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Tuesday

Tuesday, October 7, 2014

1:31 PM

Five Major Historical Periods


Mercantilist Era, 1492-1815
Pax Brittanica, 1815-1914
Thirty Years' Crisis, 1914-1945
Cold War, 1945-1990
Post-Cold War, 1991-present
Big Picture
Power
It's what we talk about and analyze in political science
The ability of an actor to make another actor to do something they wouldn't normally
do
Shifts in the balance of power among actors often cause conflicts
Often helps explain why some historical areas are stable and others are volatile
Cannot truly separate study of politics from the study of economic interests
Mercantilist Era, 1492-1815
The world didn't become a meaningful political/economic unit until about 1500
Different societies didn't start interacting until about this time
One of the reasons was that the East was so far advanced that they didn't want
anything from anyone in the West
Use of colonization to make yourself richer
Rules about imports and exports
What is a state?
A country of the world
Central authority with the ability to make and enforce laws, rules, and decisions within a
specific territory
Also a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force
Peace of Westphalia
Established state sovereignty
Sovereignty
The expectation that states have legal and political supremacy - or ultimate authority within their territorial boundaries
No other state interferes with internal affairs
Anarchy in international relations is not chaos - just means that everyone has sovereignty
Pax Britannica, 1815-1914
Began with Waterloo, ended with WWI
Time of great peace and prosperity
Hegemony
Domination of a state
Gold standard
Everyone was playing by the same rules
Wealth
Wealth is power, power is wealth
Labor theory of value
Goods and services have value, you put value in them by putting labor into them
Comparative advantage theory
Produce what you're good at, import the rest
Economic liberalism
Belief in free trade and other forms of economic openness
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Belief in free trade and other forms of economic openness


Government should only protect citizens, protect private property rights, maintain public
works
Industrial Revolution
Economic prosperity
First Great Globalization
Goods and people are moving across borders more than ever before
British hegemony was a key ingredient
Strong enough to impose and maintain a beneficial economic system
The technology is important, but it doesn't drive history all on its own
Thirty Years' Crisis, 1914-1945
Changing balance of power in Europe
WWI made tensions worse
Rise of serous economic problems
Very high inflation
The US was becoming the world's hegemon
Protectionism was meant to shield states from the international conflict, but it actually
made it worse
Rise of two superpowers: US and USSR
Capitalism
Trade and industry in a country are owned and controlled by private interests for profit
In other words, the state does not own and control most economic activity
Third world country
Not really synonymous with poor country
Referred to nonaligned countries during the Cold War
Post-Cold War era, 1991-present
Rise of the US as the sole global superpower
Capitalism as the dominant global economic system
Economic globalization increasing rapidly
Analyzing world politics
Use systematic thinking
Question others' assumptions
Focusing on actors, interests, interactions and institutions
Establish an analytical framework to understand what is happening
Actors
States
Groups within states
Voters, workers, bureaucracies
International organizations
Multinational corporations
NGOs
Individuals
We first look for the relevant actors
What is the appropriate level of analysis?
Interests
What the actors hope to achieve
Security, economic well-being, or promotion of an ideology
Interactions
We assume actors are rational and strategic
Cooperation
Positive-sum
At least one actor gains, no one loses
Collective Action Problem
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Collective Action Problem


Public goods
Nonexcludable - once it exists, no person can prevent another person from having it
Nonrival in consumption - someone else using something doesn't prevent another
person from using it

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Thursday
Thursday, October 9, 2014

