Caasi

vs.
(EN BANC, G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990)

Comelec

Facts: Merito Miguel was sought to be disqualified for the position of municipal
mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local elections of 18
January 1988, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, and on the ground
that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of
America, not of Bolinao. Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him
by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the
United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that
he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to
visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao,
Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on 2
February 1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional
elections on 18 May 1987. The COMELEC with the exception of Commissioner
Anacleto Badoy, Jr. held that the possession of a green card by Miguel does not
sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines.
Issue: Whether a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the
United States

Facts:
Alarilla and Blanco are candidates for the mayoralty elections of
Meycauayan, Bulacan. After elections but before proclamations, Alarilla filed a
disqualification case against Blanco on the grounds of vote-buying, committing acts
of terrorism and spending in his campaign more than that allowed by the Election
Code. A motion to suspend proclamation was also filed by Alarilla. This was granted
by COMELEC because evidence in support of his disqualification is strong.
COMELEC held that Blanco is disqualified for vote-buying and ordered the
Municipal Board of Canvassers to reconvene and determine the winner out of the
remaining qualified candidates.
Blanco filed an MR, Nolasco intervened. Nolasco, elected vice-mayor,
nd
claims he should be proclaimed Mayor, not the person who got the 2 highest
number of votes.
Held:
Blanco is disqualified; Nolasco should be Mayor.

Held: Miguels immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an

abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to
the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the
limited States with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his
application for an immigrants (not a visitors or tourists) visa. Based on that
application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or
authority to reside there permanently (See Question 21 of Miguels application). To
be qualified to run for elective office in the Philippines, the law requires that the
candidate who is a green card holder must have waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country. Therefore, his act of filing a certificate
of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a
waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The
waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of
and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without
such prior waiver, he was disqualified to run for any elective office. Absent clear
evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered
his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of
Bolinao in the local elections on 18 January 1988, he was disqualified to run for said
public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.
NOLASCO V COMELEC

Ratio:
1. LGC provides that in case of permanent vacancy in the office of mayor
(e.g. failure of the winner to qualify) the vice-mayor should fill in the vacany.
2. It is settled that if the candidate who got the most number of votes fails
to qualify, the person who gets the second most number of votes cannot be
proclaimed winner. He cannot be considered first among the qualified candidates
because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would
have substantially changed.
CODILLA SR. VS DE VENECIA (as Speaker)
FACTS:
Codilla (Mayor of Ormoc) and Locsin (incumbent Representative) are both
th
candidates for the Representative of the 4 District of Leyte in the 2001 elections. A
registered voter then filed a petition for Disqualification against Codilla indirect

solicitation of votes , prohibited by section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.

COMELEC (Division) delegated the hearing and reception of the evidence of such
case to the Regional Director.
Election time came, and yet still no hearing from the Regional Director.
When it was apparent that Codilla garnered the most votes, Locsin intervened in
the DQ case, and filed an urgent motion to suspend proclamation. Codilla was not
served with the Motion. COMELEC (D) issued an order suspending the proclamation
due to the seriousness of the allegations. Again, Codilla was not served with a
summons to air his side and provide contrary evidences. Although Codilla filed a
petition to lift the suspension, COMELEC (D) nevertheless issued a Resolution
finding Codilla guilty of indirect solicitation. As a result, COMELEC (D) disqualified
Codilla and considered votes cast for him as stray even though such resolution is
still not yet final. Locsin was proclaimed the winner and assumed her seat in
Congress as the Representative.
Codilla then seasonably filed an MR to COMELEC (En banc), which reversed
the Division Resolution. Locsin then questioned jurisdiction of COMELEC (E),
stating that it was the HRET who has jurisdiction over the case now that she has
assumed the post. De Venecia concurs with COMELEC (E), but since Locsin said in
one of her privilege speeches that she will not obey the COMELEC (E) reversal, he
said that it was up to the SC to decide on the matter.
Thus, the petition for Mandamus and Quo Warranto.
ISSUE:

to review, on motion for reconsideration, decisions or resolutions decided by a

division.
HRET no jurisdiction to review resolutions of COMELEC decisions
3
Locsin argued for HRET jurisdiction, raising section 17 of Article VI as her basis. But
stemming from the previous ratio, HRET doesnt have jurisdiction as the issue on
the validity of the COMELEC (D) Resolution has not yet been resolved by the
COMELEC en banc. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
COMELEC en banc to resolve. Adding to the fact that jurisprudence has held that
HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions of COMELEC decisions, whether
issued by a (D) or (E).

DOMINGO V. COMELEC
Facts:

W/N proclamation divested the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to review

its validity. NO!

RATIO:
Division Proclamation not yet Final
The validity of the respondents proclamation was a core issue in the MR filed by
the petitioner. And since the MR was seasonably filed, the COMELEC (E) was not
divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the COMELEC (D) Resolution. The
2
legal basis for this is Section 3, Article IX-C , which empowers the COMELEC en banc
1

Ernesto Domingo Jr. and Benjamin Abalos, Jr. were both mayoralty
candidates of Mandaluyong City. After Benjamin Abalos, Jr. was
proclaimed as mayor, petitioner Domingo sought to disqualify him, on the
ground that during the campaign period, Abalos, Jr. prodded his father
who was then incumbent mayor of Mandaluyong to give substantial
allowances to public school teachers appointed as chairpersons and
members of the BEIs for Mandaluyong City.
This allegations stem from an incident during a Pasyal-Aral outing for
Mandaluying City public school teachers in Quezon where then mayor
Abalos, Sr., announced that the teachers will get an additional
pay/allowance through the initiative of his son, Abalos, Jr.
Petitioner Domingo alleges that private respondents act of prodding his
father constitutes a violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
(giving money or other consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the
voters or public officials performing electoral functions).
COMELEC First Division dismissed the petition.
COMELEC En Banc affirmed.
Hence this petition.

by using the vehicles and equipment of Ormoc to extract and haul sand and gravel
and distribute it to some voters in 2 cities.

decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decision shall be

decided by the Commission en banc

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective members.

Issue:

Held:
1.

W/N petitioner was violated of his right to due process as his petition was
dismissed without hearing on the merits? NO
W/N the allegation of influencing his father was sufficiently proven? NO
W/N Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
petition for disqualification? NO
W/N there was forum shopping (an issue raised by private respondent
Abalos, Jr.)? NO

No violation of due process because the fact that petitioner was able to file
an MR shows that he was accorded ample opportunity to dispute the
findings of the COMELEC First Division.

2.

The affidavits were not able to prove any knowledge or degree of

participation of Abalos, Jr. in the grant of these allowances. Court fails to
see the connection between the photographs and videos presented to
show the alleged influence wielded by Abalos, Jr. on the public school
teachers of Mandaluyong City. The burden of proving that Abalos, Jr.
indirectly influenced the public school teachers through his father was a
burden that petitioner failed to meet.

3.

Where there is no proof of grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud

or error of law in the questioned resolutions, the Court may not review the
factual findings of COMELEC, nor substitute its own findings on the
sufficiency of evidence.

4.

The issues in the two cases are different. The complaint for election
offense is a criminal case which involves the ascertainment of the guilt or
innocence of the accused candidate and, like any other criminal case,
requires conviction of proof beyond reasonable doubt. A petition for
disqualification, meanwhile, requires merely the determination of whether
the respondent committed acts as to merit his disqualification from office,
and is done through an administrative proceeding which is summary in
character and requires only a clear preponderance of evidence.
REPUBLIC vs. DELA ROSA
232 SCRA 785
June 6, 1994
FACTS
This case is a consolidation of 3 petitions that primarily aims to declare the
naturalized citizenship of Juan Frivaldo as invalid and consequently, nullify his
proclamation as governor of Sorsogon.

