WAR

What is war?
The historical context of the term war has
left an indelible imprint on the minds of
strategic leaders and the general
public. This imprint limits ones ability to
view warfare as anything other than armed
conflict between nations. This paper
attempts to open the aperture through
which strategic leaders view the concept of
war by reviewing the traditional definitions
of war, analyzing the environment in
which wars are fought today, and then
offering a new, more expansive, definition
of the term. This new definition
encompasses the complex characteristics
and nuances of war fought in a global
society, a broader interpretation of who
engages in war, and how wars may be
fought and won in the future.
Defining War
Merriam-Webster Dictionary describes
war as a state of usually open and
declared armed hostile conflict between
states or nations. Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy states, war should be
understood as an actual, intentional and
widespread armed conflict between
political communities. On the first page
of On War, Carl von Clausewitz defines
war as an act of force to compel our
enemy to do our will. Most would agree
that these are understandable and accurate
definitions in the general context of what
the average person thinks when they hear
the word war. However, from the strategic
perspective, these definitions are arguably
too simplistic to convey the complexity of
war and the many facets which contribute
to national success in the international
arena. Todays strategic leaders need to
conceptualize and define war in a broader

perspective, and the following analysis

will attempt to do so by offering an
expansive definition for the term
war. This new definition encompasses
three attributes: the complex
characteristics and nuances of war fought
in a global society, a broader interpretation
of who engages (or should be engaged) in
war, as well as how wars may be fought
and won in the future. But first it is
necessary to examine why a new definition
for war is applicable for todays strategic
leaders.
What Changed?
Many might say that the world changed
with the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks on the United States; this was
certainly the case for the majority of the
American public. Terrorism was no longer
something that occurred at bus stops in
Israel or in discos in Berlin. The world of
terrorism became something tangible to
America. It solidified in Americans
minds that war can and will be conducted
between state and non-state actors. This
distinction is significant in the context of
the traditional perception that war was
fought between nation-states (or city-states
as early as the Peloponnesian War). It also
challenges the belief that war is governed
by some form of decorum or rule of law, in
which the belligerents agree to engage
utilizing specific limitations and
exclusions; whether the combatants have
honored that agreement, is another
discussion. From the battlefield
engagements of the Clausewitzian era, to
the formal rule of law and Geneva
Conventions that nation-states operate
under today, there existed a certain level of
restraint. Terrorism and violent aggression
conducted by non-state actors requires
strategic leaders to rethink these traditional

characteristics of warfare and the

definition of war itself. War is no longer
limited to conflict between states or
nations, nor is it fought solely between
political communities as the Global War
on Terrorism has proven. As Joseph Nye
illustrated, in todays global information
agemore things are happening outside
the control of even the most powerful
states. In 2006, 161 billion gigabytes of
digital information were created and
captured; about 3 million times the
information in all the books ever written.
This connectivity has driven globalization
down to the individual and small group
level; enabling non-state actors to think,
act, and locate themselves globally; in
some cases without ever leaving their
home because of technology. Therefore,
how we engage in this contest of wills
must expand given this dramatic increase
in globalization of the past two decades.
The Spectrum of War in the Global Era
Michael Howard summarizes the changing
environment as shifting from one centered
on the control of territory, to one focused
not only on territorial control but the
effective exploitation of the resources of
that territory. This concept leads to a new
approach to view and define warwithin
the context of globalization. As the global
finance crisis illuminated, economies can
no longer be managed/controlled internally
but in fact are impacted by events and
decisions made across the world. One only
needs to reference the so called CNN
effect, the Arab Spring or current antiAmerican protests to understand the
impact digital communications and the 24hour news cycle have had on regional and
world affairs. The bottom line:
interconnected systems of trade, finance,
information, and security demand a larger

perspective when considering the

engagement of imposing national will on
others.
One method to approach this broader
perspective is to view war as a spectrum of
discord, a continuum where unrestrained
armed conflict and world peace are at
opposing ends. By establishing this
graphic scale, it is relatively easy to
conceptualize that as a nation approaches
peace (or harmony) with other entities
values, objectives, and ideals, there is an
abeyance of hostilities. War is not over, a
nations desire to impose its will remains;
it simply does not require the use of armed
conflict to achieve its goals. What might
appear on the surface to be the age old
argument between Thomas Hobbes theory
of mans natural state as one of war and
John Lockes more peaceful perspective, is
actually providing the answer to that
debateboth may be right. If a nations
will is in harmony with other entities then
the natural tendency will lean towards
world peace. As discord develops between
a nations will and other nation-states or
non-state actors the natural tendency will
increasingly lean towards more aggressive
national engagement and armed
conflict. This theory purposefully focuses
on nation-states and/or non-state actors
versus the individual. While one may
argue it can be applied to individual
interaction, this is not the authors intent.
This spectrum facilitates understanding
that the art of war encompasses much more
than the concept of armed conflict and
acknowledges a nations capability to
change their natural state based on the
will of the people, political landscape, as
well as a nations strength, ability, and
desire to project power.

