2011 International Conference on Languages, Literature and Linguistics

IPEDR vol.26 (2011) (2011) IACSIT Press, Singapore

A Postmodernist Strategy: Language Games

Shahram Afrougheh 1, Fatemeh Azizmohammadi 2 and Abdolreza Godarzi 3
1

English Language and Literature Department, Post-Graduation Faculty, Islamic Azad University, Boroujerd
Branch, Boroujerd, Iran
2
English Language and Literature Department, Post-Graduation Faculty, Islamic Azad University, Arak
Branch, Arak, Iran
3
English Language and Literature Department, Humanities Faculty, Islamic Azad University, Boroujerd
Branch, Boroujerd, Iran

Abstract. Jean-Franois Lyotard is indeed the most influential analyst and proponent of postmodernism. In
his revelatory work, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, he treats narrative pragmatics and
language games as the bases for a critical approach to postmodern art and politics, as well as to the questions
of morality, justice, and legitimacy. He insists on the obligation of philosophy, politics and writing to bear
witness to heterogeneity and to what is repressed or forgotten in all representations of the past. He challenges
the limits of philosophy, aesthetics and political theory in terms of problems linked to the irreducible
complexities of art and literature and the nonrepresentational affects of historical political events.
Keywords: Language Games, Event, Metanarrative, Heterogeneity, Complexities, Representation.

1. Introduction
In The Postmodern Condition: A Report on knowledge, Lyotard argues that the modern period since the
late eighteenth century has been governed by the power of certain universalizing "metanarratives" in
philosophy and politics, notably the Hegelian narrative of the emancipation of self-conscious spirit through
history, and, linked to this, the Marxist narrative of progressive universal political emancipation.
Lyotard takes the view that the power exercised by such narratives, either to assimilate or to exclude all
other identities, histories, and temporalities, is totalitarian, and leads inexorably to horrors such as the
Holocaust.
The postmodern condition is one of "incredulity" toward metanarratives. In place of the dominative and
self legitimating "we" of the universal humanity presupposed and sustained by such metanarratives,
Lyotard imagines with optimism a world of multiple, small scale collectivities, none of which has the
legitimacy to subordinate others. Central to this analysis is the concept of "Language games" which Lyotard
borrows from the late Wittgenstein. A language game may be defined as the form of shared symbolic action
constituted by every act of communication. Language games include such actions as describing, promising,
prescribing, and urging.

2. Language Games
The third section of the book, entitled ''The Method: Language Games,'' is a valuable analyses of ''a
certain procedure: emphasizing facts of language and in particular their pragmatic aspect'' (p. 1). At this
moment, it seems necessary to argue that what Lyotard means by the term pragmatic:
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A denotative utterance such as ''The university is sick,'' made in the context of a conversation or an
interview, positions its sender (the person who utters the statement), its addressee(the person who
receives it), and its referent (what the statement deals with) in a specific way: the utterance places
(and exposes) the sender in the position of ''knower'' (he knows what the situation is with the
university), the addressee is put in the position of having to give or refuse his assent, and the referent
itself is handled in a way unique to denotatives, as something that demands to be correctly identified
and expressed by the statement that refers to it. (ibid)
Lyotard here gives a fascinating description of how he approached ''performatives'':
If we consider a declaration such as ''The university is open,'' pronounced by a dean or rector at
convocation, it is clear that the previous specifications no longer apply. Of course, the meaning of the
utterance has to be understood, but that is a general condition of communication and does not aid us
in distinguishing the different kinds of utterances or their specific effects. The distinctive feature of
this second, ''performative,'' utterance is that its effect upon the referent coincides with its enunciation.
The university is open because it has been declared open in the above-mentioned circumstances. That
this is so is not subject to discussion or verification on the part of the addressee, who is immediately
placed within the new context created by the utterance. As for the sender, he must be invested with
the authority to make such a statement. Actually, we could say it the other way around: the sender is
dean or rector- that is, he is invested with the authority to make this kind of statement-only insofar as
he can directly affect both the referent, (the university) and the addressee (the university staff) in the
manner I have indicated. (ibid)
With Lyotard ''prescriptions'' are another story:
A different case involves utterances of the type, ''Give money to the university;'' these are
prescriptions. They can be modulated as orders, commands, instructions, recommendations, requests,
prayers, pleas, etc. Here, the sender is clearly placed in a position of authority, using the term broadly
(including the authority of a sinner over a god who claims to be merciful): that is, he expects the
addressee to perform the action referred to. The pragmatics of prescriptions entail concomitant
changes in the posts of addressee and referent. (P. 9, 10)
Lyotard builds ''the study of language'' on Wittgenstein's "attention on the effects of different modes of
discourse:''
Wittgenstein, taking up the study of language again from scratch, focuses his attention on the effects
of different modes of discourse; he calls the various types of utterances he identifies along the way (a
few of which I have listed) language games. What he means by this term is that each of the various
categories of utterance can be defined in terms of rules specifying their properties and the uses to
which they can be put- in exactly the same way as the game of chess is defined by a set of rules
determining the properties of each of the pieces, in other words, the proper way to move them. (ibid)
In approaching Wittgenstein's language games, Lyotard seems to have used ''three observations:''
The first is that their rules do not carry within themselves their own legitimation, but are the object of
a contract, explicit or not, between players (which is not to say that the players invent the rules), The
second is that if there are no rules, there is no game, that even an infinitesimal modification of one
rule alters the nature of the game, that a ''move'' or utterance that does not satisfy the rules does not
belong to the game they define. The third remark is suggested by what has just been said: every
utterance should be though of as a ''move'' in a game. (ibid)
A convenient way to perceive the highlights of the Lyotard's ''method as a whole'' is to focus on the ''last
observation:''
This last observation brings us to the first principle underlying our method as a whole: to speak is to
fight, in the sense of playing, and speech acts fall within the domain of a general agonistics. This does
not necessarily mean that one plays in order to win. A move can be made for the sheer pleasure of its
invention: what else is involved in that labor of language harassment undertaken by popular speech
and by literature? Great joy is had in the endless invention of turns of phrase, of words and meanings,
the process behind the evolution of language on the level of parole. But undoubtedly even this
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pleasure depends on a feeling of success won at the expense of an adversary-at least one adversary,
and a formidable one: the accepted language or connotation. (ibid)
At this point, Lyotard warns readers that ''this idea of an agonistics of language should not make us lose
sight of the second principle, which stands as a complement to it and governs our analysis: that the
observable social bond is composed of language ''moves.'' (p. 10, 11) ''An elucidation of this proposition''
will shed light upon ''the heart of the matter at hand''.