It appears that Frivaldo had served as governor of Sorsogon for six terms
already and was only compelled to renounce his citizenship when he sought
political asylum in US due to the precarious political atmosphere here in the country
during the Marcos regime. As he wasnt able to reacquire his citizenship through
repatriation or through act of Congress, he was forced to file a petition for
naturalization on September 1991.
The judge set the hearing on March 16 1992 and ordered the publication
of the order in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation---for
three consecutive weeks, at least once every week, the last publication to be made
six months before the scheduled hearing. However, Frivaldo asked the court if the
hearing could be moved to an earlier date as he intends to participate in the May
1992 elections, the last day of filing of certificate of candidacy being March 15 1992,
a day ahead of the scheduled hearing.
The court granted his request and set the hearing on Feb 21 1991. Of this
advancement of hearing, neither publication nor posting of notice was made. Six
days after said hearing, Judge Dela Rosa rendered a decision granting Frivaldos
application and allowed him to take his oath of allegiance on that same day. To this,
petitioner Quiterio Hermo, Frivaldos rival for governorship in Sorsogon, filed a
Motion for Reconsideration alleging jurisdictional defects in the proceedings.
Subsequently, two petitions were filed mainly alleging that Frivaldo is an
American citizen and is therefore ineligible to run, and that the courts decision is
null and void for being fraught with legal infirmities. In one of the petitions,
petitioner Hermo prayed that the votes casted in favor Frivaldo be declared as stray
votes and that he be declared winner instead. These petitions were all dismissed by
Comelec on the ground that such petitions were filed out of time, as it should have
been filed within three days.
ISSUES
1.
2.
3.

W/N Comelec was correct in dismissing the petitions for being filed out
of time?
W/N the proceedings were invalid making Frivaldo not a Filipino citizen
and thus ineligible for public office?
W/N Hermo may be proclaimed winner upon nullification of Frivaldos
proclamation?

RULING
1. Comelec erred in dismissing the petitions on the ground that they were
filed out of time. The petitions, by their nature, are quo warranto. As such,
they are not covered by the 10-day appeal period provided in Sec. 253 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
2. The proceedings were invalid and Comelec should have cancelled
Frivaldos certificate of candidacy. The Court never acquired jurisdiction
over the case due to the following irregularities: (1) there was no order
published advancing the date of the hearing, (2) the petition was heard

3.

within 6 months from last publication of the petition, (3) Frivaldo took his
oath of allegiance when there was still a pending appeal , and (4) Frivaldo
did not observe the 2-year waiting period. Thus, as qualifications for public
office is a continuing requirement, once lost (citizenship), title may be
seasonably challenged.
Hermo cannot be proclaimed as winner. Well settled is the rule that upon
disqualification of the winner in an election, the second placer cannot be
proclaimed as winner having failed to obtain the mandate of the majority
of the electorate.

Quinto vs COMELEC MR
On December 1, 2009, the Supreme Court voting 8-6 declared as unconstitutional
the second provision in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369,
Section 66 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No.
8678, for being violative of the equal protection clause and for being overbroad.
The ponente of the decision was Justice Antonio B. Nachura.
On February 22, 2010, voting 10-5, the Supreme Court reversed its earlier ruling,
granted the motions for reconsideration of its December 1, 2009 decision and
upheld the constitutionality of the three provisions in election laws that deemed
appointive officials automatically resigned once they filed their certificates of
candidacy (CoCs). The ruling was penned by Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno with a
dissent from Justice Nachura.
Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Puno rationalized that the issue as to equal
protection has been addressed in the earlier case of case of Farinas v. Executive
Secretary, (G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003) where the Court stated that the
equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject
to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differently from the other. x x Substantial distinctions clearly exist between
elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of
the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and
may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an
appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent
capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of
the appointing authority. x x Another substantial distinction between the two sets
of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service
Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292),
appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly

prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any
election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or
employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in
political and electoral activities.
The Court goes on to state that By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two
classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office
of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those
occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or
look into the wisdom of this classification. x x x Since the classification justifying
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis--vis appointive officials, is
anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging
under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of
the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
In view of these pronouncements, Justice Puno states that the case at bar is a crass
attempt to resurrect a dead issue. And that the miracle is that the (our) assailed
Decision gave it new life. We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et
non quieta movere. This doctrine, which is really adherence to precedents,
mandates that once a case has been decided one way, then another case involving
exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same manner.
The Farinas ruling on the equal protection implications of the deemed-resigned
provisions cannot be minimalized as mere obiter dictum. It is trite to state that an
adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be
considered as obiter dictum. This rule applies to all pertinent questions that are
presented and resolved in the regular course of the consideration of the case and
lead up to the final conclusion, and to any statement as to the matter on which the
decision is predicated.
The concern, voiced by Justice Nachura, in his dissent, that elected officials (vis--vis
appointive officials) have greater political clout over the electorate, is indeed a
matter worth exploring but not by the Court. The remedy lies with the Legislature.
It is the Legislature that is given the authority, under our constitutional system, to
balance competing interests and thereafter make policy choices responsive to the
exigencies of the times. It is certainly within the Legislatures power to make the
deemed-resigned provisions applicable to elected officials, should it later decide
that the evils sought to be prevented are of such frequency and magnitude as to tilt
the balance in favor of expanding the class. The Court cannot and should not
arrogate unto itself the power to ascertain and impose on the people the best state
of affairs from a public policy standpoint.

Penera vs. Comelec (September 11, 2009 Decision)

Facts:
Penera and Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte in
the 14 May 2007 elections. Andanar filed a petition for disqualififcation against
Penera and other candidates in her party for unlawfully engaging in election
campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the campaign period. Andanar
alleged that Penera, together with her partymates, held a motorcade announcing
their candidacies and requesting people to vote for them during the time they filed
their certificate of candidacies.
nd
The Comelec 2
Division disqualified Penera for engaging in premature
campaigning. Penera filed an MR to the Comelec en banc which it denied. So
Penera filed this petition for certiorari.
Penera maintains that the motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned; and that
the evidence was insufficient to warrant the ruling of the Comelec.
Issue:
Whether or not Penera was guilty of premature campaigning and should therefore
be disqualified? And whether or not Comelec was guilty of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction?
Held:
Penera was indeed guilty of premature campaigning. SC denied certiorari.
Ratio:
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits premature campaigning. It states
that
It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any
party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan
political activity except during the campaign period.
Under Section 68 of the same Code, premature campaigning warrants
disqualification from continuing as a candidate or from holding office, as the case
may be.
SC ruled that it was sufficiently established that Penera and her parytmates did in
fact, after filing their COCs, participated in a motorcade wherein they waved their
hands to the public and gave away candies. Such act falls within the definition of
election campaign or partisan political activity under Section 79 (b)(2) of the OEC

holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar

assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes.
The dissenting opinion raises the legal issue that RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369,
provides a new definition of the term candidate as a result of which, premature
campaigning may no longer be committed.
Section 13 of RA 9369 states that any person who files his COC shall only be
considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period. Provided, that,
unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall effect only upon the start
of the aforesaid campaign period.
In other words, there can be no premature campaigning because there is yet a
candidate to speak of until the start of the campaign period.
The question now is how to reconcile this with Section 79 (a) of the OEC which
defines a candidate as any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office,
who has filed a COC.
SC ruled that RA9369 did not repeal the definition of a candidate in the OEC. It
found that there was neither an express nor an implied repeal hence the statutes
could be harmonized.
SC held that although it is true that a person is not yet a candidate upon filing
his/her COC and before the campaign period, such person had already explicitly
declared his/her intention to run upon filing of the COC. Such intention turns into
actuality when the campaign period begins; which means to say that it is only at the
start of the campaign period, when a person becomes an official candidate.
Nevertheless, the advantages of the acts of such candidate during the period
between filing his/her COC and prior to the start of the campaign period, which
constitutes election campaign or partisan political activity, accrues when the
campaign period begins. Hence, said acts can be given the effect of premature
campaigning only upon the start of the campaign period.
In other words, RA 9369 did not, in effect, extinguish premature campaigning, it
only deterred the effects of such partisan political activities until after the start of
the campaign period.
So a person can only be held liable for premature campaigning for partisan political
activities which were done after filing COC and before the campaign period, after
the campaign period starts.

