Professional Documents
Culture Documents
MIDTERMS REVIEWER
ZAZZA SIMBULAN || SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW
REGALIAN DOCTRINE declares that all lands and all other natural
resources are owned by the State.
Jura Regalia
Feudal System- this theory was that title to all lands was
originally held by the King and while the use of lands was
granted out to others who were permitted to hold them
under certain conditions, the King theoretically retained the
title. The King was regarded as the original proprietor of all
lands and true and only source of title, and from him all lands
were held.
Justice Puno: IPRA grants recognizes the existence of the ICCs and IPs as
a distinct sector of the Philippines and it grants these people the
ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands,
an indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which traces its
origin to native title.
SEC. OF DENR VS YAP
GR 167707, Oct 8, 2008
FACTS: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No.
1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas
in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the
administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA).
Respondents, Mayor Yap Jr. and others filed a petition for declaratory
relief with RTC Kalibo, Aklan claiming that Proc No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes even
if they had been in OCEN possession and occupation of the land in Boracay
since June 12, 1945 or earlier since time immemorial under CA 141, Se
48(b), and they pay taxes regularly.
OSG opposed saying that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the
public domain formed part of the mass of lands classified as public
forest, which was not available for disposition. Since Boracay Island had
not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they
had cannot ripen into ownership.
ISSUE: W/N private claimants have a right to secure titles over their
occupied portions in Boracay
HELD: CA decision was reversed. Except for for lands already covered by
existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior
to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public
forest under PD No. 705. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands,
including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests.
PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
Classification of lands of public domain under the Constitution are:
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, national parks. only
agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of
May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and
administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay
was an unclassified land of the public domain.
In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time
and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government,
declaring land as alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative
action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The
records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of
Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.
PAST&PRESENTLEGISLATIONONLANDREGISTRATION TIMELTABLE
1902
Nov. 6
but took
effect on
Jan. 1,
1903
1903
Oct. 7
1936
Nov. 7
but took
effect on
Dec. 1,
1936
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the
United States have applied for the purchase, composition or other
form of grant of lands of the public domain under the laws and royal
decrees then in force and have instituted and prosecuted the
proceedings in connection therewith, but have with or without
default upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title
therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied
and cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of their
applications.
1919
Nov. 29
1913
Feb 11
CA 141
The third and
present Public Land
Act
1978
June 11
PD 1529
Property
Registration Decree
Now authorized to hear and decide not only noncontroversial cases but even the contentious and substantial
issues which were before beyond its competence.
JUNIO VS. DE LOS SANTOS
GR No. L-35744, Sept 28, 1984
Although the grounds relied upon by petitioner for cancellation of the adverse
claim were unmeritorious, it behooved the lower Court to have conducted a
speedy hearing upon the question of validity of the adverse claim pursuant to
the second paragraph of Section 110 of the Land Registration.
In fact, the lower Court, instead of confining itself to the propriety of the
registration of the adverse claim should already have decided the controversy
between the parties on the merits thereof. Doctrinal jurisprudence holds that
the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), as a Land
Registration Court, can hear cases otherwise litigable only in ordinary civil
actions, since the Courts of First Instance are at the same time, Courts of
general jurisdiction and could entertain and dispose of the validity or invalidity
of respondent's adverse claim, with a view to determining whether petitioner is
entitled or not to the relief that he seeks.
ARCEO VS. CA
GR No. 81401, May 18, 1990
The petitioners argue that the cadastral court was bereft of the power to
determine conflicting claims of ownership, and that its authority was solely to
confirm an existing title, and that anyway, all the lots should have been
awarded to them by virtue of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession since 1941 (1942, when Jose took possession of the parcels) or
otherwise, by acquisitive prescription.
We have held that under Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree, the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a land registration court, is no
longer as circumscribed as it was under Act No. 496, the former land
registration law. The SC said that the Decree "has eliminated the distinction
between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the
limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as
a cadastral court." The amendment was "aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits,
the change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the
required trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for 'original
registration' 'but also 'over all petitions filed after original registration of title,
with power to hear and determine all questions arising from such applications
or petitions.
LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION= LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
There should be at least one ROD for each province and one
for each city.
The law does not require that only valid instruments shall be
registered.
