GARCIA v.

SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION

GR No. 170735 December 17, 2007
Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS:
- The petitioner, Imelda Garcia and four other people were directors of Impact Corporation, a
collapsible tube manufacturing company.
- In 1978, the company experienced financial turmoil and labor unrest besieged the company.
- Social Security System filed a case against the company for the collection of unremitted SSS
premium contributions and the corresponding penalties withheld by Impact Corporation from its
employees.
- Since the petitioner is the only surviving director of the company, the court held her liable
solely to answer for the obligations of the company to SSS.
- The petitioner averred that according to section 28(f) of the SS law, she is only liable for the
payment of the penalties and not the liabilities of the unremitted premium contributions.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the petitioner is liable only for the penalties and not for the liabilities of the
unremitted premium contributions
2. Whether or not the petitioner, as one of the directors, is solely liable for the companys
obligation to the SSS.
HELD:
1. It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with
the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. The liability
imposed as contemplated under the foregoing Section 28(f) of the Social Security Law does
not preclude the liability for the unremitted amount. Relevant to Section 28(f) is Section 22 of
the same law.
- Section 22 refers to the 3% deduction that has to be paid by the employer every time he fails
to pay the SSS premium in due time.
- It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that in interpreting the meaning and scope of a
term used in the law, a careful review of the whole law involved, as well as the intendment of
the law, must be made. Nowhere in the provision or in the Decision can it be inferred that the
persons liable are absolved from paying the unremitted premium contributions.
- When laws or rules are clear, it is incumbent upon the judge to apply them regardless of
personal belief or predilections - when the law is unambiguous and unequivocal, application
not interpretation thereof is imperative.
2. The court held the petitioner is among those officers mentioned in section 28(f). Invoking the
latin maxim, ejusdem generis, even though the said section did not expressly mentioned the
word director, it is understood from the enumeration of the officers liable that the petitioner is
indeed one of the personalities liable to the obligations of the company to the SSS. The said
provision does not qualify that the director or partner should likewise be a "managing director"
or "managing partner. The law is clear and unambiguous.
The court affirmed the previous decision ordering the petitioner to pay for the collected and
unremitted SSS contribution of Impact Corporation.

PEOPLE v. PURISIMA
L-42050-66 November 20, 1978
Muoz Palma, J.
FACTS:
- Twenty-six petitions for review were filed by the people of the Philippines against three
different courts namely, courts of first instance of Manila, branches seven and eighteen, and
the court of first instance of Samar.
- Before those courts, information were filed against the petitioners who allegedly violated
Presidential Decree No. 9 or the illegal possession of deadly weapon. On a motion to quash,
the judges in the courts mentioned ordered to dismiss the cases on the ground that the
Information did not allege facts, which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree
No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.
- The argument of the people stated that a perusal of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows that the
prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities; that the act proscribed is
essentially amalum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.
- The court enumerated the elements of the offense in question namely: (1) the carrying outside
one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or
implement for a livelihood and (2) that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance
of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence,
criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the information that the petitioners filed constitute the offense of illegal possession of
deadly weapon penalized under Presidential Decree No. 9.
HELD:
NO
- The petitioners did not include the second element in the information that they filed. The simple
act of carrying a deadly weapon is not the offense but the motivation of the person carrying the
deadly weapon is.
- The ambiguity in the statutes manifest because of the different interpretations, which arise
from its implementation. As a rule in statutory construction, When ambiguity exists, it becomes
a judicial task to construe and interpret the true meaning and scope of the measure, guided by
the basic principle that penal statutes are to be construed and applied liberally in favor of the
accused and strictly against the state.
- The court also said that in construing legislative measures, the primary rule is to determine the
intent of spirit of the law. In the case at bar, the court used the events during the enactment of
the proclamation namely, that the Philippines is under martial law, the desired result of
Proclamation 1081 and PD No. 9, and alleged fact that subversion, rebellion, insurrection,
lawless violence, criminality, chaos, aid public disorder mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are
committed and abetted by the use of firearms and explosives and other deadly weapons.
Another aid into construing the intent and the spirit of the law is to consult its preamble or
whereas clause. It is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that to be able to
ascertain the intent of a statute, one may pertain to its preamble.
The court denied the petitions for review and affirmed the decision of the three judges to quash or
dismiss the cases.

