INTER-UNIVERSITY SEMINAR ON ASIAN MEGACITIES: ASIAN URBANISM AND BEYOND

15-17 August 2013

Mega Urban Projects in Small Economies:

The Case of Mauritius
Autar Bhotish Awtar
Department of Urban Planning, Tsinghua University
School of Architecture #400(S), Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084
bhotish@hotmail.com, (86) 13521324121
Abstract
Mauritius is an island in the Indian Ocean. With about 1.2 million inhabitants, it has
grown tremendously with the diversification in its economy since the 1980's. In the
last decade, both the public and private sector have announced numerous mega
projects. This paper explores how the public sector of Mauritius has dealt with mega
urban projects. The characteristics of the Mauritian small and vulnerable economy are
explored and the question of mega projects affordability is posed. The ups and downs
of mega urban projects are discussed and their success/failure are analysed. In
addition, large infrastructure projects like highways, dams and light rail transit project
will have a very consequent burden on the public spending. Private sector investment
in national scale urban projects is briefly discussed. This paper concludes that the
smallness of the Mauritian economy. This paper concludes that the smallness of the
Mauritian economy, the reliance on overseas public private partnership, government
alternations and institutional lack of know-how and mismanagement have hindered
the realization of several mega urban projects.
Keywords: Mauritius, Small State Economy, Mega Urban Projects
Introduction
The Island of Mauritius is 1865 km2 in area. It is located about 900 km east of coast
of Madagascar and some 2,000 km from the coast of Mainland Africa. The majority
of the immigrant population is of Indian descent and the local lifestyle is a mixture
Indian, African, Chinese and European cultures.
The Republic of Mauritius had an enumerated population of 1,257,900 in 2011 with
about 1,200,000 residing on the island1. In 2012 the country had a GDP of $11.5
billion (current US$). It had a much better socio-economic performance than its
CSO 2012, 2011 Housing Census- Main Results: Island of Mauritius had 97% of the Republics
population (1,217,175), Island of Rodrigues counted 40,440 people, and Agalega Island had a
population of only 285.

INTER-UNIVERSITY SEMINAR ON ASIAN MEGACITIES: ASIAN URBANISM AND BEYOND

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Sub-Saharan counterparts, with GNI of $8,900 per capita (current US$), or PPP GNI
of $15,600 GNI per capita (international $)2. Mauritius is classified as an upper
middle income group country by the World Bank.
Mauritius has an life expectancy of 73 years3 at birth and the country had a HDI
score of 7.24, compared with an average of 4.6 in the Sub-Saharan African region. For
many years, it has been top-ranked in Doing Business in Africa5 and the Ibrahim
Index of African Governance6.
These indicators point to a well-regarded African society and economy. And from this
perspective, this paper explores whether mega projects that has been announced or
under construction are sustainable in this small island economy.
Mega Urban Projects since 2000
Ebene Cybercity: The Block Buster
Inaugurated by Mauritian Prime Minister Anerood Jugnauth in 2002 and
re-inaugurated by his Indian counterpart Dr. Manmohan Singh in 2005 due to the
substantial contribution of India towards its realisation, the Cyber Tower was the
landmark building in the new campus-style business park that was set to be the
Silicon Valley of the region with a focus on ICT related enterprises.
The Ebene Cybercity is spread over an area of about 70 ha. It is divided into zones
each comprising plots of about 1 ha which are available on long term lease and
provided with all infrastructure and fibre optic telecom facilities7.
Initially the Cybercity, planned by an Indian firm, was intended to have buildings with
height restrictions of 3-4 storeys with 12-storeyed Cyber Tower as the landmark
building in the centre of the campus8 (see top of Figure 1). Thus, early buildings like
the Emtel World9 are just some four stories high. However the demand pressure for
the office space was so great, that the height restriction had to be relieved. Currently,
most of the buildings in the Cybercity are of comparable height with the landmark
Cyber Tower.
2

IMF figures (rounded up). http://www.imf.org/, data retrieved on 28th June 2013
Source: UN Statistics, from WorldBank.org
4
Human Development Index; Source: http://hdr.undp.org
5
World Bank, Doing Business 2013.
6
Mo Ibrahim Foundation, Ibrahim Index of African Governance 2012- Summary.
7
Online source: www.e-cybercity.mu, accessed on June 2013
8
Personal communication with Mr S. Soborun, Senior Town & Country Planning Officer, from
Planning Division, Ministry of Housing and Lands, Interview held on 29 th January 2013
9
Head office building of Emtel, a local mobile phone and internet service provider
3

INTER-UNIVERSITY SEMINAR ON ASIAN MEGACITIES: ASIAN URBANISM AND BEYOND

15-17 August 2013

Figure 1: Ebene Cybercity in 2004 (top) and 2013 (bottom)10

Figure 1 shows satellite images of the Ebene Cybercity in 2004 and in 2013. The
rapid office building development is evident and the mushrooming of other projects in
the surrounding areas can also be observed. These include shopping centres, hotels,
university campuses, financial services and banking head offices, real estate firms,
ministerial and other governmental offices, inter alia.