INSTANCES WHERE ROD MAY DENY REGISTRATION (instances
where he may be justified in denying registration) (SC-PR)
Where there are several copies of the title but only one is
presented with the instrument to be registered;
BARANDA VS GUSTILO
GR No. 81153, Sept 26, 1988
FACTS: A parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta.Barbara,
Iloilo covered by original certificate of title no. 6406 is the land subject of the dispute
between petitioner (Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia) and respondents (Gregorio
Perez, Maria Gotera and Susan Silao). Both parties claimed ownership and possession over
the said land. However during the trial, it was found that the transfer certificate of title
held by respondents was fraudulently acquired. So the transfer certificate of title was
ordered to be put in the name of petitioners. In compliance with the order or the RTC, the
Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the order declaring TCT T-25772 null
and void, cancelled the same and issued new certificate of titles in the name of petitioners.
However, by reason of a separate case pending in the Court of Appeals, a notice of lis
pendens was annotated in the new certificate of title. This prompted the petitioners to
move for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in the new certificates. Judge Tito
Gustilo then ordered the Acting Register of Deeds for the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens but the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion for reconsideration invoking Sec
77 of PD 1529.
ISSUE: What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or annul anotice
of lis pendens in a Torrens certificate of title?
HELD: Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of Deeds stand
that the notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of the case in
the Court of Appeals. The function of the Register of Deeds with reference to the
registration of deeds, encumbrances, instrument and the like is ministerial in nature. The
acting register of deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration
of the Judges Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens. Sec. 10 of PD 1529
states that: It shall be the duty of the register of deeds to immediately register an
instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which
complies with all the requisites for registration. If the instrument is not registrable,
he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor or such denial
in writing, stating the ground and reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to
appeal by consulta in accordance with Sec 117 of this decree. On the other hand, Sec
117 states that: When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to
be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other
instrument presented to him for registration or where any party in interest does not agree
with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the
question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the Register of
Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of Deeds.
CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT
The trial court dismissed the complaint on Mar 10 1992. It ruled that Helen
Guzmans waiver of her inheritance in favor of her son was not contrary to the
constitutional prohibition against the sale of land to an alien, since the purpose
of the waiver was simply to authorize David Rey Guzman to dispose of their
properties in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the Philippines,
and not to subvert them. On the second issue, it held that the subject land was
urban; hence, petitioners had no reason to invoke their right of redemption
under Art. 1621 of the Civil Code.
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which
agricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to
prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may
be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the
hands of Filipino citizens.
the contract of lease valid and in accordance with law and the complaint is
dismissed with costs against the plaintiffs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contract of lease entered into by and between the
petitioners and private respondent on October 5, 1954 for a period of sixty (60)
years is valid.
HELD: The lower court correctly ruled that the defendant-appellee Chong had
at the time of the execution of the contract, the right to hold by lease the
property involved in the case although at the time of the execution of the
contract, he was still a Chinese national.
In the present case, it has been established that there is only one contract and
there is no option to buy the leased property in favor of Chong. There is nothing
in the record, either in the lease contract or in the complaint itself, to indicate
any scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition. Chong had merely
asked them for a lease of the premises to which they agreed. Admittedly under
the terms of the contract there is nothing to prevent the Llantinos from
disposing of their title to the land to any qualified party.
Under the circumstances, a lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So
is an option giving an alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is
granted Philippine citizenship. Aliens are not completely excluded by the
Constitution from use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in
the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a
lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to
remain here forever and share our fortune and misfortune, Filipino citizenship
is not impossible to acquire. The only instance where a contract of lease may be
considered invalid is, if there are circumstances attendant to its execution,
which are used as a scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition.
If an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land,
by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his
property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is
a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not
only of the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi, and jus
abutendi) rights, the sum of which make up ownership. It is just as if today
the possession is transferred, tomorrow the use, the next day the disposition,
and so on, until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up are
consolidated in an alien.
Coming back to the case at bar, even assuming, arguendo, that the subject
contract is prohibited, the same can no longer be questioned presently upon the
acquisition by the private respondent of Filipino citizenship. It was held that
sale of a residential land to an alien which is now in the hands of a naturalized
Filipino citizen is valid.
trustees.
The refusal of the Registrar was elevated to the Court of First Instance of Manila. On March
14, 1953, the Court upheld the action of the Rizal Register of Deeds.
UNG SIU SI TEMPLE is a religious organization whose deaconess, founder, trustees and
administrator are all Chinese citizens, this Court is of the opinion and so hold that in view of
the provisions of the sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the Philippines
limiting the acquisition of land in the Philippines to its citizens, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital stock of which is owned by such citizens
adopted after the enactment of said Act No. 271, and the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of Krivenko vs. the Register of Deeds of Manila, the deed of donation in question should
not be admitted for registration.
