preventive imprisonment.
As to the civil liability, the accused will indemnify the family of the victim as follows:
a. Actual damages in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00);
b. Moral damages in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00);
c. Exemplary damages under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code of an appropriate amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00); and
d. Attorneys fees in the amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00).[11]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming the judgment of the trial court, but applied Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code and
increased the penalty to reclusion perpetua. The appellate court considered the minority of the appellant merely as a generic mitigating
circumstance, and concluded that such minority could not be considered a generic and a privileged mitigating circumstance at the same time. The
appellate court certified the case to this Court for review, conformably to Rule 124, Section 13 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The Present Appeal
The appellant did not file any supplemental brief with this Court; neither did the appellee.
In his brief with the Court of Appeals, the appellant averred as follows:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE FACT THAT THERE WAS A COVER-UP DONE BY THE POLICE AUTHORITIES OF
MAGALANG, PAMPANGA, AS TO THE REAL IDENTITIES OF THE CULPRITS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION AS TO THE ALLEGED INCIDENT IS REPLETE
WITH IMPROBABILITIES AND CONTRARY TO HUMAN EXPERIENCE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PROSECUTION EYEWITNESSES ARE ACTUATED WITH BAD MOTIVE IN
IMPLICATING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME AND IN NOT DISCREDITING THE EYEWITNESSES OF
THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENSE WITNESS RODOLFO LA MADRID.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER IN FAVOR OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
VII
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO PAY P50,000.00 AS ACTUAL DAMAGES, P50,000.00 AS MORAL
DAMAGES, P20,000.00 AS EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND P15,000.00 AS ATTORNEYS FEES.[12]
The appellant asserts that the testimonies of Manabat and Sia are incredible. He contends that he was only seventeen years old when the crime was
committed and, as such, he could not have committed the crime alone. He insists that there must have been others who assisted him in
electrocuting the victim and in digging a knee-deep hole in which the victim was buried. He laments that the trial court even ignored the fact that
Ignacio was convicted of carnapping.[13]

The appellant also avers that he could not have committed the crime in the presence of onlookers, and in a place which was only a few meters
away from the police station. The appellant claims that police officers Remigio Layug and Leonardo C. de Leon covered-up the investigation
because despite reports that Ignacio, Santiago and Estanislao were involved in the crime, they were not investigated nor included in the charge of
murder against the appellant. The police officers were even administratively sanctioned for their misconduct.
The appellant contends that the claims of Manabat and Santos, that they refrained from reporting the crime because they were afraid of the
appellant, are incredible. He avers that the prosecution presented Manabat and Sia as surrebuttal witnesses when Ignacio and Estanislao failed to
appear during the preliminary investigation in the Municipal Trial Court and during the trial in the RTC. Manabats testimony that he was from
Barangay Camias, San Miguel, Bulacan, was belied by Barangay Captain Macario Paulino and his certification that Manabat and his family were
not residents of the said barangay.
The Ruling of the Court
The contention of the appellant has no merit.
First. The trial court gave credence and full probative weight to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, Manabat and Santos, viz:
The revelation of Manabat and Santos were confirmed by Dr. Suzette Yalung, the one who made the autopsy on the cadaver of victim Danilo
Bondoc, who testified that the cause of death of the victim was cardio-respiratory arrest and asphyxiation, severe hemorrhage, fracture of cervical
vertebrae and left lower jaw and fracture on the left parietal area of the skull, the very injuries testified to by Manabat and Santos were the ones
found by Dr. Yalung on the body of the victim confirming the authenticity of the formers testimony.
The evidence also disclosed that victim Danilo Bondoc was tortured by the accused when he ran a 110-voltage electric wire in the palm and feet of
the victim and that the victim was also mauled causing severe hemorrhage in his body.
Viewing the entire testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, the Court finds the same to be consistent and corroborated one another, leading
this Court to believe the same.
The Court also noted that Francis Ryan Manabat and Rodelito Santos did not waver but stood pat during their cross-examinations.
The Court did not find any motive for Manabat and Santos to pinpoint the accused as the culprit. There is no animosity nor bad blood between
Manabat and Santos, on one hand, and the accused, on the other hand. In fact, Manabat and Santos are afraid of the accused because Vincent
Henry Chua is a siga and matapang as per testimony of Rodelito Santos considering the fact that the family of the accused is the owner of the lot
where the peryahan is located.[14]
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court. The well-settled rule is that the findings of facts of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court unless the trial court ignored, overlooked or misconstrued facts and circumstances
which if considered warrants a revision or reversal of the outcome of the case. [15] We have reviewed the records and find no justification to deviate
from the trial courts findings.
Second. The appellant failed to prove with clear and convincing evidence the physical impossibility of digging a knee-deep hole in the ground
alone, with the use of a shovel. There is no evidence that the soil where the appellant dug was hard or even strong. At such a youthful age of
seventeen years, the appellant had the physical strength and stamina to dig a knee-deep hole all by himself.
Third. It is futile for the appellant to argue that it was unnatural of him to have committed the crime in full view of onlookers. Crimes are known to
have been brazenly committed by perpetrators undeterred by the presence of onlookers or even of peace officers, completely impervious of the
inevitability of criminal prosecution and conviction. In this case, the appellant was a drug dependent, an escapee from the rehabilitation center and
had an outstanding warrant for his arrest for robbery, and an Order for his recommitment to a rehabilitation center.
The appellants bare denials cannot prevail over the positive, straightforward and unwavering identification made by Santos and Manabat, that the
appellant was the sole perpetrator of the crime. Thus, we agree with the findings and disquisitions of the Court of Appeals, viz:
Accused-appellant further denies having inflicted any injuries on the victim. He claims it was impossible for him to beat the boy to death and at the
same time dig the small grave where the victims body was buried.