War Redefined
A strategic leaders concept of war must
necessarily be more encompassing, and
also more complex:
War is the coherent execution of all means
to bring about sufficient adherence to a
nations will in the international (global)
arena; resulting in armed conflict only
when all other means fail.
As one observes from this new definition,
the constant is Clausewitzs theory of a
nations primary desire in conflict to
compel our enemy to do our will. What
has changed is both the focus and breadth
of those means within the nation which can
be used to accomplish this action. While
Clausewitz advocated in a limited manner
(and Kautilya more energetically) the use
of diplomacy in war, this concept takes a
more dramatic approach by including all
means available to a nation-state or nonstate actor. It also diverges from the
traditional definition of war as armed
conflict by suggesting war is not an act of
armed aggression but instead the constant
desire and actions of nation-states and nonstate actors to impose their will. The
rationale behind this approach is explained
by examining each of the key components
of the definition separately.
War is: Like Clausewitz, the author views
war as an extension of national policy;
however, not as a specifically separate
activity as defined by armed conflict. The
activity of war is ongoing and the
participants in imposing a nations will are
many, as will be examined in the next
component.
the coherent execution of all means: This
expansionary phrase is derived from the

authors belief that armed conflict is one

end of the spectrum of war, and as such
should not (and arguably cannot) be
delineated from all other means in a global
era. It also conveys advocacy for
coordination between these entities in
order to develop a cohesive approach to
international relations and engagement,
particularly in the area of conflict
resolution. Traditional definitions of war
centered on a nations war effort are
usually directed via the application of the
armed forces and in limited cases via
diplomacy (Kautilya/Clausewitz). The
proffered concept opens the aperture of
conflict resolution and directs a more
holistic approach to achieving national
strategy and/or achieving adherence to
national will. This is not to imply the
Kautilyan or Machiavellian logic of all
ways to victory are acceptable. Instead, it
exhorts the use of all means within a
nations capacity to gain adherence to its
national will without resorting to armed
conflict. It is inclusive of Gene Sharps
concept of nonviolent conflict resolution in
that nonviolent action is a means of
combat, as is war. However, this specific
definition differs from Sharps by taking a
more pragmatic approach and a national
perspective. As such, the means advocated
for nonviolent action are not the
individual-centric capabilities Sharp
espouses: nonviolent protest, persuasion,
noncooperation, and intervention. Rather,
it takes a nation-centric approach to power
projection and advocates use of diplomacy,
economic influence (to include leverage
via multi-national corporations and nongovernmental organizations), information
operations, social influence, and
educational influence. While each of these
means should be coordinated and
leveraged in a coherent approach, the
concept does not advocate a blurring of the

traditional separations of national power

from the U.S. perspective. Instead, it
suggests a one voice approach in the
international arena where each institution
self-identifies those capabilities which
could be applied in a synergistic manner
towards achieving national objectives.
The acknowledged challenge to
democracies is how to create a structure
through which to coordinate such activity
without infringing upon the freedoms on
which democracy is based. This theory
will surely stimulate argument as to
whether it is possible to limit a democratic
nations actions in demanding capabilities
from each of these institutions and the
course of due process. The concept of
free-market enterprises and unfair market
advantage will be a particularly significant
challenge to incorporate in this holistic
approach to warfare. It could be suggested
that nations already leverage economic
pressure via the vehicle of diplomacy
through trade agreements, restrictions, and
embargos. With a proper framework for
implementation, the same types of pressure
could be applied through a coordinated
approach for all institutions while
preserving democratic principles.
to bring about sufficient adherence to a
nations will: in this definition war remains
as Clausewitz described, an act of policy
and the ultimate goal of war remains to
impose a nations will on its enemies. The
term sufficient is intentionally
ambiguous, which accommodates the
changing nature of national will as well as
the variables in any international relations
scenario. Determining sufficiency
demands a political calculation or costbenefit analysis; for every change in the
level of effort/cost of engagement what is
the expected outcomes, and are those

outcomes worthy of the effort. The

calculus will vary as the means available
change and with the changing of a nations
strategic vision. A corollary to this
thought is the question, at what point will a
nation apply the most dire means available,
military force, to achieve its national
will? Once again the answer depends on
the domestic and international
environment (tensions, alliances,
aggression, economy, etc), the political
tendencies of the government, the mood
and the will of the people, as well as the
capabilities and readiness of the armed
forces. This broad spectrum approach
allows for the definition to be applied
regardless of a nations ideological
tendencies. Whether one follows the
thoughts of Karl Marx (war is the politics
of economics), Thucydides (fear, interest
and honor), Hobbes (competition,
diffidence, and glory), or Locke (freedom),
the calculus remainsit is up to the nation
to decide the point at which it is beneficial
to engage in warfare to secure its national
objectives.
in the international (global) arena: The
terms international and global capture the
fact that wars are fought between both
state actors (international) and non-state
actors (such as terrorist groups and
transnational criminal networks) on the
global stage. This statement specifically
limits engagement in war to the
international (global) stage and
intentionally excludes the concept of civil
war. This exclusion is not meant to
discredit the impact these conflicts can
have on the global stage. The reason for
the exclusion is based on national
will. During armed or unarmed conflict
within a nations boundaries conducted by
its citizens, it can be argued that a nations
will is in flux or at least weakened to the

point that the full measure of means

cannot, and should not, be applied. In such
cases, a more accurate term for these
events would be (armed or unarmed) civil
conflict.
resulting in armed conflict when all other
means fail: This phrase acknowledges the
sage advice of Sun Tzus teachings, To
subdue the enemy without fighting is the
acme of skill. This is not to imply that the
primary policy should be one of avoiding
armed conflict at all costs, but instead to
leverage all other capabilities to achieve
national will (or national/strategic
objectives) before resorting to the costly
venture of applying military force when
reasonable. It is this authors belief that
wars of the future will be fought through
the exploitation of non-traditional power
projection methods such as economic
influence, educational influence, and
information control/influence
(cyberspace). Future wars resulting in
armed conflict between state and non-state
actors may take place for three reasons:
attempting to leverage diametricallyopposed wills on one another or one
anothers allies, asymmetric power
capabilities demanding the weaker actor
use armed force in an attempt to impose its
will on a greater power, or actions taken by
irrational actors.
How Wars End
As the proffered definition implies, there is
no end to the spectrum of
war. Therefore, the answer to the question
of how does war end? would bethey
do not; this answer however, would be
unsatisfying at best. A more succinct
question would be, how does armed
conflict end? In this case, the resultant
response is when sufficient adherence to

