The Calculus of Individuals and Its Uses

Author(s): Henry S. Leonard and Nelson Goodman

Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Jun., 1940), pp. 45-55
Published by: Association for Symbolic Logic
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LOGIC
Tax JoURNALor Saouc
Volume 5. Number 2, June 190

THE CALCULUS OF INDIVIDUALS AND ITS USES1

HENRY

S. LEONARD

AND NELSON

GOODMAN

I. An individualor wholewe understandto be whateveris representedin any

given discourse by signs belongingto the lowest logical type of which that
discoursemakes use. What is conceivedas an individualand what as a class is
thus relativeto the discoursewithinwhichthe conceptionoccurs. One task of
applied logic is to determinewhich entitiesare to be construedas individuals
and whichas classes when the purpose is the developmentof a comprehensive
systematicdiscourse.
The conceptof an individualand that of a class may be regardedas different
one segmentofthetotal universefromall thatremains.
devicesfordistinguishing
segmentis potentiallydivisible,and may even
In both cases, the differentiated
in the concepts lies in this: that
be physicallydiscontinuous. The difference
to conceive a segmentas a whole or individualoffersno suggestionas to what
these subdivisions,if any, must be, whereas to conceive a segmentas a class
imposesa definiteschemeof subdivision-into subclasses and members.2
The relationsof segmentsof the universeare treated in traditionallogistic
at two places, firstin its theoremsconcerningthe identityand diversityof
individuals,and second in its calculus of membershipand class-inclusion. But
furtherrelationsof segmentsand of classes frequentlydemand consideration.
For example,whatis therelationofthe class ofwindowsto the class ofbuildings?
No memberof eitherclass is a memberof the other,nor are any of the segments
isolated by the one conceptidenticalwithsegmentsisolated by the other. Yet
the classes themselveshave a very definiterelationin that each window is a
part of some building. We cannot expressthisfactin the language of a logistic
whichlacks a part-wholerelationbetweenindividualsunless,by makinguse of
some special physicaltheory,we raise the logical type of each windowand each
buildingto the level of a class-say a class of atoms-such that any class of
atoms that is a windowwill be included (class-inclusion)in some class that is a
building. Such an unfortunatedependence of logical formulationupon the
discoveryand adoption of a special physicaltheory,or even upon the presumptionthat such a suitabletheorycould in everycase be discoveredin the courseof
time, indicates serious deficienciesin the ordinarylogistic. Furthermore,a
raisingof type like that illustratedabove is oftenprecludedin a constructional
systemby otherconsiderationsgoverningthe choice of primitiveideas.
Received July 28, 1939.
1 A somewhat elaborated version of a paper read in Cambridge, Mass., before a joint
meeting of the Association forSymbolic Logic and the American Philosophical Association,
Eastern Division, on December 28, 1936.
2 The relation is somewhat analogous to the more familiar one between classial and
serial concepts, dealing as they do with the same material, but in a manner that makes the
latter more highly specialized.
45

