HIZON et al.

VS CA
G.R. No. 119619
December 13, 1996
FACTS:
HIZON et al. were charged with violating PD 704 for supposedly fishing without the use of a poisonous
substance (sodium cyanide). A report that some fishing boats were fishing by "muro ami" led to
the apprehension of such boat (F/B Robinson), where Hizon et al were present. The police(PNP Maritime
Command and the Task Force Bantay Dagat) directed the boat captain to get random samples of the fish from
the fish cage for testing. The initial results tested the fish positive for sodium cyanide and that was the basis
of the information against Hizon et al. However, a second set of fish samples yielded a negative result on the
sodium cyanide.
Petitioners were arraigned and they pled not guilty to the charge. As defense, they claimed that they are
legitimate fishermen of the First Fishermen Industries, Inc., a domestic corporation licensed to engage in
fishing. They alleged that they catch fish by the hook and line method and that they had used this method for
one month and a half in the waters of Cuyo Island.
Notwithstanding this, the RTC found Hizon et al. guilty and sentenced them to imprisonment and forfeiture of
the fishes. The CA affirmed this decision. Hizon et al., together with the Solicitor general now question
the admissibility of the evidence against petitioners in view of the warrantless search of the fishing boat and
the subsequent arrest of petitioners.
Issues:
W/N fish samples seized by the NBI in the F/B Robinson without a search warrant are admissible in
evidence.
W/N Hizon et al., are guilty of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances.
HELD:
1. As a general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding. The rule is, however, subject to certain exceptions. Search and seizures without search
warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws have been the traditional exception to the
constitutional requirement of a search warrant. The same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing
vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws.
2. Not Guilty. Petitioners were charged with illegal fishing penalized under sections 33 and 38 of P.D. 704
which provide as follows:
Sec. 33. Illegal fishing, illegal possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing; dealing in illegally caught
fish or fishery/aquatic products. -- It shall be unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to be
caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives,
obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (l), (m) and (d),
respectively, of section 3 hereof: Provided, That mere possession of such explosives with intent to use the
same for illegal fishing as herein defined shall be punishable as hereinafter provided: Provided, That the
Secretary may, upon recommendation of the Director and subject to such safeguards and conditions he
deems necessary, allow for research, educational or scientific purposes only, the use of explosives, obnoxious
or poisonous substance or electricity to catch, take or gather fish or fishery/aquatic products in the specified
area: Provided, further, That the use of chemicals to eradicate predators in fishponds in accordance with
accepted scientific fishery practices without causing deleterious effects in neighboring waters shall not be
construed as the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance within the meaning of this section: Provided,
finally, That the use of mechanical bombs for killing whales, crocodiles, sharks or other large dangerous
fishes, may be allowed, subject to the approval of the Secretary.
In this case, the only basis for the charge of fishing with poisonous substance is the result of the first NBI
laboratory test on the four fish specimens. The apprehending officers who boarded and searched the boat did
not find any sodium cyanide nor any poisonous or obnoxious substance. Neither did they find any trace of the
poison in the possession of the fishermen or in the fish cage itself. Under the circumstances of the case,
however, this finding does not warrant the infallible conclusion that the fishes in the F/B Robinson, or even
the same four specimens, were caught with the use of sodium cyanide.
Apparently, it was the police who were the ones engaged in an illegal fishing expedition."Muro ami", as what
was reported the fishermen were doing, is made with "the use of a big net with sinkers to make the net
submerge in the water with the fishermen surround[ing] the net." This method of fishing needs approximately
two hundred (200) fishermen to execute.
What the apprehending officers instead discovered were twenty eight (28) fishermen in their sampans fishing
by hook and line. The authorities found nothing on the boat that would have indicated any form of illegal
fishing. All the documents of the boat and the fishermen were in order. It was only after the fish specimens
were tested, albeit under suspicious circumstances, that petitioners were charged with illegal fishing with the
use of poisonous substances.

