An Untouchable Monster

The Role of the CIA in the 1954 Guatemalan Coup

Presented to Craig Simpson

Presented by Maggie Zhu (250 665 873)
For History 2303F
Due November 20, 2013

Prelude

Following centuries of impoverishment under Spanish rule, a coffee boom drew investors
to Guatemala in the early 20th century. Flocks of marketers and railroad builders came to the
small country. The government structured society to optimize a cheap supply of labour. Spanish
decedents became landlords known locally as Ladinos. In 1931, the Ladinos chose Jorge Ubico
to lead Guatemala. He was a merciless and efficient provincial governor. While in power, he
exhibited a ruthless policy that included legalizing killing of Mayan Indians, enlarging the Army
and creating a personal Gestapo.1
Ubicos foreign policy welcomed American investors. The United Fruit Company (UFC)
became one of his closest allies. Simultaneously, the American embassy gave Ubico generous
support. Ubico gifted Guatemalan land to the UFC and in return the company invested heavily
into the country. Guatemalas railroad, electric utility, telephone, telegraph as well as its only
harbour were financed and controlled by the UFC. As a result, due to its interests in every
significant enterprise, it earned the nickname the Octopus.2 The UFC also held a monopoly
over banana exports. The banana industry employed as many as forty thousand Guatemalans.3
Ubica allowed the UFC to determine its own taxes, prices and governance of labour.
Nearing the end of World War II, the proletariat expressed dissatisfaction with the ruling
Ubico government. Guatemalan university students and teachers chose to resist military drills
and by June 1944, unrest had spread. Widespread petitions, public demonstrations and strikes

1
Nicholas Cullather, Secret history: the CIAs classified account of its operations in
Guatemala, 1952-1954. 2nd ed. (Standford, California: University Press, 2006), 9.
2
Cullather, Secret History, 10
3
Cullather, Secret History, 10

culminated in December 1944 with the democratic election of Juan Jose Arevalo.4 He aimed to
address long-term political, social and economic problems through a system of constitutional
reforms. These included labour codes, literacy and public health campaigns, rent controls and
other parallel initiatives. In 1947, a labour code gave industrial workers the right to organize in
places where more than 500 people were employed.5 Still, Arevalo remained relatively
conservative and his reforms were perceived as moderate. Political parties were still controlled
by the ruling coalition party and unions were not allowed to strike.
In July 1949, Francisco Javier Arana, a popular military hero, presented Arevalo with an
ultimatum. He demanded that Arevalo surrender his power to the army, becoming a civilian
figurehead for a military regime. Arevalo asked for time and formed a partnership with Jacobo
Arbenz. Arana was assassinated and Arevalo came to power.6
Arbenz worked to continue Arevelos fight against poverty through more labour codes,
the abolishment of forced labour, land reform and agrarian reform. Arbenz had twice risked his
life and career for democracy. His plans for development and agricultural reform were modest
but he was determined to carry them out7. On June 17th, 1952, Decree 900, declared a
percentage of idle land would be expropriated and rented to indigenous Guatemalans. This
included the vast, unused land of the United Fruit Company. This antagonized the Ladinos,
foreign investors and military officers. It is now seen as a moderate, capitalism reform. 8

4
Cullather, Secret History, 11
5
Cullather, Secret History, 16
6
Nicholas Cullather, "Operation PBSUCCESS: The United States and Guatemala, 19521954." CIA and Assassinations: The Guatemala 1954 Documents, October 6, 2013,
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/docs/doc05.pdf
7
Cullather, Secret History, 20
8
Cullather, Secret History, 21

By the mid-20th century, the United States had taken control of economic development in
several nations and had become a hegemonic world power. Globally, demand for the
redistribution of political and economic power dominated many countries. Ruling powers, often
with substantial American support and encouragement, responded with efforts to sustain their
privilege and actively exterminated or derailed movements for reform. This often included the
use of American military power. Guatemala followed this pattern and became another victim to
American intervention.9 Although the CIA continues to provide justification for their supportive
role in the 1954 Guatemalan coup, their role was more active and directive, resulting in the end
of a productive era in Guatemalan history and the beginning of a bloody repression by the
government.

