1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

GLORIA UMALI y AMADO AND SUZETH UMALI y

AMADO, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. 84450 February 4, 1991
Facts:
Gloria Umali was charged for violation of Section 4, Article 1 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
under an information for selling marijuana. Umali was caught with the assistance of one Francisco
Manalo, a prisoner at that time. With the consent of Francisco Manalo, Pfc. Sarmiento, Chief of the
Investigation Division gave him four (4) marked P5.00 bills to buy marijuana from sources known to him.
The serial numbers of the money was entered in the police blotter. The instruction was for Manalo to
bring back the prohibited drug purchased by him to the police headquarters. Few minutes there after,
Manalo returned with two (2) foils of dried marijuana which lie allegedly bought from the accused Gloria
Umali. Thereafter, he was asked by the police investigators to give a statement on the manner and
circumstances of how he was able to purchase two (2) marijuana foils from accused Gloria Umali. The
lower court found him guilty. In her appeal, Umali denied the findings of the lower court and insisted
that said court committed reversible errors in convicting her. She alleged that witness Francisco Manalo
is not reputed to be trustworthy and reliable and that his words should not be taken on its face value.
Furthermore, he stressed that said witness has several charges in court and because of his desire to
have some of his cases dismissed, he was likely to tell falsehood.
Issue: Is Francisco Manalo a reliable witness despite the criminal charges against him?
Held:
Yes. Rule 130, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving can
make known their perception to others may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless
otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" takes into account Article
821 of the Civil Code which states that persons 91 convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or
false testimony" are disqualified from being witnesses to a will." Since the witness Francisco Manalo is
not convicted of any of the above-mentioned crimes to disqualify him as a witness and this case does
not involve the probate of a will, We rule that the fact that said witness is facing several criminal charges
when he testified did not in any way disqualify him as a witness.

2. Yap Tua v. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu

No. 6845; 27 Phil 579; September 1, 1914
En Banc; Johnson,J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the judgment of CFI Manila.
On August 23, 1909, one Perfecto Gabriel, representing the petitioner, Yap Tua, presented a
petition in CFI of Manila asking for probate the last will and testament of deceased Tomasa Elizaga Yap
Caong. Tomasa died on August 11, 1909. It appears that she signed the will (August 11, 1909) as well as
by 3 witnesses Anselmo Zacarias, Severo Tabora and Timoteo Paez. After hearing witnesses Timoteo
Paez and one Pablo Agustin, the judge on September 29 1909 ordered the will admitted to probate and
further ordered Yap Tua as executor of the will.
It appears that no further proceedings were had until when Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu
appeared and presented a petition for rehearing, alleging that they were interested in the matters of
the said will and desired to intervene. Gabriel La O was appointed a guardian ad litem representing
them in the cause. Gabriel La O presented a motion alleging that the will dated the 11th day of August,
1909, and admitted to probate by order of the court was: 1. null (a)because the same had not been
authorized nor signed by the witnesses as the law prescribes, (b) because at the time of the execution of
the will, the said Tomasa was not then mentally capacitated to execute the same, due to her sickness,
(c) because her signature to the will had been obtained through fraud and illegal influence upon the part
of persons who were to receive a benefit from the same, and because the said Tomasa had no intention
of executing the same. 2. that before the execution of the said will, which they alleged to be null, the
said Tomasa had executed another will, with all the formalities required by law, upon August 6, 1909. 3.
that the said Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu were minors and that, even though they had been negligent in
presenting their opposition to the legalization of the will, said negligence was excusable, on account of
their age.
The petition for rehearing was granted. At the rehearing, several witnesses were presented
including Gabriel La O, instrumental witnesses Zacarias and Tabora, and physician Dr. Papa who said that
deceased was very ill to the point of mental incapacity to sign the will.
ISSUES:
1. W/N there was external influence exerted over Tomasa in signing the will.
2. W/N Tomasa had clear knowledge of what she was into at the time the August 11, 1909 will was
made.
3. W/N the signature of Tomasa in the first will (August 6, 1909) was identical to the second one
(August 11, 1909) based on the allegation that the second will was not signed.
4. W/N the will in question was executed in accordance with law.
HELD:
Appeal has no merit.
1. No, as found by the lower court.
2. Yes she had. Though the testimony of Dr. Papa is very strong relating to the mental condition of
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, yet, nevertheless, his testimony related to a time perhaps twenty-four hours
before the execution of the will in question. Several witnesses testified that at the time the will was
presented to her for her signature, she was of sound mind and memory and asked for a pen and ink and
kept the will in her possession for ten or fifteen minutes and finally signed it. The lower court found that

