Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1. Introduction
In a normal course of life, diplomatic agents are involved in different civil
relations with natural and legal persons in the State to which they have been
accredited, for example, renting accommodation, employing private servants
and purchasing goods or services. It is a general principle that every person in
the market should be treated equally and without any discrimination.
Therefore, it is logical and reasonable to assume that a diplomatic agent
should have the same rights and duties as well as bear the same liability as
every other person in similar relations. However, the matter is more
complicated as diplomatic agents are given a special status according to international law. The receiving State is under a legal obligation to respect, assist
and protect him and not to interfere with his official functions. A diplomatic
agent is granted different inviolabilities and privileges as well as immunity
from the jurisdiction of the receiving State in order to enable him to exercise
his official functions independently and effectively and to avoid any interferences on the part of the receiving State. Jurisdictional immunity encompasses actually three different immunities, namely immunity from criminal,
Ren Vrk is Lecturer of Public International Law and Director for Academic Affairs at
the Institute of Law, University of Tartu; Visiting Lecturer of Diplomatic and Consular
Law at the Estonian School of Diplomacy; Tutor at the Diplomatic Council in Oxford,
United Kingdom. He is a graduate of the Institute of Law (2000, LL.B., magna cum laude)
and Stockholm University (2001, LL.M.). Currently, he is a doctoral student at the
Faculty of Law, University of Tartu. He is a member of the Martens Society and
American Society of International Law. His main field of research is diplomatic and
consular law, use of force and international humanitarian law.
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activities. However, the need for diplomatic immunity, that is, jurisdictional
immunity especially meant for diplomatic agents, is neither self-evident nor
unchallenged. There have always been those who completely oppose such
immunity, but then again there have equally been those who unquestionably
believe in the need of diplomatic immunity without admitting any exceptions.
The reasonable path lies somewhere between the described extreme positions.
As to the justification of diplomatic immunity, three theories have been
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developed since the seventeenth century. The first two theories, namely the
theory of extraterritoriality and of representative character, are nowadays
disregarded due to their fictitious and figurative nature and non-compatibility
with reality. The International Law Commission (ILC) also rejected these
theories (although it did not deny the representative character of the head of
the mission and of the mission itself) and turned to the theory of functional
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necessity, which provides a conceptual basis for the Vienna Convention.
According to the third theory, the justification for granting immunity to diplomatic agents is based on the need to enable normal functioning of diplomatic
agents as well as the diplomatic mission. The same position can be found in
the preamble of the Vienna Convention, where it is declared that the purpose
of such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure
the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions when
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representing States. This creates a link between granting immunities and
performing diplomatic functions and furthermore serves as a criterion for
assessing whether immunities are appropriate and necessary when such a link
is missing.
The immunity conferred to diplomatic agents is primarily procedural in
character and does not affect any underlying substantive liability. The judge
said in the English landmark case of Empson v. Smith that it is elementary law
that diplomatic immunity is not immunity from legal liability, but immunity
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from suit. Subject to exceptions resulting from the performance of
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Ren Vrk, Diplomaatiline igus [Diplomatic Law] (Juura: Tallinn, 2004) at 141.
See Grant V. McGlanahan, Diplomatic Immunity: Principles, Practices, Problems (St. Matins
Press: New York, 1989) at 2734 for a detailed discussion of different theories.
Sir Arthur Watts, The International Law Commission 19491998 (3 vols, Oxford University
Press: Oxford, 1999), vol. I, at 181.
Actually, the ILC did not want to attach too much importance to the justification of
diplomatic immunities. As long as the limits of immunity are clearly enough defined,
there is probably no need for the concrete reference to its conceptual basis.
Empson v. Smith (English Court of Appeal), 1 QB 426 (1966) at 438.
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Article 41(1) [hereinafter all references to articles are to those of the Vienna
Convention].
Dickinson v. Del Solar (English Court of Appeal), 1 KB 376 (1930) at 380.
Empson v. Smith, supra note 6, at 438439.
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However, if the diplomatic agent is persistently refusing to reach a compromise, the ministry can take more serious steps and can ask either the
diplomatic agent to be recalled or his immunity to be waived.
There is also an indirect exception to immunity from civil jurisdiction of
the receiving State. If a diplomatic agent initiates proceedings in a court of the
receiving State, that is, invokes himself the jurisdiction of the latter, he
precludes himself from the possibility to invoke immunity in respect of any
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counter-claim directly connected with the principal claim. It is assumed that
if a diplomatic agent initiates proceedings, he submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the receiving State in a manner that is necessary for full and
complete examination of the particular case. The diplomatic agent has to take
into account that the defendant must also have the same rights in defending
his interest and such defence may include the submission of a counter-claim.
The latter must be directly, not simply indirectly connected with the principal
claim. For example, an English court held that when the diplomatic agent
claimed for money or damages from the defendant, he did not submit himself
to a counter-claim for defamation (especially because the latter was a criminal
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offence). A counter-claim is admissible only if the diplomatic agent was the
initiator of proceedings; he being, for example, merely a witness or expert is
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not enough.
