BAPTIZING TERRITORY:

RECONSTITUTING RUMEL AFTER 1878

by
Aye avdar

Dissertation submitted to the History Department

in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in History

Boazii University
2004

Baptizing Territory: Reconstituting Rumeli after 1878

A dissertation prepared by Aye avdar

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts at
the Department of History.

This dissertation has been approved and accepted by:

Prof. Dr. Huricihan slamolu (advisor)

Prof. Dr. Selim Deringil.

Assis. Prof. Ycel Terzibaolu

to Lale

10

zet
1878de Byk Gler ile Osmanl devleti arasnda imzalanan Berlin Anlamas,
Balkanlarda Romanya, Bulgaristan ve Srbistan devletlerinin bamsz birer
uluslararas aktr olarak domalarn salamann yan sra, Osmanl ynetimini yine
Byk Glerin onay yetkisi altnda yaplmas ngrlen bir dizi reformu uygulamak
zorunda brakyordu. 1880de hazrlanan ve Avrupa Komisyonunun onayndan
geen Rumeli Vilayetleri Kanunu, Osmanl merkezi devletini Rumelide bir smrge
imparatorluuna dntryordu. Osmanl ynetimi bu tasary bizzat kendisi
hazrlam olsa da, asla uygulamad. Blgede i karklklarn, ayaklanmalarn
kmas Osmanl hkmetinin bu yasayla ngrlen reformlar uygulamad iin
eletirilmesine neden oldu. Byk Glerin blgedeki istikrarszl nlemek iin
bulduklar yntem dorudan mdahale idi. 1903te Mrzsteg, 1908de de Reval
tasarlar gndeme geldi. Avrupa devletlerinin temsilcileri de bizzat reformlarn
uygulamalarnda grev alacaklard. Reformlar, 1908 Jn Trk devrimiyle tamamyla
ortadan kalkt. 1912deki Osmanl kabinesi, Balkanlarda sava ittifak kurulurken
yaklaan sava nleyebilmek iin 1880 tarihinde yaplan kanunu bir kez daha
gndeme getirdi. Ne var ki stanbul kamuoyu yasann tartlmasna bile karyd.
Kald ki Balkan devletlerinin de savatan vazgemek gibi bir eilimleri yoktu.
Balkan Savalarnn ardndan Ege Makedonyas Yunanistan snrlar iinde kald.
Blge bu defa da Yunan modern merkezi ulus devletinin izdii bir merkezileme
sreci ierisine girdi. Yunanistan nce mbadele ve zorunlu g ya da ge zorlama
yntemiyle blgedeki Yunan olmayan unsurlar srgn ederek, buradaki demografiyi
deitirdi. Blgedeki yerleim yerlerinin isimlendirilmesi politikas, bu topraklarn
bundan byle Yunan merkezi devleti tarafndan Yunan ulusu adna ynetileceinin
gstergesi idi.
Tezin ilk iki blmnde Rumeli vilayetlerinin Avrupal Byk Glerle Osmanl
mparatorluu arasnda nasl bir mcadele alan oluturduunu ve Osmanl
ynetiminin Byk Glerin mdahalelerine direnme biimleri yer almaktadr. Bu
iki blmn amac ise Osmanl ynetiminin merkezileme abalar ile, Avrupa
mdahalesinin blgeyi merkezsizletirici etkisinin ortaya kard gerilimi ifade
edebilmektir. Tezin nc blmnde ise Yunan ulus devletinin Ege
Makedonyasnn hangi politik aralarla merkezi ynetimin bir nesnesi haline
getirdii aklanmaya allmtr. Bu blmn amac ise, zellikle isimlendirme ve
kimlik politikalarnn yalnzca sylemsel politikalar olmadklar, aksine ulusal

11

kimliin aslnda uluslararas alanda ina edilmesi nedeniyle yasal ve ekonomik

pratikler temelinde ekillendiklerini ortaya koymaktr.

12

Summary
The Berlin Treaty of 1878, which was signed between the Great Powers and the
Ottoman Empire, not only created new nation states in the Balkans, such as
Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia, but also ordered the Ottoman administration to
implement reforms under the supervision of the European Commission. The Law of
Rumelin Provinces of 1880 was prepared to implement the Berlin Treatys
provisions on reforms. Since the Ottoman administration never applied these
reforms, it was criticized for causing the instable environment in the Balkans. The
resolution of the Great Powers was direct intervention to the Ottoman affairs in
Rumeli. According to the Mrzsteg reforms of 1903 and the Reval reforms of 1908,
the European diplomats would directly involve in the implementation of the reforms.
All these reforms were dismissed with the Young Turk revolution of 1908. The
program of the Young Turks was based on the centralization of administration
without any concession. The Ottoman government of 1912 took the Law of 1880 one
more time in order to prevent the possible war in the Balkans. However, the public
opinion in Istanbul was against even the discussion of the law. On the other hand, the
Balkan states would not withdraw from war.
The Aegean Macedonia passed under the Greek rule after the Balkan Wars. The
region was centralized by the Modern Greek nation state. The Greek administration
changed the ethnic composition of its territory by means of policies of forced
migration and population exchanges. The policy of renaming inhabited places was
one of the most significant identity politics of the Greek nation state. It was the sign
that the Greek nation state would rule over this territory on behalf of the Greek
nation.
First two chapters of this study focus on the tension between the Great Powers and
Ottoman administration, because of the intervention policies of Great Powers and the
resistance of the Ottoman administration. The centralization of the Aegean
Macedonia by the Greek central state is mentioned in the third chapter of this study.
The main goal of this chapter is to show that the policies of renaming and identity are
not only discursive policies; on the contrary, since national identity is a product of
the balance of power in international relations, the identity policies are formed on the
basis of legal and economic practices.
13

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First I would like to thank my advisor, Prof. Huricihan Islamoglu, for her kind
encouragement and guidance. I should appreciate also to Prof. Selim Deringil and
Asst. Prof. Yucel Terzibasoglu for their comments and suggestions. Thanks to Nil
Mutluer, Volkan Aytar and Tracy Lord; they helped to me to write this thesis in a
more understandable way. Thanks to Ayegl Okan and my sister Hatice avdar for
their emotional support in every level of this thesis. Special thanks to Melek Taylan,
Nurdan Arca and Sevgi Sevgin, they were very patient and supportive while I was
writing this thesis. I appreciate to my father, Yaar avdar, because his ethical way
of understanding people and events is my main guide to understand events and
people in my life, he taught me to stay on my own feet, while I am seeking for
success that I desire. In addition, special thanks to ahin Utar, who listened to and
encouraged me patiently every time while I was trying to organize my ideas about
the naming and authority.

14

Baptizing Territory: Reconstituting Rumeli after 1878

CONTENTS
zet

iv

Summary

Acknowledgements

vi

Introduction

Chapter I
Reconstituting Rumeli: The Law of Rumelin Provinces of 1880

12

I.1. Legal Status of the People of Rumelin Vilayets

19

I.2. General Councils as Provincial Parliaments

22

I.3. Election Procedure

26

I.4. The Status of Governors and Other Officials of Central Government

27

I.5. Religious Communities and Education

30

I.6. Courts

34

I.7. Security

35

Chapter II:
The Resistance of the Ottoman Administration to Reforms,
and the Restoration of the Law of Rumelin Provinces in 1912

37

II.1. Mrzsteg Reforms

39

II.2. The Resistance of the Ottoman Bureaucracy and Officers: 1908

42

II.3. The Law of Rumelin Provinces of 1912

45

Chapter III:
Greek Administration in the Aegean Macedonia After 1912

49

III.1. Greek Position until the Balkan Wars

52

III. 2. General Consequences of the Balkan Wars

55
15

III.3. Greece in Macedonia: Changing Demographic Composition

56

III.4. Centralization of Macedonia: Local Practices

62

III.5. Baptizing Territory

65

Conclusion

72

Bibliography

78

Appendixes
Rumeli Vilayat Kanunu (Layiha)

84

Maps
Kosova Viyalet at Beginning of the 20th Century

132

Selanik (Thessalonica) Viyalet at Beginning of the 20th Century

133

Manastir (Monastir) Viyalet at beginning of the 20th Century

134

The Balkans in 1878

135

The Balkans in 1913

136

16

Introduction
sim dediin, Hz. Ademden bu yana, kendini tayan kh usul usul yourur,
kh efsunlu iplerle sk sk balard. sim dediin, yksekte uann belini bkecek,
alaktan geenin ban dorultacak; pervasza perva, korkusuza korku katacak kadar kudretli idi.
Elif afak, Pinhan

According to a story in the Quran, God honored the first human, Adam, when he
learned all the names of the creatures in the universe. Therefore, Adam became the
representative of God on earth. After Adam came to the earth with Eva, only he held
the authority to name the creatures of God. This story always makes me think that
naming has strongly been related with authority. Naming or baptizing somebody or
something is a kind of declaration that the name-giver or baptizer has authority over
the existence of the baptized human or the thing.
My thesis is inspired by a suspicion of renaming policies in the context of the
construction of nation states. For a very concrete example of this issue, we have an
ongoing debate over the Armenian Genocide. Clearly, if international community
accepts the concept of Armenian Genocide, Turkey would have a right to fear
compensation from the descendents of the Ottoman Armenians. Similar to this
problematic was that experienced between Greece and the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Greece opposed the usage of the name
Macedonia by the FYROM, because of the countrys potential claims over Aegean
Macedonia (or Northern Greece). Obviously, there are large national interests at
stake in the naming of territories.
My general context is the period of the transition from empire to nation state.
Specifically, I focus on the dissolution process of the Ottoman Empire into discreet
nation states, and crucial in this process was the imbalance of powers between the
Ottoman Empire and the European Great Powers. In this thesis, I am interested in the
naming policies within the context of the conflicting interests between these two
major blocs.
The naming policy was one of several tools for nationalizing former imperial
territories. Although, the renaming policy of the nation states is generally perceived
as largely an aesthetic issue, in fact my research suggests that the stakes in territorial
names are multiple and determining, including cultural, social, economic, and
political aspects. Indeed, it seems that renaming practices are one of the defense
17

mechanisms used by nation states in their formation processes since renaming a

particular territory in a given nations language constitutes a declaration of
possession of that nation and thus implies the right of that nation state to establish
hegemony over it. In short, naming makes territories into political possessions.
While the naming had been unproblematic feature of local cultures, in this
transitional period we observe that the authority to assign territorial names became a
tool of the formation of nation states. Among the stakes listed above, I am most
concerned in this study with the emergence of new social reality carried out by the
legal processes involved in renaming policies.
Interestingly, while the nation state concept was widely acknowledged as a universal
political organizing principal, in the case of the transformation of the Ottoman
Empire, the determination of the right to nation-statehood was mainly undertaken by
seven nations (the Great Powers of Europe). This they did for Ottoman Rumeli by
reconstituting it an autonomous region as preliminary to a maze mature nationstate configuration, in the Berlin Congress of 1878. The second half of this process
of regularization handled by the Great Powers was their forced decentralizing
reforms in the autonomous region to the Ottoman administration. On the other
hand, those same seven powers authorized the nation states of the Balkans, to
establish a new social reality for that same region, which Greece did in a holistic
fashion, including the application of Greek names to former Ottoman lands and for
former Slavophonic peoples.
The historical context that this study focuses on includes three main developments in
the Balkans related to each other. First is the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire,
the second is the formulation of national identities and the third is the formation of
new nation states. All of these developments were in correlation with each other.
The Berlin Treaty was the most important text of that period, because it crystallized
and legitimized the claims of Balkan nations. On the other hand, the treaty
reconstituted the region as a contested territory between these nation-states, because
there was no way to satisfy their irredentist claims. The period was the age of
nationalism (Gellner, 1996; 115): In other words, the construction period of national
imaginations (Anderson, 1995: 20).
The Berlin Treaty created states, and freed them to figure their nations from their
imagined history and legendary events, and replace them into the limits that was
18

determined according to romantic historical memories, instead of demographic, ethnic

or linguistic realities (Karpat, 2004; 7).

However, this study does not focus on the abstraction process of these
imaginations in discursive level. Rather, it focuses on the institutionalization
process of nationalism as an administrative preference in practical level. Hence, the
main analysis object of this study is legal texts of this process.
Indeed legal instruments were one of the most important instruments of creation of
social realities, in this case nations, clearly based on the ultimate results in new
balance of power configurations. As a methodological inclination, I was guided by
Islamolus suggestion to read laws the main textual resources of my research- as
constitutive of social reality (slamolu, 2004). In this case the Berlin Treaty seems
as the main constitutive text of the new international social reality, including, of
course, that in the Balkans. Thus, in my reading of the laws, I tried to consider, in
what context, for which reason, and by whom these laws were proposed or imposed.
Thus, I try to discern and describe the power relations behind these legal texts.
It is striking that in the historical or political literature on these issues, legal texts are
used primarily as secondary and supportive, and not to be evaluated as the central
materials for historiography. For instance, Balkan economic historian Michel Palairet
builds a historiography on the base of statistics and purely economic categories, with
a very limited help from the highly determining principles of the legal context.
Perhaps the most well-known Balkan political historian L.S. Stavrianos, while
sometimes interested in the international treaties and regulations, bases his
historiography on military and political struggles among the Balkan States.
Ahmed Selahaddin, an Ottoman intellectual from the Istanbul Darulfnun,
emphasizes legal regulations in the formation of the new Balkan context of the
period around the Balkan Wars. I find his work important for two reasons, one, his
detailed analysis of legal documents, and two, his providing in Ottoman perspective
on these events.
Finally, of great importance to this thesis for assistance in developing definitions of
social reality in cultural history was Anastasia N. Karakasidou. Her work sometime
based on oral accounts of the contemporary inhabitants of Aegean Macedonia,
reveals much about the process of identity formation under the influence of the

19

Greek Hellenization program, from the formation process of the Greek nation state to
the present.
In this study, specifically, I have tried to find the linkages between the centralization
of processes of the administration and the policy of renaming places in Aegean
Macedonia. As a disputed territory, Aegean Macedonia passed through mainly two
different centralization processes. First one was the Ottoman Empire, and the second
one was the Greek nation state. The Ottoman Empire was transforming itself into a
centralized state. On the other hand, Greece was a modern nation-state, which had
Ottoman imperial legacy. Thus, this study focuses on the dissolution of the Ottoman
Empire and the formation of the Greek central administration in Aegean Macedonia,
after the Berlin Treaty of 1878.
In the first chapter, I elaborate on the Law of 1880 to show what sort of concessions
Ottomans had to give to the non-Muslim inhabitants and their European protectors.
In the second chapter, I tried to expose the resistance of the Ottoman bureaucracy to
these reforms, or decentralizating interventions of the European Great Powers. These
two chapters show why and how the Ottoman administration failed in the
centralization of the Rumeli Provinces.
The third chapter focuses on the centralization practices of Greece over Aegean
Macedonia in the period soon after the Balkan Wars. The Greek nation-state never
respected the multi-lingual and multi-religious social structure of the region. On the
contrary, it exiled the non-Greek peoples not only from administrative posts, but also
from the territory. With several ways of forced migration, it made its territory the
property of the abstract Greek nation. Renaming territory was one of the most
significant identity politics of the Greek nation-state until 1970s.

20

Chapter I
Reconstituting Rumeli: The Law of Rumeli Provinces of 1880
The Berlin Treaty was a classic demonstration of Great Power diplomacy. The major
accomplishment of the congress was the re-establishment of the balance of power in
order to solve Eastern Question. However, the context and the realpolitik, which
was created by the Berlin Treaty, became national politics of the Balkan states
(Farrar, 1996).
If one accepts the premise that laws or rules are constitutive of social reality
(slamolu, 2004), it could be suggestible that the international treaties have been
constitutive of an international social reality. As the case with national law and rules,
international treaties represent different configurations of power.
the Macedonian Question was rooted in the diplomatic arrangements that
collectively settled the Great Eastern Crisis of 1876-78. Macedonia was not only the
primary target of Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian expansionism, but also a source of
considerable consternation for the Great Powers. Then the Treaties of Berlin and
Constantinople, which were concluded in 1878 and 1881, respectively, dramatically
altered the geopolitical situation in the Balkans. The redistribution of Ottoman territory
left Greece and Serbia in possession of areas that bordered the three Ottoman
provinces that made up Macedonia (Gerolymatos, 2002: 190).

Gerolymatoss paragraph can be rephrased as the Berlin Treaty represented a

configuration of national/ethnic/international power balances in the Balkans. The
parties to the treaty tried to realize their own interests through deliberations,
contestations and compromises. In this sense, articles of the Berlin Treaty reflected
the configuration of interests in the Balkans at the end of the 19th century.
What were these power configurations? In order to answer this question, we have to
remember the consequences of the Russo-Turkish War of 1876-77. Since the
Ottoman Empire was defeated by Russia, the Treaty of San Stefano gave Russia
considerable influence in the Balkans, causing much dissatisfaction among the
Balkan States (Stavrianos, 1958: 408-10). Unavoidably, the Great Powers decided to
hold a new congress in Berlin to solve the problems over the Balkans.
The participants at the Berlin Congress, held on 13 June-13 July 1878, were the
representatives of different interests over the region. The treaty was prepared and
signed for defining the new political environment of the Balkans, which the Great
Powers of Europe; Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Russia, and
21

Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, since the young states of the peninsula, Serbia
and Greece, did not want this region to remain under Russian influence, they wanted
to have a say in the Balkans, to avoid from the formation of the Great Bulgaria.
According to the Berlin Treaty, the Rumeli provinces would remain under Ottoman
rule. Bulgaria would extend from the Danube River to the Mount Stara Planina.
Eastern Rumeli (today Southern Bulgaria) would remain as an autonomous region.
Bosnia and Herzegovina would be annexed by Austria-Hungary, and Montenegro
and Serbia would gain their independence from the Ottoman Empire. Obviously, this
new configuration of interests pointed to many conflicts in the region. Firstly,
Bulgaria could not realize its Greater Bulgaria dream. It could not even send a
representative to the Congress. Secondly, although the Rumeli provinces remained
under Ottoman rule, the treaty did not end the claims of the neighboring states.
Consequently, as Rumeli could not be shared between irredentist nation states of the
Balkans, the Berlin Treaty transformed Eastern Question into the Macedonian
Question. When this question was named as Eastern Question, it was pointing out
the issues between the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan nations, in which were trying
to gain their independence. However, with the Berlin Treaty these issues crystallized
with the scrambling of the Rumeli, or the only part of the Balkans that stayed under
Ottoman rule.
The Berlin Congress did not only establish an independent Bulgaria, but also
provided full independence to Romania and Serbia, while Austria-Hungary annexed
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Following the Congress, the Balkan states became the
independent political actors of the international arena.
From the point of view of this study, since it stated that the Ottoman government had
to implement several reforms, the most significant article of the Berlin Treaty was
article 23.
The Sublime Porte undertakes scrupulously to apply in the Island of Crete the Organic
Law of 1868 with such modifications as may be considered equitable. Similar laws
adapted to local requirements, excepting as regards the exemption from taxation
granted to Crete, shall also be introduced into the other parts of Turkey in Europe
(emphasis are mine) 1 for which no special organization has been provided by the
1

