Case 1: People vs.

Jojo Grey
Facts:
An Information for Murder was filed against Joseph Grey, Francis Grey; and two others
for the death of Rolando Diocton, an employee of the San Jorge municipal government. The
Information was accompanied by other supporting documents and a motion for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. Respondents filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice. Meanwhile,
RTC Branch 41 Presiding Judge Rosario Bandal denied the motion for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest. Bandal found the prosecutions evidence to be insufficient to link respondents to the
crime charged. She directed the prosecution to present, within five days, additional evidence that
would show that accused were the assailants or that they conspired, confederated, or helped in
the commission of the crime charged. Prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
Inhibition of Judge Bandal. Judge inhibited herself but denied the MR. The prosecutor then filed
for a change of venue alleging that Judge Navidad was a pawn in political persecution which was
then denied by the Court. Judge Navidad then proceeded with the preliminary inquiry on the
existence of probable cause and ruled that the finding of probable cause was supported by the
evidence on record. He then issued warrants of arrest against respondents and all but one of
their co-accused. Respondents alleged that Judge Navidad gravely abused his discretion and
seeking TRO.
ISSUE:
WON Judge Natividad gravely abuse his discretion for issuing the order and warrant of arrest.
WON Judge Natividad violates the constitutional mandate for the determination of probable cause.
Ruling:
The CA correctly ruled that respondents were not guilty of forums hopping when they filed the two actions.
Respondents raised different issues and sought different reliefs in the two actions, although both have the same facts.
Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in the other. The elements of res judicita are: (a) the former judgment must be final;
(b) the court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; (c) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject
matter, and cause of action. The Court ruled that Judge Natividad did not gravely abuse his discretion in issuing
warrant of arrest. His personal determination revealed no improper motive on the part of the prosecution and no
circumstance which would overwhelm presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. Judge
Natividad complied with constitution to personally determine the complainant and witnesses for probable cause
before issuing the warrant of arrest. The Court ruled that personal determination of complainant and witnesses is not
mandatory and indispensable in determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest.
Case 2: Borlonga vs. Pena
Facts:
Respondent Magdaleno Pea instituted a civil case for recovery of agents compensation
and expenses, damages, and attorneys fees, against Urban Bank and the petitioners, before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago City.- Respondent anchored his claim for
compensation on the contract of agency, allegedly entered into with the petitioners wherein the
former undertook to perform such acts necessary to prevent any intruder and squatter from
unlawfully occupying Urban Banks property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City.Petitioners filed a MD arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel.Attached to the MD were the following documents:1. A letter dated December 19, 1994 signed by
Herman Ponce and Julie Abad on behalf of Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original
owner of the subject property;2. An unsigned letter dated December 7, 1994 addressed to
Corazon Bejasa from MarilynG. Ong;3. A letter dated December 9, 1994 addressed to Teodoro
Borlongan and signed by Marilyn G. Ong; and4. A Memorandum dated November 20, 1994 from
Enrique Montilla III.- The above stated documents were presented in an attempt to show that the
respondent was appointed as agent by ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the petitioners.Respondent Pea filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bago City.

He claimed that said documents were falsified because the alleged signatories did not actually
affix their signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders nor officers and employees of
ISCI. Worse, petitioners introduced said documents as evidence before the RTC knowing
thatthey were falsified.-City Prosecutors Report (Sept 23, 1998) : In the report, the Prosecutor
concluded that the petitioners were probably guilty of four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing
Falsified Documents penalized by the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC). The City Prosecutor concluded that the documents were falsified because the
alleged signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI was the principal of the respondent; that
petitioners knew that the
documents were falsified considering that the signatories were mere dummies; and that the
documents formed part of the record of Civil Case No. 754 where they were used by petitioners
as evidence in support of their motion to dismiss, adopted in their answer and later, in their PreTrial Brief. Subsequently, the corresponding Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Bago City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 6683,
6684, 6685,and 6686. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants for the arrest of the
petitioners.-Petitioners (Oct `1, 1998) filed an Omnibus MQ : They insist that they were denied
due process because of the non-observance of a proper procedure on preliminary investigation
prescribed in the Rules of Court; since no such counter-affidavit and supporting documents were
submitted bythe petitioners, the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and
attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in contravention of the
Rules. Moreover they claim that the respondents affidavit was not based on the latters personal
knowledge and therefore should not have been used by the court in determining probable cause.On the same day that the Omnibus MQ was filed, the petitioners posted bail. Their bail bonds
expressly provided that they do not intend to waive their right to question the validity of their
arrest. On the date of arraignment, the petitioners refused to enter their plea, for the obvious
reason that the legality of their information and their arrest was yet to be settled by the court.MTCCs answer (in response to Omnibus MQ filed by petitioners): They upheld the validity of the
warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in accordance with the Rules. Besides, (according to
the MTCC) petitioners could no longer question the validity of the warrant since they already
posted bail.
Issue: Whether or not the Respondent is denied due process of law when he was not able to
submit his Counter Affidavit because there was no Preliminary Investigation.
Ruling:
The following sections of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure are relevant
to the aforesaid issues: SECTION 1. Definition. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the
purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. SEC. 3. Procedure. Except as provided for in Section 7
hereof, no complaint or information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a
preliminary investigation having been first conducted in the following manner:(a) The complaint shall state the known
address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other
supporting documents, in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies of the official file. The
said affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath,
or, in their absence or unavailability, a notary public, who must certify that he personally examined the
affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
SEC. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts not covered
by the Rule on Summary Procedure. (a) Where filed with the fiscal. If the complaint is filed directly
with the fiscal or state prosecutor, the procedure outlined in Section 3 (a) of this Rule shall be observed. The
Fiscal shall take appropriate action based on the affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the
complainant. Records show that the prosecutor relied merely on the affidavits submitted by the
complainant and did not require the petitioners to submit their answer. He should not be faulted
for doing such as this is sanctioned by the rules. Moreover, he is not mandated to require the
submission of counter-affidavits. Probable cause may then be determined on the basis alone of
the affidavits and supporting documents of the complainant, without infringing on the

constitutional rights of the petitioners.-Regarding the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners
contend that the warrants were illegally issued as they were solely based on the affidavits of the
complainant. Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution underscores the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. But the
judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the
basis thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of probable cause;
and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutors report
and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. There is no provision or procedural rule which
makes the submission of counter-affidavits mandatory before the judge could determine probable
cause. For issue number 2:- For the issuance of a warrant of arrest, probable cause has been
defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested. It is one of the requisites for a warrant of arrest to be valid.- On the basis of the abovestated documents (in the facts) and on the strength of the affidavit executed by the respondent,
the prosecutor concluded that probable cause exists. These same affidavit and documents were
used by the trial court in issuing the warrant of arrest.-The SC finds the complaint-affidavit and
attachments insufficient to support the existence of probable cause. The respondents claims of
the falsity of the documents were mere assertions.- It must be emphasized that the affidavit of the
complainant, or any of his witnesses, shall allege facts within their (affiants) personal knowledge.
The allegation of the respondent that the signatures were falsified does not qualify as personal
knowledge. Nowhere in said affidavit did respondent state that he was present at the time of the
execution of the documents. Neither did he claim that he was familiar with the signatures of the
signatories. He simply made a bare assertion-A finding of probable cause need not be based on
clear and convincing evidence, or on evidence beyond reasonable doubt. It does not require that
the evidence would justify conviction. Nonetheless, although the determination of probable cause
requires less than evidence which would justify conviction, it should at least be more than mere
suspicion. While probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a need to
examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential accuseds
constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect the State
from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials
arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges.

Case 3: Tamargo vs. Awingan

Facts:
An Information for murder was filed against Awingan, the gunman, Llyod Antiporda, the
ex-mayor and his son Licerio Antiporda Jr, the mayor of Cagayan, as masterminds of the killings
of Atty. Tamargo and his eight year old daughter. Probable cause was well-founded against
Columna, through the affidavit executed by a certain Reynaldo Geron. The former also executed
an affidavit wherein he admitted his participation as the look out during the shooting.
Respondents denied any involvement of the killings alleging that the case against them was
instituted to derail Licerio Antipordas candidacy for Atty. Tamargo was their political rival for the
mayoralty post. A clarificatory hearing was set to enable Columna to clarify his contradictory
affidavits when the latter during the preliminary investigation, disowned the contents of his
affidavit and narrated how he has been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession. The
investigating prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges, which was approved by the
city prosecutor.
Petitioner, Atty. Tamargos brother, filed an appeal with the DOJ who reversed the dismissal and
ordered the filling of the information for murder. The DOJ secretary opined that extrajudicial
confession was not effectively impeached by the subsequent recantation and that there was
enough evidence to prove the probable guilt of respondents. However, the former granted the
respondents MR and directed the withdrawal of the information declaring that the extrajudicial

confession of Columna was inadmissible against respondents and that, even if it was admissible,
it was not corroborated by other evidence. RTC judge Daguna, who handled the case after it was
re-raffled granted petitioners MR and denied respondents MR, based on Columnas first
affidavit, for there was probable cause to hold the accused for trial. Consequently, Awingan filed a
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition while the Antipordas filed another certiorari case.
The CA ruled that the RTC judge gravely abused her discretion after arbitrarily leaving her
assessment and evaluation. It also held that Columnas extrajudicial confession was not
admissible against the respondents because, aside from the recanted confession, there was no
other piece of evidence presented to establish the existence of the conspiracy. Additionally, the
confession was made only after Columna was arrested and not while the conspirators were
engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Hence this petition.
Issue: WON the trial court has the duty to make an independent assessment when confronted
with a motion to withdraw an information on the ground of lack of probable cause to hold the
accused for trial based on a resolution of the DOJ.
Ruling:
Yes, the SC agrees with the CA that Judge Daguna had committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying the withdrawal of the Informations for murder against respondents. Reliance
alone on the resolution of the Secretary would be an abdication of the trial courts duty and
jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. The court must itself be convinced that there is
indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused. It may either agree or disagree with the
recommendation of the Secretary. The selectivity of respondent RTC Judge for purposes of
resolving the motion to withdraw the informations effectively sidetracked the guidelines for an
independent assessment and evaluation of the merits of the case. Respondent RTC Judge thus
impaired the substantial rights of the accused. Instead, she should have made a circumspect
evaluation by looking at everything made available to her at that point of the cases.
When the evidence offered during the preliminary investigation is nothing more than an
uncorroborated extrajudicial confession of an alleged conspirator, the criminal complaint should
not prosper so that the system would be spared from the unnecessary expense of such useless
and expensive litigation. The rule is all the more significant here since respondent Licerio
Antiporda remains in detention for the murder charges pursuant to the warrant of arrest issued by
Judge Daguna.
Indeed, at that stage of the proceedings, the duty of Judge Daguna was only to satisfy herself
whether there was probable cause or sufficient ground to hold respondents for trial as coconspirators. Given that she had no sufficient basis for a finding of probable cause against
respondents, her orders denying the withdrawal of the Informations for murder against them were
issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Case 4: Abelita III vs. Doria
Facts:
Petitioner Judge Abelita filed a complaint for damages under Art. 32(4) and (9) of the Civil
Code against Respondents Doria and Ramirez. Petitioner alleged that he and his wife was on
their home when the respondents accompanied by 10 unidentified police officers, requested them
to proceed to the PNP headquarters. Petitioner alleged that he would proceed to the PNP HQ
after he had brought his wife home. Petitioner alleged that when she parked his car in front of
their house, SPO3 Ramirez grabbed him and took his car keys, bared into the vehicle and
conducted as search without a warrant. The search resulted to the seizure of a licensed shotgun
and an unlicensed .45 caliber pistol allegedly found inside the vehicle.
However, the respondent has a different version of the case. Doria alleged that they received a
telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident. He dispatched a team
headed by Ramirez to investigate the incident. Ramirez reported that a certain William Sia is
wounded while Petitioner and his wife just left the place of the incident. Doria looked for the
petitioner and when he found him, he informed him about the incident, he requested Petitioner to
go with him in the PNP HQ but the petitioner suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his
residence, they caught up with petitioner as he was about to run towards his house. The police