Historians continue to speculate about whether motivation came from anti-Communist

paranoia or pressure from American investors. It is reasonable to believe that both factors
contributed to inducing direct American involvement in Guatemala. Neither reason has a sound
basis. CIA officials often had little understanding of or interest in the motives of those in the
Department of State, the Pentagon, and the White House who made the final decision.10 As a
result, Washington has been accused of resorting to semantics due to a lack of substantial proof
for Guatemalan wrongdoing or risk to American security.

9
Robert H. Holden, "The Real Diplomacy of Violence: United States Military Power in
Central America, 1950-1990." The International History Review 15, no. 2 (1993): 284, accessed
November 3, 2013, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40106667.
10
Cullather, Secret History, 8

Some Historians emphasize the importance of Communist suspicions. These began under
Arevalos regime and escalated towards the 1950s. As fear of communism became the centre of
American foreign policy, the United States developed vigorous responses to disruptions of the
status quo. Due to Arevalos reforms, the CIA scrutinized Guatemala. This was coupled with
corporate pressure, as the UFC grew concerned that the government was sympathetic with
laborers. The company sought official support from the American government.11 Back in
Washington, lobbyists took the case to the Truman administration and directed a campaign to
persuade congress that attacks on the company were proof of Communist activity
In 1949, the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT) was formed. Guatemalas first
labour party was composed primarily of proletariat and embodied a Marxist-Lenininst
ideology.12 Nevertheless, the centrist party, Partido Accion Revolucionaria (PAR), remained the
majority. The FBI investigated the PGT but found little of interest. The Arevalo government was
reevaluated and the State Department asked for a list of suspected communists to be removed
from high positions. Arevalo refused resulting in elevated suspicion for excessive
nationalism.13
Arbenzs controversial rise to power also contributed to the skepticism of the CIA.
Further, Arbenz was close friends with leaders of the PGT. While it was true that Arbenz had the
support of Communist-led labour and the radical fringe of professional and intellectual groups,
he was also popular among many anti-Communist nationalists in urban areas14. Arbenz did not

11
Gerald Kaines, "CIA and Guatemala Assassination Proposals, 1952-1954." CIA and
Assassinations: The Guatemala 1954 Documents., October 6, 2013,
www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/docs/doc01.pdf
12
Cullather, Secret History, 14
13
Cullather, Secret History, 15
14
William Blum, Killing hope: U.S. military and CIA interventions since World War II
(Monroe, Me: Common Courage Press, 1995), 74

appoint any Communists to his Cabinet, and only 6 or 7 held significant sub-Cabinet posts.15 The
PGT held only four of 51 seats in Congress.16 They were the smallest component of Arbenzs
coalition. Nevertheless, Washington repeatedly expressed its displeasure that Communists were
working in the Guatemalan government and were active in the countrys political sphere.
Washington saw Communists, unlike normal human being, [they] did not take jobs in the
government- they infiltrated the government.17 This perception eliminated the possibility that
reform could stem from people genuinely concerned about social change.
In the early 1950s, at the peak of McCarthyism, Washington became obsessed with
communist infiltration in Guatemala18 and direct action became a priority. With blind fear,
Dulles declared that Guatemalan ideals needed to be altered. Both Dulles brothers and
Eisenhower collectively agreed that the Arbenz led a communist government that needed to be
replaced. Decree 900 was seen as a beginning to radicalization. Communists would use the land
redistribution to mobilize the proletariat and divest the Ladinos of their power. Secretary of State
Dulles claimed that Guatemalans were being subjected to a Communist type of terrorism.19
The National Security Council published a statement in August 1952 that claimed A policy of
non-action would be suicidal, since the Communist movement, under Moscow tutelage, will not
falter nor abandon its goals.20
This fear of Communism was intensified by the geographical proximity of Guatemala to
the United States, making it of strategic importance. It became a frequent justification for

15
Cullather, Secret History, 21
16
Blum, 74
17
Blum, 74
18
Richard H. Immerman, Empire for liberty: a history of American imperialism from
Benjamin Franklin to Paul Wolfowitz (Princeton: Priceton University Press, 2010), 194
19
Blum, 73
20
Cullather, Secret History, 38