46

HENRY

S. LEONARD

AND NELSON

GOODMAN

The ordinarylogisticdefinesno relationsbetweenindividualsexceptidentity

and diversity. A calculus of individualsthat introducesotherrelations,such as
the part-wholerelation,would obviouslybe veryconvenient;'but what chiefly
concernsus in this paper is the generalapplicabilityof such a calculus tothe
solutionof certainlogico-philosophical
problems.
The calculus of individualswe shall employis formallyindistinguishable
from
the general theoryof manifoldsdeveloped by Lesniewski.4 Leiniewski's purfromours, was to establisha generaltheoryof manifolds
pose, quite different
that would not be subject to Russell's paradox; but sincehe excludesthenotion
of a null class, his formalsystemis virtuallythesame as thatwhichwe interpret
as a calculus of individuals. Inasmuch as his system is ratherinaccessible,
lacks many usefuldefinitions,
and is set forthin the language of an unfamiliar
logical doctrineand in wordsratherthan symbols,we shall attempt(in Part II)
to restate the calculus in more useable form,with additional definitions,a
practicalnotationand a transparentEnglishterminology. In Part III we shall
explainhow this calculus enables us to describegenerallycertainimportant,but
oftenneglectedpropertiesof relations,and therebycontributesto the clarificationofmanyphilosophicalproblems.
II. The generalfeaturesof the abstractcalculus may perhapsbe mostreadily
apprehendedby comparisonwith the Boolean algebra of classes. It involves
operations of addition, multiplication,and negation, a part-wholerelation
analogous to class-inclusionand an elementanalogous to the Boolean universal
fromthe Boolean analogue in ways consequentupon the refusal
class. It differs
to postulate a null element,althoughthe primitiverelationof "discreteness"
may be correlatedwith the Boolean function"x*y= 0".
In the lightof thisanalogy,the characteristicpropositionsofthe calculusmay
be generallydescribed: To any analyticpropositionof the Boolean algebra will
corresponda postulate or theoremof this calculus providedthat, when in the
Boolean propositionevery expressionof the form"x y=0" is replaced by an
expressionof the form"x is discretefromy", no referenceto the null element
remainsand everyproductand negationis eitherdeduciblyunequal to the null
to be unequal to it. From the three
elementor else is conditionallyaffirmed
postulates(presentedbelow) of the formalcalculus,enoughtheoremshave been
deduced to indicate that this characterizationis accurate. Some illustrative
theoremsappear in thesequel.
For the formalestablishmentof the calculus, the symbolismand logisticof
Whiteheadand Russell's Principia mathematics
have been employedin orderto
secure correlationwith other logical doctrines. Only the one primitiveidea
already mentionedis required: the dyadic propositionalfunction,or relation,
written"xly" and hereinterpretedto mean that the individualswhichare its
argumentshave no part in common,that theyare discrete.' In our interpreta3Since this paper was presented, the convenience of such a calculus of individuals has
been well illustrated by Dr. J. H. Woodger's Axiomatic method in biology (1937).
4 In 0 podstawach matematyki (in Polish), Przeglqd filozoficzny,vols. 30-34 (1927-31).
6 Legniewski employs discreteness as his primitive relation in the final version of his
system. See Chapter X of his above-mentioned paper.

CALCULUS OF INDIVIDUALS

47

AND ITS USES

partsand commonpartsneed not necessarilybe spatial parts.

tion,furthermore,
Thus in our applicationsof the calculus to philosophicproblems,two concrete
entities,to be taken as discrete,have not only to be spatially discrete,but also
temporallydiscrete,discretein color,etc., etc.
In terms of the one primitiveidea just described,other concepts may be
definedas follows:
I.01

.Z l y DFZ l

X < Y =Df

I.e., one thingis a part of anotherif whateveris discretefromthe latteris also

discretefromthe former.
? Y
X <<

I.011

Df X < y .

X id Y

This definesproperpartin a familiarsense.

I.02

X O Y =Df (3z) . z < x .z < y

I.e., two things overlap if they have a part in common. As postulate I.13
(below) indicates,overlappingis equivalent to the denial of the primitivediscreteness.
I.03

x Fu

a =Df Z lX

y ea

D, Z

This definesthe heterogeneousrelationof an individual,x, whichis the fusion,

or sum-individual,of a class, a, to that class. An individualis said to stand in
that relationto a class wheneverythingthat is discretefromit is discretefrom
every memberof the class and everythingdiscretefromevery memberof the
that any not null class has a sum,
class is discretefromit. Postulate I.1 affirms
and it is demonstratedin subsequenttheoremsthat the relationheredefinedis a
one-manyrelation,so that we may speak of thesum, or fusion,of any existent
class, a.
I.04

x Nu a

=Df

Z <

X .

/ a
EY

Dy Z < Y

This definesthe relation of an individual which is the nucleus, or productindividual,of a class, to that class. It is structurallysimilarto definitionI.03,
with the part-wholerelationreplacingthe discretenessrelation. Theorem I.56
and subsequent theoremsreveal that forany not-nullclass of individualssuch
that some one individualis a commonpart of everymemberof the class, there
is at least one individualwhichis a nucleus of that class; and that no class has
morethan one nucleus,so that we may speak of thenucleusof the class.
The concepts of fusion and nucleus just definedare not strictly Boolean
concepts,since the Boolean concepts operate withinone logical type, whereas
6
Identityis not definednortaken as primitivesince it is alreadydefinedin our logistic
vehicle,Principiamathematics. Had it been desirable to developthiscalculusin isolation
fromothertreatmentsof logistic,identitycould have been definedas mutual part-whole,
to whichit is equivalentby theoremI.315:

x=

y. -

. x < y. y < x

This isolation,however,seemedundesirablebecause of the uses, as in Part III below,that

we intendedto makeofthecalculus.

