Maneuver and Firepower. The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades by John Wilson

ARMY LINEAGE SERIES
MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER

The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Bri gades
by
John B. Wilson
CENTER OF Mi LiTARY HISTORY

UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.c., 1998
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Dala

Wilson, John B., 1934Maneuver and firepower : the evolution of divisions and sepa rate
brigades I by John B. Wilson.
p.
cm.
Army lineage series
Incl udes bibliographi cal references and index.
1. United States. Army- Organ ization- Ilistory. I. Center of
Mi litary History. II. Title.
VA25. W554 1997

355.3'0973- 0 C20
94-2 103 1
CIP
CM H Pub 60- 14-1
Fi rst Printing
ARMY LINEAGE SERIES

Jeffrey J. Clarke, General Editor
AdvisOlY Committee
(As OfScplcmbcr 1997)
Mic hael J. Kurtz

Nat ional Arch ives and Records
Joseph T. G lauhaar
University of Houston
Admi ni stration
Raymond A. Ca llahan
Universi ty o f Delaware
Brig. Gen. Fle tcher M. Lamkin, Jr.

U.S. Mi litary Acade my
Maj. Gen. James J. Cravens, Jr.

U.S. Army Tra ining and Doctrine
Command
e" fol A. Reardon

Pe nnsylva nia Siale University
Carlo W. D'Eslc
New Seabury, Mass.
Col. Everett L. Roper, Jr.

U.S. Army War College
George C. He rring, Jr.

University of Kentucky
Univers ity o f Vermont
Mark A. Stoler
Brig. Gen. Joseph R. Inge
LI. Gen. Frederick E. Vollrath

Arch ivist or lhe Army
U.S. A rmy Command and Genera l
Staff Coliege
Gerha rd L. Weinberg
University of North Carolina
u.s. Army Cel/ler ofMililwy HislDlY

Brig. Gen. John W. Mountcastle, Chi ef of M ili tary History
Ch ief Historian
Jeffrey J. Clarke
Chief, Fie ld Programs and

Historical Scrvices Div ision
John T. Grecnwood
Editor in Chie f
John W. Elsbcrg
III
Foreword
This work traces the evolution of two unique U.S. Army organizations---divisians and brigades- which combi ned combat arms, combat support, and combat
service support units into well -oi led engi nes for war. The Army has used divisions for over two hu ndred and twenty years on the battlefield and for nearly
eighty years has maintained them in peacetime as well. Separate combined arms
brigades, a newer phenomenon, date to the 19605. Bot h organ izations have played
a pivotal ro le in the American military experience, and their exploits form the
corc of the Army's history in the twentieth century.
The fo llowing study is a systematic account of the way these two organizations evolved, highlighting the rationales behi nd Ihal evolul ion and Ihe many factors Ihal played a part in bringing those changes inlO real ity. This book will al so
comp lement Ihe forthcoming revised editio n of Armies, Corps. Divisions, and
Separ(lIe Brigades, a vol ume in the Army Lineage Series.
In this work the reader, whcther mi litary or civ ilian, can follow the developmen t of two of the Army's complex organizations. Force planners today will find
thc cha llenges faced by their predecessors in making these insti tutions responsive
to an ever-changing threat in an evolvi ng political and technological environ ment
hig hly relevant. By telling this story in a comprehe nsive manne r, the volume
makes a signifi ca nt contribution to the history of the Army.
JOI-IN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Washington, D.C.
2 February 1998
Brigadicr Gcnera l, USA

Chicfo f Mili tary J-listory
The Author
John B. Wilson was born and grew up in Imperia l, Pennsylvan ia. He is a
graduate of Duquesne University, receiving a B.A. deg ree in history in 1963 and
an M.A. degree in America n history in 1966. He jo ined the O rgani zational
History Branch, Center of Military History, in 1968 and served the re until he
ret ired in 1997. He compi led Armies, COIpS. Divisions. alld Separafe Brigades in
the Army Lineage Series and is the author of several art icles on the organizations
of divis ions and separate brigades.
VI
Preface
This volume examines the evolution of divisions and separate brigades in the
U.S. Army as it searched for the most effective way to fuse combat arms, combat
support , and service units into combined arms teams. The Army has used divi
sions and brigades since the colonia l era, but the national leadership did not provide for thei r permanency in the force unt il the twentieth century. When divisions
became a part of the stand ing force, experiences on American battlefields in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuri es, as well as Europea n military practices,
sha ped their organization. The permanent divisions and brigades thai the Army
organized, however, were uniquely American.
AI the beginning of the seventeenth century annies had no permanent tactical
subdivisio ns. Ad min istrative o rga ni zat ions called " regi ments" were primarily
designed to bring armed men to the battlefield. Upon arriv ing at the batt le si te,
the men were usua lly g rouped into battal ions or squadrons, tactica l organizations.
King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden establ ished brigades during the Thirty Years
War as tactica l organizations, assigning several battalions to them for the duration
of 1I campaign, an arrangement that minimized the necessi ty for regrouping or
retra in ing his army before go ing into ba it Ie. Shortly therea ft er, other nations
adopted the Swedish example.
The size of annies increased by the early eighteenth century, and Frederick the
Great of Prussia began dividing his army into col umns, which marched as wings or
lines that fell into a prearranged order on the battlefield. Such maneuvers required
disci pline and well-drilled troops. To overcome the Prussians, Marshal Maurice de
Saxe of France reintroduced the cadence step, which had fa llen into d isuse, and
stressed discipline to control an army on the march and in combat. By marching
troops at a measured step, Maurice cou ld judge the time requ ircd to move his army
to engage an enemy. Wi th the abil ity to calculate marching time, Marsha l Victor F.
Broglie in the mid- 1700s began divid ing the French Army into several permanent
columns or divisions of infantry and arti llery for a campaign. These divisions made
an anny easier to maneuver and occasionally permitted him to lise part of it as an
independent force. Al most two hundred years later Basil Liddell Hart described that
process as making a limbless army grow arms that could grip an enemy at di fferent
poi nts wh ile others struck him.
During the seventeen th and eighteenth centuries Europea n mi litary theorists
incorporated the doctrine for organizi ng divis ions and brigades in to the ir publicaVH
tions, and many o f those works we re known to military leaders in co loni al

America. The British Army al so brOllght European method s of war to North
America before the Revolutionary War, and the colonists adopted much of that
practice and doctrine in developing their own divisions and brigades as command
and control units.
Aga inst this background, Chapter I su rveys the types of brigades and di visions the Army empl oyed in the various wars o f the eighteent h and ninetecn th
centuries. These units and the doct rine underlying them were the basis for organizing and mainta ining permanent divisions and brig<ldes in the twcntieth cent ury. Chapters 2 through 14 trace the evolution of Uni ted States Army div ision s and
separate brigades from approximately 1900 to 1990. Their various reorganization s and th eir roles in the total Army arc the gri st of the study. Chapter 15 draws
together some of the lessons ex plored in the main body o f the volume. Since the
manuscript was prepared seven years ago momentous changes have oeurred in
the Army, and a brief look forward ex amines some of them.
The word "division" over the years has had many meanin gs wi thin the Army,
as well as within the other military se rvices . As used in th is stud y, th e term
add resses only a large, combined arms tcam ca pable of independent operations.
But an integral part of the story is al so thc deve lopment of the " brigade," initia lly
a comma nd and control headquarters for two or more regiment s or battalion s
from the same arm or branch. In the mid-twenti eth cen tury the brigade evo lved
into a combined arms unit smal ler than a d ivision. The combined arms brigade,
although a relatively new structure, is also a subject of thi s study.
A fcw words need to be said about the charts and tabl es in the vo lume. T<lbles
of organization and equipm ent (TOE) publi shed for di vis ions and separate
brigades and their subordinate e lements served as the skeleton for the study, and
the ch<lrts were derived from them. No one table, however, contains all the information that appears in e<lch charI. Therefore, to develop each chart, I began with
the largest unit, such <I S the d ivision, and compi led the data for each subordi nate
element down to and inc luding com pany, Iroops, battery, or det<lchment. The
charts, nevertheless, represent on ly windows in time, for the organi zations constant ly changed. The tabl es li sting di visions and brigades, their location, maneuver clemen ts, and olher information were al so drawn from many sources. Hence,
they are not attributed to any parti cular work or document.
Many co lleagues have served as mentors in the rese<Jrch and writing of thi s
manuscript. To name everyone who ass isted in the work is impossible, but key
support ers in the Center of Mi lita ry History have been Morr is J. MacGregor,
Actin g Chi ef Hi storian of the center in 1989- 90; Dr. David Trask, form er Chi ef
Historian ; and LI. Col. Clayton R. Newe ll, fo rmer Chi ef, Histori cal Serv ices
Division. I am also indebted to Col. Raymond K. Bluh m, Colonel Newell's successor, who read the manu script and offered insightful suggestions, and to Dr.
John T. Greenwood, who arranged space and support for me wi thin the center
after I retired to compl ete the work. Jani ce E. Mc Kenney, Chi ef, Organizational
V111
History Bran ch, read, commentcd on , and cd ited numerous versions of eac h
chapter, and Romana M, Danysh from thc Organizat ional Hi story Branch read
and commcnted on the work and listened to cnd lcss hours of discussion about the
scope and presentati on of the material. Rebecca Robbins Raines, Donna Everett,
and Edward Bedessem, all curre ntl y assigned to the Organi zation al Histo ry
Branch, assisted in defining ideas and the rclationships ofarrns, su pport , and service units to division s and separate brigades.
Outs ide the branc h but wit hin the cen tcr, Dr. Edward Orca, form er Chief,
Historical Research and Analysis Division, offercd invaluabl e help in clarify ing
the ideas presented. Maj. Glenn Haw kins and Dr. Edgar F. Raincs rcad sect ion s of
the manuscript and forced close examination of some of its basic assumptions.
Dr. Robert K. Wright, Chief, Historical Resources Branch, otTered suggestions
for orga niz ing and presenting the material. Over the years the ccntcr's library
statT, especially James Knight , offered ind ispensable hclp in locating books and
articles and complet ing citatio ns in the notes and bibliography. Gera ldin e
Harcarik from the Historical Resources Branch cheerfull y searched for countless
documents in the center's archival holdings.
No serious historical work about th e Army can be accomp lished without
drawing on ho ldings of the U.S . Army Mi litary History Insti tute at Carlis le
Barracks, Pennsylvania. The staff there was a steady source of help. In part icular,
John S lonaker, Dennis Vetock, and Louise Arno ld-Friend always found time to
stop d uring a busy day to respond to my requests for documents, books, and articles. They gladly sha rcd their know ledge of Army o rgani zation, suggest ing works
that might not have come to my atten tion. Another ind ivid ual in the historical
com munity who sha red his knowledge about the Army was John L. Romj ue of
the U.S. Army Training and Doct rine Command.
The preparation of the vo lume for publication has a lso been the result of the
efforts of many people. I would like to ex press my apprec iation to Susan Carroll,
who edited the manuscript and prepared the index; Joycelyn M. Ca nery, who
typed the final text; Beth E Mac Kenzie, who designed the chart s and obtained
and placed the photographs; Joh n A. Birmingham, who created the pages and
des igned the cover; and Sherry Dowdy who created the maps. I am part icularly
apprecia tive of the work of Cath erine A. Heeri n, who oversaw the ed itorial
process, and Arthur S. Hardyman, who saw the product ion e ffort to fruition.
Many have contri buted to the comp letion of thi s work by their knowledge,
advice, cooperation, and encouragemcn t- and to all of them lowe a debt of g ratitude. For any and all errors of fact or interpretation, I am responsible .
Washington, D.C.
2 February 1998
JOI-IN B. WI LSON
IX
Contents
Page
Chapfer
I. EARLY EXPE RIENCES

RevoluliollGlY War
Mexican I1flr
Civil 1#11"
3
3
7
10
12
War Wilh Spain.
16
~f/arofI812
2. GENES IS OF PERMANENT DIVIS IONS

Reforms Following the mil' Wilh Spain
COllcentl'(lfioll 01/ the Mexican Border ill 191 1
The Stimsoll Plan.
.......... .
Operations 01/ 'he Mexican Borde/: "/9/ 3- / 917
AlIlllOriz(lfiOIl of Pel'lI/onell' Divisiolls
3. THE TEST- WORLD WAR I . . . .
Firsl Revisions . . . . . . . . .
The Baker Board and Pers"ing SraifOrgalliz(lliollof Study

Plans To Organize More Divisiolls
Organizing the Divisio1ls . .

Expansion of the Divisional Forces
Divisional Challges
4. T HE AFTERMAT H OF WORLD WAR I
23
23
29
31
34
37
47
47
52
55
58
65
67
79
Occupation and Demobilization
79
TheAEF Evaluates World mw I Divisional Organizatiol/s

Development of Divisions Ullder tlie 1920 National De/elise Act
ReOlgal/ization of Divisions . . . . . . . . . . .
83
86
97
5 A RETURN TO H IE PA ST; A LOOK TOT HE FUTURE

Paper Divisions
Resel'l'e Divisions . . . . . . .
More Realistic Mobilization Plalls
Motorization and Mechanization
A Nell' II//al//ly Division
A Nell' Cavalry Division. . .
109
109
11 5
11 7
120
125
133
Chapter
Page
6. PRELUDE TD COMBAT
III/allllY alld Cavaby Divisiolls Revisiled
Olgallizillg Armored Divisiolls . .
Mobilizalioll 0/ Naliollal Guard Vllits . .
Expanding Divisional Forces
Reorganization a/the National GI/ard Divisions
Allother Reorganization
Increases ill the Force Stl"llcture
143
143
147
7. T HE CRUC IB LE- COM BAT.