10

Images from Google Earth

INTER-UNIVERSITY SEMINAR ON ASIAN MEGACITIES: ASIAN URBANISM AND BEYOND

15-17 August 2013

The Ebene Cybercity mega project, which was planned with a campus-style business
park, had ended up being a highly demanded high rise and mixed purposed office
park. This success can be attributed to few factors including its closeness to the
conurbation and large resident employees, and a new attractive type of sub-urban
environment which together have transformed Ebene green-field to a major
employment centre in just a decade.
The transformation of Ebene from a green-field into a major employment centre in
just a decade can be attributed foremost to its central geographic location and the
attractive sub-urban working environment that it provides.
The Ebene Cybercity project has developed in a concentric progressive manner. First,
the 70 ha plot was equipped with all infrastructure including the connection with an
international submarine optical cable network11. When the Cyber Tower opened it
acted as a node to catalyse the development of the whole area. In a second phase,
other Mauritian-owned BPO companies and international firms established operations,
and this increased the gravitational pull of the Cybercity.
During the third phase, other businesses including governmental services set their
bases in this new type of suburban office environment. As Ebene Cybercity
established itself as an employment centre, low rise residential developments
mushroomed in its peripheries and later, high-rise-high-end residential projects were
erected within 2-3 km range12.
National projects have reckoned the importance of the Ebene Cybercity. The planned
Mauritius Light Rail Transit system will take an important deviation to pass near the
Cyber Tower. So will the new Terre Rouge-Verdun-Ebene Highway which links the
north to the centre of Mauritius, by-passing the congested capital city, Port Louis (see
Figure 6).
Highlands New Town: Mega Wishful Thinking
In 2001, the government had acquired some 4,500 ha13 of sugar cultivated land from
a South African sugar group14 around the Highlands region. The State Land
11

The SAFE/SAT-3 network

For example Le Prestige Luxury Apartments at Sodnac and L Merrit Epilsis Condominium at
Trianon.
13
Around 4500 hectares or 10,600 Arpents (a popular local unit 1 arpent= 0.422 ha).
14
The Illovo Deal occurred in 2001, when the South African Illovo Sugar Group, sold its entire asset
to a Mauritian consortium, of which the government held 35% of the shares.

12

INTER-UNIVERSITY SEMINAR ON ASIAN MEGACITIES: ASIAN URBANISM AND BEYOND

15-17 August 2013

Development Company (SLDC) was set up to take the charges of the development of
these lands for residential, commercial and other agricultural purposes. By 2004, the
Highlands New Town has conceptualised by the government.

Figure 2: Land Use Plan for Highlands New Town by Halcrow (2004)15
Figure 2 shows the land use master plan by Halcrow Group. A new city covering
1,060 ha was planned, including an artificial lake covering 140 ha, created by a new
dam. The project was set to become the new knowledge hub and government
administrative centre of the country. However, in 2005 the government in office
would lose the general election and the project would be shelved for a couple of years.
In 2006, the new governments Minister of Finance, Sithanen would refuel the
ambition to implement this mega project. Sithanen said, The development proposed
at Highlands is expected to catalyse economic, social and tourism development within
Mauritius, enabling the country to make a quantum change in its economic

15

Source: State Land Development Company 2004:5

INTER-UNIVERSITY SEMINAR ON ASIAN MEGACITIES: ASIAN URBANISM AND BEYOND

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integration with the world at large16.

The project would require an investment of about $ 3 billion17 and private partnership
was required to construct and promote this mega project, in a span of 3 to10 years18.
The PPP scheme proposed required the private partner to fully develop buildings,
infrastructure and utilities on some 200 ha (about 220,000 m2 floor area19) free of
charge for the government. In return the promoter would develop the remaining 720
ha as per concept plan, and sell or lease to cover cost and earn profits.20
In 2009, one lead promoter had to be selected between Mahindra Developers from
India and Bloom from UAE, however, the selection was never made21. In 2011, the
Prime Minister Ramgoolam announced that the Highlands New Town was definitely
set aside22. Three main reasons were given for his decision.
Firstly, it was a matter of an inequitable share of benefits between the private
developer and the government23. Secondly, the PM mentioned that Port Louis, the
capital city, is the centre nerveux du pays24 and should remain the administrative
capital of Mauritius. Moving the employment centre to Highlands would create a
socio-cultural vacuum in Port Louis25.
Thirdly, he affirms that the project incubated in the first place to resolve the traffic
congestion problems around Port Louis26. However, construction of the Ring Roads
around the city had started, and besides, the construction of a LRT system linking Port
Louis to Curepipe would start in 2014. If jobs and subsequently, housing are moved to
Highlands, then these projects have no raison dtre.
16

Cited in Le Mauricien News, appeared on October 2008,

http://lemauricien.com/mauricien/081002/ac.HTM#2
17
Finance Minister Sithanen quoted Rs 100 billion required, cited in LExpress New, appeared online
on 19th October 2008; http://www.lexpress.mu/Services/archive_116485_PROJET-HIGHLANDS
18
Government Information Service, accessed on June 2013,
http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/cso?content_id=8ee295756a68f010VgnVCM1000000a04a8c0RCRD
19
LExpress New, appeared online on 19th October 2008;
http://www.lexpress.mu/Services/archive_116485_PROJET-HIGHLANDS
20
SLDC 2007, Expression of Interest for the Urban and Knowledge Industry development project at
Highlands, Mauritius.
21
Le DefiMedia News, appeared online on 22nd November 2011,
www.defimedia.info/news-sunday/nos-news/item/1311-highlands-mega-project-set-aside.html
22
Le Defi Media News, appeared online on 18th November 2011,
www.defimedia.info/defi-quotidien/dq-actualites/item/1071-abandon-du-projet-de-la-ville-intgre--h
ighlands-devient-un-parc-de-casinos.html
23
It was estimated that the developer would investment only Rs 3.8 billion, in return the land offered
to them evaluated at Rs 19.5 billion. Source:Ibid.
24
French for central nervous system of the country
25
PM Ramgoolam cited in Ibid.
26
Ibid