American intervention. Worries that Communists were infiltrating Americas backyard21 drew
widespread fear. American Ambassador John Peurifoy emphasized the importance of not
permit[ting] a Soviet Republic to be established between Texas and the Panama Canal22. In
reality, Russians had little interest in Guatemala. They did not provide any military assistance.
Other historians argue that American involvement partially stemmed from the geopolitical
optimality of Guatemala.
Another major factor was the under-current of pressure from the United Fruit Company.
It had several connections that granted it influence in the government. The UFC had close
personal ties with both Dulles brothers, various State Department officials, congressmen and the
American Ambassador to the United Nations.23 In the 1930s, Secretary of State Dulles had
helped to negotiate a contract between the UFC and the Guatemalan government under Ubico.
The wife of the public relations director was Eisenhowers personal secretary. Further, former
Director of the CIA and under-secretary of state Walter Bedell Smith was seeking an executive
position with the UFC at the time he was helping to plan the coup.24
Decree 900 was perceived as a direct attack on the wealth and power of the UFC. Land
reform had already ignited conflict between the UFC and the Guatemalan government. Decree
900 added significant friction. Pressure from the United Fruit Company persisted. They wanted
nearly $16 million for the land that was taken from them. However, the government was only
offering $525, 000 based on the value that United Fruit had declared for tax purposes.25
Meanwhile, illegal seizures due to vagueness and poor enforcement further enraged the United

21
Cullather, Secret History, 8
22
Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: the foreign policy of intervention.
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 138
23
Blum, 75
24
Blum, 75
25
Blum, 75

Fruit Company. To compete with UFCs influence, Arbenz constructed an Atlantic port and a
highway. Arbenz expressed in his inaugural address:
Foreign capital will always be welcome as long as it adjusts to local conditions, remains
always subordinate to Guatemalan laws, cooperate with the economic development of the
country, and strictly abstains from intervening in the nations social and political life.26
This juxtaposed Ubicos relationship with foreign investors. The new Presidents strategy was to
limit the power of foreign companies through direct competition rather than nationalization.
With land, this strategy was simply not attainable.
Increasing the economic well being of the United States is a less convincing argument for
the motivation of the United States. Secretary of State Dulles believed in the power of
international finance and trade to fix global problems. Liberal trade and stable currencies were
important. However, these foreign policies were not designed to safeguard American economic
interests but were instead beneficial to international economic development. Dulles believed
America had a duty to respond to international communism and these policies were a way to
combat the growing epidemic27
Finally, success in previous interventions, such as TPAJAX in installing the Shah as ruler
of Iran, set a precedent that covert operations offered a safe and inexpensive substitute for armed
forces.28 It elevated the CIAs reputation. This method became an effective way of challenging
communism in the Third World and a tool that should be utilized. Guatemala was unique
because it was the first time that a popular, elected government would be replaced by a political
nonentity. Previously, covert operations had been used to assist a prominent candidate to gain
power.

26
Blum, 75
27
Immerman, Empire, 194
28
Cullather, Secret History, 38

II

In 1952, the first plan to topple Arbenz through a CIA operation known as PBFORTUNE
was approved by Truman but aborted at the last minute. PBFORTUNE faced problems with
State Department indecision and poor security.29 Following his election in January 1953,
Eisenhower resurrected the focus on Guatemala under the name PBSUCCESS. The headquarters
of the operation was located in Opa Locka, Florida. It involved approximately one hundred CIA
agents and a budget between five and seven million dollars.30 In March 1953, the CIA
approached disgruntled right-wing officers in Guatemalas army and arranged to send them
arms. The United Fruit Company donated $64,000 towards this cause.31 The rebels initiated
several uprisings but they were quickly put down by loyal troops. These rebels were put on trial
and the UFCs role was revealed but not the CIAs.
The Army was considered the only organized element in Guatemala capable of decisively
altering the political situation. However, Arbenz, who was a former officer, remained popular
among military leaders. While the Catholic Church opposed land reform, it was not strong
enough and the CIA would need to build revolutionary assets from scratch.32 Armas was chosen,
a Guatemalan purged from the army, to be its representative.
The program relied heavily on the State and Defense Departments. It was their role to
isolate Guatemala diplomatically, militarily and economically. An arms embargo would need to
be enforced while the military of neighboring states was built up. The US Navy and Air Force