CALTEX v. PALOMAR
GR No. L-19650 September 29, 1966
Castro, J.
FACTS:
- Caltex Philippines devised a new promotional scheme to drum up the patronage of petroleum
products. Vehicle owners and/or driver's license owners have to estimate the actual number of
liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during the prescribed time.
- to enable Caltex to spread the news to its potential participants, they sought the help of the
postal authorities for the contest to be cleared for advanced mailing having in view of sections
1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code.
- The codes indicate the non-mailable matter. Among those prohibited are Written or printed
matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or conveying or
purporting to convey any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme.
- Caltex Philippines mailed to the postmaster general a copy of the contest rules and
endeavored to justify that their contest is not prohibited by the said administrative code. The
acting postmaster opined that the contest fell under the non-mailable materials therefore,
denying their clearance to use the mailing system.
- Caltex sought for a reconsideration stating that there being involved no consideration in the
part of any contestant; the contest was not, under controlling authorities, condemnable as a
lottery. The Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involves consideration, or
that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a "gift enterprise" which is equally banned by the Postal
Law
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law.
HELD:
- Yes.
- The term "lottery", as stated in the Revised Administrative code, extends to all schemes for the
distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles
at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: First,
consideration; second, prize; and third, chance.
- the court considered the contest to be a 'gift enterprise'
- the court noted that in the Postal Law, the term in question is used in association with the word
"lottery". With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known principle of legal
hermeneutics noscitur a sociis it is only logical that the term under a construction should be
accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word
associated therewith. Hence, if lottery way of inducement each purchaser is given a chance to
win a prize is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift
enterprise" be so construed.
- Accordingly, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

DAOANG v. MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE

GR No. L- 34568 March 28, 1988
Padilla, J.
FACTS:
- Respondent spouses Agonoy filed a petition seeking the adoption of minors Quirino Bonilla
and Wilson Marcos.
- On April 22, 1971, the petitioners filed an opposition to the aforementioned petition for
adoption, claiming that the spouses Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy,
oppositors mother, who died on March 1, 1971, and therefore, said spouses, were disqualified
to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
- The Municipal Court of San Nicolas granted the petition for adoption.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent spouses are disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
- No.
- Art. 335 of the civil code states that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged
natural children, or children by legal fiction are not allowed to adopt.
- The respondent judge held that to add grandchildren in this article where no grandchild is
included would violate to the legal maxim: Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius or that what is
expressly included would naturally exclude what is not included.
- It is a well-known rule in statutory construction that if a statute is clear and unambiguous on its
face, it needs not to be interpreted. Statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be
the subjects of statutory construction.
- In the case at hand, the children mentioned in the provision have a clearly defined meaning in
the law, and as pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include grandchildren. The Civil
Code obviously intended that only those persons, who have certain classes of children, be
disqualified to adopt.
- Accordingly, the petition is denied. The judgment of the Municipal Trial Court of San Nicolas is
affirmed.

