Cuba - United States Secret Diplomacy

(1961-1977)
Historical Documents

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2,200 pages of CIA, National Security Council, and Department of State
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Cuba - United States

Secret Diplomacy Documents
(1961-1977)
A selection of documents dating from 1961 to 1977 chronicling secret
diplomacy between the United States and Cuba. Includes documents
from the Kennedy, Johnson, Ford, and Carter Administrations,
Department of State, CIA, Justice Department, and Kennedy secret
White House audio recordings.
Highlights from the Material include:
Kennedy Approves Secret Meeting between Envoy and Castro
Seventeen days before his assassination a recording made in the White
Houses Oval Office captures a conversation between President Kennedy
and his national security advisor, McGeorge Bundy, discussing the Castro
regimes overture to have a meeting in Havana with a Kennedy
Administration envoy. Kennedy's conclusion was that he approved, if it
could be assured that it could be denied that that the meeting ever took
place. Memorandums document the process in arranging for a meeting
between William Attwood, a deputy to UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson.
This initiative waned after Kennedy's assassination.
Kennedy Speech Writer and Advisor Meets with Ernesto "Che" Guevara
A memo dated August 22, 1961, written by JFK speech writer and advisor
Richard N. Goodwin conveys to the President details about his chance
meeting with Guevara in Uruguay.

Castro Offers to Aid LBJ's Campaign

The notation of a verbal message from Castro to LBJ given through ABC
news reporter Lisa Howard. The document in part records Castro's
message as, "Please tell President Johnson that I earnestly desire his
election to the Presidency in November though that appears assured. But
if there is anything I can do to add to his majority (aside from retiring
from politics), I shall be happy to cooperate." Further the message
contains Castros assessment of the juncture of U.S. domestic politics
and U.S./Cuba relations.
Frank Mankiewicz Secret Intermediary to Cuba
Frank Mankiewiczs career included serving as Robert F. Kennedy's press
secretary, George McGovern's presidential campaign strategist, and the
president of National Public Radio (NPR).
In April of 1974 Mankiewicz called Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to
inform him of an upcoming trip to Havana to interview Cuban leader
Fidel Castro. Kissinger used this as an opportunity to have delivered to
Castro a handwritten letter. On his return Mankiewicz delivered a
handwritten letter and a box of Cuban Cohiba cigars to Kissinger from
Castro. Mankiewicz's efforts lead to Kissinger's deputies and Fidel
Castro's representatives having a meeting at La Guardia Airport on
January 11, 1975.
Jimmy Carter Presidential Directive
A Presidential Directive signed by President Jimmy Carter dated March
15, 1977, stating, "I have concluded that we should attempt to achieve
normalization of our relations with Cuba.

Letter from Fidel Castro to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 11/06/1940

Castro first reached out to an American President when he was 14-yearsold. In the letter Castro congratulates President Roosevelt on his recent
re-election, and asks FDR to send him a $10 bill. Theres an interesting
discrepancy in the letter: in 1940, Fidel was 14 years old, however he
states in the letter that he is 12-years-old.

CONTENTS
1940-11-06 (White House - FDR) Letter from Fidel Castro to President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, November 16, 1940
1961-08-22 (White House - Kennedy) White House memorandum, Secret, Conversation
with Commandante Ernesto Guevara of Cuba, August 22, 1961
1963-03-04 (White House - Kennedy) White House memorandum, Top Secret, Mr.
Donovan's Trip to Cuba, March 4, 1963
1963-04-11 (White House - Kennedy) White House memorandum, Top Secret, Cuba Policy, April 11, 1963.
1963-05-01 (CIA) Briefing paper, Secret, Interview of U.S. Newswoman with Fidel
Castro Indicating Possible Interest in Rapprochement with the United States, May
1,1963
1963-11-12 (White House - Kennedy) White House memorandum, Secret, November
12, 1963 Bundy reports to William Attwood on Kennedy's opinion of the viability of a
secret meeting with Havana
1963-11-19 (White House - Kennedy) White House memorandum, Top Secret,
Approach to Castro, November 19, 1963.
1963-11-22 (Department of State) U.S. UN Mission memorandum, Secret, Chronology
of events leading up Castro invitation to receive a U.S. official for talks in Cuba,
November 8, 22, 1963
1963-11-25 (White House - Johnson) White House memorandum, Top Secret, Cuba Item of Presidential Interest, November 25, 1963.
1963-12-12 (Justice Department) Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney
General, RFK Memo -Travel to Cuba, December 12, 1963
1963-12-13 (Department of State) State Department, Travel Regulations, December
13, 1963
1964-02-12 (White House - Johnson) Message from Fidel Castro to Lyndon Johnson,
Verbal Message given to Miss Lisa Howard of ABC News on February 12,1964, in
Havana, Cuba.

1964-06-16 (Department of State) United Nations memo, Top Secret, from Adlai
Stevenson to President Johnson, June 16, 1964. Stevenson sends the verbal message
given to Lisa Howard from Castro to LBJ
1964-07-07 (White House - Johnson) White House memorandum, Top Secret, Adlai
Stevenson and Lisa Howard, July 7, 1964
1974-04-24 (Department of State) Department of State, Telcon, [Kissinger
conversation with Frank Mankiewicz about seeing Castro], April 24, 1974
1974-08-30 (White House - Ford) National Security Council, memorandum for
Secretary Kissinger, Confidential, Cuba Policy, August 30, 1974
1975-01-11 (White House - Ford) Kissinger Aide-Memoire to Cuba, January 11, 1975
1975-01-11 (Department of State) Department of State, Meeting Memorandum,
Meeting in New York with Cuban Representatives, Secret-Sensitive, January 11, 1975
1975-01-16 (Department of State) Department of State, Memorandum, Message to
Castro, January 16,1 975
1975-01-20 (Department of State) Department of State, Action Memorandum, The
Mankiewicz Trip, Secret-Nod is-Eyes Only, January 20,1975
1975-03-27 (Department of State) Department of State, Secret, Normalizing relations
with Cuba, March 27, 1975.
1975-07-09 (White House - Ford) Memorandum of Conversation, Pierre Hotel U.S.Cuba Meeting, July 9, 1975
1977-03-15 (White House - Carter) Presidential Directive - NSC-6, Subject Cuba, March
15, 1977, Secret

COLEGIO DE DOLORES
APARTADO

SANTIAGO DE CUBA

'

?1
.,(:;

SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 22, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Conversation with Commandante Ernesto Guevara of Cuba
/

The conversation took place the evening of August 17 at 2 A. M. Several

members of the Brazilian and Argentine delegations had made efforts -throughout the Punta del Este Conferenc~;to arrange a meeting between
me and Che. This was obviously done with Che 1 s approval, if not his
urging, I had avoided such a meeting during the Conference, On Thursday we arrived in Montevideo and I was invited to a birthday party for
the. local Brazilian delegate to the Free Trade area,; After I arrived,
and had been there for about an hour, one of the Argentines present
(who had been on the Argentine delegation) informed me they were inviting Che to the party,. He arrived about 2 A, M. and told Edmundo
Barbosa DaSHva of Brazil and Horatio:Larretta of Argentine that he had
something to say to me, 'The four of us entered a room, and the following is a summary of what took place, (The Argentine and Brazilian alternated as interpreters)
Che was wearing green fatigues, and his usual overgrown and scraggly
beard, Behind the beard his features are quite soft, almost feminine,
and his manner is intense, He has a good sense of humor, and there
was considerable joking back and forth during the meeting. He seemed
~ very ill at ease ~e:ri we began to talk, but soon became relaxed and
spoke freely, Although he left no doubt of his personal and intense devotion to communism, his conversation was free of propaganda and
bombast,. He spoke calmly, in a straightforward manner, and with the
appearance of detachment and objectivity, He left no doubt, at any time,
that he felt completely free to speak for his gover=ient and rarely distinguishe.d between his personal observations and the official position of
the Cuban government,, I had the definite impression that he had thought
out his remarks very carefully -- they were extremely well organized.

DeCLASSIFIEO
E 0 1 :??ISt, ~e.. 3,4
l-h,i.<. - l')'i( - 2ta

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 I told him at the outset that I had no authority to negotiate my

countryts problems, but would report what he said to inter\)sted
offi.cials of our government, He said "good" and began,
Guevara began by saying that I must understand the Cuban revolution,, They intend to build a socialist state, and the revolution which
they have begun is irreversible, They are also now out of the U.:S.
sphere of infl.uence, and that too is irreversible, They will establish
a single-party system with Fidel as Secretary-General of the party,
Their ties with the East stpm from natural sympathies, and common
beliefs in the proper structure of the social order, They feel that
they have the support of the masses for their revolution, and that that
suppor.t will grow as time passes,
He said that the United States must not act on the false assumptions
that (a) we can rescue Cuba from the claws of conununism (he meant
by other than direct military action}; (b} that Fidel is a moderate
surrounded by a bunch of fanatic and aggressive men, and might be
moved to the Western side; (c) that the Cuban revolution can be overthrown from within -- there is, he said, diminishing support for such
an effort and it will never be strong enough,
He spoke of the great strength of the Cuban revolution, and the impact
it has had on liberal thought throughout Latin Ainerica, For example,
he said, all the leftwing forces in Uruguay were joining forces under
the banner of Cuba,. He said civil war would break out in many countrie's. if Cuba were in danger -- and such war might break out in any
event,, He spoke with great intensity of the ilnpact of Cuba on the continent and the growing strength of its example,

-...

~''
He said that in building a communist state they had not repeated~
of the aggressive moves of the East,) They did not intend to construct
an iron curtain around Cuba but to welcome technicians and visitors.
from all countries to come and work,j
He touched on the matter of the plane thefts" He said he didntt know if
I knew but they had not been responsible for any hijackings,, The first
plane was taken by a young fellow who was a good boy but a little wild
and who is now in jail, They suspected that the last plane was taken by
a provocateur (a CIA agent),J He is afraid that if these thefts keep up it
will be very dangerous,
SEGRET

..

,~ ~

"

.. '~
J~l"

.!

~:.1

SECRET

- 3 He began to discuss the difficulties of the Alliance for Progress. He

asked me if I had heard his speech at the closing of the conference.
I said I had Hstened to it closely. He said that it explained his viewpoint on the Alliance for Progress. (In this speech he said the idea
of the Alianza was fine, but it would fail. He spoke also of the play
of historical forces working on behalf of comrrmnis:rn, etc. -- that
there would be either leftists revolutions or rightist coups leading to
leftist takeovers, and there was also a strong chance that the corrunies
would get in through popular election.<) He then said he wished to add
that there was an intrinsic contradiction in the Alianza -- by encouraging the forces of change and the desires of the masses we might set
loose forces which were beyond our control,1ending in a Cuba style revolution.' Never once did he indicate that Cuba might play a more direct
role in the march of history.,
He then said, now that he had discussed our difficulties he would like
~to discuss his own problems -- and he would like to
do so very frankly. There were in Cuba, he said, several basic problems.
l. There was disturbing revolutionary sentiment, armed men and
sabotage.

z.,

The small bourgeouisie were hostile to the revolution or, at best,

were lukewarm.,
3., The Catholic Church (here he shook his head in dismay).
4. Their factori~s looked naturally to the U. S., for resources, especially spare parts and at times the shortages of these resources made
things very critical.
5. They had accelerated the process of development too rapidly and
their hard currency rese:rves were very low. Thus they were unable to
import consumer goods and meet basic needs of the people.
He then said that they didntt want an understanding with the U.S.,, because they know that was impossible.~ They would like a Modus vivendi -at least an interim modus vivendi<! Of course, he said, it was dlifficult
to put forth a practical formula for such a modus vivendi -- he knew because he had spent a lot of time thinking about it. He thought we should

SEGRET
,

SECRET

- 4 put forth such a formula because we had public opinion to worry about
whereas he could accept anything without worrying about public opinion.
I said nothing, and he waited and then said that, in any event, there
were 'Some things he had in mind.I

1. That they could not give back the expropriated properties -- the factories and banks -- but they could pay for them in trade.

z. They could agree not to make any political alliance with the East -although this would not affect their natural sympathies.
3. They would have free elections -- but only after a period of institutionalizing the revolution had been completed. In response to my
question he said that this included the establishment of a one-party
system.:
4. Of course, they would not attack Guantanamo., (At this point he
laughed as if at the absurdly self-evident nature of such a statement .)_
5.1 He indicated, very obliquely, and with evident r~uctance because of the
company in which we were talking, that they could also discuss the activities of the Cuban revolution in other countries.:

He then went on to say that he wanted to thank us very much for the invasion --that it had been a great political victory for them -- enabled
them to consol.idate -- and transformed them from an aggrieved little
country to an equal.

air;i;:S

Guevara said he knew it was difficult to

these things but we could
open up some of these issues by beginning to discuss subordinate issues
He suggested discussion of the airplane issue. (presumably, we would
use the airplane issue as a cover for more serious conversation}
He said they could discuss no formula th;:!.t would mean giving up the type
of society to which they were dedicated.
At close he said that he would tell no one of the substance of this conversation except Fidel. I said I would not publicize it either.1

SECRET

: '
u

----------~

SECRET

- 5 -

After the conversation was terminated I left to record notes on what

had been said. He stayed at the party, and talked with the Brazilian
and Argentine.,
The Argentine fellow -llarretta -- called me the next morning to say
that Guevara had thought the conversation quite profitable, and had told
him that it was much easier to talk to someone of the ''newer generation,111
The above is substantially a complete account of the entire

(\)1c)LDick Goodwin

SECRET

conv~ersation.

._.-/

'-""" t._

l'OF SECRET
EYES ON:L Y

March 4, 1963
.ME1vi0RANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Mr. Donovan's Trip to Cuba

At Mr. Bundy's request I passed to Bob Hurwitch the following

Presidential reactions to the attached memorandum:

1. The President does not agree that we should make the

breaking of Sino/Soviet ties a non-negotiable point. We don't want
to present Gasho with a condition that he obviously cannot fuUUl.
We should start thinking along more flexible lines.
2. Donovan should reeiat taking his week-long walk along
the beach with Castro until we have had a chance to give Donovan
a very good briefing. We may want to give Donovan some flies
to dangle in front of Castro.
3. The above must be kept close to the vest.
himself, ia very interested in this one.

The President,

Gordon Chase

TOP S::GRE'f "ETES ONLY

t..- ,_..

-:.'To. --.....

TOP SECRET - EYES QNL Y

April 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bundy

SUBJECT:

Cuba -- Policy

l. We are all concerned about solving our Cuba problem, but so far,
we have been looking seriously at only one side of the coin -- ways
to hurt Castro by varying degrees of overt and covert nastiness. We
have not yet lo6ked seriously at the other side of the coin -- quietly
enticing Castro over to US.

z.

If the sweet approach turned out to be feasible and, in turn,

successful, the benefits would be substantial. In the short run, we

would probably be able to neutralize at lea.st 2. of our main worries
about Castro -- the reintroduction of offensive missiles and Cuban
subversion. In the long run, we would be able to work on eliminating
Castro at our leisure and from a good vantage point.
3. While the practical obstacles to this sort of approach may be
immense, they may not be insuperable. Two such obstacles are
the domestic p8Utical situation and Castro's reluctance to be entieed.
(a) Domestic Problem -- If the American people can be shown
that the offensive missile threat and the subversive threat
are under control, that the Russian presence in Cuba is
reduced and that Castro is much more a nationalist than
a. Communist, the selling Vc>b necessary for a careful,
quiet policy turn-around may not be impossible.
(b) Castro's Reluctance to be Enticed -- This may beuan easier
nut to crack now than lt once would have been, Castio may
have received, from our point of view, some very valuable
education over the past couple years. Hopefully, he has
learned that the Russians are not as tough and reliable as
he thought they were and that we are a lot tougher and nastier
than he thought we were; also hopefully, he is scared.
DECLASSiFl'::D

I
1'01" SEC:l'l:ET - EYES ONLY

-zOur present nasty policy is probably a necessary prelude to a sweet

approach, The more we can (1) scare Castro and (Z) demonstrate to
him that the Bloc is either unwilling or unable to :fill his security and
economic requ'irements, the more amenable Castro probably will be
to a new approach. In this regard, perhaps the worst thing we can
do is to let our nasty policy ease of:f without a particular objective in
sight.
4. I understand that, in the near future, the President will be looking
at some more violent solutions to the Cuban problem. It might be
interesting if, at roughtW the same time, he could have a took at a
feasibility study on a policy turn-around.
Do you think this timing for such a study is right?
is still premature?

