Journal of Southern African Studies, Volume 35, Number 4, December 2009

The Lack of Internal Party Democracy in the

African National Congress: A Threat to the
Consolidation of Democracy in South Africa*
Kebapetse Lotshwao
(University of Botswana)

This article argues that the lack of internal democracy within the African National Congress
(ANC) is a threat to the consolidation of South African democracy. The ANC has
leadership elections but few other elements of internal party democracy. There is a
centralised style of leadership in which the National Executive Committee (NEC) or even
individual leaders dominate decision-making to the exclusion of the membership and lower
party structures, and there is still an adherence to Leninist principles such as democratic
centralism and the need for absolute party discipline on the part of party members.
Coupled with an intolerance of debate and dissent by the leadership, these features stifle
debate of important issues and policies. Thus, bad decisions by the leadership cannot be
checked within the party before becoming public policy. Since lower structures and the
general membership are deprived of an opportunity to influence public policies, the
government in some instances becomes unresponsive to the peoples needs. Democratic
centralism and the absolute party discipline required from ANC members deployed in various
state institutions, especially parliament, weakens their ability to provide oversight over the
executive or influence public policy that contradicts the party line. The executive is thus left
unchecked and virtually free to act as it wishes where the institution of accountability is
ANC-dominated. Instead of consolidating democracy, these factors could lead, eventually, to
the gradual decay of liberal democracy in South Africa. Whilst multiparty democracy might
well continue to exist, such democracy could be of low quality, particularly with regard to
government responsiveness and accountability, given the overwhelming dominance of the
ANC. Thus, internal democracy within the ANC is a prerequisite for the consolidation of
South African democracy.

As with most African countries, multiparty democracy in South Africa is characterised by the
dominance of a single political party, in this case the African National Congress (ANC). The
ANCs dominance derives from its leading role in the liberation struggle in South Africa and
its association with respected national leaders such as Nelson Mandela.1 The majority of
black South Africans thus identifies with and votes for the ANC because of its historical role
in opposing the apartheid system and finally bringing it to an end. Also contributing to this
popularity is the ANCs association with the trade unions,2 especially the Congress of South
*This article was presented to the Department of Political and Administrative Studies Seminar at the University of
Botswana on 3 September 2008. My thanks to Charles W. Gossett, Edelgard Mahant, David Sebudubudu, Emmanuel
Botlhale and Markus Korhonen for their advice.
1 H. Giliomee, South Africas Emerging Dominant Party Regime, Journal of Democracy, 9, 4 (1998), pp. 23.
See also T. Lodge, Politics in South Africa, from Mandela to Mbeki (Cape Town, David Philip, 2002), pp. 1545.
2 Giliomee, South Africas Emerging Dominant Party Regime, p. 3.
ISSN 0305-7070 print; 1465-3893 online/09/040901-14
q 2009 The Editorial Board of the Journal of Southern African Studies DOI: 10.1080/03057070903313244

902 Journal of Southern African Studies

African Trade Unions (COSATU). The ANC has, as a result, won huge majorities in the four
national elections held so far, from 1994 to 2004; its share of national popular vote rising in
the process from 63 per cent in 1994, to 66.4 per cent in 1999 and 69.7 per cent in 2004,3
although falling slightly in 2009 to 65.9 per cent.4 The emergence of the Congress of the
People (COPE) as a breakaway party from the ANC offers a possible explanation for this
slight fall in votes: COPE came third behind the ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA),
with 7.42 per cent of the national popular vote.5 Even so, the ANC remains firmly entrenched
in power; and its leader, the South African president Jacob Zuma, has even claimed that the
ANC will rule South Africa until the second coming of Christ.6
In addition to enjoying massive electoral support because of its historic role, the ANCs
dominance is further aided by the fragmented nature of opposition political parties along
provincial and ethnic or racial lines.7 The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), with a largely Zulu
following, is based predominantly in KwaZulu-Natal, for instance, whilst the United
Democratic Movement (UDM) is concentrated in the Eastern Cape,8 and the DA has a mostly
white support-base.9 Moreover, the ANC views the opposition, especially the white
opposition parties, as illegitimate and motivated by racism,10 an allegation that damages their
legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the majority of the voting public.
The ANCs dominance and the fragmentation of the opposition make a democratic
change of government in South Africa unlikely in the foreseeable future. Some observers
have suggested that two possible scenarios might make such an eventuality more likely. The
first would require the white opposition parties such as the DA to attract substantial numbers
of black voters, perhaps by developing a black leadership.11 Alternatively, the second would
involve a split in the Tripartite Alliance between the ANC, the South African Communist
Party (SACP) and/or COSATU, resulting in the formation of a new opposition party.12
For now, however, the ANCs electoral majority and political power remains largely
unchallenged, a situation that raises important questions for the future development of the
new South African democracy. Indeed, it is suggested here, the very nature of the ANC is a
problem for, even a threat to, the consolidation of the democracy for which it fought and
which it has promoted since 1994. Although no longer an exiled liberation movement
influenced by the SACP, the ANC remains internally undemocratic and highly centralised.
Ordinary party members and lower level party organisation, such as provincial, womens and
youth structures, are not involved in important decision-making, which is still dominated by
the party leadership in the form of the National Executive Committee (NEC). Indeed, at
times, dominant individual leaders such as the party president even impose decisions and
policies. The ANC still adheres to the Leninist practices of democratic centralism and the
need for absolute party discipline on the part of membership and lower party structures.
3 See the South African General Elections Report www.saweb.co.za/elections.com, retrieved on 16 July 2007.
4 Electoral Commission of South Africa, available at http://www.elections.org.za/NPEPWStaticReports/reports/
ReportHandler.ashx?22Apr2009NationalElectionnResultsReportnAllProvinces.pdf, retrieved on 09 June 2009.
5 Ibid.
6 Mail and Guardian, 29 May 2008.
7 Lodge, Politics in South Africa, from Mandela to Mbeki, p. 157.
8 Ibid., p. 157. See also S. Friedman, South Africa: Entering the Post Mandela Era, Journal of Democracy, 10, 4
(1999), pp. 3 18.
9 J. Barkan Emerging Legislature or Rubber Stamp? The South African National Assembly after Ten Years of
Democracy (Centre for Social Research, Paper No. 134, University of Cape Town, 2005), p. 6.
10 H. Giliomee et al., Dominant Party Rule, Opposition Parties and Minorities in South Africa, in R. Southall
(ed.), Opposition and Democracy in South Africa (London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), pp. 16182.
11 Ibid., p. 163.
12 See for instance R. Southall, Democracy in Africa: Moving beyond a Difficult Legacy (Cape Town, Human
Sciences Research Council Press, 2003), p. 42.