Uy Siu Si Temple has appealed to this Court, claiming: (1) that the acquisition of the land in
question, for religious purposes, is authorized and permitted by Act No. 271 of the old
Philippine Commission and (2) that the refusal of the Register of Deeds violates the
freedom of religion clause of our Constitution.
HELD:
We are of the opinion that the Court below has correctly held that in view of the absolute
terms of section 5, Title 13, of the Constitution, the provisions of Act No. 271 of the old
Philippine Commission must be deemed repealed since the Constitution was enacted, in so
far as incompatible therewith. In providing that,
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines,
The Constitution makes no exception in favor of religious associations.
The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock does not suffice to
escape the Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its members are of foreign
nationality. The purpose of the sixty per centum requirement is obviously to ensure that
corporations or associations allowed to acquire agricultural land or to exploit natural
resources shall be controlled by Filipinos; and the spirit of the Constitution demands that
in the absence of capital stock, the controlling membership should be composed of Filipino
citizens.
As to the complaint that the disqualification under article XIII is violative of the freedom of
religion guaranteed by Article III of the Constitution, we are by no means convinced (nor
has it been shown) that land tenure is indispensable to the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession or worship; or that one may not worship the Deity according to the
dictates of his own conscience unless upon land held in fee simple.
YES
Sec. 2, Art. 12
Yes =1935 Consti as
long as not exceeding
1,024 hectares
No=1973 Consti
Except by LEASE
No=1987 Consti, Sec
3, Art. 12 Except by
LEASE period: not to
exceed 25 yrs,
renewable for not
more than 25yrs
Area: not to exceed
1000 hectares
YES
-at the time of the
corporation acquired the
land, its predecessor in
interest had been in
possession and occupation
in manner and for period
described by law as to
entitle him to registration
in his name, then
proscription agains
corporation acquire public
land does not apply since
the land was no longer
public but PRIVATE land.
- At least 60% of capital is
owned by Filipinos
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
ALIENS
NO
NO
NO
NO except by HEREDITARY
SUCCESSION, Sec 7 Art 12
-allowed to buy condo units
and shares; as long as no
more than 40% of total
stocks of condo corpo
because he is a member of
condo corpo only, but lands
belong to the condo corpo
still
The court declared both the sale and the lease valid and binding and dismissed
the complaint.
HELD: The sale in question having been entered into in violation of the
Constitution, the next question to be determined is, can petitioner have the sale
declared null and void and recover the property considering the effect of the
law governing rescission of contracts? Our answer must of necessity be in the:
"We can, therefore, say that even if the plaintiffs can still invoke the
Constitution, or the doctrine in the Krivenko Case, to set aside the sale in
question, they are now prevented from doing so if their purpose is to recover
the lands that they have voluntarily parted with, because of their guilty
knowledge that what they were doing was in violation of the Constitution. They
cannot escape this conclusion because they are presumed to know the law. As
this court well said: 'A party to an illegal contract cannot come into a court of
law and ask to have his illegal objects carried out. The law will not aid either
party to an illegal agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.' As
expressed in the maxim in pari delicto.
YES
NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF
THE PHILIPPINES WHO LOST
CITIZENSHIP
RELIGIOUS
CORPORATIONS
CONTROLLED
BY NON-FILIPINOS
CORPORATION SOLE
YES
Upon taking oath of
allegiance to Republic
pursuant to RA 9225
which grants him full
civil and political
rights
NO
NO
NO
YES
10
Agricultural
purposes
o
o
Notes: The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas
is rooted in the Regalian doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and
waters of the public domain.
After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and
marshy disposable lands of the public domain continued to be only leased and
not sold to private parties.56 These lands remained sui generis, as the only
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain the government could not
sell to private parties.
Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private
parties government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public
domain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale. CA No. 141
does not authorize the President to reclassify government reclaimed and
marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 59 (d). Lands
classified under Section 59 (d) are the only alienable or disposable lands for
non-agricultural purposes that the government could sell to private parties.
In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands
of the public domain, there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to
sell these lands.
Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its
reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain.
Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain would be subject to the constitutional ban
on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain.
Hence, such legislative authority could only benefit private individuals.
As such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be alienated," unless they
are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain. The mere
reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural
resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or
concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or
disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special
patent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation
classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquino's issuance of a land patent also
constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer needed for
public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties.
11
of the four (4) parcels of land in the name of respondent Filomeno Gallo after
excluding a portion Identified as Lot "1-A" which is the site of the municipal hall
of Buenavista town, and subjecting Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to the road-of-way of 15
meters width.
Out of the 30.5943 hectares applied for registration under the Torrens System,
11.1863 hectares are coconut lands and admittedly within the disposable
portion of the public domain. The rest, consisting of 19.4080 hectares is now
the center of controversy of the present appeal.