Wartime Reorganization, J943
Lighl Divisiolls . .
6pallding Divisiollal Forces: Meetillg tlte Troop Basis
Deploymelll alld More Olgan izatiollal Changes
Co rrecting OlganiZGliolial Problems.
Redeployment
179
8. AN INTERLU DE OF PEACE
Demobilizatioll. Occupatioll. al/d the Gel/eml Reserve
Reorganization 0/ Reserve Dil'l'siollS
Postwar Divisional Orgallizations
The State 0/ Divisiol/al Forces.
9. TH E KOREAN WAR AN D ITS AFTERM ATH
Deployll/ent 0/ Forces 10 Korea
Rebuildillg tlte Genemf Reserve
Organizational Trellds
Readjustmellt 0/ Divisiollal Fo rces
....
Improving the Reserves
10. T HE SEARC H FOR ATOM IC AGE DI VISIONS
Explorillg Altemalive Divisiolls
Pelltomic Divisions . . . .
Reorganization o/lhe Divisiolls
Evall/ating ROCID Gild ROCAD
II. A NEW DIR ECTION- FL EX IBLE RES PONSE
MOMAR-I
.....
Tlte Development 0/ ROA D
ROA D Delayed . . . . .
Tlte ROAD Reorganization
Ail'lI/obilily . . . . .
12. FLEX IBLE RESPONSE
The Buildup 0/ lite Army
152
154
158
160
169
179
187
190
193
196
199
207
207
213
222
229
239
239
242
247
250
254
263
263
270
279
281
291
291
293
303
308
3 14
323
323
XII
Chapter
Expansion a/the Force. . . . . . . . .

Orgallizational Changes 10 Units in Vietnam.
Divisions and Brigades ill Other Commal/ds
Relreflchmellt . . . . . . . .
Page
330
333
336
341
D. THE TOTAL ARMY . . . . . .

The 21-Division, 21-Brigade Force
A New Force- Greater IflleglUtioll of Regulars all(/ Reserves
353
14. A NEW ASSESSMENT

The Divisioll Restructurillg SlIIdy
Divisioll-86 . . . . .
Elusive Light Divisiolls
The Army 0/ Excellence
A New Direction
379
379
383
390
39 1
403
15. CONCLUSION .
413
A LOOK FORWARD
42 1
BIBLI OGRAPH ICAL NOTE
INDEX . . . . . . . . .
353
364
427
445
Tables
No.
Page
I. National Guard Infantry Divis ions, 19 14

2. National Guard Infantry Divis ions, 1917
3. Geographic Distribution of Nat ional Guard
Divisions, World War 1 . . . . .
4. Geographic Di stribution of Nat ional Army
Div isions, World Wa r I . . . . .
5. Expansion of Divisional Forces, 19 18
6. Deployment of Divisions to France
7. Demobilization of Div isions . . . .
8. Distribution of Regular Army Divisions and Brigades, 1922
9. Allotment of Reserve Component Infantry Div isions, 1921
10. Allotment of Reserve Component Cavalry Divisions, 1921
II. Allotment of National Gua rd Caval ry Brigades, 1927
12. Div isions Act ive on 7 December 1941
13. Div isions Act ivated or Ordered Into Active
Mi litary Service in 1942
14. Div isions Act ivated in 1943 . . . . . .
XIII
32
40
59
61
66
70
82
100
102
103
116
157
17 1
192
No.
15 .
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
2 1.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27 .
28 .
29 .
30.
3 1.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
Page
Deployment of Divisions to the Pacific Theater
Deployment of Divisions to the European Theater
Status of Divisions, 1 June 1946
Location of National Guard Divisions, Post- World War II
Location o f Organized Reserve Corps Divisions,
Post- World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Di visions Designated as Training Centers, \947- 50 .
Combat Divisions on Active DUly During the Korean War
Regular Army Train ing Div isions, \950- 56
Operation GYROSCOPE
...... .
Maneuver Element Mix of Divisions:
ROAD Reorganization, 30 June 1965
Maneuver Element Mix of Bri gades:
ROAD Reorganization, 30 June 1965.
Divisions and Brigades: Selected Reserve Force, 1965
Deployment o f Di vision s and Brigades to Vietnam
Maneuver Elements Assigned to Divisions and
Brigades in Vietnam, 30 June 1969 . . . . .
Maneuver Element Mix of Divisions and Brigades on
Active Duty Outside Vietnam, 30 Ju ne 1969
Nati onal Guard Divisions and Brigades, 1968
Redeployment of Divisions and Brigades From Vietnam
The 2 1~ Di vision Force, June 1974
The 2 I-Brigade Force, June 1974
Round-out Uni ts, 1978
The 24- Division Force, 1978
The 24- Bri gade Force, 1978
Divisions, 1989 . . . . .
Brigades, 1989 . . . . .
Di visions and Brigades in Southwest Asia, 1990-9 1
194
195
209
216
220
222
244
245
253
310
313
329
333
336
339
340
345
362
363
365
368
369
404
406
407
Charts
Page
No.
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Infantry Division, 1917 . .

Cavalry Division, 191 7
Infantry Div ision, 24 May 1917 .
Infantry Div ision, 8 August 1917
Infantry Div ision , 7 October 1920
Cavalry Division, 4 April 1921
Cavalry Division, 1928
XIV
39
41
50
56
93
96
114
Page
No.
8. The Mechanized Force, 1928 . . . .

9. Proposed In fan try Division, 30 July 1936
10. In fan try Division (Peace), 1939, Corrected to
8 Ja nuary 1940
I I.
12.
13.
14.
. . . .
Cava lry Division, 1938

In fantry Divis ion, I November 1940
Cavalry Div ision, I November 1940
Armored Division, 15 November 1940
15. In fantry Division, I August 1942

16. Armored Division, 1 March 1942 .
17. Motorized Division , I August 1942
18. Airborne Division, 15 October 1942
19. Infantry Di vision, 15 July 1943 .

20.
2 1.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
3 1.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
Armored Division, 15 September 1943

Light Division, 1943 . . . .
Airborne Division, 1944 . . .
Infantry Division, 7 July 1948
Armored Division, 8 October 1948
Airborne Division, I Apri l 1950
Atomic Field Army In fantry Div ision. 30 September 1954
Atomic Field Anny Arrn orcd Division, 30 September 1954
PENTANA Div ision . . . . . .
....
Airborne Division (ROTA D). 10August 1956
Infantry Division (ROC ID), 2 I December 1956
Armored Div ision (ROCAD) , 1956 . . . .
Pentomic Infantry Division, I February 1960
Traini ng Div ision, I Apri l 1959 . .
Mediu m Division (MOMAR), 1960
Heavy Division (MOMA R). 1960
ROAD Division Base, 1961
Airborne Division, 196 1 . . . .
Airborne Brigade. 1961 . . . .
Howze Board- Air Assau lt Division, 1963
Airmobile Division, 10 July 1965.
Training Division , 1966
TR ICA P Division . . . . . .
Training Division , 1970 . . . .
Heavy Division , Divi sion Restructuring Stu dy,
1 March 1977 . . . . . . . . . . .
45 . Heavy Divis ion (Tank I-Icavy) as Briefed to Genera l Meyer
on I 8 October 1979 . . . .
46. Heavy Division, 1 October 1982
xv
124
128
134
136
146
148
151
162
164
165
168
183
186
189
197
226
228
230
266
268
273
275
278
280
283
285
294
295
299
30 1
302
315
317
342
358
37 1
38 1
385
388
Page
No.
47. Li ght Divi sion, 1 October 1985

48. A irborne Division, I April 1987
49. Air Ass<lult Division , I April \98 7
394
398
399
Maps
Page
No.
I. Corps Areas in the United States, 20 August 1920
2. Field Armies in the United States, 1932
3. Field Armies in the United States, Post-World War II
88
11 8
218
Illustrations
Soldiers of tlte Americall Revolutioll, Trell /on, December 26, 1776
Bvl. Lt. Gen. Winfield SCOIl
The Battle of Palo Alto
Camp Humphreys, Virginia , 1863
Staff of the 2d Di vision, I Army Corps, 1898
Camp Alger, Virginia, 1898 . . . . . . .
The Public Views the 1904 Maneuvers, Manassas, Virg inia
Troops Pass in Review, 1904 Manassas Maneuvers
Maj. Gen. Henry C. Corbin and Col. Arthur L. Wag ner
Maj. Gen. J. Frank lin Bell . . . . .
27th In fantry, 2d Division, Encampment, Texas Ci ty, Texas
4th South Dakota In fantry, San Beni to, Texas, 1916
Maj . Gen. Hugh L. Scott. . .
Maj . Gen. Tasker H. Bliss . . . .
16th In fantry, ISl Division, Parades in Pari s, 1917
The Gondrecourt, France, Training Area
Officers of the American Expeditionary Forces
and the Baker Mi ss ion . . . .
Draftees Drill in Civ ilian Clothes, Camp Upton, New York
Camp Meade, Maryland, 1917 . . .
165th Infantry, 42d Division, in Trenches, 1918
Traffic Congestion in the Argonne, 19 18 . . .
American Occupation Troops Cross the Rhine at
Coblenz, Germany, 1919
1st Field Arti llery Brigade, 1st Division, on Occupation
DUly in Germany, 1919
. . . . . .
51h Field Artillery Troops at the Isl Di vision Parade,
Washington, D.C., 19 19
XVI
4
8
II
15
17
18
26
26
27
29
35
36
48
49
51
51
53
62
63
69
72
80
81
84
Superior BOHl'd Members, 1919

26th Division I)Hrade, Fort Devens, Massach usetts, 1925
Maj. Gen . Charles P. Summcrall
... .
OlTicers Quarters, Fort Sam Houston , Texas, 1925 .
Ist Cavalry Division Maneuvers, 1927 . . . . . .
Medium Armored Car of the Mechanized Force, 193 1
General Malin Craig . . . . . . . .
General George C. Marsha ll . . . . .
Ist Cava lry Divi sion Maneuvers, Toyahvale, Texas, 1938
671h Infantry (Provi sional Tank Brigade) at Third Army
Maneuvers, 1940 . .
37-111111 . Gun and Crew, 1941
Brig. Gen. Ad na R. Chaffee
Half-Track Personnel Car, 1941
Tanks of the 68th Arrnored, 2d Armored Division, at the
Louisiana Ma neuvers, 1941 . . . . . .
Provisional Tank Destroyer Baltation, Fori Meade,
Maryland, 194 1
. . . . . . . .
Lt . Gen . Walter C. Short Reviews the Hawaiian Division, 194 1
Ca mp Shelby, Mi ssissipp i, 1941 . . . . . .
Paratroopers in a Spec ial Demonstrati on, Fort Belvoir,
Virginia, 194 1
LI. Gen. Lesley J. McNa ir
.......... .
Genera l McNHir and Maj. Gen. Elbridge O. Clmpman Inspect
13th Airborne Division Troops, 1944 . . . .
8th Infantry Div ision Arrives at I-Iamplon Roads, Virg ini a,
Port of Embarkation, 1945 . . . . . . . .
4 1sl Infantry Di vision Departs the Phi lippines, 1945
7th Infantry Division Band, Seoul, Korea, 1945
350th In fantry, 881h Infanlry Division, Parades in
Gorizia, italy, 1945 . . . . . . . . . .
A Final Pa rade in Gorizia, Prior 10 the 88th Division's
Departure, 1947
....... .
82d Airborne Di vision Troops at the New York City
Victory Parade, 1946 . . . . . . . . . .
Elements of the 2d Infantry Division Near Wonju , Korea, 195 1
40th Infantry Division Troops Prepare To Replace Ihe 24th
Division, 1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4th Infantry Division Leaves New York for Germany, 195 1
3.5-i nch Rockel Launcher in Action Against the
Nort h Koreans, 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . .
M4 I Light Tank Bound for the 7051h Tank Battalion, 1954
37th Infantry Division Troops Pass in Review, 1954
XV II
86
110
III
113
113
123
127
133
135
144
145
149
152
155
156
158
160
167
18 1
19 1
200
208
21 1
22 1
23 1
23 1
24 1
246
247
248
249
25 1
General Matthew B. Ridgway . . . . . . . . .