1:40 PM

Bargaining: zero sum


You gain what I lose (and vice versa)
Collective action problem
It makes public goods hard to obtain
Solve: small number of actors
Selective incentives
Prisoner's Dilemma
All actors in a group want the same thing, they'd all benefit equally
What helps encourage cooperation?
Iteration
When you expect repeated interaction with the other actor
More willing to forego immediate gain in order to preserve future benefits
Information
Knowledge of cooperation
Bring up examples in discussion section
Bargaining
Zero sum
Division of a fixed resource
A gains what B loses
Reversion outcome
What will happen if bargaining breaks down
Could be the status quo, or worse (i.e. war)
Power
Coercion: if B doesn't agree, then A will use force
Attractive outside option: B needs a deal, A really doesn't
Agenda setting: A can take things off the table before bargaining even begins
We need a systematic approach to comprehend IR
Who are the actors, what are their interests, ad how do they interact?
Cooperation/Bargaining
Examine rational, strategic decision making
Examine power relations
Institutions
Key concept in political science
Not synonymous with organizations
Defined as a set of rules that structures actors' interactions
Formal or informal
Why are they important
They help coordinate behavior, facilitate cooperation
They set the "rules of the game"
International institutions
The international institution is in a state of anarchy
No higher power needed to enforce the rules
How international institutions work
Set standards of behavior
Help actors verify compliance
Reduce costs of joint decision making
Help resolve disputes
Institutions do not always benefit all actors equally
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Institutions do not always benefit all actors equally


Three Main Approaches to International Relations
Realism
Liberalism
Constructivism
Realism
States are the dominant actor
Main interest is security
States' interest generally conflict
Mostly bargaining, coercion always possible
Liberalism
Many types of actors are important
No single interest dominates, though wealth is a common goal
Cooperation often possible because interests are often common
Conflict happens when states fail to realize this
Institutions important, facilitate cooperation
Constructivism
Many types of actors important
Actors' interests are influenced by culture, identity, and ideas
Interactions can transform actor's interests
Institutions shape identities and action, set norms of appropriate behavior
War
An event involving the organized use of military force by at least 2 parties that satisfies
some minimum threshold of severity
1000+ battle deaths
Causes of War
States fight over territory, other states' national politics, other states' regime types
These things do not cause wars by themselves
Interstate war is actually very rare
Costs of war are tremendous
States always attempt to bargain first
Crisis bargaining: at least one actor threatens force
Coercive diplomacy: use threats to influence interaction
Compellence and deterrence
War is a failure of bargaining
Bargaining model
An idea of how to analyze war
Not the only way
Realists see war as a product of states in constant competition with each other in anarchy
States will initiate crises and risk war when they believe war would provide more benefits
than the status quo
They do want to negotiate but they want to make the other actor think that war is a
possibility
Three possibilities of causes for war
Incomplete information
Commitment problems
Indivisibility
War from incomplete information
States do not know the full cost, or the outcome
One state can concede too little, and other side is willing to start a war
One state can demand too much, and other state is willing to risk war
Why is there incomplete information?
States can't reliably observe another state's capabilities or resolve
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States can't reliably observe another state's capabilities or resolve


Credibility of threats
Brinksmanship
Increase risk of accidental war, hoping other side will back down first and make
concessions
Like the game of Chicken
Tying hands
Make threats hard to back down from (audience costs)
Paying for power
Costly steps to increase capabilities
How does all this lead to war?
Incomplete info turns into states miscalculating bargaining
They concede too little or demand too much
This turns into war
Brinksmanship, tying hands, and paying for power can also backfire

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Tuesday
Tuesday, October 14, 2014

1:36 PM

Three causes of war


Incomplete information, commitment problems, indivisibility
War from commitment problems
Bargaining over goods that are a source of future power
Preventative war and changes in power
Preemption and first-strike advantages
Bargaining over goods that are a source of future power
One state cannot guarantee another will not use future force to change a deal
Bargaining only happens if states can credibly commit to not use force
Examples: strategically important territory, weapons programs
Might lead to war if a state worries about future war (better to fight now than later)
Preventative war and changes in power
Factors external to bargaining can shift the balance of power
Examples: economic growth/new technologies
Can A credibly commit not to use its future power to extract concessions from B?
If what can come from war today is better than what could come from war in the future,
war today might happen
Preventative war: a war fought with the intention of preventing an adversary from
becoming stronger in the future
Preemption and first strike advantages
First strike advantage: situation that arises when military technology, military strategies,
and/or geography give a significant advantage to whichever state attacks first in a war
Preemptive war: a war fought with the anticipation that an attack by the other side is
imminent
War from indivisibility
An indivisible good cannot be divided without diminishing its value
Conflict becomes all or nothing
Examples: territory important to ethnic and religious groups
States don't want to bargain or compromise
They prefer to go to war
If state A can convince state B they won't back down, they might be bluffing
Good might seem indivisible but creative solutions exist
Or, enforcement mechanism is just too weak
How to make war less likely
Raise costs of war, increase transparency, have outside enforcement, divide invisible goods
Raise the costs of war
Nuclear weapons
Dictatorships might see it differently if total annihilation is possible vs. sending people
to front lines
International trade
Increase transparency
Find ways to assess other state's capabilities
Sat technology, international organization
Much easier to assess capabilities than resolve
Have outside enforcement
International organizations, great powers' security guarantees
Iteration (repeated interaction) helps
Divide indivisible goods
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Divide indivisible goods