PEOPLE v. MAPA
G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967
Fernando, J.
FACTS:
- On August 13, 1962, Mario Mapa have in his possession one home-made revolver, Cal. 22,
without serial number, with six rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the
necessary license or permit from the authority. This is in violation of Section 878 in connection
with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by the Commonwelath Act
No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4.
- The defendant alleged that he was assigned by Governor Leviste as a secret agent and
therefore exempted from the rules prescribed in the said Administrative Code.
- Accused relied on People v. Macarandang, where the secret agent was acquitted on the
assumption that the appointment of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance
of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category
of a peace officer
- On November 27, 1963, the lower court convicted him of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of one year and one day to two years and
to pay the costs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mapa should be acquitted on the ground that he is considered a peace officer as
stated in Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code.
HELD:
- No.
- The law is explicit that it shall be unlawful for any person to possess any firearm, detached
parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to
be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition and that "firearms and
ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the
Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial
treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and
jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public
servants for use in the performance of their official duties.
- No provision is made for a secret agent and therefore he is not exempt. Applying the legal
maxim: Dura lex sed lex, when the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be
applied regardless of who may be affected, even if it may be harsh or onerous.
- The court also ruled that the Macarandang ruling is devoid of authority. The judgment
appealed from is affirmed.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS

GR No. 122156 February 3, 1997
Bellosillo, J.
FACTS:
- Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding 51% of
the issued outstanding shares of the respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC).
- The winning bidder will be entitled as the strategic partner who will rovide management
expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.
- There were two bidders who participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share,
and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per
share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
- Pending Berhads proclamation as the winning bidder, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS
matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. In a subsequent letter
etitioner sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos
(P33.000.000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, which respondent
GSIS refused to accept.
- In a petition by the petitioner, the court issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining
respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian Firm.
- Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the
Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture.
- The respondents raised that first, Section 10, Second Part of Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is
merely a statement of principle and policy and is not a self-executing provision and requires an
implementing legislation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 10, second paragraph or Art. 12 is not a self-executing provision thus,
awarding the shares to Renong Berhad.
HELD:
No. The Constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a
nation. It is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation therefore as a rule; constitutional
provisions are self-executing except when provisions themselves expressly require legislations to
implement them. Although the said section is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is
not self-executing but simply for purposes of style, it does not render a provision ineffective in the
absence of an enabling law. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require
any legislation to put it in operation. It is per sejudicially enforceable When our Constitution mandates
that[i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an
action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the
subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right,
such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations
must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Accordingly, the court awarded the 51% shares to Manila Prince Hotel Corporation.

ALFON v. REPUBLIC
GR No. L-51201 May 29, 1980
Abad Santos, J.
FACTS:
- The petitioner filed a petition to change her name from MARIA ESTRELLITA VERONICA
PRIMITIVA DUTERTE to ESTRELLA S. ALFON.
- The facts, as stated in the petition, says that the petitioner was born and baptized as Maria
Estrellita Veronica Primitiva Duterte.
- She has been taken cared of Hector Alfon, her uncle and her mothers brother.
- Ever since she started schooling until she finished college, she used the name Estrella S.
Alfon. She even used the same as she exercised her right of suffrage.
- The petitioners reasons for filing the petition are as follows:
o She has been using Estrella S. Alfon since her childhood
o She went to school and finished college using the same name
o She was known by her friends as Estrella S. Alfon
o She exercised her right to vote using the same name
- the court partially granted her petition changing her name from MARIA ESTRELLITA
VERONICA PRIMITIVA DUTERTE to Estrella Alfon Duterte on the grounds that if she used
the name Estrella S. Alfon, she will be adopting the surname of her mother contrary to Art. 364
of the Civil Code which states that
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father
ISSUE:
WON the lower court erred in construing Art. 364 of the Civil Code thus, only partially granting the
petitioners prayer
HELD:
Yes. It is a rule in statutory construction that a word of general significance in a statute is to be taken
in its ordinary and comprehensive sense, unless it is shown that the word is intended to be given a
different or restricted meaning. In the instant case, the word principally as used in the codal
provision is not equivalent to exclusively so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or
legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled.

