Public Participation in Environmental Assessment:

Case Studies on EA Legislation and Practice*

John F. Devlin,
Nonita T. Yap, and
Robert Weir
ABSTRACT - The practice of environmental assessment (EA) has grown since the late 1960s and is now institutionalized in more than 100 countries. This paper reports on a comparative analysis of EA legislation and regulations in 27 countries and 4 regional development banks and on a reviav of 17EAprocesses in 6 developing countries.
Some degree of public participation is now required in most of the legislation examined although to quite different
degrees. Analysts suggest thatpublic participation in EA can improve the quality of information provided during
project approval processes but the literature also suggests that EA has been less successful in establishing improved
terrns and conditions for project approval. The 17 case studies of EA processes provide additional empirical evidence
for assessing the effectiveness of public participation in practice. The majority of case studies supports the generalizations found in the literature thatpublic participation to date does not avoid irreversible environmental change or
ensure that those on the margins of decision-making will have their concerns addressed in the project design and
approval process. But there are some examples of success. The paper describes cases in the Philippines, Brazil, and
South Africa, where public participation in EA has led to the abandonment of largeprojects.

RESUME -Lapratique de l'kvaluation environnementale (EE) apris de l'expansion depuis la fin des annkes 1960;
elle est maintenant institutionnaliske dans plus de 100pays. L'articleprksente une analyse comparative des lois et
rkglements touchant I'EE adoptks par 27pays et 4 banques de dkveloppement rkgional. I1 passe en revue 17processus
d'EE dans 6pays en dkveloppement. La plupart des lois exarninkes exigent une certaineparticipation du public, mais
d des degrks t r b variables. D'aprks les analystes, cette participation peut amkliorer la qualitk des informations
disponibles durant leprocessus d'approbation desprojets. Les kcrits sur la question signalent toutefois que I'EE a
remportk moins de succks en ce qui concerne l'amklioration des conditions exigkespour approuver lesprojets. Les 17
processus d'EE ktudiks fournissent d'autres donnkes empiriques a j n d'kvaluer, dans la pratique, l'efficacitk de la
participation du public. La majoritk des etudes de cas conjrment les gknkralisations mises de l'avant dans les krits :
cette participation n b pas permis, jusqu'ici, d'kviter des changements environnementaux irrkversibles ni de garantir que l'on tiendra compte des inquiktudes des gens en marge de laprise de dkcisions lors desprocessus de conception
et d'approbation des projets. I1 y a toutefois des exemples de succks. Lhrticle dkcrit ainsi des cas aux Philippines, au
Brksil et en Afrique du Sud ou la participation d u public d I'EE a menk d l'abandon de vastes projets.

* The legislative reviews and the 17 case studies that were the basis for this paper were investigated under a CIDA
contract. We thank CIDA for allowing us to use the information from these reports. We also wish to thank the three anonymous reviewers whose comments have contributed to a significant recasting of the present paper.
CANADIAN
JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT
STUDIES,
VOLUME XXW,NO 3,2005

DEVLIN, YAP, AND WEIR

Environmental assessment (EA) was first introduced by the National Environmental Policy Act of the
United States in 1969 and its practice has expanded over the past 30 years. EA is now institutionalized
in more than 100 countries. Two broad normative positions have been adopted with respect to the
importance of public participation in the EA process. Technocrats argue that EA involves issues of
environmental and social science and should be an exercise left to experts. Populists argue that EA
is a process of public policy-making and must incorporate effective public participation. The benefits
of public participation in EA have been argued since its inception and the populist vision gained
influence during the 1990s in step with the rise of governance as a public administration and development policy concern. Section I1 offers a review of the place of public participation in EA legislation covering 27 countries and 4 regional development banks. In most cases EA legislation explicitly
includes a requirement for some form of public participation. But the mechanisms by which public
participation has been formally incorporated into EA procedures are diverse and create a qualitative
range of participatory potential. Section 111then addresses the question of the effectiveness of public
participation in actual EA processes. In the literature the effectiveness of public participation in EA
has generally been found to fall short of expectations and our analysis of 17 case studies from 6 countries reinforces these conclusions. But the experiences are mixed and the paper describes in some
detail case studies from the Philippines, Brazil, and South Africa, where public involvement in the EA
process has contributed to the halting of major development projects. Section I introduces the basic
concepts concerning EA and the place of public participation within it.

