1

DOMINGO v. CA
Facts:
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition for the "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto Domingo. They were married on November 29, 1976.
Unknown to her (Delia), he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and
still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy;
sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she
further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or consent.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. The marriage being void ab initio,
the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary.
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a man with another woman is illegal and void and
no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss.
CA affirmed.

2
Issue: WON a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should be
filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Held:
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage
with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning. Petitioner himself does not
dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage.
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier ruled
that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that
Justice Alex Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the
spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. . . .
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of
a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law
for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

3
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where
a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an
action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for
the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes.
Hence, in the instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into
another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity.
But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished
merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to the essential
requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect and nothing more.
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply be one of the
necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage.

4
ATIENZA v. BRILLANTES
Facts:
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, petitioner (Atienza) saw respondent (Brillantes) sleeping on his
bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting with Yolanda De Castro.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as appearing in his
1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her. He alleges that
while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license.
Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June
5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and
purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first marriage
took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and
governed by the Family Code.

5
Issue: WON a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is necessary. YES.
Held:
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the
date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it
does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected. As a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time he went
through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. His
failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.

6
BELTRAN v. PEOPLE
Facts:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973.
On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named
Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage.
Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the
determination of the criminal case.
Issue:

7
Held:
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
"The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void."
[12]

In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the
only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previo us
marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared
null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a
defense.
Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Reloval

[13]

cited in Donato vs. Luna

[14]

where this Court held that:

"xxx Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to
the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can
it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who

8
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosec uted
for bigamy."
Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk
of being prosecuted for concubinage.

9
REPUBLIC v. CA & ALEGRO
Facts:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A.
Julaton.
Alan and Lea were married on January 20, 1995. On February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening and he berated
her for being always out of their house. When he reported for work the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he
arrived home later in the day, Lea was nowhere to be found. Alan thought that Lea merely went to her parents
house. However, Lea did not return to their house anymore.
On February 14, 1995, after his work, he went to the house of Leas parents to see if she was there, but he was told that she
was not there. He also went to the house of Leas friend, Janeth Bautista, but was informed that the latter went to Manila. Alan
sought the help of Barangay Captain Juan Magat, who promised to help him locate his wife. He also inquired from his friends
of Leas whereabouts but to no avail.
Alan then left for Manila on August 27, 1995. He went to a house in Navotas where Janeth, Leas friend, was staying. When
asked where Lea was, Janeth told him that she had not seen her. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On his free
time, he would look for Lea in the malls but still to no avail. He returned to Catbalogan in 1997 and again looked for his wife
but failed.

10
On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Leas disappearance to the local police station. Alan also reported Leas disappearance to
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on July 9, 2001.
Barangay Captain Juan Magat corroborated the testimony of Alan.
RTC granted the petition for the declaration of presumptive death of Lea.
CA affirmed.
OSGs Contention:
Alan B. Alegro failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that Lea was already dead.
failed to exercise reasonable and diligent efforts to locate his wife.

[23]

It averred that the respondent

Issue: WON there exists a well-founded belief on the part of Alan and diligent efforts to locate Lea. NONE.
Held:
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage.
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or
circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably
founded in truth.

11
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the
whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other than BarangayCaptain Juan Magat. The respondent even failed
to present Janeth Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other person from whom he allegedly made inquiries about Lea to
corroborate his testimony.
The respondent failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Leas whereabouts before filing his petition in the
RTC. It could have enhanced the credibility of the respondent had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Leas
whereabouts considering that Leas father was the owner of Radio DYMS.
The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police authorities and the NBI to locate Lea, but it was only an
afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC.