national will has been achieved. The

concept encourages nation-states and nonstate actors to clearly define objectives for
armed conflict and those actions/events
that must occur in order to bring about an
end to armed hostility. This is arguably
somewhat nave, but there is potential for
tangible benefits by embracing this
approach. Internally, this furthers the
theory of one voice by clarifying the
objectives to all entities. Externally, it
provides the opposition with a clear path
towards peace, while allowing for
modifications via negotiations, course of
battle, escalation and de-escalation of
hostilities.
Conclusion
War is no longer a discrete action of armed
conflict but a continuum of engagement in
order to limit the dissonance between a
nations will and that of other state and
non-state actors. In war, nation-states and
non-state actors utilize all means available;
diplomacy, economic influence (including
multi-national corporations and nongovernmental organizations), information
operations, social influence, and
educational influence as well as military
force in order to encourage adherence to
their will. As such wars do not end; rather
imposing ones will and maintaining
harmony between national objectives and
those of the international community to the
level of acceptable adherence precludes the
use of armed conflict.
War is the coherent execution of all means
to bring about sufficient adherence to a
nations will in the international (global)
arena; resulting in armed conflict only
when all other means fail.
The author recognizes that the historical

context of the term war has left an

indelible imprint on the minds of strategic
leaders and the general public. This
imprint limits the ability of the offered
definition to achieve widespread
understanding and use by U.S. or
international leadership and most assuredly
the general public. However, the goal of
this essay was to open the aperture through
which strategic leaders view the concept of
war and stimulate discussion in the hopes
of achieving the acme of skill as a war
fighter of subduing our enemy and
imposing our will without resorting to
armed conflict.

What is Peace?
Peace is an occurrence of harmony
characterized by lack of violence, conflict
behaviors and the freedom from fear of
violence. Commonly understood as the
absence of hostility and retribution, peace
also suggests sincere attempts at
reconciliation, the existence of healthy or
newly healed interpersonal or international
relationships, prosperity in matters of
social or economic welfare, the
establishment of equality, and a working
political order that serves the true interests
of all.
Perspective and associated meaning of
peace are best summarized through a
number of social principles. These have
been documented and the evidence given
for them elsewhere, as will be noted for
each.

balance is a definite equilibrium among the

parties' interests, capabilities, and wills; the
agreement is a simultaneous solution to the
different equations of power, and thereby
the achievement of a certain harmony-structure--of expectations. At the core of
this structure is a status quo, or particular
expectations over rights and obligations.
Conflict thus interfaces and interlocks a
specific balance of powers and an
associated structure of expectations.
Cooperation--contractual or familistic
interactions--depends on a harmony of
expectations, a mutual ability of the parties
to predict the outcome of their behavior.
Such is, for example, the major value of a
written contract or treaty. And this
structure of expectations depends on a
particular balance of powers. Thus,
cooperation depends on expectations
aligned with power.

Principles towards Peace

The Gap Principle

The Conflict Principle

A gap between expectations and power

causes conflict. A structure of
expectations, once established, has
considerable social inertia, while the
supporting balance of powers can change
rapidly. Interests can shift, new capabilities
can develop, wills can strengthen or
weaken. As the underlying balance of
powers changes, a gap between power and
the structure of expectations can form,
causing the associated agreement to lose
support. The larger this gap, the greater the
tension toward revising expectations in
line with the change in power, and thus the
more likely some random event will
trigger conflict over the associated
interests. Such conflict then serves to
create a new congruence between

Conflict is a balancing of powers among

interests, capabilities, and wills. It is a
mutual adjusting of what people want, can
get, and are willing to pursue. Conflict
behavior, whether hostile actions, violence,
or war, is then a means and manifestation
of this process.
The Cooperation Principle
Cooperation depends on expectations
aligned with power. Through conflict in a
specific situation, a balance of powers and
associated agreement are achieved. This

expectations and power.

Conflict and cooperation therefore are
interdependent. They are alternative phases
in a continuous social process underlying
human interaction: now conflict, then
cooperation, and then again conflict.
Cooperation involves a harmony of
expectations congruent with a balance of
powers achieved by conflict.
The Helix Principle
Conflict becomes less intense, cooperation
more lasting. If interaction occurs in a
closed system or is free from sudden, sharp
changes in the conditions of a relationship
(as, for example, if one party to a business
contract goes bankrupt, or a signatory to a
regional military alliance with the United
States has a military coup), then through
conflict and cooperation people gradually
learn more about each other, their mutual
adjustments come easier, their expectations
more harmonious and lasting. Conflict and
cooperation thus form a helix, moving
upward on a curve of learning and
adjustments, with the turn through
cooperation being more familistic and
durable; that through conflict shorter and
less intense.