offices saw a gun in the form seat and a shotgun at the back. They confiscated the firearms and
charged Petitioner for illegal possession of firearms and frustrated murder and an administrative
case.
Issue: Whether the warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure were illegal under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
Ruling:
The Supreme Court stated that the police officers were justified in seizing the firearms
because the police authorities were in the area because that was where they caught up with
petitioner after the chase. They saw the firearms inside the vehicle when petitioner opened the
door. Since a shooting incident just took place and it was reported that petitioner was involved in
the incident, it was apparent to the police officers that the firearms may be evidence of a crime.
Hence, they were justified in seizing the firearms.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting
officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. In this case,
P/Supt. Doria received a report about the alleged shooting incident. SPO3 Ramirez investigated
the report and learned from witnesses that petitioner was involved in the incident. They were able
to track down petitioner, but when invited to the police headquarters to shed light on the incident,
petitioner initially agreed then sped up his vehicle, prompting the police authorities to give chase.
Petitioners act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, is
enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of
probable cause.
Case 5: People vs. Reyes
Facts:
On Aug. 11, 1999, Domingo Reyes y Paje and two others were charged with the special
complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide penalized under Article 287 of RPC before
the RTC. The accused, together with 3 other men who remain at large, allegedly carried away
and deprived Robert Yao, et al against their will and consent on board their Mazda MVP van for
the purpose of extorting money and during the detention, killed Chua Pong Ping Sim and
Raymond Yao. Accused Arnaldo surrendered to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task
Force and identified his co-accused. Together with Flores, he executed an extra-judicial
confession. Reyes claims that his alleged participation in the kidnapping was based solely on the
written extra-judicial confessions of the two other. He claimed that their written extra-judicial
confessions should be inadmissible as it was produced in violation of their constitutional rights to
have an independent counsel of their own choice during custodial investigation. He alleged that
the agents of the PAOCTF did not ask his co-appellants during the custodial investigation
whether they had a lawyer of their own choice and suggested the availability of two lawyers who
were associates of PAOCTF.
Issue:
a. Whether the extra-judicial executed by the accused admissible in evidence.
b. Whether they afforded the right to counsel at his own choice.
Ruling:
Yes. Since the prosecution has sufficiently established that the respective extra-judicial
confessions of appellant Arnaldo and appellant Flores were obtained in accordance with the
constitutional guarantees, these confessions are admissible. They are evidence of a high order
because of the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and
knowingly confess to a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience. Consequently, the
burden of proving that undue pressure or duress was used to procure the confessions rests on
the appellants, which they failed to do. Although extra-judicial confession is admissible only
against the confessant, jurisprudence makes it admissible as corroborative evidence of other
facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accuse Reyes.

b. Yes. It is true that it was the PAOCTF which contacted and suggested the availability
of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous to appellants Arnaldo and Flores. Nonetheless, this does
not automatically imply that their right to counsel was violated. What the constitution
requires is the presence of competent and independent counsel, one who will effectively
undertake his clients defense without any intervening conflict of interest. Also, the phrase
preferably of his own choice does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer
by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and
independent lawyers from handling the defense. Otherwise, the tempo of custodial
investigation would be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede or obstruct the
progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who is not available to protect
his interest. While the choice of a layer in cases where the person under custodial
investigation cannot afford the services of counsel or where the preferred lawyer is not
available, is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the final choice,
as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. The accused in this
case did not object to the appointment of the lawyers during the custodial investigation.
Case 6: Malacat vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response to bomb threats reported
seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the
Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with three
other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the
Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men,
with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of stop
and frisk, where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by
an arrest and whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police
officer seeks to obtain more information; and that the seizure of the grenade from Malacat was
incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty of the crime of illegal
possession of explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not more
than 30 years of Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat filed a notice
of appeal indicating that he was appealing to the Supreme Court. However, the record of the case
was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR 15988). In its decision of 24 January 1996,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a petition for review with the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception of stop and
frisk.
Ruling:
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in
order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests,
searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain
exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under
Section 5(a) has been denominated as one in flagrante delicto, while that under Section
5(b) has been described as a hot pursuit arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches,
they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3)
seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful
arrest; and (6) a stop and frisk. The concepts of a stop-and-frisk and of a search incidental
to a lawful arrest must not be confused. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms
of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search. Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest
preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting

officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of Malacat, indicating that a crime had just been
committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. Plainly, the search conducted on
Malacat could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest. On the other hand, while probable
cause is not required to conduct a stop and frisk, it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a
hunch will not validate a stop and frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about him. Finally, a stop-and-frisk serves a two-fold interest: (1) the
general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a
police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a
person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and
(2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to
take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. Here, there are at
least three (3) reasons why the stop-and-frisk was invalid: First, there is grave doubts as to Yus
claim that Malacat was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days
earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any
other police officer who allegedly chased that group. Second, there was nothing in Malacats
behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his
eyes were moving very fast an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his
teammates were nowhere near Malacat and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk.
Malacat and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any
commotion or trouble. Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that
Malacat was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the
alleged grenade was discovered inside the front waistline of Malacat, and from all indications
as to the distance between Yu and Malacat, any telltale bulge, assuming that Malacat was indeed
hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. What is unequivocal then are blatant
violations of Malacats rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the
Constitution.
Case 7: People vs. Nuevas
Facts:
Nuevas was with illegal possession of marijuana along with Din and Inocencio were
likewise charged with the same crime, before the same court. Upon arraignment, Nuevas, Din
and Inocencio pleaded not guilty to the charges. PO3 Fami received information that a certain
male person, more or less 54" in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper right
hand, and usually wearing a sando and maong pants, would make a delivery of marijuana dried
leaves. While stationed thereat, they saw a male person who fit the description, carrying a plastic
bag, later identified as Jesus Nuevas (Nuevas), alight from a motor vehicle. They accosted
Nuevas and informed him that they are police officers. Fami asked Nuevas where he was going.
Nuevas answered arrogantly but afterwards, calmed down. Nuevas and Fami conversed in the
Waray dialect. Nuevas informed him that there were other stuff in the possession of a certain
Vangie, an associate, and two other male persons. Later on, Nuevas voluntarily pointed to the
police officers a plastic bag which, when opened, contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks
wrapped in a blue cloth. Shortly, in his bid to escape charges, Nuevas disclosed where the two
7
(2) other male persons would make the delivery of marijuana weighing more or less five (5) kilos.
Fami and Cabling, together with Nuevas, then proceeded to Purok 12, Old Cabalan, Olongapo
City, which according to Nuevas was where his two (2) companions, Din and Inocencio, could be
located. From there, they saw and approached two (2) persons along the National Highway,
introducing themselves as police officers. Din was carrying a light blue plastic bag. When asked,
Din disclosed that the bag belonged to Nuevas. Fami then took the bag and upon inspection
8
found inside it "marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein." After confiscating the
items, Fami and Cabling brought Nuevas, Din and Inocencio to the police office at Purok III for
9
proper documentation. Fami further testified that a receipt for the property seized was issued by
Cabling and that a field test was duly conducted on the confiscated items. All three accused were
likewise physically examined on the basis of which corresponding medical certificates were

issued. The corresponding booking sheets and arrest report were also accomplished. Fami stated
that he and Cabling executed a joint affidavit in connection with the arrest of all the accused and
10
the confiscation of the items.
Issue: Whether or not the constitutional rights were violated.
Ruling:
The appellate court stated that the search in the instant case is exempted from the
requirement of a judicial warrant as appellants themselves waived their right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. According to the appellate court, both Cabling and Fami
testified that Din voluntarily surrendered the bag. Appellants never presented evidence to rebut
29
the same. Thus, in the instant case, the exclusionary rule does not apply. , the Court holds that
the searches and seizures conducted do not fall under the first exception, warrantless searches
incidental to lawful arrests.
39
A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. Recent jurisprudence
holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed as in this case
where the search preceded the arrest. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous
with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the
40
outset of the search. In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in
the presence of the police officers. Moreover, police officers Fami and Cabling did not have
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the persons to be arrested had committed an
offense. The searches conducted on the plastic bag then cannot be said to be merely incidental
to a lawful arrest. Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under
Section 5(a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act
that would indicate that he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
41
offense." Secondly, neither could the searches be justified under the plain view doctrine. An
object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed
package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant.
However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its
transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and
may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer
from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view.
It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of
42
a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
Records show that the dried marijuana leaves were inside the plastic bags that Nuevas and Din
were carrying and were not readily apparent or transparent to the police officers. In Nuevass
43
case, the dried marijuana leaves found inside the plastic bag were wrapped inside a blue cloth.
In Dins case, the marijuana found upon inspection of the plastic bag was "packed in newspaper
44
and wrapped therein." It cannot be therefore said the items were in plain view which could have
45
justified mere seizure of the articles without further search. On the other hand, the Court finds
that the search conducted in Nuevass case was made with his consent. In Dins case, there was
none. Indeed, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right which may be waived. However, it must be seen that the consent to the search was
voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent was
unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. The
consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing
evidence. The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact
to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the
following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is
given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3)
whether he objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of
the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no
incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment
in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that
46
the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.

Case 8: People vs. Aminnudin

Facts:
Idel Aminnudin was arrested shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about
8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted
him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him
and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana
leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. According
to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that the
accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He
was identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited for him and approached him as he
descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. They detained him and
inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed
as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the
marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts
and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed.
His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled
to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of
wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. He
insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling
watches and sometimes cigarettes. He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have
been carrying was not properly identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the
stock
room
of
the
PC
headquarters.
Issue: Whether or not a search warrant is needed to seize and search the subject.
Ruling:
Yes.
The
mandate
of
the
Bill
of
Rights
is
clear:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search
warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause.
Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante
nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless
arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to
dispense with the obtention of the warrant. It is clear that they had at least two days within which
they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on
the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was
certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that
there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No
effort was made to comply with the law.
Case 9: People vs. Molina
Facts:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information
regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. His informer pointed
to the motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to accused-appellant Molina,
SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the arrest. Moreover, the names and
addresses of the accused-appellants came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested.
In the morning of August 8,1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the alleged pusher

will be passing at NHA, Ma-a, Davao City. He called for assistance at the PNP proceed to the house of
SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by. At around 9:30 in the morning of
August 8, 1996, a trisikad carrying the accused-appellants passed by. At that instance, SPO1Paguidopon
pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers. The police officers then ordered the trisikad
to stop. SPO1Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant
Molina to open the bag. Molina replied, Boss, if possible we will settle this . SPO1
Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves
inside. Thereafter, accused-appellants Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers .Accusedappellants contended that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence
for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Issue: Whether or not the marijuana is inadmissible evidence for having been seized in violation
of appellants constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Ruling:
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be
carried out in a reasonable fashion. The Constitution provides:
SEC. 2.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
I. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained
there from may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a
lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation
of customs laws; (4) seizure of evid ence in plain view; (5) when the accused
himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures;
II. and (6) stop and frisk situations. As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if
effected with a valid warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes
permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant,
arrest a person: (a)when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an
offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it
(arrest effected in hot pursuit);and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving f i n a l j u d g m e n t o r i s
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
b e i n g t r a n s f e r r e d f r o m o n e confinement to another (arrest of escaped prisoners). In the
case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In
holding a bag on board a trisikad , accused-appellants could not be said to be committing,
attempting to commit or have committed a crim e. The response of Molina that
Boss, if possible we will settle this is an equivocal statement which standing alone will
not constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1
Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants
to the arresting officers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise.
SPO1 Paguidopon only learned Mulas name and address after the arrest. It is doubtful if SPO1
Paguidopon indeed recognized accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy to note that, before the
arrest, he was able to see Mula in person only once, pinpointed to him by his informer while they
were on the side of the road. These circumstances could not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a
closer look at accused-appellant Mula, considering that the latter was then driving a motorcycle when SPO1
Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him. With respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon admitted that he
had never seen him before the arrest. The Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not
fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was

10

likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted
as evidence. Wherefore, accused are ACQUITTED.
Case 10: People vs. Mengote
Facts:
The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were
three suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and side to side, one of whom
holding his abdomen. They approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen,
whereupon the two tried to run but unable to escape because the other lawmen surrounded them.
The suspects were then searched. One of them the accused-appellant was found with a .38
caliber with live ammunitions in it, while his companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken
from them and they were turned over to the police headquarters for investigation. An information
was filed before the RTC convicting the accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness
testified that the weapon was among the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the
police including the revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire
arm or that he was licensed to possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on
him at the time of his arrest. He was convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence
against him because it had been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree.
Issue:

Whether

or

not

the

warrantless

search

and

arrest

was

illegal.