INTER-UNIVERSITY SEMINAR ON ASIAN MEGACITIES: ASIAN URBANISM AND BEYOND

15-17 August 2013

Jin Fei Industrial Town: The Chinese Ghost Town

In 2006, the Mauritian government had embarked with a Chinese consortium27 to
construct the Jin Fei Economic & Trade Cooperation Zone. It was the biggest
integrated project in Mauritius, and was presented as Mainland Chinas springboard to
the African continent market. Prime Minister Ramgoolam announced that the project
would require an investment of some $ 750-820 million and would create 34,000
direct jobs and 8,000 indirect jobs after its development (phased between 2008 and
2015) would be completed28.
Unfortunately, Jin Fei has been one the greatest flops of the Mauritian mega projects
and is currently a ghost town. The Mauritian government acquired some 211 hectare29
of land near the port region and leased them on very low fees to the Chinese
promoters. The industrial park of Jin Fei was planned to accommodate the operation
of around 40 Chinese companies, manufacturing a wide range of products.30
In terms of urban development, the Mauritian government had to take care of the
infrastructure such as electricity, water, wastewater and roads, while the Chinese
promoters would invest in other works. The promoters wished to complete the project
within by 2015, with a 34-storey land mark building (highest building in Mauritius),
with hotels, conference centres, and multipurpose facilities. Some 600,000 m2
warehouses were to be built, and in addition to industrial and cultural facilities.
Figure 3 (top) shows the area of land leased to the Chinese promoters. The below
images juxtapose a rendering of the new town by 2015, and the current situation on
2013. By December 2012, only 4 ha31 of the total 211 ha of land allocated to the
promoter had been developed32.

27

The Taiyuan Iron & Steel Co.(50%), Shanxi Coking Coal (30%) and Tianli Group (20%).Mauritius
Board of Investment, cited in China Daily News, appeared online on 17 th February 2009,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2009-09/17/content_8702540.htm
28
S750 million cited in China Daily News, appeared online 18 th February 2009,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-02/18/content_7487419.htm; and $820 million cited in
China Daily News, appeared online on 17th September 2009,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2009-09/17/content_8702540.htm
29
70 hectare in phase one (2008 to 2010) and 141 hectare in phase two (2010 onwards), Source: Le
Matinal News, appeared in
http://www.accommodation.io/index.php?view_page=news&acticle=145&lang=1
30
source: Le Matinal News, appeared in
http://www.accommodation.io/index.php?view_page=news&acticle=145&lang=1
31
Le Defi Media, appeared online 27th December 2012,
http://business.mega.mu/2012/12/27/jin-fei-project-10-acres-developed-522-granted-chinese/
32
A light steel manufacturing firm and a ranch-styled Chinese Hotpot restaurant are among the few
establishments on the site, surrounded by brown fields.

INTER-UNIVERSITY SEMINAR ON ASIAN MEGACITIES: ASIAN URBANISM AND BEYOND

15-17 August 2013

Figure 3: Land Area leased to Jin Fei Mega Project (top), Rendering of the Jin
Fei in 2015 (bottom left) and actual image of Jin Fei Site (bottom right)33
The government finally realised the undesirable turn of events and explained that,
Chinese firms diverted their investments to other African countries. Jaddoo34
explained that while Mauritius was establishing itself as a platform to enter the
African market, the platform had already been set up inside Mainland Africa and it
did not make sense for Chinese enterprises to manufacture in Mauritius and export to
Africa35.
It can be concluded the failure of Jin Fei lied in the over rating of Mauritius as a
manufacturing hub for the African market, and also the Chinese-style mega scale
33

Source: Images compiled by Author; Satellite images are snapshots of Google Earth, and rendering
(bottom left) is from media source: Le Matinal News, appeared in
http://www.accommodation.io/index.php?view_page=news&acticle=145&lang=1
34
Ex-director of Mauritius Board of Investment
35
LExpress News, in an interview appeared on c. April 2012,
www.lexpress.mu/article/raju-jaddoo-il-faut-ouvrir-jin-fei-aux-autres-investisseurs

INTER-UNIVERSITY SEMINAR ON ASIAN MEGACITIES: ASIAN URBANISM AND BEYOND

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development that the promoters could bring to Mauritius in a period of 5 to 7 years

was not tailored to suit a small economy island.
Les Salines Neotown: Mega Project in Coma
In March 2010, an Indian developer, Patel Engineering Ltd was awarded some 24 ha
of land fronting the city port, at Les Salines. Its Managing Director, Mr Patel said in a
press release: Our aim is to encourage the establishment of Port Louis as the
commercial capital of the Indian Ocean region, which will position Mauritius as the
Gateway to Africa36.
Indeed, the project required an investment of $ 500 million in the first phase, creating
920,000 m2 of new floor space in the capital city, and expected to create 10,000 new
jobs upon completion37. Neotown was developed with the concept of leisure, culture,
business and lifestyle, and would encompass developments such as apartment
complexes, office buildings, shopping malls, hotels, casinos, entertainment area,
marinas, tourist heritage centres, and others.38 The developer aimed to complete the
project in around 201739.
In addition of integrating to the commercial and cultural landscape of the capital city,
Neotown was to form an integral part of the port activities. Besides, Neotown will be
crossed by the upcoming Harbour Bridge40, thus increasing its importance in the Port
Louis scene (see Figure 4).
Soon in mid 2011, the Neotown Mega Project would turn into a Mega Scandal.
Firstly, it was known that the developers were paying a lease fee of only $ 500,000
yearly, which is only 0.01% of the land value (worth $ 500 million)41. Secondly, the
developer convinced the government to make legislative amendments to give them 99
years of lease over the land, instead of 30 years permissible by law42. Thirdly, the
government accepted to remove all existing urban design restrictions and guidelines
36

Press release dated 29th March 2010: http://www.neotown.mu/press.html

Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Mr. Patel, MD of Patel Engineering cited in The Economic Times (Indian newspaper) on 26 th March
2010;
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-03-26/news/28455855_1_patel-engg-patel-engineer
ing-mega-project
40
A bridge crossing over the harbour from North to South, also known as the Dream Bridge, long 2.7
km of which some 450 m above the harbor waters.
41
LExpress news, appeared online on 4th June 2011;
www.lexpress.mu/article/neotown-un-mga-scandale-pour-un-mga-projet--les-salines-dans-la-rgi
on-de-caudan
42
Ibid.
37

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imposed locally, thus, unrestricting the developer over building heights and plot area
ratio43.

