PEOPLE VS RACHO

Issue:

626 SCRA 633, August 3, 2010

Whether or not the appellant has a ground to assail the validity of his arrest.

Facts:

Held:

On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular
phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent reported the transaction
to the police authorities who immediately formed a team to apprehend the
appellant. The team members posted themselves along thenational highway in
Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in
Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him
as the person he transacted with, and when the latter was about to board a tricycle,
the team approached him and invited him to the police station as he was suspected
of carrying shabu. When he pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a white
envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing
the suspected drug. The team then brought appellant to the police station for
investigation and the confiscated specimen was marked in the presence of
appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the
confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Appellant was charged in two separate informations, one for violation of Section 5
of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the
same law for possessing, dangerous drugs. During the arraignment, appellant
pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.

The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the
accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. We find no cogent
reason to depart from this well-established doctrine. Appellant herein was not
committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Neither did the arresting
officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
had committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of the
arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a
tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a
reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was
committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by
the informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would
have been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been
confiscated. Neither was the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would
allow them to do away with the requisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1
Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office received the "tipped
information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not only
the appellants physical description but also his name. Although it was not certain
that appellant would arrive on the same day, there was an assurance that he would
be there the following day. Clearly, the police had ample opportunity to apply for a
warrant.

On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment convicting appellant of Violation
of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of
Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The
appellant brought the case to SC assailing for the first time he legality of his arrest
and the validity of the subsequent warrantless search.

PEOPLE VS ARANETA
Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of Court of appeals affirming the decision
of RTC Pasig City finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating
the comprehensive drugs act of 2002. The accused argue that the evidence adduced

by the prosecution was not able to establish without a doubt, that the dangerous
drugs presented in court were the very same ones allegedly sold by them. They
insist that the police officers failed to strictly abide by the requirements of the law
as regards the proper custody of dangerous drugs seized in the course of the alleged
buy-bust operation.

The prosecution stands firm by its position that the arrest of the accused and
seizure of the shabu and marijuana were lawful and that the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses were truthful. In the absence of any credible evidence to the
contrary, the police officers are presumed to have regularly performed their official
duty. More importantly, all the elements necessary for the prosecution of the illegal
sale of drugs are present, to wit: 1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object and consideration; and 2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment
therefor. The prosecution asserts that the accused cannot raise for the first time on
appeal the issue on the alleged failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly with
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. At any rate, the prosecution believes that it has
shown that the chain of custody of the seized items was not broken.

The Court also holds that the seized items were admissible. A search warrant or
warrant of arrest was not needed because it was a buy-bust operation and the
accused were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of, and selling, dangerous
drugs to the poseur-buyer. It was definitely legal for the buy-bust team to arrest,
and search, them on the spot because a buy-bust operation is a justifiable mode of
apprehending drug pushers. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby
ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the
lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan.

The seizure made by the buy-bust team falls under a search incidental to a lawful
arrest under Rule 126, Sec. 13 of the Rules of Court, which pertinently provides: A
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a
search warrant. Since the buy-bust operation was established as legitimate, it
follows that the search was also valid, and a warrant was likewise not needed to
conduct it.
ONG VS PEOPLE

Issues:
1. Whether or not the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating the
Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002.
2. Whether or not seized items are admissible.

Ruling: Yes, the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating the
Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002. The Court finds the evidence on record sufficient
enough to sustain the verdict of conviction. It is morally convinced that the accused
are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged against them.

FACTS: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the
Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, saw the accused, who was coming
from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City,
driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the
accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to
wear helmet while driving said motor vehicle that while he and SPO1 Rayford
Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he
noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket;
that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the
pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused
obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a

nickel-like tin or metal container about two 2 to 3 inches in size, including 2

cellphones, 1 pair of scissors and 1 Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container,
he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he
noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction,
the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out
to be 4 plastic sachets, the 2 of which were empty while the other 2 contained
suspected shabu.
Petitioner was convicted for violation of The Dangerous Drugs law. Petitioner claims
that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He
claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was
not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even
assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the
search conducted upon him.

Issue: Whether or not there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no
lawful arrest.

Held: We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular
reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for
review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the
appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial courts decision based on grounds
other than those that the parties raised as errors.
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for
committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason,
arrested. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be
bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual
restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to
the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force,
manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of

arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the
parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general
procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but
the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter;
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the
motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of
authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge that the
officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination,
exert some pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects of
the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most importantly, the typical
traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called
Terry stop, than to a formal arrest. Even if one were to work under the
assumption that petitioner was deemed arrested upon being flagged down for a
traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements
for a valid arrest were not complied with.

This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the
arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that
person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional
rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make
could be used against them. It may also be noted that in this case, these
constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers only after
petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed arrested when he was flagged
down for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then there would

have been no need for him to be arrested for a second timeafter the police
officers allegedly discovered the drugsas he was already in their custody.

drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of
the accused.

Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was
likewise illegal. The following are the instances when a warrantless search is
allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence
in plain view; (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v)
customs search; (vi) a stop and frisk search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident
to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case

ABENES VS CA

It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently

discovered, was not in plain view. It was actually concealed inside a metal
container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately
apparent. Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Neither does the
search qualify under the stop and frisk rule. While the rule normally applies when
a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to
believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons. The foregoing considered,
petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object to the illegality of
his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does
not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the
illegal warrantless arrest.

GR No. 15632014, February 2007

Facts:
Rodolfo Abenes, a barangay chairman, was charged with illegal possession of high
powered firearm and its ammunitions during the election period. Two Informations
were filed for (1) illegal possession of firearms and its ammunitions; and (2)
violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The firearm was confiscated from Abenes at
a checkpoint wherein his vehicle was stopped and he was asked to alight the same
for routine inspection. The police saw the firearm tucked in his waist, and asked him
to produce a license for it. When Abenes could not produce one, the police
confiscated the firearm. It was then found that Abenes was not a registered nor a
licensed firearm holder. The trial court then convicted Abenes on both charges.
Abenes appealed to the CA alleging that the checkpoint was not shown to have
been legally set up, and thathis constitutional right against unlawful search and
seizure was violated. The CA affirmed the trial court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the checkpoint was legally set up.

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any
evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to
the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without
contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute
is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government. The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The
drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous

2. Whether Abenes constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure had
been violated.
Held:
YES. The production of a mission order is not necessary in view of the fact that the
checkpoint was established three days before the May 11, 1998 elections; and the
circumstances under which the policemen found the gun warranted its seizure
without a warrant (plainview).

NO. The law enforcement officers lawfully made an initial intrusion because of the
enforcement of the Gun Ban and were properly in a position from which they
particularly viewed the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, the policemen
came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating Abenes where they saw
the gun tucked into his waist. The gun was in plain view and discovered
inadvertently when Abenes alighted from the vehicle. However, there is insufficient
evidence that the firearm Abenes carried had no license. Thus, for failure of the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Abenes was carrying a firearm
without prior authority, license or permit, the latter must be exculpated from
criminal liability under the illegal possession of firearms law. However, Abenes is still
convicted for violation of the Comelec Gun Ban.

SUSAN ESQUILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 182010, August 25, 2010.
FACTS:
Susan Esquillo was convicted of the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Acts. On the
time of the arrest, two police officers came to Esquillo and another person while
they were transacting. While the officers were coming, one of the officers saw
Esquillo hide a transparent plastic bag with white substance in it. When asked, she
fled but was eventually caught.
Esquillo argues that the arrest was invalid and that the officers planted evidence
against her. The lower cause said that the officers had probable cause to search
Esquillo under the stop-and-frisk doctrine.
ISSUE: Whether the arrest was valid.
RULING

The SC denied the appeal. Firstly, the issue whether the arrest was valid was waived
by the petitioner when she did not quash it before arraignment. The issue was only
raised the first time during appeal on the appellate court.
On regards her arrest, when the officer saw the white substance from a distance,
the plain view doctrine was imposed. When searched the officers followed the
definition and requirements of a valid stop-and-frisk as stated in People v. Chua that he should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and
restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check
the latters outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNOLD MARTINEZ Y NGELES, EDGAR DIZON Y

FERRER, REZIN MARTINEZ Y CAROLINO, and RAFAEL GONZALES Y CUNANAN
G.R. No. 191366

December 13, 2010

Facts:
On September 2, 2006, at around 12:45 oclock in the afternoon, PO1 Azardon was
on duty at the Police Community Precinct II along Arellano Street, Dagupan City,
when a concerned citizen entered the precinct and reported that a pot session was
going on in the house of accused Rafael Gonzales (Gonzales) in Trinidad Subdivision,
Dagupan City. Upon receipt of the report, PO1 Azardon, PO1 Alejandro Dela Cruz,
and members of the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team went to Trinidad
Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon inquiry from people in the area, the house of
Gonzales was located.
As the police officers entered the gate of the house, they saw accused Orlando
Doria coming out of the side door and immediately arrested him. Inside the house,
they saw accused Gonzales, Arnold Martinez (A. Martinez), Edgar Dizon (Dizon), and
Rezin Martinez (R. Martinez) in a room. The four were surprised by the presence of
the police. In front of them were open plastic sachets (containing shabu residue),
pieces of rolled used aluminum foil and pieces of used aluminum foil.

The accused were arrested and brought to the police precinct. The items found in
the room were seized and turned over to the Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime
Laboratory Officer, P/Insp. Maranion. The accused were subjected to a drug test
and, except for Doria, they were found to be positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
On February 13, 2008, the RTC found the accused ARNOLD MARTINEZ y Angeles,
EDGAR DIZON y Ferrer, REZIN MARTINEZ y Carolino, and RAFAEL GONZALES y
Cunanan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Possession of Dangerous
Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings defined and penalized under
Section 13 in relation to Section 11, Article II of Republic Act 9165, and each of them
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay the fine in the
amount of P500,000.00, and to pay the cost of suit.
The CA ruled that there was sufficient evidence to support the findings of the RTC as
to the constructive possession of the dangerous drugs by the accused. The CA was
of the view that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
was not sufficiently controverted by the accused.
Issue: Whether the guilt Accused-Appellants were proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling: No.
The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused. The
principal reasons are 1] that the evidence against the accused are inadmissible; and
2] that granting the same to be admissible, the chain of custody has not been duly
established.
This case would appear to fall under either a warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest or a plain view search, both of which require a lawful arrest in order to
be considered valid exceptions to the constitutional guarantee.
The facts reveal that the arrest of the accused was illegal and the subject items were
confiscated as an incident thereof. According to the testimony of PO1 Azardon and
his Joint Affidavit13 with PO1 Dela Cruz, they proceeded to, and entered, the house

of accused Gonzales based solely on the report of a concerned citizen that a pot
session was going on in said house.
As to paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge that at the time of the arrest, accused had just committed, were
committing, or were about to commit a crime, as they had no probable cause to
enter the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in order to arrest them. As admitted in
the testimony of PO1 Azardon, the tip originated from a concerned citizen who
himself had no personal knowledge of the information that was reported to the
police.
Neither can it be said that the subject items were seized in plain view. The elements
of plainview are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where
they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view"
justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
The apprehending officers should have first conducted a surveillance considering
that the identity and address of one of the accused were already ascertained. After
conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause, then a
search warrant should have been secured prior to effecting arrest and seizure. The
arrest being illegal, the ensuing search as a result thereof is likewise illegal. Evidence
procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted
for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded. The
subject items seized during the illegal arrest are thus inadmissible. The drug, being
the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, its
inadmissibility thus precludes conviction, and calls for the acquittal of the accused.
Numerous lapses and irregularities in the chain of custody belie the prosecutions
position that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject items were properly
preserved.

