Guasch v.

dela Cruz 589 SCRA 297

G.R. No. 176015

June 16, 2009

FACTS:
Respondent alleged that petitioner was his neighbor and kumadre. On several occasions, petitioner
transacted business with him by exchanging cash for checks of small amount without
interest. Petitioner went to his residence requesting him to exchange her check with cash. Initially, he
refused. However, petitioner returned the next day and was able to convince him to give her cash in
exchange for her Insular Savings Bank Check upon her assurance that she will have the funds and bank
deposit to cover the said check by January 2000. On the date of maturity and upon presentment,
however, the check was dishonored for the reason that the account against which it was drawn was
already closed. Respondent filed a Manifestation with attached Motion to Amend Order dated June 16,
2005 (Motion to Amend) to include a finding of civil liability of petitioner. In the Manifestation,
respondents counsel justified his failure to file the motion within the reglementary period of 15 days
because all postal offices in Metro Manila were allegedly ordered closed in the afternoon due to the
rally staged on Ayala Avenue. The trial court denied respondents Motion to Amend finding that counsel
for respondent was inexcusably negligent; hence, it has become final and executory. Respondent filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the trial court,
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in the case at bar.
HELD:
No.Respondents counsel received a copy of the Order dated June 16, 2005 granting the demurrer to
evidence on June 28, 2005. However, he only filed his Motion to Amend on July 14, 2005 which was one
day beyond the 15-day reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration of final orders of the
trial court pursuant to Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. As a general rule, the statutory
requirement that when no motion for reconsideration is filed within the reglementary period, the
decision attains finality and becomes executory in due course must be strictly enforced as they are
considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial
business. The purposes for such statutory requirement are twofold: first, to avoid delay in the
administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business,
and, second, to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which are precisely
why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant
must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.

Salandanan v. Mendez 581 SCRA 182

G.R. No. 160280

March 13, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner submitted a motion for clarification and intervention when she alleged that she and her
deceased spouse are the real owners of the subject property; that she was not a party to the case of
ejectment and did not receive any notice; and that by virtue of the said decision, she was about to be
evicted from her property without having participated in the entire process of the ejectment
proceeding. Petitioners further claims that private respondents went to their house and showed a
certain paper purportedly copies of a special power of attorney but which turned out to be a deed of
donation involving the subject property; that by virtue of said donation, respondents were able to
register the subject properties.
ISSUE: Whether CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion for intervention by
petitioner.
HELD:
NO. As a rule, intervention is allowed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. After
the lapse of this period, it will not be warranted anymore because intervention is not an independent
action but is ancillary and supplemental to an existing litigation. The permissive tenor of the provision
on intervention shows the intention of the Rules to give to the court the full measure of discretion in
permitting or disallowing the same, but under Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, the courts are
nevertheless mandated to consider several factors in determining whether or not to allow intervention.
The factors that should be reckoned are whether intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether the intervenors rights may be fully
protected in a separate proceeding. Keeping these factors in mind, the courts have to give much
consideration to the fact that actions for ejectment are designed to summarily restore physical
possession to one who has been illegally deprived of such possession. Petitioner is not an indispensable
party in the instant case because her claim of ownership cannot be properly adjudicated in said action.