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Samson v. Restrivera
March 28, 2011
Villarama, Jr., J.
Oswald P. Imbat
SUMMARY: Samson, Department Head, Population
Commission, Trece Martirez City, agreed to help her friend
Restrivera to register the latters lot. She received P50,000
to cover the initial expenses. Samson failed to obtain the
title because it was found out that the lot was government
property. Restrivera demanded the return of the P50,000.
Samson only paid when she was sued for estafa.
Meanwhile, an administrative complaint was filed against
her before the Ombudsman, who found her guilty of
violating Section 4(A)(b), RA 6713, i.e., for failure to comply
with the standard of professionalism. The CA affirmed. The
SC, while disagreeing that Section 4(A)(b) applies, ruling
that it is not a ground for disciplinary action, still found
Samson guilty of conduct unbecoming a public officer for
failure to promptly return the P50,000.
DOCTRINE: Failure to abide by the norms of conduct
under Section 4(A)(b), RA 6713 is not a ground for
administrative disciplinary action.
FACTS:
1. Filipina Samson is a Department Head of the Population
Commission, Trece Martirez City, Cavite.
a. In March 2001, she agreed to help register the lot of
her friend, Julia Restrivera.
b. Samson said that the expenses would reach P150,000
and accepted P50,000 to cover the initial expenses.
c. Samson failed to accomplish her task, because it was
found out that the land is government property.
d. Samson failed to return the P50,000.
2. Restrivera sued Samson for estafa and filed an
administrative complaint for grave misconduct or conduct
unbecoming a public officer against her before the
Ombudsman, for allegedly meddling in an affair that

belongs to another agency and receiving an amount for

undelivered work.
a. The Ombudsman found Samson guilty of violating
Section 4(A)(b) (Professionalism), RA 6713 (Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees).
b. The Ombudsman suspended her for 6 months without
pay, which was reduced to 3 months upon MR.
c. The Ombudsman found that, by accepting payment
with the assurance that she would work for the
issuance of the title, Samson created a perception that
she is a fixer, violating Section 4(A)(b),1 even if she did
not actually deal with the other government agencies
for the processing of title.
d. The Ombudsman stated that, if Samson really intended
to return the money, she could have done so while the
case was still in the barangay conciliation proceedings,
instead of only attempting to pay in the preliminary
investigation of the estafa case. Her belated attempt
to pay was only to avoid possible sanctions.
e. The Ombudsman found that Samson contracted a
Geodetic Engineer to do the survey of the land, when
Samson could have referred Restrivera to the proper
officials.
3. The CA affirmed the Ombudsmans decision. It ruled that:
a. It ruled that the Ombudsman had jurisdiction, even if
the act complained of was a private matter.
b. It also rejected the argument that an isolated act is
insufficient to create a wrong perceptions. It is not
the plurality of the acts that is being punished but the
commission of the act itself.
4. [The estafa case was dismissed.]
5. Samson appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/RULING:

xxx [Officials and employees] shall endeavor to discourage

wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue
patronage.

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1. Does the Ombudsman have jurisdiction (where the case

involves private dealing or the act involved is not related
to the performance of official duty)? Yes.
2. Does the dismissal of the estafa case mean Samson is not
administratively liable? No.
3. Is Samson administratively liable? Yes, but not under
Section 4(A)(b) or for grave misconduct, but for conduct
unbecoming a public officer.
4. Should a lower penalty be imposed in view of the fact
that the case is the first charge against her in her long
years of service? Yes.
RATIO:
1. The Ombudsman has jurisdiction although the act
complained of involves a private deal between them.
a. Under Section 13(1), Article XI, 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsman can investigate on its own or on
complaint by any person any act or omission of any
public official or employee when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, or improper.
b. Under RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989):
i. Section 16 states that the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and nonfeasance committed by any
public officer or employee during his/her tenure.
ii. Section 19 also states that the Ombudsman shall
act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to
acts or omissions which are unfair or irregular.
c. Thus, even if the complaint concerns an act of the
public official or employee which is not serviceconnected, it is within the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman. The law does not distinguish.
2. It is wrong to say that since the estafa case was
dismissed, Samson cannot be found administratively
liable. Administrative cases may proceed independently
of criminal proceedings, and may continue despite the
dismissal of the criminal charges.
3. While Samson may not be held liable under Section 4(A)
(b) or for grave misconduct, she is liable for conduct
unbecoming a public officer.

