Arancillo Raymond L.

LlB 1-E
Arsenio Lumiqued vs Apolonio Exevea et al

Facts:
Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by Zamudio, the Regional
Cashier, for dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses under his office. It was alleged that he was
falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and that he had an unliquidated cash advance worth
P116,000.00. Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks after she
filed the two complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings on the complaints
were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second
hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of
counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the
date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. The
Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the
recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued.
Issue: Whether or not Lumigued was denied due process when he didnt have the privilege of an
assistance of a counsel at the time of administrative inquiry?

HELD:
The SC ruled against Lumiqued. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the
waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused
during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in
a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar,
petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and
independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the
proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order
No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the
law for the complaints filed against him. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due
process unless required by the Constitution or the law.
. . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is
entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound
by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal
profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its
members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless
that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain
ones side. Whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee was
cured by Lumiqueds appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION

Facts:
On March 28, 2000, a 58-page Comment was filed by the private respondent Mark B. Jimenez,
opposing petitioners Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
On April 5, 2000, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Allow Continuation and Maintenance of
Action and Filing of Reply. Thereafter, petitioner filed on June 7, 2000 a Manifestation with the attached
Note 327/00 from the Embassy of Canada and Note No. 34 from the Security Bureau of the Hongkong
SAR Government Secretariat. On August 15, 2000, private respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion
for Leave to File Rejoinder in the event that petitioner's April 5, 2000 Motion would be granted. Private
respondent also filed on August 18, 2000, a Motion to Expunge from the records petitioner's June 7,
2000 Manifestation with its attached note verbales. Except for the Motion to Allow Continuation and
Maintenance of Action, the Court denies these pending motions and hereby resolves petitioner's Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

Held:

The Urgent Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The SC said An extradition

proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is
not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not necessarily
apply to the former. This we hold for the procedural due process required by a given set of
circumstances "must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function
involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by governmental action." The
concept of due process is flexible for "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for
the same kind of procedure
Private respondent would also impress upon the Court the urgency of his right to notice and
hearing considering the alleged threat to his liberty "which may be more priceless than life." The
supposed threat to private respondents liberty is perceived to come from several provisions of
the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 which allow provisional arrest and temporary
detention. As the extradition process is still in the evaluation stage of pertinent documents and
there is no certainty that a petition for extradition will be filed in the appropriate extradition
court, the threat to private respondents liberty is merely hypothetical

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs PURGANAN

The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999 : (1) conspiracy to defraud the
United States 371; (2) tax evasion; (3) wire fraud,; (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code
Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions,
IIThe public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez to go
on provisional liberty because:

ISSUE: Is Respondent Entitled to Bail? Is the denial of availment of bail constitute a denial of due
process?
HELD:
Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures the right to bail of all
persons, including those sought to be extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charged
with offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. He also alleges the
relevance to the present case of Section 4[59] of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which, insofar as
practicable and consistent with the summary nature of extradition proceedings, shall also apply
according to Section 9 of PD 1069.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has
the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion[68] and tyranny, as well as the power to
promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights.[69] Furthermore, we believe that the right
to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to
due process extends to the life, liberty or property of every person. It is dynamic and resilient,
adaptable to every situation calling for its application.

By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or innocence
is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the constitutional rights of the
accused are necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to a courts request to police authorities for
the arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped detention or jumped bail. Having once escaped
the jurisdiction of the requesting state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the person would
escape again if given the opportunity.

Philippine guardians brotherhood inc. vs. Comelec. April 29, 2010

Facts:
The COMELEC replicated this provision in COMELEC Resolution No. 2847 the Rules and Regulations
Governing the Election of the Party-List Representatives through the Party-List System which it
promulgated on June 25, 1996.
For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009
Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered
national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list organizations
affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not
participate in the 2007 elections. Nevertheless, the COMELEC stated in this Resolution that any
national, regional sectoral party or organizations or coalitions adversely affected can personally or
through its authorized representative file a verified opposition on October 26, 2009.

Issue: Whether or not PGBIs right to due process was violated by the resolution stating their
disqualification?

HELD:

On the due process issue, The SC agree with the COMELEC that PGBIs right to due process was
not violated for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution
No. 8679. The essence of due process, that have been consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be
heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain ones side or
the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties
are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is
frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x The SC find it obvious under the attendant
circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process. In any case, given the result of this Resolution,
PGBI has

Biraogo vs Philippine Truth Commission of 2010

Facts:
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections,
when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and
corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his
sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the
presidency.
The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis
Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for
being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it
usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds
therefor.
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr.
(petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1
establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and question
Executive Order No. 1;
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the
powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and
5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.
Held:

Legal Standing of the Petitioners

The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of
transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional
issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to
the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of
all.Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the Presidents first
effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not
due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the
Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with
overreaching significance to society.
Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission
The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having
been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong,
the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply
with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not
affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the
former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate
The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the
Court in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights.59 Thus:
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry
or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to
find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make
an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of
which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or
otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine
finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to
decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and
the entry of a judgment."
Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be
accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission

and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so,
the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the
recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be
aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of graft laws.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They
contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling
out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility."
Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and
corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo.
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its
inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through
whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the
equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find
out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration"only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order.
Decision
The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in the
exercise of its constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of
the legislature and the executive department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal,
which is expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets
like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this issue has been addressed by the Court,
but it seems that the present political situation calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its
action lest it continually be accused of being a hindrance to the nations thrust to progress.