48

HENRY S. LEONARD AND NELSON GOODMAN

these relationsare heterogeneous,relatingconceptsof one type with those of

the next highertype. They correspond,however,to the sums and productsof
classes defined in Principia mathematics,*40.01 and *40.02. But whereas
sums and products definedin Principia mathematicsare only applicable to
classes of classes, the notionshere definedare preciselyapplicable to classes of
by means of these non-Booleanrelations that
individuals. It is, furthermore,
analogues to the strictlyBoolean operationsof additionand multiplicationare
definedin I.06 and I.07 (below).
DefinitionI.05 introducestheUniverse,or the universalelement,U, and I.08
definestheoperationofnegation:
I.05

U =Df Fu'V

I.06

X + Y =Df Fu'(txu ty)

I.07

Xy =

1.08

-x

Df

Nu'(tx u ty)
Fu'"(y

=Df

X)7

Throughthe introductionof the non-Booleanfusionand nucleus,propositions

having no Boolean analogues appear in our calculus. Such propositionsstate
more generallaws, of an obvious kind, governingthe Boolean operations,and
fromthem the analogues to the Boolean propositionsare, in fact,deduced as
more or less direct corollaries. Yet although these general relationsof individuals to classes have herebeen used to definethe Boolean operationsand the
could have been given:
universalelement,independentdefinitions
I.05'

.06'

=Df

x +

I.07'

Xy =Df

I.08'

-x

(X)((y)
=Df

y<X)

(Z)(W

Df (Z)(Z

<

WW

Z .-

(7Z)(W
Z

l X. X+

W <
Z =

X . W TLY)

X . W < Y)

U)

Replacementof I.05 to I.08 by these alternativedefinitionswould, of course,

necessitatealterationsin the postulates. It would also resultin the elimination
fromthe calculusof all the highlyimportantnon-Booleanpropositions.
Of the three postulates,the firstallows us to assert the existenceof some
individualwhichis the fusionof a given class wheneverthat class is not null;
the second relates the discretenesscalculus to identity,already definedin
while the thirdin effectstates a generalpropertyof the
Principia mathematica;
primitiverelation:
I.1

(3x) .x ea.

D.

(3y) .yFua8

7The present formof this definitionhas been suggested by the corresponding definition
in Dr. A. Tarski's appendix to Woodger, op. cit.
8 Le?niewski employs only two postulates.
One is identical with our I.13 expanded in
terms of the primitive relation; the other asserts both the existence and uniqueness of the
fusion of any (non-null) class. Our postulate i.1is weaker, since it asserts only the existence of some such individual but not its uniqueness. Accordingly we require also postulate I.12.

CALCULUS

I.12
I-13

<y

OF INDIVIDUALS

y<x

AND ITS

USES

49

X=y

x o y _-(x I

are:
Someillustrative
theorems
I.3

X<Y.Y<z

I.31

x <x

x<z

I.e., "part-whole"
is a transitive
and reflexive
relation. It is non-symmetrical.
I.325

'(X << x)

I.326

x <<Y D

I.328

x << y . y << z . D . x << z

(Y <<x)

I.e., "properpart"is an irreflexive,

asymmetrical,
buttransitive
relation.
I.327

x << Y . Y < z . D . x << z

Theoremslike 1.327may be provenforeverypossiblepermutation

of "part"
and "properpart" excepttheone "x < y.y< z. D.x<<z.

I.331

xo y y o x

I.332

x < y 3Xoy

I.333

xo x

I.53

(3x) . x e a .

I.55

E! Fu'a . D . a C D Fu'a < Fu'

I.556

E! Fu'a . D . a =

.E!

Fu'a
D Fu'a

= Fu'j

Propositionsassertingconditionallythe converse implicationsof those in the

consequentsof I.55.556 are not theoremsof the system. Many distinctclasses
may have the same fusion. For example,let a be the class of tables, #be the
class of table-tops,and 'y be the class of frames(includinglegs, drawersetc.) of
tables. It is plain that
a n ( u)

That is, a and ,3u yare distinctclasses and no memberof one is a memberof the
other. Yet theyisolate the same part of the total universe:
Fu'a = Fu'(Q u ey)
in the mannerof subdivisionthat theyprescribeforthat part.
They differ
Sample theoremsconcerningthe existenceand uniquenessof the nucleusof a
class and the negate ofan individualare:
I.56

(p' < "a)

I.57

xNua.zNua

A.D(3x).xNua
D.
=D

50

HENRY

I.58

(p' < ")

I.59

(3y) . y

S. LEONARD

# A

x.