Or do you think it

Gordon C'aaae

TOP SEGER T - EYES ?5NI:Y

., ..
.g:E-C-R-E-T'
.. _I
NO' FO'.REIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM AB~D/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 2S, D. C.

1 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Interview of U.S. Newswoman with Fidel

Castro Indicating Possible Interest in
Rapprochement with the United States

1. On 30 April 1963 Liza Howard, U.S. newswoman

associated with the American Broadcasting. Company,
returned to Miami from Cuba where she .had interviewed
a number of high-ranking Cuban officials, including
Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Vilma
Espin de Castro, Raul Roa, and Rene Vallejo. Her
conversations with Fidel Castro totaled about ten hours
and included one session on 22 April which lasted from
12:45 a.m. to 5:30 a.m. Following is an account of
those conversations and Liza Howard's observations
concerning the present Cuban situation.
2. It appears that Fidel Castro is looking for a
way to reach a rapprochement with the United States
Government, probably because he is aware that Cuba is in
a state of economic chaos. The October blockade hurt the
Cuban economy. Liza Howard believes that Castro talked
about this matter with her because she is known as a
progressive and she talked with him in frank, blunt,
honest terms; Castro has little opportunity to hear
this type of conversation. Castro indicated that if a
rapprochement was wanted President John F. Kennedy would
have to make the first move. In response to the statement that Castro would probably have to make the first
move, Castro asked what the U.S. wanted from him. When
a return to the original aims of the revolution was
suggested, Fidel said that perhaps he, President Kennedy,

S-::.E-C-R.;.E-T
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S-E-C-R-E-T
._)
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and Premier Nikita Khrushchev should discuss this. Liza

Howard said that she thought it was a more likely topic
for Castro to discuss with President Kennedy. Castro
said that he do~bted that President Kennedy would talk
with him without Khrushchev being present. When Howard
pressed Castro for further inforination on .how a rapprochement could be achieved he said that steps were already
being taken. Pressed further, he said he considered the
U.S. limitation on exile raids to be a proper step toward
accommodation. It is Liza Howard's opinion that.Castro
wants to pursue the discussion of rapprochement with
proper progressive spokesmen. Based on her discussions
with the following persons Liza Howard feels that
Guevara, Raul Castro, and Vilma Espin oppose any idea
of rapprochement; Roa and Vallejo favor these discussions.
3. Castro asked Howard, who had.previously
interviewed Khrushchev, for an appraisal of him. When
Howard said that Khrushchev was a shrewd politician who
would break and dispose of Castro when the Soviets no
longer needed him, Castro made no comment but only
nodded his head as if in skeptical agreement. Liza
Howard had no insight or advance notice on Castro's
travel to Moscow.
4. Castro appears healthy, has no visible nervous
twitches or tics, and was calm, rational, humorous, and
non-argumentative during all discussions. Vallejo,
Castro's personal physician, also acts as secretary,
interpreter, and confidant.
5. Castro is in complete control in Cuba. No
major decision is made without him. Neither Guevara nor
Raul Castro would be able to rule Cuba if Fidel were
assassinated.
6. In discussions with Castro about terror and
secret police methods Liza Howard received the impression
that he was not completely aware of the extent to which
terror has gripped Cuba.

- 2 -

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' .
~
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7. Castro refers to Soviet troops in Cuba as

"technicals" and indicated that they have a training
mission in Cuba. He made the point, however, that if
an interna 1 revolt takes place in Cuba Sov.iet "technicals"
would fight with Castro to put down a counterrevolution.
8. Liza Howard said that Emil Stadelhofer, Swiss
Ambassador to Cuba, is an overworked, timid man who does
not have Castro's ear. She believes that the Swiss need
a larger staff in Habana and that Stadelhofer ne.eds
recognition for a job well done. Howard also said that
in her opinion the Western diplomatic commtinity in
Habana has no influence on Castro or his government.
9. While discussing a possible rapprochement
Castro asked for full assessments of President and Mrs.
Kennedy, and Robert Kennedy, and wanted to know if
Adlai Stevenson had power in the U.S. and if his
voice was heard in President Kennedy's councils. Castro
commented that James Donovan was a good man; it was Liza
Howard's impression that Donovan had not talked politics
with Castro but that Donovan had a platform from which
he could launch political discussions on the philosophy
of revolution.
10. Liza Howard said that she was willing to
undertake further discussions with Castro concerning
a possible rapprochement. Other possible candidates
whom she suggested were Edwin M. Martin, Adlai Stevenson,
and Luis Munoz Marin, She also mentioned Donovan but
was not quite certain that he was progressive enough.
Liza Howard is willing to arrange a meeting for any
U.S. Government spokesman with Castro through Vallejo,
who will be the point of contact.
11. Liza Howard definitely wants to impress the
U.S. Government with two facts: Castro is ready to

- 3 -

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, .

Ji

E C-R-E-'J!.

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

discuss rapprochement and she herself is ready to discuss

it with him if asked to do so by the U.S. Government.

#-?z-h::d~
Deputy Director (Plans)

CSDB-3/654,439
Orig:
cc:

The Director of Central Intelligence

Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligenci;;, Agency
The Attorney General
The Department of Justice
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant Director for National Estimates
Assistant Director for

Cur~ent

Intelligence

- 4 -

lil E GcR '-El ='il

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- Sli:C:>l ET

Novcnilicr lZ, 1903

I talkod l:hi.s :;lftornoon with William .Attwood a:c.d "tllll& him that at
th-a P raGident s instruction. I was conveying thi.G mes.sage o:::!.lly
and nc: by Ci:.~lc. I told him that the Presldant hop!?d 110 would
go1 !n touch with Vallejo to i:eport that it did net aacm p;;acticr.blo
to us at this :;it.'.lge to sand an Amcdcan ofii.cicl. to Caba =d 1/bs.t
we ;-;o"ld pl"o!er to be:;:in with a vi.cit by V'clfojo to tho O .S. where.
..'1.tt\yood would be glad to lleo him and to liatan to any me&SatJS
he miaht bring !::om C<istro. In particcl:u-, we would. be.intorei;te::!
in I:now-1ug whothar th::ire waa uy prospect o! imvarl<!li'Wmacll,fi~iar.:.
in thoaa ;mrts o:i Caotro's policy which are ;ffatly una.cc~"l!ltJ us:
namel1, t'ho t.'lrco pointn in Ambaosador .S!i;wnsan 1.S rec:eat .syee.:::ll
o:i wl:l.ch tho ccmtz-cl elemai:.~a arc (l) suhmissitr.1-tD e;2:till'f1Z)1
Co:no.:i::.~s~ idlt>anco, and (<:) a. data:rml.n2d camFCf,5<1 of subversiD7'
tli.-<'Jctcd at the roct o! tho l~o:!:isi;)llera.
Rette:r.:s;sls .or ./:bese j?Dlj,::ias
may or ma7 :::ct be suificiont to p;oodu.ce a cban5e i.l'l-thaeolk:y o
th::i UnS.t::id Statos, but they ~ro co:otaicly neces.s;u-y, and wHl1ou1;;
an indlc:ii.'::io:J. 0 rocc'~::~ss to move intth:Joc tlinci:UfYtS, lt.is hard
or uz to ocoQ what cwld be c.c~cmpilsh~d by a visi-t ~ Cu~.

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I !at ~t to /,tiwood ho'r/ mu.ch c:i this ho v;o::ld convey in-tile inillal
mas:iai.:o to V<1lloho, and I <!lso g;:.va hl.m disc:reei.on asU> how ~.s
rno~s~.~:: \7as to b-!I trnnn~it:od, with tho pr.ovlso i:h1!.t: it mLtSt ~
c!:::n;: wt ~11 ~l~c.s t!Ut \7'0 ';;;aro n~t cupplicz:.:::ts in th~s ~a-t-lei' .
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U~c.. !-Ir.:.i:;1 r;.:.~d. to t:;:l~~!-ic:ia ..Vallcjt~ and ih~a probably to get Ol'l-tlte
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li~~ l~~ ?Jc1! to Uo.ndl:a t!;.o cct1\~or3c.t!cn alons i!lle lines staied ~atte.
P. . tt...,~ood t'":ill l"c-po:rt t.1.-~ :-cct"lt.::J o: tbio commttnLe~'lion. and 1n-t1J~
event i:!'lr:t an ~rZ~:lecmont i~ mado fc:r Vallejo "to came "to Mew Yark
Att-;;-ccd will como to Wachlnzton to concert a rnsliibl!l-k.r bls iise.
ki this cc11.11er.saoon.

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. ..

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

''SF :3ECR '.!!:I SENSI:PIVE EYE QNI.y

November 19, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR
MR. BUNDY
SUBJECT: Approach to Castro
Bill Attwood called to report the following:

1. Lisa Howard called Vallejo and then put Bill Attwood on the
line. Vallejo repeated his invitation for Bill to come to Cuba,
adding that the visit would be very secure. Bill replied that this
was impossible for the present, that preliminary talks were essential, and that Vallejo might consider coming to New York.
2. Vallejo said he could not make it to New York at this time.
However, a message would be sent to Lechuga instructing him to
discuss an agenda with Bill. Bill agreed that this might be a good
way for the Cubans to convey what was on their mind. He added that
we are prepared to listen.
.
3. The ball is now in astro 1 s court. As ljlOOn as Lechuga calls
Bill to set up an appointment for the discussion of an agenda, Bill
will get in touch with us.

Gordon Chase

'fOP SECRET - SENOil'l'PTE

EYES ONLY

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UNITED STATES MISSION

TO THE UNITED NATIONS
November 8, 1963
MEMORANDUM
SBSFH3'3.'

DEC!.ASSmED
TO:

Gordon Chase

FROM:

William Attwood

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.<a \...

m;

By

Azy

'19-::J 37
;o,.,.
, NARA, Date 'i-l:J- '1"'

Following is a chronology of events leading up to

Castro's invitation on October 31, to receive a

u. s.

official for talks in Cuba:

!

'

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Soon after Joining the

u. s.

Mission to the

u.

N. on

August 26, I met Seydon Diallo, the Guinea Ambassador to

Havana, whom I had known well in Conakry.

He went out of his

way to tell me that Castro was isolated from contact with

neutralist diplomats by his "Communist entourage" because it
?
was known he was unhappy with Cuba's satellite status and
looking for a way out.

He, Diallo, had finally been able to

see Castro alone once and was convinced he was personally

receptive to changing course and getting Cuba on the road to
non-alighment.

Diallo added that the exile raids were an

obstacle since they strengthened the hand of the hard-liners

both with Castro and the public,
In the first week of September, I also read AEC
correspondent, Lisa Howard's article, "Castro's overture",
based on her conversation with Castro last April.

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Thia article stressed Castro's expressed desire for

reaching an accommodation with the united States and
his willingness to make substantial concessions to this
end.

On September 12, I talked with Miss Howard, whom

I have known for some years, and .she echoed Ambassador

Diallo 1 s opinion that there was a rift between Castro
and the Guevara-Hart-Aliieida groupon the question of
Cuba's future course,
On September 12, I discussed this with Under Secretary
Harriman in Washington.

He suggested I prepare a memo and

we arranged to meet in New York the following week.

On September 18, I wrote a memorandum based on these
talks and on corroborating information I had heard in
Conakry.

In it I suggested that discreet contact might be

established with the Cubans at the

Unite~

Nations to find

out whether Castro in fact wanted to talk, and on our terms.

I showed this memo to Ambassador Stevenson, who felt the
matter was worth exploring quietly and who indicated he
might discuss it with the President.
On September 19, I met Harriman in New York.

After

reading my memo, he suggested I also discuss it with the

Attorney-General because of the political implications
of the Cuban issue.

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On September 20, I made an appointment with the

'

Attorney-General in Washington.

Meanwhile, Stevenson

obtained the President's approval for me to make discreet

.\_

contact with Dr. Lechuga, cubas chief delegate at the

United Nations.
On September 23, I met Dr. Lechuga at Miss Howard's
apartment.

She has been on good terms with Lechuga since

her visit with Castro and invited him for a drink to meet
some friends who had also been to Cuba,
those friends,

I was Just one of

In the course of our conversation, which

started with recollections of my own talks with Castro in

1959, I mentioned having read Miss Howard's article.

i'

Lechuga

hinted that Castro was indeed in a mood to talk, especially

with someone he had met before.

He thought there was a good

chance that I might be invited to Cuba if l9-Wished to resume

our 1959 talk.

I told him that in ciy present position, I

would need official authorization to make such a trip, and

did not know if it would be forthcoming.

However, I said an

,';

exchange of views might well be useful and that I would find

out and let him know.
On September 24, I saw the Attorney-General in Washington,
gave him my September 18 memo, and reported my meeting with
Lechuga.

He said he would pass the memo on to Mr. McGeorge

Bundy; meanwhile, he thought that it would be difficult

for me to visit Cuba without it being known and risking
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the accusation that we were trying to make a deal with Castro,
He wondered if it might be possible to meet Castro -- if
that's what he wanted -- in another country, such as Mexico,
or at the United Nations,

Meanwhile, he agreed it would be

useful to maintain contact with Lechuga.

I said I would so

inform Lechuga and wait to hear from him or Bundy.

Back in New York, I informed Stevenson of my talk with
Lechuga and the Attorney-General.
On Seppember 27, I ran into Lechuga at the United Nations,
where he was doing a television interview in the lobby with
Miss Howard,

I told him that I had discussed our talk in

Washington, and that it was felt that my accepting an inv.itation to go to Cuba would be ciifficult'under present circumstances, especially in view of my official status,

I added,

however, that if Castro or a personal emis-i.ary had something

to tell us, we were prepared to meet him and listen wherever
'

else would be convenient.

Havana.

'

Lechuga said he would so inform

Meanwhile, he forewarned me that he would be making

a "hard" anti-U.S. speech in the United Nations on.October 7,

I remarked that it wouldn't help reduce tensions; he replied
he couldn't help making it because of the "blockade."
On October 7, in his reply to Lechuga 1 s tough speech,
Stevenson suggested that if Castro wanted peace with his
neighbors, he need only do three things ,-- stop being a Soviet
stooge, stop trying to subvert other nations, and start
carrying out the promises of his revolution regarding consti-

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On October 18, at dinner at the 'home of Mrs. Eugene

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Meyer, I talked with Mr.

c.

A. Doxiades, a noted Greek

architect and town-planner, who had Just returned from an

architects congress in Havana, where he had talked alone
to both Castro and Guevara, among others.

He sought me

out, as a government official, to say he was convinced

Castro would welcome a normalization of relations with the
United States if he could do so without losing too much
face.

He also said that Guevara and the other communists

were oppos.ed to any deal, and regarded Castro as dangerously

unreliable; and that they would get rid of Castro if they
thought they could carry on without him and retain his
popular support.
On October 20, Miss Howard asked me if she might call
Major Rene ValleJo, a Cuban surgeon who is also Castro's
current right-hand man and confidant.

She?said Vallejo

helped her see Castro and made,it plain to her he opposed

the Guevara group.
-i

They became friends and have talked on

the phone several times since the interview,

Miss Howard's

'1

purpose in calling him now was that she thought any message
from Lechuga would not get past the foreign office, and she
wanted to make certain, through ValleJo, that Castro knew
there was a U.S. official available if he wanted to talk.
I told her to go ahead, so long as she referred to my
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-6talk with Lechuga and made it quite plain we were not

'

soliciting a meeting but only expressing our willingness

to listen to anything they had to say,
Vallejo at his home.

She then 'called

He was out and she left word for

him to call her back.

On October 21, Gordon Chase called me from the White
House in connection with my September 18 memo. I brought
)

him up to date and said the ball was in their court.

On October 23, Vallejo called Miss Howard at her New
York apartment.

She was out of town; he left word with the

maid that he would call again.

On October 28, I ran into Lechuga in the U.N. Delegates
Lounge.

He told me that Havana did not think sending someone

to the United Nations for talks would be "useful at this

time".

But he hoped he and I might have

chats from time to time,

s~e

informal

I said it' was up to him and he

could call me if he felt like it,

On October 29, Vallejo

ag~in

He wrote down my extension.

called Miss Howard at home,

He assured her, in response to her question, that Castro still

felt as he did in April about improving relations with us,
As to his going to the United Nations or elsewhere for such a
talk, Vallejo said it was impossible for Castro to leave the
country at the present time.

But he said he would relay h.er

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message to Castro (that there was now a U,S.

authorized to listen to him), and would call her back

soon.