there was a preponderance of evidence sustaining the conclusion that Tomasa was of sound mind and
memory and in the possession of her faculties at the time she signed this will. In view of the conflict in
the testimony of the witnesses and the finding of the lower court, it is not justifiable to reverse the
latters conclusions.
3. The real issue as seen by the court regarding this is whether or not the second will was sufficiently
signed. YES it was. One who makes a will may sign the same by using a mark, the name having been
written by others. If writing a mark simply upon a will is sufficient indication of the intention of the
person to make and execute a will, then certainly the writing of a portion or all of her name ought to be
accepted as a clear indication of her intention to execute the will. The man who cannot write and who is
obliged to make his mark simply therefor, upon the will, is held to sign as effectually as if he had
written his initials or his full name. It would seem to be sufficient, under the law requiring a signature by
the person making a will, to make his mark, to place his initials or all or any part of his name thereon. In
the present case, the proof shows that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, if she did not sign her full name, did
at least sign her given name Tomasa, and that is sufficient to satisfy the statute.
4. Yes. An effort was made to show that the will was signed by the witnesses in one room and by
Tomasa in another. A plan of the room or rooms in which the will was signed was presented as proof
and it was shown that there was but one room; that one part of the room was one or two steps below
the floor of the other; that the table on which the witnesses signed the will was located upon the lower
floor of the room. It was also shown that from the bed in which Tomasa was lying, it was possible for her
to see the table on which the witnesses signed the will. While the rule is absolute that one who makes a
will must sign the same in the presence of the witnesses and that the witnesses must sign in the
presence of each other, as well as in the presence of the one making the will, yet, nevertheless, the
actual seeing of the signatures made is not necessary. It is sufficient if the signatures are made where it
is possible for each of the necessary parties, if they desire to see, may see the signatures placed upon
the will.
Judgment of the lower court admitting said will to probate is hereby affirmed with costs

3. Nayve vs Mojal
December 29, 1925 G.R. No. L-21755

Romualdez, J.:
FACTS:
This is a proceeding for the probate of the will of the deceased Antonio Mojal instituted by his surviving
spouse, Filomena Nayve. The probate is opposed by Leona Mojal and Luciana Aguilar, sister and niece,
respectively, of the deceased.
The will in question is composed of four sheets with written matter on only side of each, that is, four
pages written on four sheets. The four sides or pages containing written matter are paged Pag. 1,
Pag. 2, Pag. 3, Pag. 4, successively. Each of the first two sides or pages, which was issued, was
signed by the testator and the three witnesses on the margin, left side of the reader. On the third page

actually used, the signatures of the three witnesses appear also on the margin, left side of the reader,
but the signature of the testator is not on the margin, but about the middle of the page, at the end of
the will and before the attestation clause. On the fourth page, the signatures of the witnesses do not
appear on the margin, but at the bottom of the attestation clause, it being the signature of the testator
that is on the margin, left side of the reader.
The defects attributed to the will are:
(a) The fact of not having been signed by the testator and the witnesses on each and every sheet on
the left margin; (b) the fact of the sheets of the document not being paged with letters; (c) the
fact that the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages actually used of
the will; and (d) the fact that the testator does not appear to have signed all the sheets in the
presence of the three witnesses, and the latter to have attested and signed all the sheets in the
presence of the testator and of each other.
Trial court admitted the will to probate and from the judgment, the opponents appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will can be admitted to probate.
HELD:
The Court ruled in the affirmative.
First defect: As each and every page used of the will bears the signatures of the testator and the
witnesses, the fact that said signatures do not all appear on the left margin of each page does not
detract from the validity of the will.
Second defect: The court held in Unson vs. Abella that paging with Arabic numerals and not with letters,
as in the case before us, is within the spirit of the law and is just as valid as paging with letters.
Third defect: The attestation clause must state the number of sheets or pages composing the will; but
when, as in the case before us, such fact, while it is not stated in the attestation clause, appears at the
end of the will proper, so that no proof aliunde is necessary of the number of the sheets of the will, then
there can be no doubt that it complies with the intention of the law that the number of sheets of which
the will is composed be shown by the document itself, to prevent the number of the sheets of the will
from being unduly increased or decreased.
Fourth defect: It must be noted that in the attestation clause above set out it is said that the testator
signed the will in the presence of each of the witnesses and the latter signed in the presence of each
other and of the testator. So that, as to whether the testator and the attesting witnesses saw each
other sign the will, such a requirement was clearly and sufficiently complied with. What is not stated in
this clause is whether the testator and the witnesses signed all the sheets of the will.