AND NELSON

GOODMAN

D E! Nu'a

El-x

As special cases of generaltheoremsconcerningfusionswe have:

I.6

E!x+y

I.62

x + y=y

I.66

(x + y) + z = x + (y + z)

+ x

Theorems analogous to the above may be demonstratedfor "xy", but oniy

conditionallyupon the assumptionthat "x o y", or,what is equivalent,"E!xy".
Analogues to DeMorgan's formulaappear under interestingconditions. For
example,
I.85

xoy .x $ U . y # U. D .xy=-(-x

+ -y)

thebody ofsymboliclogic,the calculusofconcepts

III. Besides supplementing
withcertainrelational
of lowesttype equips us to exhibitand deal efficaciously
sometimesto thedetriment
propertieswhichare oftenignoredor misunderstood,
of constructionalundertakingslike Carnap's LogischerAufbauder Welt.9
Consider,forexample,the relation"met with"; we cannotdefinethe ordinary
meaningof propositionsto the effectthat threeor morepeople all met together
by requiringthat everypair met; foreach pair may have metseparately,without
all threeever having met together. Or again, Johnand James may be lodgeand John and Arthurbe
brothers,and James and Arthurbe lodge-brothers,
withoutall threebeing brothersin any one lodge.'0 Even the
lodge-brothers,
commonplacepropositionthat a color,C, is, as we customarilysay, "at place P
at time T" is not impliedby the propositionthat C is at place P and at time T.
In each of these cases we encountera relationwhichis significantin varying
degrees; as dyadic, triadic,tetradic,and so on. The relation"met with", for
example,may obtain betweentwo people, among three,amongfour,and indeed
among any number. Such a relationwithoutany fixeddegreemay be called a
"multigrade"relation."
Customarymethodsof treatingthe logic of relationswill admit of no simple
introductionof multigraderelations,for these methods presume that an exhaustive and exclusiveclassificationof relationscan be set up in termsof their
definitedegree. Two alternativeinterpretations
will,however,providefortheir
introductionin a mannerconsistentwith this presumption. Either they may
be construedas each a seriesof relations,the successivemembersof whichhave
successivelyhigherdegrees,or theymay be construedas predicatestakingclasses
of variousmagnitudesfortheirarguments.
is strictlyapplicableonlyin the case ofa multigrade
The secondinterpretation
I Berlin, 1928. See especially sections 67-93, pp. 108-120. This work is subsequently
referredto as the Aufbau.
10 The following discussion of the problem here illustrated is that referred to by W. V.
Quine in Relations and reason, Technology review, vol. 41 (1939), pp. 325, 327n.
11A unigrade relation is a relation of any one degree; a multigrade relation is one having
at least two differentdegrees.