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On October31, Vallejo called Miss Howard, apologizing

for the delay and saying he had been out of town with
Castro and "could not get to a phone from which I could
call you."
to the

u.s.

He said Castro would very much like to talk

official anytime and appreciated the importance

of discretion to all concerned,

Castro would therefore

be willing to send a plane to Mexico to pick up the official

and fly him to a private airport near Veradero where Castro

would talk to him alone.

immediately after the talk,

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The plane would fiy him back

In this way there would be no

risk of identification at Havana airport.

she doubted if a U.S. official could come

Miss Howard said

-~o

Cuba but

perhaps he, Vallejo, could come and: see the official at the
U.N. or.in Mexico, as Castro's personal spokesman.

Vallejo

.j

replied that Castro wanted to do the talking himself but

.~J

did not completely rule out this situation if there was no

'I

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.1

other way of engaging a dialogue.

would relay tpe invitation to me and cail Vallejo back as

soon as possible with our reply.

It was agreed Miss Howard

me as the U.S. official.

'

At this point she identified

Vallejo asked for the spelling, and

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recalled having met me in 1959 {I do not remember him).'

Miss Howard got the impression that Lechugas previous
1

message to Havana had not reached Vallejo or Castro.

On November 1, Miss Howard reported the Vallejo call
to me and I repeated it to Chase on November 4.
On November 5, I met with Bundy and Chase at the
Whi~e

House and informed them of the foregoing,

The

next day, Chase called and asked me to put it in writing,

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UNITED STATES MISSION

TO THE UNITED NATIONS

.,

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November 22, 1963

MEMORANDUM

TO:

Gordon Chase

FROM:

William Attwood
Following is an addition to my memorandum to you dated

November 8, 1963;
On November 11, Vallejo called Miss Howard again to
---

reiterate their appreciation of the need for security and to

say that Castro would go along with any arrangements we might
want to make.

He specifically suggested that a Cuban plane

could come to Key West and pick up the emissary; alternatively

they would agree to have him come in a u.s1'plane which could
'

land at one of several "secret airfields".near Havana.

He

emphasized that only Castro and himself would be present at

the talks and that no one else -- he specifically mentioned
Guevara -- would be involved.

Vallejo also reitereated Castro's

desire for this talk and hoped to hear our answer soon.
On November 12, Bundy called me and I reported Vallejo 1 s
message.

He said this did not affect the White House decision

that a preliminary talk with Vallejo at the United Nations

should be held in order to find out what Castro wanted to
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talk about -- particularly if he was seriously interested in

discussing the points cited in Stevenson's October

7 speech.

Bundy suggested I transmit our decision to Vallejo, stressing

the fact that, since we are responding to their invitation
and are not soliciting a meeting, we would like to know more
about what is on Castro's mind before commiting ourselves
to further talks in Cuba.
On November 13, I went to Miss Howard's apartment and
called Vallejo at home.

There was no answer.

She then sent

a telegram asking that he call her at his convenience.

On November 14, Vallejo called her.

She gave him my

message -- that we would want to talk to him here at the

United Nations before accepting an invitation to go to Cuba.
She said that, if he wished to confirm or

~iscuss

this

further with the U.S. official, he could call him (Vallejo)

at home on the evening of November 18.
be there to receive the call.

Vallejo said he would

Meanwhile, he did not exclude

the possibility of his coming to the United Nations and said

he would discuss it with Castro.
On November 18, Miss Howard reached Vallejo at home and
passed the phone to me.

I told him Miss Howard had kept me

informed of her talks with him and that I assumed he knew of

C~Ff i.0J UBRARY

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-3our interest in hearing what Castro had in mind.

Vallejo

said he did, and reiterated the invitation to Cuba, stressing

the fact that security could be guaranteed.

I replied that

we felt a preliminary meeting was essential to make sure there

was something useful to talk about, and asked if he was able
to come to New York.
time".

Vallejo said he could not come "at this

However, if that's how we felt, he said that "we"

would send instructions to Lechuga to propose and discuss with

me "an agenda" for a later meeting with Castro.
await Lechugas call.

I said I would

Vallejo 1 s manner was extremely cordial

and he called me "Sir" throughout the conversation.

On November 19, I called Chase, and reported the conversation.

WAttwood:nmg

-SECRE'P

co~v

!.IJJ LIBRARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

\VA:; !--l ING TON

TOP i>ECPl:T - EYES ONLY

November 25, l963

MEMOR/1.NDUM FOR MR. DUNDY

SUBJECT:

Cubil -- Item of Prcsidcntiill lntercst_

1. I assume you will want to brief the President on Bill Attwood's Cuban exercise which is presumJ.b]y still in train {sc:c attached).

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2. My own thinking on this one, vis a vis the events of November 22, is still
very fluid; but here it is. Dasic;illy, the, events of November 22 would appear
to make accomodation with Castro an even more doubtful issue than it was.
while I think that President Kennedy could have accornodated with Castro and
gotten away with it with a minimum of domestic heat, I'm not sure about Presi. dent Johnson. For one thing, a new President who has no background of being
successfully nasty to Castro and the Communists (e, g. President Kennedy in
October, 1962), would probably run a greater risk of being accused," by the
American people, of "going soft", In addition, the fact that Lee Oswald has
been heralded as a pro-Castro type may make rapproachment with Cuba more
difficult -- although it is hard to say how much more difficult.
3. If one concludes thCJ.t the prospects for accornodation with Castro are
much dimmer than they were before November 22, then Bill Attwood 1 s present
effort loses much of its meaning. We would appear to have three alternative
courses of action in handling the present status of the Attwood-1;<echuga tie-line.

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(a) \ve can tell Attwood that if Lechuga calls, Attwood should tell Lechuga
that in view of recent events, he is not now prepared to talk about an agenda with
Lechuga.

(b) 'Ne can tell Attwood that if Lechuga does not call over the nc:x:t couple
weeks (the Cubans may feel that November 22 has stopped all bets), he should
take the initiative and get a message across' to the Cubans, that despite recent
events, we are still prepared to hear what is on Castro's mind.
(c) We can tell Attwood that if Lechuga calls about setting up an appointment
between Attwood and Lechuga, that Attwood should schedule such a meeting for
a fow days later and CCJ.11 us irnrrn.:di;:i.tcly. However, if Lechuga docs not call hin;i.,
At~wood should take no 1nitiativc until and if lw hears from us.
~- ::. :.~~_.i\E'.(~!FIDD
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While November 22 events probably make accomocbtion

an even tougher issue for President Johnson tl1an it \'/as for President I<cnnedy,
a preliminary Attwood-Lcchug;i. talk still seems worthwhile fro1n our point of
view -- if the Cukrns initiate it. We have litt!l! or nothing to lose <Lnd there will
be soinc benefits; at a 1ninirnun1, \VC sl1oulcl get a valti.:1lJlc rc0.ding as tn \vl1~t
Castro regards as negotiable (c, g. the Sovid tic-line?) and a hint as to how he
views the effect of November 22 on Cub<J.n/U. S. rel<J.tions. At the s;:une time, if
the Cubans, who have the ball, feel that all bets ar_g_ off, we should take no initiatic
until we have thollght the problem through carefully.
'

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I <;hoose 3(c) above.

If we; decide that course 3(c) is the right one,' the sooner we
call Attwood, the
better. In view of his and Stevenson's activist tendcncics in this matter, it
seems conceivable to n1e that, not hearing fron1 Lechuga in the near future, they
will approach him and assure him that \'(C feel the same way and that we arc still.
prepared to hear what Castro has on his mind.

c;c
Gordon Chase

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December 12, 1 ~163

HLllOP.ANDUM FOR HONORABLE DEAN H.USl:

0ECHTAI<Y
-

IU::

or

STATE
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TFAVEL To' CUBA

A number of student .trips to Cuba are being

or ga ni zed over the Christma.s holidays and some of
t hese at least will be attemnted soon. The Permanent
Student Committee for Travel. to cuba has been active
on a number of campuses. '. In addition, at least one
j)ac ifist organizati,on is contemplating a trip in the
immed iate future.
It is a t so predic .t able that the
problem will become more acute over the coming months
and we c an expec t major efforts to organize a mtmber
o f s tudent trips during the summer. There is already
indication that this has been planned.

The last student 1'.x>ip to Quba resulted in a good

deal of plJblicity at)Q : !>% #-pdictments in Hew York
brought against le.;.i.der .s i'@,: ; ~he greup.
The grand jury
which voted those indi ~-b~ehtS is still sitting and it
would probably be possible t o brl,ng more indictme nts,
a,l though I am oppo sed to doing so.
There are realistically only two courses open to
us in these circumstances:
first, to make ever y offort
to curtail trips to Cuba; two,- ;to withdraw .the ex ist ing
r~gulation prohibiting ~uch trips.
The first is un1ik ely to meet the pr.oblf;ml and I favor . the second.
1 I.

Prevention of travel to Cuba

r:ffor>ts to prohibit future ~ travel to Cuba woulc!

take the f ollowing form:

Publicity that trav~l to Cuba is p.rohibi tecl

l;,y t he g overrtril<gi}t and will result in cri:J!l.inal
,pJ;>OS~cut ion.
;.
{1)

,r . .

(2)
No'tification of all carri ers and cu~::tom s
officia1s that travel to Cuba is prohibited
and th:1:t they . should tal;: e measures to bring
to the P OV ernment' s attention any a tteni ot s
to viol~te the law. .

------. . -. . .:. .--- ---- --- --

- -~--- -

(3)
l\n efi,:.ort to remove pas f.:;p orts of per.sons
wherever we have reasonable ground t ha t they
may be headed for Cuba.
This pres e nts some
. leg al and practical difficulties.
The r ig ht
to physically seize pas~ports h~s never been
te sted ; it would be difficult in many instances
to g o to Cuba ; and passpo~t ~ 0ould . no~0 b ~ needed
for travel to Cuba from Ca.n acla or Mexico , and
perhaps some other .c:::oul:rtries ~ (L})
Prosecution Of all peri:>onS . traveling to .
Cuba. in violation of l~w~ ,: This is cont~~ry
to the steos we took in the first instan6 c t6
prose~ute leader s or1ly; would require us to
indict all 'or most of'. :tJ1e students . who made
the p:rior tri'p; ahd c:!ould": result ,in liter'1lly .
hundreds of . indictments if p:resent _, plans fer
travel to Cuba are carried through.

. ( 5) Seek an injunction with respect to any

group Hhere we have reason to believe the y ..
are headed for C~ba. There are legal diffi culties in securing s0ch an injtinction in view
of th e f act th.at criminal refl\ed ie s exis t.
t'ie
could improve our> chances for injunctive relief
onl y by pr>omptly bringing more in<iictments
a gainst students i;1ho went to Cuba last s umm er .
If we fail to secure an injunction I thin k we
would be obligated to seek future legisJ.a tion
restricting travel at the earliest p oint possible
. in the new session of Congr ess. This t,1ill be
controversial and' harmful to our imag_e ab:toad
in many countries.
II.

H.emoving present

~estri~tibn~

in travel to Cuba

Rern oval of present restrictions on trav e l to Cuba

(a nd probably on ~ravel to o_ther countrie s as well )
~:ou l d obv iat e the legal and politi.cal o ue '.; tion o f
multi ple .prosecutions and inji:wctions.
H : wou lci
pr obably :1o a g reat deal to remov e existing pr e ssure
from s tudent s and pacifist grou p s to travel t o Cuba

.,
/.

~:; inc c a major appeal to stuclents o f s uch tr a v (~ l .li e :3

i n t h e fact . that the government prohibits it .

T h e major arguments against per~ ittin g trav e l

Cuba are:

to

(1)
It 0oul d be interprefed by som e g rou ps
as a "softening " of our policy to ward Cu ba ;
( 2) vie cannot provic1e pi.., o -tection for p er son s
trav e l l in~ there through normal di p loma tic
c hu n n els; ancl

O)
I t makes more difficult our p o s iti o n \vi t h
re s p ect to the Central American countri es ,
ha vi ng a g reed with them to take effort s to
c u rtail travel to Cu ba.
The principal aP g uments for remov ing the pr e s e nt
r es trictions are :
It is g oing to be extremely di ff icul,t under
to Cu ba ancl
t h i s pro b lem i s li k ely to be incr ea s ing l y e:nbar ras s ing
to us this summer ;
(1)

the b est of conditions to .. pr e v ent trav eJ

( 2 ) It is more cons i stent with our views of a

fr ee soci e ty and wou l d contrast with such thing s as
the Berlin Wa l l and Communist controls on such travel.
~ !he n the se two are put together, they form a power f ul
ar g ument in terms of both domestic and international
politics (except f or Ce ntral America ) f o r taking such
a s t e o. And I believe it likely that th e re ,,muld b e
l ess travel to Cuba i f restrictl.ons wer e removed than
there will be if th~ y are maintained . Further , tho s e
who travel would be less likely to be organiz ed b } ,
i nfluenced b y c:rnd , to a degree , controlled by the
l e ft - wing rnovements which have presentl y taken ov e r
mu ch o f this a g itation.
The chances. f6r Cas t ro to
g et a clv a nta g e from our permitting travel a:r' e faP l e ss
t han from our prohibition coupled with the i rrun en s e
and d i s tasteful prosecution s which it i;,.1i11 proba b ly
r e o u ire.
I-t ~JOulcl b e much easier to remove re s tri c tion$ on
trav e l to Cuba now than it woulcl b e aft e r the com Dlet i on
of sev eral of the contem p lated trips and wh en t he . matter
i s i. n t h e DUbl ic e y e.
Hhile th e r e woul cl be .c r i t i ci.srn ,
J 1-;.=d i e v c tiL:1t it wou1 cl be l es s c Pit i ci;:cd a nd more
:; u pport e d t:li<:i n th e p o s ition 11 e, a rc l:i.kcdy to ti nd o u r ~::;._; l v e: : : i1t u noH t h e rc turn of lar' gc num ber'.:; o J: ~:;r11 dc~ n t ::;
froi!l C1il id c-1!1c n 1;1c "611 h e f ~ic c d wi th t1 1c alt: cr nat: ivc :=
;
o : \.1l10J e:.a l c p.co s eeution 01' b e ing a c cu :=;cd ' o l dec l in ing

_, J -

to cr:force the law.

Wh ile I believe that removal o f riestriction s would
b e somewha t embarrassing to the Ce ntra l l\m er ican countri es
and the Ma na g ua agreement, T do not think . this is t oo

a--

s erious
pr 1c e to - pay .
We are anxious to c ontrol .t ravel
in t h o s e cbuntries because it is realisticall y rela ted to
revol utio n , s abota g e, etc.' a problen1 \J hic h
d o not face .
i~ ncl vi e wou l cl be abl e to point to various measur es vJe 11ad
taken to di ~ cour ag e such travel; f or examp le , cautioning
persons going that they. cannot be provid ed d i p loma tic
pr o t e ction a nd d iscouraging carriers from dir ec t t r avel
between the Unit ed Sta t e s and Cuba.

we

For a ll these reasons I believe it would be wise t o

rem ove restPictions on travel to Cuba bef ore we are
f a ced wi t h the problems which are li k ely to be created
in the i mmediate future.
I thi n k , ho~1ever, that it would be des i rable to
issu e sp ecial reg ula t ions f or suc h trav e l in v iew o f
t he special c onditions prevailing th ere. This woul d
r eq uire a pas s p or>t validated for Cuba whic h woul d
or d inaril y be g iven but which would p ermit the Department o f St a te t o e x ercis e some co n trol s (f or> e xampl e, .
suspect ed saboteur s ) as well as to inform and tB~ n
tra vel ers o f the lac k of effective diDlomatic pro tection .
Such a r ea uir eme nt woul d a l s o h~lo to an; wcr th e
q uestions which -Central Am eric an countrie s would raise
and ease our explanations to them.

If

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..~".a

..'

To:

President Lyndon B. Johnson

From:

Prime Minister Fidel Castro

Verbal Message given to Miss Lisa Howard of

ABC News orl. February 12, 1964 in Havana, CUba.
1.

Please tell President Johnson that I earnestly

desire. his election to the Presidency in November
.. though that appears assured. But it there is
anything I can do to add to his majority (aside from
retiring from politics}, I shall be happy to cooperate.
Seriously, I observe how the Republicans use CUba as
a weapon against the Democrats. So tell President
Johnson to let me know what I ~an do, if anything.
Naturally, I know that mY offer of assistance would
be of immense value to the Republicans - so this
would remain our secret. But i f the President wishes
to pass word to me he can do so through you L_Lisa
Howard...7 He must know that he can trust you; and I
know that I can trust you to relay a message accurately.