The Lack of Internal Party Democracy in the ANC

903

This article seeks to understand how this lack of internal party democracy poses a threat to
the consolidation of South African democracy. Rather than its consolidation, it could lead to
the gradual decay or slow death of democracy in South Africa in the long run. The ANC
government has already become unresponsive and largely unaccountable in certain areas of
governance: unresponsive because a lack of intra-party democracy deprives supporters of the
opportunity to influence decision-making and government policy; and unaccountable where
the institution of accountability is ANC-dominated. In particular, the ANC-dominated
parliament fails to hold the executive accountable. ANC members of parliament (MPs) are
selected by the party leadership which also has the power to redeploy or remove them from
parliament. And as MPs, they are controlled by the traditions of democratic centralism and
party discipline to which we have referred. Not only does this weaken parliament, rendering it
incapable of exercising independent oversight over the executive, but it also limits the ability
of parliament to influence any public policy that contradicts the executive line. The executive
is thus left unaccountable and virtually free to act in circumstances where parliament needs to
provide independent oversight, in the process leading to cases of political corruption and
abuse of power. Given the ANCs historic dominance, it is thus of critical importance that the
party should become internally democratic if democracy in South Africa is to be
consolidated.

Internal Party Democracy

Internal party democracy, as it is widely understood in the study of liberal democracies,
emphasises the need for participation by party membership and lower party structures in the
decision-making processes of the party.13 Participation in decision-making allows
the selection of more capable leaders and the adoption of responsive policies, as well as the
development of a democratic culture.14 For a governing party, intra-party democracy is
particularly important inasmuch as it makes government (and not just party leadership)
responsive to popular demands. Participation by party membership and lower structures in
decision-making also imposes checks against bad leadership.15 For this to exist, a culture of
tolerance of debate and dissenting opinion by the party leadership is a necessary precondition
of internal democracy.16
In contrast, critics of this conception of intra-party democracy, or advocates of an
oligarchical or authoritarian style of party leadership, point to its potential to undermine party
cohesion and thus efficiency. This is an argument advanced by Maurice Duverger, for
instance. According to him, an internally democratic party is not well armed for the struggle
of politics and . . . a party that organises itself along authoritarian and autocratic lines is
superior to others.17 Eric E. Schattsneider makes a similar argument: democracy, he asserts,
is not to be found in the parties but between parties.18 The problem with such arguments,
however, is that whilst efficiency and cohesion are indeed necessary for a party to implement
13 A. Ware, The Logic of Party Democracy (London, Macmillan Press Limited, 1979), pp. 7092. See also
J. Teorell, A Deliberative Defence of Intra-Party Democracy, Party Politics, 5, 3 (1999), pp. 363 82.
14 S. Scarrow Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives: Implementing
Intra-Party Democracy, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (2005), p. 3.
15 A. Ware, Citizens, Parties and the State (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1987), p. 33.
16 K. Lotshwao, Lack of Internal-party Democracy in Ruling Parties as a Threat to Consolidation of Democracy:
The Case of Botswana and South Africa (M.Sc. Dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 2007).
17 M. Duverger, Political Parties (London, Wiley, 1954), p. 134.
18 E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York, Rinehart and Company, 1942), p. 60. See also R. Michels,
Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (New York,
Dover Publications, 1959).

904 Journal of Southern African Studies

its policies, especially once in government, it does not follow from this that the agenda that
will be implemented will be a democratic one. For instance, the internal cohesion and
discipline of the National Party (NP) in South Africa enabled it to implement its apartheid
policy efficiently. Where there is a single dominant party, with little prospect of a change of
government through elections, the absence of internal party democracy can become more
important than the existence of democracy between parties and cohesion and efficiency
can become a justification for executive control.
Moreover, the existence of internal party democracy within political parties can also
encourage the development of a wider democratic culture, not only within political parties but
in the country at large. This is especially important for countries in transition to a
consolidated democracy like South Africa, where the democratic culture is still in an early
stage of development. As Jan Teorell observes, how could we trust party representatives to
consider the arguments put forward by opposing groups in the public sphere if they ignore the
reasoning of their own members?19

