Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 92349 November 9, 1990
MARIA LUISA ESTOESTA petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and GERRY R. GONZALES,
Presiding Judge, MTC, Br. 76, Marikina, respondents.
Manuel V. Regondola for petitioner.

GANCAYCO, J.:
The legal effect of the appearance of a litigant in his own behalf is the focus of controversy in this
petition.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of slight physical injuries committed against Perla Y. Corpuz in
an information filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina, Metro Manila. By the same token,
on a countercharge of petitioner, Perla Y. Corpuz was charged in an information for the same
offense before the same court.
The cases were consolidated and after a joint trial on the merits where both parties were duly
represented by counsel, the trial court rendered a decision dated January 12, 1989 convicting the
petitioner of the crime charged and sentencing her to suffer imprisonment of arresto menor in its
medium period of eleven (11) days to twenty (20) days but acquitting Perla Y. Corpuz with costs de
oficio in both cases.
Not satisfied therewith petitioner through counsel filed a notice of appeal within the reglementary
period to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig wherein in due course the judgment appealed from was
modified as to the penalty by imposing a straight penalty of eleven (11) days imprisonment.
A motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for petitioner was denied by the Regional Trial Court on
August 30, 1989.
On September 20, 1989, petitioner, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the Court of Appeals
a motion for extension of time of thirty (30) days from September 30, 1989 or up to October 19, 1989
within which to file a petition for review on the ground that she has to look for another lawyer to
represent her and prepare the necessary petition. The motion was granted by the appellate court in
a resolution dated October 16, 1989.
However, instead of filing the petition for review, petitioner in her own behalf filed on October 9, 1989
a written manifestation and motion to withdraw petition for review for the purpose of applying for
probation in the court of origin, "she being a first offender and possesses (sic) all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications provided for under the said probation law." 1 The motion was granted

by the appellate court in a resolution dated October 24, 1989, copy of which was received by petitioner on
October 30, 1989.

The division clerk of court of the Court of Appeals made the entry of judgment on October 25, 1989.
On November 17, 1989, the petitioner filed a joint or alternative motion for reconsideration and
reinstatement of petition for review and petition for relief from judgment with prayer for a temporary
restraining order based on the ground that the motion to withdraw the petition for review was filed
without the advice of her lawyer and under the honest impression that her application for probation
pending with the lower court will be granted.
In a resolution dated February 20, 1990, the Court of Appeals denied the said motion for lack of
merit.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari with prayer for restraining order dated March 10, 1990
predicated on the following grounds:
I. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING YOUR PETITIONER'S
MOTION TO REINSTATE PETITION FOR REVIEW IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF
THE DOCTRINES ENUNCIATED IN THE CASES OF DELGADO VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 145 SCRA 357; REPUBLIC VS. ARRO, 150 SCRA 626 AND
SILVESTRE VS. MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 21, NO. L-46366, MARCH 8, 1978.
II. THE DENIAL OF YOUR PETITIONER'S MOTION TO REINSTATE HER
PETITION FOR REVIEW WOULD PERPETUATE THE SERIOUS AND PATENT
ERRORS COMMITTED BY THE LOWER COURT ESPECIALLY AS TO THE
ALLEGED OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE WITNESSES' DEMEANOR WHEN THE
JUDGE WHO PENNED THE DECISION WAS NOT THE SAME JUDGE WHO
HEARD THE WITNESSES (WHO) TESTIFIED. 2
The petition is devoid of merit.
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. In the court of a justice of the peace a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed
by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be
either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
From the foregoing provision of the rule, it is clear that a party in a case may conduct a litigation
either personally or by an attorney in the courts. He may also be assisted by an agent or friend for
the purpose in the inferior courts. And even if a party may have chosen to appear through counsel,
he may at any time dispense with the services of his/her lawyer and prosecute or defend his/her
case personally.
In this case the Court notes that before the Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court, the
petitioner was duly represented by counsel. However, when she decided to elevate her case to the
Court of Appeals she chose to handle her case personally, first, by asking for an extension of time
within which to file a petition for review and second, by filing thereafter a petition to withdraw the
petition for review to enable her to apply for probation. Unfortunately, under Section 4 of Presidential