This Court once again takes note of the growing number of acquittals for dangerous
drugs cases due to the failure of law enforcers to observe the proper arrest, search
and seizure procedure under the law. Some bona fide arrests and seizures in
dangerous drugs cases result in the acquittal of the accused because drug
enforcement operatives compromise the integrity and evidentiary worth of the
seized items. It behooves this Court to remind law enforcement agencies to exert
greater effort to apply the rules and procedures governing the custody, control, and
handling of seized drugs.

ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 89139 August 2, 1990
Facts:

in his possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao
Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed
to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City wherein after a
plea of not guilty and trial on the merits a decision was rendered on October 8, 1987
finding petitioner guilty of the offense The petitioner was asked to show the
necessary license or authority to possess the firearms and ammunitions but failed to
do so.
Not satisfied therewith the petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals
wherein in due course a decision was rendered on February 23, 1989 affirming in
toto the appealed decision with costs against the petitioner.
Issue: Whether petitioners right against unreasonable searches and seizures has
not been violated.

On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and
Pat. Umbra Umpar, both members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the
Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a
surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were within the
premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri"
bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously.

Ruling: No. Between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or

police checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at bar, there is no question
that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it
was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the
petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a
probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the
right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.

They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP.
Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two
notwithstanding his resistance.

It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the
possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for
the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.

They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber
.38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196 1 two (2) rounds of live
ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live
ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the petitioner to the police station
for further investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to
show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found

Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions, hence,
the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not
been violated

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS

G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992
Facts:
On August 8, 1987, the Western Police District received a telephone call from an
informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan
Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of
plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. Two men "looking from side
to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons
and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but
were unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The
suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accusedappellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live
bullets in the chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a
fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken from
them. Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for
investigation by the Intelligence Division.
Issue: Whether or not the accused constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure is violated.
Ruling: Yes.
The Supreme court held that par(a) section 5 Rule 113 of rules of court requires that
a person be arrested 1 After he has committed or while he is actually committing or
is at least attempting to commit an offense 2 In the presence of the arresting
officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar at bar. At the time
of the arrest in question, the accused was merely looking from side to side and
holding his abdomen. There was apparently no offense that has just been
committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by
Mengote in their presence.

The prosecution has not shown that at the time of arrest an offense had in fact just
been committed and that the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information
from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed.
-

ACQUITTED

MANALILI V. COURT OF APPEALS - 280 SCRA 400

Facts:
Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas were patrolling the vicinity of the
Kalookan City Cemetery due to reports of drug addicts roaming the area. They
chanced upon a male (who turned out to be petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon) who
seemed to be high on drugs in front of the cemetery. He was observed to have
reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner.
When Manalili tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and asked
what he was holding in his hands. Manalili tried to resist, but the policemen were
persistent until he yielded his wallet which they examined and found to contain
crushed marijuana residue.
Further examination by the Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI confirmed the
findings. Trial court convicted Manalili of violation of Section 8, Article II, of RA 6425.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
(In his defense, Manalili claimed that he was not walking; that he was riding a
tricycle until the three policemen ordered the driver of the tricycle to stop because
the driver and passenger were allegedly under the influence of marijuana. He
claimed that he was searched and his pants were turned inside-out but nothing was
found. To some extent he implied that the marijuana sample found in his entity was
framed up by the policemen.)

Issue: WON the evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk operation is admissible.

Held: Yes
Ratio: The general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously
secured judicial warrant. However, this is not absolute and exceptions have been
contemplated by the law: Search incidental to a lawful arrest; Search of moving
vehicles; Seizure in plain view; and Customs search.
Waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and
seizure. In the cited cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable
cause as essential requirement. Probable cause (in relation to search and seizure):
Existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item,
article, or object sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and
destruction by law is in the place to be searched.
A stop-and-frisk operation is another exception to the general rule. In this case,
probable cause was established with Manalilis suspicious behaviour.
A stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police
officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapons. It
has been held as one of the exceptions to the general rule against searches without
warrant.

Esquillo hide a transparent plastic bag with white substance in it. When asked, she
fled but was eventually caught.
Esquillo argues that the arrest was invalid and that the officers planted evidence
against her.
The lower court said that the officers had probable cause to search Esquillo under
the stop-and-frisk doctrine.
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid "stop-and-frisk" operation.
RULING: Yes.
The Court held that the questioned act of the police officers constituted a valid
"stop-and-frisk" operation. The search/seizure of the suspected shabu initially
noticed in petitioners possession - later voluntarily exhibited to the police operative
- was undertaken after she was interrogated on what she placed inside a cigarette
case, and after PO1 Cruzin introduced himself to petitioner as a police officer. And,
at the time of her arrest, petitioner was exhibiting suspicious behavior and in fact
attempted to flee after the police officer had identified himself.
Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse petitioner of such a grave offense, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the
trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses prevail over that of petitioner.
The SC denied the appeal.

SUSAN ESQUILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 182010. August 25, 2010.
FACTS:
Susan Esquillo was convicted of the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Acts. On the
time of the arrest, two police officers came to Esquillo and another person while
they were transacting. While the officers were coming, one of the officers saw

(INSERT VEROY TO BOC)

(INSERT RIETA AND SALVADOR)

PEOPLE VS. DE GRACIA

[GR 102009-10, 6 July 1994]
Facts: At the height of the December 1989 coup detat staged against the
Government, the members of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of
the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) bombarded various establishments and military
camps in Metro Manila with their tora-tora planes and took over the Villamor Air
Base, the Headquarters of the Philippine Army, the Army Operations Center, the
government television station, and the Greenhills Shopping Center in San Juan.
The accused in this case was charged with the crime of illegal possession of
ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion.
According to the military officers involved, said establishment was being used as a
communication command post by the RAM-SFP. However, when they neared the
establishment, they were attacked and fired upon by a group of men. This resulted
in the subsequent raid of the sales office, wherein the military officers discovered
and confiscated high-powered firearms and explosives inside one of the offices.
The officer who first entered the building alleged that he saw the accused inside the
office of the Colonel holding a C-4 while suspiciously peeping through the door. The
accused was arrested and was made to sign an inventory of the explosives and
ammunition confiscated by the raiding team.
The team, however, failed to secure a search warrant prior to the raid. They
attributed this failure to the disorderly circumstances at the time, i.e., the attack of
the nearby Camp Aguinaldo by rebel forces with the simultaneous firing within the
vicinity of the sales office, coupled with the fact that the courts were consequently
closed.
Issue: Whether the military operatives made a valid search and seizure during the
height of the December 1989 coup detat.

Held: It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office
were not armed with a search warrant at that time. The raid was actually
precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters
by the RAM. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and
explosives in the Eurocar Sales Office could not be justifiably or even colorably
explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of
simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby
Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the
surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and
houses therein were deserted.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the case falls under one of the exceptions to the
prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives,
taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to
believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than
sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation
then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a
search warrant from the courts.
The trial judge himself manifested that on 5 December 1989 when the raid was
conducted, his court was
closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could
lawfully be dispensed with.
PEOPLE VS. ANDRE MARTI
[GR 81561, 18 January 1991]

Facts: On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes,
went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang
Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them 4 gift-wrapped packages. Anita
Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them.

Marti informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich,
Switzerland. Marti filled up the contract necessary for the transaction. Anita Reyes
did not inspect the packages as Marti refused, who assured the former that the
packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in
Zurich.
Before delivery of Marti's box, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita
(Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final
inspection, where a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. Job pulled out a cellophane
wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves, and took several grams
of the contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the
shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he
extracted from the cellophane wrapper. At the Narcotics Section of the NBI, the box
containing Marti's packages was opened, yielding dried marijuana leaves, or cakelike (bricks) dried marijuana leaves.
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate Marti but to no avail, inasmuch as the
latter's stated address was the Manila Central Post Office. Thereafter, an
Information was filed against Marti for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
Issue: Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of the accused's
constitutional rights, be invoked against the State.
Held: In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be
invoked against the State. The contraband herein, having come into possession of
the Government without the latter transgressing the accused's rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same
should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged. The
mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by
Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely
to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed

that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not
search.
If the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without
the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law
enforcers, is involved.
In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit
of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION VS NLRC

[GR 113271, 16 October 1997]
FACTS: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp.
Catolico sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, the
normal selling price is P320 per unit. Catolico overcharged by P64 per unit for a total
of P640. YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a refund for the jacked-up price.
It was sent in an envelope addressed to her. Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug
Corp. opened the envelope and saw that there was a check for P640 for Catolico.
Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty.
NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being
rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants.
Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of
ones person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government.

ISSUE:
Whether Waterous act of opening an envelope from one of its regular suppliers is
contrary to the injunction against unreasonable search and seizure and a persons
right to privacy of communication.
HELD:
In light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of ones person from
interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government. The Court finds no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People
vs. Marti that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches
and seizures perpetrated by private individuals.
It is not true that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the
contrary, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Herein,
there was no violation of the right of privacy of communication, and Waterous was
justified in opening an envelope from one of its regular suppliers as it could assume
that the letter was a business communication in which it had an interest.
However, Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due process requires that an
employee be apprised of the charge against him, given reasonable time to answer
the charge, allowed ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and assisted
by a representative if the employee so desires.
Thus, the decision and resolution of the NLRC are affirmed except as to its reason
for upholding the Labor Arbiters decision, viz., that the evidence against Catolico
was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her constitutional rights of
privacy of communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures, which
was set aside.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. OCTAVIO MENDOZA y

LANDICHO, accused-appellant.
[G.R. No. 109279-80. January 18, 1999]
FACTS:
On the night of November 11, 1988, one Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza was shot to
death. The trial court found her husband, Octavio Mendoza, responsible for her
death. However, the real victim of this unfortunate occurrence is the spouses only
minor child, Charmaine Mendoza, who is now left to the care of her maternal
grandparents.
For the death of his wife Cecilia Mendoza, accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza was
separately charge with parricide and illegal possession of firearm and ammunition
under two Informations, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 636
That on or about the 11th day of November, 1988, in the Municipality of Las Pias,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill and without justifiable motive, did, then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot with a .38
caliber revolver one Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza, his wife, thereby inflicting upon her
serious and mortal gunshot wounds which directly caused her death.
Criminal Case No. 637
That on or about the 11th day of November, 1988, in the municipality of Las Pias,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
in his possession, control and direct custody a firearm one .38 caliber revolver, Colt
with Serial No. 41001 and Four (4) live ammunitions use in the crime of parricide,
without first securing the necessary license or permit therefor.
ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a violation on the constitutional right to privacy

of the accused.