Joint or shared control
Linkage to other issues
Other goods to put into bargaining scenario
The bargaining model
War happens when bargaining fails
States don't want war
They can't find a settlement that both prefer to war
Domestic politics and war
Before this, states as unitary actors
Three main categories of domestic actors
Leaders, bureaucracies and interest groups, the general public
General vs particularistic (narrow) interests
Rally effect
Tendency for people to become more supportive of government in response to
crisis/war
Diversionary incentive
Distract from problems at home
War to satisfy the military or interest groups
War frequently imposes costs on society
Specific actors might benefit from conflict and hope to disburse these costs to
population at large
Military industrial complex
Alliance between military leaders and industry
Military favors war because
Purpose of military is to wage war
Increase of budget
Promotion opportunities
Military is most influential because it has the best information/intel
Some interest groups might benefit from war
Group that has goals and is well organized and try to benefit people in the group
by influencing policy
Other groups may oppose war
Economic actors who depend on peace for commerce and investment
Democratic institutions may discourage war

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Thursday
Thursday, October 16, 2014

1:30 PM

Case study: Iran's nuclear program


Hypothetically, what could lead to war with Iran?
Use the analytical framework and theories from this course
Iran
About the size of Alaska
Population 3x the size of Texas
Longtime adversary of the US
Persian population, speak Farsi
Islamic Republic, has been since 1979
Concern that Iran is developing nuclear weapons
Israel is the only other Middle Eastern power with nuclear weapons
Iran claims peaceful purposes only
IAEA investigations
US and Europe have imposed economic sanctions
They are a huge oil exporter
Have hit the country hard
Iran refuses to halt nuclear development
Arms race in the Middle East
Has agreed to reduce some plutonium output
Seems to be willing to compromise

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Thursday
Thursday, October 23, 2014

1:46 PM

Anarchy
International system is a system of anarchy
But we can have cooperation despite anarchy
Why do states cooperate on security when they do not have to?
Specifically, why do states form and trust alliances with other states?
Alliances
Commitments by states to cooperate on security policy
Institutions created between states that facilitate cooperation to influence outcomes
of conflicts with states not part of the institutions
Can be bilateral (between two states) or among several states
An attack on one is considered an attack on all
Not the same thing as a collective security organization
Some are asymmetrical
Not all states are equal in power, commitments are made based on that
Offensive or defensive
Offensive: teaming up to attack an outside state
Defensive: teaming up to pledge defense, attack on one is an attack on all
Costly
Commitment to use force
Putting your own soldiers/population at risk, expensive
Reputation
Hard to back down because of a risk of harm to reputation
Limits freedom
Consultation required with other allies before acting
Emboldened allies are a liability
What motivates states to form alliances?
Weak states gain protection
Can signal resolve of a strong state
Combining resources for better defense
Formalize a sphere of influence
Balance of power
A situation in which the military capabilities of two states or groups of states are
roughly equal
An alliance can help achieve this
Does not explain all alliance formation
Bandwagoning, ideology/cultural/religion
Alliances as signals
If A allies with C it signals to B a threat
This can lead to credibility problems
Tradeoff between credibility and control
Taiwan
We want to defer China from using force
But we don't want Taiwan to go and declare independence - we want them to
exercise restraint
Limit commitment through strategic ambiguity
When do alliances work best?
Strong common interests
Fighting war is preferable to abandoning alliance
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Fighting war is preferable to abandoning alliance