....
....
Genera l Maxwe ll D. Taylor
10 Ist Airborne Division Simulates an Atomic Blast
During Training, 1957 . . .
Honest John Rocket Launcher, 1957
M60Tank . . . . . . .
M48 Tanks. . . . . . . . .
Genera l Clyde D. Eddleman . .
Davy Crockett Rocket Launcher
Little John Rocket Launcher . .
32d Infantry Division Elements Train During the Berlin Crisis,
1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pre-positioned Equipment in Germany During
Operation BIG LWT
....... .
1st Batta lion , 60th Infantry, at Fort Richardson, Alaska, 1963.
Elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade Arri ve in Vietnam
9th In fantry Division 's First Base Camp in Vietnam , 1966
Soldiers of the I st Brigade, 10 I st Airborne Di vision,
Fi re From Viet Cong Trenches, 1966
Elements of the 69th Infantry Brigade Train at Fort
Riley, Kans.1s, 1966
....
....
3d Brigade, 25th In fantry Divisio n, Members Engage the
Viet Cong, 1966
. . . .
Elements of the 9th Infantry Division Depart ing
Viet nam, 1969
. . . .
Tube- Launched, Optica lly Tracked, Wire-Guided Missile
Genera l Creighton W. Abrams .
Chaparral Surface-to-Air Missi le System
Vulcan Air Defense System
General Fred C. Weyand
General Donn A. Starry
Genera l Edward C. Meyer
Bradley Fighting Vehicle System
Multiple Launch Rocket System
9th Infantry Di vision "Dune Buggy"
Genera l John A. Wickham , Jr.
Wi nter Tra ini ng, 205t h Infantry Brigade, 1986
Reactivation Ceremony, 29th In fant ry Division, 1985
265
270
27 1
272
292
292
296
298
300
304
304
3 12
324
326
327
328
33 1
343
354
357
360
360
380
384
386
387
387
392
393
396
396
Illustrations courtesy of Ihe follow ing sources: PI'. 4, 380, 386, and 393, U.S.
Army Art Co ll ection; 1'1'.8, 15, 17,36,48, 113 (top), 22 1, 247, 272, 304
(bot/om), 324, 326, 360 (lOp alld bOllom), 387 (lOp) , and 396 (top) , U.S. Army
Center of Military History; Pl'. 11 ,26 (fOp alld bottom), 27, and 53, Library o f
XV ll1
Congress; pp. 18,35,5 1 (boflom) , and 144, U.S. Army Military History Institute;
p. 23 1 (top) , Will iam Gardner Be ll ; pp. 23 I (boltom ), 292 (lOp and boltom), 300,
304 (lOp), 328, 354, 387 (botlom) , and 396 (ballom) , National Guard Association;
p. 298, Firesto ne News Se rvice; p. 384, U.S. Army Tra inin g and Doctri ne
Command; and p. 392, Fort Lewis Military Museum. All other ill ustrat ions from
the files of the National Arch ives and Records Administration.
XlX

The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades
CHAPTER I
Early Experiences
RegularilY {/lid due Subordilllllioll. being so essen/fully necessary. 10 rhe good
Order and Govel"lllllelll of lIIl Arl/lY, (///(/ wi/hollt ii, fhe whole IIIl1st $0011 become (f
Scel/e of (li~'oj"(le,. alld cOI!fiI.~ioll. The Gel/eral fillds il illdi~pe"s(lbly lIecessmy, lI'ilholll
wailillg (IllY tal/gerlol' dispatchesji'oll/ (he General COlltil/emal Congress. immediately
(0 /o/'/11 the Army illfo three Grand DivisioWi, ami oj dividing each of 'hose Grand
Dillisiolls ill/o Brigades.
General George Washingtonl
Revolutionary War
On 22 July 1775, George Washington , General and Commander in Chief of the
American revol utionary forces, ordered the army at Boston to be organized into
three divis io ns. Each d iv ision comprised two brigades of approx imate ly eq ual
strength. Major generals commanded the d ivisions, and most brigades were commanded by brigad iers who were general officers. The division commanders had no
staffs, but the brigade commanders had brigade majors to assist them . Brigade
majors were officers through whom orders were issued and reports and correspondence transmitted, analogous to regi mental adj utants. Initially, both d ivisions and
brigades were admi nistrat ive commands rather than tactica l organizat ions. 2
Divisions and brigades soon evolved into semiperm anent tactica l, as well as
adm inistrative, organiza tio ns. Because regime nts cou ld not ma intain their
authorized strengths, Wash ington made the brigade, consisti ng o f several regiments, the bas ic tac tical and adm inistrative unit for the Continen ta l Army.
When organized in 1775 all brigades at Boston had about 2,500 men each.
During the war commanders deli berately ba lanced the strength of the brigades
fo r each cam paign. For examp le, WaShington em ployed brigades of rough ly
1,400 o ff icers and enlisted men each at Trenton in Decem ber 1776 a nd at
Mon mout h in June 1778. At Yorktown in 1781 each of his brigades had approximately 1,000 officers and enl isted men)
Alt hough the Continental Army was reorgan ized on several occasions, many
brigades had the s a me reg ime nt s assig ned over lo ng pe ri ods of t ime.
Nevertheless, Washington and other army commanders had the authority to alter
regimen tal assignments. In 1778 he emphat ica lly told his subordinate, Maj . Gen.
Charles Lee, that he [Washi ngton] could change it "every day if I choose to do
MANEUVER AN D FI REPOWE R
Soldi ers orlhe AmcriC<ln Revolution, Trellton, December 26, 1776,

by 11. CJllIrles Mc8arI"Q1I
it." But the commander in chie f also be lieved that frequent changes in regimental
assignment w it hou t apparent calise would be ascribed to "caprice and whim"
rather than "stabilit y and judgement [sic]."4
The Co ntinenta l Army emp loyed a variety of artillery weapon s, includi ng
field, siege, and garrison guns, but the use of infantry and field arti llery as com
bined arms tca ms was spo radi c. During some campaign s two to fOllr field
artillery guns were attached to in fantry brigades, and the brigade commander in
turn attached the guns to infantry battalions. Harness ing the two arms together
increased firepower, provided a means to break up cncmy formatio ns, and protected infantry aga inst bayon et charges, as we ll as offering a psyc holog ica l
advan tage. A major problcm for th e fi e ld arti llcry was to kccp up w ith the
in fantry on the march because of the rough , broken terrain in colonial America.
The key to cross-cou ntry travel was the design of light, mobil e artill ery carriages,
but on the battlefield guns were manhandled. Unlike European armies, colonial
commanders oOcn lIsed field artillery for siege work because of the shortages of
guns, officers, and trained gun crews.S
With thc employment of brigades, Congress increased their staff officers. The
firs t such o lTicer was added in May 1777 when Cong ress authorized a brigade
chaplai n to care for the religious needs of the men. In January 1778 WaShi ngton
proposed thaI an infantry brigade have a quartermaster, fo rage master, wagon mas-
EARLY EX PERIENCES
tcr, and comm issary, along with armorers, a traveling forge, and some artificers.
The following May, however, Congress authorized only the brigade quartermaster.
Allhough not provided by Congress. in June 1778 Washington introduced the pasi
lion of brigade inspector, whose duties included maintaining unit rosters, regulat ing
detail s (any spccia l l<lsks assigned to the brigade), and caring for the formation and
march of al l guards and details. Furthermore, the inspector received the commander's orders and communicated them to brigade and regimenta l officers; thus the
posi tion incorporated duties of the brigade major. Allhough the brigade inspector
assisted in executing brigade maneuvers, he was not in the chain of command.
Congress officia lly authorized the posit ion in February 1779 and made the former
brigade major an aide-dc-camp to the brigad ier. At the samc time Congress also
provided a second aide fo r the brigad ier.6
In early 1779 Washington directed the appointment of" conductor ofmititary
stores fo r each brigade. Equipped wit h a portable fo rge, <111 ammun ition wagon,
and 11 wagon with an arms chest for each regiment in the brigade, the conductor
of mil itary stores and hi s assistan ts (t he latter being fu rn ished by the regiments)
ca red for its arms. Th us, by the end of the war each in fant ry brigade compriscd
several semipermanent ly assigned infantry regi ments and a few attached art illery
pieces and their crews. The bri gade com mander had a staff consisti ng of two
aides, a brigade quartermaster, an insl>cctor, a conductor of mi litary stores, and a
chaplain. Infantry brigades were generally known by the names of their commanders, but the morc permanent brigades were often known by numerical designations, such as the 1st Maryland and 21 Pennsylvania Brigades.1
Washington assigned infantry brigades to divisions, but the number of brigades
assigned to each division varied. Divisions, neverthelcss, bccmnc q~l\l s i-pe rrnanent
commands, with the samc brigades serving in the same divi sions for ex tended periods of time. As this organizational relationsh ip matured, the divi sions maneuvered
independent ly and conducted operations away from the mai n army. ij
Washington occasiona lly expressed theories about the proper organ ization of
divisions and brigades. In January 1777, as the army was about to be reorganized,
he told Congress that three ful1 ~s t rength regiments, approximately 700 men each,
would be sufficient for a brigadc and that three brigades would be adequate for a
d ivi sion. The fo llowing year, du ring si milar discussions, Washington ex pla ined that
the division-brigade-regiment organization was fo r the sake o f order, harmony, and
discipl ine. Each brigade and division would have a general officer as its commander and would be capable of mov ing eit her jointly 0 1' se paratel y like a "great
mach ine" as the circumstances required. Because of shortages in I>crsonnei, at no
time duri ng the war did either divisions or brigades adhere to organizational concepts, part icularly as far as the number of assigned regiments and brigades was concerned . Nevertheless, bot h di visions and brigades ful fil led Washington's requirement ofbcing able to operate either jointly or separately when the need arose.9
The basi c figh ting team used during the Revol utionary Wa r consisted of
infantry and artillery, but the Cont incnl<ll Army also used cavalry. Cavalry units
were initially mounted mi litia commands, but in late 1776 Congress authorized a
regiment of light dragoons for the Continenta l Army. Thai act was soon followed
by another, which authorized 3,000 li ght horsemen to be organized into four regi
menls. The regiments were never fu lly manned because o f Ihe ex pense of their
special weapon s and equipment , their horses, and their training. By 1780 the
units were converted into " legionary organizations." In the mid-eighteenth century Europeans had developed small mixed units of cava lry and infantry, known as
legions, to overrun or hold an area, gather information , and conduct raids away
from the main army. Leg ions in the Continental Army were to comprise four
troops of dragoons and two companies of infantry. They were not large, indepen.
dent combined arms units capable of defeat ing the enemy such as the divisions
and brigades in the Con ti nenta l Army. 10
Fo llowing the British surrender at Yorktown in 1781 , the Continental Army
dwindled away, and its divi sion s and brigades slow ly di sappeared. But the doc
trine for their orga ni zati on end ured, and fu ture leaders built upon it in the fo l.
lowing century.
Before the new nation ratifi ed the peace with Eng land, Congress asked
Washington for his views on the future peacetime mi litary establishment. On 2
May 1783, recognizing his countrymen's fear of standing armies and the expense
of maintai ning them, he called for a military establishment consisti ng of a small
active force organized on a regimental basis and a larger reserve based on the
militia arranged by divisions. Hi s mi litia division was to consist of two brigades
of four infantry regiments each, wi th each infantry regiment organized into two
fourcompany battalions. Furthermore, Washington recommended that two caval.
ry troops and two artillery companies be raised for eac h divi sion. These units
were not part of any combi ned arms concept for divisions, but merely a formul a
for ca lculating the number of cava lry and artillery units that would be needed by
future armies. I I
Eventually the legis lature created a military establish ment based on standing
and reserve force s. In 1784 the Con tinental Congress set the strength of the
standing army at a mere 700 men. and the Regular Army. organized on a regi
mental basis, grew stead ily in the years that fo llowed. In 1792 the new nationa l
Congress also provided for a reserve force based upon the state milit ia, whieh the
federal government co uld employ under certa in condi tions with in the United
States. The mi litia forces were to consist of all ablebodied white male citizens
between the ages of eighteen and forty five and were to be organized into campa
nics, battalions, regiments, brigades, and divisions. The leg islation provided that
each brigade consist of fOllr two-battalion infantry regiment s. A militia division
cou ld also have an art illery compa ny and a cavalry troop. bOlh of which were to
be formed From vol unteers within the brigades at the discretion of the governors.
Major general s and brigadi er generals were to command divisions and brigades,
respect ively, and the on ly staff officer authorized was Ihe brigade inspector, who
was al so to serve as the brigade major. The strengt h of the brigade was to be
w
EARLY EX PERIENCES
approximately 2,500 men. Presumably div isional strength would vary, for the law
prescribed no set number of brigades in a division.12
As imp lemented, the militia div isions and brigades were generally paper
organizat ions. Congress provided ne ither federal supervision nor effective support for them. Furthermore, no provision was made fo r a militia force that would
be avai lable immediately to react in an emergency. Although ineffectual, the system lasted fo r over one hundred years. In practice, when the federa l government
called upon the mi litia, the president asked for a specific number of men from a
stale and the state organized them into regiments.
Shortly after Congress passed the mi litia law, it authorized the use of volu nteers, a third category of soldiers, for national defense. Volunteers served freely,
like soldiers in the Regular Army, but they were not part of any stand ing or
reserve force. Generally, the states raised the volunteers that Congress considered
necessary on a regimenta l basis, and the federal government used the volunteer
regiments to form divisions and brigades.13
The Regul ar Army also experimented with the legion as a combined arms
unit in the 1790s. Differing from the legions emp loyed during the Revolutionary
War, the Legion of the Uni ted Stales resembled the organizations described by
Marsha l Maurice de Saxe in 1732 and advocated in the 1780s by Maj. Gen.
Frede r ick Wilhelm vo n Steube n, form erly the Inspecto r General of the
Continenta l Army, an d Secretary of War Henry Knox. The legion was a field
army, combinin g infantry, cavalry, a nd arti llery into one organization , which
totaled 5,120 men. Rather than being subdi vided into divisions, brigades, and
regiments, the legion consisted of four sublegions, which some consider to be the
forerunners of the regimenta l combat teams of the twentieth century. The Regular
Army adopted the legion in 1792, but it was never fu lly manned. For the campaigns against the Miami Indians in the Northwest Territory between January
1790 and August 1795 the Army emp loyed militia and vo lunteer units and the
Legion of the United States. Its sublegions, however, were not employed ex tensively. The Army abandoned the legion in 1796 for regimenta l organizations.
Henceforth, the regulars were scattered throughout the country, guard ing its frontiers and seacoast and rarely forming organizations above the regimental level. 14
Waro/I812
When the second war with England began in 18 12, Congress raised fo rces by
expanding the Regular Army, authorizing the use of volunteers, and ca ll ing out the
militia. In raising the troops both the federal and state governments used regimental organ izations, and Ihe Army organ ized these regiments into ad hoc brigades
and divisions, which varied widely in strength. For exam ple, Brig. Gen. Joseph
Bloomfield's New York mi litia bri gade assigned to Maj. Gen. Henry Dearborn's
fo rce in 1813 counted 1,400 strong; Brig. Gen. Winfield Scott's Regular brigade in
1814 before the Battle of Ch ippewa fielded 1,300 men; and the Pen nsylvania vol-

