Pindaan untuk memasukkan kausa tindakan baru

The Virgina Rhea; China Steel Corp & Anor v My Virgina

Rhea; owners of [1983] 1 MLJ 198
Court: ACJ SINGAPORE
Judge: RAJAH J
Summary of Facts
This was an appeal from the learned Registrar's decision in which he dismissed the
defendants' application to set aside the plaintiffs' amendment without leave dated November
21, 1981 to the Indorsement of Claim on the Writ. The amendment material to this appeal are
the inserted words and KKS33.
22 Oct 1980:

Plaintiffs issued a Writ against the owners of the vessels "Virginia Rhea"
"Virginia Sun", and "Mont Pioneer" ex "Virginia Sun".

Plaintiffs claim:

As owners of the consignees of goods shipped on board the vessel

"Virginia Rhea" or alternatively as endorsees or holders for value of 4
bills of lading issued in respect thereof. However the writ was not served
as none of the said ships had come into the Port of Singapore.

27 Oct 1981:

The validity of the Writ was extended by an Order of Court for a period
of 12 months from 22 Oct 1981.

21 Nov 1981:

The plaintiffs amended the Indorsement of Claim (KKS33)

13 Mac 1982:

The plaintiffs obtained an Order of Court to amend the summons further

by deleting all the names of the vessels therein mentioned other than
"VIRGINIA RHEA" with consequential amendments of the Writ.

10 April 1982:

The defendants took out a Summons seeking to delete the said

amendments effected by the plaintiffs. The 4 bills of lading mentioned in
the original Indorsement of Claim were KKS1, KKS3, KKS31 and
KKS32.
The amendment complained of sought to bring in yet another bill of
lading numbered KKS33. When the amendment was effected by the
plaintiffs on 21 November 1981, limitation had already set in against
KKS33
Issue: Whether amendment amounted to a new cause of
action? And whether it arises out the same facts as the
cause already pleaded?

Defendants

(1)sofarasKKS33isconcernedtheperiodoflimitationhadsetinsome

Arguments

timepriortoNovember21,1981(notdeniedbytheplaintiffs),
(2)thefirstamendmenteffectedbytheplaintiffswasnotinorderand;
(3)thatsuchamendmentshouldthereforebestruckout.
Theycontendedthatbyintroducingtheamendmentanewcauseofaction
wasbeingintroducedintothelitigationandthatsuchanintroductionhad

Plaintiff

theeffectofdeprivingthemofalegitimatedefense.
(1) the amendment is part and parcel of a cause or causes of action

Arguments

alreadypleadedandforthistheyrelyonRule5(1)ofOrder20;
(2)evenifitwereanewcauseofaction,asallegedbythedefendants,
thentheywouldrelyonOrder20Rules5(2)and5(5);and
(3)shouldtheyfailunder(1)and(2),thenthewordingofOrder20Rule
5(1)ismoreembracingthansubRules(2),(3),(4)and(5)andconferson
theCourtsuchawidediscretionaswouldenableit,ontheparticularfacts

Courts

oftheinstantcase,togivethemtherelieftheyhadsought.
(1)Thefirstamendmentisnotinfurtheranceofanecessarypartofthe

decision and

originalclaimsorcausesofactionoftheplaintiffsanditseekstobringin

reasoning

anentirelynewmatterwhichisinnowayrelatedtothe4causesofaction
relatingtothe4billsofladingjoinedinoneWritbyvirtueofOrder15(1)
oftheRulesoftheSupremeCourt.
(2) The new cause of action does not arise out of the same facts or
substantiallythesamefactsasanyofthecausesofactionrelieduponby
theplaintiffsintheirWrit.ThefactswhichrelatetoaclaimunderKKS33
areentirelyseparatefromandhasnobearingwhatsoeveronanyofthe
claimsundertheotherfourbillsoflading.
(3)TheprevailingjudicialviewisthattheprovisionsofthisRule,which
permitamendmentstobemadeaftertheexpiryofthecurrentperiodof
limitation,onlyempoweredthecourttograntsuchamendmentsinthe
threeclassesofcasesspecifiedinparas.(3),(4)and(5)oftherule,and
havenotimportedanygeneralrelaxationoftheformerpracticeregulating
thepowertoallowsuchamendments.
Held:Allowingthedefendants'appealwithcost.