DEMAFILES v. COMELEC
GR No. L-28396 December 29, 1967
Castro, J.
FACTS:
- The new municipality of Sebaste in Antique province held its first election of officers in the
general elections of November 14, 1967, with the petitioner Agripino Demafiles and the
respondent Benito B. Galido vying for the mayoralty.
- On November 21, the respondent Galido asked the provincial board to disregard the election
return from precinct 7 on the ground that the said return shows that 195 voters were registered
when, according to a certificate of the municipal election registrar, only 182 had registered in
that precinct as of October 30, 1997. The board voted to disregard the said return and
proceeded with the canvass of returns. Accordingly, Galido was proclaimed mayor-elect of the
municipality of Sabaste.
- On November 24, Demafiles wired the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) protesting the
boards action of rejection of the return from precinct 7 and the subsequent proclamation of
Galido. COMELEC reconsidered their previous order and held that the canvass proclamation
already made of the local official still stands.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case is moot because the respondent has taken his oath and assumed office on
November 22, pursuant to Republic Act 4870 Section 2.
HELD:
No. Construction is a judicial function. It is the court that has the final word as to what the law means.
In the case at bar, the phrase and shall have qualified of republic act 4870 section 2 is devoid of
meaning, s unmitigated jargon in or out of context, and does not warrant the respondent's reading
that the term of office of the first municipal officials of Sebaste begins immediately after their
proclamation. But here is a clear case of a failure to express a meaning, and a becoming sense of
judicial modesty forbids the courts from assuming and, consequently, from supplying. A judge must
not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship of
policy-making might wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and evisceration.
Accordingly, the court have to go by the general rule that the term of office of municipal officials shall
begin on the first day of January following their election.

VILLANUEVA v. COMELEC
GR No. L-54718 December 4, 1985
Teehankee, J.
FACTS:
- Narciso Mendoza, Jr. filed his sworn certificate of candidacy for local elections on the last day
for filing. On the same day, he filed an unsworn letter in his own handwriting withdrawing his
said candidacy for personal reasons. On January 25, 1980, petitioner Crisologo Villanueva
filed his own sworn Certificate of Candidacy in substitution of Mendozas for the supposed
seat. The results show that petitioner won over the private respondent with a margin of 452
votes.
- The municipal board of canvassers disregarded all votes cast in favor of petitioner as stray
votes on the basis of the Provincial Election Officer's erroneous opinion that since petitioner's
name does not appear in the Comelec's certified list of candidates for that municipality, it could
be presumed that his candidacy was not duly approved by the Comelec so that his votes could
not be "legally counted. The canvassers accordingly declared Lirio as the vice-mayor elect.
- Respondent COMELEC issued its questioned resolution on February 21, 1980 denying the
petition on two grounds after citing sections 28 and 28 of the 1978 Election Code. COMELEC
ruled that Petitioner Villanueva could not have substituted for Candidate Mendoza on the
strength of Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code, which he invokes, For one thing, Mendoza's
withdrawal of his certificate is not under oath hence, it has no legal effect. For said withdrawal
was not made after the last day of filing but on the same day of filing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner should be disqualified from being declared the vice-mayor elect due to
technicality issues.
HELD:
- Yes.
- The Court holds that the COMELECs ground should be rejected. The election registrar without
protest or objection had accepted Mendozas unsworn withdrawal filed later on the same day.
Since there was no time to include petitioners name in the COMELEC list registered
candidates, because the election was only four days away, petitioner as substitute candidate
circularized formal notices of his candidacy to all chairmen and members of the citizens
election committees.
- The fact that Mendoza's withdrawal was not sworn is but a technicality, which should not be
used, to frustrate the peoples will in favor of petitioner as the substitute candidate.
- Comelec's post-election act of denying petitioner's substitute candidacy certainly does not
seem to be in consonance with the substance and spirit of the law. Using the legal maxim,
ratio legis or the spirit of the law controls its letter; law should not be literally construed if it will
render it meaningless, leading to ambiguity, injustice or contradiction.
- For all intents and purposes, such withdrawal should therefore be considered as having been
made substantially and in truth after the last day, even going by the literal reading of the
provision by the Comelec.
- The Court SETS ASIDE the questioned Resolutions of respondent Comelec and annuls the
proclamation of respondent Lirio as elected vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon and instead
declares petitioner as the duly elected vice-mayor of said municipality.