Lack of Internal Party Democracy within the ANC

Democracy in the ANC functions best during national conferences and in leadership
elections and most poorly at all other times. In terms of the ANC constitution, the National
Conference, held at least every five years, decides and determines policies and programmes
and elects the top leadership and other members of the National Executive Committee (NEC).20
The National General Council reviews policies and programmes and evaluates the performance
of NEC members.21 The National General Council is also empowered to ratify or rescind any of
the decisions taken by any of the ANC bodies or officials.22 In particular, the National
Conference has allowed ANC delegates to hold the leadership accountable through elections.23
The 2007 Polokwane National Conference is the best most recent case where Thabo Mbeki and
his faction lost the leadership elections to the Jacob Zuma faction.24
This apart, however, the National Conference and the National General Council do not play
any significant role in policy-making, other than to endorse leadership positions,25 which are
generally unchallengeable because of the ANCs organisational practices of democratic
centralism and absolute party discipline.26 For their inability to play any significant role in
policy making, Tom Lodge has termed the ANC National Conferences a legitimating ritual.27
19 Teorell, A Deliberative Defence of Intra-Party Democracy, p. 375.
20 Constitution of the African National Congress, available at http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/discussion/2007/
constit_amend.pdf, retrieved on 10 June 2009. Comprising delegates from local branches and held every five
years, the National Conference (NC) is the principal policy-making organ of the ANC. It also elects the National
Executive Committee (NEC) which leads the ANC. The NEC consists of the President, Deputy President,
National Chairperson, Secretary General, Deputy Secretary General, Treasurer General and 60 additional
members. The NEC is empowered to convene the National General Council (NGC) which brings together
delegates from ANC branches, regional and provincial structures, the Alliance partners, Youths and Womens
League, ANC MPs and members of the NEC. The NGC reviews ANC policies and programmes and can alter or
rescind any decisions taken by other party organs and structures.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 V. Darracq, Being a Movement of the People and a Governing Party: Study of the African National Congress
Mass Character, Journal of Southern African Studies, 34, 2 (June 2008), pp. 43149.
24 See among others W.M. Gumede, South Africa: Jacob Zuma and the Difficulties of Consolidating South
Africas Democracy, African Affairs, 107, 427 (2008), pp. 26171.
25 T. Lodge, The ANC and the Development of Party Politics in Modern South Africa, Journal of Modern
African Studies, 42, 2 (2004), p. 210.
26 See Giliomee et al., Dominant Party Rule, Opposition Parties and Minorities in South Africa.
27 Lodge, The ANC and the Development of Party Politics, p. 210.

The Lack of Internal Party Democracy in the ANC

905

The origins of democratic centralism and absolute party discipline in the ANC originate
in its close alliance with (some would argue domination by) the South African Communist
Party (SACP) in exile.28 During this time, according to Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba, the
SACP was,
almost obsessed with control, opposing and rooting out dissent opinions in the ANC and in the
process transforming the exiled organisation (ANC) from a broad-based nationalist movement
into something more closely resembling a socialist party.29 . . . In the end, both the SACP and the
ANC in exile came to be run by a nomenklatura, an elite which, whatever its original merits may
have been, grew distant from the mass of its supporters, lost their confidence, and did not listen to
their voices.30

As Roger Southall also points out, the strategic and military assistance that African liberation
movements such as the ANC got from the Soviet Union and Cuba also encouraged a culture
of hierarchy, discipline and democratic centralism.31 Decision-making thus became the
preserve of an unaccountable exiled leadership to the exclusion of party members.
This centralisation of control was, moreover (and perhaps predominantly) a practical
response to the requirements of organising and launching a successful liberation struggle.
Differences within the ANC were suppressed and democratic centralism and absolute party
discipline emphasised in order to preserve party unity, thus allowing the ANC to confront the
apartheid state (which sought, at every turn, to divide and undermine it) as a united rather than
a factionalised movement.32
Unfortunately, but inevitably, whilst no longer an exiled liberation movement nor
dominated by the SACP, the ANC has retained some of the undemocratic practices adopted
during the struggle against apartheid. As Krista Johnson points out, democratic centralism,
tight internal discipline and strong central co-ordination continue to be the main organising
principles of the ANC.33 In 2000, the then ANC Secretary-General (and now ANC and South
African Vice-President) Kgalema Motlanthe reminded party members that democratic
centralism remained the partys guiding principle and that members must combat tendencies
towards disruption and factionalism.34 Yet, as Mervin Gumede observes, all too often,
democratic centralism, or vanguardism serves only to perpetuate the notion of a small
group of people operating in the name of democracy, but in fact taking decisions and
enforcing them without a mandate from the electorate.35
Those who have dared to criticise and challenge the lack of internal democracy within the
ANC have been labelled, marginalised and, if white, racially abused. In 2002, Jeremy Cronin
referred to this lack of internal party democracy within the ANC as zanufication
tendencies.36 Cronin likened the undemocratic practices of the ANC to those of ZANU-PF,
under whose rule Zimbabwe became a dictatorship. The ANC leaderships response was that
28 S. Ellis and T. Sechaba, Comrades against Apartheid: The ANC and the South African Communist Party in Exile
(London, James Currey Ltd, 1992), p. 200.
29 Ibid., p. 201.
30 Ibid., p. 202.
31 Southall, Democracy in Africa: Moving Beyond a Difficult Legacy, p. 36.
32 K. Johnston, Liberal or Liberation Framework? The Contradictions of ANC Rule in South Africa, in H. Melber
(ed.), Limits to Liberation in Southern Africa (Cape Town, Human Sciences Research Council Press, 2003),
pp. 20021. See also M. Ottaway Liberation Movements and Transition to Democracy: The Case of the
A.N.C, Journal of Modern African Studies, 29, 1(March 1991), pp. 6182.
33 Ibid., p. 215. See also A. Butler, How Democratic is the African National Congress?, JSAS, 31, 4 (2005),
p. 728.
34 R. Mates, South Africa: Democracy without the People, Journal of Democracy, 13, 1 (January 2002), p. 25.
35 Mail and Guardian, 19 April 2005.
36 Jeremy Cronins interview with Helena Sheehan, www.comms.dcu.ie/sheehanh/za/cronin02.htm Cronin is
National Executive Committee (NEC) member of the ANC and deputy secretary general of the South African
Communist Party (SACP).