CALCULUS OF INDIVIDUALS AND ITS USES

51

relationthat is thoroughlysymmetrical. In othercases, it mustbe modifiedin

the mannerindicatedbelow (p. 53). Since, however,the relationsthat we shall
firstconsiderare all of themthoroughlysymmetrical,
we adopt this interpretation in the sequel.
But whicheverview of multigraderelationsis preferred,
the notable feature
of the examplespreviouslygiven,althoughit does not attach to all multigrade
relationsby any means,is that a givendegreeof the relationor predicatecannot
be reduced,by the use of none but the commonlyrecognizedlogical devices, to
its lowerdegrees. It is wherethisreductionis impossiblethat a crucialproblem
forconsiderationsof economy,togetherwiththe
confrontsthe constructionalist;
special conditionsof his problemin hand, will ordinarilycause the constructionalistto rejectas primitivesofhis systemany predicatetakinganythingother
otherthan individualsas arguments,any wholehierarchyof relations,and any
uppermostmemberof such a hierarchy(shouldit be finite)whenthe identification of that upper limit requires postponementof the formal development
pending the detailed investigationof contingentmattersof fact. Thus he is
confrontedwith a dilemma: if multigraderelationsbe admittedwithoutinterpretation,thenthe standardlogic of relations,developedin termsof a classification of relationsaccordingto degree, is inapplicable to them,but if they are
admitted by using eitherinterpretationsuggestedabove, then oftenthey are
not themselvesand cannot be reduced to acceptable primitives.
The mannerin whichthe calculus of individualsmay be enlistedto simplify
the primitivesneeded, to display the connectionbetweenthe different
degrees
of the relationor predicate,and to expressthe distinctionin meaningbetween
saying,forexample,that threemen all met togetherand sayingthat each two
met severally,can best be illustratedby a slightlymore complicatedexample
than any of thoseyet given.
Suppose we have as elementsa set of threecolumns,each coloredwith three
bands, as picturedin the accompanyingdiagram,and suppose that the relation
S is such that "xSy" means that in some one band-lower, middle,or upperthe two entitiesx and y are identicallycolored (in the sense that no color in
fromany one colorin that band in the
that band eitherin x or in y is different
other). It is clear that S is a relationlike those already considered;that we
may have threecolumns,like the ones pictured,such that aSb, bSc, and aSc,
even thoughall threecolumnshave no singlecolorin any one band.

The capital lettersrepresent

distinctshades of color

52

HENRY

S. LEONARD

AND NELSON

GOODMAN

However,nothingin our specificationof S preventsit fromtakingas relata,

not only single columns,or elements,but also those entitiesthat are sums of
the elements;the expression"xSy+z" has the perfectlyclear and unambiguous
meaningthat x and y+z are identicallycolored,in the sense described,at some
level. In the illustrationgiven, therefore,"aSb+c" is false, for at whatever
level we look, eithera and b+c have entirelydifferent
colors,or else a is unicolored while b+c is bi-colored,and the conditionfor the holdingof S is not
satisfiedin eithercase. The proposition"xSy+z" will thus hold only if x and
y+z-and, therefore,x, y and z-have a single, identical color at some one
level; and accordinglythe triadicdegreeof the relationmay be definedby the
The principle involved is generally extensible to any
function "xSy+z."
degree;hence we may definethe class-predicate,S', applicable to classes having
any finitenumberof members,as follows:
S'(C)

= Df

# A

$- A .

n 'y = A

. A

u -y C a . Do,, . Fu'j S FuOy

That is, "S'(c)" means that for every two discretesubclasses, if and fy,of a,
the fusionof ,3 has the relationS to the fusionof fy.
Because the particularrelation,S, chosenhappensto have a certainproperty
later to be definedand called "interdissectiveness,"
the expressions"xSy+z,"
"ySx+z," and "zSx+y" are all equivalent,and are equivalentto "S'({x,y,zj)."
Taking advantage of this property,we can simplifyour general definitionto
read as follows:
S'(C)

=Df

(3,O)p

i n y= A

u fly= a

Fu'i3 S Fu'-y

That is, "S'(a)" means that the relation S holds betweenthe fusionsof some
two mutuallyexclusiveand exhaustivesubclasses of a.12
The meaning,then,of saying that x has the relationS to y and z together,
not merelyseverally,is given by the expression"xSy+z"; and the same treatment is applicable to the other relationsthat we noted earlier. That a man
Smith met with Jonesand Brown togethermeans that he met with the entity
whichis the sum of the two. The sum will not be a person,of course,but is a
definablethoughdiscontinuouswhole. For a colorto be "at a place at a time"
is forit to be' at that entitywhichis comprisedof both, the place plus the time,
or in otherwords,at the place-time. Likewisefora man to be a lodge-brother
of two otherstogetheris forhim to be a lodge-brother
of theirsum.
But caution is necessary here: the suggested treatmentmay be employed
only when the relationin question is one, like our S, that takes as relata not
merelyatomic elements,but also sums of theseelements,and the interpretation
of the relationmust be constantirrespectiveof the particularrelata satisfying
12 The twodefinitions
just proposedare equivalentonlyforcases in whichthecardinality
of theargument,a, is greaterthanorequal to two. The firstdefinition
makes"S'(a)" true
whenthe cardinalityof a is less than two,whilethe secondmakesit false underthesame
circumstances. This difference,
however,restsupon trivialcases that may be decided by
considerationsof conveniencein dealing withthe particularsubject-matterand problem
in hand; and eitherdefinitionmay be easily adjusted to accord withwhateverdecisionis
made.

