Conceptual Evolution: A Response

Author(s): David L. Hull

Source: PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association,
Vol. 1990, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1990), pp. 255-264
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association
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Conceptual Evolution: a Response1

David L. Hull
NorthwesternUniversity
1. Introduction
Each of the commentators on my Science as a Process has emphasized a different
part of my book: Mishler concentrates on the relevant biology, Koertge the sociological mechanism, and Bradie conceptual and biological lineages as historical entities.
Bradie (1986) has made the importantdistinction between two sorts of evolutionary
epistemology-the evolution of cognitive mechanisms (EEM) and the evolution of
theories (EET). On the first program, a biological, gene-based theory of evolution is
extended to explain the development of cognitive structures. On the second program,
a meme-based theory of conceptual evolution is modeled on the biological theory. In
order for people to be capable of producing conceptual evolution, they have to be sensient, social, able to communicate, curious, etc. These characteristics evolved through
a biological, gene-based selection process. As a result, EET takes place within the
constraints imposed by EEM. As Bradie correctly points out, I have concerned myself almost exclusively with EET.
Koertge remarksin passing that she has never understood the intense interest that
evolutionary epistemologists take in the comparison between biological evolution and
the growth of scientific knowledge. From the perspective of traditionalepistemology,
I share Koertge's perplexity. If the issue is justification, EEM does not provide the
sort of foundation for knowledge that epistemologists have sought. If cognitive abilities of our species have evolved via the mechanisms of biological evolution, then certain things follow about these abilities. First, they are likely not to be universally distributedamong human beings. Variabilityis essential to evolution. Our blood type,
eye color, resistance to disease, etc. vary. Why not cognitive abilities? And in the
context of evolutionary theory, translatingtalk of variation into talk of deviation is
illicit. Hence, epistemologists are denied reference to one of the staples of their literature-the "normal"observer.
Second, to the extent that reference to biological evolution can provide warrantfor
our beliefs, this warrantapplies only to middle-sized entities and processes, when science deals with the universe at large. EEM cannot provide support for relativity theory or quantumtheory. Even within the tiny slice of middle-sized entities and process-

PSA 1990, Volume 2, pp. 255-264

Copyright ? 1991 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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es, biological evolution can lead us to hold false beliefs. For example, apparentlythe
psychological imposition of sharpboundaries and internal homogeneity on biological
species has been advantageous in our evolution, even if this belief is itself incompatible with our understandingof the evolutionary process. Evolution has made the understandingof evolution quite difficult.
I do not want to deny the relevance of biological evolution to our cognitive capacities and predispositions. I do deny that biological evolution can provide a warrant
for our beliefs tout court. Holding false beliefs can be evolutionarily advantageous.
Koertge is willing to entertainusing evolutionary theory as a "fallible heuristic." It is
at least this much. For example, the analogs to species in science are scientific groups
and conceptual systems at the social and conceptual levels respectively. Species are
internally variable. Sometimes there are greaterdifferences within species than between closely related species. As a fallible, heuristic guide, we might try treating
groups of scientists and conceptual systems in the same way. Perhaps scientists working together in the same group can disagree with each other even over essentials, their
own claims to universal agreement notwithstanding.
My own goal is somewhat more ambitious. I think that various sorts of phenomena are all instances of basically the same sort of process, in particularbiological evolution, the reaction of immune systems to antigens, the development of the nervous
system, learning in general, and conceptual change in science in particular. I analyze
selection processes in terms that are sufficiently general that they apply to more than
just gene-based biological evolution. The issue then becomes the discovery of which
of these (and possibly other) processes have what it takes to count as selection processes. Bradie reasons that if the specific mechanisms involved in a putative selection
process are different (as they are in biological evolution and the reaction of immune
systems to antigens), then they both cannot be instances of the same sort of process. I
hate to see what effect this line of reasoning would have on the huge philosophical literatureon the natureof functional organization. Bradie also points to the danger of
making an analysis so general that it applies to anything and everything. This is a real
danger, but I do not think that this point has yet to be reached with respect to analyses
of selection processes.
As out of fashion as the principle of demarcationis nowadays, Koertge is interested in "what is distinctive about scientific development as opposed to other branches
of intellectual history." I would not be surprisedto discover that other sorts of conceptual change (e.g., the struggle between the Gnostics and more "orthodox"variants
of Christianity) turnout to exhibit some of the characteristicsof conceptual change in
science. They might even exhibit all of them but developed insufficiently. However,
if a sort of conceptual change turns out to have all the characteristicsof science fully
developed, then it is science, common conceptions to one side.
2. Selection Processes
In my book I analyze selection in terms of two constituent processes: replication
and interaction. Replication is the transmission of information in ancestor-descendant
sequences of entities largely intact. Entities are included in the same token trees or
networks because of descent. Secondarily but not incidentally, these entities will also
be similar. In interaction,entities interactwith their environments so that the causally
relevant replication sequences are differential. Interactorsevolve properties (adaptations) that allow them to interactwith their environments in very special ways.
Ecologists group these adaptationsinto kinds and attempt to discover regularities in
the processes within which they function. For example, wings are the things that can