The act of the testator and the witnesses seeing reciprocally the signing of the will is one which cannot
be proven by the mere exhibition of the will unless it is stated in the document. And this fact is expressly
stated in the attestation clause now before us. But the fact of the testator and the witnesses having
signed all the sheets of the will may be proven by the mere examination of the document, although it
does not say anything about this, and if that is the fact, as it is in the instant case, the danger of fraud in
this respect, which is what the law tries to avoid, does not exist.
The fact that the testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of the will is proven by the
mere examination of the signatures in the will, the omission to expressly state such evident fact does
not invalidate the will nor prevent its probate.

7. Testate Estate of Abada vs Abaja

450 SCRA 264

January 31, 2005

G.R. No. 147145

CARPIO, J.:

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA CAPONONG-NOBLE,

vs. ALIPIO ABAJA and NOEL ABELLAR.
FACTS:
This case is a petition for review assailing the order of Court of Appeals admitting to probate the last will
and testament of Alipio Abada.
Alipio ABADA died in May 1940 and his widow Paula Toray died in September 1943, without legitimate
children. Alipio C. ABAJA filed a petition with the CFI of Negros Occidental (RTC-Kabankalan) for the
probate of the last will and testament of Abada. ABADA allegedly named as his testamentary heirs his
natural children Eulogio Abaja and Rosario Cordova. Alipio ABAJA is the son of Eulogio ABAJA. It was
alleged that Abada executed his will on 4 June 1932.
The said petition was opposed by the nephews, nieces and grandchildren of Abada and Toray One of the
oppositors was Nicanor Caponong, alleged that ABADA left no will when he died and that if ABADA
really executed such will, it should be disallowed because 1.such was not executed and attested as
required by law, 2. that it was a result of undue influence by the beneficiaries and 3.was not the true
intention of ABADA. Alipio Abaja filed another petition with the RTC-Kabankalan, for the probate of the
last will and testament of Toray. Nicanor Caponong et al. opposed such petition on the same grounds of
their first opposition. Nicanor Caponong filed a petition with the RTC-Kabankalan praying for the
issuance in his name of letters of administration of the intestate estate of Abada and Toray.
RTC : RTC-Kabankalan admitted to probate the will of Toray RTC-Kabankalan and designated Belinda
Caponong-Noble Special Administratrix of the estate of Abada and Toray.Caponong-Noble filed a notice
of appeal, asserts that the will of Abada does not indicate that it is written in a language or dialect

known to the testator and that the will is not acknowledged before a notary public. Caponong-Noble
also alleges that the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages on which the will is written.
CA: Court of Appeals affirmed the Resolution of the RTC-Kabankalan.
ISSUES:
1.What laws apply to the probate of the last will of Abada?
2.Whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause, and if so, whether the attestation clause complies
with the requirements of the applicable laws?
HELD:
1.The Old Civil Code : Civil Code of 1889. Abada executed his will on 4 June 1932. The laws in force at
that time are the Civil Code of 1889 or the Old Civil Code, and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2.YES. The Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the RTC-Kabankalan in admitting to probate the will
of Abada.The matter in dispute in the present case is the attestation clause in the will of Abada. Section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, governs the form of the attestation
clause of Abadas will. The Code of Civil Procedure repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil Code. Under the
Code of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a notary is not necessary in the execution of any
will.Therefore, Abadas will does not require acknowledgment before a notary public.
There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew the language or dialect
used in the will. This is a matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde. Alipio Abaja testified that
Abada used to gather Spanish-speaking people in their place. This sufficiently proves that Abada speaks
the Spanish language.
Abadas will shows that it has an attestation clause. The phrase (in english) "in the left margin of each
and every one of the two pages consisting of the same" shows that the will consists of two pages. The
pages are numbered correlatively with the letters "ONE" and "TWO". The phrase "Subscribed and
professed by the testator Alipio Abada as his last will and testament in our presence, the testator having
also signed it in our presence on the left margin of each and every one of the pages of the same." The
attestation clause clearly states that Abada signed the will and its every page in the presence of the
witnesses.
The Court agrees with the appellate court in applying the rule on substantial compliance in determining
the number of witnesses. While the attestation clause does not state the number of witnesses, a close
inspection of the will shows that three witnesses signed it.The last part of the attestation clause states
(in English) "in its witness, every one of us also signed in our presence and of the testator." This clearly
shows that the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing of the will of the testator, and that each
witness signed the will in the presence of one another and of the testator.

9. SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND,
respondents.
G.R. No. 106720

September 15, 1994

nd

2 Division; PUNO, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari from the Decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the
decision of the lower court and dismissed the petition for probate.
The instrument submitted for probate was a holographic will made by the late Annie Sand, who died on
November 25, 1982. She named as devisees petitioners Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent
Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose
Ajero, Sr., and their children. Petitioners instituted a special proceeding on January 20, 1983, for
allowance of Annies will, wherein they alleged that she was of sound mill at thye time that she executed
the will and that the same was her free and voluntary act. Private respondent opposed the petition on
the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting;
it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was
procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise
opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in
Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its
entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
No evidence was presented to show that the will in question is different from the will actually executed
by the testatrix. The oppositors only questioned the handwriting in which the will was executed, but did
not present any other will which may have been executed by Annie. Three witnesses also attested to the
fact that the handwriting was that of Annies.
As regards the question of capacity, Clemente Sand testified that the decedent was of sound mind when
he visited her on her birthday in 1981, which was roughly the same time when she executed the will.
The will itself shows that the testatrix even had detailed knowledge of the nature of her estate. She
even identified the lot number and square meters of the lots she had conveyed by will. The objects of
her bounty were likewise identified explicitly. And considering that she had even written a nursing book
which contained the law and jurisprudence on will and succession, there is more than sufficient showing
that she knows the character of the testamentary act.
Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate
and allowed it, stating that it found no reason for the wills disallowance on the grounds of the
decedents lack of capacity or the wills failure to comply with the requisite formalities.
The CA reversed the decision on the ground that the will failed to meet the necessary requisites for
validity as stated in Arts. 813 and 814 of the CC:

Art. 813:
When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed without being
dated, and the last disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the dispositions preceding
it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions.
Art. 814:
In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the testator
must authenticate the same by his full signature.
It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not
dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been
authenticated by decedent.
Hence, this appeal.

Held:
The enumerations found in Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be disallowed
in any of the following cases:
(a)

If not executed and attested as required by law;

(b)
If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its
execution;
(c)

If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;

(d)
If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary,
or of some other person for his benefit;
(e)
If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the
instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto.

In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads:
Art. 839:
(1)

The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases;

If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;

(2)
If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its
execution;
(3)

If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;

(4)
If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary
or of some other person;

(5)

If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;

(6)
If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his
will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.
These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. Thus, in a petition to admit a
holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is,
indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with
the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at
the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the
voluntary acts of the decedent.
In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally
autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code,
thus:
A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand
of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and
need not be witnessed.
Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is
unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the
dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date
some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure,
however, does not render the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the
provisions of Article 814.
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the
holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of
authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.
Petition granted.

8. FEDERICO AZAOLA, petitioner-appellant, vs. CESARIO SINGSON, oppositor-appellee (109 PHIL 102)
EN BANC; G.R. No. L-14003

August 5, 1960

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This appeal involves the determination of the quantity of evidence required for the probate of a
holographic will.
On September 9, 1957, Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died at 13 Luskot, Quezon City. Francisco Azaola,
petitioner herein for probate of the holographic will, submitted the said holographic will whereby Maria
Milagros Azaola was made the sole heir as against Fortunatas nephew Cesario Singson. Francisco Azaola
testified that he saw the holographic will one month, more or less, before the death of the testatrix, as
the same was handed to him and his wife; and that the same was executed in the handwriting of the
decedent. As proof, he presented several documents showing the signature of the decedent: a mortgage
deed, a general and special power of attorney, deeds of sale, an affidavit and residence certificates.
The opposition to the probate was on the ground that (1) the execution of the will was procured by
undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife, and (2) that the
testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last will, and that the same was actually
written either on the 5th or 6th day of August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on the
will.
The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent must
present three witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of the
testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lone witness presented by the proponent "did
not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was written in the handwriting of the testatrix."
The proponent appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce more than one witness
because the will's authenticity was not questioned; and second, that Article 811 does not mandatorily
require the production of three witnesses to identify the handwriting and signature of a holographic
will, even if its authenticity should be denied by the adverse party.
Held:
Article 811 of our present Civil Code cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of
three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied.
Since no witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by
law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witness possessing the requisite
qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding
and producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature
of the testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not so express) "that the
will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator". There may be no available witness of the
testator's hand; or even if so familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive opinion.
Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may thus become an impossibility.
As can be seen, the law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness may be found (or what
amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of

the will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency (811, paragraph 2).The
requirement can be considered mandatory only in the case of ordinary testaments, precisely because
the presence of at least three witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to
their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no witness need be present (Art. 10), and the rule
requiring production of three witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be
avoided.
Again, under Article 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words "if the Court deem it
necessary", which reveal that what the law deems essential is that the Court should be convinced of the
will's authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by
their testimony that the ill is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the
other hand, if no competent witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing, the Court may
still, and in fact it should, resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the Court, in fine, is to exhaust all
available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent that the true intention of
the testator be carried into effect.
Our conclusion is that the rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of the Civil Code is merely directory
and is not mandatory.
Decision appealed from set aside, and the case is remanded to the trial court for admission of further
evidence, in the interest of fairness as this is the first time the provision has had to be construed by the
Court.