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reserve
Nederveen, 7
(Jan, professor of global studies and sociology at UC Santa Barbara, Political and
Economic Brinkmanship, Review of International Political Economy 14:3)
The exercise of American
grain millsall these and more will need to be destroyed to deny the enemy its support base. Landmines will be massively
reintroduced to seal borders and mountain passes. . . such actions will yield large civilian casualties, displaced
populations, and refugee flows. . . (2004: 24142). Ralph Peters, a former army intelligence Major assigned to future
war, who is widely admired in security circles for his outspokenness, outdoes George Kennan by formulating a
philosophy of constant conflict in these terms: We are entering a new American century, in which we will
become still wealthier, culturally more lethal, and increasingly powerful.We will excite hatreds without precedent. . . .
The de facto role of the US armed forces will be to keep the world safe for
our economy and open to our cultural assault. To those ends, we will do a
fair amount of killing (1997; cf. Peters, 2002, 2005). In an article titled Stability, Americas enemy Peters
notes, Our insistence on stability above all stands against the tides of history, and that is always a losing proposition. . .
Historically, instability abroad has been to Americas advantage, bringing us enhanced prestige and influence, safe-haven
seeking investment, a peerless national currency, and flows of refugees that have proven to be rivers of diamonds. . .
(2001: 5). He criticizes diplomatic tradition and realism as morally corrupt and not in the national interest, and discusses
several regions in which the quest for stability may prove antithetical to American interests, such as the Balkans, Russia
(demand an accountable Russia), China (A fractured, squabbling China would be less threatening to US strategic
interests in the region and might well emerge as a far more advantageous business partner (or partners)), Africa
(separatism is a natural and healthy force, until it is perverted by delay), the Middle East (would a peaceful resolution of
the Middle East confrontation benefit the US, after all? . . . wouldntwelose critical leverage?), Indonesia (the ultimate
illogical state. . . [the US should] manage and facilitate Indonesias breakup). Striking in this perspective is the
casual mix of moral sounding arguments (what on earth iswrong with people wanting their freedom,
20) and American self interest. The net effect is geopolitical opportunism
crudely masquerading as democracy, with large helpings of opinion
unhindered by area knowledge, unlimited self confidence (we are a phenomenally
strong and resilient nation, 19) and plain aggression. In November 2004 Peters told Fox News that in Falluja
the best outcome, frankly, is if theyre all killed (Drayton, 2006). (470-1)
. Since the United States and the Soviet Union initiated the Cold War in the wake of World War II, people have been accustomed to employing such adjectives as bi-polar, uni-polar or multi-polar to
the essence of
the current trend of multi-polarization is the rapid diffusion of
international economic and political powers.
illustrate the evolution of the power structure of contemporary international politics. Compared with the bi-polar framework during the Cold War and the uni-polar one in the post-Cold War era,
However, the complexity of the political and economic implications of the multi-polarization goes
far beyond a power diffusion. This is because such multi-polarization occurred in the process of fast and forceful economic globalization in the post-Cold War era, and there has been a symbiosis between the pattern of the new multi-polar world
and economic integration. Currently,
The United
States hegemonic status
has conspicuously weakened global
centers of power have emerged. The old international political and
economic regimes are increasingly out of sync with the new realities of
international relations.
the advantaged positions of the United States
have
declined
fundamentally shaken the world power regime that centered around the United States as the sole superpower. We can see the simultaneous progress of both economic integration and power diffusion.
, or its dominance of international affairs,
. More
There has been a major change in the strength of the worlds major economies and a number of emerging economies have arisen in the rapid globalization process. As
such,
relatively
, resulting in changes
in the macro structure of international economic powers, as well as an increasingly multi-polar pattern. There has also been a diversification of development modes, which have received increasing recognition and changed the US-led political and
economic monopoly over the post-Cold War world.
countries.