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be used to fly, and eyes are the things that can be used to see. Ecologically these are
the same characteristics even though genealogically they may have evolved independently several times. Selection is an alternationof genealogy and ecology.
Ecological entities interact with their environments as instances of kinds, but then immediately they must reproduce, and these kinds are dismantled and integrated genealogically.
For example, organisms belonging to two species of mammal may live in the
same valley, each rooting about in the dirt for their food. Ecologically they are indiscriminately rooters, but genealogically they are distinct (see Dupr6 1990 and Hull
1990). Because inter-specific competition differs significantly from intra-specific
competition, the selective fates of these two groups of organisms will differ even if
they fill exactly the same ecological niche. This alternationof genealogical tokens
and ecological kinds makes selection possible. It also makes selection processes very
difficult to understand. This contrastmay be what Ettinger,Jablonka, and
McLaughlin (1990, p. 504) have in mind when they remark, "While it is true that only
concrete entities (for example, individuals) reproduce, we shall argue that it is only
abstractentities such as types, genotypes and alleles that can be fit."
One of the main messages of my book is that we tend to treat conceptual change
as if concepts were ecological kinds, ignoring genealogy. The issue is not two alternative perspectives, but two alternating processes. Cannot we conceptualize species
both as genealogical lineages and as kinds? Of course we can. However, we slip
back and forth between the two perspectives so easily as it is that we hardly need to
legitimate such equivocation. I have nothing against pluralism. Species can be conceived of consistently in a variety of ways. What I would like to see is a scientific
theory in which such species play an importantrole. Might we not have a theory in
which species function as naturalkinds? Until such a theory has at least been
sketched, I for one am not interestedin such idle speculations. Parallel observations
hold for concepts, but here the onus is on those of us who propose to treat conceptual
change genealogically.
Koertge questions how closely connected my EET in terms of replication and interaction is to the social mechanism of curiosity, credit, and checking that I set out. I
must admit that these two wheels do not mesh as nicely as I would like, but they do
have at least one point of intersection-genealogy. If the social mechanism that I describe is to have the effects I claim it has, link-on-link conceptual connections are
necessary. The most significant influence of the evolutionary part of my EET on the
social mechanism I propose is the genealogical dimension it imposes.
3. Realism and Idealism
One of the distinctive features of science is the social mechanism that makes the
pursuit of certain sorts of self interest on the part of individual scientists contribute to
the realization of the traditionalgoals of science. By and large, the best way for scientists to furthertheir own careers is to behave the way that they are supposed to.
Koertge thinks I am too optimistic about how robust the coincidence between individual and general good in science actually is and that I should emphasize more strongly
the idealism so common among scientists. How optimistic one is depends on one's
contrast class. In comparison to how well the savings and loan industry has worked
during the past few years in the United States, science looks very good indeed. In
fact, science looks very good when compared to any other social institution, but it can
go awry. I agree that we need to foster the idealism that so many young scientists
bring with them as they enter science, but idealism alone is not good enough. Many