Figure 4: Artist Rendering of Les Salines Neotown44

Despite all the freebies to the promoter, development was very slow to come on site at
Les Salines. In July 2012, the Ministry of Housing and Lands informed the National
Assembly that basic infrastructure (water, electricity, communications, sewage, drains,
etc) were being installed, and that the promoter had submitted preliminary plans to
built three towers of 18 storeys and eight 2-storeyed residential units45. The grand
urban attractions were not for the immediate future46.
Even then, in March 2013, one year later, there were no buildings erected on the 24 ha
of land leased to the Indian developers, even though they had announced that the first
phase would have been completed by now. However, the developers assured the
media that the project is not dead. It was also revealed that the 15-pages contract
between the Mauritian government and Indian developers for this $ 500 million mega
project contains no clause obligating the developer to respect deadlines for
completion of works47.
43

Ibid.
Source: Neotown Brochure, p12, http://www.neotown.mu/
45
Business Mega Magazine, appeared online on 1oth July 2012,
http://business.mega.mu/fr/2012/07/10/mega-project-neotown-advanced-very-shy-rs-16-billion/
46
Ibid.
47
LExpress News, appeared online on 22th March 2013;
44

INTER-UNIVERSITY SEMINAR ON ASIAN MEGACITIES: ASIAN URBANISM AND BEYOND

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Figure 5: Neotown Master Plan (top) and Satellite Image of site on March 201348
Figure 5 shows the original master plan presented and approved in 2010, and the
progress of works and actual construction 3 years after. Note that no building had yet
been erected and the basic subdivision of the land are not same as originally planned,
www.lexpress.mu/article/neotown-rien--lhorizon-trois-ans-aprs
48
Compiled by Author. Source of top image is from Neotown Brochure available in
www.neotown.mu , and bottom is Google earth image dating 26 th March 2013

INTER-UNIVERSITY SEMINAR ON ASIAN MEGACITIES: ASIAN URBANISM AND BEYOND

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indicating major changes in the master plan.

It is difficult to make any post-mortem conclusion for the Neotown case, simply
because the mega project has not been pronounced dead. However, the reviewing of
Non-Double Taxation Treaty49 between India and Mauritius in 2012 and 2013 may
have created financial uncertainties. Secondly, the recession affecting the real-estate
sector in Mauritius may have obligated the developer to reconsider its development
strategies. Besides, the mismanagement of the project on the government side has also
been flagrant.
Mass Rapid Transit: On tracks after three decades
Finally after more than three decades of hesitation, Mauritius is going to construct its
Light Rail Transit (LRT). The LRT will run through the conurbation area where
around half a million inhabitants reside. It will be about 28 km long and will cost
about $ 800 million50, an amount described by the government as first time in the
history of the country so much of public money will be used [for a single project]51.
The rail option surfaced perhaps for the first time in 1981. That year, the Syndicat
Belge du Transport Urbain52, examined the feasibility of high occupancy vehicles
(HOV) of 120 seats and the Tramway within the conurbation. Their report rejected the
tramway option as it was judged less economically feasible and the existing transport
demand was too low to sustain it53. In August 1988, Fouchier studied implementation
of HOV of 120 and 180 seated buses on right-of-way (ROW) corridors, with the
option to convert the alignment into a tramway track by 2010 to meet projected
transport capacity requirement54. Another report in 199155 formally recommended the
construction of a LRT system between Port Louis and Curepipe.
The 1993 National Physical Development Plan56 (NPDP) appeared to ignore the 1991
report and followed the recommendations of the 1988 report. The NPDP 1993 was
approved by the National Assembly in 1994, and included the construction plan of a
bus lane between Port Louis (Immigration Square) and Quatre Bornes (Bus Station),
49

The Non Double Taxation Treaty between Mauritius and India, has attracted large amount of FDI to
India through Mauritius, and is the main incentive for investment between the two countries.
50
The figure usually quoted in the media and by government is Rs 22 to 25 billion.
51
Quote by A. Bachoo, Minister of Public Infrastructure, National Development Unit, Land Transport
and Shipping, during the debate regarding the LRT at the National Assembly on the 5 th June 2012,
source: Parliamentary Hansard, 07 of 2012, p20
52
Belgian Union of Urban Transport
53
Fouchier 1988:p24
54
Fouchier 1988
55
Various sources, however the author of the report is not mentioned.
56
The NPDP is the national planning scheme that sets up a development strategy for next 20 years

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which is considered as having the most amount of traffic flow. The bus lane was to be
constructed as a short term solution as to be later transformed into a tramway57. At
that time, the Ministry of Economic Planning rejected the rail option, because it was
thought to be justified economically but not financially viable58.
In 1997, French firm SYSTRA rejected the HOV and guided bus options due to
anticipated future capacities and opted of ROW rail solutions. It studied two rail
options: LRT and commuter express train. In 1998, consultancy firms, Iberinsa &
Scott Wilson studied nine alternative strategies, but they did not opined in favour of
any alternative59.
The Labour Party which was in office since 1995, lost the 2000 general election and
the MSM-MMM political alliance took office. The mass rapid transit project took a
new turn. The new governments Berenger60 had a passionate vision for the LRT
implementation. In 200161, the British firm, Halcrow Fox examined in depth three
alternatives: the unguided busway (UGB), the kerb-guided busway (KGB) and the
light rail transit (LRT). They recommended the LRT, together with some necessary
complimentary strategies62.
In 2002, Dr. Lupton was assigned by the World Bank to prepare a Multi-criteria
Analysis, in which he concluded that the KGB is best solution in terms of
value-for-money, however only the LRT would be successful in dealing with the
traffic congestion problem63.
This was echoed in the National Development Strategy (NDS) 200364. The NDS was
approved by the National Assembly in 2004, and included a LRT track between Port
Louis and Curepipe. However the LRT project was put on the shelf again in 2004. The
then Prime Minister Berenger justified it by saying: because elections were coming

