Philosophical Review

Belief, Truth and Knowledge by D. M. Armstrong

Review by: Peter D. Klein
The Philosophical Review, Vol. 85, No. 2 (Apr., 1976), pp. 225-227
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review
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BOOK REVIEWS
BELIEF, TRUTH AND KNOWLEDGE. By D. M. ARMSTRONG.Cambridge,
CambridgeUniversity
Press, 1973. Pp. ix, 228. $9.95.
As thetitlesuggests,ProfessorArmstrong'snew book is divided intothree
sections,the task being to develop a theoryof belief,truth,and knowledge
compatiblewith,butnotimplicativeofor impliedby,a materialistontology.
Since much of thematerialcontainedin the firstand second sectionsis an
elaborationand refinementofearlierwritings(especiallyAMaterialist
Theory
of Mind [London, 1969] and "Materialism,Properties and Predicates,"
Monist,56 [1972]),I willonlybrieflysummarizesome oftheirmoreinteresting aspects. It is thethirdsection,"Knowledge,"whichis noveland requires
a more extensivereview.
Beliefsare divided intotwo classes: beliefsconcerningparticularmatters
of fact and general beliefs-that is, beliefsin an unrestricteduniversally
quantified proposition. Beliefs concerning particular mattersof fact are
held to be states (nonrelationalproperties)of a person which are "action
guiding" in ways in which other statesare not (for example merelyentertained,but not believed,propositions).General beliefsare held to be dispositions,whichare themselvesa speciesof statessuch thatifA has the general
belief(x) (If Fx, thenGx) he is "so disposedthat,forall x, ifA believesthatFx,
then this belief-statewill both create (if necessary) and weakly causally
sustain withinA's mind the belief thatGx is true" (p. 201).
Very brieflystated,elaborationsof the account are:
belief
(i) Contradictorybeliefsare held to be twonumericallydifferent
states,(that is, Bp and B- p) and it is claimed thata person may,
therefore,hold contradictorybeliefs;the distinctionbetween (Bap
and Baq) and Ba (p&q) lies in theirdifferentcausal powers; degree
of beliefis a degree of causal efficacy
of the belief-statewithregard
to conduct; A and B believe the same thingp if the "structures"of
the belief-statesare the same.
(ii) Belief-statesare composed of representingelements(Ideas); conceptsare selectivecapacitiesto represent.Thus ifone has thebelief
thatF is G and F is H, thereare twodistinctIdeas ofF, butjust one
concept.
In the second section,"Truth,"Armstrongholds thatit is possiblebeliefstates (or "bearers of propositions"),and not the propositions,which correspond or fail to correspond to reality.He rejects the view that to each
truth-bearerthere must correspond a "peculiar correspondent"because
thereare predicatesapplicable to thingsin virtueof more than one property.As a result"we put ourselvesin a positionto see thatthecorrespondence
or lack of correspondence between belief-states,
thought-episodesand assertions,on the one hand, and theworld on the other,need not be a simple
invariable relation " (p. 130). An analysisof the correspondence relationship involving disjunctive,negative, existential,and universal beliefs is
developed; necessarytruthis postponded for another occasion.