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doctors, police officers, and politicians may well have been extremely idealistic when
they entered their professions, but in the absence of any social mechanism to encourage right behavior, the results are anythingbut heartening. Most scientists really are
interested in their subject matter,almost pathologically so, many also have very high
professional morals, but the point I wish to stress is that the general coincidence between individual and institutional goods adds anotherforce to lead scientists to behave the way that they should. It also allows scientists who are not quite so saintly to
contribute to the traditionalgoals of science.
A common complaint of viewing social institutions realistically is that a thick
layer of hypocrisy is needed in order for society to work. If the agents were aware of
what was actually going on, the system would cease to function. Without denying
this general principle, I think that it does not apply to science. Scientists can come to
understandhow science works without disruptingthe scientific process. In fact, periodic self-awareness might even make the system work better. For example, it is important that scientists run their experiments carefully and describe the results accurately, but it is also importantthat they present their results in ways that other scientists are likely to find relevant to their own work. Pick a dissertation topic that you
think is importantand interesting, but also pick a topic that at least one of the professors in your departmentthinks is importantand interesting-preferably a productive,
established professor. Viewing a life in science realistically does not preclude an idealistic perspective as well. It also increases the likelihood of survival.
4. Biological and Conceptual Evolution
What are the replicators in biological evolution? G. C. Williams' (1966, p. 25) answer is chunks of the genetic material, "any hereditaryinformation for which there is
a favorable or unfavorable selection bias equal to several or many times its rate of endogenous change." What are replicatorsin conceptual change? Various conceptual
chunks that fulfill these same requirements. But must not conceptual replicators be
absolutely discrete, all of the same size, and come in pairs? No. Since biological
replicators frequently lack these characteristics,there is no reason to insist that conceptual replicators possess them.
What are the interactorsin biological evolution? Everything from genes through
cells and organisms to colonies, demes and possibly entire species. What are the interactors in conceptual evolution? To answer this question, we need something like
the distinction between genome and phenome, homocatalysis and heterocatalysis, and
transcriptionand translation(Griesemer 1988), and on this issue Mishler and I parse
the two contexts differently. Perhaps Mishler's alternativewill pan out better than
mine. We will have to wait to see.
On my view, like produces like in replication (transcription). Germ-line genes
produce other germ-line genes, but periodically they also produce genes that are
shunted off into somatic cells. In translation,a gene contributes to the productionof
something that is different from but systematically related to itself-a protein. One of
the noteworthy features of translationis the amount of information that is lost.
Proteins are produced by sequences of genes, each interactingin complicated ways
with its environment, including other genes, to produce the protein. Of the numerous
proteins that could have been produced only one is actually produced. A genome gets
tested in terms of only one of the potentialities included in its reaction norm.
Interaction occurs in conceptual evolution when testing takes place. Ideas can be
transmittedfrom one agent to anotherin a variety of ways, but periodically, when all

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else fails, we evaluate our beliefs by seeing how well they fit nature. Theories in their
totality are never tested. Instead, limited consequences are derived from them. These
consequences are then "operationalized"to make them testable. Of all the consequences of a particulartheory, only a very few will ever be tested. Scientists are interactors in the sense that they orchestratethese comparisons. Conceptual replicators
do not produce scientists. Rather, the beliefs that scientists hold are elements in conceptual replication sequences. Because scientists hold certain beliefs, they perform
certain tests and not others. The relevant traits (phenotypes) are the results of these
tests. The litmus paper changes color. To put it as crudely as possible, the conceptual
genome is made up of the ideas transcribedin a scientist's brain while the conceptual
phenome results from scientists' interactingwith nature as they test their beliefs.
Scientists do not fit nature;their beliefs do.
5. The Social Dimension of Science
In my book I emphasize that the interplaybetween conceptual replication and interaction does not occur in isolation from all else. Scientists interact with each other
as well as with the parts of the naturalworld that they are studying. Professional relations among scientists are also important. The chief reward in science is the use of
your work by other scientists, and it is this mutual use that drives the process of selfcorrection that is so central to science. What matters in science is not individual fitness, but inclusive fitness-conceptual inclusive fitness. I spent so much time in my
book on the professional interactions among scientists because I had not expected
them to have so much epistemic relevance. The system of credit for contributions
that characterizes science not only is epistemically relevant, it should be. It is one of
the main reasons why the knowledge claims that scientists make are credible.
Because of all the attention that I pay to the professional relations among scientists,
some people have read me as advocating social relativism. Nothing could be further
from my intentions. As Mishler puts it, on my theory science does not boil down to
social relativism because "some ideas are intrinsically better than others in their fit to
the empirical world."
6. Conceptual Systems as Historical Entities
Bradie is somewhat partial to viewing conceptual systems extended through time
as historical entities. He agrees that there is something right about treating
Christianity as having historical roots in Christ no matter how much it has split,
merged, and changed in the meantime. But he is much less attractedto treating
species in the same way. My line of argumentthrough the years has been that, since
species as the results of biological evolution must be viewed as historical entities,
then so must conceptual systems in conceptual evolution. In actual fact, the influence
was reciprocal. Because treating conceptual systems as historical entities seemed so
right, I was led to get over some of my early intuitions about how biological species
must be conceived. However, some of the consequences of treating conceptual systems as historical entities are not all that intuitively appealing. In a footnote, Bradie
asks us to consider the following dialogue:
She: I believe in God.
He: I do not.
She: Oh, I am so glad that we share the same religious tradition.
She is right to be so happy. He and she have come to the opposite conclusion but
within the same conceptual tradition. The God under discussion is the same God.