29
Cullather, Secret History, 38
30
Frederick H. Gareau, State terrorism and the United States: from counterinsurgency to
the war on terrorism (Atlanta, GA: Clarity Press, 2004), 44
31
Blum, 75
32
Cullather, Secret History, 43

would provide logistical support such as maintenance and expertise as well as training. It would
be a government-wide operation led by the CIA.33 Contingency plans including cutting of
Guatemalan credit abroad, disrupting its oil supplies and causing a run on its foreign reserves.
An important part of the program was the use of propaganda, which was targeted towards
the Guatemalan government, army officials and the international community. It set the
foundation for the crucial 1954 invasion and continued to play an essential role throughout the
Coup. In light of the arms embargo, Guatemala was forced to turn to Czechoslovakia to make a
single cash purchase of weapons34. The American propaganda mill exaggerated the importance
of this purchase. Eisenhower ordered the stopping of suspicious vessels on the high seas off
Guatemala to examine cargo despite knowing such actions would constitute a violation of
international law35
The United States aimed to justify its involvement to the international community. It
placed unfounded articles in foreign newspapers labeling specific Guatemalan officials as
communists. More than 200 articles were written and placed in Latin American newspapers. 100,
000 copies of a pamphlet entitled Chronology of Communism in Guatemala36 were published
and a slew of anti-communist cartoons and posters were drawn. Three films were released with
the similar message of Communist infiltration in Guatemala.
The UFCs publicity office effectively circulated photographs of mutilated bodies to
journalists. It claimed that these were examples of atrocities committed by the Arbenz
regime.37 In reality the image did not necessarily have any association with the country of

33
Cullather, Secret History, 44
34
Immerman, The CIA, 155
35
Blum, 76
36
Blum, 77
37
Blum, 78

Guatemala. Nicuraguans president discovered a secret Soviet shipment of arms, which had
been planned by the CIA near the Pacific Cost. Also, Soviet-marked weapons were gathered for
the purpose of planting them inside Guatemala before the invasion to reinforce American
charges of Russian intervention.
PBSUCCESS, like its predecessor, continued to be plagued by breaches of security. In
January 1954, Arbenz discovered copies of Liberation documents. As a result, Guatemalan
newspapers published copies of correspondence between Armas, Nicaraguan officials and others.
It revealed many staging, training and invasion plans. The State Department labeled any
accusations of a US role as ridiculous and untrue and claimed the policy of the United States
[is] not to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations. This policy has repeatedly been
reaffirmed under the present administration38. Time Magazine claimed that the whole expos
had been masterminded in Moscow. Similarly, Life Magazine claimed, world communism
was efficiently using the Guatemalan show to strike a blow at the US.39
Leading up to the invasion, the CIA trained and supplied an invasion force in Honduras
under the command of Armas. The main purpose of this force was as a rallying point for the
American pre-invasion propaganda campaign.40 The Guatemalan government was purposely
made very aware of the growing American presence in Honduras. Propaganda, sabotage, aircraft,
an army of insurrectionists and an implicit threat of military power were meant to cause
psychological distress for Arbenz.

38
Blum, 78
39
Blum, 78
40
Gareau, 43

10

Hidden radio transmitters were placed in and around the perimeter of Guatemala,
including one in the US embassy.41 There was a radio station targeted specifically towards
military men. On the station it was reported that Arbenz was secretly planning to disband or
disarm the army and replace it with a peoples militia. The work in neighboring Nicaragua and
Honduras was effective. The Army grew alarmed about the arms embargo and growing threat.
Many officer corps grew resentful of Arbenz and apprehensive. The US dispatched a large
shipment of arms to Honduras and Nicaragua to signal a clear threat to the Guatemalan military
and persuade it to withdraw its support of Arbenz. Castillo Armass force was supposedly
highly trained and exceedingly well-equipped42, while the CIA recognized it was extremely
small and ill-trained. The CIA also bribed members of the Guatemalan officer corps.
On April 9, 1954, a letter was read in Guatemalan Catholic churches calling to the
attention of the congregations the presence in the country of a devil called communism. It
demanded that the people rise as a single man against this enemy of God and country43. This
was especially effective since the Guatemalan peasant class was highly religious and could not
read. Speech was the only way to receive the Lords Word.
By the beginning of May, PBSUCCESS was ready to place maximum pressure on the
Arbenz regime. On June 18, 1954, the physical invasion began. Armass liberation army, which
totaled only 300 troops, marched from Honduras to Guatemala. The army was composed of
Guatemalans and mercenaries from Nicaragua, Honduras and Panama.44 The weak force was
stopped twenty miles from the Honduras border by the regular Guatemalan army. It managed to
capture a few small towns. Fake parachute drops heightened the belief of a major invasion.