Ruling:
An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any
proceeding for any purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of
the Rules of Court, provides arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when the offense in
fact has just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating the person
arrested has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has escaped from a penal
establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in
question, the accused appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen,
according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that has just
been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempt by Mengote in their
presence. Moreover a person may not be stopped and frisked in a broad daylight or on a busy
street
on
unexplained
suspicion.
Judgment

is

reversed

and

set

aside.

Accused-appellant

is

acquitted.

Case 11: People vs. Binad Sy Chua

Facts:
Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of
R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal
Possession of Drugs in two separate Informations. SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a
report from their confidential informant that accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that
night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. So, the PNP Chief formed a team of
operatives. The group positioned themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant,
fronting the hotel. The other group acted as their back up. Afterwards, their informer pointed to a
car driven by accused-appellant which just arrived and parked near the entrance of the hotel.
After accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud
and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers. As
accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline

11

substance protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body
search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back
pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained
a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the
Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by
accused-appellant. SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the scene brought
the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito,
Angeles City. Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a
different version of the incident. Accused-appellant alleged that he was driving the car of his wife
to follow her and his son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along
McArthur Highway. He stopped in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel to buy cigarettes
and candies. While at the store, he noticed a man approaches and examines the inside of his car.
When he called the attention of the onlooker, the man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun
and made him face his car with raised hands. The man later on identified himself as a policeman.
During the course of the arrest, the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to open his
car. He refused, so the policeman took his car keys and proceeded to search his car. At this time,
the police officers companions arrived at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at
the scene, pulled him away from his car in a nearby bank, while the others searched his car.
Thereafter, he was brought to a police station and was held inside a bathroom for about fifteen
minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In the presence of
reporters, Col. Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was made to hold the box while
pictures were being taken.The lower court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal Possession of
Ammunitions, yet convicted him for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu. Hence, this
appeal
to
the
Court.

Issues:

found

(1) Whether or Not the arrest of accused-appellant was lawful; and

(2) WON the search of his person and the subsequent confiscation of shabu allegedly
on
him
were
conducted
in
a
lawful
and
valid
manner.

Ruling:
The lower court believed that since the police received information that the accused will
distribute illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer
had to act quickly and there was no more time to secure a search warrant. The search is valid
being akin to a stop and frisk. The trial court confused the concepts of a stop-and-frisk and of a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the
requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used
as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be arrest
before a search can be madethe process cannot be reversed. Accordingly, for this exception to
apply, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. Accused-appellant did not
act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that
accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime.
Reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the
presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable
cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. With regard to the concept of stop-and
frisk: mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a stop-and-frisk. A genuine reason must exist,
in light of the police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the

12

person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a stop-and-frisk serves a two-fold
interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the interest of
safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and
fatally be used against the police officer. A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer
to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. It should
also be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to
apply. The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. To reiterate, accusedappellant was first arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his
possession. The apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accusedappellants business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The
apprehending police officers only introduced themselves when they already had custody of
accused-appellant. In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the stop and frisk
principles is applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made
by the police operatives on accused-appellant. Wherefore, accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is
hereby Acquitted.
Case 12: People vs. Molina (Repeated case)
Facts:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information
regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. His informer pointed
to the motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to accused-appellant Molina,
SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the arrest. Moreover, the names and
addresses of the accused-appellants came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested.
In the morning of August 8,1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the alleged pusher
will be passing at NHA, Ma-a, Davao City. He called for assistance at the PNP proceed to the house of
SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by. At around 9:30 in the morning of
August 8, 1996, a trisikad carrying the accused-appellants passed by. At that instance, SPO1Paguidopon
pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers. The police officers then ordered the trisikad
to stop. SPO1Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant
Molina to open the bag. Molina replied, Boss, if possible we will settle this . SPO1
Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves
inside. Thereafter, accused-appellants Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers .Accusedappellants contended that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence
for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Issue: Whether or not the marijuana is inadmissible evidence for having been seized in violation
of appellants constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Ruling:
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be
carried out in a reasonable fashion. The Constitution provides:
SEC. 2.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
I. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained
there from may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a
lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation
of customs laws; (4) seizure of evid ence in plain view; (5) when the accused
himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures;

13

II. and (6) stop and frisk situations. As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if
effected with a valid warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes
permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant,
arrest a person: (a)when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an
offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it
(arrest effected in hot pursuit);and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving f i n a l j u d g m e n t o r i s
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
b e i n g t r a n s f e r r e d f r o m o n e confinement to another (arrest of escaped prisoners). In the
case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In
holding a bag on board a trisikad , accused-appellants could not be said to be committing,
attempting to commit or have committed a crim e. The response of Molina that
Boss, if possible we will settle this is an equivocal statement which standing alone will
not constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1
Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants
to the arresting officers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise.
SPO1 Paguidopon only learned Mulas name and address after the arrest. It is doubtful if SPO1
Paguidopon indeed recognized accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy to note that, before the
arrest, he was able to see Mula in person only once, pinpointed to him by his informer while they
were on the side of the road. These circumstances could not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a
closer look at accused-appellant Mula, considering that the latter was then driving a motorcycle when SPO1
Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him. With respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon admitted that he
had never seen him before the arrest. The Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not
fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was
likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted
as evidence. Wherefore, accused are ACQUITTED.
Case 13: People vs. Laguio
Facts:
Police operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime of the Department
of Interior and Local Government, arrested SPO2 de Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a certain Arellano,
for unlawful possession of shabu. In the course of the investigation of the three arrested persons,
Redentor Teck, alias Frank, and Joseph Junio were identified as the source of the drug. An
entrapment operation was then set after the three were prevailed upon to call their source and
pretend to order another supply of shabu. That same date, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio
were arrested while they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to SPO2 De Dios and
company. Questioned, they informed the police operatives that they were working as talent
manager and gymnast instructor, respectively, of Glamour Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence
Wang. Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio did not disclose their source of shabu but admitted that
they were working for Wang. They also disclosed that they knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu
early the following morning, and that their employer (Wang) could be found at the Maria Orosa
Apartment in Malate, Manila. The police operatives decided to look for Wang to shed light on the
illegal drug activities of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. Police Inspector and his men then
proceeded to Maria Orosa Apartment and placed the same under surveillance. Wang, who was
described to the operatives by Teck, came out of the apartment and walked towards a parked
BMW car. On nearing the car, he (witness) together with Captain Margallo and two other police
officers approached Wang, introduced themselves to him as police officers, asked his name and,
upon hearing that he was Lawrence Wang, immediately frisked him and asked him to open the
back compartment of the BMW car. When frisked, there was found inside the front right pocket of
Wang and confiscated from him an unlicensed AMT Cal. 380 9mm automatic Back-up Pistol
loaded with ammunitions. At the same time, the other members of the operatives searched the
BMW car and found inside it were the following items: (a) 32 transparent plastic bags containing
white crystalline substance with a total weight of 29.2941 kilograms, which substance was later

14

analyzed as positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug locally known as

shabu; (b) cash in the amount of P650,000.00; (c) one electronic and one mechanical scales; and
(d) an unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol with magazine. Then and there, Wang resisted the
warrantless arrest and search. The respondent judge, the Hon. Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr., issued
the herein assailed Resolution granting Wangs Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of all
charges for lack of evidence
Issue: Whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police operatives in this case
despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search warrant.
Ruling:
No, there is none. The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure on warrantless arrest provide:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of
Section 5. It is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a
felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient
to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section 5. And doubtless,
the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph (c) of Section 5.
The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the warrantless arrest was
illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.
The Peoples contention that Wang waived his right against unreasonable search and seizure has
no factual basis. While we agree in principle that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search,
however, based on the evidence on record, Wang resisted his arrest and the search on his
person and belongings. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have
been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and
is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Moreover,
the continuing objection to the validity of the warrantless arrest made of record during the
arraignment bolsters Wangs claim that he resisted the warrantless arrest and search.
Case 14: People vs. Gerente
Facts:
Two separate informations were files against Gabriel Gerente for violation of dangerous
drugs act and for murder. The appellant pleaded not guilty during arraignment. A joint trial of the 2
cases was held. On Sept. 24, 1990, the RTC rendered a decsion convictin him of both
charges.The appellant contends in his appeal that the trial court erred in admitting the marijuana
leaves as evidence in violation of his constitutional right not to be subjected to illegal search and
seizure, for the dried marijuana leaves were seized from him in the course of a warrantless arrest
by the police officers.
Issue: Whether the appellant's contention is correct.
Ruling:
No. The policemen arrested Generete only some 3 hours after Generete and his
companions killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the crime
scene, they found the instruments of death. The eye-witness pinpointed Gerente as one of the
killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent

15

death of Blace and of the facts indicating that Gerente and 2 others had killed him, they could
lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant.
The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an
incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with the provision of the ROC. The frisk and
search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of
arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed
and might attack them unless he is first disarmed.
Case 15: People vs. Doria
Facts:
Members of the PNP Narcotics Command received information that one Jun [Doria]
was engaged in illegal drug activities, so they decided to entrap and arrest him in a buy-bust
operation. He was arrested. They frisked him but did not find the marked bills on him, and upon
inquiry, he revealed that he left it at the house of his associate Neneth [Gaddao], so he led the
police team to her house. The team found the door open and a woman inside the
house. Jun identified her as Neneth, and she was asked by SPO1 Badua about the marked
money as PO3 Manlangit looked over her house [he was still outside the house]. Standing by the
door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. One of the box s flaps was
open, and inside it was something wrapped in plastic, and it appeared similar to the marijuana
earlier sold to him by Jun. His suspicion aroused, so he entered the house and took hold of the
box. He peeked inside the box and saw 10 bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from Neneth and they arrested her. The bricks were
examined and they were found to be dried marijuana leaves. Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao
were charged with violation of RA 6425 [Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972], Section 4 [Sale,
Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs] in relation to Section
21 [Attempt and Conspiracy]. RTC convicted them.
Issue: Whether or not RTC correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view, making its
warrantless seizure valid. NO
Ruling:
Gaddao s warrantless arrest was illegal because she was arrested solely on the basis of
the alleged identification made by Doria. Doria did not point to her as his associate in the drug
business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not
necessarily mean that Gaddao conspired with Doria in pushing drugs. If there is no showing that
the person who effected the warrantless arrest had knowledge of facts implicating the person
arrested to the perpetration of the criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.
Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, the search of her person and home
and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an
incident to her arrest.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence.
Requisites
a. The law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area
b. The discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent
c. It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure
An object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises when
the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the
object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. If the package
is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the

16

prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the
police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure.
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were
marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents. On cross-examination,
however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the
same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." Each of the ten bricks of marijuana in the
box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside plastic bags-- white, pink or
blue in color. PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that the contents of the box
could be items other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box contained that he had
to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents. It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit
that the content of the box was marijuana; hence, it was not in plain view and its seizure without
the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. It was fruit of the
poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court.
The fact that the box containing about 6 kilos of marijuana was found in Gaddao s house Gaddao
does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged.
In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission of proof
that the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller and the presentation of the drug
as evidence in court.
Prosecution established the fact that in consideration of the P1,600.00 he received, Doria
sold and delivered 970 grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer
Prosecution failed to prove that Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the
sale of said drug
Case 16: People vs. Ejandra
Facts:
Ed, the nine-year old son of the spouses Eddie and Marileen Tan, was a Grade III
student at the Philippine Institute of Quezon City, located at Kitanlad, Quezon City. Ed was
4
dismissed from his classes and proceeded to the nearby house of his tutor in Chinese language.
Ed Henderson and his father, Eddie Tan, had earlier agreed that after the tutorial classes ended
at 7:00 p.m., Ed Henderson would phone his father, who would then fetch him from his mentors
5
house. The tutorial classes ended at 7:00 p.m., as scheduled, and Ed Henderson then
6
proceeded to the store near the gate of the school to have his periodic test papers photocopied.
He left the store and was on his way back to the house of his tutor to wait for his father. Suddenly,
7
Ed Tampos, armed with a revolver (de bola), chased and overtook Ed Henderson at the Royalty
8
canteen near the school. Tampos ordered the boy to proceed to a motorcyle parked nearby and
warned the latter that if he refused, he would be shot. Petrified, Ed Henderson approached the
motorcycle where appellants Elvie Ejandra and Roel Revilla were waiting. Ejandra had no legs
(pilay), while Revilla had curly hair. There was no lamp post outside the school premises but the
9
lights inside the school were still on. Ejandra covered Ed Hendersons mouth with his hand,
10
11
pointed his gun at the boy and warned the latter not to shout. Revilla boarded the motorcycle
and took the drivers seat. Ejandra sat behind him, and Tampos sat behind Ejandra. Tampos
12
ordered Ed Henderson to board the motorcyle, or else, he would be shot. The boy was then
13
ordered to sit behind Tampos.
14
Ed was brought to a one-storey house with cemented flooring and white-colored walls. Once
inside, he saw a man who was drinking, who turned out to be Antonio Huera, and a female, who
15
16
turned out to be Magdalena Calunod. Ed Henderson also saw a cell phone. The was ordered
17
to write down his fathers telephone number, as well as that of their house and their store. Ed
Henderson did as he was told, and wrote down the number 737-61-77 the telephone number of
his father, Eddie Tan. It appeared to the boy that Ejandra was the leader of his abductors
because it was he who gave orders to the others. In the meantime, Eddie went to fetch his son at
7:00 p.m. at his tutors house, but the boy was nowhere to be found. Shortly after midnight, Eddie
received a call from his house that someone had called earlier up his mother, Benita Tan, with the
information that his son had been kidnapped, informing him that his son had been kidnapped.
The caller demanded P10,000,000 for the safe release of his son. Thereafter, Eddie received