a. Samson cannot be found guilty of violating Section

4(A)(b). Section 4(A) enumerates the standards of
personal conduct for public officers with reference to
execution of official duties. Thus, contrary to the
interpretation of the Ombudsman and the CA, Samson
may not be penalized Section 4(A), since what is
involved in her case is a private transaction.
b. More importantly, Section 4(A)(b) is not a ground for
administrative disciplinary action.
i. Section 12, RA 6713 authorized the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) to promulgate rules to implement
RA 6713.
ii. In the Implementing Rules, which has the force and
effect of law, Rule V provides for an Incentives and
Rewards System and Rule X enumerates ground for
disciplinary action.
iii. Domingo v. Ombudsman (2009) observed that
under said Implementing Rules: (a) those who
comply with the standards in Section 4 are rewarded
under Rule V, but there is no provision that those
who fail to comply will be sanctioned, and (b) failure
to comply with said standards is not included in the
enumeration of grounds under Rule X.
c. Likewise, Samson is not liable for grave misconduct.
i. Misconduct is a transgression of some established
and definite rule of action. It is grave if it involves
any of the additional elements of corruption, willful
intent to violate the law or to disregard established
rules. Substantial evidence is required.
ii. In this case, Restrivera failed to prove (a) Samsons
violation of an established and definite rule of action
or unlawful behavior or gross negligence, and (b)
any of the aggravating elements.
iii. Restrivera merely pointed to Samsons alleged
failure to observe the mandate that public office is a
public trust.
iv. Restriveras allegation is a serious but unproven
accusation: (a) she did not even say what acts of
interference were done, (b) she did not say in which
agency Samson committed interference.

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v. Causing the survey of the land can hardly be

considered as meddling in the affairs of another
government agency. It does not show that petitioner
made an illegal deal or any deal with any
government agency.
d. However, this does not mean that Samson is absolved
of any administrative liability. [The SC said first that
Samson did not demand money from Restrivera, so she
cannot be held liable for that. It was only after
Restrivera asked for the costs that Samson said
P150,000, and accepted P50,000.]
e. As the Ombudsman found, however, Samson only paid
to avoid possible sanctions. For reneging on her
promise to return the P50,000, Samson is guilty of
conduct unbecoming a public officer.
f. In Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Ong, et al., it was stated that
unbecoming conduct means improper performance
and applies to a broader range of transgressions of
rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice
or logical procedure or prescribed method.
g. Samson should have complied with her promise to
return the amount after failing to accomplish the task
she had willingly accepted. Instead, she waited until
Restrivera sued her for estafa, thus reinforcing the
suspicion that she misappropriated the money. It is
clear that by her actuations, she violated basic social
and ethical norms in her private dealings.
h. Even if unrelated to her duties as a public officer, her
transgression could erode the public's trust in
government employees.
4. As to the penalty, a fine of P15,000 in lieu of the three
months suspension is proper, considering as a mitigating
circumstances Samsons 37 years of public service, the
fact that this is the first charge against her, and that she
already agreed to pay the P50,000. Under Section 53,
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, mitigating circumstances such as length of
service shall be considered. [The court also stated that
[e]ventually, the parties may even find time to rekindle
their friendship.]

DISPOSITIVE:
Samson is guilty of conduct unbecoming a public officer.

PAGC v. PLEYTO
March 23, 2011
Justice Abad
tecskat
SUMMARY: DPWH USec Pleyto failed to disclose his wifes
business interests in his SALNs. The Court found that he was
only guilty of simple negligence for failing to provide more
details in his SALNs. The Court pointed out the fact that he
disclosed that his wife is a businesswoman so, naturally,
they would have business interests. This showed that there
was no intention to conceal his and his wifes business
interests. Pleytos negligence, though, is only simple and not
gross, in the absence of bad faith or the intent to mislead or
deceive on his part.

DOCTRINE:
Negligence is the omission of the diligence which is required
by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.
In the case of public officials, there is negligence when there
is a breach of duty or failure to perform the obligation, and
there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant
and palpable.

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The only concern of the Review and Compliance Procedure is

to determine whether the SALNs are complete and in proper
form. This means that the SALN contains all the required
data.

Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees and Sec

7 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The purpose of R.A. 6713 is "to promote a high standard of

ethics in public service. Public officials and employees shall
at all times be accountable to the people and shall
discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity,
competence, and loyalty, act with patriotism and justice,
lead modest lives, and uphold public interest over personal
interest." The law expects public officials to be accountable
to the people in the matter of their integrity and
competence. Thus, the Court cannot interpret the Review
and
Compliance
Procedure
as
transferring
such
accountability to the Committee.

4. PAGC found Pleyto guilty and recommended to the OP his

dismissal with forfeiture of all govt financial benefits and
disqualification to re-enter govt service. OP approved the
recommendation.

5. In 2005, Exec Sec Ermita ordered PAGC to conduct a

reinvestigation of Pleytos case. PAGC inquired with the DTI
of Region III-Bulacan and found out that Pleytos wife,
Miguela, operated the following businesses:
a. RS Pawnshop registered since May 1993

FACTS:
1. In 2002, the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC)
received an anonymous letter-complaint from alleged
employees of DPWH accusing DPWH USec Salvador Pleyto of
extortion, illicit affairs and manipulation of DPWH projects.

b. M Pleyto Piggery and Poultry Farm registered since

Dec 1998
c. RS Pawnshop-Pulong Buhangin branch registered
since July
2000
d. RSP Laundry and Dry Cleaning registered since
July 2001

2. In the course of PAGCs investigation, it was discovered

that Pleyto did not disclose his wifes business interests and
financial connections in his 1999, 2000 and 2001 SALNs
even though he said therein that his wife is a
businesswoman.

3. PAGC charged Pleyto before the Office of the President

(OP) with violation of Sec 8 of the Code of Conduct and

PAGC also inquired with DPWH regarding their Review and

Compliance Procedure. DPWH said that they merely
reminded their officials of the need to comply with RA 6713
by filing their SALNs on time and had no mechanism of
validating the entries in the SALNs of their more than 19,000
employees.

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RULING: Pleyto guilty of simple negligence only.

6.. MR of Pleyto was denied by the OP. Upon appeal to the
CA, the CA granted Pleytos petitition and permanently
enjoined the PAGC and the OP from implementing their
decisions.

PLEYTOs ARGUMENTS:
1. He and his wife has no business interests of any kind
2. His SALNs were prepared by his wifes bookkeeper
3. He should first be allowed to avail of the review and
compliance procedure in Sec 10 of RA 6713 before he is
administratively charged
4. His failure to indicate his wifes business interests is not
punishable under RA 3019

ISSUES:

1. WON Pleytos failure to disclose his wifes business

interests in his SALNs constitute a violation of Sec 8 of
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees (RA 6713).

2. WON under the Review and Compliance Procedure,

Pleyto should have first been allowed to correct the error in
his SALNs before being charged for violation of RA 6713.

RATIO:
ISSUE 1
1. This is the second time that Pleytos SALNs are before the
court. The first case was filed by PNP-CIDG wherein the
Court held that Pleyto is only guilty of simple negligence.
While the first case involves Pleytos 2001 and 2002 SALNs,
his omissions are identical. Since the facts and issues are
the same, the first case is conclusive upon the present case.
The Court merely quoted its ratio in the first case.
2. On the front page of Pleytos 2002 SALN, it is already
clearly stated that his wife is a businesswoman, and it can
be logically deduced that she had business interests. This is
inconsistent with the intention to conceal his and his wifes
business interests. That they had business interests is thus
readily apparent on the face of the SALN; it is just that the
missing particulars may be subject of an inquiry or
investigation.
3. An act done in good faith, which constitutes only
an error of judgment and for no ulterior motives
and/or purposes, does not qualify as gross
misconduct, and is merely simple negligence. Thus, at
most, Pleyto is guilty of negligence for having failed to
ascertain that his SALN was accomplished properly,
accurately, and in more detail.