Heirs of Navarro v. IAC

Facts
On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application for foreshore lease covering a tract of foreshore
land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately seventeen (17) hectares. This application
was denied on January 15, 1953. So was his motion for reconsideration. Subsequently, petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of
Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially the
application was denied, eventually however the grant was given. Pascual claimed that this land is an
accretion to his property, The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at the
Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso
Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian owner. On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented
by the Assistant Solicitor General, filed an opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his
predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the same being a portion of the
public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines. On November 10, 1975, the courta
quorendered judgment finding the subject property to be foreshore land and, being a part of the public
domain, it cannot be the subject of land registration proceedings. On appeal, the respondent court reversed
the findings of the courta quoand granted the petition for registration of the subject property but excluding
certain areas. A motion for reconsideration was filed by in the CA but the same was denied. Anchoring their
claim of ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code, petitioners vigorously argue that the disputed 14-hectare
land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their course on
the eastern and western boundaries, respectively, of petitioners' own tract of land.
Issue
Whether or not the petitioners can rightfully claim the land under the principle of accretion
Held
The petitioners claim is misplaced. The principle of accretion is only applicable to owners whose estates are
adjacent to rivers as stated in Article 457 of the Civil Code. The disputed land is an accretion not on a river
bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own
tract of land on the northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of to Civil Code but Article 4
of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. The disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay being
an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the disputed property is, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters
of 1866, part of the public domain. As part of the public domain, the herein disputed land is intended for
public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to the national domain and is reserved for public
uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by any private person, except through express authorization
granted in due form by a competent authority. "Only the executive and possibly the legislative departments
have the right and the power to make the declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer
necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause of establishment of special industries or for coast
guard services. Petitioners utterly fail to show that either the executive or legislative department has already
declared the disputed land as qualified, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the
property of petitioners as owners of the estates adjacent thereto.
People vs. Vergara (April 2, 1997)
Facts:
On July 4, 1992, in Palo, Leyte, Vergara et. al., without any authority of law, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally catch, take
and gather fish belonging to the anchovies species known locally as bolinao, with the use of explosives
contained in a bottle and called in the vernacular as badil.
A badil contains ammonium nitrate which indiscriminately kills schools and various species of fish within a
certain radius when ignited with a blasting cap.
All the accused were apprehended. The fishing boat and fishnets of bolinao were impounded.
Vergara alone was arraigned and brought to trial while his co-accused escaped and remained at large.
The trial court sentenced Vergara to a penalty of twenty (20) years to life imprisonment as punished under
Sec. 2, of PD 1058.
Vergara appealed.
Issue:
WoN Vergara et. al. are guilty of the offense charged.
Held:
Yes. Under Section 33 of PD 704, as amended by PD 1058, illegal fishing; illegal possession of explosives
intended for illegal fishing; dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. - it shall be unlawful
for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic
products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of
electricity
xxx-It was further concluded by an Agricultural Technologist and Fish Examiner working with the Department of
Agriculture that explosives were indeed used, as manifested by the result of the fish samples, to wit: samples
showed ruptured capillaries, ruptured and blooded abdominal portion, and crushed internal organs.
The decision of the lower court was affirmed.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO,
HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR.
March 16, 1994. G.R. No. 110120
Facts:
The residents of Tala Estate, Brgy.Camarin, Caloocan City raised a complaint with the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA), seeking to stop the operation of the City Government of Caloocan of an
8.6 hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, due to its harmful effects on the health of the
residents and the pollution of the surrounding water.
LLDA conducted an investigation and discovered that the City Government of Caloocan has been
maintaining the open dumpsite at the Camarin Area without a requisite Environmental Compliance
Certificate from the DENR. They also found the water to have been directly contaminated by the
operation of the dumpsite.
LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order against the City Government and other entities to completely
stop from dumping any form of garbage and other waste matter on the Camarin dumpsite.
The City Government went to the RTC of Caloocan City to file an action for the declaration of nullity of
the cease and desist order and sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the
health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its
territorial jurisdiction.
LLDA sought to dismiss the complaint, invoking the Pollution Control Law that the review of cease and
desist orders of that nature falls under the Court of Appeals and not the RTC.
RTC denied LLDAs motion to dismiss, and issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining LLDA from
enforcing the cease and desist order during the pendency of the case.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the LLDA has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist
order enjoining the dumping of garbage.
The residents seek a review of the decision.
Issue:
WON the LLDA and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the complaint against
the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City
Government of Caloocan.
Ruling:
YES. LLDA has authority. LLDA is specifically mandated under RA 4850 to carry out the declared national
policy of promoting the development and growth of the Laguna Lake area and other surrounding
provinces with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control,
preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological
disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by
virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake
region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the
surrounding areas.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court and permanently ordered the city government to stop garbage
dumping operations in the area.
On balancing the interest of the city government as against the individual citizens, the Court stated that the
immediate response to the demands of the necessities of protecting vital public interests gives vitality to the
statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the 1987 Constitution.
Article II, Section 16 which provides:
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-impairment. This
is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state to protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay
GR No. 171947-48
December 18, 2008
FACTS:
The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way
below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or
the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily
liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for
swimming, diving, and other forms of contact recreation.
ISSUES:
(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Cleanup Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited
only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents;
(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.
HELD:
PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.-Where the quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree where it s state