Decree No. 1257 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1990 dated October 5, 1985, it is
specifically provided that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted when the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction."
Thus, as petitioner failed to secure favorable action on her application for probation, she filed a
motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the appellate court granting her motion to withdraw
or in the alternative, a petition for relief from judgment alleging that she was not duly assisted by
counsel then and that she was under the honest impression that she could apply for probation, and
that if the motion is granted, petitioner could very well demonstrate that the assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses by the lower court which was relied upon by the Regional Trial Court is
misplaced as the one who decided the case is different from the judge who heard the case.
The said alternative motion for reconsideration or petition for relief from judgment, however, was
filed only on November 17, 1989, beyond the reglementary period. Petitioner received a copy of the
questioned resolution dated October 24, 1989 on October 30, 1989. Hence, said resolution had
become final by the time petitioner filed her motion. Besides, the alternative petition for relief from
judgment is not accompanied by an affidavit of merit as required by the rules. 3
The Court emphasizes the fact that it is always better for a party to be represented by counsel in a
litigation. Nevertheless, it is the right of such party to appear in his or her own behalf to prosecute or
defend a cause in court. If in the process petitioner suffered reverses, she has only herself to blame.
She is bound by the consequences of her own voluntary act.
The judgment of conviction of the petitioner for slight physical injuries inflicted by the petitioner upon
the offended party was arrived at by the Regional Trial Court based on the testimony of the offended
party corroborated by her witnesses and proof of the injury. Such judgment has become final and
petitioner must now face the reality of submitting herself for its execution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 117083 October 27, 1995

LAZARO V. KAVINTA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PRUDENCIO ALTRE CASTILLO, JR., Presiding Judge, Branch 220, Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, and ANTONIO C. FRANCO, respondents.
RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The issue in this special civil action for certiorari is whether public respondent Judge Prudencio Altre
Castillo, Jr., has committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss the complaint
in Civil Case No. Q-94-20532 on the ground that the certification of non-forum shopping required
under Administrative Circular No. 04-941 was, nevertheless, subsequently submitted after the filing of
the motion to dismiss.

The antecedent disclosed by the parties in their pleadings are uncomplicated.

On 11 May 1994, private respondent represented by his attorney-in-fact, Angeles F. Arroyo, filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint against petitioner Lazaro V. Kavinta and
others 2 a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Issuance of Writ of Demolition. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-20532 and was raffled to Branch 220 of said court, which is presided
over by public respondent Judge Castillo.

On 20 June 1994, the petitioner and his codefendants moved to dismiss the complaint 3 on the
ground that "it does not comply with Administrative Circular No. 04-94 of the Supreme Court which took
effect on April 1, 1994."

On 4 July 1994 private respondent filed, through counsel, an opposition to the motion to dismiss, 4 to
which he attached as Annex "A" thereof the certification required in Administrative Circular No. 04-94. 5

On 20 July 1994, Judge Castillo issued an order 6 denying the motion to dismiss in view of the
submission of the aforesaid certification, and directing the defendants to file their answer or responsive
pleading "within the remaining reglementary period in accordance with the Rules of Court."

On 3 August 1994, Judge Castillo issued an order 7 declaring petitioner's Reply to the opposition to the
motion to dismiss moot and academic in view of the order of 20 July 1994.

On 24 August 1994, petitioner filed a motion to reconsider his Reply as a motion for the
reconsideration of the order of 20 July 1994. 8

On 2 September 1994, Judge Castillo issued an order 9 denying the Reply, which was treated as a
motion for reconsideration, and clarifying that