17

several calls threatening him that if he refused to pay the ransom they demanded, the kidnappers
would cut Ed Hendersons ear and finger, and thereafter kill the boy and dump his body in an
isolated place. Eddie pleaded for mercy but the caller would simply hang up the telephone. The
accused were charged of kidnapping for ransom, and sentencing them to suffer the death
penalty. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in not acquitting them of the crime charged on
reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
The appellants Revilla and Tampos were identified by Ed Henderson in open court,
pointing to both of them as two of his kidnappers. It bears stressing that Ed Henderson was only
68
nine years old and in Grade III when he was kidnapped. In People vs. Bisda, et al., the kidnap
victim Angela was barely six years old when she testified. We held that, considering her tender
years, innocent and guileless, it is incredible that she would testify falsely that the appellants took
her from the school through threats and detained her in the "dirty house" for five days. Thus,
testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit. The testimony of children of sound
69
70
mind is likewise to be more correct and truthful than that of older persons. In People vs. Alba,
this Court ruled that children of sound mind are likely to be more observant of incidents which
take place within their view than older persons, and their testimonies are likely more correct in
detail than that of older persons. In the case at bar, the trial court found the testimony of Ed
Henderson credible and entitled to full probative weight. Well settled is the rule that the findings of
facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of witnesses, its assessment of the
credibility of the said witnesses and its evidence based on the said findings are given high
respect if not conclusive effect by the appellate court, unless the trial court overlooked,
misconstrued or misinterpreted facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, will
71
alter the outcome of the case. We have meticulously reviewed the records and find no
justification to deviate from the findings of facts of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility
of Ed Henderson and the veracity and probative weight of his testimony.
Case 17: People vs. Jalosjos
Facts:
Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of
lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking
that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense.
Issue: Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law by
reason of the mandate of the sovereign will.
Ruling:
NO. While the Constitution guarantees: nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws., this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike
both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the mandate of the
people are multifarious.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may
justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly
assert that their interests are disregarded.
Here, election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him
from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those

18

belonging to the same class. Hence, the performance of legitimate and even essential duties by
public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.

Case 18: People vs. Vasquez

Facts:
The brothers Hector Vasquez and Renato Vasquez were convicted of the crime of
murder by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 17) of Roxas City. They were said to have beaten up
one Primo Dollete and alleged to have dragged the said victim to the river bank at Barangay
Bangan-an, Panit-an, Capiz. Thereafter, they were alleged to have forcibly submerged their victim
in the water and caused his death. Consistently before the trial court and before us now, the
Vasquez brothers insist that they were not in Panit-an but were in Iloilo City when Dollete
drowned and that Dolletes death was accidental, the banca he rode on having capsized in the
middle of the river at Barangay Bangan-an, panit-an, Capiz. Only around eighteen (18) years
after the alleged killing of Primo Dollete, that is, on August 19, 1986, were the Vasquez brothers
formally charged with the crime of murder. Upon arraignment, the Vasquez brothers, each
entered a plea of not guilty.While the accused were previously bonded, obviously upon the
ground that the evidence of their guilt was not strong, Judge Pelagio R. Lachica, then Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, of Roxas City, ordered the accused-appellants to
either reconstitute their previous bail bond or to put up a new one, hence, both accusedappellants posted their bail bonds anew.Trial ensued, after which the trial court, through Judge
Ramon B. Posadas, held that the mass of evidence of the prosecution clearly and convincingly
established the corpus delicti. After weighing the evidence presented by both the prosecution and
the defense, the trial court found the defense of alibi unavailing allegedly because the accusedappellants were positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as the culprits and, thus,
convicted
the
accused.
In the present appeal, the accused-appellants maintain their innocence, arguing that Primo
Dolletes death was caused by accidental drowning, this fact having been sustained by the
physical evidence, the findings of the doctor who conducted the autopsy. Likewise, they impugn
the credibility of the prosecution witnesses by pinpointing serious flaws in their testimonies
Issue: Whether or not the mass of evidence proffered by the prosecution meet the quantum of
proof necessary to convict the accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt
Ruling:
In criminal cases, the duty of the court is not so much as to convict but to enter a
judgment of acquittal when doubt exists as to the guilt of the accused. For, under our criminal
justice system, the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the
accused but
whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as
to his
guilt.
The prosecution evidence is miserably tainted with inconsistencies and inherent improbabilities in
the testimonies of the principal witnesses bearing on essential details of the murder charge
against the Vasquez brothers. Consequently, the evidence on the identity of the perpetrators of
the crime we find subject to the strong suspicion that the alleged eyewitnesses for the purpose of
positive identification were not spontaneous and candid when they took the witness stand. We
are constrained to review and reverse the factual findings of the trial court since the assessment
on the credibility of witnesses made by the judge who penned the appealed decision failed to
convince this Court that the same is conformable to the evidence on record.
Thus, in the case of People vs. Danta Manansala y Manalansan we held: Trial courts must keep
in mind that the prosecution must be able to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence beyond a reasonable doubt to justify the conviction of the accused. The prosecution
must stand or fall on its own evidence; it cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the defense xxx.Since the right to be presumed innocent is guaranteed by the Constitution,
every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must be taken into account, al
contrario, proof against them must survive the test of reason.Inasmuch as the prosecution, in this
case, failed to adduce that quantum of evidence necessary to warrant a conviction, the herein
accused-appellants, perforce deserve an acquittal. Admittedly, if a life is taken, justice demands

19

that the wrong be redressed, but this same justice calls for retribution cannot be the same one
that would convict the accused-appellant at bar whose guilt has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The burden of proof rests upon the prosecution and unless the state succeeds
in proving his guilt, the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused-appellant applies. The
conscience must be satisfied that on the accused-appellant could be laid the responsibility of the
offense charged. (People v Eslaban).

Case 19: People vs. Villareal

Facts:
PO3 Renato de Leon was on his way home when he saw Nazareno Villareal from a
distance of 8-10 meters, holding and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet of shabu. Being a
member of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Unit (SAID-SOU), he approached
Villareal whom he recognized as someone he had previously arrested for illegal drug possession.
Villareal tried to escape, attempting to resist the arrest but failed to do so. Upon qualitative
examination, the plastic sachet revealed to contain 0.03 gram of methyl amphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court convicted
Villareal finding that all the elements of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs have
been established. The RTC gave full faith and credit to PO3 de Leons testimony and found the
plain view doctrine to be applicable. Upon petition, the Court of Appeals sustained Villareals
conviction finding a clear case of in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest as provided in Section 5
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It further held that Villareal exhibited an
overt act or strange conduct that would reasonably arouse suspicion, aggravated by the
existence of his past criminal citations and his attempt to flee when PO3 de Leon approached
him.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC and CA is correct in holding that there exist a lawful warrantless
arrest in relation to Section 5 Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Ruling:
No. There is no lawful warrantless arrest. In both paragraph (a) and (b) of Section 5
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the officers personal knowledge of the fact
of the commission of an offense, that is, the officer himself witnesses the crime and he knows for
a fact that a crime has just been committed is absolutely required. However, the factual
circumstances in the case at bar failed to show that PO3 de Leon had personal knowledge that a
crime had been indisputably committed by Villareal. It is not enough that PO3 de Leon had
reasonable ground to believe that appellant had just committed a crime; a crime must in fact have
been committed first. The Court found it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon would be able to
identify with reasonable accuracy from a distance of 8-10 meters a negligible and minuscule
amount of powdery substance (0.03 gram) inside a plastic sachet. Additionally, a previous arrest
or existing criminal record for the same offense will not suffice to satisfy requirements to justify a
lawful warrantless arrest. Consequently, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the shabu
purportedly seized from appellant is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial
fruit of the poisonous tree.

Case 20: People vs. Salvador

Facts:
On April 7, 2002, at around 7:30 p.m., Albert rode his Toyota Prado and drove out of the
Coliseums parking lot. Ahead was a white Honda Civic car (Civic), while behind was a Toyota HiAce van. The Hi-Ace overtook and suddenly stopped and blocked the Civic. Six men with long
firearms alighted from the Hi-Ace, pointed their guns at Pinky, and motioned for her to step out of
the car and ride the Hi-Ace. Two men came near the Prado and gestured for Albert to likewise
alight from the vehicle and ride the Hi-Ace. Albert and Pinky were handcuffed together and made

20

to wear dark sunglasses. The men took Alberts wallet containing PhP 9,000.00, his drivers
license and other documents. They also took his Patek Philippe watch which costs PhP
400,000.00. While inside the Hi-Ace, Albert and Pinky were ordered to duck their heads.
Notwithstanding the position, Albert noticed some of the passed by vicinities. They arrived in their
destination 10 to 15 minutes after and were handcuffed separately. Albert and Pinky stayed in the
house and were fed food mostly bought from Jollibee until they were rescued on April 12, 2002.
Thus, the RTC held that the Accused-appellants be sentenced for the crime committed, the
kidnapping of Albert Yam y Lee for the purpose of extorting ransom and likewise kidnapping
Pinky Gonzales. Hence, the accused appellants filed appeal from the decision rendered.
Issue: Whether or not the CA gravely erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom despite the prosecutions failure to
overthrow the constitutional presumption of innocence in their favor.
Ruling:
The CA correctly found that the essential elements comprising the crime of kidnapping for
ransom were present and that the accused-appellants conspired in its commission. In the case of
People v. Uyboco, enumerated the elements of the crime of kidnapping for ransom, viz: In order
for the accused to be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of the crime, namely: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains
another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping
must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is
present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by
simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped and kept in detained is a
minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally
detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellants, who were indicted for forcibly abducting Albert, are all
private individuals. Albert was taken on April 7, 2002 and his detention lasted for six days, during
which period, threats to kill him and demand for ransom were made. In affirming the conviction of
the accused-appellants, we are guided by four-settled doctrines enunciated in People v.
Martinez, viz:
(a) The trial court[]s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses must be accorded great respect
owing to its opportunity to observe and examine the witnesses conduct and demeanor on the
witness stand;
(b) When there is no evidence to show that the prosecution witness is actuated by an improper
motive, identification of the accused-appellants as the offenders should be given full faith and
credit;
(c) Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof of prior agreement by the parties to
commit a crime but that it may be inferred from the acts of the accused-appellants before, during
and after the commission of the crime which indubitably point to a joint purpose, concerted action
and community of interest; and
(d) The respective alibis proffered by the accused-appellants cannot prevail over the unequivocal
testimony of the victim categorically and positively pointing to them as his abductors, and for the
defense of alibis, to be given full credit, they must be clearly established and must not leave room
for doubt.
Likewise, the CA found Alberts testimony as clear and categorical. The test to determine the
value of the testimony of a witness is whether such is in conformity with knowledge and
consistent with the experience of mankind; whatever is repugnant to these standards becomes
incredible and lies outside of judicial cognizance. It is settled that irregularities attending the arrest
of the accused-appellants should have been timely raised in their respective motions to quash the
Informations at any time before their arraignment, failing at which they are deemed to have
waived their rights to assail the same. No such motions were filed by the accused-appellants.
This Court has held that the most natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see
the features and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime is
committed. It is also settled that the victims in-court identification is more than sufficient to
establish the identities of accused-appellants as among the malefactors, and previously executed