The evidence on record does not refute in any manner the capability of the accused to commit such acts of violence. On the contrary, appellants
destructive behavior does not run counter to his psychological profile brought about by his drug dependency at the time of the incident. The
record shows that accused-appellants own mother Ma. Antoinette L. Luciano had filed with the Regional Trial Court in AngelesCity, a petition for
the voluntary commitment of the accused-appellant in a drug rehabilitation center.

However, accused-appellant escaped from the Gabay Diwa Rehabilitation Center, thereby causing Ronald P. Balatbat, a psychologist of the said
center, to recommend to the Angeles City Regional Trial Court the recommitment of accused-appellant. Acting on said recommendation, said
court in its Order dated June 24, 1994, ordered the recommitment of accused-appellant for continuous treatment. But, again, accused escaped for
the second time, thereby giving rise to another Recommitment Order dated August 29, 1994.

Clearly, on the day of the fatal incident, accused-appellant was a second-time escapee from the drug dependency rehabilitation program he was
sentenced to undergo. This is indicative of accused-appellants unwillingness to be rehabilitated from his dependency to drugs. Undoubtedly,
accused-appellants drug dependency was responsible for his violent behavior towards the victim.
Accused-appellants drug dependency and troublesome behavior was no surprise to the peryahan workers. They were aware that the carnival
grounds belonged to the family of accused-appellant who resides some fifty (50) meters away from the peryahan. The proximity of the carnival
grounds to the house of accused-appellant made it easy for him to frequent the place during daytime and nighttime as well. The peryahan
workers observed accused-appellant as one that displayed a behavior characterized by them as a bully or siga. Accused-appellants drug
dependency, reputation and influence deterred the peryahan workers, who were mere transients in Magalang, from intervening while accusedappellant was committing the crime. This was further bolstered when accused-appellant, who, after burying the victim, threatened the peryahan
workers with harm if they would report what had just transpired to the police authorities. This explains why prosecution witnesses Romeo
Ignacio and Jaime Estanislao were reluctant in divulging any information relative to the fatal incident while they were still in Magalang, and why
they waited until they were relocated to Angeles before going to the police authorities to report the incident.
Prosecution witnesses Francisco Manabat and Rodelito Santos have positively identified accused-appellant as the one who inflicted upon the
young victim such bodily harm. Manabat vividly recounted the entire incident from the time the victim was apprehended by the peryahan boys
at the instance of a woman vendor to the time the accused-appellant took custody of the victim and started beating him which led to his untimely
death. Santos who witnessed the accused-appellant struck and hit the victim with a piece of wood on the neck and jaw, causing the victim to fall
down, materially corroborated this. The rule is the detailed testimony of a witness in a murder or homicide case acquires greater weight and
credibility if it corresponds with the autopsy report.[16]
Fourth. The appellant is not entitled to an acquittal simply because the police investigators did not include Ignacio, Santiago and Estanislao in their
investigation, nor charge them, in tandem with the petitioner, for the death of Bondoc. The evidence on record shows that the involvement of
Ignacio, Santiago and Estanislao was confined only to the tying of Bondocs hands and feet, on suspicion for robbery. When the appellant arrived
at the scene, he took sole charge, tortured the victim and buried him alive. The policemen found no basis for charging the other helpers for the
death of the victim. In fine, the appellant cannot invoke as basis for his acquittal the minor and inconsequential involvement of the helpers. We
affirm the findings and disquisitions of the Court of Appeals on this matter, viz:
Anent the first assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred when it totally disregarded and ignored the March 15, 1995
Decision of the Regional Director of the Philippine National Police Command III (PNP RECOM 3) in the administrative case filed by the appellants
mother, Ma. Antoinette Luciano, against P/Insp. Romeo Layug and SPO4 Leonardo de Leon of the Magalang Police Station, wherein it found as
haphazard and irregular the investigation conducted by the aforementioned officers involving the death of Danilo Bondoc.
We do not subscribe to accused-appellants urgings. Precisely, in due course of this case, accused-appellant had moved for a reinvestigation in
order to determine who are the real culprits who killed the 12-yr.-old boy, which the trial court granted without objection from the prosecution. During
the reinvestigation, the statements of the accused-appellant, together with those of his witnesses, namely, Joemar (sic) Basa and Oliver Santos, were
all re-evaluated. Thereafter, 1st Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jesus Y. Manarang stood pat on his finding that a prima facie case for murder exists
only with respect to accused-appellant, and recommended that the Information dated September 2, 1994 filed against the accused ought to be
maintained.[17]
Fifth. The credibility of the testimonies of Manabat and Santos and the probative weight thereof were not affected by their failure to report the
terrifying crime they witnessed, nor by the prosecutions failure to present Ignacio as witness. As the Court of Appeals declared:
The facts reveal that the peryahan workers were the only witnesses who positively identified the accused-appellant as the one responsible for
inflicting the fatal wounds on the victim. The notorious behavior and influential family background of the accused-appellant were among the
reasons, which prevented these witnesses from reporting the incident to the police authorities in Magalang. Since they were all transients, they
opted to keep their silence until they were able to transfer to Angeles City where the authorities there were informed of the incident. SPO2 Celso
de Castro of the Angeles Police even testified that when the case was to be turned over to the Magalang Police, Romeo Ignacio was afraid of

accompanying them to the Magalang police station. On the other hand, reporter Jun Sia of the Central Luzon Times testified that when he asked
Romeo Ignacio why he reported the incident to the Angeles Police instead of the Magalang Police, the latter replied that accused-appellant was
influential in Magalang, Pampanga.