It is significant that the treaty mentions the region as the parts of Turkey in Europe. Doubtless, it
was the language of diplomacy. In this period the naming of the region was a highly contested one.
Harris emphasizes the problem over the usage of different names for Macedonia: The term
Macedonia does not appear of ten on modern maps, but it is in common use in a variety of ways,
some of which are very confusing The name is usually employed in its most restricted and
22

present treaty. The Sublime Porte shall depute special commissions, in which the native
element shall be largely represented, to settle the details of the new laws in each
province. The schemes of organization resulting from these labors shall be submitted
for examination to the Sublime Porte, which, before promulgating the Acts for putting
them into force, shall consult the European Commission 2 instituted for Eastern
Rumeli. 3

According to Aram Andonyan, who is an Armenian Ottoman intellectual, article 23

stated that Ottoman Rumeli an autonomous region was under the control of the
European Commission. In order to prevent this autonomy, the Ottoman government
offered a reform project, which was more substantial than Europeans had demanded.
Eastern European Commission approved the draft law inclusive of the reforms,
which was called Rumeli Vilayat Kanunu (The Law of Rumeli Provinces) on 23
August 1880 (Andonyan, 2002: 202). 4 Rumeli provinces included Uskub (Skopje),
Monastir (Bitolya), Kosovo and todays Northern Greece or Aegean Macedonia.
From the Ottoman point of view, this reform project had two aspects. First, it made
concessions both to the Great Powers of Europe and to the non-Muslim population
most of whom were affected by the Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian nationalisms.
probably its most correct- meaning to designate that region of the Balkans embraced within the three
Turkish vilayets of Salonika, Monastir and Kosovo... (1913B; 205). Never using the term
Macedonia Ottomans instead referred to it as Rumeli. On the other hand, this region was
Macedonia for especially Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian nationalists, which were demanding
Macedonia as a part of their national territory. Consequently, the European diplomacy pointed out the
region as the European Turkey or the parts of Turkey in Europe refraining from offending any of
the concerned parties.
2
With the Berlin Treaty, a new province was formed and entitled Eastern Rumeli in southern
Balkans. It would be remain under Ottoman rule, with conditions of administrative autonomy (article
13). A Christian Governor General would govern it. A European Commission would be formed with
the representatives of the Great Powers to arrange the new administration in the region, in concert
with the Ottoman government (article 15) (Aydn, 1992; 17-19). The same European Commission
would also supervise the reforms in Rumeli vilayets. Eastern Rumeli unified with Bulgaria in 1885.
This experience also affected the reform policies of the Ottoman government. Because of this
experience, naturally, Ottoman governments were not voluntary to give such an autonomy to the
regions were highly effected by the nationalistic policies of the Balkan states.
3
Treaty between Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Russia, and Turkey for the
Settlement of Affairs in the East: Signed at Berlin, July 13, 1878, The American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 2, No. 4, Supplement: Official Documents, October 1908, p. 412
4
Another case for similar practice that Ottoman administration gave some privileges to a region is
Lebanon. In Lebanon the problems between Druzes and the Marronites had been turned into an
international problem. With the British and French armed intervention in 1861, the Ottoman
government accepted to implement similar reforms in Lebanon. With these reforms, Lebanon had a
special semi-independent provincial status: Mount Lebanon would be organized into a special
Ottoman governorate, or mutasarrifiyya. A Christian governor was to head the mutasarrifiyya. He
would be appointed by and directly responsible to the Sublime Porte (the Ottoman government)
(Akarl, 1993: 33). All religious communities of Lebanon would send a representative to provincial
administration. A central council would be formed with two elected representatives from these
religious communities. Ortayl emphasizes that neither vilayet law of 1864, nor 1871 included the
arrangement that these religious communities sent representative to local councils as electing among
their members. It was a privilege that Ottoman administration accepted as a diplomatic concession in
Lebanon (Ortayl, 2000; 51).
23

Secondly, it was a sort of diplomatic trick to gain time for a more advantageous
resolution in Rumeli.
The most significant characteristic of the Law of 1880 was its repeated emphasis on
the multi-lingual and multi-religious structure of the region. It constituted the region
as a kind of colonial province. There would be local parliaments in each vilayet.
These parliaments could negotiate the activities of the Ottoman central government
within their borders. The Ottoman central government would send a governor to the
vilayets, however, since he was only the representative of the central government on
the local autonomous administrative structure, that governor looked like a modern
colonial one. According to article 23 of the Berlin Treaty, the Ottoman government
had to take the approval of the European Commission, which was formed by the
diplomats of the Great Powers of Europe. The Berlin Treaty also determined the
preparation process of the law. Several special commissions would be formed in the
provinces, and each would send their reports included local needs. The Ottoman
government manipulated these local commissions, and never applied the law of
1880. The law was a kind of diplomatic concession to the local rebels and the
European Great Powers. Obviously, such a reform project stated with the Law of
1880 was decentralizing the Ottoman administration in the Rumeli provinces.
The main problem of the Ottoman government was its inner conflict between the
required concessions for such reforms and its demand for the centralization of its
administration. It seems the multi-religious and multi-lingual social structure of the
region was a sort of legitimacy tool for the Great Powers to intervene to the Ottoman
affairs in the Rumeli. Since they advocated the rights of non-Muslims and tried to
provide an environment that the non-Muslims could take posts at the different levels
of administration.
However, especially under the reign of Abdulhamid II, the Ottoman bureaucracy was
trying to transform the empire into a modern central state on the base of being
Ottoman. They were trying to create an Ottoman identity (Deringil, 2002, 74).
The policy to provide equal rights for non-Muslims was emphasizing this demand.
However, giving privileges to the non-Muslims was damaging this idea. Thus, while
the Ottoman governments were giving diplomatic concessions with several reform

24

projects to the non-Muslims and their European protectors, at the same time, they
resisted to implementation of those reforms 5
In this chapter, I will summarize and discuss the articles of Law of Rumeli Provinces
of 1880, which address the multi-lingual and multi-religious social structure of the
region. First, I will point to the significance of this text, which was never put in
effect: Both the Berlin Treaty and the Law of Rumeli Vilayets represented
imaginings on the part of European Powers about the way they wanted to see the
Balkans, as a multi-lingual, a multi-religious, civil society environment. This
construct remained awkward in the late 19th century environment of centralizing
states with rising nationalist sentiments. But then, for the European Powers the multilingual and multi-religious social order may have provided space for intervention to
the Ottoman domains. Such an intervention aimed at transforming the Balkans in
such a way that it would be ungovernable by the modernizing, centralizing Ottoman
State.
The Ottoman bureaucracy and diplomats reacted both to the Treaty and to the Law of
Rumeli Provinces, which was formulated in compliance with article 23 of the Berlin
Treaty. They were aware of the Great Powers intentions and in the drafting of the
Law, an attempt was made to fashion the Law in such a way as to meet the
expectations of the Europeans. At the same time, as is evidenced, in the Ottoman
reluctance to the foreign interventions to the domestic affairs, the Ottoman
bureaucracy was caught between its needs to centralize its administration and the
effects of the European intervention, which had decentralizing effects. I will discuss
the reactions against the law and the foreign intervention, in the third chapter.
Article 23 can be summarized in 3 points: Firstly, it recast the administration in the
Rumeli provinces and established the autonomy of the region and as had earlier been
done in the case of Crete 6 . Second, the article established special commissions,
5

In 1880, when this law was prepared, Sadrazam Mehmed Said Pasha (or Kk Said Paa) who was
Sadrazam in 1912 July was Sadrazam as well. With the order of Abdlhamit II, he prepared a project
about centralization of the Ottoman administration. This is meaningful to show the Ottoman
bureaucracys conflict between European intervention to decentralized Ottoman administration and
Ottomans own centralization needs. For a brief biography of Sadrazam Mehmed Said Pasha see
Kuran, 1970.
6
Because of the revolts in 1841, 1858, and 1867 the Ottoman government accepted to implement
some reforms in Crete. The special condition of Crete was determined with Halepa Mukavelenamesi
(Halepa Agreement, 23 October 1868). According to this agreement, the governor general of Crete
would be appointed for 5 years by the Ottoman government among local Christians. His
25

consisting of local people represented, determined the details of the new

administration. Third, this article granted rights of approval to the European states. In
fact, a European Commission consisting of representatives of the Great Powers was
formed for Eastern Rumeli. This commission also set out to form a new
administration for the Rumeli provinces. It is obvious that, the provisions of article
23 took away the administrative abilities of the Ottoman central government. The
Ottoman government even lost the right to organize a new administration in the
Rumeli Provinces, because the government had to take into consideration the needs
of the local commissions and get the approval of the European Commission.
The Ottoman government prepared the Law of Rumeli Provinces under these
conditions. The government formed numerous local commissions while preparing
the law. However, it seems there were issues about the representation of the local
inhabitants of the provinces. The government appointed its own officials and the
people more loyal to the central government to these commissions, and, as I will
mention later, this situation caused problems in the preparation process of the draft
law. The local Christian inhabitants of the provinces sent petitions to the European
Commission complaining of the policies of the central government, which prevented
the local representatives taking part in the commissions (Bozhinov and Panayotov,
1978).
The draft law included many details that should normally be part of a constitution. It
began with a chapter defining the rights of citizens for this region alone, then it
constituted a provincial parliament, and then it defined other institutions of a state,
including a separate election procedure. The significance of the text of the draft law
is that it emphasized the multi-lingual and multi-religious character of the region.
The draft law called for representation of local Christians and other religious
communities at every level of the administration in Rumeli provinces.
Administration of these provinces was reorganized in hierarchically clustered local
commissions (from the level of nahiye to the vilayets, every district has a
undersecretary would be Muslim. A general council would be formed in the island with 80 members,
49 of them non-Muslim. This council would decide on local issues and meet once a year. The general
council had the authority for collecting tax and for controlling local incomes and expenditures. The
island was divided into 5 vilayets. Each vilayet would be administered by a Muslim or non-Muslim
governor. If the governor was Muslim his undersecretary would be non-Muslim or vice versa. The
officers in Crete would be elected among local peoples. These reforms would be a kind of example for
other parts of Ottoman territory (Tokay, 1995; 24).
26

commission), which the elected and natural members representing the local
inhabitants at every level. The natural members of the local commissions were
basically the religious leaders and the officials of the central state. Elected members
of the commissions came throughout the multiple-level constituency elections in
nahiyes, kazas, sancaks and vilayets. On top of the hierarchy of these commissions
was a General Council, apparently similar to a local or federal parliament at each
vilayet.
The draft law guaranteed the representation of the different lingual or religious
communities in the General Council. In addition, central government had to prefer
the people, knowledgeable in local languages and customs, to appoint to the
administrative positions. Every law to be applied in the region had to be translated
into local languages. Similarly, in the courts, people could use their motherlanguages, and (if it was possible) the judges and attorney generals had to be
knowledgeable in local languages. In fact, the draft law reconstituted the Rumeli
administration within autonomous lingual and religious communities, since
administrative hierarchy in every district (throughout the local commissions) had its
own autonomy to manage its domestic issues, and the authority to monitor the
workings of its sub-districts commissions. Furthermore, as independent from those
administrative councils and commissions, the draft law regarded the autonomy of the
vakfs of the religious communities. These vakfs had the right to manage the issues
remained under their control, like charity works, education and the issues about their
places of worship.
All these points show that the Law of Rumeli Provinces constituted not only the
administrative scheme of the Rumeli Provinces, but also the relationships between
Ottoman government and the multi-religious and multi-lingual society of the region.
Apparently, these councils constructed a multi-level negotiation between local
representatives (power holders) and the central government, throughout local
councils. The elected and religious leaders as natural members of the General
Council represented the local inhabitants, while the officials, as natural members of
the Council, represented the government. It means theoretically, the central
government could not do anything without the approval of these communities in the
region.
27

However, in this context, the new party of the negotiation process is the Great
Powers intervening into the Rumeli affairs of the Ottoman Empire throughout their
constituted legitimacy within international treaties. Especially the Berlin Treaty and
article 23 provided the authority to monitor Rumeli affairs of the Empire. The most
significant legitimizing tool of the Great Powers was the multi-religious and multilingual social structure of the region. It means, there were Christian populations in
the region, and the Great Powers got their protection authority within the
internationally constructed rules of inter-state relations. Together with the provisions
of the Law of Rumeli Provinces, the logical consequence of this situation was the
decentralization of Ottoman Rumeli.
At this point, I want to summarize the basic points of some articles of the draft law,
which outline the regions multi-lingual, multi-religious, decentralized social and
administrative structure.

I.1. Legal Status of the People of Rumeli Vilayets

The first chapter of the Law of Rumeli Provinces is entitled Ahali-i Vilayatn
Hukuk-u Umumiyesi, (the general legal status of the people of the vilayets). This
very formalization in the article suggests that a special status was given to the people
of Rumeli, since a vilayet law, and a constitution were already in place since 1864
(?). Moreover, the first article of the Law of Rumeli Provinces, declared that the
people of each Ottoman vilayet had legal status, which was granted by the
constitution (Kanuni Esasi, 1876) and the law of the provinces (vilayet law of 1864).
The second article of the layiha (draft), which was accepted, states that all people of
vilayets had equal rights and responsibilities under the law. The third article
guaranteed freedom of worship to all members of all religions, including officially
unrecognized ones, on condition that they did not violate the general customs and
public order. The fourth article guaranteed the personal freedom of all people of the
vilayets.
Articles 5-12 define the procedures for trials in the vilayets. According to these
articles, nobody could be arrested unless there was a call that shows because of
which crime, according to which law, he/she would be arrested, prepared by a judge.
28

If someone was caught red-handed, he must be tried in court within 24 hours.

Everyone had the right to be released on bail, and showing a sponsor, except there
was a danger that he/she could escape from the city. Additionally, policemen or
gendarme could not conduct searches on personal properties, unless a judge had
authorized it.
In articles 13 and 14, taxation was limited by considerations of the public interests
and public security as specified by laws. Article 15 guaranteed the right of residence
in all territory of the Empire for all citizens. Article 16 guaranteed immunity of
private property from unlawful intervention by third parties. Confiscation and forced
labor were banned, and limited by public interest (this was an issue well covered by
article 17). Article 18 recognized the freedom of education under the supervision of
government. Similarly, article 19 guaranteed freedom of press, and prohibited
investigation prior to publication.
Article 20 tried to distinguish properties of local and central governments. The
vacant places that belong to the miri would be left to the vilayet (valilik,
governorship, the representative of central administration) according to need, and the
empty spaces in cities and towns would be left to the municipalities.
Article 21 defined some particularities in regions, which were multi-religious and
multi-lingual. Firstly, this article declared that government could employ everybody
without regard to his/her ethnic origin, if there was need. More notably, in areas,
where the majority of population was Muslim, kaymakams (the head officials of
districts) and mutasarrfs (the governors of sancaks) would be appointed from among
Muslims, while in areas, where the majority were non-Muslims they would be
appointed from among non-Muslims. Finally, persons, who knew the local languages
in addition to Turkish, were preferred for these positions. However, nobody could be
appointed mutasarrif or kaymakam in his/her own district or township. Article 22
dictated that the official language was the lisan- Osmani (Ottoman). However,
people, who knew local languages, were preferred for the position of the judge
(hakim) and of the public prosecutor (mdde-i umumi). The mustantiks were
certainly appointed from among the people who knew local languages. The petitions
would be submitted to civil servants or judges, if it was necessary, could be written
in officially recognized languages of the country. The writs, official reports, court
29

records etc. were to be written in Turkish and the language that parties preferred.
Court procedures would be carried out in languages preferred by the parties. Laws
and other orders of governor in vilayets would be published both in Turkish and in a
principal language of that vilayet.
According to article 23, only either the government itself or the committees, which
were recognized by the central government, could accept petitions, which were
written by one or more persons, or a congregation. Article 24 declared that the
General Councils would be established in each vilayet. The majority of the members
of the councils would be elected by the people of a given vilayet (this articles details
are in the fourth chapter of the Law of Rumeli Provinces). Article 25 stated that in
vilayets government could use police and regular army to maintain public order and
security (It means irregular armies (babozuklar) could not be used, placing certain
restrictions on central government). Similarly, article 26 declares that the Circassian
(erkes) warriors would not be settled in those vilayets.
This chapter of the Law of Rumeli Provinces described the social environment of the
Rumeli vilayets of the Ottoman Empire. The most striking characteristic of the region
was that it was multi-lingual and multi-religious. No doubt, the articles and clauses
making it possible for persons of different religions to hold administrative positions,
the religions of administrators were concessions made by government to the nonMuslims of the region; the usage of local languages was more than a concession, but
also a way of establishing better administration.
It should be kept in mind that the Ottoman government recognized only the Greek
Orthodox Patriarchate and the Bulgarian Exarchate at that time. Thus, this article
meant that only these churches and the languages of these churches are acceptable
officially. It meant that unrecognized churches could not be represented at
administrative levels, such as catholic or protestant missionary churches.
Additionally, it should be noted that Serbia also had territorial demands over
Macedonia and it also tried to Serbianize Macedonia by the use of churches and
schools. However, for the Ottoman administration, the Serbian population did not
have a legal political or religious existence (Lange-Akhund, 1998: 58). After 1890s,
IMRO (Inner Macedonia Revolutionary Organization) would also try to establish an

30

autonomous Macedonian Church. Thus, this article limited the number of Christian
communities to officially recognized ones.

I.2. General Councils as Provincial Parliaments

The text of the Law of the Rumeli Provinces makes a distinction between the
authorities of local and central governments, and I believe this is one of its most
significant points. Governors in provinces represented the central government, while
the General Councils took decisions on the domestic issues of the vilayet.
The fourth chapter of the draft established the General Councils for each Rumeli
provinces named Vilayet Meclis-i Umumileri (Provincial General Councils). There
were three kinds of members in these General Councils. Firstly, the appointed
members (aza-y tabii), which are mfts, nakibs, the leaders of non-Muslim
communities, undersecretary of governor, defterdar, the directors of justice,
education, and the public works, and the inspectors of finance and justice. Secondly,
General Councils had elected members (aza-y mntehibe). According to article 69,
each kaza (district) was accepted as a single electoral district out of which two
representatives would be elected to the General Council. Half of the members of the
Council would be subject to by-elections in two years. These members of the
General Councils would receive salaries from the vilayet budgets. Thirdly, there were
various appointed members of the General Councils (aza-y mensube). The governor
would appoint those members from among the elites of the vilayet: primarily among
the most respected property owners, merchants, and tradesmen; secondarily among
experts of science and education, for four years (Law of Rumeli Provinces, article
72). The number of appointed members would be one out of four of elected members
at most.
The General Council met in the beginning of October each year, for two months. At
the end of two months, or when the topics of discussion were over, the governor
would adjourn the meeting. If there was a need for a longer time (a maximum of 15
days), the governor had to inform the central government. The governor could not
disband the General Council without the approval of the Council of Administration.
Under extraordinary conditions, the governor could decide to dispersal of the
General Council. In this case, the election had to be held within two months. The
31

General Council would decide with a simple majority of its members, and the all
votes were equal. According to article 78, no security personnel, except for
policemen, who were appointed for the security of the General Council, could enter
the sessions of the Council.
Articles 82 and 83 gave an autonomous status to the General Councils. According to
article 82, the General Council had the right to propose laws to the central
government, as to discuss the laws, which were sent by the central government. The
central government had to discuss the drafts sent from General Councils, and if the
central government could not discuss it in 4 months, it would be regarded as enacted
by central government. According to article 83, the governor was responsible not
only to the central government but also to the General Council, in the issues related
to the budget of vilayet. The governor had to seek the approval of the General
Council, before submitting the provincial budget to central government.
Article 84 made a distinction between the revenues and budgets of central
government and the vilayet. According to this article, the local government did not
have to aid the expenses of the central government related to military affairs.
Reciprocally, the local government did not have to share the revenues of central
governments investments, in postal services, customs, telegraph, the monopoly of
salt, the license of alcoholic drinks, official seals etc. However, all sources of
revenue of the vilayet, except the central governments investments were included to
vilayet budget. The 15 percent of these revenues were left to the General Council.
The whole cash of the vilayet was kept at the local branch of Bank- Osmani in the
account A. This account was divided into two sub-accounts under the signs of B
and C. The cash in account B was spent for the needs of local administration, and
the C was left to the national treasury. However, the central government (the
Ministry of Finance) had to request to use the account C. In the vilayet, the governor
and the defterdar, in livas the mutasarrf and the accountant, and in sancaks the
kaymakam and the director of public property (mal mdr) were the responsible for
the expenditures. All of them had to report to the General Council in its first session.
Additionally, the expenditures for justice, gendarme and police services belonged to
the General Council.