The benefits of public participation in environmental assessment have been argued by numerous
authors over the last 20 years. Most arguments stress pragmatic and administrative benefits. Public
participation leads to better baseline and impact information and therefore better design of projects
and programs (World Bank 1993; IAIA 2002). The quality of project decisions is improved when
local knowledge and values are included and when expert knowledge is publicly examined
(Parenteau 1988).Public participation enhances the credibility and legitimacy of overall processes of
environmental decision-making, thereby increasing "a community's sense of ownership, commitment or support to a policy or project" (IAIA 2002,9). Such credibility and sense of ownership can
serve to smooth the process of implementation (Canter 1996). Some go further and argue not only
that the public be involved but that the process go beyond legal req~iremer~ts.
In their examination
of the different outcomes of two EA cases involving the U.S. Army, Shepherd and Bowler (1997)
presented evidence that "a proactive, substantive approach to public involvement has benefits over a
reactive, procedural approach (726).
Other advocates speak of the use of public participation to transcend social divisions, controversy, and political conflict (Tobin and Carpenter 1983; Kakonge 1998).This is a pragmatic argument
that blends into more ethical considerations.Robert Chambers (1983, 1997) is among the best known
of those who argue that groups who have little, and who are likely to lose the most from a proposed
intervention, should have influence on the decision-making process. Other writers argue that partic-

1. The literature uses both environmental assessment (EA) and environmental impact assessment (EIA) interchangeably. We have adopted EA in this paper except in quotations and titles where EIA was originally used.

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION I N ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT

489

ipation is a democratic right (Brown 1998, quoted in Johnson and Wilson 2000,1893). It is deemed
the "proper conduct of a democratic government" (Webler et al. 1995, quoted in Cooper and Elliott
2000,342). Indeed, some would dispute the validity of any EA process that does not provide for such
participation (Roberts 1995).
However, not everybody shares the conviction that public participation necessarily leads to better
decisions, particularly regarding matters involving science and technology (Tobin and Carpenter
1983).Jasanoff (1996) argues that "increasing knowledge and increasing participation -in the sense
of larger numbers of voices at the table -do not tell us how to act or how to make good decisions.
Participation and science together often produce irreducible discord and confusion" (65).
Jasanoff cites instances in which open and inclusive decision-malung appeared to produce rather
than reduce disagreements, and made the process messy and the outcomes unpredictable. What is
considered legitimate and desirable in one context, therefore, can be seen as unnecessarily costly,
anarchical, and destabilizing in another. As argued by Webler et al.:

If public participation is to be successful, it has to do more than offer people a fair and competent decision-malung process. It has to effectively cope with the tendency for people to want to
pursue egoistic aims before collective ones, and it has to be responsible for contributingin a positive way to the democratic quality of our societies (1995,quoted in Cooper and Elliott 2000,342).
The tension between the technocrats and the populists is discussed extensively by Yap (1990). The
debate is continuous but in legislative terms the populists appear to be gaining influence.

Two previous studies have compared the place of public participation in EA legislation across countries as part of larger comparative projects on the content of EA legislation. The CEAA-IAIA
(Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency-International Association for Impact Assessment)
study of EA effectiveness (Sadler 1996) found that public participation was being institutionalized in
EA legislation. Lee and George (2000) discovered that although there were provisions for public
participation, the requirements were often cast in general and vague terms. However, neither of these
studies was based on a systematic comparison of public participation provisions. A third study
comparing EA legislation was undertaken by the present authors (CIDA 2003). This study was based
on 31 Environmental Assessment Consistency Analysis Reports (EACAs) examining the level of
congruence between Canadian EA requirements and those in effect in Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA) partner countries and international financial institutions IF IS).^
Thirty-one EACA Reports representing 27 developing countries and 4 regional development
banks were a ~ ~ a l ~ sPublic
e d . ~ participation opportunities were considered in relation to the following
questions.
2. The EACAs compared the EA legislation, regulations, and procedures of these countries with the Canadian
Environmental Assasment Act (section 54[21) and the Projects Outside Canada Regulations. The analysis identifies incongruities
between the foreign legislation and Canadian EA requirements.The purpose is to assist CIDA to address EA coherence issues
during contractual negotiations with partners on the conduct of EA, to develop contractual clauses for project agreements to
limit inconsistencies in EA execution,and to expand its knowledge base on EA capacity in partner countries and institutions.
3. Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, China, Columbia,Costa Rica, Egypt, El Salvador,Ghana, Honduras, India, Malaysia, Mexico,
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Palestinian National Authority (PNA), Philippines, Poland, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania,
Thailand, Uganda, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe, the African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB),
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD),and the Inter-AmericanBank for Development (IABD).

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DEVLIN, YAP, AND WEIR

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Are the decision criteria (i.e., project approval or rejection) made public?
Is there a mechanism for an appeal of the decision?
Is it a requirement that public input be solicited?
If yes, at what stage of the project cycle is public input solicited?
How is the public notified about the project?
What are the mechanisms for public involvement?
What are the provisions for public access to project information?
Is there a requirement that the input from the public be integrated in the EA report?