. The main countries that make up the present-day multi-polar economic structure include the United States, European Union, Japan, Russia, China,
India, and Brazil (the aggregate GDP of the seven economies accounted for two-thirds of the worlds in 2011.) The United States and China, respectively the biggest developed country and the biggest emerging economy, with the largest and
second-largest GDP, have become the two most influential players in the world economy (aggregate GDP of the United States and China accounted for a third of the worlds in 2011). A great number of important intermediate countries are also
playing increasingly active roles, constituting another significant part of the multi-polarizing regime (they include the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Mexico, and Australia).
historical
transition
We
, which will roughly run through the second decade of the 21st century. This period of historical transition is of
significant changes way before all parties were prepared. The sudden prominence of the conflicting and divergent aspects of state -to-state relations has led to strategic competition between major countries. The parties poor preparedness and
inability to adapt have resulted in anxiety and fear, as well as anxiety caused by changes in comparative strength and more intensive competition. This is likely to create an upsurge of extreme nationalism, radical nationalism, or narrow
nationalism. During such a period, countries adjustments of their foreign strategies are accompanied by domestic changes and reforms in their politics and economy. The interweaving of internal and external contradictions is highly complicated,
resulting in extraordinarily fierce internal disputes. In China, for instance, the unprecedented diversification of social interests, plus the increasing transparency brought by an information society have brought about unprecedented multi-party
competition, and a substantial impact of public opinion on government decision-making. Such a period is full of uncertainty, unpredictability and multiple possibilities. The competition between the countries boils downs to their capabilities for
grasping macro trends, enduring internal and external pressures, and for internal coordination and rapid responses. Most countries need to retain control over the escalation of mutual competition. Maintainin g the basic stability of international
economic, political and security conditions is also a consensus among major countries, which constitutes the basis for cooperation. The Asia-Pacific has generally sustained regional peace and stability in the more than 20 years since the Cold
War. Robust economic progress and the fact that economic and trade collaboration has dominated state-to-state relations in the Asia-Pacific have to a great extent concealed problems in the security arena, and also distracted us from the
ineffectiveness or defects of Asias existing framework of security cooperation. It is a common wish to preserve the overall stability of regional security conditions. And, the positive aspect of cooperation is on the rise. Meanwhile, security concer ns
have become highly uncertain. In the face of unstable and uncertain factors, strategic hedging is also on the rise, causing tension. Under the complex circumstances of national transformation, with an increase in pressure during the transitional
period, diplomacy has been unprecedentedly affected . Peace, security, and stability are basic preconditions for ensuring sustainable economic progress in the Asia-Pacific. Setting up a region-wide and effective regional security framework is an
attractive option, although unachievable in the short term. Yet from an optimistic perspective, perhaps we are in a transitional stage proceeding towards such a goal. Compared with other areas, the Asia-Pacific is the most vibrant, multivariate,
and diverse region. And development is extremely imbalanced here. Asia-Pacific countries may share the macro goal of building an extensive and comprehensive regional security framework. But, there are huge divergences over the path to
achieving it. It will take a considerably long time to explore, rally consensus, and create conditions through the further development of economic, political and security relations. At present and even through the second decade of the 21st century,
security conditions in the Asia-Pacific will display the following characteristics: A certain degree of imbalance and disorder; Some existing non-universal security dialogue platforms and mechanisms; The actions of major countries will attract
even more attention. The United States will modify its strategies in the face of new conditions; in step with the conspicuous rise in its status and impacts, China actively deliberates on and explores how to play a new role; the ASEAN, as the sole
commonwealth in the region, strives to play a peculiar role. During the transitional period, security relations between countries and the countries actions will be on two parallel tracks: Countries will manage and control the situation, take
advantage of existing mechanisms to enhance dialogue, properly handle differences and sensitive issues, and maintain general stability of the overall situation; Countries will deliberate on and explore effective approaches to improving security
relations and regional security conditions, including concepts and possible formats of a universal regional security framework. This calls for courage to transcend past mindsets and ways of thinking, as well as endeavors to find converging points
of common interests, discover new realms of collaboration, and build mutual trust through consecutive successes in pragmatic cooperation. Another major trend accompanying the multi-polarization of international economic and political
conditions is the eastward shift of the worlds economic and political gravity center, from the two sides of the Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific. This is a historic change, which may very likely become the prelude to a new historical cycle in economic,
political, and cultural development in the 21st century. The Asia-Pacific has become the most important engine for world economic growth, the rise of Asia as a whole is of more historic significance than that of China alone.