906 Journal of Southern African Studies

Cronin was a frustrated white male who could not come to terms with loss of white
privilege.37 While the absence of internal party democracy and adherence to principles of
centralism and party discipline are not unique to the ANC, they are not as institutionalised or
entrenched in other parties in South Africa. For instance, the DA38 and the Inkatha
Freedom Party (IFP)39 do not have these forms of control as their guiding principles and
their members can engage the leadership with perhaps less risk of inducing charges of
indiscipline.

Consolidation of Democracy
As with democracy, the consolidation of democracy is also a contested concept. Samuel
Huntington, for instance, talks of the two turnover test,40 by which he means that democracy
has been consolidated if the party that wins power in the first elections loses it in the next
elections and peacefully relinquish power to the victor without seeking to overturn the
election results. The new winners also have to peacefully transfer power to the winners of the
next election. However, this conception reduces democratic consolidation to no more than
electoral process and disregards other critical factors, including the quality of that democracy.
Using Huntingtons criterion, there is no prospect of democratic consolidation in South
Africa, given the ANCs electoral dominance and the fragmentation of the political
opposition.
To Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, in contrast, democracy has been consolidated if it has
become the only game in town.41 This occurs when the overwhelming majority of political
groups in society seek power through elections only, rather than by overthrowing the
government, when the public in times of political and economic crises believe the crisis can
be resolved in a democratic manner and there is recognition by all that violation of such
norms is likely to be ineffective and costly.42 However, considering that political parties
command the moral authority to influence the behaviour of their members, it could also be
argued that political parties are better able to impart such democratic values and convince
their members that democracy is, indeed, the only game in town where they are
themselves internally democratic.
Perhaps more appropriate to contemporary South African conditions, however, is the
conception of consolidation associated mostly with the work of Guillermo ODonnell43 and
Andreas Schedler.44 Rather than confining their analysis to regular elections, democratic
alternation and a general belief in democracy and the support for democratic institutions, they
consider the functioning and quality of democracy itself. Most important, in this respect, is
the need to avoid or guard against the gradual decay or regression of liberal democracy into
some form of unresponsive and unaccountable (hybrid or formulaic) democracy.
37 Mail and Guardian, 21 February 2006.
38 Democratic Alliance Federal Constitution, http://www.da.org.za/docs/542/DA%20CONSTITUTION.pdf,
retrieved on 16 June 2009.
39 Inkatha Freedom Party, www.ifp.org.za, retrieved on 16 June 2009.
40 S.P. Huntington, The Third Wave, Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK, University of
Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 2667.
41 J. Linz and A. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, Southern Europe, South America
and Post Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 5.
42 Ibid., pp. 56.
43 G. ODonnell, Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes, in S. Mainwaring et al. (eds), Issues in Democratic
Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame, University of
Notre Dame Press), pp. 17 56.
44 A. Schedler, What is Democratic Consolidation? Journal of Democracy, 9, 2 (1998), pp. 91107.

The Lack of Internal Party Democracy in the ANC

907

ODonnell refers to this gradual erosion of liberal democracy under elected governments as
the the slow death of democracy.45
In South Africa, lack of internal party democracy within the ANC is the potential source
of such a gradual erosion or slow death of democracy. All the features of such a trajectory
are in place: an unresponsive and unaccountable government enabled by a dominant party
that continues to win elections despite its increasing remoteness from the electorate; within
the party, policies dictated by the leadership and prominent members; iron control exercised
through Leninist principles by the party leadership over its cadres; and the consequent
inability of these cadres deployed in various state institutions to hold the executive
accountable or influence public policy. The ANC dominated parliament is the worst affected
in this regard.
The fragmented nature of civil society, political opposition and the ANCs alliance
partners ensure that the executive in South Africa is virtually free to act as it wishes, whereas
the ANC-dominated institutions should be providing independent oversight. Only the
judiciary remains largely independent and free of such executive direction but its ability to
continue providing independent oversight of the executive depends on it not being politicised.
Yet the ANC leadership does not hide its desire to control the judiciary as well. In one of its
policy documents, it states that the goal of transformation of the state entails extending the
power of the National Liberation Movement over all layers of power: the army, the police,
the bureaucracy, intelligence structures, the judiciary, parastatals, and agencies such as
regulatory bodies, the public broadcaster, the central bank and so on (emphasis added).46
If this ambition is achieved, the danger is clear: the judiciary too would become an extension
of the party.

Bad Leadership Decisions and the Unresponsiveness of the ANC

Government
As suggested by Alan Ware,47 participation by party members in decision-making can serve
to check poor leadership decisions within a party. Since decision-making in the ANC is
dominated by the party leadership and sometimes individual leaders, it should not be
surprising that bad decisions have been taken on a number of occasions and continue to be
taken. Some of these decisions then go on to become poor official policies of the South
African government. Teorell suggests that intra or internal party democracy should also be
seen as a mechanism to supplement general elections in making the legislature sensitive to
public opinion.48 For the reasons we have discussed, too often this is not happening within
the ANC and its government. Among many examples of such policy decisions taken by
the ANC leadership, we can cite the examples of the adoption of the Growth, Employment
and Redistribution (GEAR) economic policy in 1996, the disastrous HIV/AIDS policy and
the recent dissolution of the elite crime-busting Directorate of Special Operations
(Scorpions).
GEAR, South Africas current economic policy, was adopted by the ANC
leadership without reference to indeed with the exclusion of party members, lowerlevel party structures and even alliance partners, the SACP and the COSATU. With the

45 G. ODonnell, Do Economists Know Best? Journal of Democracy, 6, 1 (1995), pp. 238.

46 J. Netshitenzhe, The State, Property Relations and Social Transformation, Umrabulo, 5 (1998), available at
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?doc ancdocs/pubs/umrabulo/articles/sprst.html, retrieved on 16 July 2007.
47 Ware, Citizens, Parties and the State, p. 33.
48 Teorell, A Deliberative Defence of Intra-Party Democracy, p. 373.