Less than half of the cases require the final decision criteria for project approval or rejection to be
made public. It is to be made public under certain conditions in some countries; for instance, in Chile
it is made public only to those who participated in the consultation process; in India, if judged to be in
the public interest and requested; in South Africa and Tanzania, only on request. The situation is
ambiguous for Uganda and Vietnam. The case of India is particularly complex. The EA procedure is
administered across many different sector-based government agencies and the decision-making
process is exceedingly fragmented.As a result the lines of accountabilityare blurred, to say the least. In
Chile project activities may proceed before or without approval provided the proponent establishes
environmental liability insurance to compensate for impacts in case of accidents.
The EA legislation and regulations of a significant number of countries and IFIs do not provide
mechanisms for appealing a project decision. Where an appeal is provided for, it is sometimes specified that only the project proponent can appeal (e.g., Egypt, EBRD, IABD). In Brazil the right to
appeal is only implied in some documentation. In the Philippines appeal is allowed for only the
lower level of assessment." In Chile the appeal may be appealed.
The EACA Reports suggest that public input is allowed and solicited in the EA process of most
countries for the highest level of assessment. The singular exception appears to be Vietnam, where
no concrete details are given on public involvement in the EA process. There is, however, significant diversity in terms of when, how, and, in some cases, who can participate in such high-level
assessments.
The public is to be notified early in the planning process in Columbia, Honduras, the PNA, the
Philippines, and Uganda. In Costa Rica, the PNA, the Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Uganda, and
Zimbabwe, input is required to be solicited in all stages of the project cycle, except in the monitoringlfollow-up stage in a few cases. The public is involved at the guidelines stage in Bangladesh, Egypt,
Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Zambia, and by implication in the ADB and El Salvador. In other countries
and IFIs -EBRD, IADB, Chile, Ghana, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Zambia -public consultation is to start during the scoping5process and to continue through to the review of the EA Report.
Public involvement is at the discretion of authorities in Bangladesh and Honduras. The AtDB specifies consultation during scoping only. In many other cases the public is to be involved only after the
EA Report has been prepared. This holds true for Brazil, China, Malaysia, Mexico, Mozambique,
4. Most EA legislations prescribe at least two levels of assessment. The different levels vary in terms of intensity and
factors examined and are designed to reflect differences in scale, complexity,severity of impacts, and, frequently, level of public
interest. Which level applies is generally the decision of the relevant minister. The lower level is known by various names,
including screening and initial eizvironmental examination, and the higher level is called environmental assessment or envimnmental impact assessment. The Canadian federal EA process has four levels: screening, comprehensive study, panel review, and
mediation.
5. "Scoping" refers to the activity in EA that is followed "to identify the attributes of the environment for which there is
concern (public and scientific) and a plan is provided that enables the EIA to be focussed on these attributes" (Kennedy and
Ross 1992,476).

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT

491

Nicaragua, and, upon public request, in Columbia. In India the public can get involved in public
hearings of "very speciallcontroversialprojects that have aroused considerable public interest." In the
ADB, Mexico, and the Philippines, and presumably in the IADB, the public may continue to be
involved in the monitoring and follow-up phase. The mechanism for public notification is not specified except in the Philippines, where "public notice must be conspicuously posted in affected
communities, summarizing the proposed project and that EISIIEE has been submitted for re vie^."^
In most countries and IFIs where public involvement is required, any individual or group can
give their input. India is an exception since only "registered NGOs" and those with "legitimate interest" can participate. Thailand is also an exception. Participation by the public in Thailand is only
through NGO membership in the National Environmental Board, established to review public sector
EAs, or through appointment as NGO representative to the ad hoc Committee of Experts reviewing
private sector projects. The IADB is also an exception since consultation is only with those with
"legitimate interest" and "informed opinion." The protocols of the AfDB, ADB, China, and El
Salvador do not specify who may participate in the EA process. In most of the EA systems where
public input must be solicited, the views of the public are to be integrated or considered in the final
EA Report, or at least appended, for the highest level of assessment.
In 16 of the countries and IFIs reviewed, public involvement can come in the form of written
briefs or interventions at public hearings. In many countries public hearings are required for highlevel assessments but these assessments are at ministerial discretion. In the Philippines, Ghana, and
South Africa intense public concern can trigger a public hearing. In Brazil a public hearing is to be
held when requested by the civil body, by the Public Ministry,or by at least 50 people and the public
hearing must be in a location "accessible to interested parties." In almost all cases the legislation stipulates the right of the public to access project information (either in summary form or complete
project documentation) with a few exceptions. In Colombia access is only granted upon request.
There is no stipulation regarding access in El Salvador and China.
The mechanisms for public access to project information vary They include deposition of project
documents or summaries at registries, documentation centres, and public libraries, municipal
offices, on-site locations, bank offices (local and international), local and international media, and
Web sites. The exceptions are AfDB, China, Colombia, El Salvador, Mozambique, PNA, Sri Lanka,
Thailand, and Zimbabwe, where no such specification is given. Funding for public access to information is rarely described. The exceptions are ADB, EBRD, and the Philippines, where project proponents are to pay for the information provided to the public. IADB and Chile allow user fees to be
charged for access to project information.
In summary, the formal arrangements for environmental assessment vary across the countries
and IFIs reviewed. The EACA Reports suggest that while the EA process allows for some form of
public participation in all cases, less than half of the cases require the criteria for project approval to
be made public and only half allow appeals. With one exception public input is allowed and solicited
in the EA process for the highest level of assessment but the holding of public hearings remains a
decision made by political leaders. There are wide differences in the timing and the mechanisms for
public notification and consultation. In nearly half of the cases, public input is to be solicited
throughout the entire project cycle, including scoping. With the rest, public involvement starts only
after the EA Report has been submitted. In all but three countries and institutions the participation
process is open to individuals and groups.