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Article 32(3).
High Commissioner for India v. Ghosh (English Court of Appeal), 1 QB 134 (1960).
See for example Propend Finance Property Ltd. v. Sing and the Commissioner of the Australian
Federal Police (English High Court), Times Law Reports, 2 May 1997.
Yearbook of the International Law Commission (2 vols, United Nations: New York, 1957),
vol. II, at 139.
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possible answer depends very much on the choice of arguments. On the one
hand, if one wants to ensure that a diplomatic agent is completely independent from the receiving State and therefore able to exercise his official functions
effectively, one will most certainly reach the conclusion that his principal
private residence should enjoy absolute immunity. On the other hand, if one
follows more pragmatic line of reasoning, one may conclude that the principal
private residence must be subject to the jurisdiction of the receiving State
because there is no feasible and reasonable alternative to lex rei sitae. The court
practice predating the Vienna Convention favours actually the second
approach as courts did not draw a clear distinction between a principal private
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residence and other kinds of private immovable property. For example, a
Polish court stated very clearly in 1925 that municipal courts have jurisdiction in regard to the private immovable property of a public minister, except in
regard to such immovable property as is devoted to the official use of the
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embassy or legation.
The post-Vienna Convention court practice supports equally the position
that the principal private residence is not immune from the civil jurisdiction of
the receiving State. As long as such a residence is protected from any
measures of execution in accordance with Article 31(3), it is most likely
correct and better to assert that the local courts are entitled to exercise their
jurisdiction over principal private residences, which are actually situated in the
territory of the receiving State. Furthermore, such exercise of jurisdiction does
not necessarily disturb or hinder the performance of official functions by the
diplomatic agents. For example, in the Jurisdiction over Yugoslav Military Mission
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(Germany) case, where the plaintiff demanded, inter alia, a correction of the
entry in the Land Register to the effect that the plaintiff was the actual owner,
the court found that an action for correction of the Land Register does not
hamper the performance of diplomatic functions. The District Court of the
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Netherlands favoured also this position in the Deputy Registrar case, where
the court found that the deputy registrar could not claim for immunity even
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although the property was used as his residence. In the courts opinion, the
only function which the dwelling serves with regard to his work at the Registry
of the International Court of Justice is to provide him and his wife with
somewhere to live which is relatively close to his work; this is not altered by
the fact that the International Court of Justice regards this as useful, or by the
fact that [Deputy Registrars] aforesaid library is housed in the building. An
English court took a view that the fact that some premises were used as a
principal private residence and for carrying out certain social obligations
associated with the diplomatic position was not sufficient to proclaim that the
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premises were used for the purposes of a diplomatic mission.
Court practice and the majority of municipal law as well as the rational of
the exception from civil immunity in the case of a real action relating to
private immovable property indicate that the phrase unless he holds it on
behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission should be
narrowly construed and that it should be possible to bring an action to
determine the legal questions relating to the premises in which a diplomatic
agent is living.
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Sen, A Diplomats Handbook of International Law and Practice, supra note 15, at 142.
See for example Deposit (Land in Czechoslovakia) Case (Supreme Court of Czechoslovakia),
9 Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases (19381940), Case No. 167.
Some authors have even expressed the view that this exception is not known to have
given rise to any problems. Jonathan Brown, Diplomatic Immunity: State Practice
under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 37 International and Comparative
Law Quarterly (1988) 5388, at 76.
Article 42.
Charles J. Lewis, State and Diplomatic Immunity (3rd edn, Lloyds of London Press:
London, 1990) at 131.
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second job, because there is simply no time for it and the receiving State is not
interested that diplomatic agents engage themselves in activities other than
diplomatic. Therefore receiving States have made it very difficult, if not
impossible, for a diplomatic agent to work privately. Some States, for example,
the United Kingdom, will not normally accept as a diplomatic agent a person
who is engaged in business and intends to continue with his business in these
States. Such a person may still be accepted in very exceptional cases if he is
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unusually well qualified for the relevant diplomatic post. The receiving State
may, at its sole discretion, set aside the prohibition of non-diplomatic
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activities.
Although there is a clear prohibition to practice any professional or
commercial activity, it still sometimes happens that diplomatic agents ignore
this prohibition. For this reason, it was felt necessary to have a specific rule
denying the disobedient diplomatic agents immunity from civil jurisdiction in
case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised
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outside official functions. This exception is equally necessary in cases where
the receiving State has decided to overlook in respect of a particular
diplomatic agent the prohibition set out in Article 42. The third exception is
intended to guarantee that the persons with whom the diplomatic agent has
had commercial or professional relations [is not] deprived of their ordinary
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remedies. Indeed, if a diplomatic agent has still decided, whether in breach
of Article 42 or with a specific permission of the receiving State, to enter into
the market, he should have the same rights and duties as any other person
there. The receiving State can, of course, declare a particular diplomatic agent
persona non grata and demand his departure, but this political weapon does
not give much comfort to those who have suffered because of the acts of that
diplomatic agent.