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They would have a much harder time disagreeing if they were working in significantly different conceptual traditions. Such gaps can be bridged, but it is not easy.
In biological evolution, one trait can evolve into its opposite. Some organisms
have legs. Other organisms do not. Of the organisms with legs, some eventually lose
these legs. Worms never had legs; snakes are descended from organisms that once
had legs but lost them. But "no legs" is not the same trait in the two instances.
Absence of legs is not the same trait as the loss of legs. As Mishler points out. the
loss of a characterbelongs as a derived characterin the same transformationseries as
the possession of that character. The absence of this characterdoes not. The correct
sequence is: absence of legs/development of legs/loss of legs.
This distinction is crucial in phylogenetic reconstruction,but it is also importantin
selection processes themselves because of the alternationof replication and interaction. When organisms interact with their environments, the absence of legs functions
as exactly the same characteras the loss of legs. Neither worms nor snakes can run
and for the exactly the same reason. But when it comes to replication, the difference
between the two becomes apparent. Because of descent, loss of legs is conjoined with
numerous other traits, some of which are the way that they are because the ancestors
of these organisms once had legs. Extant organisms can even retain the information
necessary to produce legs. Typically different organisms within the same or closely
related species will have retained different vestiges of the informationnecessary for
the production of charactersthat are no longer produced. That is why crossing these
organisms can result in atavism, the reappearanceof a traitthat has been lost, e.g.,
stripes on the legs of horses. The distinction between homologies and homoplasies is
absolutely essential for historical reconstruction,but it is also relevant to how selection processes work in the here and now.
Parallel observations hold with respect to conceptual evolution. Two groups of scientists might hold a belief that is the same in its assertive content, but from the perspectives of both historical reconstructionand EET, these beliefs do not count as the
"same." For instance, according to Hennig's principle of dichotomy, taxonomic
groups should be subdivided dichotomously whenever possible. At one time, all of
Hennig's intellectual descendants accepted his principle of dichotomy, while his opponents rejected it. As time went by, some of Hennig's descendants abandonedthis principle. For anyone wanting to reconstructthe history of these disputes on the basis of
who believed what, the distinction between conceptual loss and absence is quite obviously crucial, but it is also importantin understandingthe dynamics of these disputes.
One source of this importance is that conceptual systems exhibit an internalcoherence. Although the connections within conceptual systems are rarely deductive, some
claims mutually supporteach other while others conflict. As Mishler explains, on the
principles of cladistic analysis, merger is an information destroying process. It produces unresolvable polychotomies. Merger here and there in the phylogenetic tree
can be handled, but wholesale merger makes the recovery of phylogenetic relations on
the basis of characterdistribution very difficult if not impossible. For that reason,
those scientists interested in reconstructing phylogeny have tended to play down its
prevalence. Among animals species at least, genuine merger is supposedly quite rare.
However, it is quite common among plants. Roughly 47% of angiosperms and 95%
of ferns and their allies are polyploids, and most of these polyploids resulted from interspecific hybridization (Grant 1985). One often hears that the frequency of merger
in conceptual evolution is one more reason why EET is bound to fail. The contrastis
spurious, stemming from a very limited view of biological evolution. Selection pro-