What is more apparent is the fact that Romeo Ignacio and Jaime Estanislao were so afraid to appear at the preliminary investigation after having
identified accused-appellant and given their respective statements on September 1, 1994. Nevertheless, the prosecution was able to present other
witnesses in the persons of Francis Manabat and Rodelito Santos who initially refused to testify against the accused-appellant because they too
were afraid of him. Then again, the two finally changed their minds and thereafter testified as a consequence of their desire to give justice to the
victim.
A witness unwillingness to volunteer information regarding a particular crime due to fear of reprisal is common enough that it has been judicially
declared as not affecting a witness credibility. Neither substantive nor procedural law requires any person witnessing a crime to immediately
report the matter to the proper authorities or to give his statement thereon. Furthermore, the delay in reporting what a witness knows about a
crime does not by itself render his testimony unworthy of belief if such delay has been adequately explained. It has, likewise, been held that a
witness failure to volunteer information to law enforcement officers does not necessarily impair a witness credibility, and part of the reason for
this is the reticence and fear of some people of getting involved in a criminal case.
Accused-appellant asserts that the trial courts acquiescence of both the testimonies of Francis Manabat and Rodelito Santos which it later found
credible as against that of defense witness Rodolfo La Madrids rejected testimony was unfair since both testimonies were belatedly given.
The threats to the lives of Francis Manabat and Rodelito Santos were apparent because their kubols were constructed on the land owned by the
family of the accused-appellant whose place of residence was just a few meters away from the fence of the carnival grounds. On the other hand,
Rodolfo La Madrid was not actually threatened by anyone from testifying, not even Romeo Ignacio, who, less than a week after the incident, left for
Angeles City with his other fellow peryahan workers. By reason thereof, this Court agrees with the lower court when it found no cogent reason
to give credibility to the belated testimony of Rodolfo La Madrid.
This Court finds no credence in accused-appellants argument that witnesses Francis Manabat and Rodelito Santos, who are related in some
manner with Jaime Estanislao and Romeo Ignacio, were actuated by improper motive in testifying against appellant.
It would be very difficult to accept the averment of the defense that prosecution witnesses Francisco Manabat and Rodelito Santos, who were only
14 and 19 years old, respectively, when they testified, maliciously pointed to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of such a serious crime. Being of
tender age, these two could not have survived a gruelling direct and cross-examination without being detected or exposed, had they decided to use
their imagination in trying to render a detailed account of a murder. Not only did their testimonies stand the ultimate test of cross-examination but
were also in consonance with the other evidence of the prosecution. It has been repeatedly held that when the issue is one of credibility of
witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court. It is clear that the two had no other motive but to render justice
to the victim and that of his family.[18]
In sum, we find the decision of the Court of Appeals finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the death of Danilo Bondoc to be in
accord with the evidence on record and current jurisprudence.
The trial court convicted the appellant of murder without stating the qualifying circumstance attendant to the crime. The trial court also
appreciated in favor of the appellant the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and considered such minority as a mere mitigating
circumstance. We shall then modify the decision of the trial court and the appellate court.
The crime was qualified by treachery. The victim, who was barely thirteen years old, was helpless and unable to defend himself. His feet and
hands were tied while the appellant mauled and kicked him, and hit him with a piece of wood.[19] The appellant was so depraved that he even
electrocuted the victim by placing a live wire on the latters palms and burying him alive. This is borne by the autopsy report of Dr. Suzette
Yalung, which indicates that the victim died because of cardiac arrest due to asphyxiation. By his detestable acts, the appellant intended to
exacerbate the suffering of the victim. Hence, cruelty was attendant to the commission of the crime.[20] However, cruelty is absorbed by treachery.
The trial court and appellate court also erred in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of the appellant. He was
arrested by the policemen not only for his involvement in the killing of the victim but also because of the warrant for his arrest for robbery, and the
recommitment order issued by the RTC for escaping from the rehabilitation center.
The appellate court erred, likewise, in appreciating the minority of the appellant merely as a generic mitigating circumstance. While under Article
13, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, minority is a mitigating circumstance, this provision must be construed in relation to Article
68[21] thereof, which provides that minority is a privileged mitigating circumstance warranting the reduction of the imposable penalty by one or
two degrees, depending upon the age of the accused. The minority of the accused is not merely a generic mitigating circumstance but is a privileged
mitigating circumstance. Furthermore, in determining the penalty to be meted on the accused, the trial court must first consider any modifying
circumstance attendant to the crime.
In this case, the appellant was seventeen years old when he committed the crime. Hence, the imposable penalty must be reduced by one degree,
conformably to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code. The imposable penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. One degree lower than reclusion perpetua to death is reclusion temporal, conformably to
paragraph 2, Article 61,[22] in relation to Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code.
To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, reclusion temporal should be reduced by one degree, prision mayor, which has a range of
from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being no modifying circumstances attendant to the crime, the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty should be imposed in its medium period. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty should be taken from the full range
of prision mayor.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Pampanga, Branch 57, convicting the appellant Vincent Henry Chua of murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Taking into account the minority of the appellant
and the absence of any other modifying circumstance attendant to the crime, he is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum. The appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim, Danilo Bondoc, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000) as civil indemnity; Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000) as moral damages; and Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000) as exemplary damages,[23] conformably to current
jurisprudence. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11074
February 27, 1960
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUFELINO ZAPATA and FERNANDICO TUBADEZA, defendants-appellants.
Ernesto P. Laurel for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General A. Padilla and Solicitor General I. C. Borromeo for appellee.
ENDENCIA, J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Abra convicting Rufelino Zapata and Fernandico Tubadeza of the crime of murder, as
principal and accomplice, respectively, and sentencing the former toreclusion perpetua, and the latter to an indeterminate penalty of from 6 years, 1
month and 11 days of prision mayor, as minimum, to 12 years, 5 months and 11 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum, both to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased in the sum of P6,000.