Penera vs. Comelec (November 25, 2009 MR Decision)

SC granted MR. A person is not considered a candidate for purposes other than the
printing of ballots, until the start of the campaign period.
The SC ruled that the Sept. 11 decision reversed the decision in Lanot vs. Comelec
which held that a person who files a COC is not a candidate until the start of the
campaign period.
Section 11, RA 8436 moved the deadline for filing COCs to 120 days before election
day. The same section states that unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect upon the start of the campaign period. Under this
provision, the purpose of the early filing of COCs is to give ample time for printing of
the ballots, as shown in the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee.
Hence, Congress never intended the early deadline for filing COCs to make the
person filing such COC to become immediately a candidate for purposes other
than the printing of ballots.
So when Congress enacted RA 9369, it sought to incorporate the Lanot Doctrine
into law. Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369 states that a person who
files his COC within the early deadline shall only be considered a candidate at the
start of the campaign periodunlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate
shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period.

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC

FACTS:
ABS-CBN prepared to conduct radio-TV coverage of the national elections and to
make an exit survey of the vote during the elections for national officials and the
results to be broadcasted immediately.
COMELEC believed that such survey will conflict with COMELEC official count and
NAMFRELs unofficial quick count. Also that ABS-CBN is not authorized to undertake
such survey.
Thus, COMELEC issued a resolution for the issuance of a restraining order to
prohibit ABS-CBN from conducting an exit survey.
ABS-CBN then filed this petition contending that the prohibition restrains its
freedom of speech and of the press.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prohibition is valid

HELD/ RATIO: NO! the prohibition is invalid. The conduct of exit polls is a valid
exercise of the freedom of speech.
The constitution provides that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech and of the press. Free speech and free press consists of the liberty to discuss
publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without prior restraint.
However, such freedom is not absolute. It is subject to limitations and it is not
immune to regulation by the state in the exercise of its police power.
There are 2 tests to determine the validity of restrictions to the freedom of speech:
1) clear and present danger test the evil consequence of the comment of
utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high
before the utterance can be punished.
2) dangerous tendency rule if the words uttered create a dangerous tendency
which the state has a right to prevent then such words are punishable. In this test, it
is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness be advocated.
IN this jurisdiction, the courts use the clear and present danger test.
In this case, the restriction to conduct exit polls would curtail the freedom of
expression.
Exit polls is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or
groups of individuals for the purpose of determining the probable result of an
election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted
for, immediately after they have officially cast their ballots. The results of the
survey are announced to the public, usually through the mass media, to give an
advance overview of how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or organizations,
the electorate voted. Aside from that definition, exit polls generate important
research data which may be used to study influencing factors and trends in voting
behavior.
Thus, an absolute prohibition would be unreasonably restrictive because it
effectively prevents the use of exit poll date not only for election day projections
but also for long-term research.
As to the contention of the COMELEC that exit poll has a clear and present danger
of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process, such contention
is purely speculative and untenable.
Therefore, an absolute ban on exit polls cannot be justified. There are other valid
and reasonable ways and means to achieve the COMELEC end of avoiding and
minimizing disorder and confusion that may be brought by exit surveys. On the

contrary, exit polls can be vital tools in eliminating the evils of election-fixing and
fraud.
PETITIONER- ATTY ROQUE & BUTUYAN AND OTHER SKEPTICS ABOUT AES