HELD:
Accused-appellant denied having and possessed the .38 colt revolver with Serial
Number 41001, the fatal weapon, and even implied that the gun belongs to the
victim. According to accused-appellant, there had been a dispute between him and
his wife over the unlicensed .38 caliber gun which his wife carried wherever she
went, and not about the fact that his wife was having an illicit relationship with
another man.
But this claim is believed by the overwhelming evidence pointing to accusedappellant as the possessor of the fatal weapon. Charmaine testified that the fatal
gun, when exhibited in court, was the gun she saw on the night her mother was
shot. And weeks earlier, she said, it was the same gun which she saw with his
father. Defense witness, Antonio Gabac, when asked by the Las Pias police
investigators to surrender the gun, claimed that the same was surrendered to him
by accused-appellant shortly after the shooting incident. The possession of the fatal
gun by accused-appellant is further established by the memorandum receipt signed
by accused-appellant himself and a mission order authorizing him to carry the said
weapon (p. 66, Rollo). But accused-appellant claims that these documents were
illegally procured in grave violation of his constitutional right to privacy of
communication and papers, and/or his right against unreasonable search and
seizure (p. 154, ibid.).
The Solicitor General is correct in explaining that such right applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies. The case in point is People
vs. Marti (193 SCRA 57 [1991]) where this Court had the occasion to rule that the
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the
immunity of ones person from interference by government and it cannot be

extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit

of alleged unlawful intrusion.
In the instant case, the memorandum receipt and mission order were discovered by
accused-appellants father-in-law Alipio Eusebio, a private citizen. Certainly, a
search warrant is dispensable.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BASHER BONGCARAWAN y
MACARAMBON, accused-appellant.
[G.R. No. 143944. July 11, 2002]
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Decision dated December 27, 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal Case No. 06-7542, finding accused Basher
Bongcarawan y Macarambon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section
16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon was charged in an Information which
reads, thus:
That on or about March 13, 1999, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, without authority of law, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody
and control eight (8) packs of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug
commonly known as Shabu, weighing approximately 400 grams, without the
corresponding license or prescription.
Contrary to and in violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA 7659.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the confiscated drugs were admissible as evidence in court against
the accused/ appellant.

government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against

unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.

HELD:

There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and
seizure performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered as one
conducted by the police authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and
tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is
a private employee and does not discharge any governmental function. In contrast,
police officers are agents of the state tasked with the sovereign function of
enforcement of the law. Historically and until now, it is against them and other
agents of the state that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
may be invoked.

The accused-appellant contends that the Samsonite suitcase containing the

methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu was forcibly opened and searched
without his consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful
search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him. He also
contends that People v. Marti[15] is not applicable in this case because a vessel
security personnel is deemed to perform the duties of a policeman.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected
by the Constitution.[16] Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[17] Whenever this right is
challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional
protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search and seizure. It should
be stressed, however, that protection is against transgression committed by the
government or its agent. As held by this Court in the case of People v. Marti,[18]
*i+n the absence of governmental interference, liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.*19+ The constitutional
proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed
only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the
law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.[20]
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the
vessel security personnel. It was only after they found shabu inside the suitcase
that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of
the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out without

(INSERT PEOPLE vs JOHNSON to CANTON)

(INSERT PEOPLE vs CONDE to GUANZON vs DE VILLA)
GAANAN VS. IAC
G.R. No. L-69809; October 16, 1986
FACTS:
In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client
Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence discussing the
terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed against
Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions, Pintor made
a telephone call to Laconico.
That same morning, Laconico telephoned Atty. Gaanan to come to his office and
advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer
went on a business trip.
When Pintor called up, Laconico requested Gaanan to secretly listen to the
telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the

proposed conditions for the settlement. Gaanan heard Pintor enumerate the
conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault.

the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear,

intercept, or record the spoken words.

Pintor called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the
office of the Department of Public Highways, but the latter insisted that Pintor
himself should receive the money. And when he received the money at a restaurant,
Pintor was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone,

dictagraph, or other devices enumerated in Sec. 1 of the law as the use thereof
cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. This section
refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the
party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of
common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording
a telephone conversation. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for
that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.

Gaanan executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard

complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault.
Pintor then charged Gaanan with violation of RA 4200 for listening to the telephone
conversation without the formers consent.
The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Sec. 1 of R.A.
4200. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court,
holding that the communication between Pintor and Laconico was private in nature
therefore was covered by RA 4200; and that the petitioner overheard such
communication without the knowledge and consent of the complainant; and that
the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the
telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered in the term
device as provided in R.A. 4200.
ISSUE:
WON an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of R.A. 4200
such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute an unlawful
interception of communication between two parties using a telephone line.
HELD:
NO.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement"
for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the
communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or

Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in

favor of the accused. Thus in the case of doubt as in this case, on WON an extension
telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement" the penal statute must
be construed as not including an extension telephone. A perusal of the Senate
Congressional Record shows that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through
punishment, persons such as government authorities or representatives of
organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court
or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone
users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must
strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in R.A. 4200 or others of similar
nature.

STONEHILL, et. al VS. HON. JOSE DIOKNO

20 SCRA 283 (1967)
FACTS:
42 search warrants were issued against petitioners (Stonehill, et.al) and the
corporations of which they were officers. The search warrants were directed to the
any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their

offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the
following personal property:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or
papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance
sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the
warrants in question may be split into 2 major groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the corporations, and
(b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners
Petitioners alleged that the search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court because:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be
seized;

RULING:
1.
YES. The SC held that petitioners have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made, for the simple reason
that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from
the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or
of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they
hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed
of by third parties.
Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence
against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the
admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to
whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers
in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.

(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned
petitioners in deportation cases filed against them;

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions
were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the
petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature.

(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and

2.

(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts
that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law.

The Constitution provides that:

ISSUES:

(1)
that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and

1.
WON the warrants for search and seizure in the offices of the corporations
were legal/lawful;

(2)

(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;

2.
WON the warrants for search and seizure in the residences of the
petitioners were legal/lawful

NO.

that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants.
Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and
juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other
words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments
thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence
of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof
that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely
one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would
place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This
is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitution to outlaw the socalled general warrants which are contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the
spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.

PASTRANO VS. CA
G.R. No. 104504; October 31, 1997
FACTS:
On February 13, 1989, a group of students went to see Capt. Rodolfo Maoza,
intelligence operations officer of the Philippine Constabulary in Oroquieta City. They
reported having seen Clyde Pastrano beaten up by his father, petitioner Pedrito
Pastrano. The students were willing to testify but expressed fear of the petitioner
who, according to them, had firearms. Clyde Pastrano had died and it was suspected
he had been the victim of foul play.

On February 20, 1989, two sons of Pedrito Pastrano by his estranged wife James
Clement G. Pastrano and Clinton Steve G. Pastrano also saw Capt. Maoza,
seeking his assistance in connection with the death of their brother Clyde. The
brothers reported that their father and his common-law wife were keeping
unlicensed firearms in their house. They executed a joint affidavit on February 20,
1989 in which they stated that they had personal knowledge of the fact that their
father Pedrito Pastrano was keeping three (3) firearms of different calibers in the
bedroom of his house.
On the basis of the affidavit of the Pastrano brothers, Capt. Maoza applied for a
search warrant on the same day.
After examining complainant and the two brothers, Judge Teodorico Durias of the
MTC of Oroquieta City issued a search warrant which Capt. Maoza and his men
later served at the residence of Pedrito Pastrano. Seized from petitioner's dwelling
was a sack containing the following:
1 Revolver Cal. 22 Magnum; 1 round ammunition for Cal. 22 Magnum; 1 Revolver
Cal. 32; Six rounds of live Ammunition for Cal. 32 revolver.
On January 14, 1991, the trial court rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty,
even as it found his common-law wife, Erlinda Ventir, innocent of the charge.
ISSUE:
WON the Search Warrant issued by Judge Durias is invalid for failure to comply with
the basic requirements of the Constitution.
HELD:
NO. Although petitioner contends that Capt. Maoza, who applied for the search
warrant, did not have personal knowledge of the facts on which the warrant was
based, the trial court actually examined the two brothers, James Clement and
Clinton Steve Pastrana. These two were the ones who reported the matter to Capt.
Maoza. They gave information of the illegal possession of firearms by their father

on the basis of personal knowledge. Their testimonies, not that of Capt. Maoza,
formed the basis of the trial court's finding of probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant.
Petitioner also assails the absence of a written deposition showing that the judge
had examined the complainant and his witnesses by means of searching questions
in writing and under oath as required by Rule 126, 4 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure. But although this is a ground for quashing a search warrant in this case,
petitioner did nothing to this end. He did not move to quash the information before
the trial court. Nor did he object to the presentation of the evidence obtained as
being the product of an illegal search.
Petitioner thus impliedly waived any objection based on the illegality of the search.
The right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, like any other
right, can be waived and the waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.

ABERCA VS. VER

G.R. No. L-69866; April 15, 1988
FACTS:
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the
rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian
Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT)
underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow
disturbances in Metro Manila."
Plaintiffs allege that complying with said order, the TFM raided several places,
employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that certain
members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items
belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued

by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of
relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to
silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats,
tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory
information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of
plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to
forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to
terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and
sanctioned by defendants.
Seeking to justify the dismissal of the complaint, the respondents postulate the view
that as public officers, they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit
for acts done in the performance of official duties or function. They are members of
the AFP and their primary duty is to safeguard public safety and order. The
Constitution no less provides that the President may call them "to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger
thereof."
ISSUE:
Whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil
action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other
violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution.
HELD:
NO. The SC finds respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from
suit totally misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents actually involved acts done
by officers in the performance of official duties written the ambit of their powers.
It may be that the respondents, as members of the AFP, were merely responding to
their duty. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission
untrammeled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the
rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the

Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all
officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code, which renders any public officer or employee or any
private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and
liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from
responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy
petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention
and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render
valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right
of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus
as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated
"directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the
ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its
violation. The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply
set forth in the complaint. General Ver, who ordered the raid, is therefore also held
liable together with the members of the TFM.
FORBES VS CHUOCO
FACTS:
In 1910, Respondent Chuoco Tiaco and other Chinese citizens were expelled from
the Philippines and returned to China under the orders of the Petitioner W.
Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, with the said expulsion
carried out in the public interest of the Government and at the request of the
proper representative of the Chinese Government. Having been able to return to
the Philippines, he feared that he should be again deported by the said defendants,
concluding with a petition that a preliminary injunction should be issued against the
plaintiffs in this case prohibiting them from deporting the respondent and to pay
him P20,000 as an indemnity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the (executive) government has the power to deport aliens without
due process of law
RULING:
Yes, the government has the power to deport aliens without due process of law.
It has been repeatedly decided when a government is dealing with the political
rights of aliens that it is not governed by that "due process of law" which governs in
dealing with the civil rights of aliens. For instance, the courts of the United States
have decided that in the deportation of an alien he is not entitled to right of trial by
jury, the right of trial by jury being one of the steps in the "due process of law" in
dealing with civil rights
It is also admitted that the act of the Governor-General in deporting the defendant
was in compliance with a request made by the official representative of the Imperial
Government of China. It would seem, therefore, that said request, in the absence of
any other power, would be sufficient justification of his act. The mere fact that a
citizen or subject is out of the territory of his country does not relieve him from that
allegiance which he owes to his government, and his government may, under
certain conditions, properly and legally request his return.
This power to deport or expel obnoxious aliens being invested in the political
department of the Government, the judicial department will not, in the absence of
express legislative authority, intervene for the purpose of controlling such power,
nor the purpose of inquiring whether or not he is liable in damages for the exercise
thereof.