6.

The EIS is the Environmental Impact Statement and the IEE is the Initial Environmental Evaluation.

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DEVLIN, YAP, AND WEIR

The review suggests that some degree of public participation appears to be possible in most
countries. It can then be asked: When public participation is allowed by law, how effective is it in
practice? The next section considers the literature and some specific cases.

A. The Quality of Public Participation in Environmental Decision-Making

Several reviews of EA in different countries (Monosowski 1990; Sadler 1996; Kruger et al. 1997; Lee
and George 2000; Glasson and Salvador 2000; Gibson 2002; Sinclair and Fitzpatrick 2002) suggest
that even where public participation in EA is embodied in legislation it frequently falls short in practi~e.~
A crucial factor that affects the quality of participation is the unequal resources available among
the different "publics" in terms of time, access to information, and political power (Sinclair and
Diduck 2000). Project "momentum" is also a major barrier. Project proponents invest considerable
time and money in preparing studies, lobbying decision-makers, and clearing regulatory hurdles.
Proponents seek quick decision processes and are not likely to be interested in debating alternative
uses of a proposed site or alternative technologies (CIDA 2000). The uneven level of technical
expertise is another factor affecting the quality of participation (Palerm 1999).In addition, attitudes
toward the importance of social impacts vary significantlyamong project publics. Some believe that
social impacts are common sense and hence there is no need for public consultation about them.
Others believe that social impacts cannot be measured and therefore should be ignored. Finally, there
are those who assert that the discussion of social impacts emphasizes only the costs and not the
benefits of a project and therefore tends to slow down or stop development (Evaldice,Arguelles, and
Fearnside 2000).
It is clear from the literature that in practice, public participation can range along a continuum of
involvement. "Full" participation implies that the public is involved in the definition of the problem
to be addressed or the project to be approved and in the subsequent implementation of the intervention approved (Arnstein 1969; Johnson and Wilson 2000; CIDA 2002), but public participation may
fall short of this ideal. The public can be consulted in a variety of ways while the decisions concerning the intervention are made elsewhere or the public can be invited to participate after the principal
decisions have already been made. Large-scale projects involve complex conflicts among environmental sustainability, financial returns, national development strategies, and the security of local
livelihoods. Effective public participation is unavoidably tempered by differences in power along
financial, organizational, and ideational dimensions. Even when public hearings are held they may
not result in significant changes in project design.

B. Case Studies
In 2003, as a follow-up to our analysis of EA legislation, we reviewed secondary literature on 17
cases of EA practice in the Philippines, China, Ghana, South Africa, Brazil, and Chile (CIDA

7. Indeed the Canadian EA process still excludes social impacts, and public participation in screening remains discretionary. This is not trivial because screenings constitute 99%of the 25,000 assessments conducted under the federal process
since the Act came into force in 1995 (Sinclair and Fitzpatrick 2002). In comprehensive studies, public participation is only
mandatory at the point the comprehensive study report is submitted, unless a hearing is called by the minister.