MACHINES- THEY WON BUT HAD TO UNDERGO POST QUALIFICATION SCREENING

WHERE THERE PCOS MACHINE COMPLIED W/ THE SBACS 26-ITEM CRITERIA SET BY
THE COMELEC & HAD 100% ACCURACY RATING
LATER, TIM & SMARTMATIC INCORPORATED THEIR Joint Venture Corporation

RESPONDENTS- COMELEC , (NCC )NATL COMPUTER CENTER, TIM-SMARTMATIC

What? Wants TO NULLIFY THE AWARD OF AUTOMATION PROJECT TO TIMSMARTMATIC
HISTORY:
DEC 97- CONGRESS MADE RA 8436 AUTOMATION LAW
JAN 2007- PASSED RA 9369 AMENDMENT OF AUTO LAW AND FAIR ELECTION ACT
CREATED THE CAC & TEC (COMELEC ADVISORY COUNCIL & TECHNICAL EVALUATION
COMMITTEE)
2008- MANAGED TO CONDUCT AUTOMATED ELECTION IN ARMM USING CENTRAL
COUNT OPTICAL SCAN (CCOS)
MARCH 09- COMELEC SENT REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL
3 PARTS:
1.
2.
3.

PAPER BASED AES

PROVISION FOR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION OF RESULTS
OVERALL PROJECT MGT + CONTINUITY & BACK UP PLAN

FOR THE BIDDING: 2 ENVELOPE SYSTEM

ST

1 ELIGIBILITY ENVELOPE
ND
2 - BID ENVELOPE W/ 2 ENVELOPES
ST
1 - TECHNICAL PROPOSAL
ND
2 FINANCIAL PROPOSAL
SPECIAL BIDS & AWARDS COMMITTEE (SBAC) PUBLICIZED INVITATIONS W/ 10
RESPONDENTS ONLY 7 COMPLIED &ONLY 3 WERE FOUND ELIGIBLE
JOINT VENTURES HOLDING THEMSELVES SOLIDARILY LIABLE ARE ALLOWED
TO PARTICIPATE
TIM & SMARTMATIC IS A Joint Venture, TIM IS DOMESTIC CORP while SMARTMATIC
IS A FOREIGN CORP FROM BARBADOS- PROPOSED TO DELIVER 82,200 PCOS

ISSUES:
1. TIM-SMARTMATIC DIDNT SUBMIT DOCUMENTS TO ESTABLISH JVA & NO
VALID JVA
TIM & SMART IN FACT SUBMITTED THEIR JVA ON APRIL 09
IT INCLUDED THE COMPOSITION, 60-40 CAPITAL STRUCTURE
AND ALTHOUGH INCORPORATED LATE IT DIDNT VITIATE THE BID
BEC IT IS ALLOWED BY CIRCULAR
2. TIM-SMARTMATIC DIDNTY SATISFY DEFINITION OF JOINT VENTURE
ACTUALLY THEY undertook to incorporate, if called for by the
bidding results, a JVC that shall be solidarily liable with them for
any actionable breach of the automation contract
NON- INCLUSION OF THREE (3) IT PROVIDERS- ACTUALLY UNDER
INSTRUCTION TO BIDDERS THEY ARE ALLOWED TO SUBCONTRACT
3. COMELEC ABDICATED ITS MANDATE & RESPONSIBILITY
NO! THE LOSS OF CONTROL SUPPOSEDLY BEC. THE PUBLIC &
PRIVATE KEY WERE ALL GIVEN TO SMARTMATIC BEC. THE LAW
ITSELF PROVIDIED THAT THE COMPANY WITH MORE TECHNICAL
EXPERTISE SHOULD PROVIDE SERVICES BUT THE COMELEC STILL
MAINTAINED SUPERVISION & CONTROL ON CONDUCTING THE
ELECTION THRU ITS PERSONNEL & WHOEVER IT DEPUTIZES
4. NO PILOT TESTING WAS CONDUCTED
SEC. 6 OF RA 8236- SUPPOSEDLY REQUIRES THAT IT BE PILOT
TESTED IN AT LEAST 12 AREAS
NO! PILOT TESTING IS NOT REQUIRED- SEC 5 IMMEDIATELY AFTER
EFFECTIVITY SHALL BE USED IN 2 HIGLY URBANIZED CITIES & 2
PROVINCES- THE MAY 2007 DIDNT USE AES
NO AUTHORITY SAYS THAT THE PCOS MACHINE IN 2007 BE USED
FOR PILOT TESTING THOSE THAT WILL BE USED FOR 2010- NOT A
MANDATORY REQT/ PREREQUISITE FOR THE 2010 ELECTIONS
LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO HAVE 2010 FULLY AUTOMATED
REGARDLESS OF W/N PILOT TESTING WAS DONE IN 2007