Signal to opponent in credible manner
Limit risk of entrapment
Collective security organizations
Not the same as alliances
Broad-based institutions that promote peace and security among their members
Can be global or regional
Examples: League of Nations, United Nations
Membership is universal
How does collective security work?
Threat to international peace/security triggers a response
All members are called upon to act against that state
Possible actions: send mediators, peacekeeping forces, economic sanctions, etc.
Attempt to stop large scale human rights abuses
Basic logic: make war unattractive to belligerents
Raise costs of war
Less likely if states have the backing of the whole international community
Increase transparency
More information available
Have outside enforcement of commitments
Keeping promises to disarm
Divide indivisible goods
Peacekeepers can help people reach agreements on indivisible goods
Difficulties
Dependent on member states for troops, funds, equipment, etc.
Public goods and collective action problems
Problems with joint decision making
United Nations Security Council
Authority to identify threats
Prescribe organization's response, including military/economic sanctions
15 members, 5 permanent
Permanent: US, GB, FR, RU, CH
Veto power
You need support of all 5 permanent, and a majority
Pros and cons
Fewer collective action problems
Acts with backing of the 5 strongest states
Biased, uneven outcomes
United Nations
Cold War divide crippled the UN for first 5 decades of its existence
1990s, much more activity in peace enforcement and peacekeeping
Peace enforcement operation
Military operation in which force is used to make or enforce peace among warring
parties who haven't agreed to end fighting
Heavily armed
Impose peace on warring parties through active intervention
Peace keeping operation
An operation in which troops and observers are deployed to monitor a cease fire or
peace agreement
Impartial force, usually only with warring parties' consent
Lightly armed, there to make sure war does not resume
Sometimes administer elections and ensure fairness
Rarely drawn from the P5
Strong support for Gulf War
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Strong support for Gulf War


Very weak response to Bosnia, Rwanda, Darfur
Quiet successes in El Salvador, Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Cambodia
Keeping peace after war easier than making peace
2001, optimism but short lived
2003 US invasion of Iraq
Very controversial intervention
France/Russia/China refused to back
11/15 would have voted against if it came to a vote
Security Council divided
For UN to be effective
Powerful members must all agree, or at least not block the resolution
Proposed action must not threaten the interests of any of the powerful
members
Powerful members must see outcome as worth the risk and costs in lives, money and
other resources
"Worth the cost" is very politicized
Moral imperative to provide security
Yet self-interest and apathy of powerful states stops the UN from being totally effective
Inconsistent application of intervention
Cannot protect everyone, everywhere, all of the time
Not random which human rights violations UN cares about and which it doesn't, etc.
Sovereignty issue
Short term vs long term solutions
As flawed as it is, is it better than nothing?
UN has helped countries reconstruct after war
Has perception of being impartial and neutral
Able to bolster legitimacy

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Tuesday
Tuesday, October 28, 2014

1:45 PM

Civil wars
War in which main participants are within the same state
Government/rebel group
Can include non-state actors
No one-sided massacres
1000 battle related deaths or more
Consequences of civil wars
Possible state failure - government loses monopoly on legitimate use of force
Maybe the state is breaking down
Human welfare cost - civilians tend to suffer the most
Financial expense, like rebuilding infrastructure
Basic characteristics of civil war
Fragmented authority
State is losing monopoly on force
Rise of militias, black markets, child soldiers, paramilitary groups
High civilian casualties
Insurgencies
What is an insurgency?
Military strategy in which small lightly armed units engage in hit and run attacks
Can be used to further many different kinds of political agendas
Why these tactics?
Small, weak groups vs larger, stronger adversary
Seek to undermine confidence in the government
Also try to provoke government forces into attacking civilians
Hope that gov will mistakenly kill civilians so they come to insurgent's side
Comparative politics vs. IR
Why study civil wars in world politics (international relations), not just in comparative
politics?
We use tools of analysis used for interstate war
Role of external actors
They play a significant role in civil wars
Supply of arms, money, training, political sanctuary
Spillover across borders
Refugees, etc
Why some groups rebel
Disputes over territory, governance, policy
Or, ethnic/religious divisions
But these things themselves do not cause civil war
Especially important to note: ethnic and religious divisions alone do not cause civil war
Degree of ethnic diversity does not affect rate of civil war
Options
Leave the state
Separatism
Creating an independent state on territory of an existing state
Most of the time does not work
Irredentism
Desire to detach a region from one country and attach it to another, usually
because of shared ethnic and religious ties
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because of shared ethnic and religious ties