unicef brigade that crossed the bo r~
def int o Up pe r Canada in 1814
numbered 413. The strength of the
divisions n ucluatcd just as much. In
18 12 the New York quota for mi l i l ia ~
men wa s \3 ,500, whi ch the state
organized into two divisions of four
brigades eac h. At the same lime,
wi lh a quota of 2,500 men,
Tennessee o rga nized a di vis ion of
two infantry regiments pillS a nondivisional cava lry rcgimcnt.15
Whi le assembl ing brigades and
d ivisions in 1813, t he question
arose as to whether or not Regu lar
Army and militia units should be
" brigadcd " togethe r. Because the

drill and di scipline of the regulars
differed greatly from that of th e
militia , each slat e prescribing its
own drill , the general practi ce was
to brigade each category of troops
Gel/eral SCOff
separate ly. Alt houg h Regu lar, mili
tia, and vol unteer brigades served
at limes in commands that eq ualed Ihe size of a di visio n, such organizations
were frequen tly called "a nnies."16
Raising and maintai ning troops during the War of 18 12 proved to be difficult
because of the opposition to the war. As a result, when divisions and brigades
look to the field for the various campaigns, they were temporary organizations.
Most of the units assigned to them had little training and were poorly equipped,
creating largely ineffective fighti ng forces. One exception was Scott's Regular
Army brigade. In the spring of 1814, after establishi ng a ca mp near Buffa lo, New
York, he used French dri ll regulations to tra in his men. When the brigade later
fought at Chi ppewa as a we ll-disciplined force, it prompted the British comm,m
der to excla im , "Those are Regulars, by God!"17
During the War of 18 12, as in the Revolution, Army leaders discussed the
organ iza tion of brigades and divis ions, and their com me nt s sometimes di s
agrecd w ith the co ntemporary pract ice o r with the laws then in effect. The
Register of the Arm)' published in 18 13 stated that a brigade wou ld consist of
two regiments and a div ision of two brigades with but II si ngle staff officer, the
brigade major, in each. The laws in fo rce, however, aut hori zed a brigade staff of
an inspector, subinspector, qua rtermaster, wagon IlHlster, ,lnd chaplain. When a
brigad ier general commanded a brigade, hi s brigllde major and a ides were
EARLY EXPERIENCES
included in the siaff. Major general s continued to command div isions, and their
staffs consisted of a quartermaster, judge advocate, and two aides. The offic ial
handbook fo r infantry compi led by Wi lli am Duane, the Adjutant General, in
1813 called for a brigade in the peace establishment to consist of any number
of batta lions, but fo r fi eld se rvice it was not to exceed 4,000 men. A div ision
could have from two to four brigades. During congressional del iberat ions as to
the number of major and brigad ier genera ls needed in 1813 to conduct the war,
Secretary of War John Armstrong expressed his belief that a brigade should
have only two regiments because the ma nagement of 2,000 men in the fiel d was
amp le duty for a brigadi er general. Also, in his opinion, the direction of 4,000
men was a suitable command for a major general. But the lac k of trained person nel and the short duration of campaigns in the War of 18 12 resulted in ad
hoc brigades and divisions that did not approach the combined arms teams of
the Revolutionary War.18
After the War of 1812 the militia uni ts were released from federal service, the
volunteers were discharged, and the Regu lar Army units were eventually reduced
to seven in fantry and four artillery regiments. Despite the small size of the Army
of the United States, Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott in 1819 secured congressional
approval for the preparation of a code incorporating the laws, regulations, orders,
and practices governing the Army. Having stud ied foreign armies, particularly the
French, he thought sllch regulations woul d be useful. In them he introduced a
new organization- the army corps. During the Napoleonic wars the French had
decentral ized their armies for greater mobility and maneuverabi lity. French field
armies had consisted of several army corps, which in turn were made up of two
or three divisions of in fantry or cavalry. Each division comprised two brigades.
With this structure, an army could be dispersed over a wide area, but the command mechanism allowed it to concentrate quickly to destroy the enemy.1 9
Scott's General Regularions for rite Unired Stares Army, published in 1821,
thus included the new European concepts. Two regiments constituted a brigade,
two brigades a division, and two div isions an army corps. Infantry and cavalry
were to be brigaded separately. The only staff officer for either the brigade or the
division was a "chief of staff," who acted in a manner similar to a brigade inspector or brigade major. The divisions and brigades were to be numbered accord ing
to the rank of their commanders. For ease in distingui Shing each body of troops
in official reports, units were to be identified by their commanders' names.20
Between the War of 18 12 and the Mexican War these concepts meant little to
the Regu lar Army. The periodic campaigns against the Indians, using Regular,
mi litia, and volunteer troops, were fought with small bodies of troops, usually of
regimental or smaller size. Such constabulary tactics neither infl uenced the fo rmation of large units in the field nor affected the regulations that governed such
organizations. The only a lteration in Army Regula/iolls prior to the Mexican War
specified that neither the division nor the brigade was to have a fixed staff, with
their size and composition vary ing according to the nature of their service.2 l
10
MANEUVER AN D FIREPOWER
Mexican War
In the fa ll of 1845, just before hostilities broke o ut between the United States
and Mexico , Brevet Brig. Gen. Zachary Tay lor organ ized the Regu lar A rmy
fo rces that had gathered at Corpus Christi , Texas, numbering about 3,900 men ,
into three brigades, each consisting of two infantry regiments or their eq uivalent.
The 2d Dragoons and Regu lar Army fie ld art illery compan ies supported the
brigades. With these forces Taylo r foug ht and won the Battles of Palo Alto (8
May 1846) and Resaca de Palma (9 May 1846).22
After the declaration of war in the spring of 1846, Congress ca ll ed for
50,000 vo lunteers. Individual states organ ized thei r vo lunteers into regiments,
which the War Department initia lly planned to brigade, mixing foot and mounted infa ntry23 in the same units. Two or more vo lun tcer brigades, eac h consisting of three o r mo re regi ments, were to form a division. Under the wartime
laws, a brigade was to be authorized at least 3,000 men and a di vision 6,000 .
Si nce Army Regulations ca lled fo r no fixed staffs, the president was to appoi nt
a quartermaster, commissary, and surgeon for each brigade. Each staff officer
was to have an assistant. Congress further provided that the regimen tal officers
of a brigade eould emp loy a chapla in .24
In the late summer of 1846 Taylor organi zed hi s army into di visions for a
campaign against Monterrey, Mexico. Using the three brigades he had organ ized
in 1845 , plus a new brigade, Taylor formed two Regular Army divisions of two
brigades eaeh. Eaeh brigade had two infantry regiments; th ree brigadcs had a
fi eld arti llery company attached; and one div ision had an additional fi eld artillery
company and a regiment of dragoons assigned. Because the volunteers did not
deploy in any prearranged order, Taylor temporarily brigaded a portion of those
who had joined him for instruction and camp service. Others he organizcd as a
volunteer division of two brigades, each containing two 500-man infantry regimen ts. A regiment of mounted volunteers from Texas com pleted the division.
With these forces Taylor captured Monterrey in September 1846.25
When Taylor took to the field after his victory at Monterrey, he had planned
to continue to use divisiona l organizations. But, si nce the politica l leadershi p in
Washington decided to shift the center of operations more directly toward Mexico
City, the bulk of Tay lor's troops were transferred to a new command under Maj.
Gen. Winfield Scott and wcre replaced by g reen volunteers. With 5,000 mostly
untra ined troops, in February 1847 Tay lor foug ht the Battle of Buena Vista, where
his inex perienced troops performed well. Buena Vista was particularly a triumph
for American artillery, whose mobility allowed it to counter enemy thrusts wi th
intense firepowe r and close infantry support when and where needed. Infantry
and art illery had formed a more effective combined arms team.26
Scott's command against Mex ico City, a force of abou t 12,000 men , was ini tially orga nized into two Regular Army infantry brigades and a th ree-brigade volunteer div ision. Each brigade was supported by fie ld art illery. After the siege of
EA RLY EX PERI ENCES
II
71,e Banle of Palo AIIO