The Second and Fourth Master

Principles
Through conflict is negotiated a social
contract. As mentioned, conflict is a
balancing of powers--a conscious or
subconscious negotiation of opposing
interests, capabilities, and wills. This

process determines some implicit or

explicit, subconscious or conscious social
contract. It is social in involving a
relationship or interaction between two or
more wills. It is a contract in that there is
an agreement--a harmonization of
expectations.
It is this social contract that is peace within
social field theory. Peace, then is
determined by a process of adjustment
between what people, groups, or states
want, can, and will do. Peace is based on a
consequent balance of powers and involves
a corresponding structure of expectations
and patterns of cooperation. Moreover,
peace may become unstable when an
increasing gap develops between
expectations and power, as here defined,
and may collapse into conflict, violence, or
war.
CONCEPTUAL LEVELS AND
DIMENSIONS OF PEACE
The dimensions, forms, and orders of
social contracts described above are also,
by definition, those of peace. What must
be added here and in the next Section are
additional distinctions not usually applied
to social contracts but which help locate
peace as a social contract among our
diverse conceptualizations of peace. This
also represent part of my effort at
vocabulary building--developing in a
systematic manner, and locating in one
place, those terms applicable to peace that
will be used in subsequent chapters.

Conceptual Levels
A. Levels. Undoubtedly, peace is often
conceptually opposed to war. Obviously,
then, one conceptual level for analyzing a
just peace involves those social contracts
determined by international, civil, or
revolutionary war.
Peace, however, especially among
pacifists, is also opposed to violence. This
includes war, of course, but additionally
covers violent acts not ordinarily thought
of or legally defined as war. Indeed, in the
contemporary world legal war (that is, war
as a legal state of relations invoking
special international laws) is rare, while
warlike violence is as intense and
prevalent as wars were during past
centuries. Nonetheless, this is more than a
matter of defining war empirically. Many
do feel that peace, conceptually, applies
only to those human relations which
exclude personal, organized, or collective
violence.
Those opposing the idea of peace to
violence or war usually see peace as an
absence of such behavior. But a different
view, especially in the East, sees peace as
harmony, tranquility, concord. Peace is
then conceptually opposed to nonviolent,
antagonistic conflict, such as that
manifesting threats and accusations, hostile
quarrels, angry boycotts, and riotous
demonstrations.
Another concept goes even further, seeing
peace as absolute harmony, serenity, or
quietude; that is, as opposed to any kind of
conflict, antagonistic or otherwise.
Conflict is a general concept meaning, in
essence, a balancing of power, which may
involve not only hostile or antagonistic
balancing but also that of intellectual
conflict (as in friendly disagreement over
facts), bargaining conflict (as in haggling

over a sale price), or a lover's conflict (as

when each tries to give the other the choice
of a movie to see). Each of these conflicts
ends in a social contract, and therefore in a
kind of peace. I mention this conceptual
level for completeness, however. My
conceptual focus here, as for all
irenologists, will be on peace at the level
of antagonistic conflict, whether violent or
not.

B. A Threshold. Especially significant for

a theory of just peace is the distinction
between nonviolent, antagonistic conflict
on one side and violence on the other.
There is an empirical threshold here. The
conditions for a just peace at the level of
violence will increase the amount of
nonviolent conflict. A just peace free from
long-term violence is, at the level of
societies at least, only possible at the price
of peace from nonviolent conflict.

Social Levels
A. Levels. Clearly, peace as a social
contract occurs at different levels of social
relationships. Lists four of concern here.
One is international, the level of most
historical concern about peace. A second
level concerns the central government or
ruling power (such as a dominant religious
leader or political party) of a state. Peace
here is the outcome of, or can disintegrate
into, revolution or civil war; guerrilla war
and terrorism; political turmoil involving
riots, demonstrations, general strikes, and
assassinations.
A third level involves group relations
within states, such as among religious and
ethnic groups, nationalities, classes, castes,

unions, and families. A state, at the level of

its central government, may be peaceful,
manifesting a stable social contract, while
some of its regions may experience
continuing group violence. The final level
involves the interpersonal relationships
among individuals.
B. Crosscutting Levels. Social levels of
peace are crosscutting: each of the
conceptual levels may refer to any one of
the social ones. Even war is applicable to
individual relations, as when conflict goes
beyond a violent incident to involve a
campaign of violence to defeat or destroy
another person.
It should, be clear, then, that there may be
peace from war, but not from antagonistic,
nonviolent conflict. Moreover, there may
be peace from international war, while
internal war rends a state. Conversely, a
state may be at peace while engaged in
international war. Peace among states may
be widespread, central state governments
may be stable and secure, while some
groups in one province, region, or other
political subdivision are locked in total
war. From the perspective of a particular
citizen, his state and social groups all may
be at peace, while personal peace eludes
him--he simply may not get along with his
neighbors or co-workers.
Peace is thus multilayered and complex.
This must be kept in mind in defining a
just peace.
QUALITIES OF PEACE
PEACE is a sociopsychological existent.
It has dispositional and manifest being. In
this it is on a par with conflict. Conflict is
manifested in particular patterns of
behavior; so is peace. Conflict and peace
may be absent, as when two individuals or

groups lack contact or awareness of each

other. And conflict and peace are coupled
existents, closely related within a social
process I call the conflict helix.
Other conceptualizations also treat peace
as an existing something, such as peace as
harmony, integration, or virtue. However,
the currently conventional definition of
peace as the absence of violence or war
treats peace as a void, a nonexistent. This
creates several analytical problems, which
will be mentioned below.

Dichotomous
Peace as an existent is dichotomous: it is
or it is not. It would be meaningless to talk
about more or less of a peace, as it would
be meaningless to talk about more or less
of a contract, a nation-state, a president, or
an elephant. Of course, a state may be
large or small, rich or poor. Likewise,
peace varies along several dimensions; it
may take on different forms or social
orders.
It is necessary here, then, to remember the
distinction between a peace existing or not
and the attributes, form, or order of the
peace that exists. Thus, I might say that
peace in the world is increasing and mean
that more states are subscribing to a
particular overarching, international peace.
Or by saying that peace is more intense I
might imply that a specific peace is
involving more and more cooperative
interaction.