The language of the July 20, 1994 order is very clear and unambiguous. The fifteen
(15) days reglementary period to plead is reckoned from the date defendants,
through counsel, received the notice denying their motion to dismiss.
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 of this Court issued by the Chief Justice on 8 February 1994 and
which took effect on 1 April 1994 pertinently provides:
Revised Circular No. 28-91, dated February 8, 1994 applies to and governs the filing
of petitions in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and is intended to
prevent the multiple filing of petitions or complaints involving the same issues in other
tribunals or agencies as a form of forum shopping.
Complementary thereto and for the same purpose, the following requirements, in
addition to those in pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and existing circulars,
shall be strictly complied with in the filing of complaints petitions, applications or other
initiatory pleadings in all courts and agencies other than the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals, and shall be subject to the sanctions provided hereunder:
1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the complaint,
petition, application or other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such original
pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith, to the truth of the following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not
theretofore commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the
best of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such
action or proceeding which is either pending or may have been terminated, he must
state the status thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report that fact within five
(5) days therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and sworn
certification contemplated herein have been filed.
The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to and subject of this Circular
are the original civil complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.) party
complaint, or complaint-in-intervention, petition, or application wherein a party
asserts his claim for relief.
2. Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the dismissal of the complaint,
petition, application or other initiatory pleading, upon motion and after hearing.
However, any clearly wilful and deliberate forum shopping by any party and his
counsel through the filing of multiple complaints or other initiatory pleadings to obtain
favorable action shall be a ground for summary dismissal thereof and shall constitute
direct contempt of court. Furthermore, the submission of a false certification or noncompliance with the undertakings therein, as provided in Paragraph 1 hereof, shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to disciplinary proceedings
against the counsel and the filing of a criminal action against the guilty party.

In Loyola vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 10 we categorically ruled that the Circular is mandatory as
indicated by the clear language of its paragraph 2. Nevertheless, substantial compliance thereof is
sufficient. Thus:

Substantial compliance with the Circular is sufficient. This Circular expanded or

broadened the applicability of Circular No. 28-91 of this Court. In Gabionza vs. Court
of Appeals [G.R. No. 112547, Resolution of 18 July 1994. 234 SCRA 192] this Court
held that substantial compliance therewith is sufficient for:
It is scarcely necessary to add that Circular No. 28-91 must be so
interpreted and applied as to achieve the purposes projected by the
Supreme Court when it promulgated that Circular. Circular No. 28-91
was designed to serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate an
orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with
such absolute literalness as to subvert its
own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of
procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously
as possible.
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that the Circular requires that it be strictly complied with merely underscores
its mandatory nature in that it cannot be dispensed with or its requirements
altogether disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with
its provisions under justifiable circumstances.
In his opposition to the motion to dismiss, private respondent neither offered any explanation why he
failed to comply with the Circular nor invoked any justifiable circumstance which would relieve him of
the adverse effect of non-compliance. If this Court is to be unbending in its demand for at least a
substantial compliance of the said Circular, the challenged order must have to be set aside.
However, in his motion to dismiss the instant petition, 11private respondent pointed out that the filing of
the required certification was done with dispatch by his counsel upon "realization of the existence of said
circular." He thereby admits his unawareness or ignorance of the Circular at the time he filed his
complaint. We are not unmindful of the fact that Administrative Circular No. 04-94 took effect only on 1
April 1994 and the complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-94-20532 was filed on 11 May 1994. The proximity then of the filing of the complaint to the date of the
effectivity of the Circular may be pleaded as a justifiable circumstance, and the belated filing of the
certification required thereunder may be deemed a substantial compliance therewith. We thus rule pro
hac vice, but not without a whit of reluctance, that this special circumstance in this case could sustain the
action of the respondent Judge. This should not be taken, however, as a precedent. Elsewise stated, the
mere submission of a certification under Administrative Circular No. 04-94 after the filing of a motion to
dismiss on the ground of non-compliance thereof does not ipso facto operate as a substantial
compliance; otherwise the Circular would lose its value or efficacy.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. Petitioner is DIRECTED to file his responsive
pleading in Civil Case No. Q-94-20532 within a period of ten (10) days from notice of this resolution.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 116910 October 18, 1995

INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANGEL V. COLET, MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, ET
AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:
Material hereto are the antecedents mostly taken from the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP 33177, (International Container Terminal Services, Inc., et. al. v. Hon.
Angel V. Colet, et. al.), 1subject of the present petition for review, viz:
On February 3, 1988, the Philippine Ports Authority issued Administrative Order No. 02-88 (A.O. No.
02-88) entitled "Implementing Guidelines on Open Pilotage Service". A.O. No. 02-88 opened
pilotage services in the Philippines to all licensed and accredited harbor pilots regardless of their
non-membership in existing harbor pilots association. 2
The United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "United
Harbor" for brevity) and private respondent Manila Pilots Association (hereinafter referred to as
"Manila Pilots") 3 made representations with then Acting Secretary of Transportation and
Communications, Hon. Rainerio O. Reyes and the Chairman of the Philippine Ports Authority to set aside
the implementation of A.O. No. 02-88 claiming that it violated their exclusive right to provide pilotage
services in the Philippines.