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cesses can produce both splitting and merger. Merger does pose certain difficulties in
both biological and conceptual change, but these are the same difficulties for both.
A second reason for the importance of the distinction between homologies and homoplasies in the ongoing process of science turns on the social nature of scientific
disputes. Some of Hennig's opponents emphasized his principle of dichotomy because they found it to be one of the most vulnerable parts of his system. Hennig's disciples reluctantly added to its significance by responding to these criticisms. The net
effect was that abandoning the principle of dichotomy threatenedthe entire program.
Hence, a Hennigian rejecting Hennig's principle of dichotomy was of much greater
moment than a non-Hennigian rejecting this very same principle. From the perspective of conceptual transformationseries, these are two distinct beliefs, even if they
have the same assertive content.
If all you are interested in is truth or falsity, then "snow is white" will be true or
false depending on the color of snow and nothing else. But if you are interested in
science as a dynamic process, what is termed the "same proposition"in Old Speak
may well function as different propositions depending on its genealogy. The process
by which we come to understandthe world in which we live is crucially dependent on
our studying conceptual trees and networks. Perhaps one might admit that such considerations actually do intrude into science but complain that they should not.
Science should be a function of subjects interacting with the world in total isolation
from all other subjects-the model that informed traditionalepistemology. All powerful evil demons, inverted spectra, and brains in a vat are epistemically relevant, but
the social structureof science is not-even though it is one of the most important
sources of scientific claims having the credibility that they have. I think that we need
to reevaluate our understandingof epistemic relevance if epistemology is to have anything to do with how we come to understandthe world in which we live.
7. Species as Individuals One More Time
If species are taken to be the entities that result from biological evolution, then
they cannot possibly be kinds of the sort that function in laws of naturebut come closer to having the characteristics assigned to spatiotemporally localized individuals.
This view has come to provide a superabundantsource of philosophical disputes. As
a good philosopher should, Bradie confronts this position with a batteryof counterexamples. In the past I have refused to discuss what I take to be casual, superficial,
often downright silly counter-examples Too many real problems exist without worrying about bug-eyed monsters. Thought experiments can be useful, especially if
they are specified in detail and are raised in connection with explicitly stated contexts.
For example, Koertge sets out several thought experiments about the social structure
of science. She specifies which characteristics of science are to be considered in
place and which ones are to be modified or replaced. Although such examples do not
settle anything, they do help us to probe the functional organization of science.
Which parts are likely to serve which functions? Of course, empirical investigations
are necessary to determine which of these surmises are actually correct (for further
discussion, see Hull 1989).
I do not find Bradie's thought experiments with respect to species all that helpful.
He asks lots of questions about species that arise in the context of a series of thought
experiments, but frequently he does not describe his examples in sufficient detail for
me to be able to answer his questions. Nor was I able to discern the contexts of these
examples. As far as I am concerned, "ordinaryexperience" or how "ordinarypeople
might conceive of the issue" do not afford sufficiently determinatecontexts to be of

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any use. Even if they did, I am a philosopher of science, not an ordinarylanguage