5.

6.

7.

8.

PLUS GOVT KNEW THAT THE PCOS MACHINE WASNT USED IN

PILOT TESTING YET ALLOCATED 11.3 BILLION FOR ITS USE SO THEY
INTENDED THAT THERE BE AUTOMATION REGARDLESS
ALSO THE CCOS MACHINE USED IS SIMILAR TO THE PCOS
MACHINE (difference?) the ccos doesnt transmit results
PARTIAL AUTOMATION? NOPE THE LAW MANDATED FULL
AUTOMATION
PCOS DOESNT SATISY MINIMUM SYSTEM REQT
DOESNT MEET STANDARD OF COMELEC THAT IS 99.99%
ACCURATE SINCE THE SMARTMATIC WEBSITE SAID THE MACHINE
HAD 2-10% MARGIN OF ERROR
COMELEC HAS ADOPTED A RIGID TECHNICAL EVALUATION
MECHANISM OF APPLYING 26-ITEM CRITERIA- THE PCOS
MACHINE HAD A 99.99% ACCURACY
SBAC-TWG (one of the committees of the COMELEC) CONDUCTED
A TEST THAT SHOWED THE PCOS MACHINE PASSED THE DEMO
TESTS AND HAD A 99.955% ACCURACY
ALSO THE WEBPAGE IS ALREADY OUTDATED THE PCOS NOW HAS
99.99% ACCURACY
ALSO IN TERMS OF CHECKING THE RESULTS SINCE THE ELECTION
IS PAPER BASED THE ACTUAL BALLOTS CAN BE MANUALLY
COUNTED
Violate the SANCTITY OF THE BALLOT?
NO! SINCE THE VOTERS CAN STILL FEED THEIR OWN BALLOTS
INTO THE MACHINE REGARDLESS OF HOW LONG THE BALLOTS
ARE
POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-DUMMY LAW
SINCE THE 60% FILIPINO OWN REQT ON THE JOINT VENTURE
BIDDER * SMARTMATIC OWNS 40% EQUITY ON THE JV & THEN IN
SMARTMATIC TIM CORP.
COURT SAYS NO LAW REQUIRING THAT THE PROVIDING OF
MACHINES FOR AUTMOMATED ELECTIONS TO BE OWNED 60% BY
FILIPINOS & NOT CLASSIFIED AS A NATIONAL ACTIVITY
POSSIBILITY OF HACKING
POSSIBILITY OF HACKING IS SLIM SINCE ITS ONLY IN THE 2
MINUTE INTERVAL OF THE TRANSMISSION AND WOULD REQUIRE
A SUPER COMPUTER

ALSO THE MEMORY CARD IS READ ONLY AND CANNOT BE

WRITTEN OVER
IT HAS ALSO PROVIDED FOR A CONTINUITY PLAN PF PROVIDING
2000 SPARE PCOS MACHINES & IN THE CASE THAT ALL 82000
UNITS FAIL TO RESORT TO MANUAL COUNTING