Failing in their efforts to obtain a reconsideration of the said administrative order, "United Harbor"
and private respondent "Manila Pilots" sought to invalidate A.O. No. 02-88 by filing with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining
order against Secretary Reyes, the Philippine Ports Authority, its General Manager, Maximo S.
Dumlao, Jr. and certain "John Does" (Civil Case No. 88-44726).
On October 26, 1989, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 88-44726 in
favor of "United Harbor" and private respondent "Manila Pilots", the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, for all of the foregoing, the petition is hereby granted:
1. Respondents are hereby declared to have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in approving Resolution

No. 869 and in enacting Administrative Order No. 02-88, the subject of which is
"Implementing Guidelines or (sic) Open Pilotage Service;
2. Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 02-88 is declared null and void;
3. The preliminary injunction issued on September 8, 1989 is made permanent; and
4. Without costs.
SO ORDERED. 4
The above decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari and prohibition
which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, as it raised a purely legal question. 5 The dismissal was
appealed to this court by way of a petition for review on certiorari which was denied with finality on June
8, 1992. 6 Notwithstanding the finality of the decision recognizing the exclusive right to pilotage of "United
Harbor" and private respondent "Manila Pilots", petitioner "International Container" took over the pilotage
services at the Manila International Port area 7 on October 28, 1992 by virtue of a contract it entered into
with the Philippine Ports Authority.

As a consequence, "United Harbor" and private respondent "Manila Pilots" filed a series of petitions
in Civil Case No. 88-44726 to hold then Philippine Ports Authority General Manager Rogelio A.
Dayan and "International Container" officials and other persons in contempt of court. The contempt
petitions, however, have not been resolved because the Office of the Solicitor General elevated to
the Supreme Court (docketed as G.R. 107720) the question of whether or not the lower court still
had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petitions for contempt in view of the finality of the decision
in Civil Case No. 88-44726.
Pending resolution of the contempt petitions, private respondent "Manila Pilots" filed another case
against petitioner "International Container" before Branch 32 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
docketed as Civil Case No. 93-66024 for damages suffered by private respondent "Manila Pilots"
between April 19, 1993 and April 29, 1993 as a result of petitioner's usurpation of its sole and
exclusive exercise of harbor pilotage in the South and North Harbors of Manila and Limay,
Bataan, except the Manila International Port area. 8
Similarly, aggrieved by the unjust actuations of petitioner "International Container", and its continuing
refusal to relinquish pilotage services in the Manila International Port area, private respondent
"Manila Pilots" instituted a petition for mandamus, prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction
and damages against petitioner "International Container" before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 66143.
In an Order dated January 20, 1994, the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 93-66143 issued the
writ prayed for, thereby "restoring and reinstating private respondent "Manila Pilots" to the exclusive
exercise of harbor pilotage in the Manila International Port (MIP) area and commanding petitioner
"International Container" to cease and desist from usurping or exercising the right to compulsory
pilotage in the said Manila International Port (MIP) area." 9 Petitioner "International Container" assailed
this order of the lower court by filing a petition for certiorari with respondent court contending, among
others, that the filing of Civil Case No. 93-66143, pending:

1.) Contempt petitions incidents of Civil Case No.

88-44726 The contempt petitions filed by "United Harbor" and private respondent
"Manila Pilots" against petitioner "International Container" and Philippine Ports
Authority for defying the final judgment in Civil Case No. 88-44726;

2.) G.R. No. 107720 The case filed by the Office of the Solicitor General with the
Supreme Court raising the question of jurisdiction of the lower court to take
cognizance of the contempt petitions in view of the finality of the decision in Civil
Case No. 88-44726; and
3.) Civil Case No. 93-66024 The action for damages filed by private respondent
"Manila Pilots" against "International Container" to recover unearned income from the
exercise of harbor pilotage in ports other than the Manila International Port (MIP)
area from April 19, 1993 to April 29, 1993 was violative of the prohibition against
forum shopping. 10 Respondent court found no merit in this contention, and affirmed the
decision of the lower court.