PEOPLE VS DELA CRUZ

FACTS:
Respondent Dela Cruz was the family driver of the petitioners. He was accused of
raping the 6-year old daughter of the said family when he kissed, touched the
genitals and played with the girl and assured her that it was just a father-mother
plaything. Later that day, the girl told her parents of respondents acts. According
to respondent, the girls father was so angry at him the next day that he him and
banged his head against the garage wall. After the girls mother pacified her irate
husband, barangay officials arrived and brought accused-appellant to the police
station. Once there, accused-appellant was charged with molesting the girl.
Respondent states that while he has been detained since April 26, 2000, his
arraignment came only on March 2, 2001 and the prosecution started to present its
evidence only on May 9, 2001. To compound matters, the prosecution was not
deemed to have terminated its presentation of evidence until April 14, 2004.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused- appellants right to speedy trial was violated
RULING:
No, his right to speedy trial was not violated.
Accused-appellant never invoked in the RTC that he has been deprived of his right to
speedy trial and speedy disposition of case. As it is, any allegation of violations of
rights should first be ventilated with the RTC concomitant with the prayer to dismiss
the case with prejudice. It is a bit too late in the day for herein accused- appellant to
invoke now his right to speedy trial. By raising this point belatedly with the CA,
accused-appellant has thus waived his objection and accordingly forfeits his right to
the aforesaid constitutional guarantees
The right to speedy trial, as an adjunct to the right of all persons to a speedy
disposition of their cases before judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, requires that

court proceedings should be conducted according to fixed rules and must be free
from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. The same right may also be
considered violated when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the parties having their case tried.[14] None of these
circumstances are, to us, present in the instant case. While perhaps there might
have been delays, accused-appellant does not state in some detail what or who
caused the delays, or whether these are of the vexatious or oppressive kind.
PEOPLE VS AGOJO
FACTS:
Respondent Agojo was arrested via a buy-bust operation, and then was
subsequently convicted by the trial court and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
death. First, a civilian reported to the police of the drug activities being conducted
by the Respondent in their area. A police team was dispatched to conduct the said
buy-bust operation to apprehend Agojo. From the spot where the buy-bust team
was, they witnessed the sale of shabu took place. After their insider had signalled
the buy-bust team when he received the VHS tape (where the drug was concealed)
from respondent, the Head of the operation approached the insider and
immediately examined the tape. Soon thereafter, he executed the ruse to make
respondent to go down, as the latter had in the meantime gone up his hide-out. The
ruse succeeded when respondent went down, and he was arrested right then.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest of Agojo is proper even though the arrest was made
without a warrant?
Ruling:
YES. The arrest of Agojo is proper even though the arrest was made without a
warrant.

The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court, which states: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant ; when lawful. A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When,
in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact been
committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and, (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another. The second instance of lawful
warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (b) cited above necessitates two stringent
requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just
been committed; and (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. A review of the
records shows that both requirements were met in this case
In this case, appellant points to the arrest not being in flagrante delicto, the
existence of discrepancies in the serial numbers of the buy-bust money and a prior
attempt to frame him up as proofs of the frame-up. However, the fact that the
arrest was not in flagrante delicto is of no consequence.
PEOPLE VS TAN
FACTS:
Bobby Tan was the head of a wealthy extended family. In his house lived his
immediate family members, along with respondents Jan Tan (his illegitimate child)
and his other illegitimate brother Archie. Respondents were accused of murdering
most of their family members in the said house. They were said to have nurtured ill
feelings towards their stepmother and siblings, as well as constantly having heated
arguments with their father. Respondents claimed that they were away when the
crimes took place at the house. But evidence shows that the two were still at home
when the killings happened.

At first, the RTC found no probable cause against respondents Archie and Jan-Jan.
Judge Aguilar thus granted their motion to suspend the issuance of warrants for
their arrest and to defer the proceedings. Upon a motion, RTC reversed the order
and found probable cause against respondents Archie and Jan Tan this time and
ordered the issuance of warrants for their arrest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is probable cause to warrant the arrest of the accused
RULING:
Yes, there was probable cause to warrant the arrest of the accused.
Probable cause assumes the existence of facts that would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that a crime has been committed and that it was likely
committed by the person sought to be arrested. It requires neither absolute
certainty nor clear and convincing evidence of guilt. The test for issuing a warrant of
arrest is less stringent than that used for establishing the guilt of the accused. As
long as the evidence shows a prima facie case against the accused, the trial court
has sufficient ground to issue a warrant for his arrest.
Here, admittedly, the evidence against respondents Archie and Jan-Jan is merely
circumstantial. The prosecution evidence shows that they had motive in that they
had been at odds with their father and stepmother. They had opportunity in that
they were still probably home when the crime took place. Archie took two pairs of
new gloves from his car late that evening. Their stepmother was apparently
executed inside Archies room. The separate rooms of the two accused had, quite
curiously, been wiped clean even of their own fingerprints. A trial, unlike
preliminary investigations, could yield more evidence favorable to either side after
the interrogations of the witnesses either on direct examination or on crossexamination. What is important is that there is some rational basis for going ahead
with judicial inquiry into the case.

ONG VS GENIO
FACTS:
Petiitoner Ong filed a criminal complaint for Robbery (of his kitchen and canteen
equipment as well as her personal things) against respondent Genio. The RTC
however dismissed the case because the other elements of the crime of Robbery,
specifically the elements of intent to gain, and either violence against or
intimidation of any person or force upon things, were not specifically alleged in the
Information filed against respondent; that the information should be dismissed in its
entirety for lack of probable cause.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that the RTC erred in relying
on Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, since the said
provision relates to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, and it does not cover the
determination of probable cause for the filing of the Information against
respondent, which is executive in nature, a power primarily vested in the Public
Prosecutor. The RTC denied the same motion, stating that RTC has the power to
evaluate not only the resolution of the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary
investigation and eventually filed the Information in court, but also the evidence
upon which the resolution was based. In the event that the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause, the RTC may dismiss the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the regional trial court has authority to dismiss the information on
the ground of lack of probable cause
RULING:
Yes, the regional trial court has authority to dismiss the information on the ground
of lack of probable cause. The RTC judge, upon the filing of an Information, has the
following options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to
establish probable cause; (2) if he or she finds probable cause, issue a warrant of
arrest; and (3) in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause, order the

prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice, the issue to
be resolved by the court within thirty days from the filing of the information.
Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure clearly provides:
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Court.
Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He
may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a
commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant
issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of
doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be
resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or
information.
(INSERT PEOPLE VS PEPINO to PEOPLE VS MARTINEZ)
ONG VS PEOPLE
FACTS: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the
Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, saw the accused, who was coming
from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City,
driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the
accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to
wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle that while he and SPO1 Rayford
Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he
noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket;
that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the
pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused
obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a
nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including

two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing
the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened
the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon
his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table
which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty
while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.

other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the
belief and impression that submission is necessary.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general
procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but
the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter;

Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no
lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was
erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of
the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had
never consented to the search conducted upon him.

Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the
motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of
authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge that the
officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination,
exert some pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects of
the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most importantly, the typical
traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x

Issue: Whether or not there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no
lawful arrest.

In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called
Terry stop, than to a formal arrest.

Held: We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular
reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for
review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the
appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial courts decision based on grounds
other than those that the parties raised as errors.

Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed
arrested upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the
issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied
with.

Petitioner was convicted for violation of The Dangerous Drugs law.

First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for
committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason,
arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the
one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of
the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is
enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the

This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the
arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that
person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional
rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make
could be used against them. It may also be noted that in this case, these
constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers only after
petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed arrested when he was flagged
down for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then there would
have been no need for him to be arrested for a second timeafter the police
officers allegedly discovered the drugsas he was already in their custody.

Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was
likewise illegal. The following are the instances when a warrantless search is
allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence
in plain view; (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v)
customs search; (vi) a stop and frisk search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident
to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.

The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the
very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their
inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.

It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently

discovered, was not in plain view. It was actually concealed inside a metal
container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately
apparent.

On July 5, 2002, a confidential informant arrived at the Station Drug

Enforcement Unit (SDEU) of the Pasig City Police Station to report to Officer-InCharge SP04 Numeriano de Lara the alleged peddling of illegal drugs of live-in
couple Botong and Malou, later identified as appellants Rolando Araneta y Abella
and Marilou Santos y Tantay. SPO4 de Lara immediately formed a team composed
of SPO2 Dante Zigapan who acted as the team leader, PO2 Danilo Damasco, PO1
Orig, and PO1 Bede Montefalcon, to confirm the veracity of the informants report
and conduct a buy-bust operation.

Neither was there a consented warrantless search.

Neither does the search qualify under the stop and frisk rule. While the rule
normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct,
which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is
merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons.
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to
object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any
evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to
the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without
contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute
is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government.