will adversely affect its best u sage, the government agencies concerned shall
take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the
prescribed water quality standards. Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the
responsibility of the polluter to contain , remove and clean up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the
government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and
expenses incurred in said operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or entities responsible
for such pollution.
(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies
concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when
a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary,
Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water
quality has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage. Section 17 & 20
are of general application and are not for specific pollution incidents only. The fact that the pollution of the
Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well -nigh impossible to draw the
line between a specific and a general pollution incident.
(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the implementation
of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or
the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may
be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial discipline describes as continuing
mandamus , the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of
ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference.
This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is institutionalized in the rules of procedure for
environmental cases.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner vs. NHA, Respondents
G.R. No. 164527
Facts:
Solicitor General Francisco Chavez petitioned the Court directy, among other things, access to all
documents and information relating to the Smokey Montain Development and Reclamation Project including
its underlying Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) between the National Housing Authority (NHA), a government
body, and the R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI).
Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for eventual development into a
low cost housing complex and industrial/commercial site. RBI is expected to fully finance the development of
Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40 hectares of the land at the Manila Bay Area. The latter together with the
commercial area to be built on Smokey Mountain will be owned by RBI as enabling components. If the project
is revoked or terminated by the Government through no fault of RBI or by mutual agreement, the Government
shall compensate RBI for its actual expenses incurred in the Project plus a reasonable rate of return not
exceeding that stated in the feasibility study and in the contract as of the date of such revocation,
cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be agreed upon by both parties.
The SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the project involves clearing, levelling-off
the dumpsite, and construction of temporary housing units for the current residents on the cleared and
levelled site. Phase II involves the construction of a fenced incineration area for the on-site disposal of the
garbage at the dumpsite.
Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the JVA was amended and
restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the design changes and additional work to be done to successfully
implement the project. The original 3,500 units of temporary housing were decreased to 2,992. The
reclaimed land as enabling component was increased from 40 hectares to 79 hectares, which was supported
by the issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by President Ramos. The revision also provided for the 119-hectare
land as an enabling component for Phase II of the project.
Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made the establishment of an
incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at Smokey Mountain necessary. On August 1, 1998, the
project was suspended, to be later reconstituted by President Estrada in MO No. 33.
On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby both parties
agreed to terminate the JVA and subsequent agreements. During this time, NHA reported that 34 temporary
housing structures and 21 permanent housing structures had been turned over by RBI.
Issues:

1.
Whether or not neither respondent NHA nor respondent R-II Builders may validly reclaim
foreshore and submerged land.
2.
Whether or not respondent R-II Builders cannot acquire the reclaimed foreshore and
submerged land areas.
3.
Whether or not the Clean Air Act struck down the Phase-II of the Project.
Held:
1.
Yes,the DENR is deemed to have granted the authority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain
Project for the DENR is one of the members of the EXECOM which provides reviews for the project. ECCs and
Special Patent Orders were given by the DENR which are exercises of its power of supervision over the project.