It appears from the evidence on record that on the evening of February 15, 1951, at about eight o'clock, while Fausta Tubadeza, a sexagenarian, was
cutting firewood near her house at the barrio of Camcamiring, municipality of Dolores, Abra, appellants Rufelino Zapata and Fernandico
Tubadeza approached her, and Zapata, after telling her "You are the old woman who bewitched my wife," repeatedly beat her with a piece of wood
about 2 feet long and 3 inches in diameter, on different part of her body, while Fernandico Tubadeza dragged her by the arms. Her husband
Mariano Bondame, also a sexagenarian, attracted by the noise outside their house, looked out of the window and saw his wife being dragged by
Fernandico Tubadeza and clubbed by Rufelino Zapata. Mariano Bondame immediately set to go down to help his wife, but Zapata met him at the
stairs and threatened him bodily harm should he intervene. Bondame helplessly saw his wife being beaten and dragged towards the direction of
the house of councilor Simeon Tubadeza, Bondame then went to the house of Estanislao Elvena to ask for help and followed appellants to the
house of councilor Tubadeza, where he saw his wife already sprawled on the yard uttering, "I am going to die now," so he approached and
embraced her. Fausta then told her husband she had been maltreated and that some of her teeth were broken.

The evidence further shows that Fausta was taken to the house of councilor Tubadeza, who told appellant Zapata and one Florencio Pilor to go to
Fausta's house, and upon their return they brought a bottle of wine and a bottle of oil and told the councilor, "Here are the ingredients for
witchcraft that we took from her house." The councilor then wrote on a piece of paper (Exhibit A) a statement that Fausta practiced witchcraft on
Zapata's wife and had the same thumbmarked by Fausta. Likewise Bondame was forced to sign it. Fausta died that same evening at the house of
councilor Tubadeza.
Dr. Paterno Millare who made a post-mortem examination of Fausta's body, found that the cause of her death was:
Fracture, compound, complicating, Rib 5th, postero-lateral portion, right; Hemorrhage, internal, acute; Wound, lacerated, lung, right; and
Contusion, multiple and ecchymosis, abrasion evulsion, teeth, upper incisor, canine, jaw, left, and etc.
Appellant Fernandico Tubadeza submitted a defense of alibi, attempting to show that on the night of February 15, 1951, he was in Bantay, Ilocos
Sur, in the house of the parents of his wife; while Rufelino Zapata offered the following defense: That on the night in question, his wife Carolina
Mercurio was seriously ill; that in view of the barking of dogs and whining of pigs in his yard, he went down and saw Fausta Tubadeza, who had a
reputation in their barrio of being a witch, run away; that while he was chasing her, she fell face down; that when he overtook her, she confessed
that he had bewitched her wife, whereupon Zapata took her to the house of councilor Simeon Tubadeza; that the latter, being a near relative of
Fausta and ashamed of her admission of having practiced witchcraft, kicked her a number of times in her right side; that councilor Tubadeza then
ordered appellant Zapata to fetch her husband Mariano Bondame, and when Bondame arrived and knew of his wife's admission he became angry
and also kicked her a number of times on the right side, below the armpit; and that councilor Tubadeza then wrote affidavit Exhibit A whereby
Fausta assumed responsibility should Zapata's wife die.
By and large, the issue in this appeal is credibility of witnesses.
Referring to the alibi put up by Fernandico Tubadeza, we give it little or no evidence at all not only because this kind of defense can be fittingly
conceived and conveniently adjusted to suit any time and place ad libitum but that his witnesses are all his relatives. On the other hand,
prosecution witnesses Salvador Turqueza, Relito Claro and Mariano Bondame positively identified and pointed him as the one who dragged the
deceased while his co-defendant Rufelino Zapata clubbed her.
Appellant Zapata's defense that the deceased died from the hands of Simeon Tubadeza, Florendo Pilor and her own husband Mariano Bondame,
who all kicked her, is likewise unworthy of belief. Although it is true that, originally, Simeon Tubadeza and Florendo Pilor were included as
defendants in the complaint filed before the justice of the peace, upon reinvestigation of the case, however, the same was dismissed as against them
for lack of evidence and the fiscal had to exclude them from the information. Besides, Mariano Bondame was not among those originally indicted.
It is hard to believe that Mariano Bondame, the aged husband of the deceased, would ever attempt to harm his wife, le alone kick her several times
in the presence of many people, just for the flimsy reason of having admitted that she was a witch. On the contrary, Bondame positively testified
that he tried in vain to rescue his wife from the hands of appellants when he saw her beaten up, only to be confronted by Zapata at the stairs and
threatened with bodily harm.
Zapata further contends that prosecution witnesses Salvador Turqueza and Relito Claro who testified having seen him beat the deceased on the
back and on the nape, did not tell the truth because Dr. Millare contradicted them by saying that he did not find any ecchymosis, discoloration or
laceration at the back and nape. We do not, however, find any inconsistency between the two versions, rather they complement each other, for
while these eyewitnesses said that they saw appellant Zapata beat the deceased on the back, Dr. Millare, in his post-mortem examination found:
External: The body is cold and in rigor mortis. The height is about 4 ft. and 8 inches. The weight is about 100 pounds more or less. There is presence
of contusions and abrasions with ecchymosis of the left face and with avulsion of the teeth, upper incisor and canine, left upper jaw. Presence of a
compound complicating fracture of the 5th rib at the right postero-lateral portion of the chest wall. Presence of contusions on the anterior portions
of the legs and thighs.
Internal: On opening the chest wall, there is a fracture, compound, complicating, of the 5th rib, right, postero-lateral portion of the chest; with
wound, lacerated on the right lung and internal hemorrhage of the right lung. There is approximately 150 cc of unclotted blood on the right
chestcavity. Heart and left lung are apparently normal.
which evidently shows that the deceased was beaten mercilessly not only on the head but also on different parts of the body as shown by the
avulsion of the teeth, abrasions and ecchymosis on the left face, the compound fracture of the 5th rib, on the postero-lateral portion. These two
eyewitnesses could not be expected to tell the exact spots where the blows had landed, considering that it was nighttime and those fleeting
moments cannot be recalled with exact precision. At all events, both witnesses are agreed that it was appellant Zapata who clubbed the deceased.