4. Negligence is the omission of the diligence which is

required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons,

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of the time and of the place. In the case of public

officials, there is negligence when there is a breach
of duty or failure to perform the obligation, and there
is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant
and palpable. Pleyto was negligent for failing to comply
with his duty to provide a detailed list of his assets and
business interests in his SALN. He was also negligent in
relying on the family bookkeeper to fill out his SALN and in
signing the same without checking or verifying the entries
therein. Pleytos negligence, though, is only simple and not
gross, in the absence of bad faith or the intent to mislead or
deceive on his part, and in consideration of the fact that his
SALNs actually disclose the full extent of his assets and the
fact that he and his wife had other business interests.

5. Gross misconduct and dishonesty are serious

charges which warrant the removal or dismissal from
service of the erring public officer or employee,
together with the accessory penalties so a finding that
a public officer or employee is administratively liable
for such charges must be supported by substantial
evidence.
ISSUE 2
1. Nowhere in RA 6713 does it say that the Review and
Compliance Procedure is a prerequisite to the filing of
administrative
charges
for
false
declarations
or
concealments in ones SALN.
2. The only concern of the Review and Compliance
Procedure is to determine whether the SALNs are
complete and in proper form. This means that the
SALN contains all the required data. If it finds that
required information has been omitted, the appropriate

Committee shall so inform the official who prepared the

SALN and direct him to make the necessary correction.
3. The review of the Committee cannot possibly refer to the
truth and accuracy of the entries for the following reasons:
a. Assuring the truth and accuracy of the answers in
the SALN is the function of the filers oath that to the best
of his knowledge
and information, the data he provides
in it constitutes the true
statements
of
his
assets,
liabilities, net worth, business interests,
and
financial
connections, including those of his spouse and
unmarried
children below 18 years of age. Any falsity in the SALN
makes him liable for falsification of public documents
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code.

b. The law will not require the impossible, namely,

that the
Committee must ascertain the truth of all the
information that
the public officer or employee stated
or failed to state in his
SALNs and remind him of it.
4. In the case at bar, the PAGC succeeded in discovering the
business interest of Pleytos wife only after it subpoenaed
the DTI Bulacan for certified copies of her business
interests there. The Heads of Offices do not have the means
to compel production of documents in the hands of other
government agencies or third persons.
5. The purpose of R.A. 6713 is "to promote a high standard
of ethics in public service. Public officials and employees
shall at all times be accountable to the people and shall
discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity,
competence, and loyalty, act with patriotism and justice,
lead modest lives, and uphold public interest over personal

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interest." The law expects public officials to be accountable

to the people in the matter of their integrity and
competence. Thus, the Court cannot interpret the Review
and
Compliance
Procedure
as
transferring
such
accountability to the Committee.

DISPOSITIVE: Pleyto is guilty of simple negligence only and

forfeits 6 months of his salary from his retirement benefits.

GSIS vs. CSC

June 19, 1995
Kapunan, J.
Mica Maurinne M. Adao

length of service for retirement purposes is the period on

which services are paid on per diem (reimbursement for
expenses incurred in performance of duties) The issue of
lack of contribution during the time they were paid on per
diem basis was raised. SC held they should not be faulted
for it. The equitable solution is to deduct a reasonable
amount corresponding to the contributions which should
have been deducted during the period from the amount of
retirement benefits accruing to them.
DOCTRINES: Government service rendered on a per
diem basis is creditable in computing the length of service
for retirement purposes if the per diem received is actual
compensation for services rendered and not just
reimbursement for expenses incurred (own words)
What should therefore be considered as controlling
in computing the length of service for retirement purposes
would be the nature of remuneration, not the label attached
to it.

*These are MRs on 2 cases2 involving the same issue thus

resolved jointly by the SC
SUMMARY: CSC issued resolutions and orders
requiring GSIS to consider the services of Matilde Belo,
former Vice Governor of Capiz, and Dr. Manuel Baradero,
former Sangguniang Bayan member, on a per diem basis.
GSIS questioned these orders. In 1994, SC held that
government service rendered on a per diem basis is NOT
creditable in computing the length of service for retirement
purposes. Thus, the questioned resolutions and orders of the
CSC were REVERSED. MRs were filed. SC reversed and
affirmed CSC Resolutions. The per diems given to Belo and
Baradero were actual compensation for services rendered.
They are not what the Government Insurance Law is
referring to. What should be excluded in computing the
2