Internal and External

In my view, peace is internal and external.
It is a social contract among people or
groups involving these psychological and
social realities. The former comprises the
parties' expectations and the congruence of
these expectations with their mutual
interests, capabilities, and wills. These are
all psychological variables. The social
reality, manifesting the harmonization of
certain expectations among the parties,
may be evidenced in specific documents
(such as a written contract), physical
structures (such as certain government
buildings), and patterns of cooperative
interaction. To say, then, that peace is an
existent means that the particular
expectations, meanings, and values within
the minds of the parties and their social
manifestations are all causally-functionally
integrated into a social contract. Thus, like
an iceberg, peace seen on the surface of
social relations is only a small part of the
overall structure.

Active
Finally, peace as a social contract is active,
not passive. It is created through
negotiation, adjustment, resolution,
decisions. It comprises predictions
(expectations) about the future. It is
manifested through cooperative
interaction. Its existence depends on
congruence with the balance of powers. It
is a phase in the dynamics of the conflict
helix.
By contrast, peace as the absence of
violence or war is passive. True, it may be
generated by negotiation and resolution.

But the resulting peace is inactive, inert. It

is a social void-something to build a wall
around to protect and maintain. Any
condition or structure or lack thereof
constitutes such a peace as long as there is
no social violence-even a desert without
human life.

What is the Military for?

The military is an arm of government
authorised to use lethal force, and
weapons, to support the interests of the
state and some or all of its citizens. The
task of the military is usually defined as
defence of the state and its citizens, and the
prosecution of war against another state.
The military may also have additional
sanctioned and non-sanctioned functions
within a society, including, the promotion
of a political agenda, protecting corporate
economic interests, internal population
control, construction, emergency services,
social ceremonies, and guarding important
areas. The military can also function as a
discrete sub-culture within a larger civil
society, through the development of
separate infrastructures, which may
include housing, schools, utilities, food
production and banking.
Military history has a number of purposes.
One main purpose is to learn from past
accomplishments and mistakes so as to
more effectively wage war in the future.
Another is to create a sense of military
tradition which is used to create cohesive
military forces. Still another may be to
learn to prevent wars more effectively.
Human knowledge about the military is
largely based on both recorded and oral
history of military conflicts (war), their
participating armies and navies and, more
recently, air forces.
As part of Society
For much of military history the armed
forces were considered to be for use by the
heads of their societies, until recently, the
crowned heads of states. In a democracy or
other political system run in the public
interest, it is a public force.

The relationship between the military and

the society it serves is a complicated and
ever-evolving one. Much depends on the
nature of the society itself and whether it
sees the military as important, as for
example in time of threat or war, or a
burdensome expense typified by defence
cuts in time of peace.
One difficult matter in the relation between
military and society is control and
transparency. In many countries only few
information on military operations and
budgeting is accessible for the public.
However transparency in the military
sector is crucial to fight corruption. This
showed the Government Defence Anticorruption Index Transparency
International published in 2013.
These relationships are seen from the
perspective of political-military relations,
the military-industrial complex mentioned
above, and the socio-military relationship.
The last can be divided between those
segments of society that offer support for
the military, those who voice opposition to
the military, the voluntary and involuntary
civilians in the military forces, the
populations of civilians in a combat zone,
and of course the military's self-perception.
Militaries often function as societies within
societies, by having their own military
communities, economies, education,
medicine and other aspects of a
functioning civilian society. Although a
"military" is not limited to nations in of
itself as many private military companies
(or PMC's) can be used or "hired" by
organisations and figures as security,
escort, or other means of protection where
police, agencies, or militaries are absent or
not trusted.

Ideology and ethics

Militarist ideology is the society's social
attitude of being best served, or being a
beneficiary of a government, or guided by
concepts embodied in the military culture,
doctrine, system, or leaders.
Either because of the cultural memory,
national history, or the potentiality of a
military threat, the militarist argument
asserts that a civilian population is
dependent upon, and thereby subservient
to the needs and goals of its military for
continued independence. Militarism is
sometimes contrasted with the concepts of
comprehensive national power, soft power
and hard power.
Most nations have separate military laws
which regulate conduct in war and during
peacetime. An early exponent was Hugo
Grotius, whose On the Law of War and
Peace (1625) had a major impact of the
humanitarian approach to warfare
development. His theme was echoed by
Gustavus Adolphus.
Ethics of warfare have developed since
1945 to create constraints on the military
treatment of prisoners and civilians
primarily by the Geneva Conventions, but
rarely apply to use of the military forces as
internal security troops during times of
political conflict that results in popular
protests and incitement to popular
uprising.
International protocols restrict the use, or
have even created international bans on
weapons, notably weapons of mass
destruction. International conventions
define what constitutes a war crime and
provides for war crimes prosecution.
Individual countries also have elaborate
codes of military justice, an example being

the United States' Uniform Code of

Military Justice that can lead to court
martial for military personnel found guilty
of war crimes.
Military actions are sometimes argued to
be justified by furthering a humanitarian
cause such as disaster relief operations or
in defence of refugees. The term military
humanism is used to refer to such actions.