Ve ra Cruz Scott o rganized the Regul ars into a div ision, but before rcaching
Mexico City he had to reorgani ze his army anew due primarily to losses by disease and exp iring enlistment terms. When morc volunteers arrived, he formed his
infantry into four d ivisions of two brigades each, wi th an arti llery company supporting each brigade. He placed elements of three dragoon regimen ts in a brigade
under Col. Will iam S. Harney. Sat isfi ed wit h his field d ispositions, Scott attacked
and then entered Mex ico City on 13 September)7
Duri ng the course of the war both Taylor and Scott organized ad hoc divisions as com bined arms learns . T hese underwent several reorgan ization s for a
variety of reasons, including a lack of transportation fo r moving units and supplies, a need to establish and protect lines of communication, and a shortage of
personnel to main tai n units at some semblance of fig hting strength. The war, nevert heless, brought about a new in tegration of infantry and field arti llery within
divisions, which operated as independent , maneuverable commands. The stocktrail gun carriage, adopted in 1836, was a technological breakthrough that gave
U.S. fie ld arti llery in the Mexican War sufTic ient mobili ty and maneuverabi lity
for integration of tile anns.28
T he revised Army Regulations published in 1857 reflected the changes developed d uring the course of the war for com bining the co mbat arms. Doct rine
ca lled for a divis ion usually to consist of " two or three brigades, either infantry or
12
cavalry, and troops of the ot her corps in th e necessary proporti ons."29 Each
bri gade was to consist of two or more regiments. "The Iroops of the other corps"
were artil lerymen and eng ineers, but there was no ind ication as to what proportion of a division th ey were to be. A d ivision staff or that of a detached brigade
was st ill minimal- artill ery, engineer, and ordnance offi cers. The regulat ions
changed the system for designating divisions and brigades from being numbered
according to the rank ofth ei.. commanders to be ing num bered according to their
position on the line, although the names of the commanders were still to be used
in re ports. Finally, the regulations provided that only the War Department could
authori ze the fo rmation of divisions and bri gades duri ng peacetime. In practi ce,
such units would thus rema in only wartime expedients.30
Civil War
The Civil War broug ht about the first large armies in the nation 's history, and
both Uni on and Con federate leaders used brigades, d ivisions, and army corps as
command and control un its. A ft er re be l troops fired o n Fort S umler, South
Carolina, President Abraham Lincoln ca lled for 75,000 militiamen to assist the
Regular Army in quelling Ihe rebe lli on. Short ly thereafter Cong ress began to
ex pand the Regular Army and call for vol unteers. Following the rout of the Union
fo rces at Manassas in July 1861 Congress authorized the first large call for men,
500,000 volunteers to serve three years. To train the new Army Lincoln selected
George B. McClellan, a form er West Point officer and president of the Eastern
Di visio n of th e Ohi o and Mi ss iss ippi Railroad Company) 1 McC le lla n lat er
described the Union troops at Manassas, who were mostly mili tia, as "a collee
tion of undi sciplined, ill o fTi cc rc(~ and uni nstructed men" instead of an army. The
new commander in chie f had much 10 do.32
As the volunteer reg iments arrived in the Washington, D.C., area, McC lellan
began to organize them into what beca me known as the Army of the Potomac.
During the course of the war additional Union armies were formed and served,
but Ihe experience of the Army of the Potomac serves as the model to illustrate
the difficult ies fa ced by commanders on both sides in organizing their forces. As
many of the future leaders of the Army after the war fou ght with the Army of the
Potomac, the ir experi ences had a profound impact on Army organization in the
last halfofthe nineteenth century.
In the Army of the Potomac the largest unit initially was a division, wh ich con
sisted or three infantry brigades, one caval ry regiment, and rour arti llery batteries.
The division commander d id not have a sta ff, except for hi s three aides and an assis
tant adjutant general. The brigade commander, on the other hand, had two aides, a
surgeon , a commi ssary or subsistence, an mljutant general , and a quartermaster))
McC le ll an pl anned to organi ze the volu nteers into brigades, di vision s, and
army corps. Each army corps, about 25,000 men, was to consist of two or more
di visio ns. He hes itated to imp le ment that o rganiza tion, however, until his offi
EA RLY EXPERIENCES
13
cers gained experience as division commanders. He also de layed the organization of army corps for politica l reasons. Over one-ha lf of hi s divi sion commanders were Re publican s w ho were ardent s upport ers of Lincoln , while
McClellan, II political foc of the pres ident, was a Democrat. In March 1862,
before the Peninsula campaign began in Virginia, Lincoln, co ncerned about
command and conlrol in combat, d irected that McC lellan 's forces be organized
into army corps. McC lella n orga ni zed the Army oCthe Potomac on the peninsula into four army corps of three divisions each. The Union fo rces on the upper
Potomac were a lso placed into an army corps.3 4
Comba t expe rien ce bro ught organizationa l c hanges to th e Army of the
Potomac. Cava lry assigned to divisions within army corps were generally unable
to pcrform army-level missions. In July 1862, after the Peninsula campaign, Brig.
Gen. Georgc Stoneman, Chief of Cavalry of the Army orthe Potomac, shifted cavalry units from the infantry divisions and organ ized two cavalry brigades fo r the
army, but he left a caval ry sq uadron35 in each army corps for picket, scout, and outpost duti es. Little improvement resulted from havin g separate cavalry brigades,
which were used the same as the cavalry sq uadrons in the army corps.
[n November 1862 Maj . Gen. Ambrose Burnside took command of the Army
of the Potomac and reorgan ized it into three "grand divisions." He planned for each
g rand division to move and fight as a heavy column of two corps and a cavalry
division, which removed the cava lry from army corps. The grand division commanders, however, were reluctant to use cava lry as an independent force. In Fcbruary
1863 Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, the new commander of the Army of the Potomac,
abolished the grand divisions and reverted to the army corps structure. At the same
time the Union cavalry was also reorganized as a separate corps under Stoneman,
with approximately 13,000 men divided into three divisions. Each division had two
brigades, with each brigade havi ng three to fi ve regi ments. Artillery was assigned
to the caval ry corps headquar1ers. The cavalry corps operated as an independent
unit thereafter, but the jest "Whoever saw a dead cavalryman?" remained within the
Army of the Potomac.36 By Jun e 1863 Un ion cava lry proved eq ual to th e
Con fed erate cavalry. At Brandy Station the Union cava lry corps cxcelled under the
aggressive Icadership of Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan in 1864.37
Experience a lso led to the standard ization of fi e ld art ill ery pieces and their
mass in g w ithi n th e army corps. At Mana ssas the Union arti ll e ry had been
assigned to bri gades, but when organizing the Army of the Potomac McClellan
assigned it to di vis ions, usually one artillery battalion per di vis ion . He a lso
approved a ratio of 2.5 artillery picccs to 1,000 infantrymen, with six artillcry
pieces of the same ca liber, if possible, fo rming a battery. One of every four battcrics was to be a Regu lar Army unit , the commander of which was to assist the
div ision commander in orga ni z in g and training the artil lery. Because of the
shortage of artillery pieces in 1861, the Union's arsenal s were ransacked and
guns of va riolls calibers wcre sen t to the troops in the field, causing ammunition and su pply problems. Bu t evcnt uall y th e Army of the Potomac achieved
14
MANEUVER AN D FI REPOWER
uniform ity wi thin its field a rt il lery batteries by lI sing 3-inch or 12-pou nder
"Napo leon" g ll lls.38
Alt hough standardization o f weapons eased some f ield arti llery problems,
others rema ined. With the organizat ion of army corps, ha lf of each corps' divisional arti llery was withdrawn to form an Army of the Potomac art illery reserve
orlhrcc arti llery brigades. The army corps had no art il lery except that in its divisions, and divisio n commanders were loath to lose con trol over the ir guns. By
1863 most commanders recognized that their heavy losses stemmed from fronta l
infantry assaults on entrenched positions. Rines, with a max im um range of a
thousand yards and an effective range of half that distance in the hands o r good
marksmen, pl us supporting arti llery fire presented formidab le obstacles to mass
attacks. Fic1d arti llery could break up the in fantry's defensive pos itions, but with
the gu ns scattered among the corps' divisions the coordination and concen trat ion
of arti llery fi re was d ifficult 10 o rchestrate.39
After the Union defeat at C ha ncellorsville in 1863 the f ie ld artillery batteries
were withdrawn from the divisions of the Army o f the Potomac and concentrated
in fie ld artillery brigades d irectly under the corps headq uarters. T hese brigades,
with fou r to six batteries and their own officers and staff, rendered efficient service, which resu lted in a red uction in th e amount of art illery needed and in the
dependence on the army's arti llery reserve without any red uction in fi re support.
T he reserve gradua lly became a place ror recuperation a nd reorgan ization of battered batteries.40
To be successfu l, armies in the Civi l War needed more than infantry, field
artillery, and cavalry. As the Regular Army had few engineer units, volun teer
in fantry regiments often served as engi neers. In the Army of the Potomac these
regi ments eventua lly formed a brigade. Army corps in other Union armies al so
employed infantry as engi nee rs. As the medical , ord nance, signa l, and quartermaster depart ment lacked units, their fie ld tasks were performed by personnel
assigned to the departme nts o r by soldiers detai led fro m the line regiments or
by hired c ivilians. 41
To coordinate all the activ ities within an army corps, supporting staffs grew
at each level- corps, division , brigade, and regimen t. Event ual ly an adj utant,
comm issaries of muster and subsis tence, and a chief of ordnance com prised the
div isiona l sta ff. T he sta ff for the brigade incl uded an adjutant, quartermas ter,
commissary of subsistence, and, when the brigade served as an independent command, an ordnance officer. In add ition, genera l officers continued to have aides
as their personal staff.42
As army corps evolved, the method by which they were des igna ted changed .
Initially each Union army corps was designated within an army- i.e., I Army
Corps, Army of the Potomac-but later the practice o r numbering them consecutively without any re ference to the army to which they were assigned was adopted. Divisions withi n army corps were numbered consecutively. as were brigades
within divisions.43
EA RLY EXPERIENCES
15
CiI/l/fJ Humphreys. Virgi,,;a, he(lt!ql/{WferS of AI/aback's Brig{/(Ie. Pellnsylvania
Volullteel's, 1863
Basica lly th e Army of the Poto mac served as th e mo de l for all Un io n

forc es. In the West army corps were introduced aftcr the ir organizatio n in the
Army of the Potomac. As the war ebbed and flowed commanders o rga ni zed,
consolida ted, and d iscontinued army corps as needed. When regi ments were
reduced because of attri tion, thea ter com manders added morc regi ments to the
brigades to maintain their strength and thai of divis io ns withi n the army corps.
When the volun teer system broke down , both the Union and Confederate goy
emments turned to draftees, subst itutes (men hired to serve in d raftees' places),
and bount ies to mai nt ain the ir arm ies. To re lieve manpower prob lems, the
Union Army bega n using bl acks in 1862, while the Confede rate Co ngre ss
au thorized the enrollment of bl ack troops in Ma rch 1865. Sma ll numbers of
Negroes had served in past wars, both in integrated and segregated units, but
during the Civil War both si des organized segregated regiment s. The Union
eventually created the XXV Army Corps with Negro enli sted personnel from
the X and XV III Army Corps.44
Wit h the Confederate Army spring ing from the same ancestral roots as Ihe
Un ion Army, it was not surpri sing that both armies used s imilar patterns of
organization. At Bu ll Run in July 1861 , the Con federates e mp loyed two p rovi~
sional army corps made up of brigades without an interveni ng div isiona l-level
structure. Eventua lly the ir army co rps consisted of infantry brigades and d ivi .
16
M AN EU VE R AN D FI REPOWER
Slo ns. Parall eling the Union arm ies, the fi eld artillery batteries were organized
as corps- level units, whi c h we re des ig nat ed battalio ns rath er tha n bri gades.
Confederate cavalry e mployed a di visional rather than a corps structure, but it
fu ncti o ned as an agg ress ive inde pe nde nt fo rce earli er tha n Union cava lry.
Unlik e the Union forces, Southe rners rare ly numbered the ir bri gades and di visio ns but used the names of commande rs fo r identificat io n. Army corps were
numbe red w ithin the ir respective armies. 45
To he lp contro l and idenl'i fy units on the battle fi eld, armies traditionally used
nags, and Un ion army corps and their d ivisions and brigades employed them during the Civil Wa r. The national colors formed the basis of the fl ag system. Along
with d istinctive flags, Union corps badgcs wcre introduced to identify men and
foster esprit de corps.46
Fo ll owi ng the C ivil War th e War Departmcnt disbanded the fi eld a rmies,
along with the ir army corps, d ivision s, and brigades. Milit ia units returned to
the ir states, the vol unteers leO se rvice, and most of the Regula r Army troops
returncd to scattercd posts throughout the South and Wcst. Cong ress in 1869 set
the peacetime Regular establishment at 25 infantry, 10 cava lry, and 5 artill ery
regiment s, but few were ever able to assemble thcir far-flu ng companies, I'roops,
and batteries in one place unl'il the end of the century. Fie ld operations usually
invol ved less than a reg iment or were conducted by gathering the geog raphica lly
closest elements of several regiments on a temporary basis. Army Regulations,
nevertheless, continued to repeat the ideas for organizing army corps, divisions,
and bri gades, wit h the division described as "the fundam ental cl ement and ba sis
of organi zation of every active army."47
War With Spain