MUTUC v. COMELEC
GR No. L-32717 November 26, 1970

Fernando, J.
FACTS:
- the petitioner was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. The respondent
acknowledges said candidacy of the petitioner but prohibited him from using jingles in his
mobile units during his campaign.
- The petitioner filed a special civil action for prohibition alleging that prohibiting him from using
jingles violates his constitutional right to freedom of speech.
- The respondents asserted that the word jingles was among those enumerated in the
Constitutional Convention act, which prohibits the purchase, produce, request or distribute
sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever
nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches,
cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.
- COMELEC was asked to issue a minute resolution since the elections were just days away.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the word jingles constitutes the prohibited propaganda materials as enumerated in
the Constitutional Convention Act.
HELD:
- Yes. Applying the legal maxim, ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration
being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. It is
quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the
kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate
responsible for its distribution, which was prohibited by the act.
- However, it is also a cardinal rule in statutory construction that a statute should be construed in
harmony with the constitution. If the above provision of the Constitutional Convention Act were
to lend itself to the view that the use of the taped jingle could be prohibited, then the challenge
of unconstitutionality would be difficult to meet. For, in unequivocal language, the Constitution
prohibits an abridgment of free speech or a free press.
- Accordingly, the Court restrained the respondent COMELEC from prohibiting the petitioner
from using political taped jingle.

PEOPLE v. ECHAVES
GR No. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980

Aquino, J.
FACTS;
- Mario Aparici and 4 other persons stealthily and strategically, enter into, occupy and cultivate a
portion of a grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by Atty. Vicente de la
Serna thus in violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similar
acts.
- The court dismissed the case on the grounds that (1) that it was alleged that the accused
entered the land through "stealth and strategy", whereas under the decree the entry should be
effected "with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or
tolerance of the landowner", and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does
not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 772 covers agricultural land.
HELD:
- No. The decree does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was
intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions
in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squatting complained of involves
pasturelands in rural areas.
- It is a rule in statutory construction that when the statute is ambiguous, the preamble can be
resorted to clarify the ambiguity.
- Accordingly, the court dismissed the case.

SANSIANGCO V. ROO
GR No. L-68709 July 19, 1985

Menelcio-Herrera, J.
FACTS:
- Petitioner was elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Sta. Cruz, Ozamiz City, in the May 17,
1982 Barangay elections. Later, he was elected President of the Association of Barangay
Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of Directors of the said Association. As the
President of the Association, petitioner was appointed by the President of the Philippines as a
member of the City's Sangguniang Panlungsod.
- petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections
for Misamis Occidental. He was not successful in that election.
- Invoking Section 13(2), Article 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 (supra), petitioner informed
respondent Vice-Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes, Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, that he was resuming his duties as member of that body.
- The matter was elevated to respondent Minister of Local Government Jose A. Rono who ruled
that since petitioner is an appointive official, he is deemed to have resigned from his appointive
position upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy.
- Petitioner impugns said ruling on the ground that Section 13(2) of Batasan Pambansa Blg. 697
covers appointive barangay official.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 13(2), Article 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 includes appointive barangay
officials in its enumeration
HELD:
- No.
- Although it may be that Section 13(2), B.P. Blg. 697, admits of more than one construction,
taking into consideration the nature of the positions of the officials enumerated therein, namely,
governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunians or barangay officials, the legislative
intent to distinguish between elective positions in section 13(2), as contrasted to appointive
positions in section 13(l) under the all-encompassing clause reading "any person holding
public appointive office or position," is clear. It is a rule of statutory construction that "when the
language of a particular section of a statute admits of more than one construction, that
construction which gives effect to the evident purpose and object sought to be attained by the
enactment of the statute as a whole must be followed.
- A statute's clauses and phrases should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions,
but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
parts.
- The court dismissed the case finding that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the respondent officials. The Writs prayed for are denied.

