EMINENT DOMAIN

REPUBLIC VS. TAGLE

[299 SCRA 549; G.R. No. 129079; 2 Dec 1998]

Issue:
Whether or Not the respondent judge may quash a writ of possession on the
ground that the expropriating government agency is already occupying the
property sought to be expropriated.

Facts:
Held:
Private respondent Helena Z. Benitez is the registered owner of two (2)
parcels of land located in Barangay Salawag, Dasmarias, Cavite containing
an area of 483,331 square meters more or less.
The Philippine Government, through the Philippine Human Resources
Development Center (PHRDC), negotiated with the Japanese International
Cooperation Agency (JICA) Survey Team on the technicalities of the
establishment of the ASEAN Human Resources Development Project in the
Philippines. Among the five (5) main programs of the proposed project was
Program III (Construction Manpower Development) which involved the
establishment of a Construction Manpower Development Center (CMDC).
PHRDC and private respondent Helena Z. Benitez, signed a Memorandum of
Agreement which provides, among others, that Benitez undertakes to lease
within the period of twenty (20) years and/or sell a portion of that property
(which is no less than ten-hectares) in favor of PHRDC which likewise agrees
to lease within a period of twenty (20) years and/or buy said property site.
The Philippine Womens University (PWU) and Benitez granted a permit to
PHRDC to occupy and use the land in question and to undertake land
development, electrical and road network installations and other related
works necessary to attain its objectives. Pursuant thereto, the CMDC took
possession of the property and erected buildings and other related facilities
necessary for its operations. A deposit made by the plaintiff with the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the amount of P708,490.00 which is
equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject matter hereof based
on defendants 1990 tax declaration, was made.
In view of the agreement on the sale of the land in question, PHRDC
prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale with Benitez, as vendor, and PHRDC and
CMDC, as vendees, duly represented by then Undersecretary Gloria M.
Arroyo, for the signature of Benitez. Benitez in her own capacity did not sign
the deed of absolute sale.
Failing to acquire the property involved through negotiated sale, petitioner,
through the Department of Trade and Industry, to which CMDC is attached,
instituted a complaint for Eminent Domain, pursuant to the provisions of
Executive Order No. 1035, dated June 25, 1985.
A Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession was granted by the court but
quashed it subsequently.

No. Under Section 7 of EO 1035, when the government or its authorized

agent makes the required deposit, the trial court has a ministerial duty to
issue a writ of possession. The expropriation of real property does not
include mere physical entry or occupation of land. Although eminent domain
usually involves a taking of title, there may also be compensable taking of
only some, not all, of the property interests in the bundle of rights that
constitute ownership.
In the instant case, it is manifest that the petitioner, in pursuit of an objective
beneficial to public interest, seeks to realize the same through its power of
eminent domain. In exercising this power, petitioner intended to acquire not
only physical possession but also the legal right to possess and ultimately to
own the subject property. Hence, its mere physical entry and occupation of
the property fall short of the taking of title, which includes all the rights that
may be exercised by an owner over the subject property.
CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY
[40 Phil 349; No. 14355; 31 Oct 1919]
Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a
portion private cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal
Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be
made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are
within their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary
because other routes were available. They further claimed that the
expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to
them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and
monuments that would have to be destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on
the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have
the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have
no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the
same filed an appeal.

Issue:
Held:
Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of
the expropriation.
Held:
The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to
the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes
designated by the law. The moment the municipal corporation or entity
attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the
conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the
authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent
domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not
the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case
under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the
courts have the right to inquire to.
REPUBLIC VS. PLDT
[26 SCRA 320; G.R. No. L-18841; 27 Jan 1969]
Facts:
The plaintiff Republic of the Philippines is a political entity exercising
government powers through one of its branches, the Bureau of
Telecommunication. Herein defendant, PLDT is a public service corporation
holding a franchise to install operates and maintains a telephone system.
After its creation, the BOT set up its own government telephone system by
utilizing its own appropriations and other equipment and by renting trunk
lines of the PLDT to enable the govt offices to call privately. BOT entered into
an agreement with the RCA communications for joint overseas telephone
service whereby BOT would convey overseas calls received by RCA to local
residents. PLDT complained to the BOT that it was a violation of the
condition of their agreement since the BOT had used trunk lines only for the
use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general
public in competition with the business of PLDT. Subsequently, the plaintiff
commenced suit against PLDT asking the court judgment be rendered
ordering the PLDT to execute a contract with the plaintiff, through the BOT
for the use of the facilities of PLDT's telephone system throughout the
country under such conditions as the court may consider reasonable. The
CFI rendered judgment stating that it could not compel PLDT to enter into
such agreement. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or Not PLDT may be compelled to enter into such agreement.