32

If the governor wished to spend more than his allocated budget line, he had to
consult with the General Council. Article 86 stated that the General Council, if it
wanted, could inspect the budgets of the Administration Councils of livas and inform
the governor. According to article 87, if it was necessary, the General Council could
earmark 1 percent of whole revenues of the vilayet for education and public
improvement (in addition to the vilayets portion of 15 per cent). According to article
89, councils of liva, and then the General Councils would solve the conflicts in areas
where the property survey (tahrir) was not completed; if there were a re-arrangement
in taxation, the General Council would inform the central government. Article 91
stated that if the central government wanted to levy new taxes, the General Council
would decide on how they would be collected.
Article 98 provided legal immunity for the members of the General Council, and
article 99 stated that the members of the General Council could submit the
documents about themselves in their own language.
All these articles show that the General Councils were, in fact, local parliaments of
the Rumeli Provinces, since they had the authority to enact laws on their own, and
propose laws in related to the local issues of vilayets- to the central government. All
vilayets had their own budgets. They were able to appoint civil servants.
These articles show that the General Council had complete autonomy on provincial
domestic issues. Moreover, the articles on the relations between governor
representing central government, and the General Council, show that this law defined
the negotiation process between the administrative center of the Empire and the
provinces. Basically, according to the draft law, the governor had to convince the
General Council while conducting his work.
Actually, these general councils can also be seen in the vilayet laws of 1864 (Vilayet
Nizamnamesi) and 1871 (dare-yi Umumiye-yi Vilayet Nizamnamesi). The main
difference of the general councils of the Law of 1880 is that these councils were
authorized in re-organization and implementation of laws of the Ottoman central
government. On the other hand, the definition of the general council in the vilayet
laws of 1864 and 1871 does not include that kind of authority, it had only a kind of
advisory role on the local issues of the vilayet: General council of vilayet discussed
about the issues relating to reparation of the roads and public buildings, and the
33

requests of local people about these issues. The council advised to governor about
the taxes that levied on people of vilayet. Then again, general council could not
decide about these issues. Members of general council could only explain their ideas.
However, the realization of these ideas and requests were depended on the policies of
central government. These councils did not have a judicial personality. Their
meetings did not have any practical reason, these meetings were shows (Ortayl,
2000; 90-91). In the vilayet laws of 1864 and 1871 since general council did not have
any legislative and executive authority, the administrative council had a more central
role in the vilayet administration. It seems the Law of 1880 tried to provide
autonomy throughout strengthening general council as ornamenting it with
legislative and executive authorities, since the council were formed with elected
members, instead of appointed ones as administrative council.

I.3. Election Procedure

The election procedure, which was defined in the text of the law, gave substance to
the General Councils. According to the procedure, every religious and lingual
community had equal rights to send representative to the Councils.
The rules of the election were arranged in chapter 12. The first subtitle of this chapter
is about voter lists. Accordingly, to be eligible, a candidate had to be an Ottoman
citizen, and at least 21 years of age. He had to be a regular taxpayer. A conviction for
murder would make him ineligible. Eligibility would be limited to property owners,
merchants, craftsmen and their sons. Ulema (scholars), priests, members of the
clergy, teachers, doctors, judges, officials, and people who were educated at the
Darlfnun or a foreign university and received a diploma, were exempted from the
precondition of taxpaying and property ownership. Soldiers, gendarmes and
policemen were ineligible during their term of office. Additionally, the law brought
forth the literacy requirement, which would be valid after 15 years from the
enactment of the law.
Councils of Elders (ihtiyar heyetleri) would prepare the voter lists to be re-arranged
every September. These had to be displayed in a public place. The objections to the
lists had to be submitted to the ihtiyar heyeti within 15 days. The Community
34

Councils and the Councils of Elders were elected every year, and members could be
reelected.
After these general conditions, the law puts forth the rules of nahiye elections. The
candidates of the Nahiye Councils had to pay a minimum of 50 kuru in taxes and to
reside at that nahiye. Ineligible people included those who were not subject to civil
law (in its entirety or partially), convicted of murder or ordinary crimes, or servicing
a foreign country and had applied for citizenship of a foreign country.
Then the law arranged the elections in kazas. Article 199 stated that the candidates of
kaza councils should pay at least 100 kuru (in addition to other conditions as
specified for nahiye elections). The nahiye councils would elect them for 2 years.
According to article 208, candidates for liva councils should pay at least 150 kuru of
tax. The members of nahiye councils would elect them. Each liva would send two
members to the General Council elected from among its own members.
Roles of the nahiye, kaza and sancak administrative councils were very important in
the administrative scheme of the provinces, because of the multiple-level election
process, which was defined by the draft law. Then, these councils structures
determined the structure of the General Councils. These local councils were to be
formed basically by the officials of central government and the representatives of the
local population. For instance, according to article 114, every liva has its own
administrative council, and the work of these councils were basically discussing and
deciding the mutasarrfs activities and the disagreements between the local people
and the officials. These councils were composed of the mutasarrf, his assistant, and
the accountant of liva, mft, the leaders of the non-Muslim communities, and the 6
elected members from the administrative councils of kazas. Similarly, every kaza had
its own administrative council, which was formed in the same way: The elected
members of a given kaza sent by the administrative councils of nahiyes depended on
the kaza.
Since religious leaders were the natural members of the local administrative councils,
one could claim that the multi-lingual and multi-religious structure of the provinces
was reflected in the councils by this election procedure.

35

I.4. The Status of Governors and Other Officials of the Central Government
The second chapter of the Law of Rumeli Provinces was on governors (Valilere
Dair). Article 27 (the first article of this section) stated that the governors were the
chief administrative officials appointed for 5 years as Sultans deputy in the vilayets.
Article 28 pointed that these governors were only responsible to the central
government in issues related to their mission.
Article 30 arranged the extraordinary situations: According to this article, the
governor could declare idare-i rfiye (state of emergency) in one or more districts
in his region. State of Emergency could be declared if the population disobeyed a law
or order, causing civil strife that could not be suppressed by regular means. The
governor had to send a written decree together with the reasons for declaring the
State of Emergency immediately to the central government. Once the reasons for
declaration were over, the State of Emergency had to be abolished.
Articles 31 and 32 highlighted the authority of the governor as the chief of the local
officials: Governors would oversee the application of laws and orders. They would
supervise the officials, which were either popularly elected or appointed by
governors. Governors could not create new official posts unless specified by laws.
All officials without exception were under the governors command. The
gendarmeries and the policemen of the vilayets were as well under the command of
governors.
Article 33 stated that the governor would call for election for the Provincial General
Councils, Councils of Administration, Municipality Councils and Nahiye Councils.
Then the governor would call General Councils for meeting, and report to the
Council on his responsibility areas and activities, and adjourn the sessions.
However, according to article 34 governors were responsible also to the General
Council on provincial income and budget any issues. In addition, according to article
43, the authority of the governor to spend money from his budget was limited by the
determination of the General Council; the governor could use unallocated monies
only under extraordinary conditions to keep general security in a given province after
he convinced the General Council and the central government.

36

The governor would manage the province together with the provincial
Administrative

Council.

The

Administrative

Council

consisted

of

both

representatives of local inhabitants and central government. The third chapter of the
draft law, which arranged the central administration of vilayets, determined the
structure the Administrative Councils. According to the chapter, the erkan- vilayet
(Administrative Council) of the vilayet included mstear (undersecretary), defterdar
(the head of the financial department), adliye mdr (the director of justice),
mektupu (secretary), the directors of agriculture, commerce and the public works,
zaptiye alay beyi (the commander of security troops), mft (the leader of the
Muslim community), the leaders of the non-Muslim communities, and the 8
representatives of the General Council.
The Administrative Council could not intervene with the Governors daily work.
However, if the Governor seeks their opinion the Council could state its own take on
the issues. Additionally, the Governor had to confer with the Administrative Council
in the emergency issues not mentioned in the laws. The Administrative Council
could also discuss the Governors precautionary measures. In those cases the
governor had to inform the central government, as well. If the situation was too
critical to wait for the answer of the central government, the governor could take
precautionary measures by taking full personal responsibility. Article 53 stated that if
the central government did not answer the governors question in three months, it
meant that the application was accepted.
Following that point the draft law started to define members of the Administrative
Council in terms of their authority and responsibility. Mstear (undersecretary) was
similar to a deputy-governor. In ordinary periods, he would carry on the relationship
with the religious communities and would manage their issues. Thus, if the governor
was Muslim, he should be non-Muslim or vice-versa. Additionally, he was
responsible for collecting and keeping the statistical data on the population of the
vilayet.
Defterdar (the head of financial office) was in charge of the financial issues of the
vilayet, such as taxes and other financial claims of the central government, public
revenues, and the preparation of the budget of vilayet. He was responsible both to the
governor and the Ministry of Finance in the central government.
37

Adliye Mdr (Director of Justice) was basically an intermediate person between

the laws and the local councils. He would declare the central administrations laws
and orders to the local appliers.
Mektupu (a secretary of sorts) was in charge of the written documents of the central
administration of vilayet. Directors of agriculture, commerce, and the public
improvement simply would manage these sectors according to the directives of the
central government in line with the public interest.
Similarly, Maarif Mdr (the director of education) was responsible for the
education issues. In the section on the directors of general education, it seems the
most important item was article 63. According to this article, the revenues of the
religion-based community vakfs were allocated to these communities schools.
These communities under the supervision of the director of education spent these
revenues.
Chapter 16 was on the civil servants of the vilayets. According to the general
principles of this chapter, every civil servant was responsible to the central
government in all their activities. If the citizens were to sue the civil servants, and if
the courts decide there was a misuse by them; the civil servants would compensate
the damages done by their acts. If he could not provide compensation, the citizen
could seek compensation from the government. In this case, the government would
pay only the material damages. According to article 292 the directors of the vilayets
could be elected from among the members of General Councils.
The situation of the governor seems very conflicted, since he was an in-between
situation with General Council and the central government. He was similar to an
appointed prime minister to a mostly elected local parliament. Because of his doubly
representative role, he had to convince both central government and General Council.
From the central governments point of view, he represented the local parliaments
demand. On the other hand he was the representative of the central government in the
province, which had even its own parliament. From this perspective he could be seen
as a colonial governor of sorts.

38

I.5. Religious Communities and Education

Chapter 8 established the Community Councils. Article 141 establishes at each kaza,
Community Councils made up of each religious community (Muslim and nonMuslim). The members of these Councils were elected from among the members of
the communities. The trustees of the vakfs (which are founded by the communities)
could not become members of the Councils. The job of the Councils was basically
organizing the spending of the revenues of vakfs according to the communitys
needs. Although there was no limit for the community needs or services, the law
refers only the fields of schools, places of worship, funerals and charity functions.
The reference of the Community Councils was primarily the local administrative
councils, secondly the General Councils, and in the field of education the
Educational Councils. In addition, the primary schools and the junior high schools
(rdiye) were under the authority of the respective religious communities. In
addition, the incomes of these schools ware left to these communities (article 266,
chapter 14).
Chapter 15 also organized the rights and responsibilities of religious communities. It
concerns the sects (mezahib). According to this chapter every religious community
had equal guarantees, immunities and privileges. Every officially recognized
religious community could elect its own leaders and nobody could intervene with the
relationships between these communities and people. Every priest kept all his rights
while he traveled to Rumelis other vilayets. In addition, their rights were valid in all
Ottoman lands as well.
The property rights were respected for every officially recognized sect. These
properties could only be expropriated if there was a certain public benefit involved.
The residences of the clergy members (regardless of their position), and the buildings
used for charity were exempted from all taxes. These religious communities had to
provide for the needs of their own schools and temples. The places and the
investments of the religious communities, which were not used for educational,
religious or charity purposes, were subject of taxes like ordinary places and
investments.
Chapter 14 organized the educational system in Rumeli. According to article 265, all
schools of vilayet were subject to centrally instituted laws, implementation of which
39

was under the supervision of the vilayet director of education. The share of the
community schools in the budget was proportional to their original contribution into
the budget of vilayet. However, the primary schools and the junior high schools
(rdiye) were under the control of respective religious communities. As well the
incomes of these schools were left to these communities.
Article 267 organized the foundation of universities in vilayets. According to the
article, while the governor elected the teachers of the university, he had to consider
the proportions of religious communities in vilayet. In addition, although the official
medium of instruction of the universities was Ottoman, education could also be
carried out in different languages. According to article 268 every religious
community had the right to establish schools. Article 269 stated that every child of 613 years old either had to go to school, or go through home schooling. No child had
to learn the religion beyond his/her own. The inspectors of education were also being
appointed among the religious community, which was the founder of the school.
Primary schools students were educated in only their mother tongue.
The problem of education and churches had always been important in the
relationships between the Christian population of Rumeli and the Ottoman Empire.
These articles importance is based on one of the main problems (the problem of
schools and churches- Mektepler ve Kiliseler Meselesi) of the years following the
revolution in 1908. In fact, all churches of Rumeli were dependent on the
Patriarchate. When the Bulgarian Exarchate split away from the Patriarchate, many
of the churches of the Slavic communities preferred to be dependent on the Bulgarian
church. Churches were the main contested area of the Bulgarian and Greek
nationalisms in this period. Following 1908 revolution, the CUP government formed
a commission within Bulgarian and Greek communities to solve the problems
between these two churches. Then, the government decided that the majority of the
population had the right to establish church in a given town or village. The
Patriarchate resisted this decision. Then, the government decided that Bulgarian
Exarchate could found churches only those places the Bulgarian population had a 2/3
majority. Besides, government would found the church and school for people who
were not members to either church. (Selahaddin, 1914: 69-70). It seems there was no
way to satisfy those two churches, because of their competition over the Balkan
40

people. Churches were the most important spaces of propaganda for Bulgarian and
Greek nationalisms over Rumeli together with schools.
At this point, I would like to remember the special status of Orthodox Church in
Ottoman Empire, because this special status gave opportunity to Greek subjects of
the Empire awaring their national identity earlier than other ethnies 7 of the
Balkans.
By making all Romans (formerly Orthodox subjects of the Byzantine Empire)
members of the Ottoman Rum millet, the Ottomans officially sanctioned the Churchs
Orthodox universalism, thus facilitating the legitimation of Grecophone ecclesiastical
elites over the Balkan ethnies. Additionally, after 1453, the Church assumed
jurisdiction over the civil affairs of the Orthodox communities (Roudometof,

1998; 18)
This special status provided a great opportunity to the church to constitute its
hegemony all peoples of the Balkans. First of all the Greek Patriarchate was an
Ottoman institution derived from its Byzantine counterpart. Moreover, Roudometof
mentions that the Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul gave a very important ideological
service to Ottoman Empire, especially in the era that liberal and nationalistic ideas
was raising. The Patriarchate of Istanbul did not support the Greek national
revolution, because of its secular position. Istanbul Patriarchate had always worked
together with Ottoman Sultan (Macar, 2003; 45). In 1833, the Greek Patriarchate had
been founded. However, the Istanbul Patriarchate would regard it 17 years later. The
conflict between ecumenical Patriarchate of Istanbul and national church of
Greece did not end (Macar, 2003: 47). After Greek historiography re-invented
Byzantium Empire as historical root of Greek nation, the problems between these
two churches were softened. On the other hand, after Greek Revolution of 1821, the
power of Greeks in Istanbul reduced. Ottoman administration did not give them
important posts in state administration, and preferred Armenian and Muslim people
(Macar, 2003: 47)
Even though, the hegemony of the Istanbul Patriarchate in the Balkans was also
strengthened by the Ottoman administration to establish its supremacy over
7

It is very hard to use the term nation for these groups in the Balkans, especially in this period.
Roudometof uses the term etnie for these distinct groups of the Balkans: Contrary to modern
secular nations, characterized as they are by a mass public culture, common economy, and the legal
rights and duties of their members, ethnies are predominately premodern social formations.
Membership in an ethnie does not necessarily lead to attributing political significance to ethnic
differences. I would like to suggest that Greeks, Albanians, Bulgarians, Serbs, and Romanians were
ethnies in the Ottoman Balkans, and were clearly aware of their differences (Roudometof, 1998; 12).
41

Bulgarian or Serbian churches in the Balkans (Lange-Akhund, 1998: 26) in the

second half of the 18th century:
In 1766 and 1767, Patriarch Samuel, citing huge deficits as his reasons and the
involvement of the local pashas in the election of archbishops, reluctantly subsumed the
autocephalous archbishops of Pec and Ohrid under the ecumenical seat. This
expansion of the Patriarchates authority has been interpreted as proof of Greek
domination over other Balkan peoples (Roudometof, 1998; 19-20).

Since, the role of Greeks changed in the 18th century, when Balkan ethnies became
aware about their national identities and claim national independence from the
Ottoman administration, they also wanted to found their national churches as
breaking away from the Istanbul Patriarchate.
The reception of Enlightenment into Orthodox Balkan society led to a growing trend
toward secularization and critical thinking The central place of ancient Greece
within the Western Enlightenment led to a reconstitution of the relationship between
modern Greeks (Greek-Orthodox) and ancient Greeks (Hellenes) (Roudometof,

1998: 32).
With these developments, the Greek identity started to be independent from
Orthodox Church and secularized itself. Thus it can be said that, Orthodox
Patriarchate of Istanbul (Byzantine legacy) lost its power, together with Ottoman
Empire:
modern concepts of secular statehood and nationality associated with the ideas of
the Enlightenment and Western rationalism came to disrupt and subvert both Ottoman
rule and Orthodox unity in the Balkans. The eventual conflicting nationalisms which
sprang out of this ideological transformation were the forces that brought the hared
Byzantine legacy to an end in Balkan Society (Kitromilides, 1989; 152).

Naturally, the Istanbul Patriarchate resisted to this ideological transformation that

Kitromilides mentioned above (Kitromilides, 1989; 159). Hence, in the 19th century
and more than ever after the Tanzimat reforms, the relationship between Patriarchate,
Ottoman administration and the Christian populations became very problematic,
because of the rise of the separatist Bulgarian and Romanian clergies. In fact, for
Bulgarians liberating themselves from the Ottoman Empire and liberating their
church from the Greek Patriarchate was the same. In 1870, the Ottoman Empire
allowed the formation of the Bulgarian Exarchate. It was the official beginning of the
competition between two churches. This struggle was also linked to the organization
of schools and to education, which was under the authority of the churches (LangeAkhund, 30).