What is difference between the Police

and the Military?
The duties of police officers and soldiers
are completely different and both must
understand this when the other takes over.
This principle of police and military being
willing to relinquish control and take it
back is what makes a stable and safe
society and country.
One of the fundamentals of modern
policing is that a military organization
should not conduct police work. Police
officers were to be selected from the
general population because they best
understood that population and the day-today functioning of the society they policed
or watched over. It was this intimate
knowledge which helped them prevent
crime and keep the peace.
Police use force as a last resort the vast
majority of arrests an officer makes
involve no resistance whatsoever. The
organized use of force is the primary
(although far from singular) function of the
military, and is either practiced or
implemented daily.
2. The police force, like the military is part
of the coercive state. Both of them are
uniformed, disciplined and armed bodies;
yet they are different in many ways.
3.In the first place, military is called into
action rarely only at times of war,
emergency or natural disaster; the police
force has a day to day in-volvement in
public life. Thus the police is more closer
and integrated in the social life, than is the
military, which remains alienated.
Police are usually unarmed or their arms

are primarily for self-defences while

military uses arms for defending the
country.
Modern developments have however,
minimised the distinctions between the
police and military. Military is frequently
called to deal with domestic disorders, like
communal riots, earthquakes and election
violences. Police forces are also becoming
paramilitary; they have been trained to
handle more sophisticated weapons and in
many states they also adopt quasi-military
mode of operations.

What is the Just War Theory

Just war theory is a doctrine, also referred
to as a tradition, of military ethics studied
by theologians, ethicists, policy makers
and military leaders. The purpose of the
doctrine is to ensure war is morally
justifiable through a series of criteria, all of
which must be met for a war to be
considered just. The criteria are split into
two groups: "the right to go to war' (jus ad
bellum) and 'right conduct in war' (jus in
bello). The first concerns the morality of
going to war and the second with moral
conduct within war. Recently there have
been calls for the inclusion of a third
category of just war theory - jus post
bellum - dealing with the morality of postwar settlement and reconstruction.
Just War theory postulates that war, while
very terrible, is not always the worst
option. There may be responsibilities so
important, atrocities which can be
prevented or outcomes so undesirable they
justify war.
Criteria of Just War theory
Just War Theory has two sets of criteria,
the first establishing jus ad bellum (the
right to go to war), and the second
establishing jus in bello (right conduct
within war).
Just cause
The reason for going to war needs to be
just and cannot therefore be solely for
recapturing things taken or punishing
people who have done wrong; innocent life
must be in imminent danger and
intervention must be to protect life. A
contemporary view of just cause was
expressed in 1993 when the US Catholic
Conference said: "Force may be used only

to correct a grave, public evil, i.e.,

aggression or massive violation of the
basic human rights of whole populations."

Comparative justice
While there may be rights and wrongs on
all sides of a conflict, to overcome the
presumption against the use of force, the
injustice suffered by one party must
significantly outweigh that suffered by the
other. Some theorists such as Brian Orend
omit this term, seeing it as fertile ground
for exploitation by bellicose regimes.
Competent authority
Only duly constituted public authorities
may wage war. "A just war must be
initiated by a political authority within a
political system that allows distinctions of
justice. Dictatorships (e.g. Hitler's Regime)
or deceptive military actions (e.g. the 1968
US bombing of Cambodia) are typically
considered as violations of this criterion.
The importance of this condition is key.
Plainly, we cannot have a genuine process
of judging a just war within a system that
represses the process of genuine justice. A
just war must be initiated by a political
authority within a political system that
allows distinctions of justice".
Right Intention
Force may be used only in a truly just
cause and solely for that purpose
correcting a suffered wrong is considered a
right intention, while material gain or
maintaining economies is not.
Probability of success
Arms may not be used in a futile cause or
in a case where disproportionate measures
are required to achieve success;

Last Resort
Force may be used only after all peaceful
and viable alternatives have been seriously
tried and exhausted or are clearly not
practical. It may be clear that the other side
is using negotiations as a delaying tactic
and will not make meaningful concessions.
Proportionality
The anticipated benefits of waging a war
must be proportionate to its expected evils
or harms. This principle is also known as
the principle of macro-proportionality, so
as to distinguish it from the jus in bello
principle of proportionality.
In modern terms, just war is waged in
terms of self-defense, or in defense of
another (with sufficient evidence).
Just war conduct should be governed by
the principle of proportionality.
Combatants must make sure that the harm
caused to civilians or civilian property is
not excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated
by an attack on a military objective. This
principle is meant to discern the correct
balance between the restriction imposed by
a corrective measure and the severity of
the nature of the prohibited act.
Jus in bello
Once war has begun, just war theory (Jus
in bello) also directs how combatants are
to act or should act:
Distinction
Just war conduct should be governed by
the principle of distinction. The acts of war
should be directed towards enemy

combatants, and not towards noncombatants caught in circumstances they

did not create. The prohibited acts include
bombing civilian residential areas that
include no military targets, committing
acts of terrorism and reprisal against
civilians, and attacking neutral targets (e.g.
the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor).
Moreover, combatants are not permitted to
attack enemy combatants who have
surrendered or who have been captured or
who are injured and not presenting an
immediate lethal threat or who are
parachuting from disabled aircraft (except
airborne forces) or who are shipwrecked.

Military necessity
Just war conduct should be governed by
the principle of military necessity. An
attack or action must be intended to help in
the military defeat of the enemy; it must be
an attack on a military objective, and the
harm caused to civilians or civilian
property must be proportional and not
excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated. This
principle is meant to limit excessive and
unnecessary death and destruction.
Fair treatment of prisoners of war
Enemy combatants who surrendered or
who are captured no longer pose a threat. It
is therefore wrong to torture them or
otherwise mistreat them.
No means malum in se
Combatants may not use weapons or other
methods of warfare which are considered
evil, such as mass rape, forcing enemy
combatants to fight against their own side
or using weapons whose effects cannot be
controlled (e.g. nuclear/biological
weapons).