O n 25 April 1898, Co ng ress dec lared that a state of war exi sted between the
United States and Spain. Even though the USS Maille had been Slink six weeks
be fore, threatening war, the nati on had taken only minima l steps toward mobi li zatio n. One of these ste ps, howeve r, wa s cong ress iona l a uthori za ti o n fo r
Presi dent Will iam Mc Kinley, when necessary, to o rga nize a new army consisting o f the Regular Army and the Volunteer Army of the Un ited States. The reg iment s of the Volu nteer Army were to be rai sed <lnd officered by th e states and
eventually incl uded most of the ir o rganized mil it ia units. The reg ulars and volunteers were to be fo rmed into brigades, divisions, and army corps. On 23 Apri l
th e M c Kinl ey admi ni s t ra ti o n d irec te d t he reg ulars c on ce nt rat e d at
Chickamauga Natiollll l Park , Georg ia, to be organized as an army corps; those
at Mobil e. Alabama . as an indepe ndent di visio n; and those at New Orl C;:II1S,
Loui siana, as a separate brigade .48
A ft e r th e declara ti o n of war Mc Ki nl ey re vised that ar ra ngem e nt and
approved the organization of eight army corps, each of which was to con sist o f
th ree or more di visions o f three bri gades each. Each brigade was to have approxi-
EA RLY EXPERIENCES
17
Staffo/the 2d Dil'isioll. I Army COI1Js. 1898
matcly 3,600 officers tlnd en listed men organized into three regiments and, wi th
three such brig<ldcs, cHch divi sion was to total about 11,000 officers and men.
Thus the division W<lS to be abollt the same size as the division of 186 1, but army
corps were to be larger. The division sta rr initially was to have an adjutant general , quartermaster, commi ssary, surgeon, inspector general, and engineer, wi th an
ordnance ofTiccr added tater. The briga de slatT was ide nt ica l except that no
inspector genera l or ordnance officer was authorized.49
The Commanding General of the Army, Maj . Gen. Nelson A. Mi les, had
planned to ex pa nd the Army in an orderly fa shion by holding the volunteers in
state camps ror sixty days. There they would be organized, equipped, and trained
ror fie ld duty. During that period the Wa r Department was to prepare large trai n ~
io g ca mps and collect the necessary stores 10 ou tfit the new army, while
Mc Kin ley was to appo int the general officers who wou ld command th e new
brigades, divisions. and army corps. Miles' plan soon went awry. Because or the
lack o r Regula r Army officers to staff state camps and the need to have vol unteers
and regulars train together, he quickly abandoned it. In midMay the volunteers
were moved to a rew large unfinished camps in the South, and when they arrived
only seven instead or the eight projected army corps were organized. Two army
18
-I
.......... -~---....-;
- ......
...
--..
~,.
..... -
Camp Alger. Virginia, 1898
corps, the IV and Y, consisted of regulars and volunteers, while the others were
made up of volunteers.50
To facil it ate co mmand a nd co ntrol , co rp s and di v ision co mmand e rs
requested pe rmission to use di stincti ve Civil War flag s and badges fo r the ir
units . Secretary of War Ru ssell A. A lge r. however, di sapproved the request
be cause of pressure from Civ il War veterans who had bee n pe rm itted by
Congress to wea r their dist incti ve unit insig nia and guarded the privi lege jealously. The quartermaster general, therefore , had to prepared an enti re ly new
g roup of hera ldic item s for the recently organized army corps and th eir di visions and brigades.51
Be fore the new army completed its organization and trai ning, it was thrust
into combat. About two-thirds of V Army Corps, o ne di smounted cava lry and
two infant ry divisions, sail ed ror Cuba in June 1898. Ex pedit ions al so were
mounted for Puerto Ri co and the Philippi ne Island s in which partial army corps
prov ided the troops. The war ended in August 1898. and less than two months
later the wart ime army began to rade away. The War Depa rtment disba nded the
last army corps on 13 Ap ril 1900. Following the war, the Army maintained
troops in the Ph ilippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, but those com mands did not
employ army corps nnd di visions.52
EARLY EX PER IENCES
19
During major confl ict s of Ihe Uni ted States prior to the twentieth cen tury,
Army leaders sough t to find the best command level at which to merge infantry,
cavlllry, and artill ery int o e ffective, coo rdina ted co mbat units. Brigades and
d ivisions usually compri sed a single arm, wh ile the army corps was the bas ic
comb ined arms unit. Withi n the army corps itself, [itt le special izat io n existed
beyond the combat arm s. Usua lly no field units were organ ized for signa l, medica l, transportat io n, mil iwry poli ce, engi neers, ordnance, or other combat suppori serv ices. Hired c ivilian s or detailed so ldiers provided such support in the
field. By the begin ning of the twentieth century, however, innovat ions in warfare , especially technolog ical developmen ts, requ ired more sophist icated organizations, both to use the new tech no logy and to in tegrate it into a larger operationa l and tactica l fram ework.
20
Notes
I George Washington, 1'11(1 Wrilillgs 0/ George W(/sMltg/oil Frum Ihe Origimd M(II/IIscripl
Sol/ree, 1745- 1799. ed .. John C. Fitzpatrick. 39 vols. (Washington. D.C.: GovCnlOlcnl Printing
Office, 1931-44).3:354-55.
2 Ibid.; Worthington C. Ford, cd. , JOI/I"II(I/$ Qjlhe COlllil/en/(i1 CQI/gress. J 774- 1789. 34 lIols.
(WaS hington, D,C.: GOllcnlmcil! Priming Office, 1904- 37), 2: I 03, 191 (hereafter cited as l ee): An
Unive rsal Military Dicti onary (London: J. Milian, 1779; rcprinl, Ottawa: Museum Restoration
Service, 1969), p. 36. In the initial legislation Congress made brigadiers genera l officers.
Washington nevertheless viewed their function during the war as nothing more than regimental
colonels who acted on a larger scale. Regime nts of the Continental AnllY were authorized staff offi
eers, which included adjlllants, surgeons, quanennasters, nnd paymasters.
3 Washing to n, Writillgs , 9:103- 04.12:60- 61: Peter Force. cd. , AlllericllI/ Archh'es: If
COlft!CliOIl of AllllllmllC Records. SimI.' Papers. t/J1t/ Lellers (IIul Olhcr Notices of Public Affairs, 9
vols. (Washington. D.C.: M . SI. Clair & I'eter Foree, 1839- 53),2: 1028; Charl es H. Lesser, 11lc
SillclI's of Il/delXmdellcc: MOlllhly Strcllgth Report.f of 'he COlllillellwl Arlll)' (Chicago: University
of C h icago Press, 1976), pp . 43, 72, 208 ; Robert K. Wright. Jr., rhe COII/illellllil Ar/lly
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983). p. 97. Infantry regiments varied in strengt h
during the war. but were usuall y authorized appro)(inmtc1y 700 officer.> and enl isted mcn cacho
4 Washington, IVri/illgs, 9:103-04,12:60- 6 1.
5 Boyd L. Daslrup, Killg of /Jallle: A IJI"{I/Ich His/OIY of fhc
A,.m)1~ Fie/(I Anil/ery (Fort
Monroe, Va.: U.S. Arnly Training and Doctrine COl11mand, 1992). pp. 12- 3 1; Wright , COlllil/ellw!
Arm)" pp. 54, ISO; William E. Birkhimer.lHstoricuf Skefch offhc Org(///;;:m;oll. Adm;n/slmlioll.
Mmeriel. all(/ Tuclies oflhe ArlilfclY. Unil('(1 SUlles Army (Washi ngt on, D.C.: James J. Cha pman,
1884),pp.76-77,96-97.
6 Ford, JCC, 8:390-91, 11:542, 13: 197- 98; Washington, Writin gs, 10:374, 12:67,79.
7 Washington. Writi ngs, 16: 10 I. Lesser's Tlte Sincws of IlIdepell(lellce illustrates the point on
brigade deSignations.
8 Wright, COlllillellWI Ar/l/Y, p. 29; Washington, Wriling.f, 3:354-56; James C. Scudieri, "The
Continentals: Compamtive Armlysis ora Latc EightecnthCcntury Stan ding Anny," l'h.D. dissertation, City Univer.>i ty of New York. 1993. Lesser's The Sinews of Il1delJelulellce ill ustrates the point
about quasi~penllanent divisions.
9 Washington. IVrilillgS, 7:49. 10:363.
10 Ford, lCC, 6:1025,1045, 18:960; M;Iry Lee Stubbs and St;ulley Russell Connor, Arll/QI"
C(lmby. Pm'll: Regnlar Anll)1(111(1 Arlll)1 Rescl"e (Washington, D.C.: Govenullent Printing Office,
1969), pp. 3- 6; Wright. COillil/elltal Arm)" pp. 105- 07, 133- 34. 160- 6 1; Oli ver L. Spaulding,
Hoffman Nickerson. and John W. Wright. Ww"/tlre (Washington. D.C.: Harcourt Brace, and Co.,
1925), pp. 554-55.
I I Washington, Writings, 27:374-98.
12 Ford. JCC, 3 Jlln 1784; John F. Call:m, comp., The Mili/(II J' I.all's of Iltl..' UI/ifl..'d Sfafe~'
(Philadclphia: G.W. Childs, 1863). pp. 95- 100.
I) Callan. Mili/(//)' Lows, pp. 122- 25. This was the first law authorizing volunleers; the other
laws conceming them were cnacted during periods of crises. Those printcd in this vol um e cover the
period ullli11863 .
14 Maurice de Saxe, Rel'eries 011 'he Arl of War. trans .. Thomas R. Philipps (Harrisburg. I'a. :
Military SCI'\'ice I'ublishing Co., 1944), PI). 36- 38; Frederick Wilhelm von Steuben. A Leller 011 I!II!
Subjecl of 0/1 E.uablished ',..fili,ill. (///(/ MiliullY Armllgell/ellls. Adt/ressel/to Ihe 'nlwhitmlls of ,fte
Vlliled SIMI'S (New York: J. McLean and Co., 1784), p. 45 ; tl enry Knox, A Plan for Ihe Gel/eml
i/,.ml1gemelll of Ihe Mililill oflhe Vlliled Siaies (1786), Jlu blished in /Jolilica! PlIlllphfel.r, Jefferson
Col lcction, Library o f Congress: John K. Mahon and Ronmna D:lIIysh. II/fillliry. I'a/"I I: Regu!a,.
Arlll)' (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1972). pp. 12- 13; Francis I). tleitman.
1/;.floricllJ Regi.\ter all(/ Dieliol/ary oflhc Ulliled SUIIC5 AI'II/)' From 1150rgm/iztlliol/. Septcmbn'
u.s.
EA RLY EX PER IENCES
21
/779/0 March 1. 1903,2 'lois. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1903), 1:139-41:
Francis Paul Prucha, nil! Swol'd of ,lie Republic: The VI/IMI Arm)' 01/ 'he FrQllf;er. 1783- 1846
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971). PI'. 17- 24.
IS Marvin A. Kreidbcrg and Mer10n G. Ilcnry, His/at)' of Mili/ary Mobilizfllioll ill 'he Ullifetl
S/(l/e.I' Army. 1775- /945 (Washington, D.C.: Government Print ing Office, 1955), PI'. 44-46. hereafler ciled llS Mobilization; Benson J. Lossing, Hie Pictorial Field-Book oflhe Wa/' of 1812 (New
York: Harper and Brothers. 1869). PI'. 366, 142: Allledcm/ S/mc Pupas. Mifiwry Affoil:~, 7 'lois.
(Washington, D.C.: Gales and Senton, 1834). I :6 18; Cha rl es W. Ellioll, IVinfiefd &01/: n,e Soldie,.
({lid 'he MWI (New York: Macmillan Co., 1937), p. 15 1.
16 Americtll/ SUI/e PlIlx-n', Milillll)' Aff"ir.~, 1:495.
17 Ellioll , Willfleltl Scvl/. pp. 146-47, 162.
18 AmericlII/ SllI/e I'''per.f. MilillllJI Affi/ir~. 1:330, 425; Wi ll iam DUllne, II HlInd Book for
I"jillllr),. 9th cd. (Philadelphia: William Duanc, 1814), p. 20; Cal lan, Mililnr)' L(lII'~', pp. 136, 213.
219,228,240.
19 Amcric(1II SllIle Pl11x-r.f. MilillllY Affilirs, I: 199- 200; Ellioil, Wil/jieftl Seoll. pp. 228- 29.
20 Gelleml Reglllllliol/sfvr lite VI/iled Slflles , 11'111)" 1821, pp. 85-89; Michael Howard, W(II' ill
"ropetlll IlislOIJ' (Oxford: Oxford Universily Press. 1976), PI). 83- 84.
21 Gel/er,,1 Regula/iollsfor lite Arm)' oflhe Vlliled Slales, 184 1, p. 67.
22 Juslin H . Smith, The 1JI(l1" lVilh Mexico, 2 vols. (New Yo rk: Macmillan Co .. 1919).
I : 143- 80 passim: Kreidberg and Ilcnry, Mobili:.alivlI. PI'. 74-75.
2l Mounted infantry men were dragoons who reached the banleficld on horse but as fOOl soldicrs.
24 Callan, MilillllJ' l_ a1\l~', pp. 367- 69, 373, 375. and 380; Kreidberg and Henry. iHobiliZtllioll.
p. 73; Mexical/ Wor CO/.,.e.~pO/l(lell/;e (Washinglon, D.C.: Wendell and van Belllhuyscn, Printers.
1848), p. 458.
25 Mt!fictlll Wtll" CVl"l"espv/ulellce, PI'. 417- 19. 498- 500; Edward D. Mansficld. 71,e Mt!fical/
IVtll": A IJi.vlOl), oflIS Origill (New York: A.S. Barnes and Co., 1850). p. 57.
26 Mt!\'ic(1I/ lVor COl"re.lp()//dellce. Pll. 5 13- 14; Joh n D. Eisenhower, So Far FIYJ/IJ God: The
U.S. W(II" \1'ilh Mexico 1846- 1848 (New York: Random 1louse. 1989), pp. 178- 91; Daslrup, King
of/Jal/le, PI). 7 1- 78.
21 R. S. Ripley, TIle War willi MClka (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1849), PI" 17,55- 56;
Mansfield. 71,e Me:ric(II1 Wur. pp. 225- 27,
28 Sianley L Falk. "Artillery ror the Land Service: The Developmenl of a System." Milil(ll),
IIffilir!; 28 ( F:llI 1964): 97- 110.
29 !legltlalioll.l of/he Army oflhe VIIi/eli Slale!;. 1857, p. 13.
30 Ibid .. pp. 13.71 - 73.
II George 13. McClellan, McClel/ml's OU'I/ SIOI)': rlIC IVaI" of Ihe Vllioll (New York: Cha rles
L Webster and Co., 1887), p. 2; War Department General Ordcrs (WD GO) 49, 1861.
32 MeClell,Ul, MeGlellal/':; aII'll Slary, p. 68.
D The War of Ihe Rebellioll: A COIIII)ilalioll of Ihe Official Records vf Ihe Vl/ivl/ al/d
COllfe(f<'Nlle Al'lIIies. SeT. 1.53 vols. (Washi ngto n, D.C.: Governmcnl Prinling Office, 1881 - 98),
5: 11- 17, hereafter ciled as OR: WD GO 49, 186 1.
34 Robert M. Epstein, "The Creation and Evolution of the Amly Corps in the American Civil
War." )ollrlwl of Military Hislmy 55 (Jan 199 1): 21-46; OR, 5: 11- 67 passim. Congress provided
for anny corps on 17 July 1862.
35 II e:lvalry sq uadron was and still is cquivalenllo a batlalion.
36 I'hilil) II. Sherid;ll1, I'el'sol/ol Meillvil'.~ of {>.11. Shedd/III. Gel/eml oflhe Vlli/etl SI(l/e,~ AI'IIIY,
2 vo ls. (New York: Charles L. Websler& Co" 1888), 1:347.
37 Ibid.; B. W. Crowninshi el f. "Cavalry in Virginia During Ihe War of Ihe Rebellion," )0111"1/(/1
of Ihe MilillllJ' Se/1'ice IIISlillllioll 12 (May 1891): 527- 5 1; Kenneth P. Williams, Lil/co/" Fill(/s II
Gel/eral, 4 vols. (Nell' York: Macmillan, 1949).2:483,487; OR. 25:471- 72: Moses Harris, The
Union Cnv<llry," )oltl"llol oflhe V.s. Cllllalry A:;sodaliOIl 5 (Ma r 1892): 2- 16.
38 Henry J. Hunl , "Our Ex perie nce in Arlille ry Ad miniSlr;llion," )0111'11111 vf Ihe Mifil(llJ'
22
111:;1;111/;011 12 (Mar 189 1): 197- 224; John C. Tidb.,II, "The Arlilicry Sen'ice in Ihe W,lf or
the Rebellion. 186 1- 1865," JOIII"II(lI oflhe }.-lUi/my Service IIISlilWioll J 2 (Jul 1891): 697- 733.
J'l OR, 5:67. 471 - 72: Tidbllll , ''The Artillery Service," PI'. 697- 733.
40 Tidb.,JI , "The Artillery Service:' pp. 697- 733.
41 History /iliff TI'l/(lilioll.~ oflhe Corps of Ellgilleers. Engineer School Special Text 25- 1, ( Fort
Belvoi r, Va.: Enginlocf School. 1953), p. 29; OR. 15:716 17; Mary C. Gillen, The Army Me(liefl/
Departlll(!lII. 1818- 1865 (Washington, D.C.: Govc mmcll\ Pri nting omcc, 1987), pp. 156-57.
42 WD GOs 12,79. 1862; 411, 1863 ; lllld 3 1, 193, 1865.
43 Frederick 1I. Dye r, A COl/wel/dill1ll oflhe War oflhe Rebellioll (Des Moines, lo\\'a: Dyer
Publishin g COIllJXmy, 1908). pp. 26 1- 69.
44 See chari Civil War Arm y Corps rnl scd on notes from Dyer 3nd OR. author's notes Civil
War: OR, 15: 7 16- 17 and 30. pI. I. pp. 2 11 12; George W. Williams. A 1-/i.~IQlJ' oflhe Negro
Troops ill Ihe lVar oflhe Rebellioll. 1861- 1865 (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1888: reprint, New
York: Ncgro Univcrsities I'ress. 1969). pp. 10- 58 passim: James 1. Robcrlson. Jr .. Soldiers BIlle
lIIlll Grtl)' (Col umbia: Uni\'ersity of South Carolina Press. 1988), pp. 19-40; QuarlcnJl<lster Gellcml
or the Anny. com p . Tabllhlr Sill/eli/elliS Sltowillg Ihe Nf/lll e.~ ofColIIlII(lllllers of Ann) COIPS.
Divisiolls. (wd Brigades. Vllile(1 Sltl/c.~ Anll)'. l)"rill8 Ihe Wflr of 186/11) /865 (Philadelphia: !lurk
and MeFe trigde, I' rimers and Li thogmp hers. 1887). XXV Anny Corps table.
45 Crowninshi eld. "Caval ry in Virginia:' pp. 527- 51; Tidball. "The Arlillery Service," pp.
697- 733; Ric hard J. Sommers, Richmolld Re(leeme(/: The Siege at Pelersburg (New York :
Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1981). PI). xi i- xiii .
46 OR, I I. IlL 3, 33- 36; John W. Wike, "The Wearing or Anny COIl)S and Division Insignia in
the Un ion Army," lV/ilillllY Col/ector lIlId /-lislorial/. [V (J une 1952): 35- 38: Julia Lorri1:ml
BUHerlield, cd . A Biagraphic(11 Memol'i(l/ afGellel'll1 DWliel Blllleljieltl (New York: Granou Press,
1(04). pp. 11 6-18.
47 WD GOs 56 . 1866, and 15, 1869; Anll)' Regula/ ions, 1873. pp. 6 5- 66; Troops i ll
C(IIIII'(lig l/, Regl/{(ltioll~' for Ihe Arm)' uf Ihe Uniled Silltes (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing
Officc, 1892), IIp. 3-4: I' erry O. Jamieso n. Crossillg lite /)emily Grollnd: Ullile(1 S/(/Ie.~ AI"III)'
TllCfics. /865- /899(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. 1994). pp. 123- 27.
48 WD GOs 25 and 30, 1898; CorreslJO lldcllce Helll/illg /0 'he W(II" lVith Spai". 2 vo ls.
(Washin gton, D.C.: Govcmlllent Print ing Office, 1902), 1: I.
49 WD GOs 30. 36. and 96. 1898.
SO Rpt or the Maj Gcn Commanding the Anny, Alllllmi Repol'fs oflhe lV"r Dep(lnlllelll. /898,
pp. 7- 8, hcreaner cited as ARWD; Ru ssell A. Alge r. TIl(' Sp(lIIi.fh.Amel"ic(1I/ War (New York :
Harper and Co., 1901 ). pp. 26- 27; HlII7JCI"S PiClori(lllli.tllllJ' oflhe IV(W 1V;lh S,)llill (Ncw York:
I [a'1>er and Co .. 1899). p. 187; CO/"l'espundence Refutillg 10lhe War Wilh Spain, 1:509.5 19. 534.
539. and 547: WD GO 30 and 96, 1898.
5t Ll r. V Anny Corps to The Adjutant General. U.S. AmlY, 28 May 1898. no subject, \Vi lh
fi ve endorsements, AGO file 8541\. Telegram, 111 Corps to the Quarlcnnasler Gcneral (QMG).
U.S. AnllY, 28 May 1898, no subjcct, AGO file 3 198, Llr. 1st Division. IV Corps, to The Adjutant
General. IV Co rps. 19 Junc 1898, no subject, Adjutant Geneml's Officc (AGO) file 114100, all in
Record Group (hereaner cited as RG ) 165. National Arc hives and Records Administration (here.
an er cited as NARA); WD C ir 12, 1883: WD GO 99. 1898.
S2 Rpt orlhe Maj Gcn of the AnllY, AR WD. 1898, pp. 499-50[; CorreslJOmlellcc Relaling 10
lite Wm' lVilh S,Xlill, 2:705- 0 8.
Sen'ice
CHAPTER 2
Genesis of Permanent Divisions