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION I N ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT

493

2003).~Our review confirms the findings of the studies cited above. There were mixed outcomes in
terms of community empowerment and redistribution of development benefits. Because of the
intervention of advocacy groups, environmental conditions were sometimes attached to operating
permits and licences. However, in most cases public participation in the EA was not sufficient to
lead to the rejection of projects that clearly would cause irreversible ecological and human
impacts. Nor did it force a serious examination of alternative, less impact-intensive development
directions. There were, however, three striking examples where public participation led to the
abandonment of large projects.
1. Philippines: The Bolinao Cement Complex
In 1993 an international consortium led by a Taiwanese multinational corporation announced its
plan to build the world's biggest cement factory in the middle of the coral reef-covered shoreline of
Bolinao along the Lingayen Gulf in the northern Philippines. The proposed cement complex, to cost
US$ 525 million, included a quarry, a power plant, and a wharf. The project was attractive to the
national government. The cement complex was an opportunity to develop an area with no major
industries and where a majority of the population depended on small-scale fishing and farming and
lived close to the poverty line. But the proposal triggered a broad-based opposition. The 200km2
coral reef complex is the most valuable asset of the coastal communities. One-third of its 30 villages
and 50,000 people depend on fishing for a living. More than 350 species of vertebrates, invertebrates,
and plants are harvested every year from the reefs. The coral reef complex is the spawning ground for
90% of the fish catch. Lingayen Gulf is listed as an "environmentally critical arean9under the EA
regulation.
The debate revolved around the presumed economic benefits of the project and whether or not
these benefits would offset the environmental damage expected from the extraction of limestone, the
sulphur dioxide emissions from the power plant, the carbon dioxide, and the particulate emissions
from the cement plant and the alkaline wastewaters. The proponents claimed that the complex would
use the most advanced, most efficient, and cleanest cement manufacturing technologies. The 700
anticipated jobs were seen as a better livelihood base than the rice fields, orchards, and small-scale
fishing activities. The EA consultants engaged by the proponent organized an EA training workshop
to explain the EA process to the community and to encourage their participation in the process. They
also employed a community development specialist who conducted several scoping sessions. After
the EA was completed three validation sessions were held to inform the community of the results.
The project was supported by the local municipal government, the provincial council, teachers,
and an association of Bolinao fishermen and fish dealers. The project was challenged by the
Movement of Bolinao Concerned Citizens (MBCC) with support from researchers at the Marine
Science Institute of the University of the Philippines. The Movement was in effect an offshoot of
community visioning, education, and the mobilization program of the Community-based Coastal

8. From the Philippines we examined the Bicol River Basin Development, the San Roque Multipurpose Project, and the
Bolinao Cement Complex; from Brazil, the Tucurui 1 Dam, the Paulinia Pipeline Link, and the Pilar Dam; from Chile, the Rio
Condor Project, the Ralco Dam, the Cascada Chile Project, and the Alumysa Smelter Project; from Ghana, the Land
Administration Project and the Bui Hydroelectric Project; from South Africa, the St. Lucia sand dune mining project, the
Coega Industrial Development Zone project, and the KwaZulu-Natal Transmission Grid project; from China, the Xiaolangdi
Multipurpose Dam project and the Lancang-Mekong River navigation channel improvement project.
9. "Environmentally critical areas" (ECAs) under the Philippine EA legislation are areas considered environmentally
sensitive. Any projects in ECAs are required to undergo a full Environmental Impact Assessment (Republic of the Philippines
1981).

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DEVLIN, YAP,

AND WEIR

Resources Management Project, funded by Canada's International Development Research Centre