Yes, the state, may, in the interest of national welfare transfer utilities to
public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why
the state ma not require a public utility to render services in the general
interest provided just compensation is paid.
PEOPLE VS. FAJARDO
[104 Phil 443; G.R. No. L-12172; 29 Aug 1958]
Facts:
The municipal council of baao, camarines sur stating among others that
construction of a building, which will destroy the view of the plaza, shall not
be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the expense of the owner, enacted
an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a written request with the incumbent
municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline
station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the
national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The
request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building
would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. Defendants reiterated
their request for a building permit, but again the mayor turned down the
request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the
building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very
badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto
they had been living on leased property. Thereafter, defendants were
charged in violation of the ordinance and subsequently convicted. Hence this
appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.
Held:
No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable
and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the
right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police
power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just
compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the
beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness
of residents.

As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants'
land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in
question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the
highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land
remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited,
being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must
give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.

be taken away except for public use and upon payment of just compensation.
Judgment affirmed.

CITY OF BAGUIO V. NAWASA

[106 Phil; G.R. No. L-12032; 31 Aug 1959]

Petitioner filed an action to acquire a right of way over the land of

Respondents for the construction of transmission lines. Petitioner was
adjudged to pay the full market value of land traversed by the transmission
lines. Petitioner argued that it was only asking for a right of way.

Facts:
Plaintiff a municipal corporation filed a complaint against defendant a public
corporation, created under Act.1383. It contends that the said act does not
include within its purview the Baguio Water Works system, assuming that it
does, is unconstitutional because it deprives the plaintiff ownership, control
and operation of said water works without just compensation and due
process of law. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss ion the ground that it
is not a proper exercise of police power and eminent domain. The court
denied the motion and ordered the defendants to file an answer. The court
holds that the water works system of Baguio belongs to private property and
cannot be expropriated without just compensation. Sec. 8 of R.A.1383
provides for the exchange of the NAWASA assets for the value of the water
works system of Baguio is unconstitutional for this is not just compensation.
Defendants motion for reconsideration was denied hence this appeal.

NATIONAL POWER CORP. VS. GUTIERREZ

[193 SCRA 1; G.R. No. 60077; 18 Jan 1991]
Facts:

Issue:
Whether or Not the acquisition of the right of way constitutes "taking" and
such the case will be entitled just compensation.
Held:
The acquisition of the right of way constitutes taking. It perpetually deprives
Respondents of their proprietary rights. No plant higher than three meters is
allowed below the transmission lines. Because of high tension current
conveyed through the transmission lines, danger to life and limbs cannot be
discounted. The owner of the property is entitled to just compensation.

Issue:

REPUBLIC VS. CASTELVI

[58 SCRA 336; G.R. No. L-20620; 15 Aug 1974]

Whether or Not there is a valid exercise of police power of eminent domain.

Facts:
Held:
R.A. 1383 does not constitute a valid exercise of police power. The act does
not confiscate, destroy or appropriate property belonging to a municipal
corporation. It merely directs that all water works belonging to cities,
municipalities and municipal districts in the Philippines to be transferred to
the NAWASA. The purpose is placing them under the control and supervision
of an agency with a view to promoting their efficient management, but in so
doing does not confiscate them because it directs that they be paid with
equal value of the assets of NAWASA.

In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
entered into a lease agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-year basis. When
Castelvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused. She
then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however,
the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in
question.
Issue:
Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.

The Baguio water works system is not like a public road, the park, street
other public property held in trust by a municipal corporation for the benefit of
the public. But it is a property of a municipal corporation, water works cannot

Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of
1947, and that just compensation should not be determined on the basis of
the value of the property as of that year.
The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private
property, 2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period, 3) it must
be under warrant or color of authorities, 4) the property must be devoted for
public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected, and 5)
the utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. Under Sec. 4
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensation is to be determined as of
the date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that
when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent
to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation
should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. In the
instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of
the Castelvi property, by authority of court, on August 10, 1959. The taking
of the Castelvi property for the purposes of determining the just
compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959
when the complaint for eminent domain was filed. There is no basis to the
contention of the Republic that a lease on a year-to-year basis can give rise
to permanent right to occupy since by express provision a lease made for a
determinate time, as was the lease of Castelvi land in the instant case,
ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand (Art. 1669, New Civil
Code). The Supreme Court, however, did not apply Art. 1250 of the New Civil
Code for the adjustment of the peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or
deflation because in eminent domain cases the obligation to pay arises from
law independent of contract.