Principles of the Just War

A just war can only be waged as a last
resort. All non-violent options
must be exhausted before the use
of force can be justified.
A war is just only if it is waged by a
legitimate authority. Even just
causes cannot be served by
actions taken by individuals or
groups who do not constitute an
authority sanctioned by whatever
the society and outsiders to the
society deem legitimate.

proportional to the injury

suffered. States are prohibited
from using force not necessary to
attain the limited objective of
addressing the injury suffered.
The weapons used in war must
discriminate between combatants and noncombatants. Civilians are never
permissible targets of war, and every effort
must be taken to avoid killing civilians.
The deaths of civilians are justified only if
they are unavoidable victims of a
deliberate attack on a military target.
How should a Just War be fought?

A just war can only be fought to redress

a wrong suffered. For example,
self-defense against an armed
attack is always considered to be
a just cause (although the justice
of the cause is not sufficient--see
point #4). Further, a just war can
only be fought with "right"
intentions: the only permissible
objective of a just war is to
redress the injury.
A war can only be just if it is fought
with a reasonable chance of
success. Deaths and injury
incurred in a hopeless cause are
not morally justifiable.
The ultimate goal of a just war is to reestablish peace. More
specifically, the peace established
after the war must be preferable to
the peace that would have
prevailed if the war had not been
fought.
The violence used in the war must be

A war that starts as a Just War may stop

being a Just War if the means used to wage
it are inappropriate.
Innocent people and non-combatants
should not be harmed.
Only appropriate force should be used.
This applies to both the sort of
force, and how much
force is used.
Internationally agreed conventions
regulating war must be obeyed.

What are the core Tenets of military

intervention?

Criteria for Military Intervention

Inherent in the concept of sovereignty

is a state's responsibility to protect its
populations; and

The ICISS report articulates a wellmeasured and careful approach to the

acceptance of military intervention for
human protection purposes. Foremost, less
intrusive and coercive measures must be
exercised before more coercive and
intrusive ones are applied. However, in
cases of extreme circumstances - those that
"shock the conscience of mankind, or
which present danger to international
security" - use of force can be considered.

If a population is suffering serious

harm, and the state in question is unwilling
or unable to halt or avert it, the
responsibility to protect those people lies
in the international community.

Six criteria were identified for defining

when a situation is appropriate for military
intervention: right authority, just cause,
right intention, last resort, proportional
means and reasonable prospects.

Core Elements

(1) Right Authority - The most appropriate

body to authorize military intervention for
human protection purposes is the United
Nations Security Council. However,
should the Council rejects a proposal or
fails to take up a situation within a
reasonable amount of time, alternatives are
the following:

The principles and elements of The

Responsibility to Protect doctrine were
elaborated in the 2001 report of the
International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty (ICISS). Its basic
principles are two-fold:

Three core elements define what is the

R2P doctrine. First, states and the
international community have the
Responsibility to prevent atrocity crimes,
which requires action to address both the
root causes and direct causes of internal
conflict and other man-made crises putting
populations at risk. Second, states and the
international community have the
Responsibility to react during situations of
compelling human need with appropriate
measures, including the use of force.
Finally, states and the international
community have the
Responsibility to rebuild in the aftermath
of atrocities. This may mean providing
assistance with recovery, reconstruction
and reconciliation as well as seeking to
address the causes of the conflict.

A. the General Assembly can consider the

matter during an Emergency Special
Session under the "Uniting for Peace"
procedure; and
B. Regional or sub-regional organizations
can act within their geographic
jurisdiction, subject to their seeking
subsequent authorization from the Security
Council.
If those mechanisms fail to discharge their
responsibility to protect in conscienceshocking situations, concerned states may
not rule out other means to meet the
gravity and urgency of that situation.

(2) Just Cause Threshold - In order for

military intervention to be warranted,
serious and irreparable harm must be
occurring to human beings, or imminently
likely to occur. Two broad circumstances
provide justification.
A. large scale loss of life, actual or
apprehended, with genocidal intent or not,
which is the product either of deliberate
state action, or state neglect or inability to
act, or a failed state situation; or

The doctrine of the responsibility to

protect was first elaborated in 2001 by a
group of prominent international human
rights leaders comprising the International
Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty.Under their mandate, the
Commission sought to undertake the twofold challenge of reconciling the
international community's responsibility to
address massive violations of humanitarian

B. large scale 'ethnic cleansing', actual or

apprehended, whether carried out by
killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or
rape.

norms and ensuring respect for the

sovereign rights of nation states.
Led by Gareth Evans, former Foreign

(3) Right Intention - The primary purpose

of the intervention, whatever other motives
intervening states may have, must be to
halt or avert human suffering. Right
intention is better assured with multilateral
operations, clearly supported by regional
opinion and the victims concerned.

Minister of Australia, and Mohamed

(4) Last Resort - Military intervention can

only be justified when every non-military
option for the prevention or peaceful
resolution of the crisis has been explored,
with reasonable grounds for believing
lesser measures would not have succeeded.

appropriate for states for take coercive -

(5) Proportional Means - The scale,

duration and intensity of the planned
military intervention should be the
minimum necessary to secure the defined
human protection objective.
(6) Reasonable Prospects - There must be
a reasonable chance of success in halting
or averting the suffering which has
justified the intervention, with the
consequences of action not likely to be
worse than the consequences of inaction.