2.

If the President feels it necessary during the campaign to make bel11cose statements about CUba or
even to take some hostile act:1.on - i f he will inform
me, unoff:1.c:1.ally, that a spec:1.f:1.c action is requ:1.red
because of domest:1.c political considerations, I shall
understand and not take any serious.retaliatory
act:1.on.

3.

Tell the President that I understand quite well how

much political courage it took for President Kennedy
to instruct you L_Lisa Howargl and Ambassador Attwood
to phone my aide in Havana for the purpose of commencing a d:1.alogue toward a settlement of our differences.
Ambassador Attwood suggested that I prepare an agenda
for such talks and send the agenda to my U.N. Ambassador.
That was on November 18th. The agenda was being prepared when word arrived that Pres:1.dent Kennedy was assassinated. I hope that we can soon continue where Ambassador
Attwood's phone conversat:1.on to Havana left off . though
I'm aware that pre-electoral political considerations may
delay this approach until after November.

COPY LBJ

LIBRAR~

I"'

.......

\;;_c
........

...

4. Tell the President (and I cannot stress this too

strongly) that I seriously hope that Cuba and the

United States can eventually sit down in an atmosphere
of good will and of mutual respect and negotiate our
differe~ces.
I believe that there are !!Q. areas of
contention between us that cannot be discussed and
settled within a climate of mutual understanding. But
first, of course, it is necessary to discuss our differences. I now believe that this hostility between
Cuba and the United States 1s both unnatural and
unnecessary - and it can be eliminated~

5. Tell the President he should not interpret

my conciliatory
attitude, my desire for discussions as a sign of weakness.
Such an interpretation would be a serious miscalculation.
We are not weak the Revolution 1s strong very
strong. Nothing, absolutely nothing that the United
States can do will destroy the Revolution. Yes, we are
strong. And it is from this position of strength that
we wish to resolve our differences with the United States
and to live in peace with all the nations of the world.

6.

Tell the President I realize fully the need for absolute

secrecy, 1f he should decide to continue the Kennedy
approach. I revealed nothing at that time I have
revealed nothing since I would reveal nothing now.

COPY LBJ LIBRARY

- 'FOP SECRE'F
UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

799

UNITED NATIONS PLAZA

NE\V YORK 17, N. Y.

June 16, 1964

YUkon 62424

To:

The President

From:

Adlai E, StevensonQ2(f-

Last fall, with the knowledge of

Lisa Howard and Ambassador Bill Attwood
together to consider Castro's statement
that he wanted to open discussions with

JFK, I brought
(now in Nairobi)
to her in Havana
the United States.

Under my supervision, the project had reached the

point of preparation of an agenda by the Cubans, when
President Kennedy was assassinated. Lisa Howard now
informs me that following further talks and correspondence
with Castro she was asked to give you the attached message.
Attwood's communication was through Dr. Rene Vallejo,
said to be Castro's close friend and companion. He speaks
perfect French and English.
While I am not sanguine that anything will come
of this, she is convinced that he sincerely wants some
channel of communication. If it could be resumed on a
low enough level to avoid any possible embarrassment, it
might be worth considering. I am.sure it cannot be done
through the usual channels,
If you wish to discuss this further, let me know.

COPY LBu

LIBRARY


MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 7, 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY
SUBJECT:

Adlai Stevenson and Lisa Howard

Here are some thoughts on the above subject.

1. I think we should be clear that the latest developments add at least two new
factors to the situation which make Lisa Howard's participation even scarier
than it was before. One, for the first time during the Johnson Administration1
Lisa has been used to carry a message from the U.S. to Cuba. Before this, the
Johnson Administration had relatively little to fear fro-;;- Lisa since, essentially,
we were just listening to her reports on and from Castro. Two, Lisa's contact
on the U.S. side is far sexier now (Stevenson), than at any time in the past
(Attwood and then Chase).

2. While I'm in favor of having a channel to Castro, I would feel somewhat safer
if we could find a way to remove Lisa from direct participation in the business of
passing messages (a view which I have held for some time -- e.g. see attached
memo). Accordingly, you might want to consider the desirability of calling
Stevenson to make such points as the following:
(a) Lisa Howard's participation in the U.S./ Cuba channel, understandably,
makes us nervous -- the more so now, since communications are passing and
may pass, in the future, from the U.S. to Cuba. Also, the name of Lisa's new
American contact, Adlai Stevenson, is not an unsexy one from a public media
point of view.
(b) We would appreciate it if you would give some thought to ways and means
of retaining a channel to Castro but removing Lisa from direct participation.
(c) One possibility might be to shift the channel to Lechuga, the channel
which had been set up just before President Kennedy died. With Bill Attwood gone,
perhaps you could have Sid Yates (Attwood 1 s nominee) a pass Lechuga in the
corridor periodically to exchange whatever messages may need to be exchanged.
We doubt that Castro would object to a change in channels. In your memo of
June 26 you note, "that for want of anything better, he (Castro) assumed that he
could call her and she call me and I would advise you. 11
(d) We recognize that it won't be easy to extricate Lisa from the operation.
One way to do it might be to simply tell her that we have nothing further to say;

--pep SE GRE-'.F---EES-ONl:iY'--'

COPY LBJ

LIBRARY

MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE

.-'f'OP SECRE'I .,,..

EYES ONLY -

WASHINGTON

-2at the same time we could indicate to Castro that we prefer to communicate on
the Lechuga channel and that we would appreciate his cooperation in keeping
from Lisa news of this switch in channels.
Another possibility is to "level" with Lisa and tell her (1) that we are very
chary of the security aspects of her p:fy;one conversations between the U.S. and
Havana, (2) that we have decided to use the Lechuga channel for any further messages (which Lisa effectively set up), and (3) Lisa should relax, stay quiet, and
stand at the ready -- we may want to use her influence with Castro in the future.

r;;c
Gordon Chase

COPY

LBJ

LI BR'

TE LC ON
Manki.ewiec z/Sec. Kissinger
April 24, 1974
2:32 p. m.
'M: I had no idea when I last spoke to you that you were sort of-:.way down
the aisle. I asked if you were going to Acapulco or Syria and you thought
I had gone out of my mind. Very well done. I congratulate you. She
always struck me as a marvelous woman. I am a great admirer.
K: We have got to get together soon.

M: I have two matters to tell you. One is the trip that I told you about
is now on.
K: Wait a minute now -- what trip was that?

'M: To the Caribbean.

on
K: I must have blanked out

~hat.

'M: I told you that I might be doing a television interview with

K: Yes, yes, I know exactly -- of course. Good. Then I want to see you.
M: Yes. Well it's a .
K: When?
M: Well, it's six weeks away.
K: Well, let's do it when I get back from the :Middle East.
M: When you get back -- early in May?
K: Yes.
M: I'm going to England on the 17th of May so maybe sometime in between
there, or even after the 1st of June. It will be late in June.
K: I must see you before you do that.
M: I think there might be something useful in that. rm delighted to hear
about the Chilean. You're leaving at the end of this week and coming back ..
K: I'm leaving on Sunday.
'M: Do you think before you leave you could get us a tentative date. I'm told .. ,

Mankiewiecz - page 2
K: Let me look it over.
M: . that our seminar file in in your action file. We've been talking to
Eagleburger and to Gompert. If you could just give them a tentative date
before you go that would be good.
K: Good.
'M: Now you mentioned one other things once which I think would be very useful
in light of a lot of things that have happened, which is, you SUJgested that
H3l&X Holly and I should put on a very discrete evening with critics of a kind
that you' re not likely to meet.
K: I would like that.
'M: in your normal travels. Nothing public or anything like it. Responsible
concerned people who are not members of the foreign relations committee, or
even members of the Senate but who have some influence. Are you still
interested in that?
K: Yes, I am, very much.
'M: Maybe we could try to work that out -- May I think is probably too quick, but
maybe after the 1st of June.
K: Why don't you and I talk as soon as I get back.
M: Alright. But we'll have to do that, we'll talk sometime between the 5th
and thel'ith of May.
K: Right. I don't think I'll be back until the 10th.
M: Alright, whenever it is.
K: We'll talk in that period and then we'll set that evening.
M: And then if you could tell Larry or somebody, if you can pick a date after
the 10th, anytime in the rest of May for this seminar thing. That will be fine.
And then we'll talk about the other thing when we talk, because it looks very
serious and I think it's not without significance.
K: It is of significance because it fits in with other things.
M: Exactly. The time cable strikes me as an interesting one and of course
r will say not a word to anyone.

Mankiewiecz - page 3
K: And the NY Times with it's great acumen has missed the whole point of
what we did with Cuba at the OAS.
M: Really? I haven't seen the Times.
K: Well, they have an editorial compru_ning.
M: Complaining that you didn't do k anything.
K: That the Latin's know what we're doing.
M: Of course they do. I got that from the AP. If you know how to read and
if you know how Latin's talk, it was quite obvious. I wasn 1t surprised when
this other thing came along. I think we can make all kinds of ground.
K: Exactly. What you're doing may fit really very nicely into it.
M: I hope that you will not mention it to anybody.
K: Look, it's against my interest.
M: Where it could get back to them. Above all, we certainly don't want them
to think ..
K: No, no. What you can do is to give your impressions. I don't want you to
be a messenger.
M: But in any event, you don't know that I'm going or at least you're not treating
it very seriously because otherwise they get the impression that I seerm to be
but that I'm indeed some kind of ..
K: t No, I 1 m not going to talk to anybody about it.
M: Good.
K: There's no NE: need for me to talk to anybody.
M: But file the information away that that happened a day or two ago, it should
effect your thinking about other things, perhaps.
K: Exactly. No, I don't consider it an

~accident.

'M: I don't either .. Just put it into your file and I think it's significant, if you
want to know, that this was the only one accepted.

Manki.ewiecz - page 4
K: What channels did they use? I mean, they didn't use the Soviets, that's
all I ....

M: No, they used their own UN' mission.

K: OK, well that's fine.

M: And simultaneously did not accept major networks, all of which had been
asking for the same thing.
K: That's intelligence.
M: In other words, they want exposure, but

K: But from somebody with political sophistitcation.

M: Exactly.
K: Very intelligent.

M: And whom they have reason to believe, you know, if not friendly, at least
open.
K: Exactly.

M: So, it all sort of fits together and rm .

K: Look, as soon as you hear that rm back, will you call me.

M: Yes, I will.
K: Good, Franko

M: I will and if you could give them a date, we'd set something up for late May
on the other thing.
K: Right.

M: Alright, Thank you, Henry and congratulations.

K: Thank you, Frank.

JK

END

MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION
August 30, 1974

CONFIB-ENTL'\-J,, (GDS)
MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

STEPHEN

SUBJECT:

Cuba Policy

..

Lovf!>C-

Events are now forcing us to make piecemeal decisions relating to our sanctions policy. Decisions already taken on licenses for Argentine subsidiaries
and agreement for an OAS Committee of Inquiry have moved us beyond the
policy framework within which we had previously been operating. We are
called on to make recommendations and decisions on such matters as Cuban
participation in the Detroit Energy Conference, validation of passports for
travel to Cuba, continuing requests for licenses to U. S. subsidiaries for
trade with Cuba, and the like. With the change in the Presidency, each isolated action in this area is taken by the press and foreign observers as a
straw in the wind pointing to a new policy--and each is given an importance
out of proportion to its real significance.

00

.g
'<

i
-

(ti

In fact, we may not wish to modify our bilateral policy toward Cuba in the
~
absence of some real concessions, These might include renewed assurances~
from the Soviets on military activity in Cuba, in addition to commitments
from Castro on such problems as the $1 billion in expropriated and uncompensated U.S. assets, U, S. political prisoners in Cuba, maintenance of
Guantanamo, the reunification of families, the loosening of Cuba's travel
controls and so on. At least exploration of the possibility for progress
in these areas would probably be necessary before modifications should be
contemplated.
However, there are strong arguments for reducing the problem to manageable
proportions by disentangling it from the workings of the inter-American system.
A majority of the countries in the Hemisphere now oppose OAS sanctions; the
constant intrusion of the Cuban issue threatens to distort the new dialogue; and
the enforcement of our trade denial sanctions on third countries now costs us
far more than it costs Castro. The Cuba issue is also complicating our relations with Canada and some of the European and Asian countries,
In agreeing to the OAS Committee of Inquiry, we have already moved toward
extracting the issue from the inter-American context. The requirement now
is to determine how this process can best come out in terms of U.S. interests.
The Committee of Inquiry will predictably find either that the sanctions should
be eliminated entirely or that the member countries should be set free to make

CONFIDEN';t'IAL (GDS)

~b,

11 /f'I /J.Mo

- 2 CO~IFIDElPfl'lt.L

(GD1:>1

their own decisions,

We should examine the implications of these two outcomes while there is still time to influence the process, The terms of
reference under which the Committee operates will have a significant effect
and these will be decided within the next two to three weeks.

'\'\'

In addressing these tactical decisions, we have to think ahead to a restatemen1

of U.S. -Cuba policy after the sanctions have been lifted or modified.
That \
policy will have to deal with maintenance of aabilateral position as well as
current legislative ,and executive sanctions against third country trading with
Cuba. As more countries normalize their trade and diplomatic relations
with Cuba, pressures on us to modify these laws and regulations will increase"1::1
That policy must also deal with our bargaining position vis-a-vis the Soviet
[
Union and Cuba and pressures from the Congress to move quickly toward
g
normalization of bilateral relations.
~
If you agree, I would propose to draw up an options paper dealing with the
various alternatives involved.
The project should be held very closely. I
would plan to work with only one person each from CIA, State and Defense.
We would hope to submit the paper for your and the President's consideration
within the next few days,

RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve drawing up an options paper as outlined above by NSC,
CIA, State and Defense and on an extremely restricted basis for submission to the President.
Approve*
Dis approve_ __

CO:t-lFIDENTJ,;',L (GDS)

(
?:I

We are meeting here to explore the possibilities for a

We ,do
this agaL1~t a b;:.c'.<grounc wich whct wt> ;.re ;.ll familiar and
which makes this effort' particularly delicate. It is essential,
in the first instance, to determine whether there exists an
equal determination on both aides to settle the differences
that exist between us. In this context, it is equally important
that neither side does anything to worsen the existing situation
between our countries.
rnore no"l"n1al relati ..>ns~1iw .:;etv.;eer: ~ur :v,o 'cOuntries.

The mood in our two countries will, of course, be

important to such talks. We have noted the recent public
expressions of Premier Castro about President Ford and
Secretary Kissinger. By the same token, the Govermnent
of Cuba will have seen that our own recent public statements
about Cuba have been temperate and measured. Restraint
on the two sides can, we think, contribute importantly to
the improvement of the environment in which such talks as
these can take place. We propose, therefore, to continue
to give the most careful consideration to our public
declarations on the Cuban issue, which is, of course,
a matter of some sensitivity in our country.
The ideological differences between us are wide. But
the fact that such talks will not bridge the ideological
differences does not mean that they cannot be useful in
addressing concrete issues which it is in the interest of
both countries to resolve. The United St:.te3 is able and
willing to make progress on such issues even with socialist
nations with, whom we are in fundamental ideological disagreement, as the recent progress in our relations with the Soviet
Union and the Peoples' Republic of China has shown.
There is a long agenda of matters of concern on both sides.
Meanwhile, we, as a unilateral gesture, will do the following:
The Government of the United States will move
now to permit the travel of the Cuban diplomats,
accredited to the United Nations, from New York
to Washington,

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The United St!'te_s, considers it appropriate

t:iat ~ubar,s begin t> 9ar>i< ipare'more actively
b h~ in:e!lectual l:fc of tt.e Un~ted States.
No purpose is served in attempting to embargo
ideas. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect
that the Government of the United States may
begin to grant additional visas from time to
time to Cubans to visit this country for cultural,
scientific and educational meetings and for other
similar purposes, in order that such scholars
and experts may begin to communicate more
effectively with their colleagues in this country.
We recognize that there are a number of issues on both sides.
We anticipate that many of these issues must be resolved over time
between us for itnportant substantive reasons, while a number of
them are essential for Cuba or for the United States to settle for
symbolic reasons.
It would, ther<;!fore, be helpful for both sides to identify and
define the issues which may be discussed, and in what order we
might best discuss them._ We a.re prepared now to consider how
talks on these issues could go forward, where, a.t what level and
a.t what pace. We will look at these suggestions carefully and
respond quickly and in a. cooperative spirit.