Furthermore, it was the President via the abovementioned MOs that originally authorized the reclamation. It
must be noted that the reclamation of lands of public domain is reposed first in the Philippine President.
The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and disposable via MO 415 issued by President Aquino
and Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 by President Ramos.Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly states that the NHA
can acquire property rights and interests and encumber or otherwise dispose of them as it may deem
appropriate.
2.
No, R-II Builders cannot acquire the land. When the lands were transferred to the NHA, these
were considered Patrimonial lands of the state, by which it has the power to sell the same to any qualified
person.
3.
The court find that the March 19, 1993 JVA between NHA and RBI and the SMDRP embodied
in the JVA, the subsequent amendments to the JVA and all other agreements signed and executed in relation
to it, including, but not limited to, the September 26, 1994 Smokey Mountain Asset Pool Agreement and the
agreement on Phase I of the Project as well as all other transactions which emanated from the Project, have
been shown to be valid, legal, and constitutional. Phase II has been struck down by the Clean Air Act.
GREATER METROPOLITAN MANILA SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE and the METRO
MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. JANCOM ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION and JANCOM
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS PTY. LIMITED OF AUSTRALIA
494 SCRA 280 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales J.)
If the contract provides that it shall be effective until and unless it is approved by the President, the
same shall first be approved to be valid and enforceable.
FACTS: President Fidel Ramos issued Presidential Memorandum Order no. 202 creating an Executive
Committee (EC) to oversee and develop waste-to-energy projects for the waste disposal sites in Rizal and
Carmona under the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme. Respondent Jancom International Development
Projects Pty. Limited of Australia was one of the bidders for the Rizal Site which subsequently entered into a
partnership with its co-respondent Asea Brown Boveri under the firm name Jancom Environmental
Corporation (JANCOM). Consequently, EC declared JANCOM as the sole complying bidder of the Rizal Waste
Disposal Site hence a Contract for the BOT implementation of the Solid Waste Management Project for the
Rizal Site was entered between Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management Committee
(GMMSWMC) and Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA), and JANCOM. The contract was submitted
for approval to President Ramos who subsequently endorsed it to then incoming President Joseph E. Estrada.
Owing to the clamor of the residents of Rizal, the Estrada administration ordered the closure of the San Mateo
landfill. GMMSWMC thereupon adopted a Resolution not to pursue the contract with JANCOM, citing as
reasons therefore the passage of Republic Act 8749, otherwise known as the Clean Air Act of 1999, the nonavailability of the San Mateo site, and costly tipping fees.
JANCOM filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City to declare the GMMSWMC
Resolution and the acts of MMDA calling for the bids for and authorizing the forging of a new contract for the
Metro Manila waste management as illegal, unconstitutional and void, and to enjoin them from implementing
the Resolution and making another award. The trial court ruled in favor of JANCOM which was subsequently
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court declared the contract valid and perfected, albeit
ineffective and unimplementable pending the approval by the President.
JANCOM and MMDA later entered into negotiations to modify certain provisions of the contract which were
embodied in a draft Amended Agreement which bore no signature of the parties. JANCOM then filed before
the Pasig City RTC an Omnibus Motion for a writ of execution which upon its issuance, was challenged by
GMMSWMC and MMDA. The Court of Appeals however affirmed the RTC Order.
ISSUE: Whether or not contract is ineffective and unimplentable until and unless it is approved by the
President
HELD: The only question before the Court is whether or not there is a valid and perfected contract between
the parties. As to necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the contract, these are outside the realm of judicial
adjudication. These considerations are primarily and exclusively a matter for the President to decide. While
the Court recognizes that the garbage problem is a matter of grave public concern, it can only declare that the
contract in question is a valid and perfected one between the parties, but the same is still ineffective or
unimplementable until and unless it is approved by the President, the contract itself providing that such
approval by the President is necessary for its effectivity.
In issuing the alias writ of execution, the trial court in effect ordered the enforcement of the contract despite
this Courts unequivocal pronouncement that albeit valid and perfected, the contract shall become effective
only upon approval by the President.