from 1993 to 1998 (Talaue-McManuset al. 1998).Position letters opposing the project were sent to
President Fidel Ramos, other government officials in the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, and the Environmental Management Bureau. A public information and mobilization
campaign was launched - including protest marches in Metro Manila - that lasted nearly four
years. Financial contributions to the cause came from Bolinaoan professionals in Metro Manila and
the United States. The MBCC also sought support from marine scientists around the world.
Overall the Philippine EA process provided for a high level of public participation. Public input
was solicited in all stages of the project cycle and intense public concern triggered a public hearing.
The most unusual and innovative feature of the Philippine EA system was the requirement that the
project proponent provide evidence of "social acceptability" by the site-based project stakeholders as
a condition for the issuance of the Environmental Compliance Certificate (Republic of the
Philippines 1979,1981,1992,1996).
"Social acceptability" is defined as "the result of a process that is mutually agreed upon by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), stakeholders, and proponent to ensure
that the concerns of stakeholders, including affected communities, are fully considered andlor
resolved in the decision-making process for granting or denying the issuance of an ECC" (DENR
1997,6 quoted in Cooper and Elliott 2000). Indicators of social acceptabilitymay include: (1) process
documentation reports signed by stakeholders, (2) scoping reports signed by all key parties and
stakeholders' representatives, (3) detailed description of the EA process with concurrence of all stakeholders who participated, (4) signed Memorandum of Agreement for the establishment of a multipartite monitoring team, and (5) report of the Hearing Officer during public hearings. Consultation
is recommended to be held with the following stakeholders: (1) affected citizens, (2) concerned local
government units, (3) government agencies with concerns in the project site, (4) representatives of
NGOs and peoples' organizations, (5) representatives from local institutions such as the church and
schools, (6) community leaders, (7) indigenous communities present in the area, and (8) industry
representatives.
The Environmental Assessment Review Committee recommended against the issuance of an
Environmental Compliance Certificate for the project. The strong and well-informed opposition
from local groups was taken as evidence of the lack of "social acceptability" in spite of the endorsement from the local government council. In 1996 the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources denied "with finality" the application for an Environmental Compliance Certificate, citing
the unacceptable risks that the cement plant would pose to aquatic wildlife and coral reefs, and the
conflicts that would arise with existing land and marine uses (WRI 2000).
The rejection of the proposed cement complex in Bolinao, Philippines was a first in many ways.
It was the first time that the information from scientists made a difference when pitted against the
politically and financially powerful institutions. Marine scientists were instrumental in educating
the community on the ecological costs of the proposed intervention. Because of the public education and mobilization work of scientists in support of well-organized community-based associations, this town has been allowed to pursue a different development vision. Members of the MBCC
moved on and with others in the community helped develop a coastal zone development plan
(Talaue-McManus et al. 1998). They have also managed to institute some rules regarding the
number of fish pens and the use of destructive fishing technologies by the local community. Bolinao
has been placed on the ecotourism map and has become a favourite destination for local and
foreign tourists. The "social acceptability"provisions of the Philippine EIS system provided the legal
basis for rejecting the proposal.

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT

495

2. Brazil: Pilar Dam

In the early 1990s Italy's Fiat Group and Canada's Alcan joined forces to propose the construction of
the 170m-wide,67m-high Pilar Dam in the state of Minas Gerais. The dam would be located 13 km
from Ponte Nova, a city of 60,000 people. One hundred and thirty-three families would need to be
relocated. Proponents argued that the project would bring "modernization and progress" as the
increased power supply would attract industries and generate employment. The investors also promised to provide technical assistance to affected farmers to improve their productivity, incomes, and
quality of life. The proposal was submitted to the state environmental licensing authority.
The implementation framework for EA in Brazil is multi-layered with basically parallel mandates
at the federal, state, and municipal levels. The federal government allows state and municipal authorities to develop their EA policy, legislation, and guidelines, thus introducing a significant degree of
decentralization (Governo do Brasil 1986,1987).
By 1995 the consortium was already trying to pressure local farmers to accept its compensation
proposals, giving the impression that the dam construction was a fait accompli. This reportedly led
some anxious farmers to stop planting and making farm improvements. Fiat wields considerable
power in the state as a result of its huge car assembly plant in the state capital (Rothman 2001).
There were three key players in the opposition: a young agronomist, a small farmer, and a local
businessman. The young agronomist owned a large property that would potentially be lost to the
dam. He helped establish a community association of potential dam-affected families. An alumnus of
the University of Viqosa, he contacted the university extension group in 1995. The small farmer was
the elected president of the community association of dam-affected families. He was an eloquent
speaker who secured the support of the progressive elements of the Catholic Church and managed to
mobilize kinship, friendship, and religious networks (Rothman 2001). The local businessman
provided the link to local political authorities and civil society groups. Scholars associated with the
extension group at the University of Viqosa met with association members to discuss the potential
social and environmental impacts of the dam. They prepared the dam-affected families for their
participation at the public hearing. Concerns revolved around the impact on water quality; the threat
to the endangered surubi catfish and other fish species; the potential for increased sewage received by
the Piranga River combined with the reduced water flow to aggravate water contamination and incidence of water-borne diseases in the area; the underestimation of the agricultural productivity in the
area and the role of women in food production and marketing; and the complete failure of the
proponents to recognize the risk of dam failure and subsequent threat to the local population.
United, the groups lobbied government officials at the state level.
At the public hearing in May 1998 critics of the dam dramatized their opposition with vigorous
interventions, poetry readings from children, and protest marches. Under public pressure, the
government formed a commission to evaluate the economic impacts of the dam. The commission
reported that the local government would have to expend far more on necessary infrastructure than
the revenues they would receive in the form of royalties and potential industrial development as a
result of the dam's construction.
Fiat decided to pull out of the consortium, leaving Alcan the choice to scale down the project,
seek new partners, or abandon the project. There has been no further development reported to date
(Rothman 2001).
The traditional emphasis in Brazilian EA has been on how the environment affects the technical
and economic feasibility of the project, rather than how the project affects the environment. The
early practice of EA consisted mainly of studies focusing on physical and biological aspects: soil,
subsoil, geology, climate, land use capacity, seismology, and limnology. Social impacts were