GSIS vs. CSC and Dr. Manuel Baradero; GSIS vs. CSC and
Matilde S. Belo

FACTS: In G.R. No 102449, Respondent Belo held the

position of Vice-Governor of Capiz continuously between
January 5, 1972 up to February 1, 1988. From January 25,
1972 up to December 31, 1979, she held office by virtue of
an election and was paid a fixed salary. From December
31, 1979 up to February 1, 1988, she held the position of
Vice Governor of Capiz in a holdover capacity. She was
paid on a per diem basis from December 31, 1976 to
December 31, 1979; and She was paid a fixed salary from
January 1, 1980 to February 1,1988.
In its June 7, 1989 Resolution on the matter, CSC held that
the services rendered for the first holdover period between
January 31, 1976 to January 1, 1979 was creditable for
purposes of retirement. CSC noted that during the entire
holdover period, respondent Belo actually served on a full
time basis as Vice Governor and was on call 24 hours a day.

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Disagreeing with the CSC's insistence that the period in

which respondent Belo was paid on a per diem basis should
be credited in computing the number of years of creditable
service to the government, GSIS subsequently filed a
petition for certiorari before this court, questioning the
orders of the CSC.
In G.R. No. 98395, the period disputed was served by
respondent Baradero as a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of the Municipality of La Castellana, Negros
Occidental between January 1, 1976 to October 10, 1978
where he was likewise paid on a per diem basis. It is not
disputed that during this period, respondent Baradero
rendered full services to the government as a member of
the Sangguniang Bayan.
Agreeing that per diems were not compensation within the
meaning of Section 1(c) of R.A. 1573 which amended
Section 1(c) of C.A. No. 186, SC granted the petitions in G.R.
Nos. 98395 and 102449, and reversed the CSC Orders and
Resolutions in question. Thus, these MRs were filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not regular service in government
on a per diem basis, without any other form of
compensation or emolument, is compensation within
the contemplation of the term "service with
compensation" under the Government Service
Insurance Act of 1987?
RULING: YES. SC reconsidered its prior ruling.
While what respondents Belo and Baradero received were
denominated as "per diem," the amounts received were
actually in the nature of a compensation or pay. What
should therefore be considered as controlling in both
cases would be the nature of remuneration, not the
label attached to it.

The "per diem" received by Belo was actually paid for in the
performance of her duties as Vice-Governor of Capiz in a
holdover capacity not as the per diem referred to by section
1(c) of R.A. No 1573 which amended Section 1(c) of C.A. No.
186 (Government Insurance Service Act). A closer look at
the aforecited provision, moreover, reveals a legislative
intent to make a clear distinction between salary, pay or
compensation, on one hand, and other incidental
allowances, including per diems on the other. Section
1(c) provides:
(c) Salary, pay or compensation shall be construed as
to exclude all bonuses, per diems, allowances and
overtime pay, or salary, pay or compensation given
to the base pay of the position or rank as fixed by
law or regulations.
In the sense in which the phrase "per diem" is used under
the Government Service Insurance Law, a per diem is a daily
allowance given for each day an officer or employee of
government is away from his home base. This is its
traditional meaning: its usual signification is as a
reimbursement for extra expenses incurred by the
public official in the performance of his duties. Under
this definition the per diem intended to cover the cost of
lodging and subsistence of officers and employees when the
latter are on duty outside of their permanent station.
On the other hand, a per diem could rightfully be
considered a compensation or remuneration attached
to an office. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case
of respondent Belo the per diems received by her
during the period that she acted in holdover capacity
obviously were in the nature of compensation or
remuneration for her services as Vice Governor of the
Province of Capiz, rather than as a reimbursement for
incidental expenses incurred while away from her
home base. It is to be noted that (1) he rendered services
to the government and was paid per diems for every session
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan he attended; (2) According
to CSC, [F]ormer Vice Governor Belo was on a full time

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basis when she served . . . on a hold-over capacity; (3) She

received no other forms of remuneration during the disputed
period.

not absolutely determinative in drawing up criteria for those

who would qualify as recipients of the retirement benefit
system.

The same could be said of the services rendered by

respondent Baradero, who, before and after the period in
question had an unblemished record of service to the
government as a member of the army and as a medical
officer of the Philippine Medicare Commission. The
disputed period was served on a full-time basis
regardless of the denomination given to the
compensation received by him.