San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the
latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be
fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower.
Such objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied
and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioners report. EPZA
then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent
from further hearing the case.
Issue:
Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just
compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just
compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible
encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a
matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial
determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding
principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may
not substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be
awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just
compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the
legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a
violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not
be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the
courts findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the
justness of the decreed compensation.

EPZA VS. DULAY

[148 SCRA 305; G.R. No. L-59603; 29 Apr 1987]
AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA
[43 SCRA 360; G.R. No. L-26400; 29 Feb. 1972]

Facts:
The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the
Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be
constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation (San
Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered under, claimed that
the lands were expropriated to the government without them reaching the
agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an
order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just
compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to

Facts:
Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of
her Transfer Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of
the government of any right or interest in the property. Without prior
expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of the lot for
the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958, Amigables
counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the

th

portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9
Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint against the
Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and
possession of the lot. According to the defendants, the action was premature
because it was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor General. According to
them, the right of action for the recovery of any amount had already
prescribed, that the Government had not given its consent to be sued, and
that plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of

newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare
Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it
violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government
against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General
claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of
supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information operations of
print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a
fair, impartial and credible election.

Issue:
Issue:
Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the
government.

Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.

Held:

Held:

In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that
when the government takes away property from a private landowner for
public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or
negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit
without its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in favor of the
government appears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not
executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the
government, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring an
action to recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one
of the attributes of ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at
this time since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is
for the government to make due compensationprice or value of the lot at
the time of the taking.

The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that

to compel print media companies to donate Comelec space amounts to
taking of private personal property without payment of the just
compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of
necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec,
considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space.
The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution,
but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772
does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the
case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to
take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.
REYES VS. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
[395 SCRA 494; GR NO. 147511; 20 JAN 2003]

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC

[244 SCRA 272; G.R. No. 119694; 22 May 1995]
Facts:
Facts:
Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing
newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for
the common use of political parties and candidates. The Comelec space
shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates
to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue
and their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by
the Commission for dissemination of vital election information.

Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed complaints for the

expropriation of sugarcane lands belonging to the petitioners. The stated
public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Dasmarias
Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocated
from the Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment
ordering the expropriation of these lots and the payment of just
compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
A few years later, petitioners contended that respondent NHA violated the
stated public purpose for the expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement

Project when it failed to relocate the squatters from the Metro Manila area, as
borne out by the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court which showed
that most of the expropriated properties remain unoccupied. Petitioners
likewise question the public nature of the use by respondent NHA when it
entered into a contract for the construction of low cost housing units, which is
allegedly different from the stated public purpose in the expropriation
proceedings. Hence, it is claimed that respondent NHA has forfeited its rights
and interests by virtue of the expropriation judgment and the expropriated
properties should now be returned to herein petitioners.

MUNICIPALITY OF PARAAQUE VS. VM REALTY CORPORATION

[292 SCRA 676; G. R. NO. 127820; 20 JUL 1998]
Facts:
Petitioner sought to exercise its power of eminent domain based on a
resolution by the municipal council. Petitioner cites a previous case wherein
a resolution gave authority to exercise eminent domain. Petitioner also relies
on the Implementing Rules, which provides that a resolution authorizes a
Local Government Unit to exercise eminent domain.

Issue:
Issue:
Whether or not the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in the light of the
failure of respondent NHA to use the expropriated property for the intended
purpose but for a totally different purpose.

Whether or Not an LGU can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant
to a resolution by its law-making body.

Held:

Held:

The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA. Accordingly,

petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision
of the Constitution by contending that the contract for low cost housing is a
deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled doctrine that the
concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. The term
"public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest,"
"public benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience." Thus, whatever
may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use."

Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is
stated as the first requisite that LGUs can exercise its power of eminent
domain if there is an ordinance enacted by its legislative body enabling the
municipal chief executive. A resolution is not an ordinance, the former is only
an opinion of a law-making body, the latter is a law. The case cited by
Petitioner involves BP 337, which was the previous Local Government Code,
which is obviously no longer in effect.
RA 7160 prevails over the
Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the latter only an
administrative rule which cannot amend the former.