(INSERT PEOPLE vs QUEBRAL to LUMANOG VS PEOPLE)

PEOPLE VS ARANETA (2010)
FACTS:

SPO2 Zigapan designated PO2 Damasco as the poseur-buyer giving him a marked
P100 bill to be used in the entrapment. The team proceeded to the target area on
board two vehicles. PO2 Danilo Damasco, upon reaching the area in the early
morning of July 5, 2002, he and the confidential informant approached the accused.
After a brief introduction and short conversation, accused Botong went inside their
house while accused Malou received the marked money from the poseur-buyer.
Malou then called Botong who thereafter came out of the house. Malou gave the
marked money to Botong who, in turn, gave Malou a plastic sachet containing a
white crystalline substance. The plastic sachet was then handed over to PO2
Damasco who examined it and immediately gave the pre-arranged signal to arrest
the accused. During the arrest, the marked money was recovered from Rolando and
so were several other plastic sachets containing white crystalline substances
together with a plastic sachet containing marijuana. Subsequently, the accused
were brought to the police station and the seized items were later brought to the
Police Crime Laboratory Office for examination. The laboratory tests gave a positive

result of the presence of methampethamine hydrochloride or what is locally known

as shabu on the contents of 9 sachets and marijuana on 1 sachet.
The trial court found accused Botong and Malou GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of violation of Sec. 5 in relation to Sec. 26, Art. II of R.A. 9165, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. In another criminal case, the
Court finds accused Botong GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 11,
Art. II of R.A. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.
The RTC ruled that all the elements for the prosecution of the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs were present during the buy-bust operation conducted by the
police officers. Aggrieved, the accused appealed to the CA arguing that the RTC
erred in not finding that they were illegally arrested and, as such, the sachets of
shabu allegedly recovered from them were inadmissible in evidence.CA rendered
the subject decision affirming the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE ILLEGALLY ARRESTED
ANDS, AS SUCH, THE SACHETS OF SHABU RECOVERED FROM THEM WERE
INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THEM FOR VIOLATING THE COMPREHENSIVE
DRUGS ACT OF 2002

consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The
manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an
informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money,
and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police
officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding
citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be caught
but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of the police
should not disable courts into ignoring the accuseds predisposition to commit the
crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain
criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts should look at all
factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far
as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement.
Absent any convincing countervailing evidence, the presumption is that the
members of the buy-bust team performed their duties in a regular manner. It was
certainly a job well done. Hence, the Court gives full faith and credit to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

After due consideration, the Court finds the evidence on

record sufficient enough to sustain the verdict of conviction. Doubtless, the
prosecution was able to establish all the necessary elements required in the
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, namely: 1) the identity of the buyer
and seller; 2) the identity of the object of the sale and the consideration; and 3) the
delivery of the thing sold upon payment.

The Court also holds that the seized items were admissible. A search warrant or
warrant of arrest was not needed because it was a buy-bust operation and the
accused were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of, and selling, dangerous
drugs to the poseur-buyer. It was definitely legal for the buy-bust team to arrest,
and search, them on the spot because a buy-bust operation is a justifiable mode of
apprehending drug pushers. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby
ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the
lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In this jurisdiction, the operation
is legal and has been proven to be an effective method of apprehending drug
peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.

The Court stressed that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that
the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This
must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the
offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the

The illegal drugs seized were not the "fruit of the poisonous tree" as the defense
would like the Court to believe. The seizure made by the buy-bust team falls under a
search incidental to a lawful arrest under Rule 126, Sec. 13 of the Rules of Court,
which pertinently provides: A person lawfully arrested may be searched for

RULING:

dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in
the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
Since the buy-bust operation was established as legitimate, it follows that the
search was also valid, and a warrant was likewise not needed to conduct it.
PEOPLE VS UYBOCO (2011)
FACTS:
On 20 December 1993, Nimfa and her wards, siblings Jeson Kevin and Jeson Kirby
Dichaves were abducted and brought to a house in Merville Subdivision, Paraaque.
Nimfa was able to recognize done of the kidnappers as appellant, because she had
seen the latter in her employers office. The kidnappers called Jepson and
demanded for ransom of P26 Million. In one of the calls of the kidnappers,
Jepson was able to recognize the voice of appellant because he had several business
transactions. After, numerous times of negotiation, the parties finally agreed to a
ransom of P1.5 Million, some in ash and the balance to be paid in kind, such as
jewelry and a pistol. Appellant asked Jepson to bring the ransom alone at Pancake
House in Magallanes Commercial Center and ordered him to put the bag in the
trunk, leave the trunk unlocked, and walk away for 10 minutes without turning back.
P/Insp. Escandor and P/Supt. Chan were assigned to proceed to Magallanes
Commercial Center and brought a camera to take photo and video coverage of the
supposed pay-off. He identified Macias together with appellant and the latter as the
one who took the ransom.
Later, appellant checked on his trunk and the bag was already gone. Appellant then
apprised him that his sons and helper were already at the Shell Gasoline Station
along South Luzon Expressway. He immediately went to the place and found his
sons and helper seated at the corner of the gas station. P/Supt. Cruz and his group
was assigned at Fort Bonifacio then heard on their radio that the suspects vehicle, a
red Nissan Sentra was heading in their direction. A few minutes later, they saw the
red car and tailed it until it reached Dasmarias Village in Makati. When said car
slowed down, they blocked it and immediately approached the vehicle. They

introduced themselves as police officers and accosted the suspect, who turned out
to be appellant. Appellant suddenly pulled a .38caliber revolver and a scuffle took
place. They managed to subdue appellant and handcuffed him. Appellant was
requested to open the compartment and a gray bag was found inside. P/Supt. Cruz
saw money, jewelry and a gun inside the bag.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VALID ARREST AND SEARCH WITHOUT
WARRANT
RULING:
The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b) When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and,
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
A search incident to a lawful arrest is also valid under Section 13, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
The instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (b) cited above
necessitates two stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be
effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the person making the
arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has

committed it. Records show that both requirements are present in the instant case.
The police officers present in Magallanes Commercial Center were able to witness
the pay-off which effectively consummates the crime of kidnapping. Such
knowledge was then relayed to the other police officers stationed in Fort Bonifacio
where appellant was expected to pass by. Personal knowledge of facts must be
based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion. Section 5, Rule 113 does not require the arresting officers to personally
witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. It is sufficient for the
arresting team that they were monitoring the pay-off for a number of hours long
enough for them to be informed that it was indeed appellant, who was the
kidnapper. This is equivalent to personal knowledge based on probable cause.
Likewise, the search conducted inside the car of appellant was legal because the
latter consented to such. Even assuming that appellant did not give his consent for
the police to search the car, they can still validly do so by virtue of a search incident
to a lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule 126. In lawful arrest, it becomes both the
duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not
only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter's
reach. Therefore, it is only but expected and legally so for the police to search his
car as he was driving it when he was arrested.

Huyon-huyon. They overtook appellant who was on a bicycle. The police officers
flagged appellant down and found marijuana wrapped in a cellophane and
newspaper together with other grocery items. The amount of P1550.00 was also
found in appellant's possession. The police officers confiscated these items and took
photographs thereof. Appellant was then brought to the headquarters where he
was booked.

PEOPLE VS PENAFLORIDA (2008)

RULING:

FACTS:
SPO3 Vicente Competente (Competente) narrated that in his capacity as chief of the
Investigation and Operation Division of the Philippine National Police (PNP) station
in Tigaon, Camarines Sur, that he received a tip from an asset that a bundle of
marijuana was being transported by appellant to Huyon-huyon from another
barangay in Tigaon, Camarines Sur. Major Domingo Agravante (Agravante), chief of
police of Tigaon, then organized a team composed of Competente as team leader,
SPO2 Ricardo Callo (Callo), SPO1 Portugal, PO3 Pillos and PO2 Edgar Latam. The
team boarded the police mobile car and proceeded to Sitio Nasulan in Barangay

Callo, who was the chief intelligence officer of Tigaon PNP, recounted that at around
1:00 p.m. on 7 June 1994, he was called by Competente and was briefed about the
operation. While they were in Nasulan, the members of the police team caught a
man riding a bicycle who turned out to be appellant. Callo saw the marijuana
wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper in the bicycle of appellant so the latter was
brought to the police headquarters and turned over to the desk officer. .
On 26 October 1998, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of transporting a prohibited drug, a violation of Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE POLICE OFFICERS SHOULD HAVE FIRST INVESTIGATED AND
TRIED TO OBTAIN A WARRANT OF ARREST AGAINST APPELLANT, INSTEAD OF
ARBITRARILY ARRESTING HIM
Appellant resorts to a challenge on the validity of his arrest
predicated on lack of a warrant of arrest. The OSG correctly justifies the failure to
apply for an arrest warrant because at that point, time was of the essence in
appellant's apprehension, noting in the same breath that there is no law requiring
investigation and surveillance upon receipt of tips from assets before conducting
police operations.
The police was tipped off at around 1:00 p.m. that appellant was transporting
marijuana to Huyon-huyon. Certainly, they had no time to secure an arrest warrant
as appellant was already in transit and already committing a crime. The arrest was

effected after appellant was caught in flagrante delicto. He was seen riding his
bicycle and carrying with him the contraband, hence, demonstrating that a crime
was then already being committed. Under the circumstances, the police had
probable cause to believe that appellant was committing a crime. Thus, the
warrantless arrest is justified.
PEOPLE VS SEMBRANO (2010)
On 28 July 2004, two separate Informations against MICHAEL SEMBRANO y CASTRO
alias Takol for (1) illegal sale and (2) illegal possession of shabu, a dangerous drug.
The combined testimonies of PO1 Manaol and PO1 Bagay sought to establish that at
around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of 26 July 2004, an informant of the police
relayed information regarding illicit drugs trade operations conducted by Takol in
the area of Gulod in Novaliches, Quezon City. Superintendent (Supt.) Ramon Perez,
formed a buy-bust team. The group then proceeded for the entrapment operation.
The group arrived at the designated area at around 3:30 oclock in the afternoon.
They waited until appellant arrived at around 5:00 oclock in the afternoon. Upon
appellants arrival, the confidential informant introduced PO1 Manaol to him as an
interested buyer of shabu. PO1 Manaol handed the two marked One Hundred Peso
bills to appellant, who, in turn, handed 1 plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance to him. The transaction having been consummated, PO1 Manaol
executed their pre-arranged signal and scratched his head. When the other
members of the team saw PO1 Manaol execute the pre-arranged signal, they
immediately proceeded to their location and arrested appellant.
After his arrest, the police officers took appellant to the police station where he was
turned over to the desk officer and to the on-duty investigator. Qualitative
examination conducted on the above-stated specimens gave POSITIVE result to the
tests for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
The RTC found accused-appellant guilty as charged. Seeking recourse from his
conviction by the trial court, the appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
via Notice of Appeal. Insisting on his innocence, the defense questioned the

admissibility of the confiscated evidence on the ground of illegality of appellants

arrest. The defense also attacked the credibility of the prosecution witnesses,
claiming their stories are unbelievable and should have led to the dismissal of the
charges. CA sustained the decision of the RTC..
ISSUE: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
APPELLANT WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED AND AS SUCH, THE SACHETS OF SHABU
ALLEGEDLY RECOVERED FROM HIM WERE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
RULING:
The Court found no merit in the appeal.
The defense challenges the RTC and
Court of Appeals rulings, anchored on its claim that the warrantless arrest against
appellant was unlawful. Consequently, applying the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine, any evidence allegedly obtained during such unlawful warrantless arrest
cannot be used as evidence. The defense proffers that the illegal drugs allegedly
seized from appellant during the buy-bust operation should have been declared
inadmissible.
Conviction is proper in prosecutions involving illegal sale of regulated or prohibited
drugs if the following elements are present: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment thereto. What is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually
took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited or regulated
drug.
On the legality of the warrantless arrest, the Court reiterated that appellant was
arrested during an entrapment operation where he was caught in flagrante delicto
selling shabu. When an arrest is made during an entrapment operation, it is not
required that a warrant be secured in line with the provisions of Rule 113, Section
5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court allowing warrantless arrests, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:(a) When, in his presence, the person to

be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an

offense.
For illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs, the prosecution must
establish the following elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object, which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
All the aforesaid elements were established. Finally, this Court held in a number of
cases, that mere possession of a regulated drug per se constitutes prima facie
evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent
a satisfactory explanation of such possession the onus probandi is shifted to the
accused, to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.