It cannot be convincingly asserted that petitioners could not

avail themselves of the benefits of the policy because no
deductions were made from their salaries during the
disputed periods when they were paid on a per diem basis.

While there is no dispute that the law excepting per

diems from the definition of compensation is clear and
requires no interpretation, however, since the term per
diem may be construed either as compensation or as
allowance, it would be necessary for us to inquire whether
the term per diem in the GSIS Law refers to one or the other
signification. As explained above, it is plainly obvious
that per diem as compensation, is not what the law
contemplates. The clear intent of the Government
Insurance Law was to exclude those extra incidental
expenses or incurred on a daily basis covered by the
traditional definition of the term per diem.
Retirement benefits given to government employees in
effect reward them for giving the best years of their lives to
the service of their country. In exchange for their selfless
dedication to government service, they enjoy security of
tenure and are ensured of a reasonable amount of support
after they leave the government. The basis for the provision
of retirement benefits is, therefore, service to government.
While a government insurance system rationalizes the
management of funds necessary to keep this system of
retirement support afloat and is partly dependent on
contributions made by the thousands of members of the
system, the fact that these contributions are minimal when
compared to the amount of retirement benefits actually
received shows that such contributions, while necessary, are

Both Belo and Bradero assumed in good gaith that they are
covered by the GSIS insurance benefits. The deductions are
mandatory. If the GSIS did not deduct, it was by its own
choice:
contributions
were
exacted
from
petitioner before and after the disputed period. To assert
that petitioners would have been entitled to benefits had
they opted for optional deductions at that point misses the
principal fact in issue here, which is the question as to
whether or not the disputed periods should be credited as
service with compensation for the purposes of retirement.
Moreover, the source of GSIS benefits is not in essence
merely contractual; rather, it is a social legislation.
The situation as far as private respondents and the GSIS are
concerned could be rectified by deducting a reasonable
amount corresponding to the contributions which should
have been deducted during the period from the amount of
retirement benefits accruing to them. It would be grossly
inequitable as it would violate the spirit of the
government retirement and insurance laws to
permanently penalize both respondents Belo and Baradero
by ignoring the fact of actual period of service to
government with compensation, and deny them the
retirement privileges that they, for their unselfish service to
the government justly deserve. Under the peculiar
circumstances of the case at bench, the demand for equity
prompts us to regard spirit not letter, and intent, not form,
in according substantial justice to both respondents, where
the law, through its inflexible rules might prove inadequate.

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WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby GRANTED, our

decision dated October 28, 1994 RECONSIDERED and the
questioned resolutions and orders of the CSC requiring GSIS
to consider creditable the services of private respondents on
a per diem basis AFFIRMED.
QUIASON, J., dissenting:
It is the GSIS which has the power to determine what service
is creditable for retirement purposes. Presidential Decree
No. 1146 (Government Service Insurance Act of 1987) vests
such power in the GSIS. It must be emphasized that P.D. No.
1146 is a special law which prevails over Executive Order
No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987).

continuing her membership when she started working for

the local government unit by complying with the
requirements of Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 1573. However, she
failed to exercise such option.
The GSIS is only obligated to grant retirement benefits to its
members. Such obligation exists where there is a contract of
life or retirement insurance between the GSIS and the
government employee. Premiums payable by the members
are the lifeblood of the retirement scheme. These premiums
are actuarially computed and any attempt to do away with
them has an unsettling effect on the entire system.

Prior to Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local

Government Code of 1991, local government units were not
compulsorily covered by the Government Insurance Act (R.A.
No. 186). However, R.A. No. 1573 amending R.A. No. 186,
allowed the optional coverage under the government
insurance system, provided that:
(1) the employee notifies the System in
writing; (2) the employee complies with the
requirements of the System and that he is in
government service when the insurance takes
effect; and (3) after his admission, the
employee shall be eligible to either life or
retirement insurance benefits, or to both, for
which the rates of the premiums or
contributions shall be paid by him, including
the share otherwise payable by his employer
(Sec. 4[b]).
Anent the third issue, it must be borne in mind that the
obligation to pay premiums is equally essential as the period
of services rendered.
In the case of respondent Belo, she never became a
member of the GSIS during her term as Vice-Governor and
Governor of Capiz, nor did she contribute to the System. It
must be emphasized that she then had the option of

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