57

NPDP 1993, p-111-129, also see Map 15.1, 15.8

Cited in Motor Mega, on article dated 13th July 2012,
motors.mega.mu/news/2012/07/13/light-rail-over-rs-70-million-spent-reports/
59
Le Matinal News, article appeared online, 19th December 2009,
www.lematinal.com/news/local-news/2552-projet-mtro-lger-abandonn-par-latat.html
60
Mr P. Berenger is the leader of the MMM party, the Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Finance
(2000-2003) and Prime Minister (2003-2005)
61
Halcrow Fow in association with MDS Transmodal will submit at least three volumes of the
Integrated National Transport Strategy Study (INTSS) in April 2001
62
Some of complementary implementations are road price, integrated bus service and integrated
ticketing system.
63
Lupton 2002
64
The NPDP 1993, considered outdated was reviewed in 2003, but renamed National Development
Strategy (NDS)
58

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[in 2005]65.
In the 2005 general election, the MSM-MMM alliance lost to the Labour Party and its
allies. Back in office, the Labour government killed the LRT and brought up again the
bus based systems. In 2006, Dr. Richmond presented the Mauritius Transport
Consensus Forums, in which he disapproved of the LRT project, on the basis of
insufficient population pool to support the infrastructure, and instead he
recommended the Open Bus Way66.
However, his recommendations were not heeded, and the government went on
working towards a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system on the alignment proposed by
Halcrow Fox and Iberinsa67. The LRT was formally set aside in favour of the BRT in
200968.
Again, the project was shelved for a while. In 2010s general election, the Labour
party (now, with the MSM party as ally) won another term. In September, that year,
Prime Minister Ramgoolam visited Singapore and its mass transit systems. During
that visit, the Mauritian government made agreements with the Singaporean
counterparts, to help implement a LRT system!
The Singaporean consultants were asked to revise the LRT itinerary as the previously
proposed alignment are considered outdated and did not link the newer developments
like the Ebene Cybercity, the Reduit Cultural Triangle and the Bagatelle Mall69. The
ground breaking for the construction is now scheduled late 201470.
Assuming that the project will not experience any more rebounds, it is interesting to
note that the LRT will be implemented more than three decades after a mass rapid
transit system was recommended in 1981. This delay in my opinion can be explained
partly in two main aspects.
Firstly, the size of the population using the mass transit was always thought to be
65

Quote by the P. Berenger, Leader of Opposition, during the debate regarding the LRT at the National
Assembly on the 5th June 2012, source: Parliamentary Hansards, 07 of 2012, p15
66
Richmond 2006
67
Parliamentary Hansard 14 of 2009, p9
68
Le Matinal News; article dated 19th December 2009,
www.lematinal.com/news/local-news/2552-projet-mtro-lger-abandonn-par-latat.html
69
Le Matinal News, online article appeared 21st January 2013,
www.lematinal.com/news/local-news/19691-Metro-leger-plus-de-50-investisseurs-interesses.html
70
Government Communiqu, Cited in LExpress News, online article dated 25 th January 2013,
www.lexpress.mu/article/mtro-lger-cette-fois-cest-bon-le-chantier-sera-lanc-en-octobre-2014

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insufficient, causing a lot of debate among politicians, economists-planners and

Mauritians in general. For example, in 2009, Minister Bachoo in defence of the BRT
said to the parliament: the LRT is only viable when there are 15,000 passengers
per hour, which is impossible in our small island71, he added Mauritius, with
such a fragile economy, cannot afford to make tests, trials and errors.72. However,
three years later, the same Minister Bachoo said to the parliament: After assessing
the implications, merits and demerits of the two options namely the BRT and LRT, and
bearing in mind that the government is focusing on a long term solution, that is
fifty-year horizon, the LRT has emerged as being the preferred option73.
The second aspect of this delay is clearly political. The MMM government seems to
have been supportive of a rail-based system, where as the Labour preferred a
bus-based system, therefore, when government changed, the project also took turns.
However, after his inspirational visit to Singapore in 2010, the Labour party leader
and Prime Minister had swung in favour of the LRT.
Road Decongestion Program: First major DBOF Experience
The RDP is package deal that merges few independent and significant projects.
Among other constructions, the RDP include (see Figure 6):

The construction of a 4-lanes 1020m long cable-stayed harbour bridge,

The construction of a 310 m long 4-lanes river gorge bridge,
The construction of a 870 m long twin bore tunnel,
The construction of 16 grade-separated interchanges and bridge structures,
The rehabilitation and upgrading of portions of the existing road network
required as part of the tollable network.

Mauritius Research Council estimated that the traffic congestion cost up to $ 100
million to the country every year74. The congestion problems are very serious from
during the morning peak from Terre Rouge to Port Louis and from Phoenix to Port
Louis (see Figure 6). This is because Port Louis is the main employment centre of the
country and there is currently no good alternative for through-traffic75 to by-pass the
capital city. According to government statistics, some 25,000 vehicles enter the capital
71

Source: Parliamentary Hansards, 39 of 2009, p10

Ibid, p15
73
Source: Parliamentary Hansards, 07 of 2012, p10; The earmarking of Rs 25 billion in the PSIP
indicate that the government will finance the LRT project.
74
Rs 2.5 to 3.0 billion yearly, Cited in Le Defi Media, online article dated 03 rd April 2013,
www.defimedia.info/defi-quotidien/dq-economie/item/29552-l-eternel-probleme-de-la-congestion-plus
-de-200-vehicules-penetrent-dans-la-capitale-par-minute.html
75
That is vehicles travelling from North to South and vice-versa, through Port Louis, without having
business in Port Louis.
72

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city between 7am and 9am, during weekdays, where there are some 65,000 jobs76.