January 11, 1975

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DEPARTMENT OF STATZ

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OFi'ICE 0? 'l"'EE

~'TARY

SECRE~TIVE
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MEJ...~ORANDUM
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January 11, 1975

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FOR THE SECRETARY

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Subject: Meeting "i.n New York with Cuban

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Represcnt~thes

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Frank Mankiewicz and I met today at LaGuardia airport with

Mr. Nestor Garcia, First Secretary of the Cuban Mission to the
United Nations and Mankiewicz' basic contact, and Mr. Ramon
Sanchez Parodi, who had been sent from Havana to New York for
this meeting.

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After Man.~iewicz made the necessary introductions, the fo1.1r

of Ul3 had cof!cc together in a La.Guardia restaurant. Our conversation lanted for approximately one hour.

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I began by saying that" you a.nd l had met scvc ral times on thi.o
iGsua, mo:Jt recent!~ for about r.n hour lc:i.st night, anci that th3
docunlcnt I w~IJ about to h i'\.nd o\cr to them {nttachcd) v.'ils ro~1rs in
both t1'.ou~ht ~ncl 1Ui1f.U;,:\f.!C that it had b e en t;pcd b; my accretaq',
e.nd th~t no one olso hacl seen it. l invited the tv."O Curons t:o rca.d
tha c!ocumemt r.nd make any commentg they mi~ht wioh.

cor.:dtlcrcd th;-.t ''US c:n.':!in.r. of the

blod~do

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of Cub:l

~.-;.o

th-:! n~c ..~esnr~ cc~d.it.!on for b 1 ~ in~i.ng th!! procoe;'!i of

nonn::.U:~tilln." It ..~...~o. IH: !?ni d. " the dr.~ qu~ non.
It
would be im?{)f'ir.ib!o for- Cub.:i to br~in c.lincusdon:i '.'r'ith
tho L?n~t~cl St;,.~:::a 011 o~h~r fo ;) :-t e~u'tl t~mi~. ::i.~d th i s
rcq~i :-r.:d th~t tho b.!r;.c:~~.;c!P. bi? brol;:::~t to :ln cm!.
He ~~id
th~t wh U o t h t: b-2oc k~cic w :!, ~ r.ol :: -::: cct:. e ro. l'il y h:\ rrr. fol. it
clid p~0\cnt C1:c.:; tr("!m ;lcCc!~ to t he.: .r'\1"'!'lcric<?n m~r7.'::?t.

c!o::;pito tho fact ~hat o~:.;4 t:id not cou:-:t on tl-.at

in thi:! t.t~\elnFn~:it o.f its n . :c-ye:Olr pli.ln."

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DECLASSIFIED

!E.0.12958. Sec.3.6

PER -tr~o3

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A!tor, rc:oding the doc1.uncnt, S:inchoz P~rodi sc:.id that nr.itheihc nor No i; to 1 G!l?"ciC& hn.d. l!ny ;:iat.l:arHy to nc-s otiflto: their task w:io
to lb tel\ ~ntl 1cport back to tbcir ~ut horiticP. in H~vann.. Howc1.or, he
did ..-J:i.r.t t.o rr:a.ke a nu..rnbcr of person.:V. coa1rncnt&:
Cubz~

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Public or official action to end the blockade was not

neccsF.ary; but cases such ClS that of Litton Industries
in Canada and the t;S decisior. to abstain in Quito \vcre
demonstrations that the United States intended to maintain the blockade and was taking po siti\'c <lc.tions to\vard
that end.

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The blockade is the:: onl~ obstacle" standing in the way

o! a bc[:innii~e of the process of normalizing :-elations.
"Other issues can l:.c cliscu~sec..! later, .but it is necessary
to end the block~llc in or<ler to begin the process of.
norrnaliz:J.tion."

cuba has already taken !!tc.ps to c:rcatn the right

atmo~rh c rc for ctn ~.mpro\'cment i.1 the rcb..tions between th~ tv.o countric~1. Cuba has, for e~:ample,
m~dc an a:;rc~rner.t with the l 1nitcd St.;tes on hij~cking
clospilc.: the fact lh'lt hijackit~g itscU \\'as no particub.r
problem for Cub2. The step was tak~n a.a <:1 "i;oocl will
{;cntuM " ~nd in l'Cco r. n .i.tion 0 intcrn.:i.tiona.1 public
opinion." The US, ho wc\'c r. h~ s not acted r~ciprocally
in c.pplic:--ti'=in of this 2..~ reemcnt. Cuba would ?.pply the
t:grcc-mcnt more ri ~. ::>!"oUd)' if the>' rccclvcd rcciprocit
from the Unit~d St<..:.te3 in terrns of Cub;;.n exiles in

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When

~r.che~

P<\rocii

h~d

completed his rt.'.:ma1ks, 1 pointed out

tl'lr::t hie cmph:>.:;i~ on th~ bloc::~<lc wan lr.~~ th.an precise, antl that it
Wl.Ul not clo:Ar tc.' rr.~ - - givc-n h.i!J r:tatC';-:v!nt that " official and P'tblic"
&ction:~ n ocd not be t.:-.1-::cn -- whether Cuba was insisting on a complete

cli.vn!r,:..Hon of Ule

b!~ckade

or

~o:r.ething

lei; s than

th~t.

S&ncho~
c:i~cnt!cl

Puro cH rcplic:c.l that a "rebhation o{ tha blockade w~s a.n

conduioa to the b-::~imiin~ of nonncilir.ation of relations between

UQ."

l pointod out thc:.t the blod:.:lcic wns. a combirntion of both legal and
::crr.c o! which coulcl onl; be changed uy

Aumir:.i!tr~thc r-~qu.in:. ~c::t:!I,

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an act o{ Cong res 9. I aisked whether in his personal opinion Cuba would
require that we change our laws before t he process o! r:orma.lh:ation
could bcsin. Sanchez Parodi replied, "I co n~t think eo."
Sanchez Parodi then siid th~t we had probably seen report!! o! .
1
Cnstro a ist:ltc:m~nts agninet the l!:i.ited Stoi.te:s during the ..bit o! Sena tor a
J2.vit:i ilnd Pell. Ha i1aid thnt ~'ic'e statements were '' un;:noidablc " at
the times but th.it ~.-e we:-e rit:1t to t.:i..kc them <\:5 evidence thilt Cuba W;lS
not lnterc!lt ~ d in improved rdations with the US. He !\~id that 5t<J.temonts U!~o 'th -~t oi Castro d'Jrh'!g the Javits-Pcll visit were ''not our
atylo" ~nd t.b~t it w~s not Cuban pro:>.ctlce to attack publicly whlle
~ogotiut!.r.g p!'ivatc.ly ~t the same time.

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Pinoc!i then ask:.:d, with rcforc'"lce to the nttn.chcc.l vt :it.9rnant. wlu~!l tho t:S ~.cu!d movo to p e r.nit t.h ~ t r~vcl o{ Cub.i .n diplom:1t!J
Lccrc d it~d to t ~ci Unitr:d Nnti.onl.i iro:n New YorJt; to Wa ~ r. t nf, ton.
1
:opHcd t h :;t wo inti:-m!~d to t:i..~e thc:.t ntop now, :Uthou~h it rni ~M t <~1~o

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~omc tL~~ tu rn::.t:'!:l t.ho nocca i;ary ~. dminl :it t":'ltive ::.rr'ar. ~ r.rncrnt!!.
l
r.:l{d ~ h~~ t h~ C1.h:l!'l. ;,Ht: r. :{"'ln t:o t h~ t:r:l tad N ~tlom: woulcl bo notified when
tho d:.:~ n~(J 1-:.:.d cuGn t'!.C!;omvlie h.~tl.

S:lr.:hc: :; t: :.rctli ~aid t h;;t ~ h~ c u::..."\n i; W~Ht3d to h;-.va t\ a r.con:J mi\n

t o p i2. ::- t i dp~to in t!~ o t :;~ t\: <> rn lh ~ {\.' c r-.t lhat h e f S:q~ch c :: Pi\ rodi)
rnl i;ht ! ":::! t l::~ r.::\LJ.<::t.h -.:hl"'t\ w~ or ; :, o Curi :-. n~ .;~r. ~e tl r.~~t~cr rn o-:tirq.
H:i !', ~:~~ :l t h~t ,,,~ :n:~ht.1ri;""6 t h<:! i .J~ u ~ ncf) of ~- m ~~ti ;; lc C'n1.ry v b~ foi
Jo::c '!d~t'~. Gt?' :-: c-tor of !r.~('t~;i t ir.- r-:~ Or :t:\ n !. t:~.tlonR int ~' M i r.i : tl'~,. of
l'c r.;:\ r:: r~ /" ~...:.a ir !1~
l rro~'i::;."d fl l o-i~ i.:-?i ? t h n m :tttor D n ~ ~ ct 11. i::i ~! r to
tl: ~ c~! :!,.~ n:-> n~ r. \'"'.Jtl ...... 'l ~~,, r. j b; I: l.'i ~ :HH' t!'\ 6:;ll l r h Fr ~n..~ : :': .. f') :.io.:.! t:;; 0 i:t~ a ; < ~ ~ (~~"c ~ '~'
T! : ~~ C~:.::;~ 1!tcl ti: .~. .,.~~ t h... ..t t h':y '~ :J!.!.ld pr:::r.? r it if~~~
G~ !! ~ r~ :-,t r~!) s ~ 'I} J !~ \''!l ~~ C\ri ?..!.!. , ., r.: u r: t >~~ vi:! n ~~the:! I'" t 14\ '1:1 :-r.r: i~11i:~ ~
\'tcr~ ~) ! ~; t t"l !\ : ,~ ~icr) Cit ~., ~v o' ~.\r; ~~~ '?vi ~. .: f r ~ m cur- ;.:~r1 :1.J ri ~ y t!-. !1rn.
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tw\iU:. ~l o

[ , _rnt;' h '-1:l !';,it'"n~:i '}:.zn r r;tlit-:-.:.:! C" l ~ C<' :l !!od .11 to t!1c quo:.tiOl\ of thr;
hl~~,., t} ""I b s::.: i ~,_~t "tw:n~~ ::::i 1f' m "J.~ t h e d ):tc <l bv".lt it. ''It i~

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bnportant," he said, "to establish a wa~{ or get an agreement whe!"c-by

the blockade i ' no longer an issue. Perhaps a change in the way in
,..,hieh the United States reacts on trade and economic relations would
be sufficient; perhaps mo\.es ::o ch;lnge our legislation would be
necessary. 1 do not know precisely, but I do know that the situa.tioo
has to be chanzed in some way. l unde!sta.nd th~t the is sue is
complicated. but the US mu!'lt take <>.ctiv e steps in that sense. As
long as there is no arran si; t?1T1ent with respect to the blockade and its
removal, there can be no ad vance in our relationship. ' ' Sanchez
Parodi went on to sar that in Cuba's view time is ruo:Ung aga i nst the
United Stat'!s, which is running the u risk oi isolating itself from the
rent o! the Hemisphere. 11

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Sanchez Parodi in1ic:?.led that this \l.''1-!> the e:\."tcnt of hh personnl

rcmn. rk!J. 1 facn aaid tlut I h::id some addition~! orcl p oints to ma1<e
tho.t had been C\l..1thorizcd by. you. Those points were ao follow!>:
The Unit~cl Statee ic prcpa t'cd to impro ve relations

with Cub3.,

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We ~~c n<:>t aGld ng that C \.~b~ g ive up its domestic

fltr.u.ct-..:re or m~Lhod oi go \'errunent. We do believe,
bowevcl", that Cub..i !;hodcl pursue an indcpcnriant
!ot'ilign P<llicy. Thu!# thir. mc-:i. n:'i th:?.t Ct.~ba. should
not b:i ~ Soviet !lC?.toUi~c a nd th:i.t :::e recog r.i::c aB '-'ell
th.,.t indc:pcOlC:en cc rn <:lans t hnt Ct:. bi\ will proc<'..b~ r continue
to c.lfr;;:t,g1ee v:"it:h the Uo.ii.:.::d St.'.!tcn in the majorit} of

c:a:30s.
Th~

p:oce:ss of ncr~<J. i.za. tion of relntiona mc1ns th:lt ::;c

muot (!iVC attc~t~Oi'l t .., c z ch o t i1cr 1 S probhm1s
~re-. '> i::;~u::r.

on both. ::. ic r. s v: hl ch ,..,. e her ') todc:i.\I or

e:ornt~n'.! els n at .:~ b t cr ti:n c c o:.t.!cl c ?..t:th1 g ue and
dlscur.s in wh~tcv::ir orcler was mutunlly a greed.

.Thc ::. c

Cub::. mu!:t und~rst~n<l th~: v.-hilc we nre!, of cour!: e ,

intcrestc<l in i:':.ip ..-ovin13 rcl at i.ons bct.vecn our hvo

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countries, thi!S was not a particularly "big cleal''

for the United States. It was not . for example. so
significant for u~ ilS the process of normal.bing
relations with the PRC ~..-hi.ch w~ are now engaged in.

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Cuba must al.so understand that any normali zation of

rclation5hips bzt~cen our h\--o countries must involve
a. quid pro quo. Uncle.- no circumstances would the
United States be prepared to view the normalization
of relations as a one way street in which we gilvo and

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Cuba took.

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After going throu~h th~ ~ e " instructed" comment!J. I said that I

had flovoru t)c r .. on:.!.l co.nmc:nt~ t~ m~ka. I c mph.:i.siz.ed that thcso
wero tot~y rn;- u:m ro!:!action to the discus a ion so !ar nnd th~t thoy
. in no wuy r eprcnr.:ntcd tho views o! nnyo no o t hi:?r than myacH. I s:i.id
th~t in my cplnion if Cub~. rorr.tircd d complete clL"nin:ltion of the
blocJ,~dc boforo L'..ny efforto toward norm,lb~~tion of rabtion& c:oulcl
't o.k~ pfat:c, the U:~i!cd States v: ould be unprcparod to pl'"ocoed i1,,~rthor.
Thi~ would h~rclly be a 11 b;J..anccd 11 way or pr.occedL~g.
1 on th3 oti1or
hllncl, wh<il Cc.bn cxpoctcci v.ao !lOl'liC parhn.pt: motlout 2tcp!l, th:it might
or rnir;ht not bo 1>--:isnible. I cocl<l ma..!to no commitment under tho~a
cl rclli-n otnnce n.

At this point .M. nHnwic~ inti;,rruptcd to n!!.y thut Cuhil. m\.\st undo:rctr..nd tJ1:it th~ contluf'.:t , ou:- !c:-oi ttn rcl~tionJ today i::: far more n public.
prohi<!m th.:-.n cv~r boforo. Tb~ Con~:res~ h ~!i deeply involvc~rl itorj .: in
l!:r.uc~ of fOA"c!p,n r~~l n.Hcntl ~nc.! th~ " proCC iHI Cit c h<ln ~h;; the circction of
poli!:y i~ new mori!J iliilkult t)~;;.n it haa cvor bocn."
Surich'Jz Pu~:odi rcpli.-:: Ll l!, ?.t he u ntlrJI'r."tood this but perh;.po i;ome
thin~:; co\.tltl ba done. For C):~.m pla, ha cr.tcl t pcrhiJ.p9 the 6 n.lc of r. u.5!'.'.r
to tbe Urtitcd S ~t~~ co~d bc ~~ in. c~inro, h e pointed Ot\t, h :!d npo l~ e n
about thte nt t~o s~ cond Con r; i ~ !Hl of Wom~n r ~ ccntl y ...... ricl it wa!I c ::i.:.u iauG
propoaal. vrh~t in needed, he f!r,id, is ' ' thin g ~ to cha.ngo tho aunor.p!'lorc,"

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I replie1 that I u:iderstood his point but I must emphasize again

that it wac; absolutel~ necessary that Cuba understand my earlie.r
reference to a quid pro quo relationship and that the United States
would be unprepared to proceed to norrrializing relations in the absence
0 a balanced arr'a ngement.

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Sanchez Parodi replied that he understood the difficulties being
the United States. The US is a world power and a sudden change o!
position is difficult, as would be a..ny steps which would imply a lens
of prestige. It is 11 not" he said, "our intention to be able to claim
victory ovc r the United Stat~s. That is not our way o! conducting
aserioulJ b-.iaincss. But a chilnge of attitude or atmosphere is necc:soil.ry.