42

On the other hand, because of the Greek initiative on the traditional Orthodox
Patriarchate of Istanbul, the relationship between Greek nation and the Istanbul
Patriarchate was the most problematic one among other Balkan nations.
The proclamation of the independence of the Church of Greece from the Patriarchate
of Constantinople was urged in the very first year of the War of Independence The
independence of the Church of Greece, which according to Orthodox canon law could
only be granted by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, was proclaimed
unilaterally by a local synod of Greek bishops in 1833 at the initiative of the Bavarian
regency. This move was never recognized by the Patriarchate in 1850, with the
eventual total conversion of the Church of Greece to the secular values of Greek
nationalism and its transformation into an official arm of the civil state, to the point
that the Church of Greece spearheaded all nationalist initiatives in the latter part of the
nineteenth and throughout the twentieth century (Kitromilides, 1989; 165-166).

Greek Church and the schools that were founded as dependent to the Church became
the main tools of the Hellenization of Orthodox population. This method would be
followed by also Bulgarian and Serb nationalists in the Balkans. At the end, the
issues about the schools and churches would continue and became one of the reasons
of the Balkan Wars.
I.6. Courts
According to the draft law, every nahiye had a court of peace (Sulh mahkemesi). The
governor would appoint the head of the court, and the head of the court had two
assistants (one Muslim and one non-Muslim) elected by the nahiye council. The
courts of liva were arranged with articles 219-228. In every liva there should be a
judge, an interrogator judge, and two assistants. The governor would appoint the
judge for this court. In every liva court, there should be an attorney general and few
interrogators.
With articles 229-237, the draft arranged the vilayet courts of appeal. Every vilayet
had a judge, two advisors, and two assistants (one Muslim, one non-Muslim). The
central government would appoint the head of the court of appeal and advisors, while
the General Council would elect assistants (one Muslim, one non-Muslim) and
Ministry of Justice would appoint them. In every court of appeal there should be an
attorney general (basavc), and few interrogators.
The courts of liva would hold the appeal cases, which were sent by lower courts, and
the personal, legal, and commercial cases involving assets worth up to 5000 kuru. In
murder cases and cases involving assets worth more than 5000 kuru, the appeal
43

right was reserved. The appeals of the liva courts were hold in Istanbul. The appeal
courts of vilayet would hold the appeals from liva courts and the murder cases. This
courts appeals could be hold only in Istanbul.
In the chapter titled Mevaid-i Mahsusa (The Special Conditions), the draft law
stated some details on the courts. According to article 243, contracts and the
privileges of the foreigners were reserved. The judge of appeal and the attorney
general should hold a diploma from Darlfnun or should have served as judge or
attorney general in Istanbul for a minimum of 5 successive years. The trials were
open to the public, if there was no need for closed meetings. Article 247 stated that
the testimonies of non-Muslims and Muslims were considered equal. Article 248
guaranteed the independence of courts; no civil servant could intervene to the courts.
Additionally, article 251 stated that neither heads of courts nor the advisors of the
courts of appeal were dismissible. According to article 252 the authorities of the
justice and administration were certainly separated. The Nizamiye Courts could
accept direct petitions. The civil servants and the gendarmes had to help to the courts
to their decisions.

I.7. Security
Chapter 17 is on the gendarmerie and the police force. According to the chapter, in
cities and villages, primarily the gendarmerie, secondarily the police force was
responsible for public security. They were under the supervision of vilayet. The
vilayet kol aas (Director of Security) had the authority to appoint police officers,
but on the issues of public order, he was under the supervision of the Ministry of
Military Affairs. The gendarmerie was financed from the vilayet budget (from out of
the A account of vilayet). Muslims and non-Muslims should be chosen for the
security offices in proportion to their population in the vilayets. The salaries of the
security personnel of the vilayet would not be less than the salaries of the central
army members. Article 310 stated that the foreigner (European) officers could be
employed in gendarmerie troops. Following that the draft detailed the responsibilities
of security troops and the hierarchy in these troops.
The law ended with the chapter entitled Fasl- Mahsus (the Special Chapter).
Article 327 stated that all laws, which were not comfortable with this law, would be
44

dismissed.
In summary, the concluding paragraph of the chapter says:
We, the members of the European Commission on Eastern Rumeli approved and
sealed this draft which was proposed to fulfill the requirements of article 23 of the
Treaty of Berlin on July 13th, 1878. This draft law sent by Bab- Ali consists of
administrative details of the Ottoman provinces of Rumeli 8 .

8 Babali 13 Temmuz sene 78 tarihinde Berlin'de akdolunan muahedenamenin yirmi nc bendi ahkamn icraen muahedename-i mezkurede kendileri
iin tekilat- mahsusa tasrih klnlan Rumeli'deki vilayat- ahaneye idhal klnacak nizamat hakknda Rumeli-i arki-i Avrupa komisyonunun rey ve
mutalaasn istifsar etmi olmakla muahedename-i mezkuri imzalayan devletlerin komiserleri bulunan muharririn imza ibu nizamname layihasnn canib-i
Babaliden tarafmza tebli klnan layiha zerine icra ettikleri tetkikatn neticesi ettiini beyan ederek tasdiken lil-mekal ibu nizamname layihasn imza ve
armal mhrlerimizle temhir eyledik.. The following have signed this draft on 23 August 1880, in Istanbul: Asm (Hariciye Nazr The Minister of
External Affairs- Asm Paa), Sahak Abro Efendi (ura-y Devlet Azas-The Member of ura-y Devlet), Msy Kuan from Austria, Broneoyan from
Germany, Obara from France, Fiy Moris from Great Britain, Vernoni from Italy, and Hitrov from Russia.

45

Chapter II
The Resistance of the Ottoman Administration to Reforms, and the Restoration
of the Law of Rumeli Provinces in 1912
In this chapter, I will try to explain the opposition of the Ottoman bureaucracy to the
law and the changes made in the draft law of 1880 to avoid the coming war in 1912.
The simple evidence for the fact that the Ottoman bureaucracy rejected these reforms
in Rumeli is that the law was never implemented. The central government attempted
to manipulate the text to suit its own purposes. Ahmed Selahaddin summarizes how
that manipulation took place:
In the light of the contents of article 23 of the Berlin Treaty, these reforms were
accepted in 1880. However, it was not implemented as it was declared in the Treaty.
Despite reassurance that the reforms would be discussed in specially constructed local
commissions, in which local people would be fully represented, and presented to the
Babali as separate nizamnames, Babali set up councils with its own officials, which
were responsible for gathering information about local needs in the provinces. On the
basis of the information gathered by councils, Babali then collected the information
from these councils and prepared the draft law, in Istanbul. Finally, the preliminary
draft had been approved by a special commission, which consisted of two members
representing the Ottoman government and the representatives of Great Powers, on 23
August 1880. (Selahaddin, 1914: 204-205).

Petitions from the Bulgarian inhabitants of Rumeli show how the Ottoman central
government formed the local commissions and how the local inhabitants resisted
central governments manipulation.
One petition, which was signed by the municipalities of Monastir (Bitolya), Prilep,
Ohrid, Veles and Lerin and sent to the European Commission in Istanbul, on 5th
April 1880, claimed that local people were not represented in the local commissions,
which were formed in order to discuss the content of the reform package. The
Petition reads as follows:
The Government of the Sublime Porte, in its desire to implement Art. 23 of the Berlin
Treaty sent its draft for reforms to the Bitolya vilayet to be represented in great
numbers. However, the authorities in Bitolya, instead of consulting the opinion of the
population on this draft for reforms, arbitrarily chose the members of the committee,
most of whom were Turks government officials or members of the town council and the
court. As a result, the population of the vilayet, which was not at all represented on the
committee, knows nothing of what it has discussed and decided in connection with the
draft for reforms, the aim of which was to ensure to the local Christian population a
future, corresponding to the intentions of the Great Powers and the needs of the
country, as well. On account of this we, Bulgarian residents of the Bitolya vilayet,
believe that it is necessary to draw attention of the Supreme European Commission to
this fact, and at the same time, humbly to express our opinion of what we consider to be
the most essential reforms, which could create the prerequisites for a more or less
46

tolerable future for the Christian population in this country. (Macedonia

Documents and Material, Bozhinov and Panayotov, 1978: 390).

In the following paragraphs, the signatories of the petition summarize their requests
on the reforms. First, they requested religious freedom and equality in all respects,
translation of all laws into the local languages, recognition of their language as a
secondary official language. Additionally, they offered that the judges be chosen
from among the members of local communities.
It seems clear that, although the Ottoman administration tried to manipulate their
demands, the local peoples of Rumeli attempted to shape the preparation process of
the draft law by involving the members of the European Commission.
Another petition, which was sent to the British representative of the European
Commission signed by 200 Bulgarian inhabitants on 22 May 1880, included similar
complaints:
we (Macedonians who were resident in Istanbul)learned that the European
Powers which signed the Berlin Treaty had sent their representatives to the capital to
work out and apply the reforms provided by Article 23 of the Berlin Treaty concerning
the European provinces of Turkey, with a view to improving the present wretched and
intolerable plight of all citizens of the country, we considered it our moral duty, as
representatives of the Bulgarian population in Macedonia, to declare to the honorable
Commission through Your Excellency that, when the vilayet committees in Macedonia
were set up in order to draw up the drafts for reforms, the instructions of Art. 23 were
not observed, because, in spite of the categorical stipulation in this clause that these
committees should fully represent the local population, the Bulgarian population, which
constitutes the majority of the country, was completely excluded from participation in
the said committees. The local authorities organized these committees underhand,
exclusively of officials and representatives of other nationalities. When the Bulgarian
population later learned from the newspapers that these committees had been set up
and had already drawn up the reforms at variance with the instructions of Art. 23 of the
Berlin, they addressed to our honest government general protests from all parts of the
province, copies of which we have the honor of attaching to the present. In informing
your Excellency about this, we venture to hope that the honorable Commission will not
consider the reforms presented by the government as drawn up by the local population,
which, according to Art. 23 of the Berlin Treaty should have but has not taken part in
their drafting. (Bozhinov and Panayotov, 1978: p. 394-5)

Andonyan claims the draft law of 1880 was a political trick of sorts by Babali
against the interference from the Great Powers:
If article 23 had been implemented, Europeans would have intervened in the reform
process. While Babali offered more than envisaged in article 23, it sought to keep the
power to implement the law itself. It remained the master of its house. When the law
was presented to the European Commission, the members of the commission were
surprised because of the generosity of Babali. The Commission commented at the end
of the text of the draft: In Turkey, there have always been good laws; however, their
implementations have not been satisfactory. We only present it to the approvals of
Great Powers. Nevertheless, this law, like others, had not been implemented.

(Andonyan, 2002: 202-3)

47

Why the Ottoman bureaucracy did not implement these reforms? The answer maybe
hidden in Andonyans sentence: Ottoman government and bureaucracy wanted to
remain the master of its own house. Thus, the draft law was an outcome of the
attempt to prevent European intervention. Such an intervention would have signaled
the decentralization of Ottoman administration in Rumeli and represented a
challenge to Ottoman bureaucracys attempts to centralizing the Imperial
administration.
A report from the Russian Vice-consul in Monastir, to the Russian Ambassador in
Istanbul, in 1885, mentions a case, which reveals the opposition by the Ottoman
bureaucracy against the reforms and the ways in which the European powers
responded Ottomans half-hearted policy:
According to reliable sources, our vali is now busy making a report about the state of
affairs in the vilayet, and also about the need to carry out reforms in it; but what these
reforms will be like one can judge from the following. Detesting the European law,
which served as a pattern for the last legal reforms, which took the lions share from
him, Ali Kemali Pasha, as an outstanding upholder of the Koran and Moslem Law, is
collecting and preparing evidence to prove that the basic evil in the country comes from
these European reforms. What reforms can a person like him suggest, who openly
declares, in spite of his high position as a vali, that slavery is necessary, that the
European civilization is nonsense and a subject unworthy of the attention of true
believers? (Bozhinov and Panayotov, 1978: 406)

However, while these reforms had not been implemented, and the revolts and
unstable situation had continued in Rumeli, two different reform packages have been
prepared by the Europeans. One was the Mrzsteg Program; the other one was Reval
Program.

II.1. Mrzsteg Reforms

In 1903 the Illinden Uprising took place in Macedonia: IMRO militants bombed
targets in Thessalonica. Their purpose, like that of so many rebels before and since,
was to embroil the Great Powers on the side of their demands for autonomy
(Mazover, 2001: 94). Following the Illinden Uprising, the Mrzsteg reform program
became a part of the agenda of the Great Powers and of the Ottoman administrators.
These reforms were characterized as the last real cooperation between two major
Powers involved in the Balkans (Russia and Austria-Hungary) (Mazover, 2001: 94).
Firstly, Austria and Russia prepared a reform project named the Vienna program in
February 1903, then with the intervention of Great Britain and France, the Mrzsteg
48

Program was initiated as a more workable plan, in October 1903. That program
would also be amended with the addition of reforms in finance, in civil government,
in taxation, and in security together with a European commission of control (Harris,
1913B: 208).
The Mrzsteg program had two main goals. First was to institute a direct way of
intervention into the Ottoman administration of the provinces, the realization of
which was subordinated to the control of two Civil Agents representing Vienna and
St. Petersburg. Second, to establish law and order in the provinces that were in the
grip of violence and civil strife.
The Mrzsteg reform package included nine articles. The first article offered to
appoint a Muslim Governor General together with two European (Austrian and
Russian) representatives to the vilayets. These European civil servants 9 would work
together with the Governor General Hseyin Hilmi Paa to address the needs of
vilayets.
The second article was on the gendarmerie: A European general would be
responsible for the re-organization of gendarmerie under the Ottoman governments
supervision. European governments sent their delegates to service this general. These
delegates would choose their own region of work. The fourth article suggested reorganizing the districts of Rumeli according to religion and ethnicity, in order to
provide security and stability. In addition, this article introduced reforms
incorporating Christian staff in the body of the administrative and legal institutions.
The fifth article formed a special committee with Christian and Muslim members, in
order to investigate political and judicial crimes. The seventh and eighth articles
included the details about the recovering of damages done to the properties and
persons of the local peoples in the uprisings. These articles offered tax and
conscription exemptions for Bulgarians, and banning the use of irregular troops
(babozuks) as soon as possible.
Babali declared its concern that the reforms would result in an unacceptable
intervention by the Europeans in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman government.
However, the Ottoman government nevertheless gave the impression that it was
going to start implementing the reforms (Tokay, 1995: 48). Following their
9

In Ahmed Selahaddins work they were mentioned as ajan siviller.

49

implementation, the security and stability of the region could not be improved. In
addition, more problems surfaced, when financial reforms were discussed:
Babali declared that the implementation of these (financial) reforms is absolutely
impossible. Then, governments started to negotiate the reforms, and these negotiations
took all the summer of 1905. Simultaneously, something else happened. The Great
Powers, without considering Babalis opposition, sent their financial advisors to
Thessalonica, in order to do their work and re-organize Turkeys financial situation.
That was the first example of Great Powers attempting to implement reforms without
paying attention to oppositions and requests of the Ottoman government. Although
financial advisors arrived in Thessalonica, Hilmi Paa did not meet them, and they
could not do their work. The Sultan also rejected their request for a meeting on 28
October. In response, Europeans -despite Germanys opposition- sent a fleet to
Ottoman coasts under the command of Austrian admiral Ripar. The international fleet
went to Midilli and appropriated the custom and post offices. Similar actions followed
in Limnoz. Babali was forced to make concessions to the Europeans. Ottoman
government accepted the presence of financial advisors and additionally extended the
stay of European civil agents and officers for a duration of 2 years. (Quotation

from Rene Pinon, Selahaddin, 1913: 41-42).

Tsar Nikola II of Russia and King VII Edward of Great Britain met in Reval, in June
1908. Their main aim was to reinforce the peaceful relations between those two
countries. Because of their conflicting interests over the region, one of the subjects of
this meeting was reform in Rumeli. They agreed on the renewal of a reform package,
which was offered by Great Britain 10 . However, it was obvious that other two Great
Powers, Germany and Austria would not like these reforms to be introduced. They
preferred that Macedonia should stay under the Ottoman rule rather than letting
Great Britain and Russia increase their power in the region because of Macedonian
autonomy. To sum up, in Reval, Sir Edward Grey from Great Britain and M. Ivolski,
Russian foreign minister prepared a new reform program for Macedonia. This
program offered forming a large military force commanded by Turks and assisted by
European officers; the transformations of the vilayets into an independent province
under the control of the Ottoman government; and the creation of a new civil
administration (Harris, 1913B: 208-9). Obviously, this would not have been favored
by Austria-Hungary and Germany. However in Istanbul, the news on such
discussions were perceived as a scandal.

10

Great Britain offered that the kaymakams, mutasarrfs, governors, and vice governors should also
be appointed by general governor of vilayets, so Babali should not intervene into the vilayets
administration. Secondly, since the army in Macedonia could not provide security, Ottoman
government should reduce the expenditures for this army. Instead of an Ottoman army, a European
army should be sent to the region. These mean that the Great Britain tried to provide more autonomy
for Macedonia than law of 1880 had envisaged.
50

II.2. The Resistance of the Ottoman Bureaucracy and Officers: 1908

Today it is known that, the meeting of Nikola II and VII. Edward in Reval provoked
the Young Turk committees to move on to Istanbul. In this meeting, the two kings
agreed on a new reform program, to be proposed to the Sultan. (These reforms) injured
the Ottoman officers patriotic feelings and honor. At the same time, the European
administrators in Macedonia served the European powers interests more than they
served Abdulhamid IIs government. This (Young Turk) revolution (of 1908) was for
liberty. However, at the same time, it was nationalistic and it was expressing hatred of
foreigners. Thus, (the Young Turk Revolution) was establishing a new administration
in order to bring an end to the European intervention into the (Ottoman Empires)
domestic affairs. This was the main motivation behind the Young Turk program.

(Quotation from Rene Pinon, Selahaddin, 1914: 64-65).