Alter state's policy
Overthrow the government
Three sets of factors
Help us explain the emergence of organized, armed opposition
Group level explanations, country level factors, international factors
Group level explanations
Overcome collective action problems
The nature of interests
High level of trust/solidarity
If not, then must buy or kidnap supporters
Sell diamonds, drugs, smuggling, human trafficking
Forcible recruitment
Country level factors
Geography
Is the country's conditions conducive to insurgency?
Political institutions/regime type
Lower possibility of civil war in democracies
Weak but not democratic states have a high possibility of civil war
Wealth
Distribution
Wealthier countries more likely to have peace
International factors
Direct intervention by a foreign state
Build up a rebel group with arms, money, training, etc.
Actors within foreign states could share interests with rebel group
Proxy war
A conflict in which two opposing sides fight by supporting opposite sides in a war,
such as the government and rebels in a third state
Basically a war fought vicariously
Civil War as a Bargaining Failure
Lack of information (capabilities, resolve)
Indivisible goods
Commitment problems
What can be done about civil war?
Undercut insurgents
COIN operations
UN peacekeepers
Ultimately, difficult to fully prevent civil wars
In the long run, best way to prevent is combo of economic development and
democracy
Terrorism
Premeditated threat/use of violence against noncombatants to obtain an objective through
intimidation of a larger audience
Most terrorism is not religiously motivated
Most terrorism occurs within national borders
Terrorism is rational
Actor has an interest
Pursues it through strategic, purposive behavior
Recall: rationality has nothing to do with the substance of an interest or a goal
Extremists
Actor whose interests not widely shared by others; individuals or groups that are
politically weak relative to the demands they make
Why use terrorism?
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Why use terrorism?


Weak relative to their targets and their demands
Extremism + weakness = cannot pursue their demands via normal institutions
Asymmetric warfare
Armed conflict between actors with highly unequal military capabilities
Such as when terrorists or rebel groups fight strong states
Small, self-contained cells
Very loose network
Can bargaining failure explain terrorism?
Incomplete information
Attacks signal capabilities and resolve
Commitment problems
Terrorists cannot credibly commit to ending attacks
Target (e.g.) government cannot credibly commit to uphold any bargain or
compromise
Indivisibilities
Nonnegotiable, "all or nothing" goals
Terrorist Strategies of Violence
Coercion, provocation, spoiling, outbidding
Coercion
Induces policy change by imposing or threatening to impose cost

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Thursday
Thursday, October 30, 2014

1:33 PM

Terrorist Strategies of Violence


Provocation
Intended to provoke target government into making a disproportionate response
This action alienates moderates in terrorists' home society
Spoiling
Intended to sabotage a prospective peace between target and moderate leadership
from terrorists' home society
Play on target's doubts as to possibility of compromise
Trying to discredit government
Outbidding
Demonstrates a capability for leadership and commitment relative to another, similar
terrorist group
Why multiple terrorist groups would claim credit for an attack
Can terrorism be prevented?
Deterrence
Preserve status quo by threatening some kind of unacceptable cost
Would work between two states, but terrorists aren't states
This could end up killing a lot of people in target society since terrorists can hide
Could backfire and increase support for terrorist group
Preemption
Stop it before it starts
Problem: terrorists aren't in a smooth, identifiable hierarchy
Like trying to find a needle in a haystack, but it's a well hidden needle that we don't
even know exists
Defensive measures
Keep them out
Expensive and difficult
Criminalization
Arrest them
This would require international cooperation
Negotiation and compromise
This could show weakness
What Terrorists Really Want: Abrams 2008
Commonly believed that terrorists
Motivated by relatively stable and consistent political preferences
Evaluate expected political payoffs of their available options
Adopt terrorism when the expected political return is superior to alternatives
Makes the case that this is not the case
Yes, terrorists are rational
But operating on a very different incentive structure
They use terrorism for the social aspects
Seven puzzling tendencies
Ineffectiveness, first resort, uncompromising, protean political platforms, anonymous
attacks, fratricide
Coercion is ineffective
Actions do not obtain (or even advance) their stated objectives/cause
Terrorism as a first resort
Often operate in countries with plenty of freedom of expression, assembly, association
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Often operate in countries with plenty of freedom of expression, assembly, association