Figure 6: RDP Network with Possible LRT Alignment77

76

Cited in Le Defi Media, online article dated 03rd April 2013,

www.defimedia.info/defi-quotidien/dq-economie/item/29552-l-eternel-probleme-de-la-congestion-plus
-de-200-vehicules-penetrent-dans-la-capitale-par-minute.html.

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To remedy that, firstly, the Terre Rouge to Ebene/Phoenix Link via Verdun is being
constructed. It directly connects the north to the centre, thus diverting through-traffic
east of the mountains surrounding the capital city (see Figure 6). This 26 km 4-lanes
by-pass will be completed in August 2013, at cost of some $ 150 million78.
Secondly, there were other road construction projects planned around Port Louis: The
Ring Road I, the Ring Road II, and the Harbour Bridge. The Ring Road I is completed
at the cost of some $ 30 million. In 2010, the government bundled the Ring Road II
and the Harbour Bridge as a Package Deal79. At that time, the costs of these two
segments were estimated at some $ 275 million80.
In 2012, when the government approved the LRT project, the RDP had to be
rethought because the toll system worked hand in glove with the LRT. All the new and
existing road infrastructures around Port Louis were integrated. New projects like the
grade-separated junctions and a river gorge bridge was added (Coromandel-Soreze)
and the Ring Road II was modified. Consequently, the estimated cost jumped to $ 1
billion81. It is to be implemented on a DBOF (design-build-operate-finance) scheme,
with a concession of 33 years to the private partners, including 3-years construction
period82.
According to expert reports (Halcrow Fox, World Bank, IMF, others) both the LRT
and the RDP had to be implemented simultaneously in order for the congestion
problem to be tackled effectively. These two projects costing around a total of $ 1.8
billion would have been impossible to be undertaken by the government alone.
The government revenue for 2013 was estimated at $ 2.8 billion83, with a government
debt stable around 54%84 of GDP. In accordance to the Public Debt Management Act
Map adapted from Proposed Road Decongestion Programme CCA Environmental (Pty) Ltd /
Enviro-Consult Ltd, May 2013, p4. The final LRT alignment is not yet public, but based on its study,
the Author anticipate it to be so.
78
Phase 1 cost Rs 2.2 billion (additional Rs 700 million claimed by contractor due to unexpected
works), and Phase 2 cost Rs 1.58 billion.
79
Le Matinal News, online article dated,
www.lematinal.com/news/local-news/4289-Harbour-Bridge-et-Ring-Road-Un-Package-Deal.html
80
Rs 8.3 billion, Estimated by Road Development Authority, Cited in Ibid.
81
Estimated Rs 9-11 billion in 2009, and including modifications in plans, Rs 25 to 36 billion,
according to various issues of Public Sector Investment Programme. However, the value of the PPP
contract awarded is Rs 30 billion.
82
Minister Bachoo, cited in Parliamentary Hansard 08 of 2012, p8
83
Revenue Rs 83.3 billion, expenditure Rs 91.8 billion, Source: Ernst & Young, and PWCs Budget
2013 Analysis
84
2012 GDP is estimated at $ 11.9 billion: Source: Ibid.
77

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(2008), the public debt cannot exceed the ceiling of 60%, and has to bring it below the
ceiling of 50% by 201985. So, without private sector involvement, these mega projects
would have had very negative impacts on government spending and debts, and its
implementation would have been very improbable.
Out-of-Town Shopping Malls: The Mushroom Malls

Figure 7: Out-of-Town Shopping Malls in Mauritius (2013)86

85
86

The Public Debt Management Act, Act No. 5 of 2008, Section 7(2) & Section 7(3).
Source: Author .Surveyed using Google Earth historical imagery, and Online Media

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Since 2010, people across the country have witnessed the extra-ordinary phenomenon
of Mushroom Shopping Malls. In the lap of 3 years, the amount of out-of-town
shopping centres has leapfrogged from 9 to 21 (see Figure 7)87. During the same
period the existing malls have invested into new infrastructure to stay competitive88.
In addition, the construction of few other malls has been announced89. Given the
massive investments and large amount of floor surface area built up simultaneously
by few private firms, this phenomenon can be regarded at a mega urban
development90.
Firstly, these shopping malls have a very bad urban effect, because they create low
amount of new retail economy. Thus, in most cases they just displace the retail
business from in-town to out-of-town. This regional redistribution of the retail sector
has impoverished the town centres and traditional retail streets.
Note that the NDS 200391 recommended limiting the development of out of town
shopping malls. This was to reinforce the town centres and retail streets, particularly
along the corridor of the future LRT. Evidently, these recommendations were not
applied.
Income Groups
(Monthly Disposable Income) in $92

% of Total
households

Low

less than $ 500

29.5

Lower Middle

$ 500 to < $ 833

28.3

Middle

$ 833 to < $ 1,333

21.7

Upper Middle

$ 1,333 to < $ 2,000

11.9

Upper

Above $ 2,000

8.6

Figure 8: Income distribution (%) of Households (2012)93

The question now posed is how much commercial development a country of just
around 346,000 households94 can sustain. Figure 8 shows the distribution of the
87

Source: Author, by enumerating the Main Shopping Malls in Mauritius and comparing their status
on Google Earth through Historical Imagery.
88
For example Ascencia, owner of Jumbo Commercial Centres at Phoenix and Riche Terre have
invested Rs 1 billion in their infrastructure. Source: Business Magazine no. 1064, 16-22 January 2013,
www.businessmag.mu/article/attention-au-spectre-de-la-bulle-immobiliere
89
For example, le Merrit Elipsis Mall at Trianon, and another one near Quartier Militaire.
90
Its difficult to estimate the total cost and built up area, few projects revealed these details. However
some if the bigger projects were published to have cost from Rs 2.2 to 4.5 billion.
91
NDS 2003, Section 3.6 & Strategic Policy SP5- Town Centres and Retailing, p50.
92
Not in PPP international $, but in actual $, conversion Rate used is $ 1= Rs 30
93
Source Author, Derived from CSO, 2012 House Budget Survey, p9 table 4
94
CSO, 2011 Population Census Main Results

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monthly disposable income of the households in Mauritius.