PEOPLE VS JACK RACHO (2010)

FACTS:
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular
phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent later reported the
transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team composed of
member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Intelligence group
of the Philippine Army and the local police force to apprehend the appellant. The
agent gave the police appellants name, together with his physical description. He
also assured them that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora the following day.
On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent and informed him
that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime of
the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team members then posted
themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of the
same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the
confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with earlier. Having
alighted from the bus, appellant stood near the highway and waited for a tricycle
that would bring him to his final destination. As appellant was about to board a

tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station on suspicion
of carrying shabu. Appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as he pulled
out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which,
when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug.
The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation. The
confiscated specimen was turned over to Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera
who marked it with his initials and with appellants name. The field test and
laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive
results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of
Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11
of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs.
RTC rendered a Joint Judgment convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article
II, R.A. 9165 but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II,
R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH WAS VALID
RULING:
The appeal is meritorious.
The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be
carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any
evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding, Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

Search of evidence in plain view;
Search of a moving vehicle;
Consented warrantless search;
Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is
purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances
involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of
probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or
thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.
Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest
must precede the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a
search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the
police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. Thus,
given the factual milieu of the case, we have to determine whether the police
officers had probable cause to arrest appellant. Although probable cause eludes
exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged.
What prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant,
was the tip given by the informant that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora
carrying shabu. This circumstance gives rise to another question: whether that
information, by itself, is sufficient probable cause to effect a valid warrantless
arrest.
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that reliable information alone is not
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the
accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the fruit of the poisonous tree,
hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III,
Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, any evidence obtained in violation of this or
the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Without the confiscated shabu, appellants conviction cannot be sustained

based on the remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the
waiver of appellant of his right to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a
plea and his active participation in the trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the
legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of
the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
One final note. As clearly stated in People v. Nuevas,
In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to
expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of
their rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an
illegal search and seizure as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of
the crime regardless of the methods by which they were obtained. This kind of
attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it only
fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual
denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of
law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society,
we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the
parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the
means.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.RODOLFO BIYOC y WENCESLAO
G.R. No. 167670 - December 7, 2007
Facts: Rodolfo Biyoc, having moral ascendancy over the complainant, [AAA], who is
a minor, 11 years old, the latter being his daughter by means of force, coercion and
intimidation had a sexual intercourse with her against her will. The sister of AAA
witnessed the incident and hurriedly reported it to her mother and they reported it
to the DSWD. They were accompanied by a Social Worker to report the incident to
the police station. PO1 Javier, together with AAA, her sister and mother proceeded

to the family home, and on their way, they met Biyoc. PO1 Javier at once informed
him of his rights, arrested him, and brought him to the police station. Biyoc denied
the allegations imputed against him and he was aware of the gravity of the offense
lodged against him,thus, he made no attempt to escape which is an indicative of his
innocence.
The regional trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape, which was also affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In his brief, he raised several
issues contending that the trial court erred in giving such judgment. One argument
he raised was that the trial court failed to consider the fact that the accuseds arrest
was legally objectionable. Appellant claims that his arrest was illegal because a
"warrantless arrest was effected even before the statement of the private
complainant was taken."
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant Biyoc is illegally arrested.
Ruling: No, accused-appellant Biyoc was not illegally arrested.
The Court ruled that an accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his
arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the information against him before his
arraignment. And since the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of the accused, any defect in his arrest may be deemed cured
when he voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court as what was done
by the appellants in the instant case. Not only did they enter their pleas during
arraignment, but they also actively participated during the trial which constitutes a
waiver of any irregularity in their arrest.Objections to the legality of arrests must,
however, be made prior to the entry of plea at arraignment; otherwise, they are
considered waived.

ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 170180 - November 23, 2007
Facts: On March 27, 2003, while the tanods were conducting their patrols, they have
observed that petitioner, who appeared suspicious to them, seemed to be looking
for something, approached him but the latter purportedly attempted to run away.
They chased him, put him under arrest and thereafter brought him to the house of
Barangay Captain Orencio Mercado (Mercado) where he, ordered Valdez to open
his bag. Petitioners bag allegedly contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces
of eggplant and dried marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and cellophane. It
was then that petitioner was taken to the police station for further investigation.
Petitioner maintained that at Mercados house, his bag was opened by the tanod
and Mercado himself. They took out an item wrapped in newspaper, which later
turned out to be marijuana leaves. Petitioner denied ownership thereof. He claimed
to have been threatened with imprisonment by his arrestors if he did not give the
prohibited drugs to someone from the east in order for them to apprehend such
person.
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued
with the prosecution presenting the three (3) barangay tanods of San Benito Norte,
Aringay, La Union namely,Bautista, Aratas and Ordoo, who arrested petitioner.
Finding that the prosecution had proven petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
the RTC rendered judgment against him and it was also affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, par. 2(2) of R.A. No.
9165
Petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts that his guilt of the crime charged had
not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He argues, that the warrantless arrest
effected against him by the barangay tanod was unlawful and that the warrantless
search of his bag that followed was likewise contrary to law.

Issue: Whether or not the Barangay Tanod unlawfully arrested Valdez.

Ruling: YES, the Barangay Tanod unlawfully arrested valdez.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the only occasions
on which a person may be arrested without a warrant, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
However, to determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is
indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged
contraband was lawful. The search, conducted as it was without a warrant, is
justified only if it were incidental to a lawful arrest.
Evaluating the evidence on record in its totality, as earlier intimated, the reasonable
conclusion is that the arrest of petitioner without a warrant is not lawful as well. It is
obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod, not one of
these circumstances was obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested. By their own
admission, petitioner was not committing an offense at the time he alighted from
the bus, nor did he appear to be then committing an offense. The tanod did not
have probable cause either to justify petitioners warrantless arrest.

For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two
(2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer. Here, petitioners act of looking around after getting off the
bus was but natural as he was finding his way to his destination. That he purportedly
attempted to run away as the tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by
itself be construed as adequate to charge the tanod with personal knowledge that
petitioner had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to
engage in criminal activity. The supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they
appeared dubious, cannot be viewed as sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal
activity enough to validate his warrantless arrest.
A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. The
constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal
right which may be waived. Petitioners lack of objection to the search and seizure is
not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to
the warrantless search and seizure. Therefore, the accused is hereby acquitted for
reasonable doubt.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JERRY SANTOS y MACOL and RAMON PICAYO
G.R. No. 176735 - June 26, 2008
Facts: On 8 March 2003, the SDEU operatives of the Pasig City Police conducted a
buy-bust operation in a residential area along Pasig City, on the basis of reports that
a certain alias Monching Labo was selling illegal drugs in the said locality. Upon
reaching the designated place, PO3 Luna and the informant alighted from their
vehicle, while the rest of the team were left inside.The informant then pointed to
two persons standing along the target area, one of whom was Monching Labo, later
identified as appellant Ramon Catoc . After approaching, the informant introduced
PO3 Luna as a shabu customer to one of the persons, later identified as appellant
Jerry Santos. When appellant Santos gave the plastic sachet to PO3 Luna, the latter

nabbed the former and introduced himself as a policeman.At that point, the other
members of the team arrived and likewise held and arrested appellant Catoc. The
policemen then informed the appellants of their violations and apprised them of
their constitutional rights. Afterwards, appellants Santos and Catoc were brought to
the Pasig City Police Station for proper investigation. The appellants offered a
version of the facts that was diametrically opposed to that of the prosecution.
According to them, there was no buy-bust operation to speak of and that prior to
their arrests, they were literally strangers to each other.
The RTC rendered a decision to both accused found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic Act [No.] 9165
(illegal sale of shabu). In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled that
the buy-bust operation conducted by the SDEU operatives was legitimate and
regular. Appellants contend that the trial court erred in convicting them, as their
guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, considering that the prosecution
failed to prove that a buy-bust operation took place and that their arrests without
warrant were not legally effected.
Issue: Whether or not the arrest of both accused without warrant were legally
effected.
Ruling: YES, the arrest of both accused without warrant were legally effected.
In the present case, all the elements of the crime have been sufficiently established.
The prosecution witnesses PO3 Luna and SPO3 Matias consistently testified that a
buy-bust operation did indeed take place, and the shabu subject of the sale was
presented and duly identified in open court.
The court uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.
This presumption in favor of PO3 Luna and SPO3 Matias was not overcome. As
testified to by the appellants, they did not know any of the policemen who arrested
them, and it was only during the trial in open court that they came to know of the
identities of the above-mentioned policemen. Thus, there was no indication that the
police were impelled by any improper motive in making the arrests.

The claim of appellants that their warrantless arrests were illegal also lacks merit.
The Court notes that nowhere in the records did we find any objection by appellants
to the irregularity of their arrests prior to their arraignment. We have held in a
number of cases that the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for
setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free
from error; such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.
It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid
information has been filed, the accused arraigned, trial commenced and completed,
and a judgment of conviction rendered against him.
The court have already declared the legality of the buy-bust operation that was
conducted by the police, it follows that the subsequent warrantless arrests were
likewise legally effected. Furthermore, any search resulting from the lawful
warrantless arrests was also valid, because the appellants committed a crime in
flagrante delicto; that is, the persons arrested committed a crime in the presence of
the arresting officers.
After a careful evaluation of the entire records of the instant case, we find no error
in the trial and the appellate courts' factual findings and conclusions.

BLAS F. OPLE vs. RUBEN D. TORRES et.al

G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998

Facts: The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F.
Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy. Petitioner Ople prays to
invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos On
December 12, 1996, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a
usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes
on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.

On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who
as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the
implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining its implementation.
There are three contended issue by the petitioner, one of which is the
implementation of this administrative order will insidiously lays the groundwork for
a system which will violate the bill of rights in the constitution.
Issue: Whether or not Administrative Order No. 308 violates the right to privacy and
it is unconstitutional.
Ruling: YES, Administrative Order No. 308 violates the right to privacy and it is
unconstitutional.
The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it
is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated
on two considerations: (1) the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the
facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security
providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not
totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons
seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling
enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the
broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented
will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population
Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage
among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and
"computer application designs." A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a
further look will show that it does not state whether encoding of data is limited to

biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General
claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to
the "generation of population data for development planning." This is an admission
that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but the generation of other
data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the
indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store
and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual
through his PRN.It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that
personal information which will be gathered about our people will only be
processed for unequivocally specified purposes.
The court rejects the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the National ID and the use of
biometrics technology as it stands on quicksand. The reasonableness of a person's
expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the
individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation
is one that society recognizes as reasonable.
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass
society. The threats emanate from various sources governments, journalists,
employers, social scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat comes from the
executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people
to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext
that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of
the computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives
the government the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting
citizens.
The petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for
being unconstitutional.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF

CAMILO L. SABIO
G.R. No. 174340

On September 11, 2006, they submitted to the Senate their Compliance and
Explanation,which partly reads:

October 17, 200

Facts: On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Senate
Res. No. 455, "directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses
incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC),
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT
Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by
their respective Board of Directors."