12
SSS and SSC v. VDA. DE BAILON
Facts:
On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage in Barcelona, Sorsogon.
More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) to declare Alice
presumptively dead.
By Order of December 10, 1970, the CFI granted the petition.
Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon contracted marriage with
Teresita Jarque (respondent).
On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social Security System (SSS) since 1960 and a retiree pensioner
thereof effective July 1994, died.
Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa) contested before the SSS
the release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She claimed that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifeti me,
the first with Alice, the second with her mother Elisa, and the third with respondent; and they were reserving their right to file

13
the necessary court action to contest the marriage between Bailon and respondent as they personally know that Alice is "still
very much alive."
The SSS advised respondent of the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits in view of the opinion rendered by
its legal department that her marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted while the latters marriage with Alice was still
subsisting; and the December 10, 1970 CFI Order declaring Alice presumptively dead did not become final, her "presence"
being "contrary proof" against the validity of the order.
One Alicia P. Diaz filed an Affidavit dated August 14, 2002 with the SSS attesting that she is the widow of Bailon; she had only
recently come to know of the petition filed by Bailon to declare her presumptively dead; it is not true that she disappeared as
Bailon could have easily located her, she having stayed at her parents residence in Barcelona, Sorsogon after she found out
that Bailon was having an extramarital affair; and Bailon used to visit her even after their separation.
The SSC found that the marriage of respondent to Bailon was void and that she was just a common law wife.
Issue: WON mere reappearance of the absent spouse automatically terminates the subsequent marriage. NO.
Held:
x x x while it is true that a judgment declaring a person presumptively dead never attains finality as the finding that "the person
is unheard of in seven years is merely a presumption juris tantum," the second marriage contracted by a person with an

14
absent spouse endures until annulled. It is only the competent court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87
of the Civil Code and upon the reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for annulment may be filed.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the Family Code, the
applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.
Article 83 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is
generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be
valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive years when Bailon sought the declaration of
her presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a requirement then for purposes of remarriage.

15
Tolentino: Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the validity of the
second marriage, x x x The presumption in favor of the legality of his second marriage, will prevail over the presumption of the
continuance of life of the first spouse or of the continuance of the marital relation with such first spouse.
If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of reappearance or by judicial declaration but
by death of either spouse as in the case at bar, Tolentino submits:
x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse, the effects of dissolution of valid
marriages shall arise. The good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be raised, because, as in annullable or voidable
marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned except in a direct action for annulment.
The action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved had died, as provided in Article
87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of
the parties involved.
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailons and respondents marriage prior to the
formers death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.

16
VALDEZ v. REPUBLIC
Facts:
Petitioner (Angelita) married Sofio on January 11, 1971.
Angelita and Sofio argued constantly because the latter was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972,
Sofio left their conjugal dwelling. Petitioner decided to go back to her parents home.
In October 1975, Sofio showed up and both parties agreed to separate. They executed a document to that effect.
Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes on June 20, 1985. Subsequently, however, Virgilios
application for naturalization filed with the United States Department of Homeland Security was denied because petitioners
marriage to Sofio was subsisting. Hence, on March 29, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac
seeking the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
RTC held that Angelita was not able to prove the well-grounded belief that her husband Sofio Polborosa was already dead.
The RTC found that, by petitioners own admission, she did not try to find her husband anymore in light of their mutual
agreement to live separately.
Issue: WON a petition for declaration of presumptive death is necessary. NO.

17
Held:
It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to Sofio and Virgilio on January 11, 1971 and June 20, 1985,
respectively, were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil Code.
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person
with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the
spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven
years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted
shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.

Article 390 of the Civil Code states:

18
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be
presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten
years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his
succession may be opened.
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The
law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that
the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be
dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to
arise. Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio is to be presumed dead starting
October 1982.
Consequently, at the time of petitioners marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioners capacity to marry, and
the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.
Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of well-founded belief is not required. Petitioner could not have
been expected to comply with this requirement since the Family Code was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to
Virgilio.

19
To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit well-founded belief will, ultimately,
result in the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated.
In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no decree on the presumption of Sofios death can be granted
under the Civil Code, the same presumption having arisen by operation of law. However, we declare that petitioner was
capacitated to marry Virgilio at the time their marriage was celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and
valid.