In 2012, Statistics Mauritius reported that the average disposable income per
household was $ 98095 and the average Mauritian house spends 55 % of its monthly
disposable income on basics like food, transport and housing96. Assuming an
additional 20-30% of the income reserved for education, health, communication and
savings, it is found that the Mauritian household with average of 3.5 members97 is
left with only $ 42 to $70 to spend on each member monthly on other goods and
services98. Then, it can be deduced from Figure 8, that these shopping malls can be
sustained only by the upper middle and upper class (or 20.5% of total households).
There have been few cases99 where the shopping malls are unoccupied by
customers100 and where promoters are also struggling to find tenants. In 2013, the
rental yield of the shopping malls was lower than interest gains from investments in
mutual funds, which brings more evidence of the over saturation of the retail
commercial spaces101.
This rush to shopping mall developments has sucked out the activities from town
centres and has created a few ghost shopping malls, which has sent a strong signal
that the small population of Mauritius cannot sustain so much commercial
development. It is also regrettable to note that the NDS 2003, approved by the
National Assembly in 2004, was not respected regarding the case of out of town
shopping malls.
New Sectors: Very Long Pipelines
New sectors, namely the Land Based Oceanic Industry (LBOI) and the Knowledge
Industry, have been in the incubation stage for many years, and related mega projects
are in the pipeline for a very long time.
In 2005, the Land Based Oceanic Industry (LBOI) was conceived and a Task Force

95

Rs 29,360, Source: CSO, 2012 Household Budget Survey.

Food & non alcoholic beverages- 27.3%, Transport- 15.2%, Housing, water, electricity, gas &
other fuel- 12.0%. Ibid, p13 Table 6.
97
Loc Cit.
98
Based on authors calculation.
99
For example VIP Shopping Village at Goodlands, and Les Halles Commercial Centre at Phoenix.
100
And also, see Le Mauricien News, article dated 25th October 2012,
www.lemauricien.com/article/centres-commerciaux-les-malls-ont-du-mal
101
The rental yield was between 4.5-6.5 %, according to a market observer, quoted in Business
Magazine no. 1064, 16-22 January 2013,
www.businessmag.mu/article/centre-commercial-quelle-viabilite-sur-le-long-terme
96

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under the direction of the Mauritius Research Council was set up102. Experts from
Hawaii were called in to submit schematic design for a Land Based Ocean Park. A
park of 120 ha was planned near Flic-en-Flac103.

Figure 9: (Top) The Schematic Plan of an Integrated LBOI park and (bottom) is
the LBOI Park near Flic-en-Flac104
A modest first phase of the project with 10,000 m2 built area on 10 ha was supposed
to start on 2010 with initial investment of some $60 million105. This project was
estimated at a cost of more than $ 100 million to be implemented on a PPP scheme,
with concession period of 30 years106.
102

Beebeejaun, Then-Minister of Renewable Energy and Public Utilities, in Parliamentary Hansard 31

of 2009, p6-9
103
A coastal village located on the west of the island.
104
Above image from Mauritius Research Council and Board of Investment (2006), Brochure for
LBOI, and below image from LExpress News, appeared online 9 th March 2010,
www.lexpress.mu/article/la-sic-jette-les-bases-de-la-land-based-oceanic-park-entre-albion-et-flic-en-fla
c
105
Beebeejaun 2009, Ibid.
106
Rs 3 billion cited, Le Defi News, online article appeared on 15 th December 2011,
www.defimedia.info/defi-quotidien/dq-economie/item/2750-land-based-oceanic-industry--un-projet-a

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Figure 9 (top) shows a schematic plan of how the LBOI would function. Deep sea
water is pumped from 1000 m depth, and in order to use it in an integrated system for
air conditioning, electricity generation, aquaculture, high quality salt production, spa,
aquarium purposes, pearl culture, bottling of desalinated mineral water, etc. And
Figure 9 (bottom) shows the master plan of the Flic-en-Flac Land Based Oceanic
Park.
To this day, this project has not been implemented. This has largely been blamed on
two aspects. Firstly, this type of project is very rare in other part of the world, so,
there were both high technical and financial risks. Secondly, the lead private partner
in the PPP scheme had trouble with the Mauritian judiciary system and had to be
removed from the project. It caused serious slow down of the project107.
The government has the ambitious program of turning Mauritius into the Knowledge
Hub of the Indian Ocean region. In 2011, Mauritius Island had a population of only
some 110,000 aged 19-24 years108. However, the country already has 4 public-funded
universities of various sizes. As at 2011, there other 65 registered tertiary education
institutions, of which 54 were privately funded109.
The government envisions increasing the actual local 47% tertiary education
enrolment rate to 70%. Additionally, it plans to attract 100,000 foreign students to
Mauritius by 2020110. To note that, less than 1,000111 foreign students were enrolled
in all tertiary institutions as at 2011.
In 2006, the Human Resource Development Council estimated that providing
infrastructural facilities for around 30,000 foreign students would cost some $ 280
million112. Considering the recent hikes in construction cost, it would cost above $ 1
billion just to house 100,000 foreign students.