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Mankiewicz then interceded to say that perhups there were so1no

things Cuba could do euch as permit \'i.!lit~ of Cuba.r. exiles it:I t~1~ United
Stntes to their families in Cubi:l.. I interrupted to say that I thought
thn.t whilu it mi::i;ht be pos siblc for us to c.:i..~.'l!ogue now the pc.ss ible
iaaues bahvcen us, thcit tod~y w~!; not the ti.'Tle to clo lhat. !n li;ht of
Sanchez Paiodi's cmph~fiis on the need to r;.;rr,ove the block~de, I
thought both dcles should return to their bettors for conr.ider<\ticn of
the m~tter as it now stood withoJt ma.king .:!ny attempt to list other
poD!lible heucs be.tween ua.

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1 thought it un;vise to et into the cata.loeuing of iGsue::i

bccuuse I fo~rcd th;i.t if. \:e disc1.i sscd th~n g !3 Cubil might
e1::pcct of us it would b'nply an ac:c ~7t~nc:e on my part of th.::
concept of the elimination of the block~clc ?.s a !irst sfrp towa:-d
nonnn.li:;.atio11. l :'.'?.nt:cd to le.:\vc both Ct1b;?:i.1 with the ck~. r
Ul:ldcrnh.ntling th:it while l h -id rcc..:hed thui.:- me:; sage, l ,?<Sin
no '-}' prepared - - c-..~:-i 'l:lo!HciaJly - - to <>.cc2pt it as a precondition to further ~lk!l}.
tccl~y

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5-=.nchc:t. .Paro<li c.g reed th~t a catalO!;t'in r; '-If i :i c::ucs r.ow '.v~ e
neither ncc~- J~ary nc1r .,-,ir;e and !."P.id lilat wh.U ~ Cub<!. mny c.ot bo ;::.e
!z.rc;c as Chin~, it could be a.s p.r.ticn!:. l replied that \Vhi_lo thJ l!n.H~d
States, aa clC'<:.rl} indi::ltcd by tht.i messa ~ c Sccrctn..r~ !~i~z;inr.cr '.\';,...'l
P.endi ng Premi~:- c(l.slro, W<l!i intarestcd in tno\in~ lov,ard t.n
accommodntion with Cuba, w~ folt no tirn-::! urr-cncr or compul :;ion
lo da so quickly. This issu~ w.:o..:, I rcite:-atcrl, of rl"l'-ti.c!y madc~ ~t
irn.p-:>rt to t!1e United ~'.n t s as i h::id indi~t:'..rnd r:nliu r,

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I closed by saying I had appreciated the Opf-:T'tunit')o to tr.eet \\ith

the two Cubans and that, as the) knew, Frank Ma.-J<ic.icz would :5oon be
traveling to Cuba one~ again. While I could 'not guar<int~e it, l thought
it probable that
would be carrring a message from Secretary Kissinger
to Premier Castro. I also said that i! he cii<l, in !act, carrr a message,
it would almost certainly t ak e into account the message pa!lsed by the
Cub~ns to us today.

he

We then spent a fe\v minutes discus sbg arrangements for !uturc

meetings, including code words in telephone cails should tith er side
desire a meeting quickly <':.nd feel that tt:!lephone communication might
be insecure. I also agreed that should we c t.e r have 1nectingg in
Washington, they ,..-ocld tak e place in my home which i s S<.'lme !iv e
minutes from National airport.

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D<!spite the sccminr.l y- cliiiicult touc c:.f !: Orne of t h e abo ve, the
atrno~phcre of the meeting ,:.as e:a::-cmc:l~ fri e n dly. ~eithc r o! the
Cuu~. ns w<ls eith<?r pu r:; :i~ci o 1.1~ o r diiii cult. My own r e!; pon::.cc w e r e,
I ho;>e, c1ually lo,r, k0r in t o ne. ~~evcrth C'lC S !; I went to !;omc lc n gth!l
to mokc it clear that I wa s no t a cce;it in g th e prccondi~io n " of a
remoYcil of the blockac!c. J:qu<.>.l!y I rcforrcc.! to quit: p r o quo on
scveri?l occadom: in order to rn <i~~ c it cl e a r t h?.t w e \Vt~rc no t p rcparecl
to :no1c in tJte a.b :::: en c ~ of Ct.!ban conc c:::; s i ons . 1 tlcliti':! ralcl~ l eft vaprn
the ti.."!le fr~-nc in which su c h Cub ~~ n co~cc ~!l !.o n~ rni Jht be cxp c~ t ~ d,
both bec<.:.t.!SA l b:1.vc t~o sc n!.:e o f wh en yo~ rn :-.; .var:.t t o io:cc t l \.lt h r.nd
arlci hl~cauee I \V~ n tod to avoid pu tti ng u.B in t h e po s it i o B t h :i.t t h e Cub:!.nD
ca.-nc. clouc to pu ttin3 the ms dvo ~ in at th~ bo gin:r.i ng o! cur cor1v ~ rz :::.tion,
11

I thlr:.k FraZl~~ ?.nd l bc i:h a ;:-: ~c t h:.it S ~ n c h e z P arodi' s rnc sr.~r: c i!:
not fril ~ w~ m us t tot -:.11; cE:n :. n~tc t l:e b! oc.kc::.2 c bdo rc fo!t h ar !l l .:: p !l cnn
be tc..l~cn but rr::.t h cr fr.:>.t mc -.-::r, whi ch 5Ccm. to .imply t he tm=-cr.t-:--.. :1c:d
"m~b.t c:-:.J..ncc" of t}1<:i block~d c ( ~. :.:., t h~ L;ttrrn c ~ ,;; C') !1 h n u!i:i r1r:>t t:.k c
place. Th~re i:;, o f cou r ne. :io L-U~r ~ r:t~~ '1. t 'this st ~ :;c th:it if :, c w ~re
to td~ c ;; fow oHp n which mi r.h t ~ ?? ~ar to b e a n-io dcr <i.ti cin of t h :i blocknd~ ,
th~t thczn wocld not be acc c pt('. d n~ fait a ~c .: omp!i \l :'l<l more c.l cmo.ndc d
bcforr.: Cuba v; o'.l.lcl !Jc will ing t o pro c eed tow a rd n o,mal i:.: .-~t ton.

'

r: :::. :.-_

8
....
I will ~<il<e steps on Monday to 'ilce th;lt we ch.ln~e the ~r.a"l!l
restrictions on Cuban t::-\ diplomats. permitting them to t r:wel to
and from Wa.shin~ton.
As to Manzdev:icz' Ut)corr..in:
tr-i"O
'"'
~
""
. to H.3"3na.
you ~ill want to consider v.-ith Bill Ro~c.rs v.hat uddit~or..al mc::::iiat;c

...........

Fri.i.nk misht

l".arr~

with him.
~":::.

...

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. .j anuai-y~ 16;

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HAK:

Subject: M& to Castro

U)

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---

MaDJdewtc:a will be deputing lor Cuba (via Jamaica) on

Thurday. January 21. He b whether you wtah him to carry any
pecial me1 to Caatro.

I have uked Bill Roser~ who ha a copy of my memo on the

New York talk. to pve you an appropriate draft meaage by thia
FJ'iday afternoon. When I return on Monday from my deathbed, we
can rerisw tbb toaether ~ you wiah.
i

.Frank n11t a nie&ge which would include the following

element., either oral or written:

--

.
.
a. atatement that we have lnltiated a reduction of

travel reUictlona on. Cuban. diplomata in New York.

(J'Yl: Wemay be able to tell Caatro that the
reatrlctloll9 already have been removed. ) We are
moviD1 ahead aa quietly poaaible on thb and hopefully . .
will have approval froni the Juatice-StateDefene
CommJttee by the time i'rank depart.

--

---

A reference to om eaalq of our enibargo program,

epec:Wcally in the area of thl:rd country export to
Cuba.
An exprelon of readine to begin cultural and
eporte ezcbaage,
Orally, an inc:Ucatlon that we hope Cuba wW attend
the Bueno Aire meeting of Foreign Mi.a.istera.
Flnally, an Wuatrative lit of poaible Cuban actioaa
of intereat to ua aa a guid pro quo. One example would
be pe~b aion for family viait to and !ram Cuba.

Comment: ~ .~ r~~T !1~~ c'!rtaln.wh'ti," ~.ankiewtcz ought to

bring th\ a.k'liid ~f. qies lJ!'ae f!t'om )lob to!dast?o\
.
~
:

~ t

:. .. . : . . . . . . . . . .
=~

......._

-2My own reco~n~tl~.;'1 ~~'\~.fen a basic meaaage which

jdod will to him through
the commWal~~D
~=dellveiiea
En
Nav.cnk
last week.
:. :
,.
note lht: we.b~ alraady ~l!e~Jted our

.... . . .. .. . . .

Beyo.ad thla. you may alo want eriously to consider

adding ln Frank' ng1etion on mentioning an eaai.ag of travel
and third coumrr trade retrictlona. Concerni.Dg hia aug1etlon
of a liat of Cuban quid for our quo. I believe thle ill a good idea
and one which aupport -ij\~ etre on the aame theme in the
New York metina- Clearly, however, hl thought on Cuban
atte.oclance at the Bueaoa Airea meetins i8 totally out of the

quetioa.

..;
... .

...

"'

MJ" 8Jl81 recommeadatlon le that aa much aa poaaible we

bould move the Cuban bualneaa out ol the M&aldewlcz chnnel
and into a B.01era-LSE channel (Roger !or aubtance; LSE for
contacta).

...

'

LSE

S:APAdama:bl

1/16/1s.s

.
....
. ... .
.

..

.
.
.

..

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..

.. .

(~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION MEMORANDUM
~i S

SECRET/NODI~/EY~S

To:
From:

ON!Y

.J an't'a::i:y :! 'J,

197 5

The Secretary
ARA - William D. Rogers !v-

so:o:

The Mankiewicz Trip

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!!!

Further again to the earlier memos from me and

Larry, I make an additional suggestion:
-- that we ask Frank himself to say that the
Cubans should consider permitting some family visits.
He could point out that such a move would be favorably received in this country.
A message passed in this fashion has several
advantages:
-- It uses Frank, and his credentials as a Democrat and a liberal, to emphasize to the CUbans the
importance of the human rights issue to the normalization process.
-- But it does so in a way which will permit the
Cubans to move, since the suggestion could be interpreted
as not linked to any forthcoming moves on our part in
the trade area, such as a license for Litton or the
Council of the Americas trip.
Reconunendation:
That we ask Mankiewicz to say that the Cubans
should consider permitting some family visits:
Agree~~~~~~~

Disagree

-------

SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY

ARA:WDRogers:mph
l/2C/75 - 2921C

~:
1

90149 ' 3 7 2

~--~- . :-_~_o/._;i
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- . . . - -- -----

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

\~SECRET,_ oADS~~ary

25, 1975

SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY

To:

The Secretary

From:

ARA - William O. Rogers

Cuba

There are three recent Cuban developments you

should know about:
1. Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez has told Le Mende (Tab A):
1 -- .:(. 1 , ~ M ;,, , ;; ~-,,

~ Ctip!inn rer.i; ''1

"

tron!!:l!rie'f :,, <.. .:

1'ra !ifP.r~;id ?r:. n1:: .. . :
with 'l<i;JiUJnal a;.rt1:\::
x.r;tro!lc:d t:,.. s:!-;
- .;::ifwn and c11:>tody

G~1. B -

; ... ~: e;

~ .. ta :r.r.id hy S!:3

,. . , ,. ..... ":":

;:::,11-t

fe{iS-Jr.

----

that there is "no revolutionary

process in Latin America leading
to any great changes similar
to those which have taken place
in Cuba 11 ;
that the lifting of the blockade
is an essential first step to
US-Cuban normalization, but that
'this "could comprise various
iphases and assume various forms 11
. and

'..:. ___ . ~:: ::..._<:/-_~-Lrn

:
-~F-------that .at

Quito the U.S. eschewed

its historic responsibility by
abstaining, thus avoiding giving
an impression that it was trying
to exert pressure 11 We thought
there were 14 votes, he says;
the U.S. "would have preferred
to see the Latin American countries
compel the U.S. to change its
attitude toward Cuba . 11

S~CRET,OAOR
~FC~ET/t-Ol')IS.'EY!::E Ob!!.~

oEP~RTMEl'iT

790149 '3 7 2

GEs-----OF STATE

I ) RELEASE
C ) DECLASSIFY
:)<3 EXCISE,
oQ DEC1.ASSIFY
C I DENY
IN PART
( ) DELETE' NonReaponslve Info
FOIA ~emptlona

IS/FPC/CDR
MR casea Only:
EO Cltallona

L.

Date.

'i.

11.0 /Z.Jft ,50:CT, /, JP[s:

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1

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SECRET OADRI

SECRET/NOOIS/EYES

O~L

2. Several,_.~n various posts have

been contacted by C~ intel!'igence agents (Tab B
is an example). The purpose seems to be to establish
contact, and to suggest that Cuba is prepared to consider better relations. No effort has been made to
use these intelligence channels to corruuunicate a - ,
package proposal. One Cuban has told f _ ~
that there is already another channel ~tablished for
this purpose.
3. iIA attaches partiq.uJ.ar siqnj,ficance to
one
contact, in which L
__J who is
close to Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, took pains to stress
that Cuba would consider a variety of techniques for
resolution of the problem of compensation for the expropriated properties (Tab C).

I have asked L for some concrete comments on the

proposal. The source also echoed Carlos Rafael's
statement that Havana would respond favorably to a
gradual lifting of sanctions.

Attachments:
Tab A - Le Monde interview with Cuban Deputy
~
Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodrique~

Drafted:

ARA/WORogers:sw
x29210: 1/25/75

SECRET,OADR
SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY

SECRET/NODIS
NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH CUBA
Summary
It is the conventional wisdom on both sides that
en ._ ...

I- 0

Cl) Cl)

normalization will be a lengthy process of working

through a complex agenda toward the ultimate goal
of diplomatic relations.

That process would almost

surely become mired in the issue of compensation for

expropriated property.

--

--

Our interests is in getting

the Cuba issue behind us, not in prolonging i t

indefinitely.
In all relevant cases, including the rece.nt PRC
and East German agreements, the compensation issue
has been left for later.

This paper suggests that

we reestablish diplomatic and consular relations as

part of an initial bargain including a partial lifting
of the "blockade" and mutual commitments on nonintervention and negotiations to settle claims.
Background
The most authoritative statement we have from
the Cubans on the scenario for normalization remains
the Foreign Ministry's cormnunique of January 10, 1974
........:c-...-.~~__..:....

NO::>l3 R::v;rf~b A)

~ Caption removed:
transferred to IM/iS/FPC
cat B - Transferred to 1:vu:s1FPC
with additional access
controlled by SIS
Cat. C - Caption end custody

..

:~7~----

at document envisages aprocess- beginning

SECRET/NODIS

- 2 with the U.S.

~iftinq

its cmb&rgc and going on to

talks about the "differences" between us, including

the status of Guantanamo.

The implication is that

diplomatic relations would come last.

Nothing the

Cubans have said before or since suggests a disposition toward any other order of precedence.
The usual Washington assumption has been that
diplomatic relations would be the climax to successful
negotiations in which the Cubans made fundamental concessions.

That kind of thinking arose -naturally from

a situation in which we could make the final decision

on the OAS sanctions.

Obviously, the Cubans would

have to settle across the board with the hemisphere

before the sanctions could be lifted.

There would

be no reason for the U.S. to anticipate such a

settlement -- and the settlement would haye to
meet our minimum terms.
As it became clear that the OAS sanctions could
not be sustained, we shifted to the contemplation of
a step-by-step approach designed to provide induce~
ments for the Cubans to negotiate with us.

As we

pointed out last summer, a strategy of that kind

had to be based on movement in the OAS; i.e., we
SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

- 3 would take tt.e firEt critical step

~nd p~si~ion

our-

selves for negotiations by doing the necessary to

_.,.
lift the OAS sanctions. ~We ferese:w phased aooompany)_,

iBg measures for negotiations &-ru;dn9 th.e

neces~ary

to lif~ taQ o~s sanotions:_7 We foresaw phased accompanying measures to clear the rest of the underbrush
the third-country restrictions and travel controls
in particular.

The thought was that it would then

be possible to sit tight for a time on the key

element of direct export controls, awaiting Castro's
response to the invitation.
The Current Problem
Castro now has no apparent reason to conaern
himself further about the OAS sanctions.

In fact,

he has already succeeded in breaking the interAmerican "blockade" without making a single
significant concession and without ever having
/

to deal with us.