philosopher. If scientific usage departs from ordinaryusage, so be it. In general,
Bradie asks questions about single organisms of a sort that cannot be answered with
respect to species as units of evolution. Specieshood is a populational matter. It all
depends on how many organisms are involved and the relations among them. From
an evolutionary perspective, the significant question is the individuation of species,
not whether a particularorganism belongs or does not belong to a particularspecies.
Because the boundaries between species are frequently equivocal, certain organisms
do not belong unequivocally to one species ratherthan another,and the relevant
"boundaries"exist in real space, not the conceptual space of cluster analysis.
What if the spontaneous generation of organisms turns out to be much more
widespread than we now think it is? Wouldn't this raise problems? If the world were
very different from how it is, our currenttheories would be false. My argumentfor
species being treated as spatiotemporalparticularsis based on our currentunderstanding of biological evolution. If we are wrong, then all bets are off. For me at least, ontological status is a function of our currentunderstanding,not some a priori prescription. If organisms sprang up all over the place spontaneously, they would not form
more inclusive historical entities, but they might form naturalkinds. There is no way
to know in advance.
What if the proverbial strangerfrom anotherplanet landed and mated successfully
with humans, and these hybrid offspring were fertile and mated with other human beings? We do not have to invent science fiction examples. Introgressionoccurs among
species right here on Earth. As Mishler explains, whether introgressionresults in the
two lineages merging into one or staying sufficiently distinct depends on how much
introgression occurs. As long as the gene flow is minimal, the two species remain
distinct. If it becomes too extensive, the two species merge into one. Obviously, a
single visitor from outer space would scarcely touch the human species. If species are
treatedgenealogically as historical entities, then descent matters. Species must have
single origins, but these origins need not be from single species. Hybrid species are
as much species as those that arise from a single ancestral population splitting off
from the main body of a single parent species. Prejudices against merger to one side,
most sexual organisms result from merger-the merger of a sperm and an ovum.
They are nonetheless single historical entities.
But what of the strangerhimself? Is he human? I assume that he was part of a
non-human species on his home planet. By mating successfully with humans here on
Earth, he merged his genes with human genes. But does he belong to Homo sapiens ?
One consequence of treating species as individuals is that it really does not matter
whether or not a single organism is considered as belonging to a particularspecies.
The principles of individuation for species are not determinateenough to apply unequivocally to every single organism, nor need they. Species are not that sort of
thing.
What about individuating people as persons? Is physical continuity necessary
and/or sufficient? How about psychological continuity? As far as I can see, contemporarybiological theories have no implications for the problem of individuatingpersons (see Wilkes 1988 for a position comparable to mine on science-fiction counterexamples and her own suggestions for the individuation of persons). What if
Theseus, after replacing the parts of his ship bit by bit, did the same for himself?
Here the problem is the individuation of organisms. Although currentbiological theory might have implications for individuating organisms, I do not think that "organism" plays a sufficiently importantrole in biological theory for the resolution of such

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problems to be worth the effort. Is a Portuguese man-of-war one organism or several

hundred? The most common answer is several hundred. A more fruitful question is
whether, in the evolutionary process, it functions as one interactoror several hundred.
Bradie goes on to ask if the replaced Theseus would be human. This issue is not
the replacement of parts. That goes on all the time. But the replacement of parts generated from the original zygote with manufacturedplastic parts. As in the case of the
visitor from anotherplanet, such questions cannot be answered with respect to single
organisms, nor does it matter. Consider them human; consider them non-human;it
does not matter. Only if enough of these organisms were introduced would the integrity of the human species be brought into question, and given Bradie's science fiction example, I have not even a clue what the answer might be.
Why is interbreedingso importantin sexual species? Because that is the way that
sexual species produce ancestor-descendantsequences.
Why are such genealogical connections so important? Because they are necessary
for selection.
But why is selection so important? Because that is how species evolve.
In the case of Bradie's bubble universes, I do not know what to say because I do
not know the necessary physics. So I have been told, all the things that we think are
laws of nature might actually be contingencies due to singularities in the Big Bang
that gave rise to our universe. What if there were an infinite number of such universes? Would hydrogen be a naturalkind in any or all of them? I simply do not know.
All these universes have histories. Shouldn't history make a difference? In selection
processes, the issue is not just histories but genealogies, and genealogy requires replication. Bradie says not a word in this thought experiment about replication sequences. Do we have essences back again? In my view of the world, they have never
left. Just because particularspecies do not have essences, it does not follow that there
are no essences. For example, I hope that replicator,interactor,and lineage turn out to
be naturalkinds with essences of the old fashioned sort.
I am certainly willing to submit my philosophical views to "empirical tests of
physical possibility." The world could be different from the way that it is, but a lot of
hard work is necessary to unpack these possibilities. For thought experiments like
those sketched by Bradie to be really useful, they have to be spelled out in much
greater detail.

Notes
1This paper was written in part under NSF grant DIR-9012258.

References
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Ettinger, L, Jablonka,E. and McLaughlin, P. (1990), "On the Adaptations of
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(1990), "ConceptualSelection", Philosophical Studies 60: 77-87.

Wilkes, K. (1988), Real People: Personal Identity without Thought Experiments.

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