In addition, the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban
development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold
to private homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and service
companies, and other private concerns. Moreover, the Constitution itself
allows the State to undertake, for the common good and in cooperation with
the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing
which will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement
areas. The expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized
housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance of social justice.

ASLP VS. SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM

[175 SCRA 343; G.R. NO. 78742; 14 JUL 1989]
Facts:
Several petitions are the root of the case:
a. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and
229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5
hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared
full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27. The
petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the
legislatures power.
b. A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victorias Mill
Negros Occidental against Proclamation 131 and EO 229.
Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with
initial fund of P50Billion.

c.

A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under

the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.
d. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners
of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares.
Issue:
Whether or Not the aforementioned EOs, PD, and RA were constitutional.
Held:
The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of
Police power and eminent domain.
The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229
was authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent
Domain.
RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP
becomes necessary to deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in
excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the
power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the
land. What is required is the surrender of the title and the physical
possession of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in
favour of the farmer.
A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is
concurrence of the lawful subject and the method.
Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to
be determined is the method employed to achieve it.
ESLABAN VS. ONORIO
[360 SCRA 230; G.R. NO. 146062; 28 JUN 2001]

parties in which respondent was paid the amount of P4, 180.00 as right of
way damages. Subsequently, respondent executed an Affidavit of Waiver of
Rights and Fees which waives her rights for the damage to the crops due to
construction of the right of way. After which, respondent demands that
petitioner pay P111, 299.55 for taking her property but the petitioner refused.
Petitioner states that the government had not consented to be sued and that
the respondent is not entitled for compensation by virtue of the homestead
patent under CA no. 141. The RTC held that the NIA should pay respondent
the amount of P107, 517.60 as just compensation for the 24,660 sq meters
that have been used for the construction of the canal. The Court of Appeals
also affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or Not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC.
Held:
The CA is correct in affirming the decision of the RTC but modifications shall
be made regarding the value of the just compensation. The following are the
points to be considered in arriving in this decision.
First, Rule 7 par 5 of the Rule of Civil Procedure provides that the
certification against forum shopping should only be executed by the plaintiff
or the principal. The petition for review was filed by Mr. Eslaban jr. while the
verification or certification were signed by Mr. Cesar Gonzales, an
administrator of the agency. Neither of the two has the authority to sign such
certificate for they are not the plaintiff or principal. Such case is a sufficient
ground for dismissing this petition.
Second, PD NO. 1529 provides that the owner is required to recognize in
favor of the government the easement of a public highway, way, private way
established by law, or any government canal where the certificate of title
does not state that the boundaries thereof have been pre-determined. In the
case at bar, the irrigation canal was constructed on Oct 1981 after the
property had been registered in May of 1976. In this case, prior expropriation
proceedings must be filed and just compensation shall be paid to the owner
before the land could be taken for public use.

Facts:
Clarita Vda. De Onorio is the owner of the land in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto.
Nino, South Cotabato. Such land is the subject for the construction of an
irrigation canal of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA). Mr. Santiago
Eslaban Jr. is the project manager of NIA. The parties agreed to the
construction of the canal provided that the government will pay for the area
that has been taken. A right-of-way agreement was entered into by the

Third, In this case, just compensation is defined as not only the correct
amount to be paid but the reasonable time for the Government to pay the
owner. The CA erred in this point by stating that the market value (just
compensation) of the land is determined in the filing of the complaint in
1991.The determination of such value should be from the time of its taking by
the NIA in 1981.

Lastly, the petitioner cannot argue that the Affidavit of waiver of rights and
fees executed by the respondent pertains to the payment of the value of the
land therefore exempting NIA to pay the value of the land taken. Such waiver
pertains only to the crops and improvements that were damage due to the
construction of the right-of-way not the value of the land.

Issue:
Whether or not Knechts are the lawful owners of the land at subject.
Held:

Wherefore, decision of CA affirmed with modification regarding the just

compensation in the amount of P16, 047.61 per hectare.
KNECHT VS. COURT OF APPEALS
[290 SCRA 223; G.R. NO. 108015, 20 MAY 1998]
Facts:
The instant case is an unending sequel to several suits commenced almost
twenty years ago involving a parcel of land located at the corner of the south
end of EDSA and F.B. Harrison in Pasay City. The land was owned by
petitioners Cristina de Knecht and her son, Rene Knecht. On the land, the
Knechts constructed eight houses, leased out the seven and occupied one of
them as their residence. In 1979, the government filed for the expropriation of
Knechts property. The government wanted to use the land for the completion
of the Manila Flood Control and Drainage Project and the extension of the
EDSA towards Roxas Boulevard. In 1982, the City Treasurer of Pasay
discovered that the Knechts failed to pay real estate taxes on the property
from 1980 to 1982. As a consequence of this deficiency, the City Treasurer
sold the property at public auction for the same amount of their deficiency
taxes. The highest bidders were respondent Spouses Anastacio and Felisa
Babiera (the Babieras) and respondent Spouses Alejandro and Flor
Sangalang (the Sangalangs). Subsequently, Sangalang and Babiera sold the
land to respondent Salem Investment Corporation. On February 17, 1983,
the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340 authorizing the national
government to expropriate certain properties in Pasay City for the EDSA
Extension. The property of the Knechts was part of those expropriated under
B.P. Blg. 340. The government gave out just compensation for the lands
expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340. Salem was included and received partial
payment. Seven of the eight houses of the Knechts were demolished and the
government took possession of the portion of land on which the houses
stood. Since the Knechts refused to vacate their one remaining house,
Salem filed a case against them for unlawful detainer. As defense, the
Knechts claimed ownership of the land and building. The Municipal Trial
Court however ordered the Knechts' ejectment thus their residence was
demolished.
The Knechts continuously claimed ownership of the property and allege that
they must be given just compensation.

The Supreme Court held that the Knechts were not the owners anymore of
the said land. The Knechts' right to the land had been foreclosed after they
failed to redeem it one year after the sale at public auction. Since the
petitions questioning the order of dismissal were likewise dismissed by the
Court of Appeals and this Court, the order of dismissal became final and res
judicata on the issue of ownership of the land. Petitioners contended that
they did not receive notice of their tax delinquency. Neither did they receive
notice of the auction sale. However, this question has been previously raised
in the cases which have been already set aside. The court is not a trier of
facts. Res judicata has already set it. The Knechts therefore are not the
lawful owners of the land and are not any longer accountable for just
compensation given by the government.
Note: Res judicata is a ground for dismissal of an action. It is a rule that
precludes parties from relitigating Issue actually litigated and determined by a
prior and final judgment. It pervades every well-regulated system of
jurisprudence, and is based upon two grounds embodied in various maxims
of the common law one, public policy and necessity, that there should be
a limit to litigation; and another, the individual should not be vexed twice for
the same cause. When a right of fact has been judicially tried and determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been
given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. To
follow a contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will
and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious
disposition of the parties to the preservation of the public tranquility.
Res judicata applies when: (1) the former judgment or order is final; (2) the
judgment or order is one on the merits; (3) it was rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (4) there is between the
first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of
action.

REPUBLIC VS. KER

[383 SCRA 584; G.R. NO. 136171, 2 JULY 2002]

MANOSCA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

[252 SCRA 412; G.R. NO. 106440, 29 JAN. 1996]

Facts:

Facts:

Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City a petition for
expropriation of portions of two parcels of land owned by respondent.
Petitioner needed the parcels of land for the widening of the road component
of J.P. Laurel-Buhangin Interchange in Davao City. The Regional trial court
rendered decision of a fair just compensation for defendant Ker Corporation.
However, it was challenged by Petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways alleging that
just compensation for site must be reduced. Petitioner alleged that when the
petition for expropriation was filed, the tax declaration of the property
indicated its assessed value at a lower price.

The National Historical Institute declared the parcel of land owned

Petitioners as a national historical landmark, because it was the site of
birth of Felix Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. The Republic of
Philippines filed an action to appropriate the land. Petitioners argued that
expropriation was not for a public purpose.

by
the
the
the

Issue:
Whether or Not the taking or exercise of eminent domain may be granted.
Held:

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Ker Company was given a decision for fair just
compensation.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the valuation for the lot Sites are excessive and
unreasonable. Just compensation cannot be measured by the assessed
value of the property as stated in the tax declaration and schedule of market
values. For the purpose of appraisal, the fair market value of the property is
taken into account and such value refers to the highest price in terms of
money which a property will bring if exposed for sale in the public market.
In computing just compensation for expropriation proceedings, it is the value
of the land at the time of the taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint
not at the time of the rendition of judgment which should be taken into
consideration. 4 Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the
taking or the filing of the complaint whichever came first. On this matter, the
appellate court is correct in disregarding petitioner's claim.

Public use should not be restricted to the traditional uses. The taking is for a
public use because of the contribution of Felix Manalo to the culture and
history of the Philippines.