He may believe that a little

patience will bring him the same happy result with

respect to the U.S. sanctions.

(His latest state-

ment at Tab B suggests an attitude of benign

quiescence in waiting for the U.S. to get around
SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS
-

in good time to

4 -

'recognizi~g"

Cut-a,)

In br:'..ef, from

where he sits, and from what he can see of the course

of U.S. politics, there is not much to negotiate
about.
Senator Kennedy and others propose to recognize
this seeming state of affairs by simply lifting our
controls, thus meeting Castro's primary pre-condition
for "discussions".
"negotiations").

(The Cubans never refer to

Again, diplomaticrelations would

presumably come as the end result, with at least the

"people issues"

(e.g. reunification of families and

political prisoners) disposed of first.

A more common approach is to think in terms of
a negotiating scenario which would focus on an end
to the embargo in return for agreed compensation of
expropriated property.

The sequence would begin with

minimal unilateral concessions on our part (perhaps

an end to shipping and third-country sanctions),
proceed to a joint political statement of principles
(non-intervention, "mutuality of obligation and reg?J,rd")
and go on to the extensive agenda of bilateral issues.
Diplomatic relations would seal the final bargain,.
The argmnent against Kennedy's approach is that

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

- 5 we throw away r)Dr on.l.y

rea.~... n~goi:ia Lin~

~ard.

The

problem with the second scenario is that it would

probably never play out.

The negotiations would

&

almost inevitably sink into the mire of compensation

/7

question while pressures on the embargo intensified.

It is simply much easier for Fidel to resist paying
compensation than i t is for us to maintain export
controls when our corporations are losing business.
Concessions Realistically Seen
A reappraisal should start by looking at what
we might now reasonably expect from Fidel and what
we' could bearably give him in

return~

Castro has said repeatedly that he will make

no political concessions.

He means it in the sense

that he will not specifically renounce "revolutionary

solidarity" (with the Puerto Rican

'~atriots"

as well),

or promise any modification in his relations with the

Soviets.

But it is not inconceivable to envisage a

joint statement in which both sides renounce "any

right to intervene directly or indirectly in affairs
related to the sovereignty of Latin American nations"

-.....

,.,

(Cuba's own formulation Tab A).

Nor can we rule out

a similar formulation on the use of either country's

.SEC:aET/N0:0 IS

SECRET/NODIS
-

6 -

territory as a base for at.Ned

other.

ag~r~f'si0n

agA.inst the

Thus, there is some possibility for minimal

accommodation of our traditional political concerns.

On one of his, we could agree without any great
cost to discuss the status of Guantanamo at some unspecified date in the future.

The base is now more

of a burden than a blessing to the

Navy~;

With respect to the "people ">6 is sues", release

of the eight political prisoners who claim American
citizenship should be assumed as a prerequisite to
any agreement.

We might also get some commitment to

consult on the status of the 800 dYal nationals who

remain in Cuba.

Reunification of families and

visitation rights would probably have to be subjects

for informal discussion at a considerably later stag.e.
As Dave Gantz points out (Tab C), we_ cannot be
certain precisely what Fidel means by "lifting the
blockade".

He might find.himself able to accept

less than a total elimination of our controls if

the rest of the package was attractive and if the
prospects for trade down the road were promising
enough.
SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS
-

7 -

Compensation
We could maL1ta.in so.me t:le.i.r,eni:s of d1e embargo
as leverage, but would probably have to license limited
trade with Cuba to achieve a breakthrough of consequence.
The claims against Cuba have been adjudicated by
the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (The total
is almost $1.8 million; claims amounting to $3.3
billion were filed.)
final;

The Commission's findings are

the law makes no provision for appeal or any

other method of re-opening adjudicated claims.

The recent Czechoslovakia case is an instructive
example of how the Congress can be expected to approach
the Cuban problem.

We reached agreement with the Czechs

to settle for approximately 42 cents on the adjudicated

dollar.

Strong opposition developed in the Senate

Finance Committee from Senators Long and Gravel who

objected to anything less than 100 cents --- and who
asked Bob Ingersoll specifically if the Department
looked on the Czech agreement as any kind of precedent
for the Cuba claims.

Finally, Gravel

successfull~

amended the Trade Reform Act to scuttle the agreement

Czech
~
by stipulating full/payment of-principle (a.RC not
interest) as

condition precedent for extension

of MFM and access to Ex-Im.

p:32F.ET /UOI:: S

SECRET/NODIS
-

8 -

The working papRr at

~a~

ou~lines

Cuban positicr: at;.:iir_st co:npe::isatio:..1 but.

the professed
Gf1e~u.lates

that

the regime must realize how important it is to settle

the claims issue if Cuba is to derive significant
benefits from the resumption of bilateral relations.
Such a realization may dawn in time but Castro will
)

take some convincing.

We can, in any case, expect

Cuban counter-claims to compensation for damages done

by the "blockade", "CIA raids" and the like.

No other

reasonable prospect than the most protracted and

difficult negotiations is evident -- and 100 cents
on the dollar is inconceivable.
Conclusion
If there is benefit to us in an end to the state .~.._,
of "perpetual antagonism" it lies in getting Cuba off

i)

the domestic and inter-American agendas -- in extracting

-')

the symbolism from an intrinsically

:)

trivi~l

~.

issue.

This

paper suggests that the generally accepted scenario for

change would not serve that purpose.
In the real world normalization means diplomatic
relations.

If those relations are to await resolution

of the compensation problem we can look forward to

J

--

<.

'

endless domestic and international debate.

- ..
- ()
'

SECRET/NODIS

(Which

SECRET/NODIS
- 9 of the partiE--s js

IlOX"tS

gui.~ty?

Wh0 sto.r~ted the fight?

Did expropriation lead to aggression, or vice versa?)

Our past practice in all relevant cases has been
to leave the compensation issue for later, as most
recently in the PRC and East German agreements.

(The

Czech negotiations have gone on for almost 30 years;

discussions on claims with the Soviets were suspended
before World War II and have never been resumed.}
Once the OAS sanctions are lifted we could reasonably
argue that Cuba merits neither more nor less than the
precedents establish.
The magnitude of the Cuba claims and the emotions
at play would, however, require a clear Cuban commitment to compensation negotiations.

Castro's political

interest in claiming against us should permit a formulation along the lines of the East German agreement
by which either side is entitled to raise the questions
of interest to it (Tab C}.

Moreover, a number of in-

ducements for a genuine Cuban effort toward resolution

would remain, including access to some forms of USG
credit, an! end to limited export.controls and, most
critically, protection against attachment of Cuban
trade goods in this country.
SECRET/NODIS
:.:.

> ~.

.:!~.

SECRET/NODIS
- 10 -

The ini::.ia: burgc..tin t11ei1 wuu1.d lo.,F.

scm~thing

like this:
(1)

The

U~S.

would lift all third-country

shipping and subsidiary controls1

(2).

The U.S. would permit licensed direct

exports of a limited nature, maintaining at a

minimum restrictions on technology, strategic
materials, bank financing, and the freeze on Cuban
assets now held in this country.
(3)

The U.S. would agree to discuss the status

of Guantanamo at some time in the future.

(4)

Cuba would agree to joint commitments on

non-intervention and pacific

(5)

intentions~

Cuba would agree to negotiate the

settlement of claims; and

(6)

Both sides would agree to establish

diplomatic and consular relations.

As unilateral actions we would eliminate travel
controls and the Cubans would release the eight
political prisoners with a claim to U.S.

citizenshi~.

Castro has much the best of this bargain, but he

holds most of the cards.

Over the longer term,

normalization may not prove so pleasant for him

as the end of isolation produces its inevitable
pressures.

SECRET/NODIS
- 11 -

Tab B - .. Castro Interview

Tab C - Gantz Memorandum
Tab D - Working Paper on Compensation of Claims
Tab E - Cuba Check List

ARA:HWSh~an:mph
3/27/75

SECRET/NODIS

.
~~;:;

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..

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.fJ ... -

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

....

SECRET/~*!9e -- "-~ :1 . .. ..

. ..
'.

. "
l

Participants:

u. s . :

Deputy Under Secretary for

Lawrence S. Eaglebur~er

..

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs

William D. Rogers
Wesley
Cuba :

w.

Egan (notetaker)

First Secretary of the Cuban Mission to the

United Nations, Nestor Garcia
Mr. Sanchez Parodi

Date, Time,
Place:

July 9, 1975, 1:30 p.m. to 4: 30 p.m.

Pierre Hotel, New York City.
Prior to the official discussions Mr. Eagleburger
mentioned that if Cuba thought it was appropriate,
the Secretary would consider meeting with a senior
official in New York during the upcoming UNGA
session . The Cubans res-p onded that they would
take the suggestion back and both sides were
clear that such a meeting did not preclude further
discussions at the working level. They were close
to enchanted that the Secretary would consider
coming into the picture.

CL~~ <"t -r, ,

L"J "'v ~

Assistant Secretary Rogers began the substantive

discussion with a presentation based on the talking
points prepared beforehand. He noted that the
process of discussion must be reciprocal, that we
recognized the recent gestures made by Cuba, and
that we were prepared to allow the baseball visit
and to support movement at San Jose. He noted that
hostility is not a permanent feature of our nature
and that these talks should examine a number of
issues. He then touched on the nine points (talking
points attached) as follows:

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SECRET I

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(a) Clair.ts against Cuba: These are im;>0rtant.

We are prepared to discuss conpensation ror
expropriated private ~-S property realistically
and wit!:! _flexi!::>ility. We do not insist on an
imrnedia te cash set tlenen t. Furt':-,er discussions
should also consider donpensation for our
interests in the Nicaro Nickel ~ine, the return
of outstanding ranso::i payments, the Cuban postal
debt and the issue of defaulted bonds.
(b) Cuban Clains to Blocked Assets in the U.S.:
These also should be discussed.
(c) Third Country Subsidiaries: We are prepared
to support a resolution at San Jose which would
leave each state free to determine its own
. diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba. If
such a resolution should pass, we will eliminate
current U.S. prohibitions ~hich apply to export
sales to Cuba of.goods manufactu:?:ed by U.S.
corporations in third countries.

(d) Third Country Shipping: If the OAS sanctions

are lifted, we will consider a general waiver of
the ban on foreign assistance to countries whose
vessels serve Cuba;
(e) U.S. Prisoners: Ne would hope that the eight
U.S. citizens now held in Cuba on charges of
political offenses would be released.
(f) AmCits: We would hope that
requests from the ap?roxir.ately
in Cuba (:'.'!any considered by the
to be Cuban citi:ensJ to return

Cuba could consider

800 U.S. citizens
Cuban authorities
to the United States.

(g) Family Visits: We should consider steps to ease

the strain on divided far::ilies. For exar.iple, the
two sides r:iight arrange 100 visits per week in
each direction. '.:e will begin to permit the travel
of U.S. artists and scholars to Cuba.
(h) Mutual ~espect: We do not deny Cuba the right to
defenC:: its own sovereignty but will ass\lr.\e during our
::..
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SECRET /SE~;/effrv:.:
7
~

discussions, and will verify, that .Cuba will not be

a.base for offensive ~ilitary operations or threats
against the United States. Puerto Rico is also
iir.portant. And there ~ust be an appropriate way
for Cuba to show that it will abide by the principle
of mutual respect toward other nations in the henisphere.
(i) Press: We suggest it would be appropriate to
consider press accreditation in Washington for
prensa Libre" and in Havana for U.S. wire services
and news l!ledia.
P'ollo-.ring ,\ssistant Secretary Ro:rers' initial present:ation, the following discussions.took place:
I have covered a nu"1ber of issues which illustrate
the cor:iplzxi ty of the problem \\e face, but I do not

menn to inply

~~at

this is the extent of the issues

bctwee::i. us.
It is, however, an outline of a number
of problc:ris v.nd it mi 9h t be ap?ropr ia te ~lia t we

connidor the::1 during this n:ceting. We are at your .

s0rvice regarding t.~e possibility of another meeting
11na would hope that we might pursue these discuusions
a:i informally ao possible.
(to

?~rodi) N'hcn we l.;i.st talked,

th~t before relations

we did not miss

between 'i::he Unitod
States and Cub.3. can be nor.nalized the U.. s. embargo
h&d to be rc::1oved. I said at the tine that that

tho point

CO\.~ld

t-2

p,~rt

of the! proccnSJ 0 norr:i.alizing rela- -

tions botw<!en our two countries but that you could

not ciq::>-:x=t u5 to sir..ply wipe it away. As Mr. Rogers
has indicated, we are prepared to take steps as
part of that process of mutual accorr.:nodation. !
also said that in all honesty this was not our most
i~portant foreign policy issue and that we must keep
in r:iincl. oux:- o..m do:::-.estic problc.-ns. The process of
non:i3lization must be a balanced one. In a domestic
cenae the process will not be easy for us. However,
ll balanced appro.;.ch of mutual acco=odation ;1ill
lllollko the process easier.
Pnrooi:

t;e &lso have 501:1e things to <.:.ay.

into account our previous talks.

You have taken

As you will recall

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- 4 -

from our last note, we see the United States

attitude towards this process as positive and
we welcome the opportunity to dis~uss bilateral
relations and specific issues. We agree that
something can be done and that there 1s no
virtue in maintaining the status quo.
But we
believe th.:it the process of norr.:.:ilization will
be difficult. There are many.issues involved
and your ell'.bargo against us does not permit us
to negotiate pending issues. Even so, we
believe your attitude regardinq the OAS and
the upcoming meeting in San Jo~e is positive
and will contribute to the process of no=nlizing
relations between our two countries, but that it
is only a partial solution and is not essential
to the blockade. We cannot negotiate under the
blockade. We aie willing to discuss icsues
related to easing the block-:i.de but until tha
embargo is lifted, Cuba and the United States
cannot deal with each other as equals a.."!d consequently cannot negotiate.
Eagleburqer:

Do I understand you are making a distinction

between discussions and n~gotiations?

Parodi:

Yes.

To negotiate is to come to aoreements and

to make CO!'lpromises.
Before that ~an be done, we
must be in a position to deal with each othsr as
equals.
The blockade is a punitive act and wo
are the victims. It is in a way similar to tho
Arab blockade of the U:-iited States on oil.
But
we are blockaded on all items, which makes negotiations impossible.
We believe that something should
be done about it.
We are willing to hold discussions in the future but discussions do not conotituto
an essential solution to the blockade.
Thing~ have
advanced but it is difficult for us to reciprocate.
We do not have a political policy that can be undone.
There are few things in which we can reciprocate.
We have reached a hijacking agreement but tharc arc
no l~ws or regulations which we could eliminate in
a reciprocal way. Maybe there are too many things.
It is very diff iculc for us in terms of our own
internal politics.
We have noted what you have
said and we recognize your own difficulties in
SECRET/Sr: "SI':'I'!E

:.-:..""

dealing with Congress, the President, and

the Trea!'.lury a:-.d Co~erce De?art~c-nts. 1-:e
know it

~ill

be diffic-..i:t.

~~e

beliei/e you

must eliminate your'trade restriction3 wLth

Cuba and not just those restrictions relating

to third country trade with Cuba. But even
if that is done, :nany bilateral issues will
remain.

We do not fully understand the relationship

between the OAS sanctions end the U.S. c~~argo.
The OAS sanctions date fron 1964, but the U.S.
embargo precedes that date. Even r:1ore, tllere
is the Presidential procla.:::-.ation of February
192 which is the basis for your =.!::argo. As
a result of the OAS resolution in the 8th
meeting, Cuba was exoelled. But later the OAS
passed a resoiution ~hich recognized the
"pluro.lity of ideologies" which essentially
meant that t!'!ere should be no incorr.patability
between differing ideologies in the American
system. From that point on, the rationale
behind the Presidential embargo was no longer
relative. Conse-quently we do not undcrstnnd
the linkage between the o,\S sanctio.ns of 1954
and the U.S. embargo. \'le know thil.t the policy
of isolating Cuba was established by President
Kennedy in 1960. The OAS sanctions fol!cwed
that. There is no juridical linkage between theOAS sanctions and your own embargo.
Nhy i!J a
San Jose resolution necessary? The blockade does
not benefit Cuba or the United States. There
are meny areas in which we cannot rr:al:e progress
because of the blockade. No one gains. Alno, we
see a contradiction in your efforts to find a
formula for lifting the OAS sanction while
maintaining your e:nbargo. I think we understand
each other's internal problems. We are willing to
try to find a way to understand each other on tho
embargo issue but nust repeat that something must
be done to essentially ease the blockade. We do
not insist that all the measures be dropped. We
are willing to contribute to the process of

SECRETfSJ~TIVr:

"'

'rS;1iibL"'A+ rrers:

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6

SECRE7/s:::; :-r:E
-

6 -

normalization. We are not intransigent. That

is, after all, why we are here. But as long as
a ba~ic inequality exists between the ~nited
States and Cuba as a result of the blcckade. it
is very difficult to negotiate. We want to na%e
this very clear. Further::iore, we have some do1,1bts
~ut San Jose.
It is not, after all, a' meeting
of the Permanent Council. So how can they deal
with sanctions?
Rogers:

--

We contemplate that if enough states at San Jose

are prepared to vote for a resolution which would
allow each state to determine its own diplomatic
and trade negotiato~s with Cuba, we will convoke
the Organ of Conciliation.