According to Pinon, the main aim of the Young Turks was to prevent European
intervention into the Ottoman Empires internal affairs. These reforms and
interventions were confusing the administration in Macedonia. Since there were
many European bureaucrats, Ottoman bureaucrats felt that they were unable to rule
their own country on their own. The Reval meeting exhausted their patience for these
interventions. Thus, the 1908 movement was an attempt to regain the administration
of Rumeli. They mobilized the support of local people, especially that of the
Albanians, because they proposed reforms without any interference by the
Europeans. However, the local people were disappointed, when they confronted the
nationalistic face of the Young Turk government. After the spring of 1909, they fully
encountered the Young Turk nationalism.
The Young Turk government, the CUP (Committee of Union and Progress, ttihad ve
Terakki Frkas) had its own program for Macedonia, which called for a strictly
centralized and single-handed administration as possible. However, the time was too
late for this sort of strict centralization. Therefore, the Balkan opposition to the CUP
government became one of the reasons for the revolts in the Balkans.
Pinon suggests that the 1908 Revolution deeply affected the Macedonian Question.
Firstly, this revolution was a direct consequence of the European intervention in
Macedonia. This intervention largely shaped the revolution, which was initiated
among Ottoman officers who were pursuing the Bulgarian, Serbian and Greek gangs
in Macedonia. The Young Turk committees were first formed in Thessalonica. The
revolutionary officers criticized Abdulhamid II, because of his despotic
administration, as well as his respect for foreigners (Europeans) and his weakness
vis--vis the Christian population in Macedonia. The Christian population of
51

Macedonia, especially Bulgarians and Serbians happily accepted the Young Turk
revolution, because the Young Turks advocated equality between Christians and
Muslims (Selahaddin, 1914: 64).
During the first days of revolution, the Bulgarian and Serbian gangs came down from
the mountains, and developed good relations with the Ottoman officers. Mahmut
evket Paas Movement Army (Hareket Ordusu) also included a Bulgarian
company. Christians, especially the Slavs, were hoping that the land disputes would
be resolved and poorest farmers would benefit. The revolution declared that in an
Ottoman country there were only Ottoman citizens.
Conversely, freedom and equality had different meanings for Turks and Bulgarians.
Bulgarians wanted to live in a reformed Ottoman Empire. However, they also wished
to protect their schools, churches, and language, in short, their nationality, like
Serbians, Greeks, and Vlachs. According to the Young Turks, the new administration
meant imposition of the full authority of the Istanbul government as a central state. It
was impossible to unify the two different considerations (Selahaddin, 1914: 67).
Thus, according to Pinon, the CUP government was a total disillusionment for the
people of Macedonia. With the new administration, all reforms that Abdulhamid II
was compelled to accept by the Europeans were abolished. The work of the general
inspector, civil agents, local officials, and the officers who were responsible for the
reorganization of gendarmerie all came to an end (Selahaddin, 1913: 68). After that,
CUP openly manipulated the elections in November-December 1908.
This letter, written by a Bulgarian citizen from Shtip on September 13, 1908, shows
how the CUP government manipulated these elections, how this can be considered as
part of the process leading to the Balkan Wars:
Today, September 13, 1908 the citizens of Shtip, numbering some 3.000 gathered in
the schoolyard for a meeting in protest against the illegal practices and the violence
perpetrated during the parliamentary elections in the town and the district, and after
hearing the speakers, we considered: 1. That articles 5, 6 and 30 of the Electoral Law
have been violated due to insufficient explanatory work; 2. That the sections in the
district have been disproportional distributed, for instance, the Pishitsa section includes
21 Bulgarian villages against just one Turkish, whereas Kyoseler includes only 5
Bulgarian villages against 11 Turkish, in the Starvoulevo section there are 3 Bulgarian
villages against 18 Turkish; 3. That only Turkish villages have been chosen for centers
of all sections, and, moreover, these are the remotest villages possible, notorious for
past atrocities, like Pishitsa, for instance; 4. That many Bulgarian citizen have been
disenfranchised; 5. That Turks disenfranchised by law have been granted the right to
vote; 6. That the government has abused its power during the elections. (Bozhinov

and Panayotov, 1978: 561).

52

Not only Bulgarians, but also Greeks were dissatisfied with the elections. The
Greeks offered a program to CUP envisioning proportional representation for
minorities. Even in Istanbul, non-Muslims announced the election in Beyolu was
illegal and they organized demonstrations to protest about the elections. (Tunaya,
2000: 208).
Since Foreign Affairs Minister Rfat Paa was appointed to the London Embassy in
1911, the CUP government inevitably held a by-election. Before the election, the
gravity of opposition against CUP both Christians and Muslims- had come together
and formed the Hrriyet ve tilaf Frkas (Freedom and Entente Party, FEP) in
November 1911. At the end of the election for Foreign Affairs Minister, the FEPs
candidate Tahir Hayrettin Bey took 196 votes, while the CUPs Memduh Bey had
195 (Tunaya, 2000: 209). Finally, the CUP government abolished the parliament, and
changed the election law. In 1912, another election was held. The CUP took the
majority with 270 chairs, while opposition had only 15 chairs. Consequently, the
parliament could only work for 2.5 months. Naturally, these conditions could not
help the stabilization in Rumeli and the Balkans. Thus the Europeans warned the
Ottomans that unless the government provided stability in the Balkans, they would
intervene in the region again.
The Balkan states did not want a direct military intervention from Europe either. The
Italo-Turkish War of 1911 galvanized the idea of a Balkan League into life. Serbia
hoped Bulgaria would then join in dismembering the Habsburg Empire. As much to
anticipate mutual conflicts as to pursue genuinely common interests, they resolved
their competing aspirations in Macedonia with their alliance (13 March 1912), which
gave the northern Macedonia to Serbia, a contested zone left for arbitration by tsar,
and Eastern Macedonia to Bulgaria. Bulgaria compromised in the hoe for territory in
Thrace and even Constantinople, while Serbia envisaged acquisitions on the Adriatic,
namely Albania, despite its lack of Serbs. The alliance was joined by Greece without
specified territorial demands because it could not agree with Bulgaria, Serbia and
Greece concluded an agreement secretly (Farrar, 2003). Naturally, the Great Powers
of Europe did not want another war in the Balkans, because of the fear about stability
in Europe. Thus, European diplomats and ministers started to search for a solution.
The French Prime Minister Poincare offered a new bunch of reforms, while he was
also trying to calm down the Balkan states. Poincare offered the European guarantee
53

about the applying of reforms (Andonyan, 2002: 201). Article 23 of the Berlin Treaty
once again appeared on the Balkan agenda.

II.3. The Law of Rumeli Provinces of 1912

Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece delivered an ultimatum to the Ottoman government on
30 September 1912, including a list of reforms according to article 23 of the Berlin
Treaty. Primarily, they wanted the equal representation of the Christian population in
the Ottoman parliament. Secondly, they demanded these reforms would be
implemented under the inspection of the European (especially Austria-Hungary and
Russia) states. The Prime Minister Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paa responded the European
states on 14 October 1912, and said that reforms had always been on the agenda of
the Ottoman governments. Because of provocations, they could not be applied. The
Ottoman government would deal with article 23 of the Berlin Treaty and the Vilayet
Law of 1880 by its own will. After the law was accepted in cabinet the Ottoman
officials would start to implement it, as soon as possible (Tunaya, 2000: 558-9).
Hope for peace appeared one more time in Istanbul. Babali declared that the
government took the law into its agenda at the beginning of September 1912, before
the Europeans put pressure on it. According to the newspapers there was no more a
danger of war.
However, the protests of Darlfunun (University of Istanbul) of October 7 indicated
that public opinion in Istanbul, which was dominated by the CUP, was against even
to discuss this law as a draft. A group of university students and teachers sent a
telegraph to Babali and said
We are rejecting every obligation, which is possibly detrimental for the Ottoman
hegemony and our holy homeland, under the name of reform which are forced by
foreigners. Then, you should know that we, these excited youths of Darlfnun, are
ready to protect the honor of the Ottoman Empire, with all of our power (Tanin, 8

March 1912).
They started to march around streets together and screamed We want war. Damn
article 23. At the end, they arrived in Babali. The ministers had to call soldiers for
protecting them from the demonstrators. The Prime Minister Gazi Ahmet Muhtar
Paa gave a speech to the protesters about article 23. Enis Avni Bey (Aka Gndz) a

54

journalist from the Tanin newspaper with stirring CUP links criticized the Prime
Minister:
Your excellency, you talked about old stories. I want to talk about the realities of
today, which explodes over our nation like a thunderbolt, and the scream of today that
is opened under the nations feet like a cliff. We see only oppression in the past you
talked about. There is only one light in your story, which enlightened our spirits. That is
to be Gazi. Only this word is bright, others are torture. However, if you are really
great, your Excellency let us be together. Please be a Gazi one more time, as passing
under these thunderbolts and over these cliffs Will you fight, for rejecting article 23?
Otherwise, will you accept it? (Selahaddin, 1914: 212-3).

The Minister of Naval Forces Mahmut Muhtar Paa tried to keep calm the protesters
down. He said, If the interest of our country require war, we will fight, but if not,
we will do what is necessary. Thus, Babali was in conflict between Europeans,
Balkan States and Ottomans domestic public opinion (Selahaddin, 1914: 214). On
the following day, October 8, the government published an official declaration that
said reforms had already been discussed.
Naturally, we will consider the laws, Kanuni Esasi (constitution), our international
treaties and the interests of our country. This draft will be discussed in parliament
and the council of ayan, according to the constitution. Thus, there is certainly no
necessity to be excited and grieved (Selahaddin, 1914: 217).

On this announcements day, the charge daffairs Plamenatz of Montenegro accused

the Ottoman Empire of not considering the rights of Christians under its hegemony
and declared war. It was the beginning of the Balkan Wars.
That was correct in a way that the coalition government discussed the draft law of
1880, just before the Balkan Wars. They voted all the articles of the draft law and
published their decisions. Some of them were accepted and rejected whereas some of
them were set aside for later consideration. Thus, we can say that, after the
discussions of 1912, the draft law took a new form, expressed the new structure of
Rumeli by 1912 Ottoman government. It can be said that these rejected articles
showed which conditions of the draft law of 1880 were disturbing the Ottoman
bureaucracy in its preparation process. For instance, the first article of the draft law
was rejected in 1912, which stated the rights of Rumeli people. By rejecting this
article the Ottoman government did not want to give any privilege to the inhabitants
of Rumeli. Article 3, which stated the religious freedom in all terms, was also
rejected. Another rejected article is article 26 that banned the entrance of the
Circessian babozuks into the region. Article 51, which stated that the legal
suggestions or demands of the governor on behalf of the local parliaments would be
55

regarded as accepted, if Babali would not answer in 3 months time, was also
rejected. The most important article among other rejected article is article 81. This
article arranged the General Councils rights for discussion and reorganization of the
central governments laws and decisions. Thus, it can be said that, this rejection
dismissed the negotiation process between local parliament and central government.
Under this condition, the local parliament lost one of its most important function and
authority of balancing central government. At the same time, the government
rejected article 83, which stated that governors were also responsible to the general
councils. Together with this rejection, the government tried to reduce decentralizing
effect of the draft law of 1880. In addition, by rejecting all articles on sects, the
government disregarded the privileges of religious communities in the region, in
terms of taxation, property rights and so on.
The draft law with these rejections exposes an idea about the solutions of the 1912
Ottoman government towards the increasing problems of the region, which led the
emergence of the Balkan Wars. By these rejections, the draft law of 1880 lost its
spirit of decentralization of the region. The Ottoman government of 1912 tried to
constitute region in a more centralized way as retaking its privileges and closing
negotiation channels between central government and local parliament. Hence, it can
be said that, these were the unavoidable rejections in the law. The articles that were
set aside for later consideration were mostly related to reflecting multi-religious and
multi-lingual social structure of the region to the administration; such as the articles
stated that if a governor or kaymakam is Muslim, his assistant should be non-Muslim.
All articles about courts were delayed as well. It can be said that, even in 1912 and
although the possible disastrous conclusions of the coming war, Ottoman
administration could not give up from its politics of centralization of administration.
To be able to centralize the administration, the Ottoman government tried to reduce
the privileges of the religious and lingual communities, which were under the effects
of nationalistic discourses of Balkan states more than they were in 1880. The
Ottoman domestic public opinion was also affected by nationalistic discourse. The
Darlfunun demonstration is only a small example to show how Ottoman domestic
public opinion responded about the Rumeli issues and European interventions in the
eve of the Balkan Wars. Likewise, the Ottoman bureaucracy also rejected not only
56

the decentralization of the region, but also the foreign intervention in domestic
policies of the Empire throughout the reforms.
The aim of this chapter was not to explain the reasons of the Balkan Wars basically,
but to show how article 23 of the Berlin Treaty and the Vilayet Law of 1880, as a
draft, and the responses of Ottoman bureaucracy played the crucial role in the
emergence of the Balkan Wars. Article 23 and the law could serve as a basis for the
reciprocal negotiation concessions among the Balkan States, Great Powers and
Ottoman Empire. However, it was rejected by the Ottoman bureaucracy, which came
under the influence of the Young Turk and CUP ideology. The Young Turks or the
CUP represented the modern centralization demand in the Ottoman Empire under the
dominance of the Turkish and Muslim subjects of Empire. They were trying to
transform the Ottoman Empire into a modern central state. However, the
interventions of the European states and the claims of the Balkan nationalisms were
preventing such a transformation. The law of 1880 re-constituted the social and
political content of the Ottoman Rumeli. According to the law, Rumeli was a multireligious and multi-lingual region, which should be possessed some privileges. The
structures of local councils as well as the courts reflected the administrative practices
and the details of these privileges. Implementation of the draft law gave autonomy to
Rumeli, which meant the decentralization of the region. Hence, the draft law of 1880
was never implemented. Then, two reform packages, which were also failed to be
implemented, came to the agenda of both the Ottoman Empire and the European
states: Mrzsteg and Reval. The main topic of contestation on Rumeli was about who
should rule the region. In the 19th and 20th centuries, ruling meant exercise of power
through the central administration. In this context, the critical point was from which
center Rumeli was to be administered.

57

Chapter III
Greek Administration in Aegean Macedonia After 1912
If my neighbor is happy, my own work will go
easier, too.
(Macedonian proverb)
G. Scelle, a contemporary author of the period that this study focuses on declares that
the Ottoman Empire had to collapse, because it was an anachronistic state. His
sentences simply represent the perspective that sees the Ottoman Empire as a
barbaric, colonial and old-minded state.
Turkey (the Ottoman Empire) is a military oligarchy superposed upon a servile
populace. It is a feudal state, whose feudal character has been maintained to the
present day like a living anachronism. The anachronism is shown from the point of view
of international law, by the subsistence of institutions, which have elsewhere
disappeared, namely, vassal and tributary states. From the social standpoint the
consequences have been incoherent and brutal. The conquering Turk demanded money
and obedience, and at times men. ...he knew nothing of administration, nor that the
starving of the contributor did not enrich the state. ...Add to this that religious belief in
Turkey is intermixed with civil law and excludes the unbeliever at the same time from
citizenship and common law, and you will have the whole group of causes which
engendered in Turkey those interminable uprisings of Christian nationalities, which
were enslaved, but never assimilated, because they preserved their language, their
religion and their customs. ...and they re-conquered their individuality (Scelle,

1911; 149-150).
Scelles sentences summarize the legitimacy of decentralizing interventions of the
Great Powers, and national claims in the Balkans. The period that Scelle lived in was
the age of nationalism or irredentism is the period during which there is much striving
on behalf of the implementation of the ideal of One Culture, One State. The old world of
endless cultural diversity and nuance, only very loosely connected, if indeed connected
at all, with political boundaries, acquires an air of political impropriety, illegitimacy. It
is to be replaced by a world in which each culture has its own political roof, and in
which political units and authorities are only legitimated by the fact that they protect
and express and cherish a culture (Gellner, 1996; 115).

It can be said that the main characteristic of the Balkan nationalisms is the
separatism, since the creation of autonomous and independent Balkan States was
both a break with and a rejection of the political past (Todorova, 2003; 340). That
past was re-interpreted in the 19th and 20th centuries, with the effect of nationalism
as a standard legitimacy discourse of the international public opinion at that time. At
present, it is impossible to find a standard definition for the term nationalism, since
after approximately 200 years experience showed that there are many kinds of
nationalism in earth. In this study, I mention generally Balkan nationalism, and
58

especially Greek nationalism, because I choose the Aegean Macedonia to show how
a nation-state succeeded to centralize its administration.
In this sense, I see nationalism as an ideological cover of formation of modern
central state. The correlation between the processes of configuration of a national
identity and formation of nation-state shows that nationalism is not only an identity
discourse, it is a kind of program to found central administration over a given
territory and people.
It is precisely the role of the modern state in shaping up national identity and in
cultivating national consciousness among Balkan peoples that forms the critical factor
in the growth of nationalism in south-eastern Europe to the point of the explosive
antagonisms of rival national movements in the late nineteenth and throughout most of
the twentieth century. In this perspective nation-building was a dynamic process not of
national awakening, but of forging collective identity as part of the creation of a sense
of community that was essential in cementing the social cohesion of the new nationstates of the 19th century (Kitromilides, 1989; 160).

Kitromilides inquiries the correlation between the nation and state. It seems the
relationship between state and nation in the Balkans is different from the experiences
of Western Europe. It seems in Western Europe, in the homeland of the nationalism
and central state ideas, nations create their states. On the other hand, in Eastern
Europe, it seems states create their nations. In this sense, definition of a certain
nation limits the boundaries of the state, which is the political organization of that
nation. Otto Bauer suggests reading the motto Each nation should form one state,
together with its contrary, each state embrace only one nation (Bauer, 1996: 70).
This reading can be a clue to understand how the policies of forced migration,
deportation, and population exchanges could be legitimized in the international
public opinion in formation process of central nation-states in the Balkans. The
borders of these newly formed nation-states of the Balkans were determined with the
help of pre-definitions of nations. However, many contemporary studies 11 show that
the real nation-building process of these nations started after the formation of central
states.
Gellner summarizes the steps of the irredentist nation building process:
1. People can be changed. The can acquire the culture including the self-image
fostered by that culture, and the capacity to project that image and have it accepted
even if they had started from some other culture, some other set of internalized and
projected images 2. People can be killed. Persons held unsuitable for incorporation
in the desired homogeneous ethnic socio-political unit 3. People held unsuitable for
11

For instance the studies of Kitromilides, Todorova, Karakasiodu, Mazower sited in this study
59

incorporation in the unit to be established in a given territory can be moved from that
territory to some other place 4. Frontiers can be adjusted with a view to combining
culturally similar populations within single political units (Gellner, 1996; 115-

116)
It is possible to see all steps of irredentist nation building process that Gellner
summarizes, in the policies of Greek central state in Aegean Macedonia.
The goal of this chapter is to understand how Greece succeeded in forming its central
administration in Aegean Macedonia. In other words, what was the difference
between the Greek and Ottoman centralization experiences? In order to understand
the difference, I will re-read the story of Macedonian Question by putting Greece
at the center of that reading. Thus in this chapter first I will focus on the Macedonian
affairs of Greece between years of 1878-1920s. Then, I will explore the
Hellenization of Macedonia. The focal point of my analysis will be on renaming
places and the forced population movements. In this analysis I try to highlight the
connection between national identity politics and administrative decisions of the
Greek central state.
Firstly, renaming territory may seem simply as a product of a sort of romantic
identity politics. Nevertheless, if this politics is read together with centralization
practices, one can see how identity politics have played a crucial role in the
centralization practices and also in setting the legal and the international legitimacy
tools. Naturally, inhabitants name lands and territories in their own language. In the
period of 1878 1920s, the ethnic and religious character of the inhabitants of
Aegean Macedonia changed radically. The basic characteristic of Balkan nationalism
is first to define the nation and then to set the nation (Sugar, 1994; 10). Under
the light of this characteristic, in order to purify the lands they gained from wars,
nation states of Balkans forced masses to immigrate. At the beginning of the 20th
century, this was completely a legal and legitimate politics, since every nation had a
right to form its own state. Thereby, they were reducing the possible threat that
some alien elements in their territory could cause.
At present, after experiencing nation state politics for a century, it is increasingly
evident that nationalism cannot be considered as the only possible politics over
identity. Moreover, the social reality of nationalism was made possible by a certain
kind of administration, which was the central administrative practice of modern state.
60

Thus, it is important to realize the links between identity politics and certain
administrative practices. Thinking about these links provides some clues about the
Ottoman administrations failure in ruling the Balkans in a modern context and why
national states were successful at the end of the 19th century.
Conceptually, I will use Hellenization and centralization interchangeably. As the
aim of this chapter is to show centralization of administration, in this case
Hellenization went hand-to-hand in Aegean Macedonias story under the Greek
rule.