Doubtless, there are laudable intentions of the subject inquiry in aid of legislation.
But the rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within
the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1
constitutes a limitation on the power of legislative inquiry, and a recognition by the
State of the need to provide protection to the PCGG in order to ensure the
unhampered performance of its duties under its charter.

On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator
Richard J. Gordon, wrote to Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the
herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public
meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. The purpose of the public
meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.

Unconvinced with the above Compliance and Explanation, issued an Order directing
Major General Jose Balajadia (Ret.), Senate Sergeant-At-Arms, arrested Chairman
Sabio in his office and brought him to the Senate premises where he was detained.

On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior

commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 "No member
or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its
official cognizance."
Several notices were given to Chairman Sabio requiring him to appear and testify on
the same subject matter, but still refuses many times reiterating his reason for
declining to appear in the public hearing. This prompted Senator Gordon to issue an
Order dated September 7, 2006 requiring Chairman Sabio and Commissioners
Abcede, Conti, Javier and Nario to show cause why they should not be cited in
contempt of the Senate.

Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with this Court a petition for habeas corpus against the
Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and
Committee on Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon and Joker
P. Arroyo and Members. the above-named respondents countered several issues,
one of which, that the respondents have not violated any civil right of the individual
petitioners, such as their (a) right to privacy; and (b) right against self-incrimination.
Issue: Whether or not Respondents have violated the individual civil rights of the
petitioners, such as their right to privacy.
Ruling: NO, the respondents have not violated the right to privacy of the petitioners.
One important limitation on the Congress' power of inquiry is that "the rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." This is just
another way of saying that the power of inquiry must be "subject to the limitations
placed by the Constitution on government action."

Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any
form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with
customary legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not
only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the
right most valued by civilized men," but also from our adherence to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no one shall be subjected to
arbitrary interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or attacks."
Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the Constitution, provides at least two
guarantees that explicitly create zones of privacy. It highlights a person's "right to be
let alone" or the "right to determine what, how much, to whom and when
information about himself shall be disclosed." Section 2 guarantees "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose."
Section 3 renders inviolable the "privacy of communication and correspondence"
and further cautions that "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must determine
whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so,
whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion.
Applying this determination to these cases, the important inquiries are: first, did the
directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation exhibit a reasonable
expectation of privacy?; and second,did the government violate such expectation? It
was in negative.
Petitioners were invited in the Senate's public hearing to deliberate on Senate Res.
No. 455, particularly "on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the
alleged improprieties in the operations by their respective board of directors."
Obviously, the inquiry focus on petitioners' acts committed in the discharge of their

duties as officers and directors of the said corporations, particularly Philcomsat

Holdings Corporation. Consequently, they have no reasonable expectation of
privacy over matters involving their offices in a corporation where the government
has interest. Certainly, such matters are of public concern and over which the
people have the right to information.
Under the present circumstances, the alleged anomalies in the PHILCOMSAT, PHC
and POTC, ranging in millions of pesos, and the conspiratorial participation of the
PCGG and its officials are compelling reasons for the Senate to exact vital
information from the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporations, as
well as from Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to aid it in crafting the
necessary legislation to prevent corruption and formulate remedial measures and
policy determination regarding PCGG's efficacy. There being no reasonable
expectation of privacy on the part of those directors and officers over the subject
covered by Senate Res. No. 455, it follows that their right to privacy has not been
violated by respondent Senate Committees.

SJS V. PDEA

G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE
DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA)
FACTS:
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, assailed RA 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) which requires mandatory drug
testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools,
officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before
the prosecutors office with certain offenses to be struck down as unconstitutional
for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary
to the due process and equal protection guarantees.

ISSUE: Whether RA 9165 is unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional

right to privacy of:
(1)
Secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private
offices
(2)

Persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses

RULING:
The court ruled that concerning secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, it infringes upon their right to privacy;
however, concerning persons charged, it does not.
(1)
In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the
waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school,
and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of
school authorities. The provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional since it is within the
prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission,
compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure,
the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements.
In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the
reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement. The right to privacy means
the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion
into ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons
ordinary sensibilities. Authorities are agreed that the right to privacy yields to
certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the states exercise of police
power.

(2)
Unlike the situation in the first category, the Court finds no valid justification
for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of persons
charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can
never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless
are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not
randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of
committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against
their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the
prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be
the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to
privacy.
To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a
medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of
RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons
are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
LEE V. CA
FACTS:
Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in
the 1930s as immigrants from China. They had 11 children who are the respondents
of this case. In 1948, Lee brought from China a supposed housemaid named Tiu
Chuan (Tiu) who actually had a relation with him.
Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu had children
with Lee. The Lee-Tiu children claimed that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh.
This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to investigate. The NBI found that results were contrary to their claim,
therefore, the Lee-Keh children filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City for the deletion from the certificate of live birth of the petitioner
Emma Lee, one of Lees other children, the name Keh.

In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for the
issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu to testify in the case. The
RTC granted the motion but Tiu moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that it was
oppressive and violated the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma Lees
stepmother. On August 5, 2005 the RTC quashed the subpoena it issued for being
unreasonable and oppressive considering that Tiu was already very old and that the
obvious object of the subpoena was to badger her into admitting that she was
Emma Lees mother.
The CA set aside the RTCs Order. Thus, the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether compelling Tiu to testify regarding her alleged illicit relation with Lee and
their possible children infringe her right against invasion of privacy.

RULING:
No. It does not. The CA was correct in quashing the subpoena. Section 4, Rule 21
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus provides:
SECTION 4. Quashing a subpoena. The court may quash a subpoena duces
tecum upon motion promptly made and, in any event, at or before the time
specified therein if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the books,
documents or things does not appear, or if the person in whose behalf the
subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of the production thereof
The CA correctly ruled, the grounds citedunreasonable and oppressiveare
proper for the production of documents and things in the possession of the witness,
a command that has a tendency to infringe on the right against invasion of privacy.

Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-Keh childrens action, obviously,
they would want Tiu to testify or admit that she is the mother of Lees other
children, including petitioner Emma Lee. Keh had died and so could not give
testimony that Lees other children were not hers. The Lee-Keh children have,
therefore, a legitimate reason for seeking Tius testimony and, normally, the RTC
cannot deprive them of their right to compel the attendance of such a material
witness.

MERALCO V. LIM
FACTS:
Respondent Rosario G. Lim, also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at
the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO). On 04 June 2008, an anonymous letter
stating an informal accusation to Cherry, posted at the door of the Metering Office
of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan. The letter reads:
Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY
GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG
GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA
LOOB.

In a memo sent by the Head of MERALCOs HR, Cherry Lim was directed to be
transferred to Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as A/F OTMS Clerk,, reasoning out
that the accusations against her would possible compromise her safety and security.
The respondent however, did not agree with her transfer and filed an appeal with
MERALCO claiming that the punitive nature of the transfer amounted to a denial
of due process. She likewise claimed the grueling travel from her residence in

Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation of the provisions on job
security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
Since she didnt receive a response, she filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas data against petitioners before the RTC of Bulacan. She claimed petitioners
unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued failure and refusal to
provide her with details or information about the alleged report which MERALCO
purportedly received concerning threats to her safety and security amount to a
violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas
data. Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer to the MERALCO
Alabang Sector
Her petition was granted by the RTC, prohibiting the transfer and ruling that
recourse to a writ of habeas data should extend not only to victims of extra-legal
killings and political activists but also to ordinary citizens, like respondent whose
rights to life and security are jeopardized by petitioners refusal to provide her with
information or data on the reported threats to her person.
Thus, the petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the remedy of habeas data may be properly issued to protect
purely property or commercial concerns where there is no clear showing of any
unjustifiable or unlawful violation of the right to privacy in relation to the rights to
life, liberty, and security.

HELD: No. It cannot be properly issued to protect purely property or commercial

concerns such as this case. The Supreme Court granted the petition for review on
certiorari in favor of petitioners. The assailed decision of the trial court was reversed
and set aside.

PROPRIETY OF THE REMEDY OF HABEAS DATA

The remedy of habeas data can only be invoked to protect the right to privacy in
relation to the rights to life, liberty, and security The habeas data rule, in general,
is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a
forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus
safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and
security against abuse in this age of information technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a
response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent
is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a
remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.
The Writ of Habeas Data cannot be invoked in labor disputes where there is no
unlawful violation of the right to life, liberty, or security Castillo v. Cruz (G.R. No.
182165, November 25, 2009) underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del
Rosario (G. R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008) that the writs of amparo and habeas data
will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the
grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.
Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process
clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondents reservations on the real
reasons for her transfer a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions
of ones employment are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy
of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the
NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.

In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners
committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right to privacy
vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners refusal to

disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondents

safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative.
Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown
individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as highly
suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all. And she even
suspects that her transfer to another place of work betray*s+ the real intent of
management and could be a punitive move. Her posture unwittingly concedes
that the issue is labor-related.

ISSUE: W/N the act of the wife of securing the documents and papers that belong to
her husband without his consent violative of the privacy of communication?

ZULUETA VS. CA

Sec.3, Par.1, Art.III, 1987 Constitution

FACTS:

(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except

upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law.

Petitioner, Cecilia Zulueta is married to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin.

Accusing her husband of infidelity, she went to the clinic of private respondent, who
is a doctor of medicine, without the consent of the latter. She opened the drawers
and cabinet of her husband and took 157 documents and papers consisting of
private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours. The
documents found by petitioner were seized for use as evidence in a case for legal
separation filed by Zulueta.
Dr. Martin brought an action for recovery of the documents and papers and for
damages against petitioner. The RTC, decided in favor of private respondent,
declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of properties described and ordering
petitioner to return the properties to Dr. Martin and pay him nominal and moral
damages and attorneys fees, and cost of the suit. Furthermore, petitioner and her
attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or submitting/admitting as
evidence the documents and papers in question.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision made by the RTC. Hence, this
petition.

HELD:
Yes. Such act is against the constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

The only exception to the provision in the constitution is if there is a lawful order
[from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise as provide bylaw.
Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. A person, by contracting marriage does not shed his/her
integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is
ever available to him or to her.
The law ensures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by
making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither maybe
examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions.

PETITION DENIED. The Supreme Court held that the documents and papers in
question are inadmissible in evidence.