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DEVLIN, YAP, AND WEIR

frequently understated and related mainly to resettlement issues (Monosowski 1990).Despite these
weaknesses, the active and creative collaboration between university-based scientists and farmers'
groups led to stronger and more technically informed public input. The decentralization of the EA
process and decision-making allowed local groups to have an impact leading to the effective rejection
of the Pilar Dam.
3. South Africa: The Richards Bay Mining Development in St. Lucia

St. Lucia is the largest estuarine system in Africa and the most important in KwaZulu-Natal
(Heydorn 1996). It is a string of lakes and wildlife reserves, and is the outflow of a number of the
rivers in Natal. It includes a variety of habitats: terrestrial, estuarine, and marine. It includes rare
mangrove forests, turtle breeding areas, tropical forest systems, and coral reefs. St. Lucia is located
in a biogeographic transition zone and the levels of biodiversity are therefore unusually high. The
park is managed by the Natal Parks Board. In 1986 the government of South Africa designated St.
Lucia Wetland Park as a Wetland of International Importance under the Ramsar Convention.
Signatories to the Convention commit to promoting wise use of all wetlands and special protection
for those wetlands of international importance.
In 1989 Richards Bay Minerals sought to bulldoze a 1400km2section of the St. Lucia sand dunes
to mine titanium and other metals. The company already had a mine and processing plant 25km
south of the dunes. The mining would entail the bulldozing of deep basins in the dunes, lining them
with impervious dense material such as bentonite and filling them with water. The heavy minerals
would be extracted from the surrounding dune sand by suction dredgers. The slurry would be
pumped to floating concentrator pumps that separate the heavy minerals from the dune sand. The
dunes would be revegetated by reshaping the dunes and replanting with vegetation similar to the
original grass cover. The reserve was worth 5 billion rand and would net the government revenues of
1 billion rand.
The mining proposal predated the legalization of EA in South Africa in 1997 but voluntary EAs
were common practice since the 1970s through a process called Integrated Environmental
Management.1 The EA for the Richards Bay Mining Project lasted from November 1991 to August
1993, involving more than 60 scientific and non-scientific contributors and 135 Interested and
Affected parties" who came forward to intervene. It was the largest, most expensive, and most
controversial EA undertaken in South Africa. It generated 1155 media articles (Weaver et al. 1996).
Three distinct interest coalitions were implicated in the conflict: the mining company,the environmental conservation group, and the black community that had been forcefully displaced from the
area through earlier land policy motivated by the program for establishingwildlife reserves (PrestonWhyte 1996).The environmental lobby consisted of environmental interest groups, the provincial
conservation authority, and private ranchers. The conflict revolved around several issues including
uncertainties regarding the actual effects of the disturbance of dune stratification on seepage mechanisms and, hence, fresh water replacement of the lake system. There were uncertainties regarding
the ability of the heavily used Mfolozi River to supply the water needed for the mining (about 35,000

10. Integrated Environmental Management (IEM) is the term used in South Africa to indicate an approach that integrates environmental considerations into all planning and development stages for projects, programs, plans, and policies. Six
IEM Guidelines were published in 1992 but no procedure, methods, or triggers were codified in law nor were any formal
administrative mechanisms in place at any level of government to review voluntary EAs done (Rossouw and Wiseman 2004).
11. Interested and Affected Parties is the term used in South Africa to refer to what elsewhere would be called stakeholders.