CALCULUS

OF INDIVIDUALS

AND

ITS

USES

53

it in a particularcase. If, for instance, "lodge-brother"be understoodas a

relationholdingsolely among individualpersons,we could not speak of a man
of the sum of two otherpersons. We should thenhave
being the lodge-brother
to employ as our primitivea broader relation,say "lodge-affiliate,"
which is
not thus restrictedand in termsof whichthe narrowerrelationcould be defined.
The general nature of the technique employed in the precedinganalyses
mightbe describedas follows.
Given foranalysis a multigraderelation,its dyadic cases are abstractedand
taken as a primitivedyadic relation. The multigraderelation itself,representedin the illustrationjust givenby S', is thendefinitionally
introducedas the
predicateofa class. No restriction
is put upon the cardinalityof the argumentclasses that satisfy it. The definiensof the multigradepredicate involves
referencesto the primitivedyadic case of the relationin question. But many
of the argumentsassigned in the definiensto this dyadic case are describable
only by the use of conceptsdeveloped in the calculus of individuals;generally
theyare sums of individualsor fusionsof classes of individuals.
(The generaltreatmentjust describedwould have to be slightlymodifiedin
the case of a multigraderelationthat is not whollysymmetrical. "To murder"
and "to annoy" are multigrade,inasmuchas one personmay murderor annoy
another,or several personsmay cooperate togetherin these actions; but not
inasmuchas interchanging
whollysymmetrical,
termsdesignatingthe murdered
man and one of the accompliceswill not generallyresultin a propositionequivalent to the original. All multigraderelationsare, however,at least partially
symmetrical. For example,argumentsdesignatingthe accomplicesin a murder
may be interchanged
at willwithoutaffecting
the truth-valueof the propositions
under consideration. Such multigraderelationsmay be definitionallyintroduced as heterogeneousrelationsbetweenthe class of the interchangeableindividuals and the others.)
That our generaltechniqueenables us to introducemultigraderelationsin a
mannerconformablewith the guiding principlesof constructionalism
already
suggested(on page 51), is due to the fact that a+b is a conceptof the same
logical type as a and b themselves,and moregenerallythat the fusionof a class,
a, is a conceptof the same logical type as the membersof a. Thus "aRb+c,"
and "Fu'aRFu'#3"expressdyadic relationsof individuals;they are expressions
of the form"xRy" in whichthe individualsconcernedhappen to be referredto
by moreexplicitdescriptions. Thereforeour generaldefinition,
forexample of
the predicateS', has as its definiensa logical functionof a strictlydyadic relation of individuals.
It may now be noticedthat if the generaltechniquejust outlinedhad been
used in defininga "quality-class"in the systemof Carnap's Aufbau,the gravest
defectsoftheearlyconstructions
would have been avoided. For theabstraction
of these quality classes is supposed to be accomplishedthroughthe use of a
relationof similaritythat is, in all relevantrespects,like the relationS of the
precedingillustration. And the defectsin the constructionconsistin, or result
from,mistakenlysupposing that a class of thingseach memberof which is
similarto each otheris a class of thingswhichare all similar.

54

HENRY

S. LEONARD

AND NELSON

GOODMAN

What our procedureaccomplishesis the analysisof any such complicatedand

easily mishandledspecial conceptas S' into a much simplerspecial conceptand
the generalrelationof discreteness,which is apart fromany particularsystem
and is applicable wherevera problemof multigraderelationsarises. The proband of the colored
lems of the men who met together,of the lodge-brothers,
columnsare met in each case by employinga special simple relationtogether
with the general discretenessrelation. To adopt a complicated predicate of
classes as primitivein each case would be to foregoan analysis whichdiscloses
the identityof the logical problempresentin all these cases.
The details of the solutionsof constructionalproblemsof the general character of those illustratedwill vary with the specificpropertiespossessed by the
relationsin question,especiallythose propertiesthat the calculus of individuals
assists us to comprehendand define. The relationsso far consideredhave all
that is, have not had the propertydefinedin D5 below.
been non-agglomerative,
This was the featurethat made impossiblethe definitionof the higherdegrees
of any of these relationsin termsof the lower,so long as the atomic elements
alone were considered. On the other hand, all these relationswere also not
merely dissective-conformingto D6-but were even interdissective-conto D7; and it was forthisreasonthat "aSb+c," "bSa+c," and "cSa+b"
forming
were equivalent.
I
Many furtherpropertiesof relationsand predicatesmay be defined,and may
prove importantin connectionwith other problems. A few of the more interestingof these propertiesare definedas follows:
D1