BLAS F. OPLE, vs. RUBEN D. TORRES

FACTS:
President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order (A.O.) 308 on December 12,
1996 entiltled Adoption of National Computerized Identification Reference System
or commonly known as NatioanalID System. Senator Blas F. Ople filed a petition
before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the said executive
issuance on two important grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of
Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected
zone of privacy.
We grant the petition for ther ights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need
stronger barriers against further erosion.
ISSUE: Does A.O 308 violate the right to privacy?
HELD: Yes. It cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation
because facially it violates the right to privacy. The vagueness and overbreadth of
A.O. No. 308, if implemented, will put our people's right to privacy in clear and
present danger. It presents no vital safeguards because it does not state whether
encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification
purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the Identification
Reference System will contribute to the "generation of population data for
development planning." This is an admission that the Population Reference Number
(PRN) will not be used solely for identification but for the generation of other data
with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308.
Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must present his PRN every time
he deals with a government agency to avail of basic services and security. His

transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded -- whether it

be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file
may include his transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of
assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more
frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge and
formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the files. The data
may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of
this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse,
a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. Clearly, the
indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store
and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual
through his PRN .The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No.
308 cannot be underplayed as the dissenters claim.
We reiterate that any law or order that invades individual privacy will be subjected
by this Court to strict scrutiny. The reason for this stance was laid down in Morfe v.
Mutuc, to wit:
The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental
powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is
indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government.
Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the
hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government
safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it
from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector
protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual has
become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a
technological age industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate to
narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the
capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference
between a democratic and a totalitarian society.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY ALEJANO,
PN (MARINES) CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN (MARINES) CAPT. GERARDO
GAMBALA, PA LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, PN CAPT. MILO MAESTRECAMPO, PA LT. SG
ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, PN HOMOBONO ADAZA, and ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL)
PULIDO versus GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, SEC. ANGELO REYES,
and SEC. ROILO GOLEZ
G.R. No. 160792 August 25, 2005
FACTS:
27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers,
entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments. The junior
officers publicly renounced their support for the administration. Around 7p.m. of
the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities.
On 31 July 2003, a directive was issued to all Major Service Commanders to take
into custody the military personnel under their command who took part in the
Oakwood incident. Petitioners (lawyers on behalf of their detained clients) filed a
petition for habeas corpus with SC. The SC issued a resolution, which required
respondents to make a return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of
the detainees before the CA. CA dismissed the petition because the detainees are
already charged of coup detat. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the
detainees confinement is under a valid indictment which the detainees and
petitioners do not even question.
The CA recognized that habeas corpus may also be the appropriate remedy to assail
the legality of detention if there is a deprivation of a constitutional right. However, it
held that the constitutional rights (one of which is detainees right to privacy of
communication), alleged to have been violated in this case do not directly affect the
detainees liberty. The regulation of the detainees right to confer with their
counsels is reasonable under the circumstances.
CA declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes letter is an abhorrent
violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does not justify the issuance

of a writ of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal restraint, which
is the proper subject of habeas corpus proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated the detainees right to
privacy of communication when the former opened and read the personal letters of
Trillanes and Maestrecampo
HELD:
NO. Pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement.
However, the fact that the detainees are confined makes their rights more limited
than those of the public.
Also, the letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not
confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who
received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting
as the detainees personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the
letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP
Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials
should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the
presence of the detainees.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO v. DIRECTOR-GENERAL
G.R. No. 167798 April 19, 2006
FACTS:
In 2005, Executive Order No. 420 was passed. This law sought to harmonize and
streamline the countrys ID system. Kilusang Mayo Uno, Bayan Muna, and other
concerned groups sought to enjoin the Director-General from implementing the EO
because they allege that the said EO is unconstitutional for it infringes upon the

right to privacy of the people and that the same is a usurpation of legislative power
by the president.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF

CAMILO L. SABIO versus HONORABLE SENATOR RICHARD GORDON

ISSUE:

G.R. No. 174340 October 17, 2006

Whether the said EO is unconstitutional for infringing on the citizens right to

privacy

FACTS:

HELD:
NO. All these years, government entities have been issuing ID cards in the
performance of their governmental functions and there have been no complaints
from citizens that the ID cards of these government entities violate their right to
privacy. In fact, petitioners in the present cases do not claim that the ID systems of
government entities prior to EO 420 violate their right to privacy, and that
petitioners failed to not show how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy.
EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data
that can be collected, recorded and shown compared to the existing ID systems of
government entities. EO 420 further provides strict safeguards to protect the
confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to the prior ID systems which are
bereft of strict administrative safeguards.
Also, EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems
and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws. EO 420
does not grant such government entities any power that they do not already
possess under existing laws.
In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but makes the
existing sectoral card systems of government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and
LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the public. Hence, EO
420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under the Presidents constitutional
power of control over government entities in the Executive department, as well as
under the Presidents constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.

On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res.

No. 455 directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred
by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings
Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their
respective Board of Directors.
Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman
Sabio and his Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public meeting
jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the
invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time invoked Section 4(b)
of EO No. 1: No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.
ISSUE:
Whether Senate Committee's inquiry violates Petitioner Sabio and his
Commissioners right to privacy
HELD:
NO. One important limitation on the Congress' power of inquiry is that "the rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." Our Bill of
Rights, enshrined in Article III of the Constitution, provides at least two guarantees
that explicitly create zones of privacy. Section 2 guarantees "the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable

searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose." Section 3 renders
inviolable the "privacy of communication and correspondence" and further cautions
that "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
Petitioners were invited in the Senate's public hearing to deliberate particularly "on
the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications
Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged
improprieties in the operations by their respective board of directors." Obviously,
the inquiry focus on petitioners' acts committed in the discharge of their duties as
officers and directors of the said corporations. Consequently, they have no
reasonable expectation of privacy over matters involving their offices in a
corporation where the government has interest. Certainly, such matters are of
public concern and over which the people have the right to information.
This goes to show that the right to privacy is NOT ABSOLUTE where there is an
overriding compelling state interest.
Under the present circumstances, the alleged anomalies in the PHILCOMSAT, PHC
and POTC, ranging in millions of pesos, and the conspiratorial participation of the
PCGG and its officials are compelling reasons for the Senate to exact vital
information from the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporations, as
well as from Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to aid it in crafting the
necessary legislation to prevent corruption and formulate remedial measures and
policy determination regarding PCGG's efficacy.
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ V. RAUL M. GONZALES AND NTC
G.R. No. 168338 February 15, 2008
FACTS:
As a consequence of the public release of copies of the Hello Garci compact disc
audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-

President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent

DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and
those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the AntiWiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were
committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated
that he had ordered the NBI to go after media organizations found to have caused
the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape. Meanwhile,
respondent NTC warned TV and radio stations that their broadcast/airing of such
false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the
suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued
to the said media establishments. Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65
against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC
constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the
Constitution hence unconstitutional?
HELD:
YES. Philippine jurisprudence, has recognized four aspects of freedom of the press.
These are (1) freedom from prior restraint; (2) freedom from punishment
subsequent to publication; (3) freedom of access to information; and (4) freedom of
circulation. Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or
other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination.
The Court said that a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the
press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having
the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and
present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including
broadcast media. Prior restraint on speech based on its content cannot be justified
by hypothetical fears, said the Court.

The mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC were
nullified by the SC for having constituted a form of content-based prior restraint
that has transgressed the Constitution. The Court held that the challenged acts in
the case at bar need to be subjected to the clear and present danger rule, as they
are content-based restrictions. It is not significant that the press statements made
by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars.
It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the
exercise of their official functions.
Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an
official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an act
does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular.
Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result
in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint.

NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC. V. DY

G.R. Nos. 170270

April 2, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioners operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM and FM
radio broadcast station in Cauayan Citry, Isabela. In 1996, Newsounds commenced
relocation of its broadcasting station, management office, and transmitters on
property located in Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela. On July 1996, the Housing &
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and Office of the Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator (OMPDC) affirmed and certified that the commercial
structure to be constructed conformed to local zoning regulations, noting as well
that the location is classified as a commercial area. The radio station was able to
fully operate smoothly thereafter.
In 2002 however, when petitioners applied for a renewal of mayors permit, City
Zoning Administratior-Designate Bagnos Maximo refused to issue zoning clearance

on the grounds that petitioners were not able to submit conversion papers showing
that the agricultural land was converted to commercial land. Petitioners asked the
court to compel the issuance of mayors permit but the court denied the action. In
the meantime, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region II office issued to
petitioners a formal recognition of conversion of the property from agricultural to
commercial.
In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of mayors permit,
attaching the DAR Order. Respondent Felicisimo Meer, acting City Administrator of
Cauayan City denied the same, claiming that it was void on the grounds that they
did not have record of the DAR Order.
The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents officers closed the radio
station. Due to the provision of Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the closure
of radio station during the pendency of election period, COMELEC issued an order
allowing the petitioners to operate before Febuary 17, 2004, but was barred again
by respondent Mayor Ceasar Dy on the grounds that the radio station had no
permit. Nonetheless, COMELEC allowed them to run again until June 10, 2004 after
elections.
Petitioners filed the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of mayors permit but
both courts denied the petition.
Petitioners argued that the recognition by the local government of Cauayan of the
commercial character of the property constitutes estoppels against respondents
from denying the fact before the courts. The lower courts had ruled that the
government of Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels, but petitioners classified
that this concept is understood to only refer to acts and mistakes of its official
especially to those which are irregular.
ISSUE:
Whether the acts of closing the radio stations or preventing their operations are
considered an act of prior restraint against speech, expression or of the press

HELD:
YES. The acts imputed against respondents constitute a prior restraint on the
freedom of expression of respondents who happen to be members of the press is
clear enough. There is a long-standing tradition of special judicial solicitude for free
speech, meaning that governmental action directed at expression must satisfy a
greater burden of justification than governmental action directed at most other
forms of behavior.
At the same time, jurisprudence distinguishes between a content-neutral
regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that
merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards; and a
content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject
matter of the utterance or speech. Content-based laws are generally treated as
more suspect than content-neutral laws because of judicial concern with
discrimination in the regulation of expression. Content-neutral regulations of speech
or of conduct that may amount to speech, are subject to lesser but still heightened
scrutiny.
Prior to 2002, petitioners had not been frustrated in securing the various local
government requirements for the operation of their stations. It was only in the
beginning of 2002, after the election of respondent Ceasar Dy as mayor of Cauayan,
that the local government started to impose these new requirements substantiating
the conversion of CDCs property for commercial use. Petitioners admit that during
the 2001 elections, Bombo Radyo was aggressive in exposing the widespread
election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored Respondent Dy and
other members of the Dy political dynasty. Respondents efforts to close
petitioners radio station clearly intensified immediately before the May 2004
elections, where a former employee of DZNC Bombo Radyo, Grace Padaca, was
mounting a credible and ultimately successful challenge against the incumbent
Isabela governor, who happened to be the brother of respondent Dy. It also bears
notice that the requirements required of petitioners by the Cauayan City

government are frankly beyond the pale and not conventionally adopted by local
governments throughout the Philippines.
All those circumstances lead us to believe that the steps employed by respondents
to ultimately shut down petitioners radio station were ultimately content-based.
The immediate implication of the application of the strict scrutiny test is that the
burden falls upon respondents as agents of government to prove that their actions
do not infringe upon petitioners constitutional rights. As content regulation cannot
be done in the absence of any compelling reason, the burden lies with the
government to establish such compelling reason to infringe the right to free
expression.