41 Blum, 76
42 Cullather, Secret History, 72
43 Blum, 77
44
Gareau, 44

11

While the force itself was not very strong, bombing and straffing by Air Force planes flying out
of Nicaragua allowed for the invasion to appear more effective. 30 planes were assigned for use
in the Liberation and were flown by American pilots.45 Leaflets were dropped all over
Guatemala demanding that Arbenz resigned or various sites would be bombed.
For the following week, there were daily air attacks. They were targeted at bombing
ports, fuel tanks, ammunition dumps, military barracks, the international airport, schools, and
several cities. During the actual intervention, radios played a key role in transmitting false
information. The CIA radio stations demanded Arbenzs resignation and threatened bombings.
The minor successes of the invasion force were massively exaggerated. Broadcasts claimed that
rebels everywhere were advancing in large numbers and picking up mass numbers of volunteers.
These radio stations painted an image of war and upheaval in all corners with fearsome battles
and major defeats of the Guatemalan army. The purpose was to create the illusion that military
defenses were crumbling so resistance would be futile. Sometimes, the CIA managed to
broadcast these reports over public or military channels. The CIA was able to answer real
military messages with fake responses.
On June 21, Guatemalan Foreign Minister Moriello made appeals to the UN. A resolution
to send an investigating team to Guatemala was defeated 5 votes to 4 with Britain and France
abstaining due to US pressures.46 The CIA dropped harmless bombs on Honduran territory and
the Honduran government came to the UN claiming Guatemalan planes had attacked it. The
leaders of Guatemala reached out to the United Nations, Organization of American States and

45
Blum, 76
46
Blum, 79

12

individual countries to no avail.47 Not even the world press responded to Guatemalan pleas for
help as the country remained under fire.
A perception was created by propaganda that large and heavily armed forces were
moving towards Guatemala City. The air attacks and belief in the invincibility of the enemy
persuaded the Guatemalan military officers to force Arbenz to resign. On June 27, 1954,
representatives of the military confronted Arbenz and demanded his resignation. The officers
[thought] that the Americans [were] threatening Guatemala just because of [Arbenz] and [his]
Communist friends. If [he didnt] resign, the Army would] march on the capital to depose
[him].48 On July 1, 1954, PBSUCCESS began withdrawing. Propaganda radio stations went off
the air. However, when the Army Chief of staff Colonel Carlos Diaz took control, the CIA told
him Colonel, youre just not convenient for the requirements of American foreign policy.
When Diaz refused to shoot a list of supposed communists, Peurifoy increased bombing.
In the 11 days following Arbenzs resignation, political unrest resulted in five successive
juntas occupying the presidential palace. Eventually, much to American satisfaction and a result
of their direct intervention, Armas became the new leader of Guatemala. The United States had
successfully initiated and carried out a Coup in Guatemala by hiding behind a rebel invasion
force, the Church and eventually the military. It took advantage of each of these bodies through
propaganda. Without the air force and information networks created by the United States, the
Guatemalan government would likely still be operating within the cycle of progressive change
started in the 1940s. Despite breaking the law and lying to the international community, the
United States evaded accountability. Much like a bully on a playground, it tormented a helpless
victim with unclear and meaningless motivations.