The Solicitor-General points out that Fernandico Tubadeza should not be held merely as an accomplice as found by the lower court but as coprinciple, because.
It is to be observed that while it may be true as the trial court has stated, that "there is no showing in what manner Fernandico too part in the
torture, so much so that the evidence discloses that only the accused Rufelino Zapata was provided with a club," yet the established facts that (a)
Fernandico accompanied Zapata in going to the house of the deceased; (b) he held both hands of the deceased while Zapata was hitting her and (c)
he pulled the deceased by the hands while Zapata continued clubbing her clearly show the existence of concert of design between the two. At any
rate, even granting that there existed no previous understanding between the two appellants, yet it may be implied from the acts of Fernandico, as
stated above, that they had the same unity of purpose in the execution of the act (People vs. Ging Sam, et al., 94 Phil., 139; People vs. Binasing, et
al., 98 Phil., 902).
We agree with the Solicitor-General.
We likewise agree with his observation that evident premeditation is not present in this case, but that abuse of superior strength should be taken in
its stead as the qualifying circumstance for murder, considering that the deceased was a frail and undersized woman sexagenarian.
As to the aggravating circumstances of disregard of sex and age and nocturnity alleged in the information, we find that while the evidence fails to
show that nighttime was purposely sought by appellants to commit the crime, it positively demonstrates that they disregarded the age and sex of
the deceased, it appearing that she was a frail woman of 65, weighing only around 100 pounds and only 4 feet and 8 inches in height, while Zapata
and Tubadeza were 32 and 27 years of age, respectively, when the crime was committed.
On the other hand, we believe that appellants are entitled to the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed, as it was evident that they merely wanted to denounce her as a witch before councilor Tubadeza when she was beaten and dragged to
the councilor's house, but that she received a beating more than she could take, for which she died that same evening. In addition, the mitigating
circumstance of obfuscation should be appreciated in their favor, as we held in U.S. vs. Makalintal, 2 Phil., 448, and People vs. Balneg, et al., 79 Phil.,
805, for it clearly appears that appellants committed the crime in the belief that the deceased had cast a spell of witchcraft upon the wife of Zapata
which caused her serious illness.
Considering that there are two mitigating circumstances as against one aggravating in the case, appellants are entitled to the minimum penalty
prescribed by Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code which is reclusion temporal in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
penalty that should be imposed is 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, and 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
With the above modifications, the decision appealed from is affirmed in all other respects.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120853. March 13, 1997]
PAT. RUDY ALMEDA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
This is a case of homicide.
Petitioner Rudy Almeda was charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tandag, Surigao del Sur in an information which reads
as follows:
"That on the 29th day of November 1988, at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening, more or less, inside Bautista's Food and Snack Inn at Capitol Hills,
Tandag, province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named, with intent to kill,
treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot several times one, CBL Leo Pilapil Selabao,
PC Member, with the use of a caliber 45 nickled pistol, thereby inflicting upon the latter the following wounds, to wit:
1. Gunshot wound 1 cm. in diameter with point of entry 1 cm. lateral to the 6th thoracic cavity, penetrating lung thru and thru, with point of exit 2
cm. below the left nipple.
2. Gunshot wound 1 cm. in diameter with point of entry at midscapular area left at the level of 4th thoracic vertebra, penetrating the thoracic cavity,
penetrating the heart thru and thru, with point of exit at level of ziphoid process.
3. Gunshot wound 1 cm. in diameter with point of entry 3 cm. left lateral to the 3rd thoracic vertebra, posterior chest wall penetrating the thoracic
cavity, penetrating the mediatinum thru and thru. Slug lodged skin deep.

4. Gunshot wound 1 cm. in diameter with point of entry 4 cm. from midline right occipital area thru and thru with point of exit preauricular area
right.
5. Gunshot wound 1 cm. in diameter with gunpowder tatooing (sic) left infra auricular area thru and thru with point of exit at the right side of the
neck 2 cm. beside the oricoid cartilage.
6. Gunshot wound 1 cm. in diameter with gunpowder tatooing (sic) with point of entry at left side of neck at level of 4th cervical vertebra,
tangential with point of exit at left side of the neck at the level of 5th cervical vertebra (about 4 cm. from point of entry), which wounds have caused
the instantaneous death of CBL Leo P. Salabao, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs in the following amounts:
P50,000.00

as life indemnity of the victim;

10,000.00

as moral damages; and

10,000.00

as exemplary damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (In violation of Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code.)"[1]
During arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. After trial, the lower court[2] convicted petitioner of homicide only and appreciated in his favor
two mitigating circumstances.[3] The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration with regard to the appreciation of the mitigating circumstances.
On July 23, 1992, the lower court granted the motion and modified its earlier decision. The dispositive portion of the modified judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Rudy Almeda GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE, and there being neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances which attended the commission of the offense, but applying the Indeterminate Sentence law, the Court hereby sentences
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to pay the heirs of the deceased victim PC Cbl. Leo Salabao the sum
of Fifty Thousand (50,000) Pesos as life indemnity and ten thousand (10, 000) Pesos as moral damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and to pay the cost.
The bail bond put up by the accused for his provisional liberty is ordered cancelled.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the modified judgment. [5] Hence this petition where petitioner imputes error to the appellate court
in (1) not finding that he acted in defense of strangers, and (2) in failing to appreciate in his favor the mitigating circumstances of sufficient
provocation and voluntary surrender.