Officers ",ho IUlI'e IICI'er seellll corps. division. or brigade orgallized (lml 011 the IIIlWcJ,
C(/I/ 1/01 be e.\pecfed to pello/"1II pelfecfly ,lte dillies required of Ihelll II'hell war cOllies.
Elihu ROOII
At the opening or tile twen tieth century, foll owi ng the hasty organ ization and
deployment of the army corps during the War wi th Spain, the Army's leadershi p
rea lized that it needed to create permanent combined arms units tra ined for war.
According ly. sen ior officers worked towa rd that goal until the nation entered
World Wa r I. The ir efforts rcOcclcd the princ ipal mi ssion of the Army at the time:
to defend the vast conti nental United States and ils modest insular empire in the
Ca ri bbean Sea a nd Pacific Ocea n. During thi s period the infa ntry di vis ion
replaced the army corps as the basic combined arms unit. G row ing in size and
fire power, it acquired combat support and service elements. a long with an adequate staff, refl ecting visions o f a more complex battlefield environment. The
caval ry divis ion, designed to achieve mobili ty rather than to realize its combined
arms potent ial, underwent changes sim ilar to those of the infantry division . Army
leaders also searched fo r ways to mainta in permanent di visions that could take
the fi eld on short notice. That effort accomplished little, however, because oftrad itional American antipathy toward stand ing annies.
Reforms Following the War With Spain

T he A rmy began ctosely exam ining it s o rgan izations after the War with
Spain. The War Department had been severely cri ticized for its poor leadership
during the 1898 mobil ization. Under the guidance of Secretary o f War Elihu
Root, it established a board to plan an Army war college that wou ld "direct the
instruction and intellectual exercise of the Army."2 Th is concept inspired creat ion
of the Genera l Staff in 1903, which led to major reforms in Army organ izutioll
and mobi liz..1tion.3
Under the leadership o f Maj . Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, the Chief of Stuff, the
new organiza ti on had a profound influence on the structure of the fi eld army. In
1905 the War Departme nt published Field Serllice Regulations. United Stales
Army, in whi ch Capt. Joseph T. Di ckman , a Genera l Staff member and fu ture
Third Army commande r, drew toge ther conte mporary thought on tact ics and
24
MANEUVE R AN D FIREPOWER
log istics. Designed for the first level of officer training within the Army's educational system, the regulations covered s uch subjects as orders, combat, serv ices of
in form ation and security ( inte lligence), s ubsistence, tran sportation, and organ ization. Under the guidance of Cha ffee and ot her staff officers Dickman 's organizationa l section d irected the fo rmat ion o f prov isional brigades and divisions during
field exercises so thai sma ller permanent units could train for war.4
With these new ordinances, the Army deplIflcd from national and international practice, and the infantry division replaced the army corps, whi ch had been
used in the C ivil War and the War wit h Spain, as the basic unit for combini ng
arm s. Si nce the mid-nineteenth century a typical Europcan army corps had consistcd of two or more di visions, a cavalry bri gade, a f ield artillery regiment, and
support ing units- about 30,000 men. Divisions usually included only infantry.
Although they sometimes had artillery, cava lry, or engineer troops, they rarely
included service unit s.S
In march formatio n ( in fantry in fours, cava lry in twos, guns and caissons in
single f il e), a European army corps covered approximately fifteen mi les of road,
a day's march. To partic ipate in a battle involving the va nguard, the corps' rear
elemen ts might have a day's march before engaging the enemy. Any g reater distance meant that al l corps clements could not work as a unit. In the continental
United States an army corps actua ll y req ui red abou t thirty-f ive miles of road
s pace because of the broken terrai n and poor roads. Within a moving army corps,
however, a division occupied only cleven miles.6
By replaci ng the army corps with the division, Di ckma n 's regulation sought
an orga ni zational framewor k appropriate to the mi ss ion and the ex pected terra in. In 1905 the statT did nol ide ntify s pecific adversaries, but the planners
beli eved that if war broke ou t a divis ional o rganization was more appropriate
for usc in North America . T heir assumption was that the nation would not be
involved in a war overseas.?
For traini ng, the regulations outl ined a division that included three infantry
brigades (two or more infantr y reg iments each), a cavalry regiment , an eng ineer
battalion 10 fac ilitate movement, a signal company fo r communicat io ns, and four
fie ld hospita ls. Nine fi eld art illery batteries, organized as a provisional regiment,
served both the division and other commands such as corps arti llery. To attain a
self-sufficient d ivision, the planners added an ammunition co lumn, a supply column, and a pack train, all to be manned by civilians. The regulations di d not fix
the s trength o f the organization, but in march formation it was estimated to usc
fo urteen miles of road space. T hat di stance represented a day's march, paralleling
the length o f a contemporary European army corps.8
In the fiel d, di vision s were both tacti cal and admi nistrative units. Mail ers
relating to courts martial , supply, money, property accouTltability, and adm inistration, all norma lly vested in a territoria l commander duri ng peace, passed 10 the
divisio n commander during war. To carry out these duties, the division was to
have a c hief of sta tT, an adjutant general , an inspector genera l, iI provost marshal ,
GEN ESIS OF PERMANENT OIV ISIONS
25
a judge advocate, a surgeon, and a quartermaster, a long wit h commi ssary, engineer, signa l, ordnance, and muster officers. The scnior arti llery officer served ex
officio as the chief o f the d ivision arl illery.9
The cava lry division, also described in the regulat ions, consisted of three cava lry brigades (two or three cavalry regiments each), six horse arti llery batteries,
mounted engineer and signal companies, and two field hospitals. Civi lians were
to man ammunition and supply colum ns. Because mou nted troops were likely to
be employed in smal l detachments, the cava lry divisio n had no prescribed stafT.IO
Above the division leve l, the regulations on ly sketched corps and armi es. Two
or three infantry d ivisions made up an army corps, and several army corps, along
with one or more cava lry divisions, formed an army. Specific details regarding
higher command and control were o mi tted.t l
When the Field Service Regula/iolls were published, Genera l Chaffee h ar~
nessed the m to training and readiness. First, he di rected the garrison schoo ls to
use them as textbooks, tak ing precedence over any ot hers then in li se . Second,
he appl ied the regulatio ns to both the Regula r Army and the O rganized Mi litia
when in the field .1 2
Mil itia, o r National Guard, units had dual mi ssions. Each served its stale of
o rig in but, when ca ll ed upon, al so servcd in nati onal emerge ncies. Under Ihe
Dick ACI of 1903, Nationa l Guard units had fi ve years to achieve the same o rga~
nizalional st.andards as the Regular Army units. To accomplish that goal, the fed~
eral government increased the funds for arms and equi pment and an nual training
and prov ided additiona l Regular Army o ffi cers to assist with tra ini ng.13
Hav ing an olltline for fie ld organ izat ions a nd units ava ilable to prepa re fo r
wa r, the Army tu rn ed it s att ention to tra ini ng. Co mb ined ar ms trai ningarti llery, cavalry, and in fa ntry- had been a part of the school curriculu m at Fo rt
Leavenworth, Kansas, since 188 1, but Sec retary Root gave sllch tra in ing added
meaning in 1899 when he nOled thaI o ffi cers needed to see a corps, division, or
brigade organized and o n the mareh to perform the ir d uties in wa r. In 1902
some state and federal units he ld maneuvers at Ca mp Root, Kansas, I4 but the
fi rst large dri ll took place two years later nca r Manassas, Virgin ia. At that time
Guard uni ts from e ig hteen states a nd selec ted Regular A rmy units tra ined
together- a tota l of26,OOO men. Maneuvers on a lesser sca le were held in 1906
and 1908. These biennia l ma neuvers proved benefici al to bot h pro fessional and
ci tizen soldiers. Regul ars gai ned comma nd experience, and guardsmen refi ned
the ir mi litary sk ills. IS
Alt hough periodic maneuvers had their merits, the General Staff soon real~
ized that they fe ll short o f prepa ring the Army for war. In 1906 the Regular Army
was sti ll d ispersed among posts that accommodated any\Vhere from two com pa~
nics to a regime nt. To provide for more sustained tra in ing, the stafT u rged
Secretary o f War Wil liam Howard Taft to concentrate the regulars at bri gade~size
posts. Taft proved receptive, but most members of Congress opposed the reform ,
particu la rly if closing a post might affecl their consti tuents adverscly.16
Public view.\ 'he 1904 IIWllelll'e,.~. MlIIllIssfls. Virgillia; below, 'roops pass ill
reviell', 1904 Manassas IIUlllel/l'ers.
GENESIS OF PERMANENT DI V ISIONS
27
In 1909 Assistant Secre ta ry of