47
Blum, 73
48
Cullather, Secret History, 97

13

Epilogue

In this section, I would like to provide a few comments on the result of the Coup. These
results further emphasize the destructive implications of American intervention. On June 30,
immediately following the coup, Secretary of State Dulles claimed, without basis:
[The events in Guatemala] expose the evil purpose of the Kremlin to destroy the interAmerican systemhaving gained control of what they call the mass organizations, [the
communists] moved on to take over the official press and radio of the Guatemalan
Government. They dominated the social security organization and ran the agrarian reform
programdictated to the Congress and to the PresidentArbenzwas openly
manipulated by the leaders of communismThe Guatemalan regime enjoyed the full
support of Soviet Russia[the] situation is being cured by the Guatemalans
themselves49
The United Fruit Company received all its land back, banana workers unions were
banned and illiterates (3/4 of Guatemalan voters) were barred from voting. All political parties,
labour confederations and peasant organizations were outlawed. Dulles claimed a new and
glorious chapter in the great tradition of American States50 and the history of freedom
everywhere. He declared the freedom of Guatemala from Communists. In reality, PBSUCCESS
did not liberate Guatemala from the Communists but instead from its own people. It succeeded in
removing a government while failing to install an adequate substitute. Armas and his successors
denied the liberty to the vast majority of Guatemalans.
International protest was minimal after the fall of Arbenz. Guatemala quickly came to
depend on handouts from the United States. Although the success of the Coup was the end of
what Dulles had sought, the Eisenhower administration had to underwrite an increasing
Guatemalan deficit aggravated by corruption and mismanagement. Nevertheless, PBSUCCESS

49
Blum, 81
50
Immerman, Empire, 193

14

became a model for future operations including the Bay of Pigs (1961).51 The unsuccessful
attempt to overthrow Castro seven years later was based on the success of the previous CIA
operations.
The 1954 Coup was followed by a bloody repression of the Guatemalan underclass. In
July, thousands were arrested on suspicion of communist activity. In August, a law was passed
and committee established that could declare anyone a communist without appeal. 72, 000 names
were registered within 4 months.52 The period that immediately followed was originally seen as a
Guerilla war but was more realistically a period of government repression and terror. 91% of
total violations occurred between 1978 and 1984. Reports show that the Guatemalan government
and its allies were responsible for more than 95% of the crimes committed.53
Stephen G. Rabe makes the claim that US intervention in Guatemala initiated a cycle of
violence that has led to the assassination and murder of perhaps one hundred thousand
Guatemalans.54 According to the UN Commission, 42, 275 victims of acts of violence and
human rights violations occurred between 1962 and 1996 alone. Of those victims, there were
23671 executions and 6158 forced disappearances. The majority of victims were civilians and
some sources estimate the number of victims to exceed 200,000.55 Regardless, the period of
Guatemalas history was lethal.
Despite these startling facts, the UN Commission on Guatemala had little to say about
Washingtons support. In the case of Guatemala, military assistance was directed towards
reinforcing the national intelligence apparatus and for the training of the officer corps in

51
Cullather, Secret History, 7
52
Blum, 81
53
Gareau, 45
54
Holden, 284
55
Gareau, 45

15

counterinsurgency techniques, key factors which had significant bearing on human rights
violations during the armed confrontation.56 Eisenhower claimed in his memoirs to only have
the most tangential of connections to its execution. The United States will likely never be held
accountable for these atrocities.

56
Gareau, 61

16

Bibliography

Blum, William. Killing hope: U.S. military and CIA interventions since World War II. Monroe,
Me.: Common Courage Press, 1995.
Cullather, Nicholas. "Operation PBSUCCESS: The United States and Guatemala, 1952-1954."
CIA and Assassinations: The Guatemala 1954 Documents.
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/docs/doc05.pdf (accessed October
6, 2013).
Cullather, Nicholas. Secret history: the CIA's classified account of its operations in Guatemala,
1952 - 1954. 2nd ed. Stanford, California: University Press, 2006.
Gareau, Frederick H.. State terrorism and the United States: from counterinsurgency to the war
on terrorism. Atlanta, GA: Clarity Press, 2004.
Holden, Robert H.. "The Real Diplomacy of Violence: United States Military Power in Central
America, 1950-1990." The International History Review 15, no. 2 (1993): 283-322.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40106667 (accessed November 3, 2013).
Immerman, Richard H.. The CIA in Guatemala: the foreign policy of intervention. Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1982.
Immerman, Richard H.. Empire for liberty: a history of American imperialism from Benjamin
Franklin to Paul Wolfowitz. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.
Kaines, Gerald. "CIA and Guatemala Assassination Proposals, 1952-1954." CIA and
Assassinations: The Guatemala 1954 Documents.
www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/docs/doc01.pdf (accessed October 6,
2013).

17