You are on page 1of 3

Home | Columns | Media Watch | Reports | Links | About Us | Contact

MEXIDATA . INFO
Column 011110 Brewer

Monday, January 11, 2010

Mexico’s Security Apparatus Must Guard against Apathy

By Jerry Brewer

Mexico’s strategic and elite inner circle security council, and its
policy makers, should immediately focus on the recent attack
on U.S. Central Intelligence Agency officers at Forward
Operating Base Chapman, in the Khost province of
Afghanistan.

In particular, President Felipe Calderon must rely on the high


ethical and moral integrity of his personal protective service
cadre.

The internal security failure in Afghanistan that killed seven


CIA officers and a Jordanian intelligence agent is a classic
case of systematic security failures that are unusual for
veteran clandestine service operators. This case scenario no
doubt reeks of lethargy with a passiveness that comes from
simple failures to properly authenticate operational acts of
intelligence tradecraft.

Within the compartmented structure of a critical operational


plan of action, especially when a contributor or informant is
involved as a principal source for the justification of covert
action, the source’s “vetting” and diligent monitoring must be a
fluid process. In the Khost Province incident, Humam Khalil
Abu Mual al-Balwi (36), a Jordanian doctor, became the
source asset for Jordanian intelligence who had previously
arrested him on “suspicion of extremist sympathies.” His
informational content was purported to be a high value in
information on Osama bin Laden’s deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Jordanian intelligence, with a proven track record of access


and critical insight into Iraq and Iran’s inner-sanctum of
suspected weapons proliferation, essentially delivered a “false
flag penetrator” that took the lives of a cadre of elite U.S.
intelligence officials, as well as one of their own. Many believe
this counterintelligence incident failure was a major coup and
significant victory by penetration of al Qaeda and bin Laden’s
(posthumously or not) network.

So, just what does this all mean to Mexico’s internal security
and their war against powerful and sophisticated enemies of
the state? Quite simply, everything.

The Mexican organized crime cartels are conglomerates of


wealth, power, and terror. Too, they are a nation state within
themselves. When passiveness sets in and the proverbial
failure “to connect the dots” ensues, people die, whether in
war, in policing the streets, or in the world of espionage. Much
like a “terrorist watch list” that is obviously beatable, regardless
of the painstaking efforts to prevent disaster.

An inner circle of intelligence personnel, personal security, and


policy makers, as well as their operational plans against
targets, are only as good and secure as the source ingredients
of the group. Consequently, the greatest virtue for Mexico’s
elite to strive for in their battles against the cartels is security.
All else must be subordinated to that concept.

The connection of dots to those Mexican officials nationwide


that have been kidnapped, tortured, and ritually murdered like
fish in a barrel, with impunity, is virtually unbelievable.
However, the facts are that cartels routinely mount operations
with sophisticated counterintelligence against Mexican
officials. They do this with their own network of spies and
massive amounts of money, along with informants, other
sources of information, and an iron death threat fist.

The upper echelons of Mexico’s governing officials are at great


risk, a threat assessment based on an enforcement
organizational hierarchy matrix that details decision making
against the cartels and their structures. Obviously, “one”
stands at the highest placement of the decision making
pyramid.

The security failure in Afghanistan is a grim reminder that


should be a wake-up call to all of those that stand in harm’s
way, or may be susceptible to retaliation and other acts of
retribution. Complacency kills.

As elite CIA operators targeted what they believed might be


the mother lode of tactical intelligence information against the
high ranking al Qaeda hierarchy, their usually ingrained
system of checks and balances (security) degraded. Source
reliability and content validity assessments in this incident may
have been solely overlooked due to Jordanian intelligence
failures. Balawi had done a classic example of previously
establishing credibility in the eyes of Jordanian officials by
simply spoon-feeding them morsels of intelligence. He would
later walk into the meeting in Forward Operating Base
Chapman (unsearched) and detonate.

In Mexico’s war against the cartels, human intelligence is


paramount to success. This obviously requires the recruiting
of informants and sources that have information which can
effectively penetrate and interdict the organized criminal
hierarchies.

And the cartels reciprocate in a similar manner. But their


payoffs are made easy with massive funding, plus the threat of
death for failure to perform at their demand is a significant
incentive to betray the established rule of law, and each of
those who stand at or near the top.

——————————
Jerry Brewer is C.E.O. of Criminal Justice International
Associates, a global risk mitigation firm headquartered in
Northern, Virginia.. His website is located at www.cjiausa.org.
jbrewer@cjiausa.org

You might also like