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BOOK REVIEWS
In the third section, "Knowledge," Armstrongdevelops a "reliability"
theoryof knowledge; Kap if and only if Bap is reliable. Bap is reliable if
either:
I. It is "properlyevidenced" by other beliefs,or;
II. There is a lawlikeconnectionbetweenthe stateof affairsBap and
the stateof affairsthatmakes "p" true,such thatgivenBap, it must
be the case thatp(p. 166).
I is inferentialknowledge; II is noninferentialknowledge.A'sbeliefthatpis
properlyevidenced by another beliefq if and only if:
(i) A believes thatp.
(ii) A knows thatq (noninferentially).
(iii) A's beliefthatqactuallyfunctionsinA's mindas a conclusivereason
for believingp.
(iv) A knowsthe truthof the general principleof his reasoning (pp.
199-200).
There are several noteworthyfeaturesof this account.
(a) There is no explicit truth condition included because, given
Armstrong'saccount of "conclusive" reasoning and true general
principles,such a condition would be redundant (pp. 198-199).
(b) Condition (iv) requires thatsome general principlesof reasoning
ifa viciousregressis to be avoided (p.
are known non-inferentially
200).
inherentin othercausal
(c) This analysisavoids some of thedifficulties
theories(especiallyAlvingGoldman's "A Causal Theory of Knowledge,"JournalofPhilosophy,
64, [1967], 357-372) since Armstrong
does not require thatifS knowsthatp,S's beliefthatp be caused by
the stateof affairsreferredto by "p." That is,the analysiscan easily
account for our knowledge of universal generalizations.
(d) Many of the Gettier-typecounterexamples to the traditional
three-conditionanalysisof knowledgedepend upon justifiablyinferring a proposition from a false proposition. These counterexamplesare ruled out by (ii).
(e) Manyother"felicitouscoincidence"counterexamplesare also ruled
out by (iii) and (iv).'
(J) In spite of (d) and (e), the proposed analysisis too strong.
It is Armstrong'saccount of conclusive reasoning coupled with his account of true general principlesof reasoning which create the difficulties
mentionedin (). He holds that" 'q' is a conclusivereason forbelievingp if
and only if it is the case that 'ifq, thenp' " (p. 97). Reasoning fromq to p
would be reasoningaccordingto a truegeneralprinciple:(x) (ifFx,thenGx),
where q is an instance of Fx and p an instance of Gx (pp. 199-201).
Now, Armstrongpointsout, the "if . .. then" could not "simply"be the
1 See my paper, "A Proposed Definitionof PropositionalKnowledge,"Journalof

68 (1971), 471-482.
Philosophy,

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BOOK REVIEWS
logician's "qDp" (p. 97) for that would obviously produce a definitionof
knowledge whichis too weak. He requires that"to be conclusive,an argumentmustbe completelytruth-preserving"
(p. 97). That is the reason for(a).
Also rejected as an analysisof truth-preserving
is to logician'suse of "valid."
"Valid arguments are simplyone species of conclusive arguments. (And
theyare not 'more conclusive' than other conclusive arguments)"(p. 97).
Not much more is said of conclusivereasoning; the following,however,
appears to be thecase: ifA mustpossess conclusivereasons forp in order to
Kap, and that,in turn,requires thatp be evidenced byq wherep and q are
particularinstances of a true general principle which is completely
truthpreserving(allowingno exceptions),manyobvious cases of knowledgeare
excluded. RecallJones'Ford and the evidenced has forthebeliefthatJones
does own a Ford: Jonesdrivesa Ford, garages it,and has a valid-lookingtitle
withsuch a Ford described. Accordingto Armstrong,he would not possess
conclusiveevidence forhis beliefbecause the general principle"If a person
drives,garages and possessesa valid-lookingtitleto a Ford, thenthatperson
owns a Ford" surelyis not completelytruth-preserving.
But itdoes appear
thatA could know thatJones owned the Ford on the basis of thisevidence.
In fact,it seems difficult
to constructany chain of "conclusivereasoning"
in which the finalstep is "Jonesowns a Ford" unless one includes a set of
propositionswhich entails "Jones owns a Ford" somewhere earlier in the
chain.
If, on the other hand, "conclusive reasoning" need not be completely
truth-preserving-thatis, it could allow a few exceptions-many of the
counterexamplesto earlierproposed analysesof knowledgewillre-emerge.
That is,allowp and q tobe true,and allowA's reasoningbased on thegeneral
principle to be conclusive (in this weakened sense), but let p be true not
because q is true (in thisparticularcase), but because of some other fact.A
knowsthatJonesdoes drive,garage,and have a valid-lookingtitleto a Ford,
and Jones does own one, not that Ford, but some other Ford, All of the
proposed weakened conditions of knowledge would be fulfilled,yet A
would not know thatJones owns a Ford because all of his evidence concerned a Ford other than the one which he does, in fact,own.
What has gone wrong? I suggest that "properlyevidenced" cannot be
understood eitherin termsof "conclusivereasons" in the strongsense, or a
weakersense, but rathermustbe explained in termsof the relativestrength
of the evidence possessed by A compared with the total set of relevant
evidence. Most of our reasoningabout empiricalmattersis not "completely
and is inprincipledefeasible,-butin thosecases in whichit
truth-preserving"
is infectindefeasible,we possess inferentialknowledge.The taskis to depict
adequately the required subset of the total relevantevidence.
PETER

LivingstonCollege,RutgersUniversity

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D.

KLEIN