908 Journal of Southern African Studies

approval of Nelson Mandela, then the ANC leader and South African president, GEAR was
authored by his deputy, Thabo Mbeki and a group of economists selected by Mbeki himself.49
Focusing on neo-liberal economic reforms, such as cutting public expenditure on social
services and the privatisation of public enterprises, the lower party structures and general
membership were only notified of the new economic policy after its completion and warned
by both Mbeki and Mandela that it was non-negotiable.50 Those who disagreed with GEAR
within the ANC and its alliance partners were given an ultimatum to either recant or face
harsh sanctions and those who did not recant were subjected to disciplinary hearings and
stripped of their positions within the party.51 Ironically, GEAR replaced the Reconstruction
and Development Programme (RDP), an earlier economic policy that had been influenced by
public participation. Unlike GEAR, however, the RDP had prioritised meeting the
populations basic needs such as housing, employment, health, education as well as economic
redistribution.52 Thus, by excluding members and lower party structures from decisionmaking in economic policy, not only were neo-liberal economic reforms prioritised over the
basic needs of the people of South Africa but the countrys economic policy was changed
without consultation.
The issue of HIV/AIDS is yet another instance where lack of intra-party democracy
within the ANC was demonstrated, this time not only affecting the responsiveness of
government but also resulting in loss of lives. For a long time, the then president and ANC
leader, Thabo Mbeki, denied both the existence of a link between HIV and AIDS and that the
virus could be sexually transmitted.53 Asked about his views on HIV/AIDS by the
Washington Post in 2002, Mbeki responded, Personally, I dont know anybody who has died
of AIDS. When asked whether he knew anyone with HIV, Mbeki responded, I really
honestly dont.54 The evidence of the existence of HIV/AIDS in South Africa was, however,
clear: it was the leading cause of death in South Africa during the period of Mbekis
presidency, accounting for 25 per cent of all deaths in 2000.55 As party leader and South
African president, Thabo Mbekis views on the disease became the official position of the
South African government. As a result, the government did not come to the assistance of
thousands of South Africans affected by HIV through the provision of life-prolonging AntiRetroviral drugs (ARVs). Instead, the government irresponsibly argued that such drugs were
poisonous and expensive and instead advised people to eat garlic, onions, olive oil and
African potatoes to boost their immune system.56 In the end, it has been calculated that the
failure or refusal by the South African government to provide (ARVs) to HIV/AIDS sufferers
led to loss of about 330,000 lives.57
Government also refused to provide Azidothymidine (AZT) and Neverapine to pregnant
mothers to reduce the chances of HIV-positive mothers transmitting the virus to their unborn
babies. As a result of this refusal, it is estimated that about 40,000 children were born HIVpositive in South Africa annually.58 Thus, not only were many thousands of lives lost that could
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

M.W., Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC (Cape Town, Zebra Press, 2005), p. 87.
Ibid., p. 90.
Ibid., p. 92.
Lodge, Politics in South Africa, from Mandela to Mbeki, pp. 54 69.
I. Taylor, NEPAD: Toward Africas Development or Another False Start (London, Lynne Rienner Publishers,
2005), pp. 13738. See also Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC, p. 158.
See Taylor, NEPAD: Toward Africas Development or Another False Start, p. 138.
South African Medical Research Council Report, The Impact of HIV/Aids on Adult Mortality in South Africa
(2001).
Taylor, NEPAD, Toward Africas Development or Another False Start, p. 144.
P. Chigwedere et al., Estimating the Lost Benefits of Antiretroviral Drug Use in South Africa, Journal of
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes (JAIDS), 49, 4 (December 2008), pp. 410 15.
Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC, p. 157.

The Lack of Internal Party Democracy in the ANC

909

have been prolonged but government also allowed thousands of babies to be born with HIV by
refusing to provide AZT to pregnant mothers. Within the ANC, meanwhile, formal criticism of
Thabo Mbekis position on HIV/AIDS, and the resulting public policy, was slow to emerge,
not least because those who disagreed with him were afraid of reprisals if they spoke out.59
Demonstrating the lack of internal party democracy outside of leadership elections in the
ANC, exclusive and non-consultative decision-making within the ANC continued even after
the national conference at Polokwane, where the leadership was changed through party
elections. Despite calls by the ANC membership and civil society for consultation, the NEC
proceeded with the dissolution of the organised crime and corruption-busting Directorate of
Special Operations (also known as the Scorpions) and incorporated it into the South African
Police Service. Consultation was only undertaken after the decision had already been taken.
The leaderships proclaimed reason for disbanding the Scorpions was that it was
unconstitutional for the Scorpions to both undertake investigations and prosecute cases.60
However, the NEC member and former commander of the South African National Defence
Force, Siphiwe Nyanda, stated that the action was related to the Scorpions investigation and
prosecution of top ANC officials, including the new party leader, Jacob Zuma.61 In a debate
with Helen Zille, the leader of the DA, the ANC secretary-general, Gwede Mantashe, went
further, stating that the only thing the DA and the Scorpions shared was their persistent
hatred of the ANC.62 Mantashe went further, claiming that the Scorpions contained former
apartheid security agents who were targeting their erstwhile enemies, the ANC.63 With the
dissolution of the Scorpions, the South African government would seem to be signalling a
greater tolerance of elite corruption and abuse of power, particularly where the ANC and
some of its officials are involved.
Given that the South African Police have struggled to keep crime in South Africa under
control, it is not at all clear why an already-struggling institution should be burdened with
more responsibility. Part of the reason, perhaps, is that the ANC leadership, and thus the
South African government, has been extremely resistant to claims that crime in South Africa
is out of control. Responding to public complaints about burgeoning serious crime in 2007,
then President Thabo Mbeki argued that nobody could prove that the majority of the
countrys 40 50 million citizens think that crime is spinning out of control.64 This despite
the fact that, in 2006, roughly 50 murders, 150 rapes and 35 car hijackings were reported daily
in South Africa.65 Within the party, no one dared to contradict this party line on crime for fear
of upsetting the party leadership or breaching democratic centralism and party discipline.