21

affidavits are generally considered inferior to statements that the victim gives in open
court. Hence, we hold that notwithstanding Alberts failure to identify Betty and Monico from the
police line-up presented on April 12, 2002, in which the spouses were allegedly included, no
reasonable doubt is cast upon the complicity of the latter two in the kidnapping. Further, Betty and
Monicos postulation that if they were indeed involved, they should not have proceeded to the
scene of the rescue operations and to the police station, likewise deserves scant consideration.
There is no established doctrine to the effect that, in every instance, non-flight is an indication of
innocence. It is possible for the culprits to pursue unfamiliar schemes or strategies to confuse the
police authorities. We stress though that conspiracy transcends companionship. Mere presence
at the locus criminis cannot by itself be a valid basis for conviction, and mere knowledge,
acquiescence to or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a
conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime.
Case 21: Rontos vs. People
Facts:
PO2 Masi dispatched PO1 Pacis and PO1 Labaclado of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs
Task Force to conduct surveillance in Sampaloc St., Camarin, Caloocan City because of reports
4
of illegal drug activity in the said area. When they got there around 5:00 p.m., PO1 Pacis and
PO1 Labaclado noticed petitioner standing about five meters away from them, apparently
preoccupied with scrutinizing two plastic sachets in his hand. Upon coming closer, they saw that
5
the plastic sachets appeared to contain a white crystalline substance similar to shabu. PO1
Pacis approached petitioner and confiscated the plastic sachets. Thereafter, he introduced
6
himself as a police officer and informed petitioner of the offense the latter had committed. The
7
two police officers informed petitioner of his constitutional rights, while he just remained silent.
PO1 Pacis marked the plastic sachets with his initials "JCP-1" and JCP-2" and placed them in a
8
makeshift envelope. They then brought petitioner to the station and turned him over to PO2 Masi
9
together with the plastic sachets. PO2 Masi conducted an investigation and prepared a request
10
11
for a laboratory examination of the contents of the plastic sachets. PO1 Pacis brought the
request and the plastic sachets to the crime laboratory, and forensic chemist Police Inspector
12
Jessie dela Rosa (P/Insp. dela Rosa) conducted the examination. The tests on the contents of
the plastic sachets yielded a positive result for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
13
14
drug more commonly known as shabu. A Complaint for violation of Section 11 (possession of
15
dangerous drugs), Article II of R.A. 9165, was drawn up and referred to the city prosecutor for
the filing of charges before the court. The accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Violation of Section 11, Article II, RA 9165 and hereby sentencing him to suffer
imprisonment. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether ot not , the allegedly confiscated items were inadmissible in evidence despite the
arrest was without warrant and illegal.
Ruling:
Yes. On the basis of the nonobservance of the rules of procedure for handling illegal drug
items, we resolve to acquit petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt. In illegal drugs cases,
the identity and integrity of the drugs seized must be established with the same unwavering
30
exactitude as that required to arrive at a finding of guilt. The case against the accused hinges
on the ability of the prosecution to prove that the illegal drug presented in court is the same one
that was recovered from the accused upon his arrest.The procedure set forth in Section 21 of
31
R.A. 9165 is intended precisely to ensure the identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized.
This provision requires that upon seizure of illegal drug items, the apprehending team having
initial custody of the drugs shall (a) conduct a physical inventory of the drugs and (b) take
photographs thereof (c) in the presence of the person from whom these items were seized or
confiscated and (d) a representative from the media and the Department of Justice and any
elected public official (e) who shall all be required to sign the inventory and be given copies
thereof. This Court has emphasized the import of Section 21 as a matter of substantive law that
32
mandates strict compliance. It was laid down by Congress as a safety precaution against

22

potential abuses by law enforcement agents who might fail to appreciate the gravity of the
penalties faced by those suspected to be involved in the sale, use or possession of illegal
33
drugs. Under the principle that penal laws are strictly construed against the government,
34
stringent compliance therewith is fully justified. Here, the procedure was not observed at all.
Where it is clear that Section 21 was not observed, as in this case, such noncompliance brings to
the fore the question of whether the illegal drug items were the same ones that were allegedly
seized from petitioner.
We cannot, in good conscience, affirm the conviction of petitioner for possession of illegal drugs if
the police officer charged with the preservation of the evidence cannot even be certain in the
36
identification of the envelope that was presented in court. As held in Dolera v. People, there
also exists in the present case a reasonable likelihood of substitution, in that the two plastic
sachets that tested positive for shabu and were presented in court were not the items allegedly
37
seized from petitioner.1wphi1 This possibility of substitution is fatal for the prosecution, for
38
there is then a failure to prove the identity of the corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt. We are
not unaware of the rule that justifiable grounds may excuse noncompliance with the requirements
of Section 21 as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
39
preserved. The problem in this case is that the police officers presented no justifiable reason
why they neglected to observe the proper procedure. Considering that PO1 Pacis himself
expressed misgivings on the identity of the envelope shown to him in court, with the envelope that
he had placed the confiscated illegal drug items in, neither can we confirm that the chain of
custody had been sufficiently established.Corpus delicti is the "actual commission by someone of
40
41
the particular crime charged." In illegal drug cases, it refers to the illegal drug item itself. When
courts are given reason to entertain reservations about the identity of the illegal drug item
allegedly seized from the accused, the actual commission of the crime charged is put into serious
question. In those cases, courts have no alternative but to acquit on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
Case 22: People vs. Velasco
Facts:
Roberto Velasco, stepfather of Lisa, a minor 14 years of age, raped his stepdaughter
[Lisa] for three consecutive time while they were alone in the house. A year thereafter, at
midnight, when the other members of the family were asleep, appellant succeeded in touching
and kissing Lisas private parts. Appellant was arraigned for the three charges of rape; and one
charge of acts of lasciviousness to which he entered a plea of not guilty on all charges. After pretrial, the cases were consolidated and the trial court conducted joint hearings on the merits.
Accused was charged and found guilty of the crime rape under Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code and the crime of acts of lasciviousness. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
1. Wether the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant is valid.
2. Wether the accused rights under R.A 7438 were violated.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Jurisprudence tells us that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of
his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information
against him on this ground before arraignment, thus, any objection involving a warrant of
arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction of the person of the
accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived. Nevertheless, even if appellants warrantless arrest were proven to be indeed
invalid, such a scenario would still not provide salvation to appellants cause because
jurisprudence also instructs us that the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause
for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free
from error.

23

2. No. It is settled in jurisprudence that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be
convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing,
and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. Furthermore, it is
axiomatic that when it comes to evaluating the credibility of the testimonies of the
witnesses, great respect is accorded to the findings of the trial judge who is in a better
position to observe the demeanor, facial expression, and manner of testifying of
witnesses, and to decide who among them is telling the truth. Lastly, in order for a
discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as a basis for
acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the innocence of the appellant for the crime
charged since the credibility of a rape victim is not diminished, let alone impaired, by
minor inconsistencies in her testimony.
Case 23: Roallos vs. People
Facts:
Roallos, a retired officer of the AFP, was the Executive Director of the Aguinaldo Vets
and Associates Credit Cooperative (AVACC). BBB, AAAs mother, worked as the secretary and
treasurer of Roallos. AAA went to BBBs office at Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City; BBB, however,
was then out running office errands. AAA decided to stay in her mothers office and wait for the
latter to return. At that time, two women were talking to Roallos inside the AVACC office. AAA
alleged that, after the two women left, Roallos went by the door of the office, looked outside to
see if anybody was around, and then locked it. He then approached AAA and asked her if there
was any pain bothering her; the latter replied that her tooth ached. Thereupon, Roallos held
AAAs hand and intermittently pressed it. He then asked AAA if there is anything else aching in
her body. AAA said none. Roallos then placed his left hand on the table while his right hand was
on AAAs right shoulder. At this point, AAA was seated on a chair without a backrest while
Roallos was standing behind her. Roallos then slid his hand towards AAAs right breast and
mashed it. AAA asked Roallos why he is touching her. Roallos ignored her. He then mashed
AAAs left breast. AAA shouted "Ano ba!," but Roallos still ignored her and, instead slid his hand
towards AAAs abdomen. AAA then stomped her feet and pushed her chair towards Roallos.
Roallos then left the office. Thinking that her mother would soon return, AAA stayed inside the
office. However, after about ten minutes, Roallos returned to the office and approached AAA. He
then asked AAA if she was hungry, the latter told him that she would just wait for BBB to return.
Roallos then offered to give money to AAA for her to buy food, but the latter refused the offer.
AAA then felt Roallos body pressing against her back. Thereafter, Roallos attempted to kiss
AAA. AAA was unable to escape as there was no space in front of her; she just turned her face to
avoid his kiss. He then held AAAs right cheek, pulled her face towards him, and kissed her left
cheek. AAA then stomped her feet, still trying to free herself from the grasp of Roallos. Roallos
then left the office. This time, AAA decided to stay outside the AVACC office and wait for her
mother to return. Upon her return to the office, BBB saw AAA crying. She asked AAA why she
was crying. AAA then relayed what Roallos did to her. Accused is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 (b) of Republic Act 7610 and he is hereby sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty. Hence this petition.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming Roallos conviction for the offense of sexual abuse
under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
2. Whether or not Roallos was denied due process since he was arrested without any warrant of
arrest and that he was not afforded a preliminary investigation.
Ruling:
No. The Information filed against him is duplicitous as it charged him with the commission
of two crimes is plainly untenable. The designation of the crime in the Information is clear
Roallos was charged with the crime of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b), Article III
of R.A. No. 7610. The mention of the phrase "acts of lasciviousness" in the Information does not
mean that Roallos was charged with the felony of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the

24

RPC. The charge of acts of lasciviousness against Roallos is specifically delimited to that
committed in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. In any case, "the real nature of
the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of
law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information."16 The recital of the
ultimate facts and circumstances in the Information that was filed against Roallos clearly makes
out a case for the offense of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
No. the Court emphasized that the accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity
attending his arrest should he fail to move for the quashal of the information against him on this
ground prior to arraignment, viz: At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to
the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in
the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. An accused is estopped from
assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the
information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of
arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused
must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.21 (Citations
omitted and emphasis ours) the Court stressed that the absence of a proper preliminary
investigation must be timely raised. The accused is deemed to have waived his right to a
preliminary investigation by entering his plea and actively participating in the trial without raising
the lack of a preliminary investigation. Thus: Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary
investigation must be timely raised and must not have been waived. This is to allow the trial court
to hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the prosecutor to hold a
reinvestigation, which, necessarily "involves a re-examination and re-evaluation of the evidence
already submitted by the complainant and the accused, as well as the initial finding of probable
cause which led to the filing of the Informations after the requisite preliminary investigation."
Case 24: People vs. Rebotazo
Facts:
On February 27, 2003, at around 3:00 in the afternoon, informant Orly Torremocha went
to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) office in Dumaguete City to report that appellant was
selling several sachets of shabu in his possession. Upon knowledge of such fact, the NBI planned
a buy-bust operation and formed a team. After briefing, at around 4:30 in the afternoon of the
same day, the team proceeded to Shakey's and positioned themselves strategically in locations
to ensure the ability to witness the entrapment.
As planned, the appellant and the poseur-buyer of the team successfully exchanged money and
product which lead to the signaling of the poseur-buyer to his team to rush to the location of the
exchange and effected the appellant's arrest. The operatives conducted a bodily search of the
appellant, in the process, the appellant voluntarily informed the agents of another sachet of shabu
inside one of his socks. The team recovered the sachet of shabu as well as the marked money
given by the poseur-buyer. The operatives then marked the sachet as evidence of the buy-bust
operation and took photographs as well. After being informed of the constitutional rights, the
appellant was then brought to the NBI office.
At the NBI office, the operatives conducted an inventory of the seized items in the presence of
the appellant, and made a request for laboratory examination of the seized items. The items
tested positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu).
Issue:
Whether or not the arrest made was illegal without the authorization of PDEA
Whether or not the evidence seized by the operatives are inadmissable evidence by
virtue of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine
Ruling:
The court held that the arrest made without the authorization of PDEA cannot be given
weigh to exculpate the appellant. Section 86 of R.A. 9165 reads:

25

Section 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on Illegal Drugs into the
PDEA and Transitory Provisions. The Narcotics Group of the PNP, the Narcotics Division of the
NBI and the Customs Narcotics Interdiction Unit are hereby abolished; however they shall
continue with the performance of their task as detail service with the PDEA, subject to screening,
until such time that the organizational structure of the Agency is fully operational and the number
of graduates of the PDEA Academy is sufficient to do the task themselves: Provided, That such
personnel who are affected shall have the option of either being integrated into the PDEA or
remain with their original mother agencies and shall, thereafter, be immediately reassigned to
other units therein by the head of such agencies. Such personnel who are transferred, absorbed
and integrated in the PDEA shall be extended appointments to positions similar in rank, salary,
and other emoluments and privileges granted to their respective positions in their original mother
agencies. The transfer, absorption and integration of the different offices and units provided for in
this Section shall take effect within eighteen (18) months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided,
That personnel absorbed and on detail service shall be given until five (5) years to finally decide
to join the PDEA. Nothing in this Act shall mean a diminution of the investigative powers of the
NBI and the PNP on all other crimes as provided for in their respective organic laws: Provided,
however, That when the investigation being conducted by the NBI, PNP or any ad hoc anti-drug
task force is found to be a violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the PDEA shall be the lead
agency. The NBI, PNP or any of the task force shall immediately transfer the same to the PDEA:
Provided, further, That the NBI, PNP and the Bureau of Customs shall maintain close
coordination with the PDEA on all drug related matters.
Furthermore, nothing in the act states that the absense of participation of PDEA would make the
arrest illegal. Section 86 explicitly provides only that PDEA shall be the lead agency in the
investigation of drug-related cases. Therefore, other law enforcement bodies still possess the
authority to perform similar fuctions as the PDEA as long as illegal drug cases will eventually be
transferred to the latter. In other words, the lack of coordination with the PDEA cannot in and of
itself acquit the appellant. For as long as the mandatory requirements of R.A. 9165 have been
complied with, the buy-bust operation remains legal. The fruit of the poisionous tree doctrine
cannot apply. The court has ruled that the arrest of the accused during a buy-bust operation is
justified under Rule 113 Section 5 (a) of the Rules of Court which states that:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
Lastly, the illegal drugs seized was not the fruit of the poisonous tree, the seizure made by the
buy-bust operation falls under a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Rule 126 Section 13 of
the Rules of Court which reads:
Sec. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission
of an offense without a search warrant.
it follows that the search was also valid, and a warrant was not needed to conduct the search.
Case 25: People vs. Collado
Facts:
PO2 Noble received information from a civilian asset that spouses Marcelino and Myra
were engaged in selling shabu and that drug users, including out-of-school youth, were using
8
their residence in 32 R. Hernandez St., San Joaquin, Pasig City, for their drug sessions. After
recording the report in the police blotter, PO2 Noble relayed the information to his superior,
P/Insp. Earl B. Castillo (P/Insp. Castillo), who in turn ordered the conduct of a surveillance
9
operation. PO2 Noble, SPO2 Cruz and PO1 Anthony Bitbit, conducted a surveillance on the
couples residence. After confirming the reported activities, SPO2 Cruz looked for an asset who
10
could introduce them to Marcelino and Myra in the ensuing buy-bust operation.

26

A buy-bust operation team was thereafter formed. After coordinating with the Philippine Drug
11
Enforcement Agency as evidenced by a Pre-Operation Report, the team proceeded to
Marcelinos and Myras residence on board two private vehicles. Upon reaching the target area,
12
the asset introduced PO2 Noble to Marcelino as a regular buyer of shabu. When asked how
much shabu he needed, PO2 Noble replied, "dalawang piso," which meansP200.00 worth of
drugs. But when PO2 Noble was handing over the marked money to Marcelino, the latter
motioned that the same be given to his wife, Myra, who accepted the money. Marcelino then took
from his pocket a small metal container from which he brought out a small plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance and gave the same to PO2 Noble. While PO2 Noble was
inspecting its contents, he noticed smoke coming from a table inside the house of the couple
13
around which were seven persons. When PO2 Noble gave the pre-arranged signal, the backup
team rushed to the scene. Simultaneously, PO2 Noble introduced himself as a policeman and
arrested Marcelino. He frisked him and was able to confiscate the metal container that contained
another sachet of white crystalline substance. PO2 Noble wrote the markings "MCC-RNN
October 9, 2004" on both the plastic sachets of white substance sold to him by Marcelino and the
one found inside the metal container. Meanwhile, SPO2 Cruz and another police officer went
inside the house of Marcelino and Myra, where they found Apelo, Cipriano, Ranada, Abache,
Sumulong, Madarang and Latario gathered around a table littered with various drug
paraphernalia such as an improvised water pipe, strips of aluminum foil with traces of white
substance, disposable lighters, and plastic sachets. A strip of aluminum foil used for smoking
marijuana was recovered from Ranada. The buy-bust team arrested all these persons, advised
them of their constitutional rights, and brought them to police headquarters for investigation and
14
drug testing. A chemistry report on all the seized items yielded positive results for
15
methylamphetamine hydrochloride. Another chemistry report showed Marcelino, Apelo,
Cipriano, and Ranada positive for drug use while Myra, Abache, Sumulong, Madarang, and
Latario were found negative. Appellants Marcelino Collado (Marcelino) and Myra Collado (Myra)
were then charged with the crimes of sale of dangerous drugs and maintenance of a den, dive or
resort in violation of Sections 5 and 6 of Article II, RA 9165. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the arrest, search, and seizure conducted by the police were illegal since it
was not supported by a valid warrant
Ruling:
No. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides for lawful warrantless arrests, viz:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
Section 5(a) is what is known as arrest in flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless arrest to
be valid, two requisites must concur: "(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
28
and, (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer." A
common example of an arrest in flagrante delicto is one made after conducting a buy-bust
operation.
This is precisely what happened in the present case. The arrest of the appellants was an arrest in
flagrante delicto made in pursuance of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest was
effected after Marcelino and Myra performed the overt act of selling to PO2 Noble the sachet of
shabu and Ranada of having in his control and custody illegal drug paraphernalia. Thus, there is
no other logical conclusion than that the arrest made by the police officers was a valid
warrantless arrest since the same was made while the appellants were actually committing the

27

said crimes. Moreover, assuming that irregularities indeed attended the arrest of appellants, they
can no longer question the validity thereof as there is no showing that they objected to the same
before their arraignment. Neither did they take steps to quash the Informations on such
29
ground. They only raised this issue upon their appeal to the appellate court. By this omission,
30
any objections on the legality of their arrest are deemed to have been waived by them. Anent
their claim of unreasonable search and seizure, it is true that under the Constitution, "a search
and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes
unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
31
proceeding." This proscription, however, admits of exceptions, one of which is a warrantless
32
search incidental to a lawful arrest. The arrest of the appellants was lawful. Under Section 13,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, "[a] person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an
offense without a search warrant." The factual milieu of this case clearly shows that the search
was made after appellants were lawfully arrested. Pursuant to the above-mentioned rule, the
subsequent search and seizure made by the police officers were likewise valid. Hence,
appellants claim of unreasonable search and seizure must fail.1wphi1
Case 26: De los Santos-Dio vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Petitioner Dio, the majority stockholder of H.S. Equities and authorized representative of
Westdale, was introduced to Desmond, the CEO of the SBMEI and the authorized representative
of JV China, the majority shareholder of SBMEI. After some discussion on possible business
6
ventures, Dio, on behalf of HS Equities, decided to invest a total of US$1,150,000.00 in SBMEIs
Ocean Adventure. In this relation, Dio claimed that Desmond led her to believe that SBMEI had a
capital of US$5,500,000.00, inclusive of the value of the marine mammals to be used in Ocean
7
8
Adventure, and also guaranteed substantial returns on investment. Desmond even presented a
Business Plan, indicating that: (a) Ocean Adventures "attendance will rise from 271,192 in 2001
to just over 386,728 in 2006, with revenues rising from US$4,420,000.00 million to
US$7,290,000.00 million in the same time frame"; (b) "early investors are expected to reap an
annual return of 23% in 2001, rising to 51% in 2006"; and (c) "fully priced shares would yield a
10
19% return] in 2001, rising to 42% in 2006." A subscription Agreement was executed by
Desmond, as representative of SBMEI and JV China, and Dio, as representative of HS Equities.
While no Certificate of Stock was issued either to HS Equities or to Dio, HS Equities was
expressly granted minority protection rights in a subsequent Subscription and Shareholders
11
Agreement dated March 12, 2002, stating that there shall be "a nominee of the Subscriber to be
elected as Treasurer/Chief Financial Officer, who may not be removed by the Board of Directors
12
without the affirmative vote of the Subscriber." Accordingly, Dio was elected as a member of
13
SBMEIs Board of Directors and further appointed as its Treasurer. The parties later executed
14
two (2) Investors Convertible Promissory Notes one dated April 4, 2001 and another dated
15
May 8, 2001 covering HS Equities infusion of a total of US$1,000,000.00 for the purpose of
purchasing machinery, equipment, accessories, and materials to be used for the construction of
Ocean Adventure. In June 2002, Dio, this time on behalf of Westdale, invested another
16
US$1,000,000.00 in a separate business venture, called the Miracle Beach Hotel Project
(Miracle Beach), which involved the development of a resort owned by Desmond adjoining Ocean
Adventure. They agreed that the said investment would be used to settle
SBMEIsP40,000,000.00 loan obligation to First Metro Investment Corporation and for the
17
construction of 48 lodging units/cabanas. However, when the corresponding subscription
agreement was presented to Dio by SBMEI for approval, it contained a clause stating that the
"funds in the Subscription Bank Account" were also to be used for the "funding of Ocean
18
Adventures Negative Cash Flow not exceeding US$200,000.00." This was in conflict with the
exclusive purpose and intent of Westdales investment in Miracle Beach and as such, Dio refused
to sign the subscription agreement. Dio further claimed that she found out that, contrary to
Desmonds representations, SBMEI actually had no capacity to deliver on its guarantees, and
19
that in fact, as of 2001, it was incurring losses amounting toP62,595,216.00. She likewise
claimed to have discovered false entries in the companys books and financial statements

28

specifically, its overvaluation of the marine animals and its non-disclosure of the true amount of
20
JV Chinas investment which prompted her to call for an audit investigation. Consequently,
Dio discovered that, without her knowledge and consent, Desmond made certain disbursements
from Westdales special account, meant only for Miracle Beach expenditures (special account),
and diverted a total of US$72,362.78 therein for the operating expenses of Ocean
21
Adventure. When Desmond refused to execute an undertaking to return the diverted funds, Dio,
in her capacity as Treasurer of SBMEI, suspended the release of the remaining funds in the
22
aforesaid special account. Eventually, Dio was ousted as Director and Treasurer of SBMEI,
hence she filed this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
when it dismissed the subject information's for lack of probable cause.
Ruling:
The Court illumined that a clear-cut case of lack of probable cause exists when the
records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the
existence of the elements of the crime charged. While a judges determination of probable cause
is generally confined to the limited purpose of issuing arrest warrants, Section 5(a), Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly states that a judge may immediately dismiss a
case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. In other words, once the
information is filed with the court and the judge proceeds with his primordial task of evaluating the
evidence on record, he may either: (a) issue a warrant of arrest, if he finds probable cause; (b)
immediately dismiss the case, if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause;
and (c) order the prosecutor to submit additional evidence, in case he doubts the existence of
probable cause. Applying these principles, the Court finds that the RTCs immediate dismissal, as
affirmed by the CA, was improper as the standard of clear lack of probable cause was not
observed.
Case 27: People vs. Mendoza
Facts:
On July 14, 1993 about 7:30 pm in the Municipality of Vinzons, Camarines Norte,
Mendoza hacked Anchito Nano with a bolo which led to the instant death of the accused. The trial
court found the accused acted with evident premeditation hence convicted him of the crime
murder which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Prior to trial he voluntarily surrendered but it
was not appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrendered was offset by the aggravating circumstance of treachery.
Ruling:
Treachery is a qualifying circumstance in the present case therefore it cannot offset the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Therefore, pursuant to the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the accused should be sentenced to prision mayor in its maximum period to
reclusion temporal in its minimum period.
Case 28: Espinosa vs. People
Facts:
On 6 August 2000, private complainant Andy Merto, bearing a grudge against the
petitioner, went to the house of the latter. While standing outside the house, Merto shouted
violent threats, challenging the petitioner to face him outside. Sensing Mertos agitated state and
fearing for the safety of his family, petitioner went out of his house to reason with and pacify
Merto. However, as soon as he drew near the private complainant, the latter hurled a stone at the
petitioner. The petitioner was able to duck just in time to avoid getting hit and instinctively
retaliated by hitting the left leg of the private complainant with a bolo scabbard. Merto fell to the