Hilarion Henares vs. LTFRB and DOTC,

G.R. No. 158290
FACTS:
Petitioners challenge this court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents LTFRB (Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board) and DOTC (Department of Transportation and
Communication) to require public utility vehicles to use Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) as alternative.
Petitioners alleged that the particulate matters-Complex mixture of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid
droplets, varying in sizes and composition emitted into air from various engine combustions- have caused
detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life. Petitioners also allege
that the energy and transport sectors are likely to remain the major source of harmful emissions and that an
increasing number of victims of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD) was due to the emissions of
PUVs.Petitioners upholds the decision from Oposa vs. Factoran , Sec. 16 of Art. II of 1987 Constitution and
R.A. No. 8749 otherwise known as Philippine air act of 1999.
Solicitor General (SG) sought that the petition to issue a merit of mandamus be dismissed, alleging
that mandamus is only available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty.
Hence, reiterates by SG that LTFRB and DOTC are not in the position to compel PUVs to use CNG as an
alternative fuel. The SG explains that the function of the DOTC is limited to implementing the emission
standards set forth in R.A. 8749 and the said law only goes as far as setting the maximum limit for the
emission of vehicles, but it does not recognize CNG as an alternative fuel.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondent is the agency responsible to implement the suggested alternative
fuel or requiring the PUVs to use CNG?
2. Whether or not the respondent can be compelled to require PUVs to use CNG through a writ of
mandamus?
HELD:
The court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that
imposes indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of writ of mandamus compelling the
use of CNG for PUVs. The SC agrees with the findings of SG. Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and
adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to
require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically
enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order
owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii),
Section 4 to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators
of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys It appears to us that more properly, the legislature should
provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners
before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.
Salalima vs. ECC and SSS
G.R. No. 146360
FACTS:
Petitioners husband, Juancho S. Salalima, was employed for twenty-nine years as a route helper and
subsequently as route salesman of Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Incorporated. For the considerable stretch of
Juanchos stay at Coca-Cola, he was found to be suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis. Several months
before his demise, he was diagnosed with Adenocarcinoma of the lungs. A little over two weeks before his
death, Juancho was afflicted with pneumonia.
Petitioner filed a claim for compensation benefits under PD 626 with SSS. SSS denied the claim because
allegedly the cause of death was not work connected. Petitioner brought the matter to ECC, which affirmed
the decision of SSS.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals arguing that Juanchos route as a salesman exposed him to all
kinds of pollutants. Petitioner cited the raison dtre for the passage of Republic Act No. 8749, otherwise
known as the Clean Air Act. Petitioner stated that the Act provides for a comprehensive pollution control
policy that mainly concentrates on the prohibition of leaded gasoline due to its scientifically proven
deleterious effect on the health of individuals. Petitioner likewise attached a clipping from the newspaper
Manila Standard containing a report stating that if the present level of diesel exhaust continues, the pollution
could be expected to cause more than 125,000 cases of lung cancer in 70 years.
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the ECC. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to death benefits under PD 626 as amended.
HELD:
P.D. No. 626 provides that for the sickness and resulting disability or death to be compensable, the claimant
must prove that: (a) the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the
Rules on Employees Compensation, or (b) the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the claimants
working conditions.

Cancer of the lungs is not among the listed occupational disease under Juanchos line of work. However,
petitioner can still claim death benefits if she can prove that Juanchos risk of contracting the disease was
increased by the latters working conditions. What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a
direct causal relation.
In Juanchos case, this probability exists. Juanchos job required long hours on the streets as well as his
carrying of cases of soft drinks during sales calls. The combination of fatigue and the pollutants that abound
in his work environment verily contributed to the worsening of his already weak respiratory system. His
continuous exposure to these factors may have led to the development of his cancer of the lungs.
Wherefore the claim for death benefits is granted.
SJS V Atienza
G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007
FACTS:
On November 20, 2001, the SangguniangPanlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027 and Atienza
passed it the following day. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and
desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. These
were the Pandacan oil depots of Shell and Caltex.
But the city of Manila and the DOE entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which only scaled
down the property covered by the depots and did not stop their operations. In the same resolution, the
Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. It was
extended to 2003.
Petitioners filed for mandamus in SC urging the city to implement Ordinance 8027. Respondents defense is
that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions and that the MOU was more
of a guideline to 8027.
Issues:
1. Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of
the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. Whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027
Held: Yes to both, Petition granted
1. Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court- mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal
right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act
required to be done.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or
over which a substantial doubt exists. Unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not
issue. When a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the
people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they
need not show any specific interest. Petitioners are citizens of manila and thus have a direct interest in the
ordinances.
On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce
all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. "One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the
chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed
by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute
imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public
business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and
ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers
of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
2. Need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No.
8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force
and effect only until April 30, 2003.