3. Conclusion
In The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, then, Lyotard analyzes the different types of
narrative that are used in society to legitimate social practices such as science. He draws a distinction
between grandnarratives, accounts that bring together all forms of legitimating into a single unified account,
and local language games. Lyotard claims, first, that all encompassing grand narratives, designed to
legitimize claims to truth in different arenas, fail to take full account of the event:
In contemporary society and culture-postindustrial society, postmodern culture- the question of the
legitimation of knowledge is formulated in different terms. The grand narrative has lost its credibility,
regardless of what mode of unification it uses, regardless of whether it is a speculative narrative or a
narrative of emancipation. (1984, p. 37).
Second Lyotard claims that legitimation takes place within specific rule-driven linguistic practices,
defined as language games. Any social practice can be interpreted according to a language game, that is,
according to the rules on proper and improper statements governing correct moves within the practice (the
rules of chess, for instance).
He argues that language games are incommensurable, because there can be no shared system of rules for
the resolution of conflicts. Therefore, there can be no universal basis for legitimation, because such a basis
would have to act as a bridge between incommensurable language games. These claims are consistent with
Lyotard's poststructuralist anti Hegelianism, that is, with his opposition to the possibility of totalization and
to the resolution of difference through dialectics. They are also consistent with his concern for a politics and
ethics based on otherness. There is no common discourse that can legitimate all true statements. There are
true statements in one language game that cannot be translated into others.

4. Acknowledgements
We would like to avail ourselves of the opportunity to thank Mr. Danial Kaffashzadeh for his creative
comments.

5. References
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1992.
[2] Austin, J. L. Sense and Sensibilia: How To Do Things With Words. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962.
[3] Bell, Daniel. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. New York: Basic Books, 1973.
[4] Bennington, G. Lyotard: Writing the Event. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988.
[5] Boyne, R., and Rattansi, A. ed. Postmodernism and Society. London: Macmillan, 1990.
[6] Burgin, Victor. The End of Art Theory: Criticism and Postmodernity. London: Macmillan, 1986.
[7] Connor, Stephen. Postmodern Culture. Oxford and New York: Blackwell, 1989.
[8] Docherty, Thomas ed. Postmodernism: A Reader. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester / Wheatsheaf, 1993.
[9] Garcia-Moreno, Laura. Situating Knowledge: Latin American Readings of Postmodernism. Diacritics, 25(1):
Spring, 1995.
[10] Lyotard, Jean-Franois. Libidinal Economy. Iain Hamilton Grand trans. London: Athlone Press, 1974.
[11] ________. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Geoff Bennigton and Brian Massumi trans.
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984.
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[12] ________. The Differend: Phrases in Dispute. Georges Van den Abbeele trans. Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1984.
[13] Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations. G. E. M. Anscombe trans. New York: Macmillan, 1958.
[14] _________. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Frankfurt: n. p. Translated and cited in Allen Thiher, (1984). Words
in Reflection: Modern Language Theory and Postmodern Fiction. Chicago: n. p, 1975.

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