III.1. Greek Position until the Balkan Wars

Macedonia was one of the most important desired territories of the Greek irredentist
nationalism called Megali Idea 12 since Greece gained its independence from
Ottoman Empire in 1820s. On the other hand, for the Ottoman Empire, Macedonia
never existed as a distinct official/administrative entity. It was a region with no clear
borders and did not even have a formal existence as an administrative district
(Mazover, 2001: 93). Instead of the name Macedonia, Ottomans used the word
Rumeli to define this territory. According to the Ottoman administration,
Macedonia referred to the area around Thessalonica consisting roughly of the three
Turkish vilayets of Saloniki (Thessalonica), Monastir (Bitolj), and Kosovo
(Stavrianos, 1958; 517). On the other hand, in the 1890s, neither Greeks nor
Europeans used the term Macedonian to describe the inhabitants of the three
vilayets (Lange-Akhund, 1998: 65). The name Macedonia entered the discussions of
the Ottoman affairs with the Berlin Treaty of 1878 and referred to a complex set of
issues related to interactions among multiple ethnic and religious groups in the
region (Adanr, 1996: 3). At the beginning, the general term that described the issues
was Eastern Question. Following the Berlin Congress, since no Balkan state was
happy about its part in the Balkan Peninsula, Eastern Question was transformed
into the Macedonian Question, because of the contestation over the region between
Balkan nations (Andonyan, 1996: 44-46)

12

For an explanatory story of Megali Idea see Xydis, Stephen G., 1994 pp.235-243 in Sugar and
Lederer, 1994.
61

There were mainly three nations and nationalisms which were troublesome for
the Ottoman administration in the Balkans as they were related to Macedonian
Question. First was the Greek nationalism that had emerged in the 18th century. The
second one was the Bulgarian nationalism, which started to make its presence felt in
the early 19th century, and the third was the Serbian nationalism, which appeared in
the 19th century in a different form. 13 Hence, the name Macedonia was the name of a
question in the Balkans, which addressed mainly three nationalistic claims that were
competing with each other and with Ottoman Empire. 14
Since Macedonia was a contested territory among the three Balkan states, the ethnic
identity of Macedonia was also disputed. The discourse of redeeming brethrens
was the main force of legitimacy for territorial claims. To sum, Greece, Bulgaria, and
to a lesser extent Serbia and Romania, all claimed to save their unredeemed brethren
in Ottoman Macedonia on historical, lingual, cultural and religious grounds
(Gounaris, 1995, 410). Initially, through similar methods and discourses, they tried to
convince the international society and the inhabitants of the region that Macedonians
were a part of their nation, and the Macedonian territory was a part of their
country. 15
13

Serbian nationalism was different, because it was hiding itself under Jugo-Slav (Southern Slav)
nationalism and ideals. Thus, Macedonia and Macedonians were important for Serbs, since they are a
part of Southern Slav race, like Croats, Montenegrins, and Slovenians. The European crisis of 1908
gave Serbian territorial ambitions a geopolitical push away from the Adriatic and towards Aegean. It
was at this time that the renowned Serbian ethnographer Professor Jovan Cvijic discovered the
existence of the Macedo-Slavs who, he claimed, were neither Serbs nor Bulgarians. In his latter
works, Cvijic varied the distribution of the three Slav groups in Macedonia to suit Serbias strategic
requirements. (Palmer-King, 1971: 8) In Serbian nationalist eyes, Yugoslavism became one
particular aspect of Serbias destiny and the liberation of the Habsburg southern Slavs (non-Serbs as
well as Serbs) a national responsibility. But to Croat and Slovene nationalists whose zealous
Catholicism was at once anti-Orthodox and hypersensitive to the clamorous seemed a cloak for
territorial expansion. (Lederer, 1994: 425)
14
Until that time Macedonia was Rumeli-i arki for Ottomans, divided three vilayets, Uskub,
Monastir and Thessalonica. The first challenge about the name of Macedonia was experienced in II.
Abdulhamid period. After unsuccessful attack to Sultan Abdulhamid in 1905, Ottoman bureaucrats
tried to change the name of Macedonia in Havariler Kitab (the Book of Apostles) and they
succeeded, they replaced the name of Macedonia with Uskub, Monastir and Kosovo. (From
Halbmond im letzten Viertel. Briefe und Reiseberichte aus ter alten Turkei von Theodor und Marie
Wiegand 1895 bis 1918, G. Wiegand, Munih, 1970, p. 72-73, quoted by Fikret Adanr, in Makedonya
Sorunu, Tarih Vakf, 1996, p. 3)
15
Actually, answer of the question Who are Macedonians changed in Greek historiography time to
time. Roudometof links these changes with political inclinations of Greek governments. The Greeks
utilized the continuity between ancients and moderns to strengthen their historical claims to
Macedonian territory. In this interpretation, Macedonia means the territory of the ancient kingdom in
the era of Philip II. Operating under these assumptions, Greek historiography does not allow for the
development of divergent views While the pre-1913 Greek national narrative stressed Greeces
cultural continuity from antiquity to modern times, the post-1913 narrative was modified in important
62

Each of the three Balkan nations turned to history, ethnography, and education to
justify its claims. While Bulgarians regarded their rights as proven by the role of
Macedonia in the national revival, by the exarchate, and by the decisions of the
Istanbul Conference, Greeks cited ancient history to prove that the Macedonians were
simply Slavic-speaking or Bulgarian-speaking Greeks. Entering the GreekBulgarian controversy after 1878, the Serbs in turn cited medieval history to show that
on the eve of the Turkish conquest Serbia encompassed Macedonia. (Pundeff,

1994: 123-4)
As I mentioned above, churches and the schools were the main propaganda tools,
which voiced the territorial claims that were legitimated through different readings of
the past.
In 1878, with the Berlin Treaty, Bulgaria and Serbia became independent states. This
led the competition transformed into an inter-state one. Additionally, as mentioned
before, its two main provisions made the Berlin Treaty vital in this process: Firstly it
demanded administrative reform in Rumeli that intended simply forming of an
autonomous administration in the region. Since these reforms were not implemented
by the Ottoman administration, the Balkan states and the Great Powers had a
legitimate claim to intervene in Rumeli affairs of the Ottoman government.
Secondly, with the Berlin Treaty Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro gained their full
independence from the Ottoman Empire, and they took place in the contest for
Macedonia.
Nevertheless, in a few years, the struggle that had started as a kind of propaganda
war- between the expansionist and nationalist governments was transformed into a
big war. None of the Balkan states was alone, each had an alliance in the Great
Powers, and in fact, each represented the interests of these Great Powers in the
Balkans. 16 Both the conflicts between the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan states and
ways Between 1913 and 1941 the Greek historiography was preoccupied with proving the Greek
character of Greek-held Macedonia during the Civil War and in the post-1945 decades that Greek
discourse sought to eliminate the very fact of the presence of Slavic-speakers in Greek Macedonia,
this new literature was in large part- an expression of post-World War II and post-Civil War Greek
right-wing nationalism (Roudometof, 2002, 74).
16
For a short story about the construction process of these alliances, just before the war see Harris,
1913A: According to Harris, Ottoman governments failure to found a stable administration in
Macedonia caused Balkan States found alliances between themselves. Due to failure of Ottoman
administration they had legitimacy to claim that they would rule Macedonia better than Ottoman
Empire. Owing to the failure of the new constitutional government to make good in Macedonia
after three years trial (after 1908) due to the dissensions of the leaders, the inexperience and
incompetence of the officials selected for the work and the attempt to Ottomanize the whole country
and obliterate all national lines, the Balkan affairs again reached a crisis in Greece resulting in an
alliance for peace and protection formed in May to last three years. Similar conversations were begun
between Bulgaria and Servia, culminating a treaty of alliance on March 13. Protection was to be given
the Christians of Macedonia: and, in the event of a war and victory over Turkey, the territory should
63

that between the Ottoman Empire and the European Powers exploded with Balkan
Wars.

III. 2. General Consequences of the Balkan Wars

As a result of the First Balkan War, the Ottoman rule in Macedonia came to an end.
By means of the London Treaty of 1913, the winners of war, Serbia, Montenegro,
Bulgaria and Greece received all the territory of the Ottoman Macedonia, except for
Istanbul. Bulgaria took the biggest part of the Ottoman Macedonia. However, Greece
and Serbia did not allow that Bulgaria to take Macedonia alone, because they wanted
the territory for themselves as well. Then, the Second Balkan War began. Greece and
Serbia joined against Bulgaria to prevent it from getting the whole Macedonian
Territory. The Treaty of Bucharest, August 10, 1913, concluded the Balkan Wars,
through distribution of the territory into three parts among Greece, Bulgaria and
Serbia. The delegates of Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece signed
the Treaty. The main objective of this treaty was the partition of Dobrudja, Thrace
and Macedonia; where the Ottoman lost at the end of the Balkan Wars. Romania
took a great part of Dobrudja. Bulgaria got Western part of Thrace, and Dedeagadch,
as an access point to Aegean Sea. Serbia received Kosovo and Eastern part of Novi
Pazar, whereas Montenegro took the western part of Novi Pazar. Nevertheless, the
most significant result of this Treaty was the partition of Macedonia among Serbia,
Bulgaria and Greece.
According to the treaty, Serbia took the northwest region of the Ottoman Macedonia;
Vardar Macedonia 17 , the 38,2 percent of the entire territory, which is included the

be so divided by a line running from the intersection of Servia and Bulgaria... Military conventions
were concluded between the same powers in May and September; and, owing to a massacre of
Bulgarians at Kotchany and Servians at Berane ant the announcement that the fall maneuvers of the
Turkish army would be held near the Bulgarian frontier, the armies of Bulgaria, Servia and Greece
were all mobilized on September 30 and October 1. The great powers counseled patience and caution,
but proceeded to approach Turkey on the matter of reform with great deliberation. Impatient of delay
and suspicious of the motives of the concert, the Balkan allies sent an ultimatum to the Ottoman
government on October 13. The Turkish grand vizier refused to treat with them and, after he had
concluded peace with Italy on the 15th, declared war upon the Balkan states (pp: 106-107).
17
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (MRO or IMRO, Internal Macedonian Revolutionary
Organization) renamed the Macedonia after World War I; MRO gave traditional names to the three
parts of Ottoman Macedonia that were divided between Yugoslavia, Greece, and Bulgaria. The part in
Yugoslavia was named Vardar Macedonia, the part in Greece Aegean Macedonia, and the part in
Bulgaria Pirin Macedonia. (Georgieva, V, Konechni, S, 1998: 26)
64

cities of Ohrid, Monastir, Kosovo, Shtib and Kotchana, and as mentioned above
Eastern half of the sancak of Novi Pazar. Since Bulgaria was one of the looser of the
Second Balkan War, it received the Pirin Macedonia, including the town of
Strumnitza, and the western Thrace, only 10 per cent of whole territory. The biggest
part of the Ottoman Macedonia was taken by Greece. Greece received the 51 percent
of whole territory, including Epirus, southern or Aegean Macedonia, Thessalonica,
Kavala, and in its northwestern frontier, Janina (Yanya). However, none of the
parties was satisfied with its portion, there were many unredeemed populations of
these nations in each others territory. Stavrianos mentions that, the Bucharest Treaty
could not solve the problem between Balkan states:
the Bucharest Treaty settled nothing. It merely papered over the cracks for the time
being. The period between August 10, 1913 (the date of Bucharest Treaty, A..), and
June 28, 1914 (the date of assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo, it
was the starting point of WWI, A..), proved to be put a breathing spell during which
the Balkan states jockeyed for position in preparation for future developments. when
World War I broke out there was no possibility of a united Balkan front. Rather, each
state stood ready to throw in its lot with whatever side seemed most likely to satisfy its
national ambitions. From the Balkan viewpoint was essentially a continuation of the
Balkan Wars. (Stavrianos, 1958; 542-3)

The main consequence of the Balkan Wars was the triumph of the nation-states of
the Balkans over the federalism that Ottoman Empire represented. By means of this
victory, the Balkan states started to homogenize the demographic structure of their
territory in order to be able to constitute a central state administration. Since these
policies, the homogenization of demography and the centralization of state went
hand-to-hand, the nation-building processes of Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia seem to
be based on ethnicity and religion rather than citizenship as the major criteria for
establishing a persons membership in the national imagined community
(Roudometof, 1996: 255). On the other hand, these lands as former Ottoman
territories had an imperial legacy not only from the Ottoman, but also from the
Byzantium period. The Byzantium and Ottoman Empires had composed Balkan
Peninsula throughout their own interests and that was claimed by the newborn
nation-states as their inseparable parts; terra irredenta (Yerasimos, 2002; 65).

III.3. Greece in Macedonia: Changing Demographic Composition

The Greek nation state utilized the connection between the ancients and the moderns
to reinforce its historical claims to the Macedonian territory. Even at the present,
65

Greece does not recognize the existence of a separate Macedonian ethnic identity. In
the process of the formation of the Republic of Macedonia after the collapse of
Yugoslavia, Greece published a document series to convince international public
opinion about the Greekness of Macedonia. In 1995, the Institute of International
and Strategic Studies in Athens published a brochure titled The Macedonian
Affair. In this brochure, Greece repeated its historical claims on Macedonia:
The inhabitants of this area (Macedonians) were one of the most ancient Greek tribes.
Their closest relatives were the Thessalians and particularly the Magnesians, with
whom they shared Aeolian ancestry. The language they spoke was among the oldest
forms of Greek, and it had affinities with the Aeolian, Arcado-Cypriot and Mycenean
dialects. The religion of the Macedonians was that of the other Greeks, and their myths
and traditions were those found throughout the Greek world. No mention is made of
Macedonia or Macedonians as a distinct ethnological group in any official text of
either the recent or neither the Treaty of Berlin, for example, nor the Treaty of San
Stefano which was revoked by it make any reference to such concepts. The official
Turkish census of 1905 gives figures for the populations of Greeks, Bulgarians and
quasi-Bulgarians in the vilayets of Thessaloniki and Monastir, where the Greeks were
in the majority, but contains no reference to Macedonians for the simple reason than
none of those questioned stated such descent.

Furthermore, according to this brochure Alexander the Great, who is the main
national character of todays Macedonians, was not only a Greek, but also a Pan
Hellenic leader, because he and his father King Philip II embodied the idea of the
formation of a united Greek state with the amalgamation of the Greek city-states.
It seems Greece, after it took Aegean Macedonia, made an effort to do same
personification with Philip II, under the name of the Megali Idea. This Idea shaped
the Greeces policy towards the Hellenization of Aegean Macedonia. According to
the Greek point of view, Macedonian people were unconscious about their
nationality. Although they (population of either Aegean, or central Macedonia) were
Greek, they could not become aware of it, because of the propaganda of the
neighboring countries, especially Bulgarians and Serbs. 18 On the other hand, the
domestic policies of each Balkan state towards changing the demographic
composition of their new territories to homogenize their nations, ironically, illustrate
the ethnic complexity of the peninsula.
Slavonic, Moslem, Jewish, Vlach and Albanian people, inhabited the new territory of
Greece in Macedonia. Simovski claims that more than half, i.e. 1.163.477 inhabitants
18

It can be said that the discourses of Bulgaria and Serbia were similar with Greece. Their
proclamations over Macedonia were almost same. Like Greece, Serbia also developed a discourse that
claiming Vardar Macedonia is Old Serbia and the Macedonians were Old Serbians. Similarly, for
Bulgaria, Macedonians were Bulgarian.
66

lived in Agean Macedonia of the total of 2.000.000 inhabitants of the whole

Macedonia. According to Simovski, the national composition of the population of
this region, on the eve of the Balkan Wars was as follows:
Christian Macedonians 362.000, Moslem Macedonians 41.000, Turks 295.000,
Christian Greeks 240.000, Moslem Greeks 14.000, Christian Vlachs 46.000, Moslem
Vlachs 3.500, Moslem and Christian Albanians 9.000, Jews 60.000, Romas
(Gypsies) 30.000, while the rest were inhabitants of other nationalities (Simovski,
1999: 7) 19 .
These numbers, even if they explain only some suppositions are significant to show
the integration of Macedonia into the Greek nation-state in 1913 was the beginning

19

In 1904, a census held by Greek government in Macedonia. According to this census there were
523.472 Greeks, 119.005 Bulgars, 404.238 Moslems, and 68.902 from various nationalities. Pallis
critiques the racial categorization of this census, because there was some misconceptions: The figures
include, under the heading of Greeks, the Slavophone Macedonians acknowledging the authority of
the Ecumenical Patriarch, and, under the heading of Bulgars, the Slavophone Macedonians
acknowledging the authority of the Bulgarian Exarch, as, under the Turkish regime, ecclesiastical
allegiance was the test of national sympathy. Koutzo-Vlachs, for the same reason, are classed as
Greeks, unless they had officially registered as Roumans. This classification, based on the principle
of national sentiment, does not, of course, pretend to take account of the much-disputed question of
the racial origin of the various elements of the population (Pallis, 1925: 322). The comparison
between demographical statistics can only show that nobody would know the real numbers of ethnic
groups, because of the manipulative usages of statistics. This table shows the difference between the
statistics of competent states on the demographical composition of Macedonia (Castellan, 1995, 369).
Serbian Statistics
Bulgarian Statistics
Greek Statistics (1904)
(1889)
(1900)
Turkish

499,200

634,000

231,000

Bulgarian

1,181,000

332,000

57,600

Greek

228,700

652,000

201,100

Serbian

700

...

2,048,000

Vlach

80,700

25,100

69,600

Albanian

128,700

...

165,000

Jews

67,800

53,100

64,600

Roma

54,500

8,900

28,700

Others

16,500

18,600

3,500

Total

2,258,000

1,724,000

2,870,000
67

of a long process, of marking the most difficult phase of the Greek nation-building
process as this was the area of greatest cultural diversity (Boeschoten, 2000: 36).
The Greek administration began in Aegean Macedonia, even before the First Balkan
War finished. Greece sent Konstantinos Raktivan as the first Greek administrator to
Thessalonica together with ten consulate clerks, two judges, five customs officers, a
contingent of journalists, and 168 gendarmes from Crete under the leadership of a
military officer at the end of October 1912 (Karakasidou, 1997; 162-3). Then, the
Greek government held two censuses in Aegean Macedonia in 1913 and in 1920. In
1913 the population of Greek Macedonia, according to the census taken in that
province by the Hellenic Government, immediately after the annexation, was
1.194.902 (Pallis, 1925: 321).
The second step of the centralization of Aegean Macedonia was the reorganization of
the administrative scheme of Aegean Macedonia in 1917 by the Act of 1051. This
Act formed new urban and rural municipalities. Aegean Macedonia, as the seventh
administrative area of Greece was divided into 13 counties, including 27 districts and
an autonomous unit Mount Athos, which enjoys a special autonomous status. The
names of counties were Ber, Voden, Greben, Drama, Kavala, Katerina, Kozani,
Kostur, Kukus, Lerin, Serres, Solun, and Halkidika (Simovski, 1999: 209).
The third step to nationalize, or in other words to homogenize or to centralize the
territory was the politics of forced migration: Actually, the forced migration was a
part of the continuing wars. Therefore, the environment of the First World War was
most profitable opportunity for Greece to apply forced migration policies in Aegean
Macedonia. Mainly two kinds of forced migration applied during the First World
War. First one was the forceful relocation the ethnically alien elements to the
neighboring countries; and the second one was the internal deportations. In the
internal deportations process some of the population, which were seem as threat by
Greece, were sent to the places, where they could be less dangerous.
Colonel A.C. Corfe, the chairman of the League of Nations Mixed Commission on
Greco-Bulgarian Emigration notes that In the course of conversation, Mr. Lambros
(Governor General of Macedonia), actually said that the present was a good
opportunity to get rid of the Bulgars, who remained in this area and, who had always
been a source of trouble for Greece (Rossos, 1994).
68

In his article on the census of 1928 in Greece, A.A. Pallis, who was a member of
Refugee Settlement Commission of Athens, summarizes the demographic renovation
of the country, from the Greek point of view. According to the numbers that Pallis
gives, the total population of Greece was 5.536.375 in 1920. It increased to
6.204.684 in 1928. Although the territory of Greece is lesser than 1920 20 , it is open
that the population of Greece increased as a consequence of migration. Even though
Greece sent some populations to neighboring countries, by the Neuily Treaty of 1919
with Bulgaria and the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 with Turkey, it received more than it
sent.
Refugees from Turkey
Refugees from Russia
Immigrants from Bulgaria
Refugees from Albania, Serbia, Dodecanese, etc.