Plenty of political alternatives to violence
Not just repressive societies
Terrorists are uncompromising
Political aims are even sometimes moderate, mainstream
Centered on complex, multidimensional issues
So there be some room for compromise, but there isn't compromise
Why be irrational and get nothing vs compromise and get something?
Protean political platforms
Goals and beliefs change frequently
Chameleon organization
Highly unstable policy goals
Anonymous attacks
Often do not issue policy demands - there is nothing to negotiate
Often do not take credit for attacks
Since 1968, 64% of terrorist attacks have been by unknown perpetrators
Terrorists fratricide
Terrorist groups frequently attack each other, extremely similar terrorist groups
Never ending terrorism
These attacks continuously fail to advance their platform yet they keep doing them
Should learn that these attacks aren't working but they do not disband
What Terrorists Really Want
People participate in organizations not to achieve their official goals, but to experience
social solidarity with other members
International Trade
The action of buying and selling goods and services
Liberalization is the reducing barriers to trade
Trade barriers are government limitation on the international exchange of goods
Generally steady increase since WWII
1993-2006, worldwide trade increased more than 9 per year in value and 6% per year
in volume
Breakdown
Manufactured (2/3)
Raw materials and energy resources (1/4)
Ag has been declining
Huge growth in manufacturing exports from developing countries
US imports from developing countries (relative to size of US economy) have doubled since
the 1990s
Lately developing countries have been making more complicated goods
Why export?
Production surplus, so you can seek new markets
Sometimes can get higher prices selling overseas
Help maintain employment levels
Earn foreign currency to buy imports
Promote overall economic growth
Why import?
Self-sufficiency costly/impossible
Some goods unavailable domestically
Better quality of some foreign goods
Some goods cheaper to produce elsewhere
Theory of Comparative Advantage
Theory of Comparative Advantage
Comparative advantage
Ability of a country of firm to produce a particular good or service more efficiently
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Ability of a country of firm to produce a particular good or service more efficiently


than other goods or services
Theory of Comparative Advantage
Do what you're good at
Different from the concept of absolute advantage
Comparing yourself to yourself, not yourself to others
Protectionism
Imposition of barriers to restrict imports
Generally harmful to the economy as a whole
Forces a country to produce goods that are not to its comparative advantage to produce
Raises costs for consumers
Strong evidence that international trade increases national income and efficiency
Why do countries do what they do?
Always ask: actors, interests, institutions and interactions
Consider national politics (the political process and institutions within countries)
Trade Policy and National Politics
Institutions might allow small numbers of actors who demand protectionism to have a
disproportionately big influence
Small groups also tend to be better organized, overcome collective action problems
Heckscher-Olin trade theory
A country will export goods that make intensive use of the factors of production in which it
is well endowed
Factor endowments = material and human resources
Land, labor, capital, human capital (skilled labor)
Factor price equalization
International trade will tend to make wages, profits, and other earnings more similar across
countries over time
Wages in poor countries will rise towards levels in rich countries, which fall
Ricardo-Viner model
Emphasizes the sector in which factors of production are employed rather than the nature
of the factor itself
This differentiates it from Heckscher-Olin approach, for which the nature of the factor labor, land, capital - is the most important
Stolper-Samuelson theorem
Protection benefits the scarce factor of production
This views flows from the Heckscher-Olin approach: if a country imports goods that make
intensive use of its scarce factor, then limiting imports will help that factor

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