R is internalif x R y

D2

R is externalif x R y Dxv x I

DX

vx o y
Y

A good deal of the traditionaldiscussionconcerninginternaland externalrelations mightbe clarifiedby considerationof these two simple,but systematic,
definitions. The relationof a part to a whole and of a quality to the object
that it qualifiesare examples of internalrelations. Things with no common
propertiesand withdiverslocationsin space and time are in generalexternally
related.
D3

R is expansiveif x R y x,,,.x R y + z

Part-wholeand overlappingare expansive relations.

D4

R is cumulativeif x R y . x R z . bXy, a.x R y + z

Any expansiverelationis cumulative,but the converseis not always true. Discreteness,forexample,and the converseof part-wholeare cumulativewithout
beingexpansive.
D5

ifxRy.xRz.yRz. y R
Ris agglomerative

z,,

xRy+z

Every cumulative-and hence also everyexpansive-relation is agglomerative,

but the converseis not true. The relationsof similarityand of meetingthat
and hence
we analysedin the earlierpages of this articleare non-agglomerative,

CALCULUS

OF INDIVIDUALS

AND

ITS

USES

.55

non-cumulativeand non-expansive. The converseof "properpart of"-defined

above in I.011 (p. 47)-is agglomerativebut not cumulative and hence not
expansive.
D6

R is dissectiveif x R y . z <y.y

.x R z

The converse of the part-wholerelation is dissective. Also the relation S,

analysedabove, is dissectiveon the tacit assumptionthat theoriginalelementsa, b, and c in the illustration-are to be construedas unanalysableinto proper
parts.
D7

ifx R y . w < x + y . z < x + y

R is interdissective

.3,..w

Rx

relationis dissective,but the converseis not always true.

Every interdissective
The relationS, analysed above, is interdissective. The converseof part-whole
is dissectivebut not interdissective.
by definingall thevariants
It wouldbe possibleto extendthislistofdefinitions
of the above propertiesthat could be distinguishedthroughthe possible nonif
symmetryof the relation involved. For example, R is counterexpansive
xRyD.,1.5x+zRy. There are seventeensuch variants of the propertydefined
in D5. When the relationis symmetrical,the variants will be equivalent to
the propertiesdefinedabove. Also certainof these propertiesare only special
applications to relations of propertiesthat might be definedfor predicates
generally;forexample, 0 is expansiveif 0(y): Dy.,(y+z).
IV. The utilityof the proposedcalculus of individualsis by no means limited
to its usefulnessin treatingthe problemsconsideredin this paper. Because it
is simple in structure,because its primitiveand definedideas closely parallel
relation (namely, "partintuitivenotions,because its major non-symmetrical
otherthan membership
it
relationships
because
introduces
is
whole") transitive,
and classes, and
individuals
"nucleus
between
of")
(namely, "fusion of" and
especiallybecause it providesmeans fortreatingmanyvaried entitiesby means
of conceptsof a singlelogical type,the calculus of individualsis a powerfuland
expedient instrumentfor constructionalwork. In addition it performsthe
importantserviceof divorcingthe logical concept of an individualfrommetaphysicaland practicalprejudices,thus revealingthat the distinctionand interand that
relationof classes and wholesis capable of a purelyformaldefinition,
both concepts,and indeed all the concepts of logic, are available as neutral
analysisof the world. Then, forexample,it becomes
toolsforthe constructional
clear that the practice of supposing that thingsare what the x's and y's of
Principia mathematicsdenominate and that qualities are necessarily to be
interpretedas logical predicates thereof,rather than vice versa, is purely a
matterof habit. The disputebetweennominalistand realistas to what actual
entitiesare individuals and what are classes is recognizedas devolvingupon
convenienceratherthan upon metaphysicalnecessity.
mattersof interpretative
DURHAM,

NORTH

AUBURNDALE,

CAROLINA

MASSACHUSETTS