29

ground. Petitioner then continuously mauled the private complainant with a bolo scabbard, until
the latters cousin, Rodolfo Muya, restrained him.22 September 2000, petitioner was originally
charged with Frustrated Homicide. Petitioner pleaded not guilty, and trial thereafter ensued. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction with the modification that the
penalty imposed by the trial court should be lowered by one degree in accordance with the
privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense under Article 69.
Issue: Whether under the set of facts given in this case, complete self-defense may be
appreciated in favor of the petitioner.
Ruling:
Notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner merely used a scabbard in fending off the
unlawful aggressionthe totality of the circumstances shows that after the aggressor was taken
down to the ground, the petitioner ceased to be motivated with the lawful desire of defending
himself. He was, by then, acting with intent to harm the private complainant whose aggression
had already ceased. The instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit

Case 29: Mangila vs. Pangilinan

Facts:
Anita Mangila and four others recruited and promised employment to private
complainants as overseas contract workers in Toronto,Canada and collected visa processing
fees, membership fees and online application without lawful authority from the POEA. Seven
criminal complaints were filed charging Mangila and four others with syndicated estafa in vilation
of Art. 15 of the RPC, in relation to PD No. 1689 and with vilations of Sec.7(b) of R.A. No. 8042.
Judge Pangilinan conducted a preliminary investigation on the complaints and issued a warrant of
arrest of Mangila and her cohorts without bail. Mangila was arrested on June 18, 2003. Claiming
that Judge Pangilinan did not have authority to conduct the preliminary investigation, and that the
preliminary investigation he conducted was not yet completed when he issued the warrant of
arrest and that the issuance of the warrant of arrest was without sufficient justification or without a
prior finding of probable cause, Mangila filed in the CA a petition for habeas corpus to obtain her
release from detention.
Issue: WON the investigating judge could issue a warrant of arrest during such pendency.
Ruling:
Yes. Under Section 6(b) of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
investigating judge could issue a warrant of arrest during the preliminary investigation even
without waiting its conclusion should he find after an examination in writing and under oath of the
complainant and the witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers that a probable
cause existed, and that there was a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody
in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. In the context of this rule, Judge Pangilinan issued the
warrant of arrest against Mangila and her cohorts. Consequently, the CA properly denied
Mangilas petition for habeas corpus because she had been arrested and detained by virtue of
the warrant issued for her arrest by Judge Pangilinan, a judicial officer undeniably possessing the
legal authority to do so.
Case 30: Antiquerra vs. People
Facts:
The accused George Codes Antiquera* and Corazon Olivenza Cruz was charged with
illegal possession of paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. The prosecution evidence shows that at
around 4:45 a.m. of February 11, 2004, PO1 Gregorio Recio, PO1 Laurence Cabutihan, P/Insp.
Eric Ibon, PO1 Rodelio Rania, and two civilian operatives on board a patrol car and a tricycle
were conducting a police visibility patrol on David Street, Pasay City, when they saw two

30

unidentified men rush out of house number 107-C and immediately boarded a jeep. Suspecting
that a crime had been committed, the police officers approached the house from where the men
came and peeked through the partially opened door. PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan saw
accused Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and a pink lighter. Beside him was his live-in
partner, Cruz, who was holding an aluminum foil and an improvised burner. They sat facing each
other at the living room. This prompted the police officers to enter the house, introduce
themselves, and arrest Antiquera and Cruz.4 While inspecting the immediate surroundings, PO1
Cabutihan saw a wooden jewelry box atop a table. It contained an improvised burner, wok,
scissors, 10 small transparent plastic sachets with traces of white crystalline substance,
improvised scoop, and seven unused strips of aluminum foil. The police officers confiscated all
these and brought Antiquera and Cruz to the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National
Police in Pasay City for further investigation and testing.5 A forensic chemical officer examined
the confiscated drug paraphernalia and found them positive for traces of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu." Accused Antiquera gave a different story. He said that on the date and
time in question, he and Cruz were asleep in their house when he was roused by knocking on the
door. When he went to open it, three armed police officers forced themselves into the house. One
of them shoved him and said, "Dyan ka lang, pusher ka." He was handcuffed and someone
instructed two of the officers to go to his room. The police later brought accused Antiquera and
Cruz to the police station and there informed them of the charges against them. They were shown
a box that the police said had been recovered from his house. Court rendered a Decision8 that
found accused Antiquera and Cruz guilty.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in finding accused Antiquera guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia based on the evidence of the police officers that
they saw him and Cruz in the act of possessing drug paraphernalia.
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals ACQUITS the accused George Antiquera y Codes of the crime of
which he is charged for lack of evidence sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.1wphi1
The prosecutions theory, upheld by both the RTC and the CA, is that it was a case of valid
warrantless arrest in that the police officers saw accused Antiquera and Cruz through the door of
their house, in the act of having a pot session. That valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the
right as well to search the living room for objects relating to the crime and thus seize the
paraphernalia they found there.
The prosecution contends that, since the seized paraphernalia tested positive for shabu, they
were no doubt used for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing
dangerous drug into the body in violation of Section 12 of Republic Act 9165. That the accused
tested negative for shabu, said the prosecution, had no bearing on the crime charged which was
for illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, not for illegal use of dangerous drugs. The
prosecution added that even assuming that the arrest of the accused was irregular, he is already
considered to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest when he voluntarily
12
submitted himself to the courts jurisdiction by entering a plea of not guilty.
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a "peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." This is an
13
arrest in flagrante delicto. The overt act constituting the crime is done in the presence or within
14
the view of the arresting officer.
But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto. Clearly,
no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of
accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest
16
was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Consequently, the
various drug paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the house and seized are
inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug
paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to
17
acquit the accused. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is

31

not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with
18
it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.
Case 31: People vs. Montevirgen
Facts:
On July 18, 2005, P/Supt. Marietto Valerio (P/Supt. Valerio) of the Makati City Police
Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force received a report from a confidential
informant that appellant was selling shabu in Malvar Street, Barangay South Cembo, Makati City.
Thus, he immediately formed a team composed of police officers and personnel of the Makati
Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) to conduct a buy-bust operation against appellant. The
members of the entrapment team were PO3 Esterio M. Ruiz, Jr. (PO3 Ruiz), PO1 Percival
Mendoza, PO1 Honorio Marmonejo (PO1 Marmonejo), Barangay Captain Rodolfo Doromal,
Eugenio Dizer, Miguel Castillo, Leo Sese, and Anthony Villanueva. PO3 Ruiz was designated as
poseur-buyer and was provided with two 100-peso bills marked money. PO1 Marmonejo, on the
other hand, coordinated the operation with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA),
6
which issued a Certificate of Coordination. The buy-bust team then proceeded to the subject
7
area but could not locate appellant. nThe next day, July 19, 2005, the buy-bust team returned to
Malvar Street and found appellant talking to three men. After these men departed, PO3 Ruiz,
accompanied by the confidential informant, approached appellant. The confidential informant
introduced PO3 Ruiz to appellant and told him that PO3 Ruiz wanted to buy shabu. Appellant
asked PO3 Ruiz how much he wanted to buy and he replied, P200.00. Appellant pulled out from
his pocket three plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance and told PO3 Ruiz to
choose one. He complied and gave the marked money to appellant as payment. Appellant
pocketed the remaining plastic sachets together with the marked money. PO3 Ruiz then took off
his cap the pre-arranged signal that the transaction had been consummated. The other buybust team members then rushed to the scene to assist PO3 Ruiz in apprehending appellant. The
two other plastic sachets and marked money were recovered from appellant after PO3 Ruiz
ordered him to empty his pockets. PO3 Ruiz then marked the plastic sachets "EMR" for the one
8
appellant sold to him and "EMR-1" and "EMR-2" for the other two sachets confiscated from
appellant. Appellant was taken to the police headquarters where he was booked and the incident
recorded in the police blotter. The items seized from him were turned over to the duty investigator
who prepared a request for laboratory examination and then sent to the crime laboratory. The
9
results revealed that the contents of the plastic sachets are positive for shabu.
Issue:
Whether
or
not
the
failure
to
physically
inventory
and
photograph
the
shabu
after
seizure
and confiscation is fatal.
Ruling:
No. The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required
physical inventory and take photograph of the objects confiscated does not ipso facto render
inadmissible in evidence the items seized. There is a proviso in the implementing rules stating
that when it is shown that there exist justifiable grounds and proof that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the evidence have been preserved, the seized items can still be used in
21
determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. Here, the absence of evidence that the buybust team made an inventory and took photographs of the drugs seized from appellant was not
fatal since the prosecution was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the shabu.
PO3 Ruiz, the poseur-buyer and apprehending officer, marked the seized items in front of
appellant, the barangay captain and other members of the buy-bust team, immediately after the
consummation of the drug transaction. He then delivered the seized items to the duty
investigator, who in turn sent the same to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination on the same
day. During trial, PO3 Ruiz was able to identify the said markings and explain how they were
made. Clearly, there was no hiatus or confusion in the confiscation, handling, custody and
examination of the shabu.1wphi1The illegal drugs that were confiscated from appellant, taken to
the police headquarters, subjected to qualitative examination at the crime laboratory, and finally
introduced in evidence against appellant were the same illegal drugs that were confiscated from

32

him when he was caught in flagrante delicto selling and possessing the same. Appellants
contention that the buy-bust team should have coordinated with the PDEA on the day the
entrapment operation occurred deserves scant consideration. Coordination with the PDEA is not
22
an indispensable element of a proper buy-bust operation. A buy-bust operation is not
23
invalidated by mere noncoordination with the PDEA.
Case 32: People vs. Ibanez
Facts:
A robbery with homicide was committed at Weapons System Corporation (WSC). The
National Bureau of Investigation received an information from an asset that the group og
Cachuela was involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of one of its employees and
Cachuela had been looking for prospective buyers of firearms. The NBI formed an entrapment
team and preceeded to Bacoor, Cavite to execute the operation. Melvin Nabiglas approach them
and told the that he had been sent by Cachuela and Ibaez to look for buyers of firearms. The
police introduced themselves and told that they were conducting an entrapment operation against
the suspects of the robbery at WSC. Nabiglas surrendered to the police and gave the names of
the other persons involved in the crime. The police conducted entrapment operation against
Cachuela and conducted follow-up operation on Ibaez. The agents recovered 2 guns from
Ibaez. Zaldy pointed to the appellants as the person responsible for the robbery at WSC and for
the killing of Rex. Nabiglas also executed a handwritten confession implicating the appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The
appellants filed an appeal with the CA. CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue:

Whether

Nabiglas'

extrajudicial

confession

is

admissible

in

evidence

Ruling:
Nabiglas extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against the appellant in the
view of res inter alios acta rule. The right of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or
omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant
and is not admissible against his or her co-accused because it is considered as hearsay against
them. Also, Nabiglas confession was not made in the assistance of a competent and independent
counsel. The services of Atty. Go, the lawyer who acted in Nabiglas behalf were provided by NBI.
Nabiglas testified that Atty. Go did not disclose that she was a lawyer when she was called to
assist him, she merely represented herself to be a mere witness to the confession. Atty. Go also
did not ascertained whether his confession was made voluntary and whether he fully understood
the nature and consequences of his extrajudicial confession and its impact on his constitutional
rights.
Case 33: Tanenggee vs. People
Facts:
The accused, being then a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud, thru falsification of commercial document, the METROPOLITAN BANK &
TRUST CO. (METROBANK), represented by its Legal officer, Atty. Ferdinand R. Aguirre, in the
following manner: herein accused, being then the Manager of the COMMERCIO BRANCH OF
METROBANK located at the New Divisoria Market Bldg., Divisoria, Manila, and taking advantage
of his position as such, prepared and filled up or caused to be prepared and filled up
METROBANK Promissory Note Form
No. 366857
with letters and figures
reading BD#083/97 after the letters reading PN, with figures reading07.24.97 after the word
DATE, with the amount of P16,000,000.00 in words and in figures, and with other words and
figures now appearing thereon, typing or causing to be typed at the right bottom thereof the name
reading ROMEO TAN, feigning and forging or causing to be feigned and forged on top of said
name the signature of Romeo Tan, affixing his own signature at the left bottom thereof
purportedly to show that he witnessed the alleged signing of the said note by Romeo Tan,
thereafter preparing and filling up or causing to be prepared and filled up METROBANK
CASHIERS CHECK NO. CC 0000001531, a commercial document, with date reading July 24,