The anterior facts ably supported by evidence on record are summarized by the CA as follows:
On November 29, 1988, at approximately 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Julian Herrera, Jr., together with his two nephews Donato Salabao and PC
Constable Leo Salabao arrived at the Bautista's Snack Inn to fetch Susonte Montero who lived in the same town with Herrera. (TSN, January 22,
1992, p. 6) Herrera asked Donato to enter the snack inn and inform Montero that they were ready to head home. However, Montero was in the
middle of a drinking spree with Vice Governor Acosta and the latter's companions, one of whom was Almeda who was the Vice Governor's
bodyguard. Upon the invitation of Vice Governor Acosta, Herrera joined the drinking session and left his nephews in the service jeep. (TSN Jan. 23,
1992, p. 5)
After about an hour, the Salabao brothers alighted and sought shelter in the covered porch of the Bautista's Snack Inn. (TSN, Jan. 23, 1992, p. 6)
Shortly thereafter, Felix Amora, who was among the drinking companions of the Vice Governor and the then Community Development Officer
and Civil Defense Coordinator, stepped out of the inn and saw the Salabao brothers. Irked because Cbl. Leo Salabao failed to salute him, Amora
confronted the former and ordered Cbl. Salabao to salute him. Cbl. Salabao countered that since Amora was not known to him as a PC officer and
was in civilian clothes he was not compelled to salute him.(Ibid.) Their argument got the attention of Herrera who went out to pacify them. He then
asked Amora and the Salabao brothers to get inside. (TSN, Jan. 22, 1992, p. 10) Once inside, Cbl. Salabao sat at the right side of Almeda while
Amora sat opposite Almeda at the left side of Herrera. (TSN, Jan. 22, 1992, p. 12-14) Donato Salabao, on the other hand, sat near the counter. (TSN,
Jan. 23, 1992, p. 7)
Unknown to the Salabao brothers, during the past hour, Herrera had himself been arguing with Vice Governor Acosta because of the latter's
accusation that Herrera was involved in anomalous transactions. (TSN, Jan. 22, 1992, p. 7-9)
A short time after the Salabao brothers had seated themselves, Herrera's argument with Acosta resumed. At this juncture Acosta stood up,
presumably to pay for the beer he had ordered, and whispered something to Almeda. Almeda promptly grabbed the barrel of the armalite rifle
which Cbl. Salabao carried with him and pushed it down. (TSN, Jan . 22, 1992, p. 16; TSN, Jan. 23, 1992, p. 8) Simultaneously, Almeda pulled out
his .45 caliber pistol pointed it at Cbl. Salabao's head and shot the latter in the left temple. As Cbl. Salabao staggered Almeda fired five more shots
felling (sic) the former. (TSN, Jan. 22, 1992, p. 20-21; TSN, Jan. 23, 1992 p. 12) After which Almeda picked up Cbl. Salabao's armalite, cocked it and
than (sic) pointed it at Donato Salabao who immediately raised his hands. (TSN, Jan. 23, 1992 p. 13) Almeda then left along with the Vice Governor
and his companions. The following day, at approximately 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Almeda was arrested by a group of PC Constables. (TSN,
Feb. 18, 1992 p. 3-4)[6]
The petition is not impressed with merit. A party who invokes the justifying circumstance of defense of strangers has the burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence the exculpatory cause[7] that would save him from conviction. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and
not on the weakness of the evidence for the prosecution for even if the latter's evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved[8] and will not exculpate
the former from his categorical admission as the author of the killing. The Court is convinced upon scrutiny of the evidence that petitioner failed to
discharge this burden.
Article 11 (3) of the Revised Penal Code provides:
"Justifying Circumstance. The following do not incur any criminal liability:
3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance
of this article are present and that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive "
This circumstance of defense of strangers has three requisites:[9]
(1) unlawful aggression;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
(3) the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.
The first and crucial requisite for defense of strangers to prosper is absent in this case. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and
unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life or limb of a person.[10] The mere cocking of the M- 14 rifle by the victim (Cbl. Salabao) without
aiming the firearm at any particular target, is not sufficient to conclude that the life of the Vice-Governor, Herrera or even of Amora was in
imminent danger. A threatening or intimidating attitude per se does not constitute unlawful aggression. [11] Even a mysterious whisper poses no
danger. There is nothing from the act of the victim in trying to stand up, from which the Court may infer that the life of the person (the Vice
Governor) whom petitioner was allegedly protecting, was under actual threat or attack from the victim.
Besides, assuming that such act of the victim posed an imminent danger, petitioner was able to check if not neutralize such danger, when with a
lightning speed, he held and pointed downward the rifle of the former and simultaneously poked his .45 caliber at the victim's head. Moreover,
when the victim fell down and staggered after petitioner shot him pointblank in the head, any supposed unlawful aggression by the former,
assuming that it has begun, had ceased. If so, the one making the defense has no more right to kill or even wound the former
aggressor.[12] Accordingly, petitioner's contention that "he was forced to fire five more shots to defend the life of the Vice-Governor belongs to the
realm of fantasy. "[13]
Moreover, the number, location and severity of the fatal wounds suffered by the victim belie the claim of defense of stranger but is indicative of a
determined effort to kill.[14] The victim was hit on the vital parts of his body head, lungs, heart, chest and neck.[15]
With the absence of unlawful aggression that can be attributed to the victim, it becomes unnecessary to determine the remaining requisites for they
obviously have no leg to stand on. Thus, in this case, the defense of stranger will not lie, complete or incomplete. [16]
On petitioner's claim that he voluntarily surrendered, the evidence on record disclosed otherwise. Military men acting on order of their superior
officer were tasked to look for and apprehend petitioner. When they spotted him, they surrounded and captured petitioner. Moreover, before he
was captured, petitioner could have easily surrendered to the Vice Governor or to the police station which is a few blocks from his house. Yet, the
record is bereft of any evidence that he made any effort to do so.