Parodi:

Ah, but it will take some time for this to happen.

Rogers:

But .we can convene the Orgah of Conciliation and

cncict the resolution to leave each stD.te free to
act as it will.

Eagleburger:

(to Rogers)

Rogers:

No (laughter). But the basic question is will

there be enough votes at San Jose.
(to Parodi)
Fidel must not spill this to Congress.

Parodi:

Is a two-thirds vote required?

Eagleburger:

Yes.

Rogers:

When the TIAR is ratified the Organ of Conciliation

will in effect repeal the 1964 re~olution.

Parodi:

Will it repeal what the 8th OAS

leave it in effect legally?

Rogers:

No. It will be repealed in fact. All are very

clear that it will overrule the 1964 resolution.
On another aspect, however, you talked of linkage.
Our view is that although we did not need the OAS
resolution to enact the embargo since -- it is
within our sovereign power to start or stop trade
the 1964 OAS resolution in fact required, in our
view, that each country elininatc their trade

Did you think that up?

~eeting

said but

---~-I

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-.

SECRET/SE~

TIVE

--7 -

relations with Cuba.

Therefore, we are not in

. a position to start them U? again unilaterally.

Eaqleburqer:

To add another point,, I have 1-mrked with

Secretary Kissinger closely on the ~liddle East
and am impressed by the fact that in terns of
the Arab-Israeli conflict there is after.25
years ~f extr~~e hostility no way to solve the
entire problem all at once.
It must be a step
by step approach; Over time relations begin
to change.
The Secretary has had some success
in this regard.
I have also been i.rnpressed by
what I feel to be Israel's excessively legalistic
approach to the problems at hand which makes
progress towa.+ds the resolution of those issues
all the more difficult. Given the range of issues
between us and our intention to cr,ange the status
of our relations, a step by step approach would
help do that.
If too much at~ention is paid to
specific legal problems, the entire process of
normalization will be disrupted.
I could have
used U.S. claims on Cuba as such an issue and
could have insisted that that issue be resolved
between us first before any other progress was
possible. All this is a very personal view.
If
our two sides are-intent on changing the nature
of our relationship, we can learn a great deal
from the Middle East. The difficulties in the
Middle East are immense but if you look at the
status of the relationship between the Arabs and
the Israelis in October 1973 you will see there
has been a remarkable change. They were prepared
to talk issues.

Parodi:

But that is more or less what we

going this very way. But one of
process is to lift the embargo.
steps and the pace at which they
different from ours.

Rogers:

We're not saying.that we must each take each step

at the same time.
The point is that discussions
are helpful as to how to arrange these steps
SECRET SE:-lS ITI'lE

think.
Ne are
the steps in the
But maybe your.
can be taken arc

/.

"

SECRET/S"':,;:, IT IVE

- 8 -

sequentially. We have already taken sor:ie

and may take some more.
Parodi:

We agree the problen is very co:::?lex. It is

difficult even when you have the saI:'le point of
view. We can:1ot solve all of these prob1e::1s in
two hours. ~aybe we talk a bit more. We are
willing to talk and as an expression of that we
will exchange our poi:its of view. What are our
clair:is, our issues, our outstanding issues. etc.
In other words, we agree to discuss.

Rogers:

The effort is to work out a seauence which will

take both our points of view into consideration.

.Eaaleburger:

Parodi:

We would pref er that these discussions proceed

in forums like this today and not through U.S.
Congressmen.
We will let you know all. We have something to
say on each of the nine points you raised and
on some others.

We agree that the issue of compensation must be

discussed and that
formula be worked out but
not only fron one side because we, too, have
claims against the United States so let's discuss
claims in general.

With respect to Commerce, we view that as part of

the embargo problem. How can we discuss trade in
light of the embargo? It is academic. There are
also bilateral issues on trade. But before this,
is the issue of the blockade. So it is academic.
ihere is the problen of shipping. This is part
of what we call the essential lifting of the
blockade. We agree that the question of U.S.
political prisoners in Cuba can be discussed and
that something can be done. This is not a very
difficult issue.
There are different legal points of view on the
question of Americans in Cuba. We cannot accept
SECRET/SE' ITIVE

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SECRE.T /SE!':91frvE.

/
-

9 -

the concept of dual citizenship.

~aybe some
do have a real right to' United States citizenship.
of course have the same problem with
other countries.
We arranged this issue with
Spain through discussions and the issue was
much more complex in that case.
On the guestion
of visits to Cuba, this is mainly related to our
own internal policy.
But we could work out a
common immigration policy on fa.nily visits in
both directions.
There are many ;:egulations which
apply to U.S. trips to Cuba and vice versa but

something could be worked out. Maybe 100 per

week, but I don't know.

We

The question of the mutuality of respect has to

be discussed from both perspectives.
We do not
have and are not a military power and are no
threat to the United States by ourselves.
I
assume that some of the issues you have raised are
related to our arrangement with the soviet Union.
These are decisions relating to our own internal
defense and we will always reserve our right to
take those measures we find convenient.
Our
policy has never been to promote aggression
abroad.
All of our de:ense measures are based
on the needs of our own national security and we
will take measures to defend our national security.
During the Cuban missile crisis our actions were
related to the assu.~ption that U.S. aggression
against Cuba was imminent.
If, now, U.S. aggression is not im.'Tiinen t, we have no need to do what
we did then.
We have stated often that we are willing to have
reciprocal respect for the principle of nonintervention.
We will abide by b'1at principle
as we have with those that respect it toward us~
Reciprocity is growing steadily. These are
relations of mutual benefit. We have held.talks
with all of those that voted at Quito to lift the
.OAS sanctions against Cuba as part of a process of
normalizing our relations.
But in this context we
must discuss U.S. attitudes toward other countries
in the hemis~here.
For exam?le, Chile and the
Dominican Recublic.
We must have assurances that
.what has happened in the past will not happen again.
/'

SECRET /S ;/;s IT rr:::

I

1;

Eagleburger:

You nean that this issue should be discussed

between us?
I

Parodi:

Yes. There is also the question of Puerto Rico.

Our position on this issue is not desioned to
cause problens for the United States. -The
history and the struggles of Cuba and Pu~rto
Rico are very closely related. The essential
difference is that we won our struggle for
independence and the Puerto Ricans did not.
It must be recognized that we believe Puerto
Rico is a distinct and independent nationality.
Puerto Rico is in fact a colonial matter. This
explains our attitude in the UN. We believe
that Puerto Rico has a need for independence
and self-determination.
But, again, our position
is not designed to create disturbance with the
United States. Our attitude would be the same
toward any such cnse. We do not believe that the
current situation in Puerto Rico is a reflection
of the will of the people of Puerto Rico. The
Puerto Rican problem is a colonial problem.
There is also the question of CIA activities
against Cuba launched from !liami, Nicaragua, and
Costa Rica.

Eu:ileburqcr:

Is.this to be an agenda item?

Parodi:

Yes. And it must be considered under the heading

of the "mutuality of respect." The same applies
to the Guantanano issue.
With respect to the points you made regarding
press accreditation, this would be convenient to
discuss.
We would nlso at this point like to go back to
the questio~ of Congressmen. We do not'believe
that our discussions with Ar:lerican Congressmen
are a substitute for discussions with the

executive. But Many of your representatives

want to go to Cuba, write us letters, ask
qUestions and we feel constrained to respond.
But clearly it is no substitute
. SECRET/. E::s I':'IVE

- i1Rogers:

Did we mislead you in our discussion of

Congressional contacts? Did you think. we
were disturbed?

Parodi:

We needed some clarification.

Eagleburger:

We have no objection to Congressional visits to

.
Cuba.
Our only purpose
is to make it' clear that
it is our belief that the process of normalization
be developed in this forum.

Garcia:

think we understand the problems on this issue.

Parodi:

Sometimes your Congressmen give us a lot of

trouble too.

Eagleburger:

.Ros-ers:

To negotiate with Congress is an impossible task

Parodi:

---~------------.

--

know.

But we have to live with it every day.

It is extremely useful to have clari.f ied this

point. There is no use in taking side roads.
I
would like to sum up our principal points.
(1) The
blockade must be essentially lifted.
The provisions
which prohibit trade with Cuba must be lifted and
this i~cludes the trade of third countries with
Cuba.
The embargomust be removed so that Cuba and
the United States may deal with each other as equals.
(2) Meantime we are willing to ~ontinue.discussions
like this.
(3) If a resolution is passed. at San
Jose which perrni ts each state to determine its ovm
trade and diplomatic relations with Cuba, what
follows that will be very important.
But that
resolution will not solve the essential blockade
issue. The step by step process toward normalizing
.relations between the United States is not, in our
opinion, the best way to proceed but we will not
object to it.
(4) We are willing to discuss other
things and exchange our points of view. We will
have a discreet attitude regarding the results of
the San Jose meeting and would not use the resolution as a pretext to attack the United States since
there is sor:ie good in that nove
( 5) When Cuba and
the United States can deal with each other as

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- 12 equals, we can exchange vie~s and ty to

find a way of improving relations, but again
wemust insist on the 'necessity of lifting
the blo~kade and I repeat that the events
which follow the San Jose neeting are \ery
important.
(6) Ne are willing to neet again
whenever or wherever it is possible. l'ie can
do it anywhere. Would : , .l like to fix a date
for our next meeting now or would you prefer
to wait?
Eagleburger:

I don't think 1.;e should fix a date today.

Let's
think about our discussions and then come to a
decision.

Rogers:

Let's talk about a future date sometime next week.

Parodi:

This has been a very good exercise.

Rogers:

Parodi:

.. '.

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think it allows us to discuss what we can discuss.

It is an extremely complex issue, but isolation is

.. never useful. There are many di ff icul ties that
remain before official relations between our two
countries but weare willing to discuss our
differences.

Rogers:

I agree.
We feel the same way. We understand
your position regarding the blockade.

Eagleburger:

A total lifting of the blockade is not necessary?

Pttrodi:

That is correct but the essential elenents must go.

For our part, we can define that as the lifting
or removal of all the regulations such as those of
the Department of the Treasury and of Cormr.erce that
prohibit trade.

Eagleburger:

Including those that apply to third countries?

Parodi:

Yes.

Eagleburger:

Are you drawing a distinction between actions by

Congress and actions by the executive branch?
, SECRET/ c,:lSITIVE

..........--

'
- 13 -

' .

Parodi:

Yes.

Rogers:

The executive branch can do alr.ost all of it

regarding Treasury and Cor:-r.ierce. The waiver
is by statute but the executive branch cannot
move on the issue of ~hird country trade with
Cuba of manufact'.ired goods. We r.oust go to
Congress on that one: Last year we got the
waiver on shipping and now have that authority
in the executive.branch and virtually everything else.

... '

.,.;.

: :;;..... .v

Parodi:

We do not want to get into minor details.

Eagleburger:

That explains the importance you attach to the

word essential.

Parodi:

We wanted to define what we mean by blockade.

Rogers:

There are sor.ie special technical problems that

we need not get into. We took to heart what
the Prir.ie Minister said on food and medicine and
we have noted the stat~~ent on the. blockade.

Parodi:

The Prir.ie Minister has said that he considers your

attitude very positive and helpful. It does not,
however, solve all the problems.
We also understand that our steps after San Jose
don't necessarily solve the whole problem.

EagJ.eburger:

Exchanges are very useful.

Parodi:

Is it possible to get a two-thirds vote at San

Rogers:

Yes.

Eagleburger:

Who will oppose?

Rogers:

Paraguay, Uruguay, and Chile. Bolivia, Brazil -they're marginal. They abstained 'the last time.
(to Parodi) I realize it is difficult for Havana to
understand that we don't control all the votes in
the OAS.

Eagleburqer:

Is there anything else we need to go over?

Jose~

It think there is a good chance.

,/

SECRET /,5,6sI'!'IVE

...
SECREyfuSI':'I\'E

. / - 14 - Rogers:

Let's be in touch within the next week.

If
we do not have a reaction from Secretary
Kissinger to these discussions before he
returns, it will be later in the week before
we talk with you.

Parodi:

That's fine.
fact, it doesn't matter that
much because we've lost all of our corr.munications with Havana.

Rogers:

All of them?

Parodi:

We've had nothing for the last three days.

Eagleburger:

Would you like to use ours? (laughter) '

In

You mean you have nothing?


THE WHITE HOUSE:

..
...~
~

WASHIHOT,ON .

March 15, 1977

Presldenttal DlTcctlvc/NSC-6

------------------------------The Vice President

The Secretary o! Stntc
Tho Secretary of Defense
ALSO:

~c Secretary o{ the Treasury

The Attorney Ci~~eral
The Sec:-~tary ot~co.mmerc~
The -Utlitf:d States Ropresentatlye to
the V~ited N~tions
'the Director o! Central Intelllgence

=,,
.: .. . ... i ...

. SUBJECT,

...

<

...,

..

...

..

' After revle.WJnS the i'csulis o! the mc;tblg o! ihe Polley Rc,.1.cw
.. . .
CommlttcO held onJVednosday, March 9; 19'n,.. to discuss U.S. po!ic::y .~:'f
to Cub& I have~_concludedthat_we should attempt to achieve norrila.1- ., ~
1zat1on _of ou1. r(!_lat1~s with Cuba. .
.
e

:_

To this end. we . should begin .direct and conftde_ntlal talks ln _a . :

meaaure_d'iind care!ul-42.shion with representatives o! the oovcrnmanto(C~ba:.. Our_.obj~~tive 1.~ to aat.1n.niot1~~ ~ proc~sa which
_wlll lead .io.the ra~stabllahment o! d~plomatlc retatlop between the
UnltC!d State1~nd cu~ and which will -advance tlia-.lntercsts 0 the
U~ltctfStat~s-. with respect to:

.Combating terrorism;

--

Huniari rights;

--

Cubaf8 lorefgn intervention:

Compensation !or American expropriated property; and

--

;_ nccuction of the Cuban rclationsh5p {pollHcal and military) with

tho Sovlct Union.

DF

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Tho laaue1 we should raise ln the c,._-ploratory tniks include: nshcrlcs

and marltlma boundaries; the anti-hijncklnc agreement; human rights
conditions ln Cuba (including release of American citizens in Cuban
jalla,., vl&ltatlon rlshts, and emigration l"ichta); C~ba' s external activi!lcs
Jn Angola and elsewhere; Cuba 1 s ~ctivitics with regn.:-d to p~,1erto Rico;
sports, cultural a.nd scientific/technical exchanr:es; compensation !or
American property which was expropriated by tho Cuban Governrne~:;
the posslblllty o! tracle relations: and the establishment of an American
Interest Sec~lon ln the Swiss Embo.~sy.

. i.

To lmpiement this- new policy and to negottate ln pursuit o! these

objectlveo, the Secretary o! State shoul'".1 designate officials to begi:n
exploratory talks with Cuba wit~. the intention that they will lead to
: 1.
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appropriate, r~ciproca.l and ~equo~tlal steps looking_ toward normallzatlon 0 relations behyeen our
cou;itries. Following an exploratory ... -~(~
round o! dtscusslonz, the Na.tl~nal Security Co\.mcU should m:>.ke
>~
z-ecom.manda.tions to me on how we should proceed..

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The Sacx-.diary o! State should insure thnt the NATO Governme:its,_

J'apan and various .Latin American Governments are informed of U.S.
lnltle.tlves toward Cuba, ~as appJ;opriate.

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The Attorney Ciencral should take all necessary step~ permitted by

law to prevent terrorist or any Jllega.1 actions launched from within
the United States against Cuba. and agaihst U.S. citizens and to
. &pPrehend and prosecute perpetrators 01. such actions

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UWSSIREO

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