Lucas, James Sidney

War on the Eastern Front, 1941-45

pp. 53-54
It was this land of surprising contrasts that the Germans invaded. A land of unb
earably hot summers or abnormally cold winters, of poor roads which could have b
een kept in good repair by only a small squad of men, only nobody had given the
necessary order; a land of frequently proclaimed ideals of freedom and of canals
dug by slave labour; a vast Empire in which incredible wealth existed side by s
ide with abject poverty of a sort unknown in Western Europe. It was all a myster
y and it is no wonder that [General of the Waffen SS] Max Simon expressed the co
nviction that the German troops were entering into an unknown. His report, edite
d and summarised in parts says:
"Opinion in the German Army frequently represented the Russian soldier a
s being discontented with the Soviet system [but] the Russian infantry defended
the Stalin line with great tenacity and the further we penetrated into Russia th
e greater was our astonishment at their powers of resistance, their sniping abil
ity and excellent defensive tactics. Very soon we had to admit that we were up a
gainst a different adversary from the one we had expected and I believe that thi
s under-estimation [of the Russian infantry] was one of the reasons for the unfo
rtunate course which the campaign in Russia took. The reasons did not lie in ter
rain and space, nor to the opposition put up by the air force or the artillery,
nor can mere numbers or weapons have been decisive factors. The ability of the R
ussian infantry who fanatically contested every foot of our advance was the prin
cipal, perhaps only, reason.
In attack we lost heavily from snipers and mortars which were more effec
tive than the field artillery, certainly at the beginning of the campaign. The S
oviets did outnumber us in guns but there was a lack of co-operation with the in
fantry which nullified this superiority. On the other hand Russian tanks were fr
om the outset the breast plates of the infantry. In defence the Red Army infantr
y was remarkable for the way in which they blended into the terrain and they cou
ld dig themselves in in an amazingly short time. Their defensive positions were
simple and effective. Trenches were discarded to a very great extent and instead
deep, narrow holes were dug which held two or three riflemen. Machine guns were
skilfully sited so that dead angles were avoided and snipers, of whom there wer
e often as many as forty or fifty in each company, were given the best positions
. Trench mortars were available in all calibres and flame throwers, often fitted
with remote control, were used in conjunction with mortars so the attacking tro
ops ran into a sea of flames. Well-concealed tanks stood by the take part in cou
nter-attacks or were dug in at intervals. This was defence in depth protected by
wire entanglements and numerous minefields, and was a defensive system applied
to all kinds of terrain.
Russian battlefield discipline was most impressive. German patrols were
allowed to penetrate Soviet lines and even to withdraw without having seen anyth
ing. Spotter aircraft usually saw nothing of the enemy who made no movement in t
heir well camouflaged positions. Experienced German officers driving through a s
eemingly deserted village would swear that there were neither troops nor inhabit
ants in the place but other troops following up would find themselves faced with
a fortified position, defended by an infantry regiment, reinforced by all arms.
The positions had been so well camouflaged and the Soviet soldiers had remained
so still that the officers as they drove through had noticed nothing.
However, we soon learnt to detect positions and found that attacks upon
the enemy flank or rear were almost always successful for as soon as an attack d
eveloped from an unexpected direction the Russian system broke down. At the begi
nning we were not impressed by their attacks which showed little initiative. The
y were rule of thumb, co-operation with the heavy weapons was lacking and one co
uld sense the absence of flexible leadership. Attacks against our good infantry
regiments still intact and firm in well prepared positions met with virtually no
success. Usually the main Russian attack was preceded by an artillery preparati

on lasting several hours. As soon as the artillery fire lengthened the infantry
attack began supported by armour and snipers and to the accompaniment of fighter
aircraft. If our infantry held its positions until the enemy artillery fire had
passed over it, then it could always beat off the first attack. Our intention w
as always to separate the infantry from the accompanying tanks. Experienced Germ
an troops did not bother much about the enemy armour, leaving this to the anti-t
ank weapons and the special tank-busting teams. Instead they concentrated on for
cing the Russian infantry to go to ground. Red tanks would thereupon halt and op
en fire to cover the infantry which was digging in. If the armour charged the Ge
rman positions they offered a good target to the waiting anti-tank units.
Where the Russians effected a penetration a handful of resolute grenadie
rs accompanied by armour and supported by heavy weapons could destroy the enemy
before he had time to exploit his success.
The first attack was certain to be followed by a second, third, fourth,
fifth or even more. Never in my experience did these successive assaults differ
from the first one. Russian commanders were made responsible for failure and alw
ays strove to be able to report that their orders had been carried out. Failure
to achieve success in frontal assault forced the Russian commanders to have reco
urse to infiltration, to penetrate undetected behind our front. We found that no
water or swamp was too deep and no forest too thick for them to find a way thro
ugh. Other examples of infiltration were the appearance in the latter part of th
e war, of officers in German uniform bringing fictitious orders. It was most imp
ortant to remain alert against any type of infiltration because a Russian patrol
driven off from our line would leave behind a small detachment which could rema
in concealed for days and be gradually reinforced until at a specified time and
place a large body of enemy troops would emerge and cause havoc."