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT

497

m3/day) and the implications of such heavy water demand for the downstream river ecology and
dynamics and the consequences for human communities dependent on the river. The impact of
mining infrastructure (roads, traffic, power lines) on a regional tourist centre was debated. There was
also fear that the expensive infrastructure would demand an expansion of the mining operations
beyond the proposed boundaries for economies-of-scale.Finally, there was concern over the adverse
visual impacts of a massive mining operation on an area of aesthetic and spiritual value.
The environmental lobby sought to have St. Lucia declared a World Heritage site. They found
allies with the academic community and presented a cost analysis showing that ecotourism before
1994 already employed "one out of every fourteen 'actively employed' South Africans" (Swatuk 1996),
generating 2.5 billion rand in annual revenues, and that this clearly would rise in post-apartheid
South Africa. The mining company refuted these arguments, emphasizing that the proposed mining
area is covered by exotic pine plantations and that rehabilitation of the sand dunes would restore the
pine plantation to its original indigenous vegetation cover. Mining would also offer much needed
employment for local inhabitants. In the early 1990s the company revised its job creation estimates
upward to 900 temporary and permanent jobs and 4675 jobs through multiplier effects. It claimed
that the company would annually pay 1157 million rand in taxes and earn 606 million rand in foreign
exchange. It also offered to contribute 8 million rand to "social upliftment programmes."
The displaced black communities called attention to their past ownership of the land. Their main
concern "was to return to the land that they lay claim" (Preston-Whyte 1996). Throughout the
controversy the EA process was criticized for not allowing voices of these local "indigenous" communities to be heard. It was argued that South African NGOs tended to reflect the view of the educated
and wealthy members of society. The community consultation in preparation of the EA only
included "employed workers, traditional tribal authority structures and one Inkatha official"
(Webster and Cock 1994, quoted in Swatuk 1996). But South Africa was going through unprecedented constitutional, social, and political changes. The Government of National Unity passed legislation that communities forcibly removed from the areas in the 1960s could possess title to the
affected land. In soliciting responses to the EA Report the displaced community was more effectively
consulted. The Interested and Affected Parties included people who "were not contactable by post,
whose first language was not English or who were illiterate" (Weaver et al. 1996,106). The logistics
involved in ensuring that this wide a cross-section of the public had access to the EA material represented a significant challenge. In the end 331 submissions of comments totalling 1394 pages of text
were received (Weaver et al. 1996).
In 1993 the Review Panel recommended against the mining proposal. In February 1996 the
government of South Africa, acting on the recommendation of the Review Panel, decided against
mining on the eastern shores of St. Lucia.
The ruling against mining development in St. Lucia is considered a landmark case, setting precedents on several fronts. It was the largest and most transparent EA process undertaken in Africa until
1997. The two-week public hearings in the last stage of the EA process marked the first opening of
opportunities for marginalized black communities to be involved in government decisions affecting
their livelihood base. They marked the first time that alternative development visions became the
starting point of the EA process. They pitted an approach to economic development through the
exploitation of a non-renewable resource against one that relies on non-exploitative use of a natural
endowment through ecotourism. The hearings also were the first demonstration of the application of
precautionaryprinciple in EA. The project was rejected because of the perceived value of the area
("the sense of place") and because of the uncertainties of the ecological impacts and the ability to
mitigate them (Kruger et al. 1997). In making its recommendation to the government, the Review

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DEVLIN,
YAP,
AND WEIR

Panel (made up of eminent lay people) made use of substantial documentation presented during the
process and inputs from the public hearings.

The success of these three cases does not imply that EA has made a major difference to the environment-development tension in any of these countries. Relatively few projects result in full EAs involving public hearings. For example, in the Philippines between 1983 and 1987, of 92 major
infrastructure projects only 8 went through the EA system (Ross 1994).In South Africa 10 years of
democracy has shifted a highly centralized, white-dominated technocratic approach into a decentralized, highly participative and cooperative approach (Republic of South Africa 1997; 1998).But
resistance to full EAs persists. For example, the Ministry of Minerals and Energy has succeeded in
excluding mining from the EA requirements applied to other forms of industrial development
(Preston-Whyte 1996).
Notwithstanding these weaknesses, high-level EAs involving public hearings do hold the potential for public influence over the environmental approval process. The "success" of the affected
groups in blocking the Bolinao cement complex, the Fiat-Alcan Dam in Minas Gerais, and the St.
Lucia development project suggests that public participation can make a dramatic difference in the
process of environmental a s s e s ~ m e n tSuch
. ~ examples provide not only hope for future improvements in EA processes but also lessons on which advocates of public participation can draw to
improve effectiveness. Political mobilization leading to public hearings was an important element
in the three cases reported. However, numerous other projects have not been stopped despite such
mobilization. Thus more factors must be considered. The dynamic alliance of community groups
with technical experts from universities appears to have been particularly effective in challengingthe
decision to proceed with projects. In all three cases, committed technical experts providing support
and solidarity with organized community groups had an impact on decision-makers. In the
Philippines and Brazil it appears that education of the community groups was equally important. In
all three cases the decentralization of the EA process allowed local opposition to gain greater access
to decision-makers.
It may be that neither grassroots political mobilization against a project nor the public identification of technical problems with a project proposal will on its own lead to a satisfactory result. While
public participation can bring more chairs to the table, it does not guarantee that all their occupants
will be heard and that all affected parties are equally represented. But when knowledge and action are
brought together in a local arena, project momentum can be arrested. Local public hearings provide
such arenas. It is necessary to promote the expansion of this terrain of participation while recognizing and challenging the gaps that continue to exist between legal potential and actual practice.

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12. Bloclung a project is a dramatic outcome but not the only form of effective public participation. Important changes
in design, siting, and technological choice may also be stimulated as a result of public involvement in EA. These more subtle
changes require more detailed case studies of EA processes and project evolution and will be taken up in subsequent publications.

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT

499

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