Total

1,104,216
58,526
49,027
10,080

1,221,849

Of these, about 70.000 are refugees who arrived in the country before the census of
1920, and the rest 1.151.849- came during the interval 1920-1928.
Total population of Greece, 1920 census
5,536,375
Subtract
Population of the territories lost in 1923
514,585
Turks emigrated
388,146
Bulgars emigrated
68,800
Loses in men, Greco-Turkish War of 1920-1922
33,913
Total
1,005,444
Refugees immigrated 1921-1928

1,151,849 (Pallis, 1929: 544-

5) 21
20

the present area is given as 127,000 sq. km. As compared with 147,634 in 1920, that is, a
diminution of about 20.000 sq. km. the diminution of area is due to the loss of Eastern Thrace, the
Qaraagach enclave in Western Thrace, and two Aegean islands of Imbros and Tenedos (Pallis,
1929: 544)
21
Naturally, there are many conflicting numbers about those immigrations. I am pointing out the
Greece statistics, because my study is based on Greeces administrative policies in Aegean
Macedonia. However, it can be nice to see statistics from current Macedonian historiographic
discourse: Simovski sees those forceful immigrations as a part of Greek Megali Idea. in the
course of the Balkan Wars and the First World War around 50,000 Macedonians emigrated from the
territory of Aegean Macedonia. This enforced emigration of Macedonians did not achieve the results
expected by the Greek authorities since in Aegean Macedonia, in view of the natural population
increase, there still remained about 270,000 to 300,000 Macedonians. According to the available
official statistical data, between 1923 and 1928 33,000 Macedonians immigrated to Bulgaria, while
approximately 10,000 Macedonians moved to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.
despite the enforced migrations and emigrations of Macedonians in Aegean Macedonia during the
period from 1912 to 1940 which reached the number of about 90,000 (Simovski, 1999, XI-XII)
Simovskis numbers also include the overseas migration from Macedonia. Rossos, another
Macedonian author points out that there were some Muslim Macedonians in immigrants: as a
result of the compulsory exchange of Greek and Turkish or rather Christian and Muslim minorities
required by the Treaty of Lausanne, which ended the Greek-Turkish war (1919-22), 400,000 Turks,
including 49,000 Muslim Macedonians, were forced to leave Greece; and 1,300,000 Greeks and other
Christians were expelled from Asia Minor. In the years up to 1928 the Greek government settled
565,143 of these refugees as well as 53,000 colonists from other parts of Greece in Aegean
Macedonia. Thus, as a result of the removal of 127,384 Macedonians and the conscious and planned
69

Pallis informs that the refugees from Macedonia and the western Thrace were settled
on the lands left by the Turkish and Bulgarian emigrants, and secondly Attica.
Additionally, he categorizes the racial units in Greece:
Racial unit
cent)
Greeks
Turks
Bulgars
Albanians
Salonika Jews
Armenians
Foreigners
Total

1920
4,458,000
770,000
139,000
25,000
70,000
1,000
73,000
5,536,000

(per cent)
80,53
13,90
2,51
0,45
1,27
0,02
1,32
100,0

1928
5,817,000
103,000
82,000
25,000
70,000
35,000
73,000
6,205,000

(per
93,75
1,66
1,32
0,40
1,13
0,56
1,18
100,0

(Pallis, 1929: 546)

As a natural consequence of these migrations, the table shows that the Greek element
increased among all other racial units22 . The increase of the Greek population was
clearly as a result of the arrival of refugees from Turkey and Russia in 1922 (Pallis,
1929: 546).
Roudometof gives another group of numbers about migrations:
Some 220.000 refugees from Macedonia and Thrace flooded into Bulgaria after the
end of World War I. The second wave of Bulgarian refugees took place in the 1920s
Of the 66.126 people from Greek Macedonia who left for Bulgaria, the overwhelming
majority was from central and eastern Macedonia, and only approximately 6.000 were
from Western Macedonia (Roudometof, 2002: 96).

According to Roudometof, the clear result of these population movements was the
near extinction of the Slavic population in the rest of Greek Macedonia and the
creation of an assimilation of Slavic speakers in Northwestern Greek Macedonia, in
order to strengthen Greek rule in Macedonia.
The main objective of the population exchanges was the homogenization of the
population around the definition of Greek nation, in other words the Hellenization
of the newly gained territory. With the help of the political and historical context
Greece succeeded in this aim. Consequently, the Hellenization of Aegean Macedonia
has played a significant role in contributing to the territorial integrity of the country
(Pentzopoulos, 2002, 126).

settlement of 618,199 refugees, the Greek government transformed the ethnographic structure of
Aegean Macedonia in the period between 1913 and 1928." (Rossos, 199: 284)
22
Greece, and the Pallis never mention that there were some Macedonians (ethnically, as a separate
racial unit) in Greece coherently with the policy towards denying a separate Macedonian ethnicity.
70

At the end of these population exchanges and forced migrations, the ethnic
composition of Aegean Macedonia was completely changed. The followings table is
taken from the book named Greek Refugee Settlement that shows the effect of these
population movements:
Ethnological table of Greek (Aegean) Macedonia
Nationalities
1912
%
1926
%
Greeks
513.000
42,6
1.341.000
88,8
Moslem
475.000
39,4
2.000
0,1
Bulgarian
119.000
9,9
77.000
5,1
Various
98.000
8,1
91.000
6,0
Total
1.205.000
100
1.511.000
100
Moslem: includes Turks, Pomaks, Albanians, and Moslem Gypsies
23
Various: includes Vlachs, Albanians and foreigners (Pentzopulos, 2002; 134).

III.4. Centralization of Macedonia: Local Practices

The centralization of the administration and the Hellenization of population
developed in parallel in Aegean Macedonia under the Greek rule. On the one hand,
the non-Greek population groups were excluded from the territory; on the other, the
Greek government centralized the administration around the pre-defined national
identity: The main presumption of the Greek nation state was that all people living in
Greece was Greek, except the minorities recognized by the international treaties.
According to Karakasidou, the nation of the Hellenes was largely an abstract entity,
which was invoked and symbolized through flags, schools, holidays, celebrations,
and official commemorations, from the point of view of local inhabitants of Aegean
Macedonia. However, at that point in time, the state was not immediately able to
settle in the society, it had only a concrete existence that embodied in the form of the
civil administrators, the tax collectors, and the policemen posted to the region. Thus,
the township administration was a kind of instrument between the concrete state
and the abstract nation. Therefore, the Greek central administration, contrary to
Ottoman administration, empowered the local power holders of townships and uses
some local agents to deepen its existence.
During the 1920s and 1930s, the administrative township was a veritable local ministate, a self-financed and largely self-regulated corporate community with its own
23

Pentzopoulos mentions that since 1923 Greek-Turkish Convention defined the exchangeable
persons on the basis of religion, the same criterion was adopted for compiling in this table.
Therefore, only orthodox Greeks, Moslems and members of the Schismatic Bulgarian Church were
considered as national communities. Race and language were ignored because of the difficulty of
interpretation of such terms (Pentzopulos, 2002; 134-5)
71

governors, elected representative, tax collectors, teachers, and security personnel. The
tsorbatjidhes (orbaclar, chorbajis) who came to personify Greek authority in the
township were also patrons and benefactors for township residents, providing them
with jobs and services, as well as groceries and credit. As issues of cultural
assimilation and national homogenization rose to priority on Greek government
agendas during the interwar era, the words and actions of this emergent class of local
elites helped to cultivate among township residents an ideology of commonness and a
conscious identification with the Greek nation-state (Karakasidou, 1997; 163).

In this process, unavoidably, the Greek administration changed the local relations. It
dismissed some old regulations between locals and the former Muslim or SlavoMacedonian inhabitants of these settlements. Boeschoten gives an example from
Florina (Lerin):
Before the arrival of the refugees, Slav-speaking peasants had formed the main labor
force on the large Turkish estates on the plains or lived as smallholders in the free
mountain villages. Since the end of the nineteenth century, many had bought up Muslim
property, under informal sale contracts, with money sent from abroad by family
members. After the arrival of the refugees, however, the Greek state refused to
recognize these contracts. In several instances, local state officials were unfair to Slavspeaking peasants, who consequently lost land (which they already cultivated or had
bought from the Muslims) to the refugees. Such instances explain why some Slavspeakers refer to the arrival of the refugees as the time in which the unbaptized Turks
left and the baptized Turks came (Boeschoten, 2000: 37).

Karakasidou, in her Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood, focuses on a case from Greek
Macedonia, which is old Guvezna or new Assirios. Karakasidou emphasizes the role
of local power holders in the process of Hellenization of Guvezna. Soon after the
First Balkan War, the civil administration, taxation, education, conscription, and
religious affairs were linked to a single state hierarchy, which also empowered local
elites as the agents of the state bureaucracy (Karakasidou, 1997; 162). According to
Karakasidou, the chorbajis came to personify the authority of Greek central
administration in the township. They were the Christian counterparts of ayans,
Christian landowners and communal leaders or notables of the Balkans (Karpat,
1972: 251and 269). Greece included those notables into administrative practices;
instead of excluding them from administration as Ottoman governments did. In fact,
at the first appearance, these local notables had no official privilege. However,
because of their relationships with the locals and the state, and their information and
experience about the local issues and attitudes, they gained some privileges
practically. Especially in the solutions of land conflicts, chorbajis had very important
role, and this role make them privileged (Karakasidou, 1997; 163-4).
After World War I, the main issue about Greek Macedonia was the redistribution of
the lands left by Muslims. Until late 1920, it remained the biggest problem of
72

Macedonia. In the late 1920s, Liberal Party government of Prime Minister Venizelos
started a large-scale land redistribution campaign. The policy of supporting rural
refugees was not only for homogenization, but also for reducing the social
oppositions against the central state. The government of Venizelos was attempting to
prevent new rural refugees to participate to the radical agrarian movement or
becoming proletarians in the cities. This is critical to note that in the Civil War
period, Slav-speakers took the side on the left, while refugees involve themselves in
the right (Boeschoten, 2000: 40) 24 .
In accordance with the land reform project, all former Ottoman chiftlik estates were
declared exchangeable lands, and marked for expropriation and redistribution by
the Refugee Settlement Commission (Karakasidou, 1997: 165). Contrary to Florina
district, in Assiros, the Greek law provided protection for the Muslim properties,
which had been sold or legally transferred to private Greek citizens prior to the
Muslim migration, as declared them as foreign properties. However, it seems that
protection was only theoretical. Karakasidou quotes that an old Assiros man told her
the chorbajis had used stones or other available markers to designate the borders of
their new properties. Most of them, never paid a drachma for those lands
(Karakasidou, 1997: 167). In the cities, there was a kind of natural redistribution.
The buildings and homes of the former inhabitants of Macedonia in the townships
and cities were looted. The chorbajis were also active in those looting activities.
Until the second redistribution wave in 1934, it seems the chorbajis picked the
biggest benefit of the Hellenization of the new land. Thus, they were the main
benefactors of the new administration in Greek Macedonia. In Assiros case,
Karakasidou adds that the chorbajis became executive officers of the Greek state
administration at the township level. Many of them quickly assumed active
participation in the flurry of the new administrative refugee settlement process. That
was important to the chorbajis; the township council to the highest bidders auctioned

24

The leadership cadres among the empires Muslim population at the end of the eighteenth and the
beginning of the nineteenth centuries consisted essentially of two major groups: the ayans and erafs,
or notables who had become a sort of landlords and the bureaucratic military elements associated with
the government. The ayans (the Christian counterparts for village leaders in some areas in the Balkans
were the chorbajis), despite their heterogonous origins, were in fact precursors of a new type of
middle class group The ayans, often with the support of the local ulema and the janissaries, helped
strengthen local autonomy and thus weakened the hold of the central authority over provinces,
including the Balkans. (Karpat, 1972: 251)
73

as such profitable matters as tax collecting privileges and township pasture grazing
rights (Karakasidou, 1997: 173).
This development helps to explain why the Greek central administration
strengthened the local administrations in its new territory. Under the war conditions
and the pressure of huge immigrations, it was impossible to finance a radical
centralization in this area. The Greek central administration gave a semi-autonomous
entity to the townships, after it took the region from Bulgaria, by the way foundation
of local councils. These councils had the authority to make local budgets, and
collecting taxes. The chorbajis, naturally the Greek oriented ones, dominated those
newly created township councils. Thus, it can be said that the local power balances
had a relative continuation between the Ottoman and Greek administrations until
1930s. In 1880 kanunname, Ottoman administration had intended to found these
kinds of semi-autonomous local councils, as well. However, it had not worked,
because of the manipulation of central administration over local councils. Until the
second centralization wave in 1930s, it can be seen that Greece also manipulated
these councils by the hand of chorbajis.
The chorbajis served on the managerial boards of each of these three institutions
(vakifs, churches and the schools), collaborating in the financing of many activities,
events, and celebrations that promoted sentiments of community solidarity and common
affinity with the Greek nation-state. This tripartite corporate partnership had been a
vestige of the Ottoman past, when local Christian notables, the church, and school had
worked closely together at the service of the idea of Hellenism (Karakasidou,

1997: 177).
This administrative structure was broken up by 1930s by the Metaxas
dictatorship. 25

III.5. Baptizing Territory

The Hellenization of the new territory was not limited with redistribution of the
properties of former inhabitants of the region or with changing property relations.
25

Actually, there was no change in Venizelos governments program at the end of the 1920s. Before
World War I Venizelos party had led the reform movement. It divided the large estates and
reorganized the schools, the administration, and the army. It represented the rising, progressive middle
class of merchants, manufacturers, bankers, and ship owners. But by the 1930s the ideas of this
middle class had changed. It had arrived. It wanted to preserve and retain rather than to change and
discard. I viewed with alarm the agitation for reform bred by the depression. (Stavrianos, 1958: 667)
Venizelos fell from government by the elections in September 1932 together with Greek Republic,
and after a short government absence, General Metaxas held the authority over Greece and
reconstituted the Greek Monarchy. In 1936 Metaxas declared his own dictatorship.
74

Obviously, being Greek was a privilege for taking benefit from the land
redistribution. Greek government was trying to provide property for Greeks, instead
of foreigners. In addition, administrative reorganization went hand-in-hand with
the construction of a national identity and land redistribution in Aegean Macedonia.
Moreover, it can be said that the administrative policies in Aegean Macedonia took a
very important role in Greek national identity politics. This huge region and the new
composition of population in this region was one of the biggest problems for defining
an indivisible, homogenized nation for the Greek administration. Renaming was one
of the most significant activities of the Greek nation state to reshape its territory
towards creating a homogenized nation. 26
The toponymy of Greek territory had been built up during centuries. It was as
complex as the ethnic and the historical inhabitants of the territory. There were many
Slavonic, Albanian, Vlach and Turkish names, since those people named and
renamed their villages and towns in their own languages. Naturally, it was a problem
for the Greek central state. Subsequently, beginning with its foundation the Greek
state started to change non-Greek place names, especially in larger towns. 27
Every new land taken by Greece was a new problem in that sense. In March 1909 the
Greek Foreign Minister, Nicolas Politis prepared a special report that offered the
foundation of an official commission for renaming new lands named non-Greek. On
8 June 1909, a decree was published in 125th number of Efimeristis Kiverniseos
(Greek Government Gazette), which was forming a new state commission for
exploring toponyms and discovering their historical origin (Simovski, 1999; XIV),
under the name of The Toponym Commission of Greece. According to the 8th
paragraph of the decree, all administrative and other state authorities had to inform
and assist the commission on the issue of place names.
26

After the Balkan Wars, the CUP government also decided to change place names, which were left
by non-Muslims in Thrace and Anatolia. For this reason, the government added an article to skan-
Muhacirin Nizamnamesi (The Law of Resettlement of Refugees) of 1913 (1329). Under the force of
this article, in 1915, place names were started to change. Enver Paa published a legal order as the
vice-commander-in-chief that orders to change the place names, not only settlements but also
geographical places, like mountains, lakes etc., which are in non-Muslims languages. According to
this order the new names should make people remember the great commanders or the important
events of Ottoman history. However, one year later, in 15th June 1916 this was stopped, because the
new names were confusing the military corps, while they were moving. (Dndar, 2001, 82)
27
In that process Tropolica became Tripolis, Mistra was renamed as Sparti, Vostica versus Egion,
Salona changed to Amphissa, Pisati took the name of Pyrgos, Gortina changed to Kartagena,
Dragomesti to Astakos, Zeytuni to Lamia etc. (Simovski, 1999; XIV).
75

Renaming process turned out to be a more complex job after the Balkan Wars. In
these new territories Greek population was minority, and the names were from
different languages of Balkans, like Albanian, Slavonic or Turkish. As mentioned
before, by the way of population exchanges and the forced migration, the proportion
of the ethnic groups had been altered in Macedonia. At the end the Greek population
became majority in the region.
Then, on 10 October 1919, the Greek government published a circular letter to
clarify the mission of the Toponym Commission. According to the letter, the reason
of the existence of such a Commission was defined with the following sentences:
the rejection of all Turkophonic names of villages and municipalities which
contaminate and brutalize the face of our beautiful country and leave space for
unfavorable conclusions about the Greek nation which unfriendly peoples use against
us 28 , by means of a Decree of the Ministry of Internal Affairs has decided to reinforce
its endeavors to replace foreign names with Greek ones (Simovski, 1999; XIV).

In line with the circular letter, new names would not be selected by chance. Greek
administration pointed some historical or geographical references.
According to Pallis, not only the Greek government, but also the new inhabitants of
those places were wishing to change the old names. Many of the inhabitants were
immigrants from Anatolia in those regions, so in order to identify themselves; they
used the names of their former towns in Anatolia. Thus it is possible to see such
names as Nea (New) Philadelphia, Nea Bafra, Nea Ankhialos, Neos Pyrgos, Nea
Phokaia and Nea Appollonia.
It was the same sort of feeling which made the first British settlers in North America
gives such names as New England, New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, etc. Out of
the 1975 refugee settlements throughout Greece, 462 are entirely new settlements,
while 1513 are former Turkish or Bulgarian villages whose original inhabitants have
emigrated. In the latter case, the villages have been re-christened and Greek names
substituted for the previous Slav or Turkish (Pallis, 1928; 548).