The third exception contains two phrases, namely any professional or
commercial activity and outside his official functions, which demand some
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Gore-Booth and Pakenham, Satows Guide to Diplomatic Practice, supra note 33, at 126.
Hardy, Modern Diplomatic Law, supra note 10, at 62.
Some States still doubted whether it was necessary to have such exception. For
example, Columbia proposed at the Vienna Conference to delete that exception in
favour of inserting a general prohibition of any professional or commercial activity (this
prohibition became the discussed Article 42 of the Vienna Convention). UN Doc.
A/CONF. 20/C.1/L. 173 (1961): UN Doc. A/CONF. 20/C.1/L. 174 (1961).
International Law Commission, Report Covering Its 10th Session, 1958, UN Doc.
A/3859 (1958) at 20.
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explanation. The first phrase does not refer to every single professional or
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commercial act, but to a continuous activity. Therefore the contracts, which
are necessary in the course of ordinary life, for example, purchasing goods,
ordering services, hiring private servants or renting accommodation, does not
qualify as commercial activity in the sense of Article 31(1)(c); the latter focuses
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on the pursuit of trade or business activity. Indeed, if a diplomatic agent
would be subject to civil jurisdiction of the receiving State in every incidental
contract to daily life, his independence could be potentially jeopardised. But if
the diplomatic agent takes up a paid employment outside the diplomatic
mission or offers professional services for remuneration, he engages himself in
acts that can no longer be considered as incidental to the daily life and
therefore he is no longer entitled to civil immunity. Although investment is
normally commercial activity, it may still be difficult to decide whether all
personal assets invested in the receiving State necessarily fall under the third
exception to civil immunity. When a diplomatic agent, for example, invests in
shares or businesses in the receiving State, he undoubtedly engages in
commercial activity and is subject to local civil jurisdiction. As a result, the
receiving State can sue the diplomatic agent in connection with his investment
activity, for example, for the recovery of income tax on profit acquired
through personal investments. However, an Australian court has found that
neither the purchase of a house as an investment nor the collection of rent
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from tenants thereafter amounts to commercial activity. The courts finding
was, most likely, a result of misinterpretation of the Vienna Convention
because the renting of accommodation for making profit is most certainly
commercial activity. While a single personal loan can be considered as
non-commercial act in the meaning of Article 31(1)(c), then direct or indirect
investment is a long-term activity carried out for profit. Local courts would be
particularly interested that immunity from civil jurisdiction does not become
an obstacle to bankruptcy or winding-up proceedings, which involve the
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interests of a number of people.
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This was stressed also during the drafting process of the Vienna Convention. UN Doc.
A/CN.4/116, at 56.
This position was also upheld the case of Tabion v. Mufti (United States Court of
Appeals), 73 F 3d 535 (1996).
Diplomatic Immunity Case (Family Court of Australian), unreported; see Jonathan Brown,
supra note 36, at 76.
Denza, Diplomatic Law, supra note 20, at 251.
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Portugal v. Goncalves (Civil Court of Brussels), 82 International Law Reports (1990) 115.
Article 31(3).
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Article 31(4).
Gore-Booth and Pakenham, Satows Guide to Diplomatic Practice, supra note 33, at 127.
Hardy, Modern Diplomatic Law, supra note 10, at 61.
Article 41(1).
Article 31(4).
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effective due to practical difficulties, but there can also be direct or indirect
opposition from the sending State. During the drafting process, there was an
attempt to make the jurisdiction of the sending State compulsory so that
when an action cannot be brought against a diplomatic agent in the receiving
State, the courts of the sending States are obliged to entertain the action.
States were not prepared to assume an obligation of providing a competent
forum in every case where someone wished to sue one of their diplomatic
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agents.
But even if the courts of the sending State have jurisdiction and initiate
proceedings against a diplomatic agent, there would be a number of practical
difficulties in connection with such a case. Firstly, because the diplomatic
agent has personal inviolability, the authorities of the receiving State cannot
serve him legal process unless it is done by a representative of the sending
State. Secondly, the diplomatic agent cannot, for the same reason, be
extradited so as to be physically present to stand trial in the sending State if
the latter is not prepared to give permission for that. If the sending State
waives immunity and allows (or more likely compels) the diplomatic agent to
travel home in order to stand trial, it has to find someone to replace the
leaving diplomatic agent and cover the cost regarding such irregular and
unexpected accreditation. Thirdly, the courts of the sending State cannot
compel the witnesses in the receiving State to travel to the sending State in
order to give testimonies. Fourthly, the initiation of proceedings in the
sending States (that is, in a foreign State from the perspective of the plaintiff)
involves heavy expenses for local legal aid, possible translation, travelling (not
only for himself, but also for experts and witnesses), etc. All this demonstrates
that the courts of the sending State are not indeed the best or effective forums
to settle the disputes, which have arisen in the receiving State.
6. Conclusion
Immunity from civil jurisdiction of the receiving State is undoubtedly
necessary in order to ensure that a diplomatic agent is completely independent
from the receiving State and able to exercise his official functions effectively,
but such immunity cannot become impunity or cause harm to those who
enter into some form of civil relations with a diplomatic agent. Although the
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