Admittedly the controversial area is within a timberland block as classification
of the municipality and certified to by the Director of Forestry on February 18,
1956 as lands needed for forest purposes and hence they are portions of the
public domain which cannot be the subject of registration proceedings. Clearly
therefore the land is public land and there is no need for the Director of
Forestry to submit to the court convincing proofs that the land in dispute is not
more valuable for agriculture than for forest purposes, as there was no
question of whether the land is forest land or not. Be it remembered that said
forest land had been declared and certified as such by the Director of the
Bureau of Forestry on February 18, 1956, several years before the original
applicant of the lands for registration Mercedes Diago, filed it on July 11, 1961.
As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which was lifted
from Act No. 2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the
Executive Department of the government and not of the courts. With these
rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which
determines the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the Government, through the
Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of discretion for
the respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed
area is within a timberland block and (2) as certified to by the then Director of
Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes.
Furthermore, private respondents Cannot claim to have obtained their title by
prescription inasmuch as the application filed by them necessarily implied an
admission that the portions applied for are part of the public domain which
cannot be acquired by prescription, unless the law expressly permits it. It is a
rule of law that possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership (Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, 23 SCRA 1184).
On April 6, 1966, the trial court rendered its decision ordering the registration
12
NON-REGISTRABLE PROPERTIES
Property of Public Dominion
Art. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and
others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.
Parts of the public domain and intended for pub use and pub service,
and are outside the commerce of men and therefore not subject to
private appropriation.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in
the preceding article, is patrimonial property.
Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use
or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.
(341a)
Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to
run.
Librada (with spouse Emerson Abano), Demetrio, and Antonio Alagad filed an
application for registration of their title over a parcel of land situated at Linga, Pila,
Laguna, with an area of 8.1263 hectares (survey plan Psu-116971), which was
amended after the land was divided into two parcels, namely, Lot 1 with an area of
5.2476 hectares and Lot 2 with an area of 2.8421 hectares (survey plan Psu-226971,
amendment 2). The Republic opposed the application on the stereo-typed ground
that applicants and their predecessors have not been in possession of the land
openly, continuously, publicly and adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership
since 26 July 1894 and the land has not ceased to be a part of the public domain. It
appears that barrio folk also opposed the application. On 16 January 1956, by virtue
of a final judgment in said case, supplemented by orders issued on 21 March 1956
and 13 August 1956, the Alagads were declared owners of Lot 1 and the remaining
portion, or Lot 2, was declared public land. Decree N-51479 was entered and OCT 0401, dated 18 October 1956, was issued in the names of the Alagads.
In August 1966, the Alagads filed before the Municipal Court of Pila, Laguna (Civil
Case 52) an action to evict the barrio folk occupying portions of Lot 1. On 8 August
1968, judgment was rendered in the eviction case ordering the barrio folk therein to
return possession of the premises to the Alagads. The barrio folk did not appeal.
Property, according to the Civil Code, is either of public dominion or of private
ownership. Property is of public dominion if it is (1) intended for public use, such as
roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks,
shores, roadsteads and others of similar character;or if it (2) belongs to the State,
without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.
All other property of the State which is not of the character mentioned in article
[420], is patrimonial property, meaning to say, property open to disposition by the
Government, or otherwise, property pertaining to the national domain, or public
lands. Property of the public dominion, on the other hand, refers to things held by
the State by regalian right. They are things res publicae in nature and hence,
incapable of private appropriation. Thus, under the present Constitution, [w]ith the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
13
14
NATIONAL PARKS
PALOMO VS CA:
o It has been held that where a certificate of title
covers a portion of land within the area reserved
for park purposes, the title should be annulled with
respect to said portion.
MILITARY OR NAVAL RESERVATION
REPUBLIC VS MARCOS
o Land inside a military or naval reservation cannot
be the object of registration
o A military camp or reservation could not have been
the object od cadastral proceedings
o A military reservation can not be the subject to
occupation, entry or settlement. It is inalienable.
o To segregate portions of the public domain as a
military reservation, all that is needed is a
Presidential Proclamtion
FORESHORE LANDS AND RECLAIMED LANDS
Foreshore land: that strip of land that lies between the high
and low watermarks and that is alternately wet and dry
according to the flow of tide.
May 18, 1907- Act No. 1654 which provided for the lease, but
not sale of reclaimed lands of government to corporations
and individuals
Nov. 29, 1919- Act No. 2874- authorizing the lease but not
sale of reclaimed lands of government to corporations and
individuals
15