28

Actually, Greece makes similar explanations about the usage of the name of Macedonia by
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM, this name is also used temporarily, FYROM is
searching for a name, which can be satisfactory for both international society, and Macedonians), after
it became an independent state. In the process of recognition of the Greece made a huge lobbying
activity to convince international society that FYROM would claim Aegean Macedonia in future by
legitimizing itself as the historical Macedonia. At the end, Greece as the older member of international
society made its opposition be accepted and FYROM had to withdraw the usage of Macedonia as its
international entity. However, the discussion over the name of Macedonia is going on especially in the
Diasporas of these two nations. For a brief review of that struggle over the name of Macedonia see
Roudometof, 2002, 2nd chapter. For this naming dispute see also Macedonias name: Why the Dispute
Matters and How to Resolve it, 10 December 2001, International Crisis Group Balkans Report No.
122, Skopje/Brussels
76

Simultaneously, the people have non-Greek names were forced to change their first
and surnames; every Macedonian (Slavonic) surname had to end in os, es, or
poulos. The information of these acts and the new official Greek names were
published in the Greek government daily Efimeristis Kiverniseos (Government
Gazette) number 322 and 324 of November 21 and 23, 1926 (John Shea, 1997; 109).
In October 1919, the Toponym Commission of Greece issued another circular letter,
which had instructions for the new place names. Then, Ministry of Internal Affairs of
Greece published a booklet that was written by Nicolas Politis (the Greek Foreign
Minister), entitled Advice on the Alteration of the Names of Municipalities and
Villages in 1920 (Simovski, 1999: XIV). A more detailed letter followed this in
1922, under the number of 426, which had intensified the activities of the
Commission.
In the period of 1918 and 1925, 76 inhabited places in Aegean Macedonia were
renamed. After the migration process was complete Greek government prepared a
law to quicken the renaming process. Many inhabited places in the districts of Lerin
(Florina), Kostur (Kastoria), Voden (Edessa) and Kukus (Kilkis) changed. Then in
September 1926, a law was published in the government gazette, numbered 332,
entitled On Renaming Villages, Towns, and Cities. The Decision of the Ministerial
Council dated 10 November 1927 and published in the government gazette S2 287
on 13 November 1927, afterward, the process of renaming the inhabited places
fastened.
The first article of the Decree 332 stated that the government let foreign or
distasteful names of villages, towns and cities were replaced (Simovski, 1999: XV).
By article 2 of the decree, government announced that some sub-commissions were
established in every district to study the renaming of villages, towns and cities.
Articles 3 and 4 determined the ways of proposing new names:
Article 3: The (Toponym) Commission shall compile a list for the renaming of
villages, towns and cities with a brief explanation of the reasons for the selection of the
proposed new names. The list shall be submitted to the Internal Affairs Ministry, which
shall forward it to the Toponym Commission of Greece for its judgment. Article 4: The
Toponym Commission of Greece, within 15 days of receiving the proposed renaming,
shall express its opinion on them and inform the Internal Affairs Ministry which, on that
basis, shall issue the necessary Decree of approval of the proposed renaming.

According to article 5, following the new name approved in government gazette, it

should be sent to all ministries and railway directorates. Article 7 of the decree stated
77

that after the new names were published, the usage of the old names was absolutely
prohibited.
Following that decree, a rapid renaming activity took place, and in only one year
between September 1926 and November 1927, 945 places were renamed. (Simovski,
1999: XV) Since, it was not enough for preventing the usage of old names, another
legal order that numbered 287 published in the government gazette on 13 November
1927. Two months later, on 12 December 1927 that legal order transformed into an
act no 3342. By the Act 3342, the government declared the compulsory characteristic
of the usage of new names and stated the punishments:
Article 5: The changes of the seal and the name of a municipality in compliance with
its new name are compulsory and any use of the old name by the president of the
municipality or municipal councilors in the municipal councils minutes or
correspondence shall be a disciplinary offence punishable by the District
Superintendent with a fine of from 50 to 200 drachmas and in certain cases the
offenders may be suspended by the ruling of the District Superintendent. Article 6: The
renamed municipalities and villages are ordered to place signs in the central area and
along main roads at the entry to the village or municipality. The new name of the
settlement is to be written on the sign. Failure to do so or a removal of the sign shall be
punishable according to Article 429 of the Penal Law. Article 7, Clause 2: Once the
new names have been announced, the use of the old names by public authorities or
bodies in official correspondence or in the correspondence of associations,
corporations, cooperatives and other corporate bodies is absolutely prohibited. Clause
3: Violation of this ban is a penal offence punishable by a fine of 100 drachmas or up to
ten days detention. Clause 4: Applications by individuals or corporate bodies
submitted to public services may be disregarded if the applicants already renamed
place of residence, town or village, is not mentioned. Clause 5: A witness, prosecutor or
other person examined in court using as a place of residence or birth the old name of a
town or village that has already been renamed according to the findings of the court
may be punished according to Clause 3 of this Article (Simovski, 1999: XVI).

Consequently, after 1926, 440 places in Aegean part of Macedonia were renamed: In
three years time, between 1926 and 1928 1497 places in Aegean part of Macedonia
were renamed. The special law known under its number, 4.096, was passed on 3
March 1929, and published in the government gazette on 13 March 1929. This policy
reached its most extreme and tragic dimensions during the late 1930s, under the
dictatorship of General Metaxas. At that period, not only the names but also the
Macedonian language was also prohibited even in the private places.
Under the influence of this law of 1926, and the earlier regulations, amended by Law
Number 6,429 of 18 June 1935, Law S2 1418 of 22 November 1938, Law N2 697 of
4 December 1945 and many other instructions, the legislative orders and other
enactments, the process of renaming inhabited areas had been carried until 1980s.
78

The new names had figured in all official maps, railway timetables, postal and
telegraphic directories, and railway stations. That means, Aegean Macedonia was
renamed or remapped by Greek central administration. Pallis explains the reason of
Greek government for this re-mapping activity:
All future atlases should therefore be based on the new nomenclature, as the old
names, besides no longer being in official use, is also rapidly falling into disuse locally.
Place names are the permanent landmarks, which indicate the various stages in the
history of countries and nations. Thus, just as the Slav and Turkish place-names of
Macedonia were the record of the great Slav incursions of the eight and ninth centuries
and the Turkish Conquest which followed in the fourteenth and fifteenth, so the new
Greek names will mark the period of the great migration which, in the twentieth,
brought the Greeks of Thrace, Pontus, and Ionia back to the countries which were the
cradle of their race many centuries ago (Pallis, 1928: 548).

These chosen names give also an idea on the historiographic acceptances of Greek
nation state. Firstly, the Greek authorities tried to use the classical names from
Macedonia as soon as possible. For instance Krista Misirkovs birthplace, Postol,
was renamed Pella, Rupista in Kostur (Kastoria) region was renamed Argos
Oresticon (Simovski, 1999: XVI). Another resource for the new names was the
Macedonian kings and their commanders, like Philipi, Olympias, Philotas, and
Klitos. These choices show that Greek official history tries to save the history of
Slavophone Greeks not only from Bulgarians but also from local Slavophone
Greeks.
Obviously, naming or renaming does not represent only an aesthetic preference.
Especially in the process of formation of a nation state, as replacing the old authority
in a given region and over a given population, naming refers the new ruler and its
orders. Hence, one can see that naming policy of Greek government (or any
government) is related to the activities for constituting its hegemony over a certain
territory and a population. In this case, our issue is the ways and tools of the Greek
nation state for constituting its hegemony in Aegean Macedonia.
It is very meaningful that Macedonia as a region never existed as an administrative
unit in the Ottoman Period. When it had a name, it was about break away from the
Empire. Before that region had the name Macedonia, it was Rumeli for the Empire,
but because of the wars and the separatist movements Rumeli had been changed
dramatically, not only politically but also socially. The Berlin Treaty configured
those changes as creating a legal context. Naturally the intentions of the creators of
this context can be discussed. However the main objective of this context was
79

realizing more manageable national/central entities/states in the Balkans, to provide a

stable environment to realize every partys interests and to save the international
balance of power for avoiding a big war between the Great Powers.
In this context, centralization and nationalization had almost same meaning. Hence,
the problem was who would centralize this problematic territory. It seems the
Ottoman Empire could not do that, while Greek and other nation states of Balkans
were relatively successful. Obviously, the reasons of the Ottoman failure and the
Greek success can be explained with various historical, political and social
approaches. However, in this study I tried to focus on two laws that were used as the
tools for constituting Rumeli/Macedonian society not only legally but also culturally
and politically, with their basic provisions.

80

Conclusion
In this study, I focused on the dissolution process of the Ottoman Rumeli in Greek
Macedonia. This process could be defined as the transformation of the Eastern
Question firstly to the Macedonian Question, then to the Balkan irredentisms.
The term Eastern Question covered the issues resulted in the 19th century, which
was the fragmentation period of the Ottoman Empire. These issues were mainly
based on the competition among the Great Powers to influence over Ottoman
territory. Since non-Muslim subjects of the Empire were one of the main legitimacy
tools for the intervention of the Great Powers, they had the mission to protect these
subjects. Thus, another aspect of the Eastern Question was the unequal conditions
of the non-Muslims in the Empire. One of the main aims of the Berlin Congress was
to solve the Eastern Question. However, it could only specify the issues in Rumeli
provinces of the Ottoman Empire and created the Macedonian Question, which
would be caused to the Balkan Wars. The Macedonian Question still could not be
solved, even after the Balkan Wars and the First World War. When we look at the
Balkan history, from the beginning of the 21st century, it is possible to see that the
question continued with the problems and wars among the Balkan nation-States.
At the beginning of the 20th century there was no region named Rumeli anymore.
The Rumeli was renamed as Macedonia after the Berlin Treaty of 1878 in the
international context and the Ottoman administration tried not to apply the order of
this context for preventing fragmentation or colonization of this territory.
Recognizing the privileges that were defined by article 23 of the Berlin Treaty and
the Law of 1880, which was proposed to implement the order of article 23, meant
recognizing that new context. Hence, the Ottoman administration resisted
implementation of the reforms. The main point of the Berlin Treaty and the Law of
1880 was creating an autonomous region in Macedonia. The same process was
experienced in Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania, Crete, Lebanon and so on. This gives an
idea about why the Ottoman administration tried not to implement these reforms
ordered by the Berlin Treaty. The Ottoman Empire on one hand was trying to form a
central state just like its counterparts in Europe. On the other it was forced to
decentralize by the same European powers. Hence, the Ottoman administration
rejected decentralizing Rumeli by granting of privileges to the region.
81

As I tried to explain in the first and second chapters of this study, from the Ottoman
point of view, it was very hard to accept the multi-religious and multi-lingual social
structure of the region, because this structure was used as a legitimacy tool for
foreign intervention in the affairs of the Ottoman administration. They might be right
to be paranoid about the claims of the non-Muslim elements of the Empire, because
of the relationships between the interests of the Great Powers and the non-Muslim
groups. From the Ottoman perspective, granting privileges of the autonomy to the
people of the Rumeli provinces, as the Law of 1880 stated, was no doubt damaging
to its centralization efforts.
Ottoman resistance to the reforms was not simply because these reforms were
contrary to centralization politics of the Ottoman government; but the Ottoman
bureaucracy also resisted the intervention of the European Great Powers, which tried
to pursue their own interests. Thus, it can be said that one of the reasons of the
resistance of the Ottoman administration was to prevent the transformation of the
Empire into a colonial one by the intervention of the European powers. Especially,
the content of the Mrzsteg reforms shows that the administration in Rumeli with the
involvement of the representatives of the Great Powers was very similar to the
colonial administration in other regions of the world. Given the tension between
Ottoman-Muslim administrators, and local non-Muslim inhabitants, due to the
difficult economic and political situation of the Empire, the Ottoman bureaucracy
was trying to exclude the non-Muslims from the posts of administration. Although
there were many non-Muslims in the Ottoman central administration 29 , it seems that
at the local level it was very hard for the non-Muslims to take any post in the
Ottoman bureaucracy and army. However, the Europeans repeatedly emphasized this
point. Since the Ottoman administration saw non-Muslims as the agents of the
(colonial) Great Powers and they were suspicious about their desires. 30
At the same time, these reform projects redefined the Ottoman administration as a
colonial power in the Balkans. For instance, the position of the governor as it was
defined in the Law of 1880 was very similar to the colonial governor, who was the
29

Gabriel Noradunkyan, the Foreign Minister of the Ottoman Empire was an Armenian in the period
of the Balkan Wars.
30
For a brief history of relationships between Ottoman Empire and the non-Muslim communities in
Balkans look at Vucinich, 1962. In fact, this article represents a point of view to Ottoman Empire that
criticized Ottoman Empire as the main reason of backwardness of Balkan societies. Vucinich
highlights the tension between Balkan societies and Ottoman administrators.
82

representative of a central administration in a federal state that had its own

parliament and was almost independent in its domestic affairs.
Doubtless, population exchanges that were allowed by international treaties gave a
big opportunity to Greece to reconstitute the social reality of the region around
central state administration. Naturally, one can reject that those population exchanges
could provide a homogenous demographic structure in this geography. Certainly,
new comers were different from the native Greeks of the region. However, the land
redistribution policy of Greek central administration was very helpful for
incorporating these new comers into nation state. Additionally, Greece co-opted local
power holders in the newly gained territories for constituting its hegemony.
The Ottoman governments could not apply these kinds of policies in the Ottoman
Rumeli because of trends in the international context of the 19th and 20th centuries.
That context was legitimizing unitary nation states rather than empires or federal
political constructions such as the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, there was no way the
Ottoman government to satisfy either the Balkan states or the Great Powers and to
establish a stable administration in Rumeli. There was one way for the Ottoman
Empire to exist in the Balkans, which was through re-constructing itself as a colonial
power and sharing that power with other colonials. The Law of 1880 and other
reform programs show that the Ottoman government theoretically tried this way, but
it failed.
The Ottoman bureaucracy itself was trying to reconstruct the Ottoman state as a
central one. Yet the complexity of the ethnic structure of Rumeli made the
centralization of administration impossible, because a certain definition of an
Ottoman nation was not possible. The Ottoman state was not able to baptize this
territory in the concept of a nation. On the other hand, the statehood in the
international context of the time was incumbent on nationhood. When the Balkan
states were established as internationally legal entities by the Berlin Treaty (only
Greece was existed before this treaty), they acquired a legitimate right to baptize
their territory administratively, legally, socially, and politically.
At the beginning period of the Greek administration in Aegean Macedonia, the
situation of governor general was also similar to that of a colonial administrator. At
the first appearance, the Greek central administration also seemed very exclusionary
83

against the inhabitants of Aegean Macedonia. Firstly, Greece excluded masses,

which it considered as alien elements, not only from the administrative levels, but
also from the territory. The aim of the Greek government was also to construct a
central state. In the international context, constituting a central state for itself was a
natural right of a nation at the beginning of the 20th century. Greece primarily
purified the demographic structure of its territory, by the help of the forced mass
migration and the population exchange policies. It can be said that, at this period
every nation state in the Balkans in its formation process was applying similar
policies. The population exchanges were the reciprocal demographic purification
policies. But then, Greece adopted politics different from that of the Ottoman state.
The Greek administration cooperated with the local power holders and included their
power for unifying its own and the local notables interests in the region at least
practically.
Nation-building entailed a cultural revolution, and was a dialectical process in
which both state and local interests were renegotiated and redefined through the
mediating agency of local elites with a national orientation. Greek national identity was
employed by the chorbajis of Guvezna/Assiros, and the manner, in which they used it,
often in support of their own economic interests, played a key role in defining its
meaning to other township inhabitants (Karakasidou, 1997, 164).

Renaming was another policy pointing to the exclusionary nature of the Greek
administration. Under the light of this policy, the Greek central administration did
not only punish the usage of the old names, but also ignored the intentions behind
those usages. The newcomers were not only using the names of their former cities in
Anatolia and Bulgaria, but also they gained ownership of the lands of the former
Muslim or Slav inhabitants of the region. In addition, Greece included the
Macedonian history within its identity politics, which was belonging to another
separatist nationalist discourse in the region. As I mentioned before, from the Greek
point of view, the Macedonians were the Greeks, but they had misconceptions
about their identity.
The renaming policy of Greece shows that the Greek central administration did not
recognize any minority in its geography, except the Muslims in Western Thrace; who
were acquired as a legal entity in the Lausanne Treaty. The policy of renaming was a
tool baptizing territory as the property of the Greek central state. Thus that newly
gained territory and the abandoned lands of former inhabitants were redistributed
among baptized newcomer Greeks.
84

In this study, I saw that identity politics in the process of the formation of the nation
states could not be separated from the centralization policies. Contrary to the
discourse that offers identity issues as mainly literal or discursive ones. The results of
this study point in the direction that defining an identity is strongly related to the
political economy of the central states. In this context, renaming a given
geographical territory and land might be a kind of precaution against possible claims
over the land.
In addition, the re-creation of a territory in a nations language may have a meaning
that creates legitimacy to determined territory in future, as well. The Greek
opposition to the usage of the name Macedonia by the newly established nation state
of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia also brings that question to the
mind. Greece asserts that the new Republic was preparing itself and international
public space for its future claims over Aegean Macedonia by using the name of
Macedonia. Another fact that points to the same issue, in Turkey and other Balkan
states the documents about land and property issues are very hard to access. This
might be also a policy to prevent individual claims of migrant people over their
former lands. Although these issues seem to be solved by the international treaties, it
is possible that international context can change again to give legitimacy to these
kinds of claims.
These questions make me think again about nationalism. It is obvious that
nationalism is not only a discourse. It was also an administrative preference. Thus, it
is very interesting to study the administrative and legal practices of nationalism.
Explaining the nationalism and the identity politics as only discursive practices or
imprinted policies could result in ignoring their material side. I do not mention
individual nationalisms; but I mean nationalism as a basis for obtaining international
legitimacy. Hence, it is possible to see that a given nation could exist only if it is
entitled to do in the international context. The international balance of power enables
or disables these kinds of entities. Primarily, a nation has to have a legal entity to be
able to establish its own state in its territory or struggle for its unredeemed territory
or brethrens. While some ethnic, religious, or lingual groups can have this entity;
others have to be contented with the entity of minority. The characteristic of the
entity depends on the role of these groups in the international balances of power.
This balance of power creates the international legal context or standards. At the
85

beginning of the 19th century the international legal context was focused over the
concept nation. The treaties were baptizing nations internationally. After a nation
was entitled to this entity, it was authorized to baptize its own territory. The Balkan
States were entitled to become nation states by the Berlin Treaty and they were able
to realize their centralization projects. On the other hand, for the Ottoman Empire it
was impossible to adjust the standards needed to be nation.
In fact, even today, nobody knows what these standards are. In Western Europe, a
persons national identity is determined by his/her citizenship, however ironically, in
no region of the world except Western Europe national identity is defined simply in
terms of citizenship. Therefore, it can be said that there is something added while this
concept translated into other languages. Studying the administrative practices of
different nationalisms, or the way of constituting nation states in different regions,
one can have some clues about what was added to this concept, and how it was
added, and also by whom.

86

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