33

1997, with the name reading Romeo Tan as payee, and with the sum ofP15,362,666.67 in
words and in figures, which purports to be the proceeds of the loan being obtained, thereafter
affixing his own signature thereon, and [directing] the unsuspecting bank cashier to also affix his
signature on the said check, as authorized signatories, and finally affixing, feigning and forging or
causing to be affixed, feigned and forged four (4) times at the back thereof the signature of said
Romeo Tan, thereby making it appear, as it did appear that Romeo Tan had participated in the
[preparation], execution and signing of the said Promissory Note and the signing and
endorsement of the said METROBANK CASHIERS CHECK and that he obtained a loan
of P16,000,000.00 from METROBANK, when in truth and in fact, as the said accused well knew,
such was not the case in that said Romeo Tan did not obtain such loan from METROBANK,
neither did he participate in the preparation, execution and signing of the said promissory note
and signing and endorsement of said METROBANK CASHIERS CHECK, much less authorize
herein accused to prepare, execute and affix his signature in the said documents; that once the
said documents were forged and falsified in the manner above set forth, the said accused
released, obtained and received from the METROBANK the sum of P15,363,666.67 purportedly
representing the proceeds of the said loan, which amount, once in his possession, with intent to
defraud, he misappropriated, misapplied and converted to his own personal use and benefit, to
the damage and prejudice of the said METROBANK in the same sum of P15,363,666.67,
Philippine currency.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner's written statement is admissible evidence.
Ruling:
The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt
obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA
and the OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation means any
questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. Indeed, a person under
custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the commencement
thereof, viz: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
19
own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights above. In the present case, while it is
undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled written statement regarding an anomaly
discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not
initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank;
and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant manner
during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial investigation and
to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his written statement.
20
Moreover, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, we declared that the right to counsel
applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation. Amplifying further on the matter, the Court made clear in the recent
21
case of Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission: However, it must be remembered that the right to
counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial
investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights
applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
22
administrative investigation.
Here, petitioners written statement was given during an
administrative inquiry conducted by his employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he
allegedly committed in the course of his employment. No error can therefore be attributed to the
courts below in admitting in evidence and in giving due consideration to petitioners written
statement
as
there
is
no
constitutional
impediment
to
its
admissibility.
Case 34: People vs. Guillen
Facts:
Guillen was charged with the crime of murder of Simeon Varela (Barrela)and to multiple
frustrated murder of President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, JoseFabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio
Maglalang who were the injured parties, as the information filed against him provided. Guillen

34

pleaded not guilty to the crime charged against him, but was later found after duly admitting his
intention to kill the President, the lower court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was
sentenced with the highest capital punishment, for the murder of SimeonVarela (Barrela) and to
the multiple frustrated murder of President Roxasand company.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in finding Guillen guilty of the said crime.
Ruling:
The court ruled that the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of
multiple frustrated murderer because the act of Guillen was not fully realized when the bomb was
kicked out of the stage, preventinghim from fulfilling his act of assassinating the President.
Therefore, Guillen is not guilty of the crime of multiple frustrated murder but of the crime
of multiple attempted murder.
Case 35: Luz vs. People
Facts:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City
Police Station as a traffic enforcer, saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of
Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet;
that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which
requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle\ that while he
and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he
noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was
alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the
latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of
the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3)
inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that
upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened
the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction,
the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4)
plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained
suspected shabu. Petitioner was convicted for violation of The Dangerous Drugs law. Petitioner
claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He
claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued
a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid
arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him.
Issue: Whether or not there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful
arrest.
Ruling:
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons alleged.
In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing
tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial
[9]
courts decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a
traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to
[10]
answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be
arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest.
Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a
formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one
of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit,
[11]
under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.

35

Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for
dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers
license of the latter;
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not
such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure, the
aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge that
the officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in
combination, exert some pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But
other aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most
importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a
so-called Terry stop,than to a formal arrest
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed arrested upon
being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the
requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the
arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the
warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent
[14]
and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against them. It may
also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police
officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed arrested when he was flagged down
for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no need for
him to be arrested for a second timeafter the police officers allegedly discovered the drugsas
he was already in their custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was
likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in plain view; (iii) search of a moving
vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a stop and frisk search; and
[15]
(vii) exigent and emergency circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances,
especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered,
was not in plain view. It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioners
[16]
pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately apparent.
Neither was there a consented warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the stop and frisk rule. While the rule normally
applies when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to
believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of
[20]
outer clothing for weapons.
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to
object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless
arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the
[22]
illegal warrantless arrest.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
[23]
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in
violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to
search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and
the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement
of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
[24]
government.
[25]
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the
very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their
inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.
Case 36: Uy vs. Javellana

36

Facts:
This administrative case arose from a verified complaint for "gross ignorance of the law
and procedures, gross incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a
judge, grave misconduct and others," filed by Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug of PAO against
Presiding Judge Javellanaof the Municipal Trial Court, La Castellana, Negros Occidental.
Ruling:
Yes, without any showing that the accused in People v. Cornelio and People v. Lopez, et
al. were charged with the special cases of malicious mischief particularly described in Article 328
of the Revised Penal Code the appropriate penalty for the accused would be arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods which under Article 329(a) of the Revised Penal Code, would be
imprisonment for two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) months. Clearly, these two cases
should be governed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Judge Javellanas issuance of
a Warrant of Arrest for the accused in People v. Cornelio is in violation of Section 16 of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, categorically stating that "the court shall not order the
arrest of the accused except for failure to appear whenever required."
Case 37: People vs. Almodiel
Facts:
Jose Almodiel was alleged to have violated the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act for
the sale of shabu. Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. During pre-trial, the defense
admitted all the allegations in the Information except the specific place of the alleged incident and the allegation of the
sale of dangerous drugs. Thus, trial ensued. The accused denied the allegations during the trial and
averred that he was with his girlfriend in Cadez Lodging House. He further alleged that the sachets of
shabu were planted to him by the police during the search. The RTC found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of RA 9165. The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied by the RTC in its Resolution dated 22 July 2008. The accused filed an appeal to the CA but the CA affirmed
the RTCs decision. Aggrieved the accused filed an appeal before the SC assailing the decision of the CA.
Issue: Whether or not the arrest and search of the accused without warrant would fall under the
doctrine of warrantless search as an incident to a lawful a lawful arrest.
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit. Under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a person may be arrested
without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." The accused
was caught in the act of committing an offense during a buy-bust operation. When an accused is apprehended in
flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police officers are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest
him even without a warrant. An arrest made after an entrapment operation does not require a warrant inasmuch as it
is considered a valid "warrantless arrest." The accused argues that force and intimidation attended his arrest
when four police officers arrested him and one of them pointed a gun at him. However, his allegations were not
supported by evidence. On the contrary, the CA found that the defense neither objected to the accuseds arrest
nor filed any complaint against the police officers. Considering that an arrest was lawfully made, the search incidental
to such arrest was also valid. A person lawfully arrested may be searched, without a search warrant, for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense. Accordingly,
the two sachets of shabu seized in the present case are admissible as evidence

Case 38: People vs. Dela Torre-Yadao

Facts:
The combined forces of the Philippine National Police's Anti-Bank Robbery and
Intelligence Task Group (PNP ABRITG) composed of Task Force Habagat (then headed by
Police Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson), Traffic Management Command ([TMC] led by
then Police Senior Superintendent Francisco G. Zubia, Jr.), Criminal Investigation Command (led

37

by then Police Chief Superintendent Romeo M. Acop ), and National Capital Region Command
(headed by then Police Chief Superintendent Jewel F. Canson) killed 11 suspected members of
2
the Kuratong Baleleng Gang rll along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City. Subsequently,
SPO2 Eduardo Delos Reyes of the Criminal Investigation Command told the press that it was a
summary execution, not a shoot-out between the police and those who were slain. After
investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs absolved all the police officers involved,
including respondents Panfilo M. Lacson, Jewel F. Canson, Romeo M. Acop, Francisco G. Zubia,
Jr., Michael Ray B. Aquino, Cezar O. Mancao II, and 28 others (collectively, the
3
respondents). rll On review, however, the Office of the Ombudsman reversed the finding and
filed charges of murder against the police officers involved before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Cases 23047 to 57, except that in the cases of respondents Zubia, Acop, and Lacson, their
liabilities were downgraded to mere accessory. On arraignment, Lacson pleaded not guilty. Upon
respondents motion, the Sandiganbayan ordered the transfer of their cases to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City on the ground that none of the principal accused had the rank of
Chief Superintendent or higher. Pending the resolution of the Office of the Special Prosecutors
motion for reconsideration of the transfer order, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) 8249 that
expanded the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction by deleting the word "principal" from the phrase
"principal accused" to apply to all pending cases where trial had not begun. As a result of this
new law, the Sandiganbayan opted to retain and try the Kuratong Baleleng murder cases.
4
Respondent Lacson challenged the constitutionality of R.A. 8249 in G.R. 128096 rll but this
Court upheld its validity. Nonetheless, the Court ordered the transfer of the trial of the cases to
the RTC of Quezon City since the amended informations contained no allegations that
respondents committed the offenses charged in relation to, or in the discharge of, their official
functions as required by R.A. 8249. Before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 81, then presided
over by Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr., could arraign respondents in the re-docketed Criminal
Cases Q-99-81679 to 89, however, SPO2 Delos Reyes and the other prosecution witnesses
recanted their affidavits. Some of the victims heirs also executed affidavits of desistance. These
prompted the respondents to file separate motions for the determination of probable cause before
the issuance of warrants of arrests.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she dismissed the
criminal actions on the ground of lack of probable cause and barred the presentation of additional
evidence in support of the prosecutions motion for reconsideration.
Ruling:
r The Court agrees with Judge Yadao that the affidavits and reports, taken together
with the other documents of record, fail to establish probable cause against the respondents. The
prosecution points out that, rather than dismiss the criminal action outright, Judge Yadao should
have ordered the panel of prosecutors to present additional evidence pursuant to Section 6, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court which provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within ten (10) days
from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of
the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a
warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a
warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or
information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of
probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5)
days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing
of the complaint of information. Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court
three options upon the filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on
record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable
cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in
24
case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause. rll But the option to order the prosecutor
to present additional evidence is not mandatory. The courts first option under the above is for it to
"immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause."

38

That is the situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause against
the respondents. It is only "in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause" that the judge
may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice. But that is
not the case here. Discounting the affidavits of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno, nothing is left in
the record that presents some doubtful probability that respondents committed the crime charged.
PNP Director Leandro Mendoza sought the revival of the cases in 2001, six years after it
happened. It would have been ridiculous to entertain the belief that the police could produce new
witnesses in the five days required of the prosecution by the rules. In the absence of probable
cause to indict respondents for the crime of multiple murder, they should be insulated from the
25
tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial. rll
Case 39: People vs. Mariano
Facts:
Godofredo Mariano and Allan Doringo were found guilty by the RTC of the crimes of
illegal sale of shabu (Mariano and Doringo) and illegal possession of drug paraphernalia
(Mariano). On appeal, they contended that the trial court erred in admitting the seized dangerous
drugs and illegal paraphernalia as evidences against them. They assailed the validity of their
warrantless arrest by stating that the arresting officers should have secured a warrant because
they were already in possession of pertinent information, such as the identity of their target, upon
which an application for a warrant should be used. Thus, the alleged shabu obtained by virtue of
warrantless arrest is inadmissible. On the other hand, the OSG, in its appellees brief, supports
the convictions of the appellants. It justifies the legality of the warrantless arrest of appellants as
they were caught in flagrante delicto.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of the appellants is correct.
Ruling:
No. Section 5, rule 113 of the rules of court allows a warrantless arrest under any of the
following circumstances:
a. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense.
b. XXXXXXXXXX
c. XXXXXXXXXX
In the instant case, the warrantless arrest was effected under the first mode or aptly termed
as flagrante delicto. PO1 Olleres and P03 Razo (the officers) personally witnessed and were
in fact participants to the buy-bust. After laboratory examination, the white crystalline
substances seized from the appellants were found positive for shabu, or a dangerous drug.
Under these circumstances, it is beyond doubt that appellants were arrested in flagrante
delicto while committing a crime, in full view of the arresting team.

39