Sahnoun, Special Advisor to the UN

Secretary-General, the Commission issued
its report in December 2001. Focusing on
the "right of humanitarian intervention",
this report examined when, if ever, it is
and in particular military - action, against
another state for the purpose of protecting
populations at risk. In essence, the group
concluded that when a group (or groups) of
people is suffering from egregious acts of
violence resulting from internal war,
insurgency, repression or state failure, and
the state where these crimes are taking
place is unable or unwilling to act to
prevent or protect its peoples, the
international community has a moral duty
to intervene to avert or halt these atrocities
from occurring.

Multilateralism vs Unilateralism

Multilateralism guarantees the

support of the international
community. This makes
international perceptions of action
much more favourable. The
increased good-will makes the
present action easier, and could well
spill over into future benefits in
other areas. If a state proves itself to
be a team player, willing to
compromise to accommodate other
states, then these other states will be
prepared to compromise to suit that
state in the future.

This need only be a concern for

weak countries. Those countries that
are strong enough to act alone do not
need to worry about nebulous and
unreliable goodwill. Moreover, if
the action is taken in the name of
universal principles, like freedom
and justice then people in other
countries will in time come to see
the error of their ways in opposing
the action in the first place. If a state
has the strength to act alone, and is
convinced of the righteousness of its
cause, it should not hesitate to act.

Unilateralism is destabilising; if a
country fights wars solely on a
domestic whim, unconstrained by
consultation or discussion with
allies, it is likely to act
disproportionately, high-handedly
and counter-productively. It is also a
terrible precedent to set for other
states to follow: international
relations could deteriorate if norms
of cooperation are not nurtured.
Chaos and anarchy would be the
result if states decided to act alone.

Unilateralism does not entail an

absence of consultation and
discussion with allies and other
interested states. It merely reserves
the right, when discussion and
consultation has not secured
international support, to take action
alone. Some acts, like waging a war
to defend ones own nation or free
another from oppression, are too
important to be discarded just
because no other country is willing
to share the burden.

Even if successful military action

could be conducted unilaterally, it is
likely that the problems of post-war
reconstruction will be sufficiently
costly and complicated to necessitate
a multilateral solution. It will be
much harder to form a coalition of
international support for
reconstruction if ties of cooperation
and consultation were undermined

Military action can bring great

benefits to states. Having been freed
from dictatorship, people can freely
contribute to their countrys
economy and bring prosperity for
themselves and their families. Many
such countries have natural
resources which are attractive to
companies from any state, thus many
states could have a direct financial

by a unilateral war.

interest in supporting post-war

reconstruction even when they did
not support the original war. And in
cases with no such benefits, simple
humanitarian spirit should compel
these states to aid reconstruction.
Ultimately, unilateralists should be
prepared to extend their
unilateralism to reconstruction as
well as war.

Multilateralism guarantees a
coalition of wisdom and interests.
This ensures a balanced
understanding of the issue and leads
to clear objectives for action. This
ultimately leads to a greater
likelihood of success. It is arrogant
and dangerous for countries to
assume that they alone understand
the problem, and they alone have the
might and the right to solve it.

Too much talk can impede action.

Too many points of view can cloud
the issue. Whilst cooperation with
other countries should be pursued as
far as possible, no concessions can
be offered that compromise key
objectives, and unlimited time for
negotiation cannot be afforded. One
should not let threats get bigger and
more unmanageable whilst one
forlornly tries to form a coalition of
the willing; when necessary, one
simply must be prepared to act
alone.

Many international problems cannot

be addressed by one state acting
alone, no matter how powerful it is.
Problems such as global warming
and pollution, poverty and
malnutrition, disease epidemics and
barriers to trade require multilateral
solutions. Unless countries act
together for their mutual benefit in
these areas no progress will be
possible, but multilateral cooperation
cannot be restricted to these 'soft'
areas of policy. If countries act
unilaterally on other issues, then all
their dealings will be characterised
by suspicion and hostility, and
progress will halt.

Multilateral bodies only move as

quickly as their least constructive
members will allow. Worse, the
consensus they reach may in fact be
wrong or unrealistic, providing no
real solution and creating other
problems in the long term.
Sometimes unilateral action by one
state can provide leadership, behind
which other, like-minded states can
gather. Even if different states adopt
different approaches, this policy
competition can be productive,
showing which ideas are most
deserving of wider adoption.

The purpose and strength of The

United Nations is that it constrains
countries within a multilateral
system. This limits states' freedom of
action to do whatever they wish, but
it also protects sovereignty by
insisting that states can act as they
wish providing they do not threaten
others; they are constrained only by
agreements they freely make. Over
time this has built confidence and
understanding between the great
powers, and helped keep global
peace for nearly sixty years.
Unilateral action undermines these
principles, risking dangerous
competition between the great
powers, and encouraging outside
intervention in the affairs of the
smaller states.

Multilateralism undermines
sovereignty by limiting the freedom
of action of governments, and so can
deny a people the rights of
democratic decision and selfdetermination. Most importantly, in
the post-Cold War, post-9/11 world,
a nation and its leaders must have
the right to define what constitutes a
threat, and what form self-defence
should take, without reference to
other nations. If a government has an
electoral mandate for action, then it
should be able to do as it wishes,
without allowing other states a veto
over its decisions. This is
particularly true when so many
multilateral organisations give equal
voting weight and even veto powers
to undemocratic nations.