Non-Accountability of the ANC Government

The lack of internal democracy in the ANC also weakens the ability of its majority in
parliament to provide independent oversight of the executive. As ANC cadres, ANC MPs also
have to observe party discipline and defend decisions of the party once a directive has been
given by the leadership.66 The party leadership is also generally intolerant of independent
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Ibid., p. 165.
See, for instance, The Times, 27 January 2008.
Business Day, 11 April 2008.
The Times, 22 April 2008.
Ibid.
Mail and Guardian, 2 February 2007.
World Politics Review, 19 February 2007.
See, for instance, H. Giliomee et al., Dominant Party Rule, Opposition Parties and Minorities in South Africa,
in Southall (ed.), Opposition and Democracy in South Africa.

910 Journal of Southern African Studies

views coming from its backbenches. In 1996, Jacob Zuma, then ANC national chairperson,
criticised the partys independent-minded members of parliament and told delegates
gathering for the partys congress that ANC leaders in government should not regard South
Africas constitution as more important than the ANC.67
Some ANC MPs have complained about this state of affairs where they are rendered
powerless by the party leadership and thereby unable to hold the executive accountable or
influence public policy. Some stated that there was a climate of fear in which internal party
democracy gets crushed and where you dont think about sticking your neck out for fear of
getting your neck chopped.68 In this case, the executive is virtually left accountable only to
itself, as Kenneth Good puts it.69 Thus, former president Thabo Mbeki and his government
could deny the existence of HIV/AIDS while thousands of people were dying, without
parliament challenging or changing policy.
Centralisation of power also weakens specialised parliamentary committees, because
ANC MPs who are generally a majority on these committees take instructions from the party
leadership, which also appoints the committee chairpersons.70 Unsurprisingly, therefore, they
cannot provide significant oversight of executive actions. The arms deal, given Cabinet
approval in December 1999,71 remains an unresolved scandal involving serious allegations of
fraud and corruption, some of these involving several ANC leaders such as Jacob Zuma, and
is a good example of this failure. Amounting to ZAR33 billion or US$5 billion, the arms deal
is thought to be the largest single procurement by the democratic government of South
Africa.72 It produced allegations of corruption and irregularities involving bribes by arms
contractors as well as conflicts of interest among the key decision makers in the deal.73
Among the senior leaders touched by the scandal were Joe Modise, then the Defence
Minister, and Jacob Zuma, then vice-president. Also implicated was the ANC itself, which
reportedly received money to finance the 1999 elections from some of the companies that
won tenders to supply arms to the government.74
When parliament investigated these alleged irregularities and corruption in 2000, the
ANC MPs sitting on the parliamentary standing committee on public accounts (SCOPA)
faced pressure from their partys leadership, ultimately being compelled to rescind the
committees resolution asking parliament to set up an independent multi-agency
investigation to probe allegations of corruption in the arms deal.75 At one point, the MPs
were summoned to a meeting with the then vice president, Jacob Zuma (who was himself
implicated in the deal), the ANC Chief Whip, Tony Yengeni, and the Minister in the
Presidency, Essop Pahad and were ordered to stop the committees inquiry into the arms
deal.76 Indeed, the intolerance of any questioning of executive behaviour was amply
demonstrated by Pahad when he asked them, Who do you think you are, questioning the

67 See K. Good, Accountable to Themselves: Predominance in Southern Africa, Journal of Modern African
Studies, 35, 4 (December 1997), p. 563.
68 D.T. McKinley, Democracy, Power and Patronage: Debate and Opposition within the African National
Congress and the Tripartite Alliance since 1994, Democratization, 8, 1 (2001), pp. 183206.
69 Good, Accountable to Themselves, pp. 54773.
70 Giliomee et al., Dominant Party Rule, Opposition Parties and Minorities in South Africa, p. 173.
71 See, for example, T. Crawford-Browne, The Arms Deal Scandal, Review of African Political Economy, 31,
100 (June 2004), pp. 329 42.
72 T. Hughes, The South African Parliaments Failed Moment, in M.A. Mohamed Salih (ed.), African
Parliaments: Between Governance and Government (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 236.
73 A. Feinstein, After the Party: A Personal and Political Journey Inside the ANC (Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball
Publishers, 2007), pp. 20836.
74 Ibid.
75 See The Times, 10 November 2007
76 Ibid.