Hence, the main inquiry posed before us: On the basis of the foregoing, is there forum shopping?
Petitioner "International Container" contends that there is forum shopping because "[t]he issue on
(sic) the contempt petition before Judge Flojo 11 and before this Court and (sic) in G.R. No. 107720 is
the very same issue involved in the case for mandamus and prohibition (Civil Case No. 93-66143)". 12 It
further contends that private respondent "Manila Pilots" is guilty of forum shopping because "[a]t the time
the contempt petitions were pending . . . and while these petitions were being challenged . . . (G.R. No.
107720), another case . . . was pending before RTC Manila, docketed as Civil Case No.
93-66024 . . ." 13

We are not persuaded.

The assailed decision is in accordance with the established rule that for forum shopping to exist,
both actions must involve the same transactions, same essential facts and
circumstances. 14 Furthermore, the actions must also raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and
issues. 15 We find no such similarity in the actions involved. Thus, as correctly observed by the
respondent court:

The facts which gave rise to the contempt petition is directed against what was
perceived to be violative of the permanent injunction issued by Judge Flojo not to
implement the open pilotage policy as provided for under PPA Administrative Order
No. 02-88, . . . .
Upon the other hand the complaint in Civil Case No. 93-68143 (sic) is anchored on
the alleged usurpation of the right of respondents on (sic) the sole and exclusive
exercise of Harbor Pilotageonly in the MIP area, from October 29, 1992 up to the
present and the corresponding claim for damages. 16 (Emphasis provided)
Furthermore, G.R. No. 107720 was filed with the Supreme Court solely to question the jurisdiction of
the lower court to take cognizance of the contempt petitions filed in Civil Case No. 88-44726, and the
issue raised therein has no bearing on that raised in Civil Case No. 93-66143.
On the other hand, Civil Case No. 93-66024 sought the recovery of damages in the form of
unearned income as a result of petitioner's usurpation of the right to pilotage of private respondent
"Manila Pilots" in the South and North Harbors of Manila and Limay, Bataan except Manila
International Port area from April 19, 1993 to April 29, 1993 while Civil Case No. 93-66143 was
brought to enjoin petitioner from further usurping the same right of private respondent "Manila
Pilots" in the Manila International Port area only from October 28, 1992 up to the present. Clearly,
these two cases do not have the same facts nor do they raise identical causes of action.

Moreover, "[t]here is forum shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a
party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another". 17 Therefore, a party to
a case resorts to forum shopping because "[b]y filing another petition involving the same essential facts
and circumstances, . . ., respondents approached two different fora in order to increase their chances of
obtaining a favorable decision or action". 18 It cannot be said that private respondent "Manila Pilots"
sought to increase its chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action as a result of an adverse
opinion in one forum, inasmuch as no unfavorable decision had ever been rendered against private
respondent "Manila Pilots" in any of the cases brought before the courts below. On the contrary, private
respondent "Manila Pilots" was one of the prevailing parties in Civil Case No. 88-44726 which established
with finality its exclusive right together with "United Harbor" to provide pilotage services in the Philippines
even prior to the institution of the other actions (G.R.107720, Civil Case No. 93-66024 and Civil Case No.
93-66143.)

ACCORDINGLY, finding no reversible errors, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and
this petition is DENIED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 127393 December 4, 1998

SPOUSES VALENTIN ORTIZ AND CAMILLA MILAN ORTIZ, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES FRANCISCO AND BERNARDINA
RODRIGUEZ, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioners seek a review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 42238 dated October
18, 1996, and its resolution 2 dated December 03, 1996, on the motion for reconsideration, dismissing the
case for failure of the petitioners to comply strictly with the Rules of Court. The appellate court decreed,
thus:

WHEREFORE, for not being sufficient in form and substance, the instant Petition for
Review is hereby DENIED due course and accordingly DISMISSED outright. 3
The factual background of this petition is as follows:
The spouses Francisco and Bernardina Rodriguez, herein private respondents (hereafter the
"Rodriguezes"), filed an action for ejectment in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Paraaque,
Branch 77, against Valentin and Camilla Ortiz, herein petitioners (hereafter the "Ortizes"), who are
lessees of Christopher and Angelica Barramedas, on the ground that they are the real owners of the
house and lot or the subject property. MeTC, Branch 77, awarded the possession of the property in
favor of the Rodriguezes.
The Ortizes appealed the Paraaque MeTC decision to the RTC of Paraaque, Branch 257. On
August 30, 1996, the latter court found no reversible error in the assailed judgment, and thus
affirmed it in toto. On September 27, 1996, the Rodriguezes filed the Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution of judgment, which was opposed by the herein petitioners on October 24, 1996.
Upon the Paraaque RTC's denial of the Opposition to Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, the
petitioners Ortizes appealed to the Court of Appeals ("CA"). The petition was dismissed on the
following grounds: (1) the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by the counsel and not by
the petitioners themselves, and (2) the copy of the RTC decision is not duly certified as a true copy
as required by Sec. 3 (b), Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the CA.. Further, the supposed
duplicate original copy of said decision does not bear the dry seal of the trial court, but merely
stamped "Original Signed," which appears above the name of the judge.
Hence, the petitioners now come before us, and raise the following grounds in support of the
petition:

I. The Court of Appeals in clear contravention of the Rules of Court,

and the rulings inGabionza v. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA
192, Loyola v. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 477 and Kavinta v.
Castillo, 249 SCRA 604 gravely erred in dismissing the Ortizes'
petition for review, and/or in failing to reconsider such dismissal.
II. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to rule on the issue of
lack of jurisdiction of the MTC which had decided the issue of
ownership.
III. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ignoring the issue of forum
shopping raised against the Rodriguezes, and thus sanctioned a
violation of Circular Nos. 28-91 and 04-94. 4
From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents, the main issue for our resolution is:
DID THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 41 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT
AS AMENDED, FOR FAILURE OF PETITIONERS TO FAITHFULLY COMPLY WITH
THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN SC CIRCULAR NO. 28-91
AND SC ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 3-96?
To resolve the issue, it should be recalled that Revised Circular No. 28-91 5 provides that the party
must certify under oath that he has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same
issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency, and that to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency. 6(Emphasis
supplied).

Petitioners admit that their lawyer, Atty. Ma. Filomena Singh-Paulite, signed the Certification on NonForum Shopping. Allegedly, Atty. Paulite has personal knowledge that the Ortizes had not
commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same parties and causes of action.
Petitioners now assert that their lawyer's signature must be accepted as substantial compliance with
the requirements of the Circular.
Regrettably, we find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict
observance as provided for in Circular No. 28-91. The attestation contained in the certification on
non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. To merit the
Court' s consideration, petitioners here must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the
certification. The petitioners must convince the court that the outright dismissal of the petition would
defeat the administration of justice. However, the petitioners did not give any explanation to warrant
their exemption from the strict application of the rule. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
Concerning the second ground for the appellate court's dismissal of the petition, it is required that:
2. The duplicate original copy must be duly signed or initialled by the
authorities or the corresponding officer or representative of the
issuing entity, or shall at least bear the dry seal thereof or any other
official and indication of the authenticity and completeness of such
copy. 7 (Emphasis ours.)

Petitioners contend that they attached the very same duplicate original copy of the decision which
they received from the RTC. Said duplicate original copy of the decision, having come from the trial
court itself, petitioners believed in good faith that, by attaching it to the petition, they would be
considered to have substantially complied with the filing requirements under the law. However, strict
compliance with procedural requirements in taking an appeal cannot be substituted by "good faith
compliance." To rule otherwise would defeat the very purpose of the rules of procedure, i.e., to
"facilitate the orderly administration of justice. 8
Although the petitioners subsequently submitted to the CA the corrected annexes of the Petition for
Review, the respondent court ruled that it did not stop the questioned decision from becoming final
and executory.
The petitioners failed to fully satisfy the CA or this Court that (1) the non-compliance with the
requirements was not in any way attributable to them; (2) they exerted due diligence; and (3) there
are highly justifiable and compelling reasons for the court to make a disposition in the interest of
justice. 9
The Petition for Review filed by the Ortizes' with the CA was an appeal from the RTC in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction. Consequently, the Ortizes should bear in mind that the right to appeal is
not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. 10 The party who seeks to avail of
the same must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is
lost. 11 Rules of procedure are required to be followed, except only when for the most persuasive of
reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. 12

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion committed by public
respondent, the Court resolved to DENY the Petition for Review on Certiorari and AFFIRM the
decision in CA-G.R. CV 42238. COSTS against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.