u-stade-embryonnaire-depuis-plus-de-cinq-ans.html?tmpl=
Le Defi News, article appeared in 3rd October 2013,
www.defimedia.info/defi-quotidien/dq-economie/item/19691-land-based-oceanic-industry-le-projet-ref
ait-surface.html
108
Derived from Census 2011, Data- Volume 2 Table D1
109
Jeetah, Minister of Tertiary Education, Science, Research and Technology. On Mauritius
International Knowledge Investment Forum (MIKIF) 2012, 30 th Jan 2012
110
Ibid.
111
635 foreign students, Tertiary Education Commission 2012, Participation in Tertiary Education
2011, p11
112
Rs 8.5 billion; HRDC 2006, Transforming Mauritius into a Knowledge Hub- Sectoral Committee
Report Nov 2006, p13
107

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The construction of four additional campuses was approved in 2011, including one on
Rodrigues Island113 (which has a population of 3,600 aged between 19-24 years114).
An amount of $ 27 million and 84 ha of land have been earmarked for these 4
campuses115. None of them has been constructed yet.
The private sector is also optimistic regarding the knowledge industry and is investing
into it. For example projects by IOREC and Medine Group, have already attracted
foreign private secondary and tertiary institutions to occupy their newly built
infrastructures. From 2012 to 2017, the Medine Groups Flic-en-Flac Campus hopes
to accommodate 11,700 students, while their Pierrefonds campus has a capacity of
4,000 students116.
In the case of the knowledge industry, the small population of Mauritius will not be
able to feed these great ambitions. The Mauritian knowledge industry will largely
depend on international established universities and schools to attract these large
amounts of foreign students because so far the local institutions have hardly been able
to do so. However, attracting major or popular international educational institutions to
establish themselves in Mauritius is by itself another herculean task.
Summary & Conclusion
Summary
The success of the Ebene Cybercity project lies in developing a strong catalyst (the
Cyber Tower), attracting niche ICT enterprises which gradually pulled along other
businesses. This resulted in the establishment of a major employment centre that
influenced regional developments.
The failure of the Highlands New Town was explained partly due to malfunctioning
of the PPP scheme and divergence in political ideologies. The smallness of the
economy, in the sense that it is not able to fill in a new town, without emptying the
capital city Port Louis is also to be blamed.
The third case of Jin Fei had a different set of failure reasons. This was a combination
of economic miscalculation and scale mismatch. Firstly the Chinese overrated the role
of Mauritius as a platform to enter the African market for the manufacturing industry.
Minister Jeetah, cited in LExpress News, online article appeared on 5 th March 2011,
www.lexpress.mu/article/le-gouvernement-dcide-de-crer-quatre-nouvelles-universits-et-une-cole-v
trinaire
114
Derived from Census 2011, Data- Volume 2 Table D1
115
Same as 113.
116
T. Sauzier 2012,Managing Director of Medine Group 2012, MIKIF 2013, 18-19 February 2013
113

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Secondly, the Mainland China style large scale industrial new towns could be
sustained by neither the local economic growth nor the labour force.
The failure of Neotown at Les Salines can be attributed to a combination of
uncertainties pertaining to economic relationships between India and Mauritius,
real-estate recession in the local market and the failure of the institutions to enforce
the private sectors commitments.
The fifth project, the Light Rail System is a mega project that could not be
implemented for the past 30 years. Factors include the small size of the population
and thereby ridership volumes, the political ideology divergence and the internal
mismanagement of the project.
Against these negative developments stands the $ 1 billion dollar Road Decongestion
Programme, made possible by the participation of the local private sector. It was seen
that the government alone was not in a position to properly realise the RDP and had to
appeal to the private sector, because of its small annual budget and by-law public debt
control.
In the case of private sectors sudden and massive investments in out-of-town
commercial spaces, it has been concluded that the smallness of the local market and
its limited spending power has caused the undesired urban consequence by displacing
retail economy from town centres. Institutional loopholes have also been put to
evidence, by the lack of regional development coordination and not respecting the
National Development Strategy of 2003.
Lastly, several reasons were also put forward to explain the slowness to realise mega
projects in new sectors. In the case of the LBOI, the technical limitation and high
financial risks were pointed out. Also, the governmental aspiration regarding the
knowledge industry seems a bit too ambitious. The smallness of the local potential
student population, and the unattractiveness of the country to foreign students are not
conducive to the establishment of a viable Knowledge Hub.
Conclusion
Despite the high aspirations towards mega projects, the smallness of the Mauritian
economy has affected their implementation and financial sustainability. Projects like
the rapid transit system which have been in the pipeline for 3 decades have stalled due
to concern on critical mass. The knowledge hub project appears to follow the same

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path due to the same reasons. Other projects like the Highlands New Town have been
set aside possibly due to conservatism towards new visions.
The smallness of Mauritius is not the only culprit that stalls or kills mega projects.
Other accomplices are the mismanagement of projects (e.g. like the Neotown and Jin
Fei) by governmental agencies, and political ideology divergence, like for the Light
Rail transit system and Highlands New Town project. Furthermore, institutional
weaknesses have been highlighted in the uncoordinated regional development and
failure to implement the NDS, as in the case for the mushrooming shopping malls.
Acknowledgements: I am grateful to my research supervisor, Dr. Tan Zongbo,
Professor at the Department of Urban Planning of Tsinghua University for his
guidance and support. I am also very thankful to Dr. S. Chu-Chun-Lin, Associate
Professor at Business School of National University of Singapore for reviewing this
paper and for his valuable advices.

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INTER-UNIVERSITY SEMINAR ON ASIAN MEGACITIES: ASIAN URBANISM AND BEYOND

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Halcrow Fox (2001b). Integrated National Transport Strategy Study, Summary

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