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and where
the MONEY
claim is purely incidental to or a
consequence of the principal relief sought, the action is
as a case where the subject of the litigation is not
capable of pecuniary estimation and is cognizable
exclusively by the Court of First Instance.
The jurisdiction of all courts in the Philippines, in so far
as the authority thereof depends upon the nature of
litigation, is defined in the amended Judiciary Act,
Sterling INVESTMENT
case.
In December 1971, however, this court re-examined and
reversed its earlier doctrine on the matter. In Dupla v.
16
Court of Appeals, this Tribunal, speaking through Mr.
Justice Villamor declared:
... the underlying philosophy expressed
in the Dumara-og case, the policy of
judicial stability, to the end that the
judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction may not be interfered with by
any court of concurrent jurisdiction may
not be interfered with by any court of
concurrent jurisdiciton, this Court feels
that this is as good an occasion as any
to re-examine the doctrine laid down ...
In an action to annul the judgment of a
court, the plaintiff's cause of action
springs from the alleged nullity of the
judgment based on one ground or
another, particularly fraud, which fact
affords the plaintiff a right to judicial
interference in his behalf. In such a suit
the cause of action is entirely different
from that in the actgion which grave rise
to the judgment sought to be annulled,
for a direct attack against a final and
executory judgment is not a incidental
to, but is the main object of the
proceeding. The cause of action in the
two cases being distinct and separate
from each other, there is no plausible
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-8934. May 18, 1956.]
ANASTACIO T. TEODORO, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs. ARMANDO MIRASOL, Defendant-Appellee.
DECISION
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal against an order dismissing the complaint.
On November 20, 1952, Defendant leased to Plaintiff a
parcel of land situated along Taft Avenue, Ermita,
Manila, for a monthly rental of P490, payable on or
before the fifth day of each month. The contract provides
that the term of the lease is two years, beginning on
October 1, 1952, which may be extended for another
period not exceeding two years with the written consent
of both parties. (Par. 2, Exh. A of Exh. 1, p. 24, Record
on Appeal.)
On October 15, 1954, Defendant wrote Plaintiff that the
lease expired on October 1, 1954, and that as the latter
has lost interest in renewing the same and the retention
by the lessee will mean a great financial loss to the
owner, Defendant is
giving Plaintiff notice
of
the
termination of the contract. (Par. 2, Complaint, p. 2,
Record on Appeal.
It is alleged in Plaintiffs complaint that it is not true
that Plaintiff has lost interest in the renewal of the lease
contract; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat
as Defendant allowed Plaintiff to choose to continue the
lease for another two years, Defendant is now estopped
from denying that the said period had actually been
extended for another period of two years; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand
that Plaintiff has
already
paidDefendant a considerable sum of MONEY
,
besides spending another big sum for the improvements
on the land. Plaintiff prays that the court fix a longer term
for the lease, or rather extend the lease for another
period of two years and that Defendant be also required
to pay Plaintiff P10,000 as indemnity for moral damages,
because Defendants wife had stated that a check
issued by the Plaintiff had been dishonored, such
statement having been made for the purpose of affecting
adversely Plaintiffs business.
Upon receipt of the summons, Defendant promptly filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following
grounds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary that the court has no
jurisdiction to grant the remedy prayed for in the
complaint; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat there is
another action pending between the same parties and
for the same cause; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat the
complaint
states
no
cause
of
action
against Defendant; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand
thatPlaintiffs claim cannot be enforced because the
same is barred by the Statute of Frauds. In connection
with the allegation that another action is pending
between the same parties and for the same cause, a
copy of a complaint for ejectment filed by
the Defendant against Plaintiffin the Municipal Court of
Manila on December 20, 1954, was attached as Exhibit
1. The complaint for ejectment alleges that the lease
was terminated on October 1, 1954, and that even if the
contract could be extended for another period of two