The Lack of Internal Party Democracy in the ANC

911

integrity of the government, the ministers and the President?77 In 2001, Andrew Feinstein,
who headed the ANC delegation on SCOPA, was removed from the committee by the party
leadership. In removing him, Tony Yengeni, ANC chief whip, argued that we really wanted
to improve our capacity, but also wanted people who are going to be the political link with
ANC structures so that the ANC from the president down could exercise political control.78
Yengeni was later convicted of fraud and given a four-year prison sentence after admitting
that he had received a large discount on a luxury car from a European arms contractor during
the negotiations on this arms purchase.79 The arms deal remains unresolved and charges
against some of those implicated, like Jacob Zuma, have been dropped.
The 1996 Sarafina II incident is yet another case in point. A large portion of South
Africas AIDS budget, about ZAR14 million, was spent on an unsuccessful musical play
aimed at preaching AIDS awareness. The play was not only unsuccessful but proper
tendering procedures were not followed in awarding the contract, and the health minister,
Dr Nkosasana Dlamini-Zuma, was implicated in the controversy.80 But the ANC members of
parliament on the health committee were instructed by the party leadership not to question the
health minister over the issue when she appeared before the parliamentary health
committee.81
With ANC MPs unable to exercise executive oversight, calling the executive to account is
left to the weak opposition parties, sometimes risking ridicule and racial abuse from the ANC
officials. When the opposition, for instance, called on government to account for the rising
crime rate in 2006, the then Safety and Security Minister, Charles Nqakula, accused the
white opposition MPs of being unpatriotic moaners who should stop complaining and
emigrate from South Africa. They can continue to whine until theyre blue in the face, be as
negative as they want or they can simply leave this country,82 Nqakula stated in parliament.
Further compounding the lack of internal democracy and the weakening of the ANCcontrolled parliament is the proportional representation electoral system used since 1994.
Whilst democratic in that it allocates parliamentary seats proportionally to votes won, the
major limitation of proportional representation is that it centralises nomination powers in the
hands of the party leadership. Through the control of the party list, the ANC leadership has
control over ANC MPs,83 as they depend not on voters but on the party leadership for
selection into parliament.84 The party leadership also has the power to remove, replace and
redeploy ANC MPs at any time.85 Thus, MPs are accountable not to the electorate but to the
leadership. In this way, it is difficult for them to exercise much independence of action
without risking charges of indiscipline and consequent removal or redeployment. Reacting to
public pressure, President Thabo Mbeki in 2002 appointed a task force, chaired by Van Zyl
Slabbert, to identify a preferable electoral system for South Africa.86 According to the report,

77 Feinstein, After the Party, p. 176.

78 Hughes, The South African Parliaments Failed Moment, p. 242.
79 R. Alence, South Africa after Apartheid: The First Decade, Journal of Democracy, 15, 3 (2004), p. 89. See
also, Mail and Guardian, 27 July 2006.
80 Taylor, NEPAD: Toward Africas Development or Another False Start, pp. 138 9.
81 Mates, South Africa: Democracy without People, p. 27.
82 The Guardian, UK, 21 June 2006. See also Gumede, South Africa: Jacob Zuma and the Difficulties of
Consolidating South Africas Democracy, p. 263.
83 Giliomee, South Africas Emerging Dominant Party Regime, p. 134.
84 Alence, South Africa after Apartheid, p. 83. See also Butler, How Democratic is the African National
Congress?, p. 721.
85 Barkan Emerging Legislature or Rubber Stamp? The South African National Assembly after Ten Years of
Democracy.
86 Report of the Electoral Task Team, (January 2003), available at http://www.elections.org.za/papers/27/ETT.
pdf, retrieved on 17 June 2009.

912 Journal of Southern African Studies

53 per cent of South Africans polled wanted representatives to be chosen by party members
rather the party leadership.87 However, the South African government has been reluctant to
act on the recommendations of the task force88 as this would see the ANC lose the power to
choose representatives and, in turn, lose control over them.

The Recalling of Thabo Mbeki and the Formation of COPE

On 12 September 2008, Judge Chris Nicholson of Pietermaritzburg High Court found that
there had been executive interference in the National Prosecuting Authoritys decision to
charge Jacob Zuma with corruption.89 Whilst Judge Nicholsons ruling was later quashed by
a higher court,90 it left its mark on South African politics, setting in process a chain of events
that eventually resulted in the recall of Thabo Mbeki from the presidency. In replacing a
sitting president, the process demonstrated internal party democracy at work in the ANC, at
least on the surface. As Teorell observes, where the power of leadership displacement is
granted to party members, party leaders are forced to be responsive not only to the electorate
but also to the policy views of the electorate.91 Yet, while the ANCs power to recall leaders
is democratic in the sense outlined by Teorell, what happened here needs to be understood in
the context of Thabo Mbekis humiliating defeat by Jacob Zuma at Polokwane. One could
well ask why Mbeki was not recalled following his imposition of GEAR, or for his disastrous
HIV/AIDS policy. Instead, the recall was for alleged interference in the prosecution of Zuma.
The recalling of Mbeki was more about punishing him for alleged interference in the
prosecution of his rival than about not being responsive to the needs and interests of the ANC
membership or the South African public at large. It thus appears that the power to recall
depends more on the dynamics of power within the ANC than on any institutionalised
democratic process.
Disgruntled by the defeat at Polokwane and the loss of the power and patronage
that accompanies control of the ANC, some members of Mbekis camp broke away from
the ANC to form COPE a rival opposition party. Prominent among the founders of
COPE was the former ANC national chairperson and Defence Minister, Mosiuoa
Lekota, who had lost to Gwede Mantashe in the contest to become ANC secretarygeneral.92 In an attempt to justify the formation of COPE, Lekota argued that there was lack
of internal party democracy in the ANC93 and that the ANC had been hijacked94 (by the left).
While Lekota is essentially correct to point to the ANCs lack of internal democracy, his
criticisms might have carried more weight had he not waited to voice them until after his
defeat at Polokwane.
Although possibly helping to account for the reduction in the ANCs share of the national
popular vote in 2009, the creation of COPE posed no significant electoral challenge to the
ANC. While the founders of COPE share the ANCs liberation credentials as individuals,
COPE was unable to defeat the ANC because it lacked a credible leadership, a strong

87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Ibid.
Gumede, South Africa: Jacob Zuma and the Difficulties of Consolidating South Africas Democracy, p. 264.
See Judge Chris Nicholsons judgment, 12 September 2008, Natal Provincial Division, Case No 8652/08.
See the judgment of Justices Harms, Farlam, Ponnan, Maya and Cachalia, 12 January 2009, National Director of
Public Prosecutions v Zuma, case No 573/08.
Teorell, A Deliberative Defence of Intra-Party Democracy, p. 36.
See, for instance, Mail and Guardian, 19 December 2007.
The Times, 23 May 2009. See also, Mail and Guardian, 24 May 2009.
R. Southall, The Congress of the People: Challenges for South African Democracy, Representation, 45, 2
(July 2009), p. 175.