The Court does not also agree with petitioner's claim that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of "sufficient provocation on the part of the
offended party immediately preceded the act."[17] To avail of this benefit, it must be shown that the provocation originated from the offended party,
in this case, the victim. However, the records will attest that it was not the victim who provoked the heated confrontation between the ViceGovernor and Herrera, as he has nothing to do with their discussions. Neither was it shown that the victim provoked petitioner into committing
the felonious act. Petitioner and the victim do not know each other, they never met before that incident, and the victim never aimed his rifle at
petitioner. They merely sat beside each other which could hardly be sustained as a provocative act. Moreover, any purported provocation by the
victim on Amora, when the former refused to salute the latter outside the restaurant, could not be considered as a provocation on petitioner since

the latter was not even aware of the saluting incident between the victim and Amora. Thus, the benefit of the mitigating circumstances under
Article 13 (4) of the Revised Penal Code is unavailable to petitioner.
At any rate, the errors assigned by petitioner assail the factual findings and evaluation of witness's credibility by the trial court. It is a settled tenet,
however, that the findings of fact of the trial court is accorded not only with great weight and respect on appeal but at times finality, especially
when such findings are affirmed by the CA and provided it is supported by substantial evidence on record. [18] Upon examination of the evidence in
this case, the Court is convinced that no significant facts or circumstances were overlooked or disregarded by the courts below which if considered
would warrant a reversal of the findings and vary the outcome hereof. [19] With respect to the issue of credibility of witnesses, the appreciation and
assessment thereof is best left to the trial court judge[20] having the unique opportunity of observing that elusive and incommunicable evidence of
the witness' deportment on the stand, a privilege denied to the appellate court.[21] Again, there is nothing in the record that would indicate material
inconsistencies or even improbabilities in the testimony of prosecution's witnesses. Since no arbitrariness or any cogent reasons were cited that
would call for the reversal of the lower court's evaluation of credibility of witness, such evaluations bind this court.[22]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court convicting Rudy Almeda of
homicide and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one ( 1 ) day of prision mayor, as minimum to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one ( 1 ) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum and to pay the heirs of the victim Leo Salabao, a total of P60, 000.00 as
indemnity and damages is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 112721 March 15, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EFREN RIVERO, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Accused-appellant Efren Rivero appeals from the decision of 31 August 1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, at Pili, Camarines
Sur, 1 finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to:
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of Leon Gutierrez the sum of P50,000.00 and the
further sum of P5,000.00, as and for funeral expenses, with costs.
He was tried under an information 2 which was filed on 12 April 1983 and whose accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on or about the 18th day of March, 1982 at Barangay San Ramon, Municipality of Lagonoy, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, armed with
a bolo, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and hack with said bolo, one Leon Gutierrez, who as a result thereof
suffered several fatal hack wounds on his head and other vital parts of his body which directly caused his death.
The facts of the case duly established by the evidence for the prosecution are correctly summarized by the trial court in the challenged decision as
follows:
Efren Rivero is the son-in-law of the deceased Leon Gutierrez; on March 18, 1982 at about 11:30 o'clock in the morning, in San Ramon, Lagonoy,
Camarines Sur, while Leon Gutierrez was walking along a path, with Demetrio San Juan ahead of him, Efren Rivero, from behind Leon Gutierrez,
attacked the latter with a bolo, the first bolo attack hitting the right shoulder of Leon, and the latter, on facing his assailant, received numerous hack
wounds from Efren, totalling 13 incised wounds in all, detailed in Exh. "A", the autopsy report of Dr. Galan; Leon fell dead on the site there he was
attacked by Efren Rivero; while the attack on Leon was taking place, Demetrio San Juan moved back and for fear of being attacked by Efren, fled
from the scene of the incident, and immediately reported the matter to Eufemia Gutierrez, the wife of Leon, who thereupon went to the place of the
incident, finding Leon dead on the path, some 30 meters away from the house of Efren Rivero, and with the help of relatives and friends, brought
the dead Leon to their house; the next day, Leon was autopsied by Dr. Galan, whose findings are detailed in Exh. "A"; the first bolo wound
administered by Efren on Leon's right shoulder immediately disabled Leon, preventing him from offering any resistance at all. 3
The accused-appellant, on the other hand, claimed self-defense. According to him, at or about 8:00 a.m. of 18 March 1982 he went to the house of
the barangay captain of Lojo, Lagonoy, to settle his case with his wife Myrna Gutierrez, a daughter of Leon Gutierrez, whom he caught in
flagrante with her paramour, Danilo Delfino, in their conjugal home. Myrna did not come, but Leon did. The accused-appellant told Leon that he
will not live anymore with his daughter because she committed adultery. Leon reacted by warning him to be careful because he would kill him
before the end of the day. The accused-appellant was frightened, and he returned home, arriving at about 9:00 a.m. At about 11:00 a.m., while he
was inside his house, Leon Gutierrez, who was then armed with a bolo, challenged him to get out because he was going to kill him; as a result, he
was struck with fear. Then, Leon forced open the door and entered his house. Due to his fear, the accused-appellant also got a bolo and told Leon
not to come any nearer, but the latter cornered him against the wall and hacked him. Leon was not able to hit him. He then hacked Leon hitting the
latter on the right shoulder thereby immediately disabling him. He could not recall how many more times he hacked the victim because at that
time he had already lost control of his mental faculties. He thereafter surrendered to the police authorities. 4
The trial court accepted the version of the prosecution. It discredited the version of the accused-appellant thus:
Upon the other hand, this Court cannot believe the version of Efren Rivero that he killed Leon Gutierrez in self defense, having been attacked first
by Leon in his own house, which is preposterous, first: because nothing could have been easier than to have established this fact BY SHOWING TO
THE POLICE at the time he surrendered, THE BLOOD STAINS THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN VISIBLE INSIDE HIS HOUSE, were it true that the
wounding of Leon occurred inside Efren's house; second, Demetrio San Juan testified that the attack occurred at the pathway, and the deceased
was found near the pathway, and 30 meters away from Efren's house.