VILLEGAS v. SUBIDO

GR No. L-31711 September 30, 1971

Fernando, J.
FACTS:
- Respondent Eduardo Z. Romualdez, Secretary of Finance, authorized respondent Jose R.
Gloria of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila to assume the duties of Assistant City
Treasurer effective June 1, 1968.
- In administrative Order No. 40, petitioner Antonio J. Villegas, Mayor of the City of Manila,
directed respondent Gloria to desist and refrain from exercising the duties and functions of the
Assistant City Treasurer,' on the ground that respondent Romualdez "is not empowered to
make such designation.
- January 1, 1969, Mayor Villegas, appointed petitioner Manuel D. Lapid, chief of the cash
division of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila, as Assistant City Treasurer.
- Respondent Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of Civil Service disapproved the appointment of
Lapid, alleging that he appointment of Assistant Provincial Treasurers is still governed by
Section 2088 (A) of the Revised Administrative Code, and not by Section 4 of the
Decentralization Law, Republic Act No. 5185.
- In the general provisions found in the Decentralization Act of 1967, it is a city mayor who has
the power to appoint all other employees paid out of city or local funds subject to civil service
law, rules and regulations
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Antonio Villegas is authorized to appoint officers in his city of jurisdiction
HELD:
- No.
- The Revised Administrative Code should be the Charter in control
- Revised Administrative Code distinguishes one in that category from an "officer" to designate
those "whose duties, not being of a clerical or manual nature, may be considered to involve the
exercise of discretion in the performance of the function of government, whether such duties
are precisely defined by law or not." Clearly, the Assistant and City Treasurer is an officer, not
an employee. Then, too, Section 4 of the Decentralization Act relied upon by petitioner City
Mayor specifically enumerates, the officials and their assistants whom he can appoint,
specifically excluding therefrom city treasurers.
- The Decentralization Act had the effect of repealing what is specifically ordained in the city
charter
- It has been a rule in statutory construction that implied repeal is brought about by irreconcilable
repugnancy between two laws takes place when the two statutes cover the same subject
matter. Repeals by duplication are not favored and will not be so declared unless it is manifest
that the legislature so intended.
- A special law is not regarded as having been amended or repealed by a general law unless
the intent to repeal or alter is manifest. Generalia specialibus non derogant, hence the city
charter reigns over the Decentralization Act.
- Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the case.

CARANDANG v. SANTIAGO

GR No. L-8238 May 25, 1955

Labrador, J.
FACTS:
- The respondent Valenton was charged with frustrated homicide. The petitioner Carandang
filed a civil case to recover damages incurred from the consummation of frustrated homicide.
- The respondent Judge Santiago suspended the civil case ruling that the trial of the civil action
must await the result of the criminal case on appeal.
- The petitioner invokes Article 33 of the Civil Code. The respondents argue that the term
"physical injuries" is used to designate a specific crime defined in the Revised Penal Code,
and therefore said term should be understood in its peculiar and technical sense, in
accordance with the rules statutory construction.
ISSUE:
Whether the term "physical injuries" used in Article 33 means physical injuries in the Revised Penal
Code only.
HELD:
- No.
- Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific
provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein,
so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any
technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense
- The term "physical injuries" could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined
in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have
used terms in the same article some in their general and another in its technical sense. In
other words, the term "physical injuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the
crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms.
- In statutory construction, there is such a rule as Noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or
phrase is ambiguous in itself or equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it
is found or with which it is associated
- Applying the legal maxim, noscitur a sociis, since defamation and fraud is construed in its
generic sense; physical injuries should also be construed in its original and generic sense.
- The court ruled that the respondent judge committed an error in suspending the trial of the civil
case, and his order to that affect is hereby revoked, and he is hereby ordered to proceed with
the trial of said civil case without awaiting the result of the pending criminal case.