The Lack of Internal Party Democracy in the ANC

913

organisation and an alternative programme and vision to that of the ANC.95 Instead of
offering clear policy alternatives on economic and social issues, COPE mainly championed
the introduction of a constituency-based electoral system and direct presidential elections, not
the issues of primary concern amongst voters.96

The Need to Democratise the ANC

For democracy in South Africa to be consolidated, priority must be given to promoting
intra-party democracy within the ANC. So long as the ANC remains a highly centralised
and autocratic political party, South Africa is likely to retain an unresponsive and
non-accountable form of democracy. It is only through the free participation of the
membership and lower party structures that the government can know the needs and interests
of the public and be able to respond to them in a timely manner. As Xolela Mangcu, puts it,
the ANC must become a transparent public organisation. In this way, its policies would
have greater credibility when they become public policies, because they would have gone
through a process of public deliberation.97
In an attempt to help consolidate South African democracy, some international donors
have focused on trying to help strengthen institutions such as parliament, the judiciary and
local government. The Fredrich Ebert Foundation in South Africa, for instance, works with
various parliamentary committees to strengthen them and enhance their capacity to hold the
executive accountable.98 The National Democratic Institute (NDI) of the United States has
also assisted with enhancing parliamentary capacity and local government.99 While such
institutional strengthening is necessary, there is no evidence that this will enhance the
independence and capacity of such bodies, so long as the ANC, which controls them, remains
undemocratic and the majority of their officials are selected by the ANC leadership. As party
cadres chosen by the party leadership, such officials will still have to account to the party and
the appointing authority, regardless of capacity-building efforts. They will also have to abide
by practices and traditions such as democratic centralism and absolute party discipline.
Hence, they would continue to be unable to hold the executive accountable or to act
independently to influence public policies that contradict the party line.
The independence of such institutions and their ability to provide independent oversight
and influence public policy could to some extent be secured if the appointment of officials is
democratised or the power of the ANC leadership over their appointments is balanced by
participation by the party membership and lower party structures. The relaxation of the
partys non-democratic exile and Leninist practices could also liberate MPs from tight control
by the party leadership, thus allowing them to act independently and provide oversight over
the executive.
Ultimately, South Africa cannot hope to develop or consolidate a democratic order if the
major parties are themselves not internally democratic. The ANC is not an ordinary political
party. Its unique history imposes on it the requirement to be the midwife of South African
95 R. Suttner, Opposition and Breakaway in ANC Liberation Movement History (Draft paper prepared for Policy
Forum organised by Fredrich Ebert Stiftung and FRELIMO Party School on The Impact of Breakaway-Groups
on Parties and Political Systems: Analyzing Root Causes-Facing a democratic challenge Maputo, 1719 May
2009), p. 5. See also, R. Suttner, The Challenge to African National Congress Dominance, Representation, 45,
2 (July 2009), p. 1201.
96 See for instance Southall, The Congress of the People, p. 173.
97 Business Day, 5 May 2007.
98 The Fredrich Ebert Foundation in South Africa www.fes.org.za, retrieved on 17 July 2007.
99 The National Democratic Institute of the United States of America, www.ndi.org/worldwide/safria/southa/
southa.asp, retrieved on 17 July 2007.

914 Journal of Southern African Studies

democracy. Because it enjoys the support of the majority of South Africans, it needs to
encourage the development of a democratic political culture among both leaders and its
membership.
If the ANC remains undemocratic in its practice and continues to act in an authoritarian
manner, democracy in South Africa could well decay even whilst regular multiparty elections
continue to take place. The experience of other African countries where former liberation
movements are in power, or have been in power, provides evidence for such a trend.
As Marina Ottaway observes, liberation movements in the continent have not consolidated
nor led to viable democracies.100 Or as Roger Southall puts it, liberation movements in
Africa have suppressed rather than liberated democracy.101

Conclusion
This article has argued that the danger to democracy and democratic consolidation in South
Africa is that of long-term decay or gradual erosion of institutions, especially with regard to
government responsiveness and accountability, and that the source of this danger lies in the
lack of internal party democracy within the ruling ANC. The centralisation of power and
control in the hands of the party leadership and influential individual leaders, to the exclusion
of the membership and lower party structures, has made government unaccountable and
created instances in which bad decisions and policies cannot be checked from within the party
or parliament. Given that, for all its shortcomings and imperfections, the ANC does not face
the prospect of electoral defeat, it is imperative that, for democracy in South Africa to be
consolidated, the ANC must be democratised. Rather than being the exclusive preserve of the
leadership, decision-making needs to include party members and lower party structures.
This, in turn, could make an ANC government more sensitive to the needs and interests of the
public. Thus, the promotion of internal party democracy within the ANC could also help to
foster the development of a democratic culture in South Africa.
KEBAPETSE LOTSHWAO
Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Botswana, Private Bag
00705, Gaborone, Botswana. E-mail: lotshwaok@mopipi.ub.bw/kebapetse@yahoo.com

100 See for instance Ottaway Liberation Movements and Transitions to Democracy and Southall, Democracy in
Africa.
101 Ibid., p. 31.

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