1. . . . IN FINDING: THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT EFREN RIVERO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER.
2. . . . IN NOT APPRECIATING THE CLAIM OF THE. ACCUSED-APPELLANT THAT HE ACTED IN SELF DEFENSE WHEN THE INCIDENT
HAPPENED.
3. . . . IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE LONE EYE WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION. 5
and submits that the lone issue to be resolved is whether he acted in complete self-defense.
Having admitted that he killed his father-in-law, Leon Gutierrez, the burden of the evidence that he acted in self-defense was shifted to the
accused-appellant. It is hornbook doctrine that when self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the appellant to show that the killing
was justified and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution's evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after his open admission of responsibility for the killing. He
must prove the essential requisites of self-defense, to wit: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (b) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to repel the aggression, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. 6
The accused-appellant maintains that he was able to prove all these requisites. The victim, armed with a bolo, came to his house and challenged
him to a fight and, receiving no positive response from him, the victim thereafter forced himself into his house. 7 The use of a bolo against a bolowielding aggressor was a reasonable means to repel the aggression. Finally, he insists that there was absolutely no provocation on his part; he was
attacked inside his house and the killing took place therein.
We are not persuaded.
The accused-appellant has spun an incredible tale. The victim was found dead some thirty meters away from the house of the accusedappellant. 8 This place corresponds to that indicated by prosecution witness Demetrio San Juan as the spot where the victim was attacked by the
accused-appellant. There is no credible evidence that the victim was able to run away from the house; besides, with the thirteen wounds inflicted
on him, it was physically impossible for the victim to have done so. Then too, the accused-appellant presented no evidence that bloodstains were
found in his house although, as correctly observed by the trial court, if indeed there were bloodstains, he could have pointed them out to the police
authorities immediately after he surrendered to them since they immediately came to the scene of the incident and were even able to recover the
fatal bolo. Moreover, the alleged bolo of the victim was not recovered. It is indubitable to us that the victim was unarmed and was not killed inside
the accused-appellant's house.
Dr. Wilfredo Galan declared that the victim's wound at the back may have been inflicted without his being forewarned of the attack. Thus:
Q So far, the wound that was directed at the back, can it be possible that the deceased is about to face or backtrack?
A The first theory is that, the victim is already on his turning back of the body and the victim does not know anything. That is why there was a
striking area at the back, and he had to face the assailant.

Q But the victim could have avoid or still defend the attack by running away if he do it if he is not also intending to face the assailant?
A The victim is already out of his senses. That is why I have made that theory. 9
This wound at the back strengthens the testimony of prosecution witness Demetrio San Juan that the victim was hacked from behind with a sharp
bladed long bolo called "ginogon" by the accused-appellant who was following the victim while the latter was walking. 10 The victim sustained
thirteen hack wounds while the accused-appellant suffered no harm or injury despite the fact that the former was bigger than him. 11 It is an oftrepeated rule that the presence of a large number of wounds on the part of the victim negates self-defense; instead, it indicates a determined effort
to kill the victim. 12
On the basis of the evidence established by the prosecution and the nature of the injuries inflicted on the victim and considering that the accusedappellant sustained no harm or injury, we are convinced that the victim was attacked from behind; suddenly, unexpectedly, and without warning.
There was, therefore, treachery in the commission of the crime because the accused-appellant employed means, method, or form in its execution
which tended directly and especially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the victim might make. 13
Treachery and evident premeditation are alleged in the information as qualifying circumstances; however, only treachery, which is sufficient to
qualify the killing to murder as defined and penalized in Article 248; of the Revised Penal Code, has been duly established.
On the other hand, we appreciate in the accused-appellant's favor the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and of sufficient threat on
the part of the victim which immediately preceded the killing. 14 It was duly established that immediately after the incident the accused-appellant
surrendered to the police authorities at the Lagonoy Police Station. 15 And, as could be inferred from his testimony, he killed his father-in-law
because at the house of the barangay captain of Lojo at 8:00 a.m. of 18 March 1982 after he told the victim that he cannot live anymore with his
adulterous wife whom he caught in flagrante with her paramour in their conjugal home, the victim warned him to be careful because he would kill
the latter before the end of the day. The accused-appellant could have interpreted this warning as a serious threat and may have prompted him to
decide to eliminate his father-in-law before he could carry out such threat.
Nonetheless, any of the two mitigating circumstances was offset by the alternative circumstance of relationship. 16The remaining mitigating
circumstance would then authorize the imposition of the minimum period of the prescribed penalty. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, a penalty which is comprised of three distinct penalties, viz., a divisible
penalty and two indivisible penalties, each of which, pursuant to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code, shall form a period. Conformably with
Article 64 of the said Code, the proper imposable penalty in this case would thus be reclusion temporal in its maximum period. Since the accusedappellant is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he could be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty whose minimum shall be
within the range of the penalty next degree lower to that prescribed for the offense proved and whose maximum shall be within that so prescribed,
taking into account the modifying circumstances. This penalty next degree lower is prison mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
medium period. The accused-appellant could thus be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prison mayor maximum as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the challenged decision of Branch 32 of the Regional Trial Court
of Camarines Sur in Criminal Case No. P-2100 (formerly T-198) subject to the modification of the penalty which is hereby reduced from reclusion
perpetua to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from Ten (10) years and One (1) day of prison mayor maximum as minimum to
Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months, and One (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.