War Robert Shaw Oliver, a veteran
with ex pe ri ence a s a vol unt eer,
Regular, and Guard officer, adopted
a not h er approach 10 readines s.
Following the European exa mpl e of
mixing regulars and reserves in the
sa m e formation , he divided th e
nation into eight di stri c ts. Within
each district, O liver planned to form
brigades , divi s ions , a nd corps for
training Regular and Gua rd unilS.
The district comma n de r was 10
superv ise all assigned reguhu s, but
to exercise only nominal contro l
over Guard units, which were to be
federalized only during a nalio nal
eme rgency o r wa r. Neve rtheless ,
O liver expec ted the di st ri ct co m Maj. Cell. NeillY C. Corbi" allli
mander to influence the c itizen-solColollel Wagller
dier by man ifesting an interest in the
reserve forces. The p lan was voluntary for th e Nat ional Guard, but by early 1910 th e governors of the New
England states and New York had agreed to have their units participate.17
About the sa me timc this agreement was reached, the Army modified its field
orga nizations, retaining div isions but rep lacing the corps and army commands
wi th a field army. Si nce the mid-nineteenth centu ry military theorists had debated
the need for the corps. Col. Arthur L. Wagncr, a foun ding fat her of the Army
school system, be lieved that it was a necessary eche lon between division and
army, but ba sed on experience d uring the Civi l War Maj. Gen . Andrew A.
Humph reys, former Chief of StafT of the Army of the Potomac, disagreed.
Humphreys wanted a strong division capable of independent operat ions, noting
that the terrain and poor roads in the United States prevented the easy maneuver
or movement ofa large uniL IS
Agreeing with Humphreys, the General Staff decided that a command made up
of divisions, designated as a field army, best fit the nation's needs. As described in
the Field Service Reglila/iolls of 1910, the fi eld army comprised two or more
infan try divisions, plus sUPl>ort troops, which included pioneer infanlry (service
troops for the forward area of the batt lefield), heavy arti llery, engineers, signal and
medica l troops, and ammunition and supply units, which could maneuver and fight
independent ly. Cava lry might be included in Ihe division jf appropriate. 19
To fit within the new concept, the General SlafT, in conjunct ion with the
Army Schoo l of Ihe Line al Fori Leavenworth , made the infantry division a
28
MANEUVER AND FI REPOWER
morc powerful and selfsufficicnt organization. A field artillery bri gade of two
regiments with forty-ei ght g uns rcplaced the provisional regiment. In fantry and
cilvalry regiment s benefited from add it ional firepower. Ba sed on experiments
with nUlchinc g uns in 1906, a provisional two-gun platoon had been added to
each infantry and cavalry regiment , and with the new regu lations the authorization was increased to six g uns. Depending on range, one mach ine gu n eq ual ed
Ihe firepower of between sixteen and thirty-nine rincmcn . Thus, divi siona l firepower g rew substantia lly. Other changes improved communicat ions by replacing the sig nal company wi th a two-company battalion and ex panded the med
ieal service by adding fout' ambulance companies. For the first time, a directive
fixed the strcng th of a di vision at 19,850 men- 740 officers, 18,533 cn li sted,
and 577 c ivi lians, the last se rving mostly in the amm uni tio n and su pply units.
Tran sport for a di vision included 769 wagons and carts, 48 ambulances, and
8,265 animals. 20
While making the di vision more powerful , the regulations realigned the divisio n staff. The new staff cons isted of a chief of staff, an adjutant general, an
inspector general , a judge advocate, a quartermaster, a commissa ry officer, a surgeon, the com mander's three aides, ami six civi lian clerks. Engineer and signa l
battlliion commanders joined it at the di scretion of the division cOlllmander. The
provost marshal was elim inated, as were the ordnance, muster, and senior arti llery
officers, wit h most of these positions mov ing to the field army headquarters) I
A new nomenclature for divis ions indicated their self-sufficiency. Instead of
being numbered as the 1st, 2d, and 3d Divisions, I Army Corps, as during the
Civil Wa r and the War wit h Spai n, units were to be numbered consecuti vely in the
order of their formation . No reference to any field army appeared in divisiona l
designation s. As before , brigades we re identified only as the 1st, 2d, and 3d
brigades of a division.22
Th e new o rdinances also included a 13,836-man cavalry di vision in th e
fi eld army, and, as in the infantry divi sion, interna l changes affectcd fi repower,
log istics, and staff. A field artillcry regiment replaced Ihe six battc ri es , and
each cavalry regiment fi e lded a provisional machine gu n troop . The engineer
and sig nal companies were expanded to battalions, and two ambulance compa nies were added. A pack train compl eted the division. For th e first time, the
cava lry di vision was given a staff similar to that in th e infantry divi sion .
Designatio ns of cavalry divisions were a lso to be numeri cal and consecuti ve in
the order of th eir o rganization.23
Maj. Gen. James Franklin Bel l, the Chief of Staff of the Army, establi shed the
First Field Army on 28 Februa ry 1910. Although merely a paper orga nization
be fore mob ilization, it cons isted of three infantry di vis ions, each with three
in fant ry brigades. Each infantry brigade comprised three infantry regiments, and
the other div isional un its included a cavalry regiment , an engineer battal ion, and
medica l and signal units. In place of the field artillery brigade, each division had
o nly o ne fi e ld artillery regiment . Because the arti ll ery and caval ry regi ments
GENESIS OF PERMANENT DIVISIONS
29
were made up of bot h Rcgular Army

and Na ti o nal Guard c lements, Bell
designated thcm as "Nationa l" regiments. The suppl y and am muniti on
tra ins, manned by civi lians, were to
be formed after mobi lization.24
Within a few months the new
Chief of StafT, Maj. Gen. Leo nard
Wood, reported to Secretary of War
Jacob M. Dickin so n that th e First
Field Army ex isted in name only.
Noting th at th e A rm y lacked th e
req uired units and equipment to field
the organization, he nevertheless
believed that the Wa r Department
had taken the first step in organizi ng
the Regular Army a nd the Nat iomd
Guard for modern war.25
Not everyo ne in the War
Department agreed with the concept
of the First Field Army. The Chief of
the Division of Mi litia Affa irs, Brig.
General Bell
Gen. Robert K. Evans, recommended
that General Wood revoke the orders
establishing the organization for two reasons. First, the field army did not fit any
plan fo r the national defense, and, second, he believed that Regular and Guard
units did not be long in the same formation. He further contended that the orders
implied the existence of a field army. Events a long the Mexican border soon
caused the Army to abandon the organization, and event ually the secretary of war
resc inded the orders.26
Concentration on th e Mexican Border in 1911

In March 1911 , during disorders resulting from the Mex ican Revol ution, the
War Department deployed many Regular Army units of the First Field Army to
the southern border. Units assembl ed at San Antonio, Texa s, const ituted the
Maneuver Division and the Independent Caval ry Brigade, whi le ot hers, concentrated at Galveston, Texas, and San Diego, Californ ia, made up separate infantry
brigades. The division, following the Field Service Regula/iolls outline, consisted
of three infant ry brigades, a field arti llery brigade, an engineer battalion, and
medi cal and signa l units, but no trains. Thirty-s ix com pani es from the Coast
Art illery Corps, organized as three provisional infantry regiments, comprised the
brigade at Galveston. The bri gade at San Diego had two infantry rcgimcnts and
30
small med ica l, signal, and cavalry units, along with a provisional quartermaster
(bakers and cooks) un it. The Ga lveston and San Diego brigades were intended to
defend against possible attack by the Mex ican Navy, whi le the Mane uver
Division read ied for offensive operations aga inst Mcxico.27
The Army experienced great difficulty with this assembly of troops. Scores of
movement orders had to be issued. and inadequate arrangements for transportation
c<l used innumerable delays. Upon <lrriving at their new stations, the uni ts found
themselves considerably under strength. The division in itially had about 8,000 officers and enlisted men but, with the addition of recru its, its st rength cl imbed to
12,809. That total represented only about two-thirds of the authorized strength outlined in the regulations fo r the division. Although the division impressed some
American cit izens, General Wood's comment was "How litt le."28
Du ring the concentration of troops along the borde r, wh ich lasted for
almost fi ve months, the Army learned many lessons about readiness. The fo remost one concerned the effects o f lhe lack ofa mobiliz'ltio n pl,\I\, which caused
delays in notifyi ng and transporting un its. Sixteen days were req ui red to assemble the small force. By comparison, the fo llowi ng year the Bulgarians needed
only eighteen days to mobilize 270,000 men aga inst the Turks. After the Iroops
arrived at the mobilization sites, the d iv isio n 's inspector gene ral fo und ma ny
problems. No two units had the same tentage , tra nsporta tion equ ip me nt , o r
quartermaster supp lies. The large numbers of recruits overwhel med the units
and caused genera l con fu sion. Medical uni ts performed poorly since they had
been haphazard ly o rganized.29
To correct these fa ul ts , the inspector genera l recommcnded thai st andard
field eq ui pment be issued 10 a ll units, that their peacetime strength be increased,
and that permanen t fiel d hospi ta ls and ambu lance compa nies be maintained .
Logist ica l problems stemmed from the lack of regulatory civi lians in the ammunition <l nd supply tra ins. But rather than urging the organi;wtion of those units,
the inspector suggested th<lt the Army experi ment wi th "autotrucks."30
In the communiC<lt ions arena, the Signal Corps tested the telegraph, wireless
tclegraph (radio), and the ai rplane d uring tactica l exercises. Cavalry employed the
wire less telegraph, whil e infa ntry used telegraph wire, and bot h reported g rea t
success . In <Idd it ion to traini ng officers to fl y, the airplane was used for reeon~
naissancc in the division, which spurred further aeronautica l development.31
When the Maneuver Division and the brigades we re mobi li zed, General
Wood expected that they could rema in on the border for three months withou t
asking Congress fo r addi tion<ll money. He succeeded. T he brigades at Ga lveston
and San Diego were d iscont inued in June 191 1, and divisiona l elements began
returning to thei r home stations at lhe end of July. On 7 August the division headquarters passed into history.32
T he mobilization served many purposes, not the least of which was to give
impetus to General Wood's preparedness ca mpaign. T he performa nce o f the division and the brigades illustrated the nation 'S un preparedness for war.
GENESIS OF PERMANENT DIVISION S
31
The Stimson Plan

After the break up of the division and brigades, Secretary of War Henry L.
Stimson requested the Genera l Staff to rev iew national defense pol ic ies and to
develop a mobi lizat ion plan for the Army. Maj. William Lassiter, Capt. John
McAuley Palm er, a nd Capt. George Van Horn Mose ley prepared the reCOm mendations subm itted to Sti mson in 19 12 as the Reporl 011 fhe Orgallization of
Lalld Forces of fhe United Slales.33 Known as the Sti mso n Plan, it set out Ihe
need for "A regular army orga nized in divis io ns and cavalry brigades ready fo r
immediate li se as an expeditionary force or for other purposes ... ." Behind it
was to be " an army of national cit izen soldiers organized in peace in complete
di visions and prepared to reen fo rce the Regular Army in time of war." Fi nally,
the plan called for "an army of volunteers to be organi zed under prearranged
plans when greater forces are requ ired than can be furn ished by the Regular
Army and the organized c iti zen so ldiery."34
Alt hough the St imson Plan rece ived su pport throughout the Army and the
nation, changing the military establishment proved di fficult. Congress balked at
altering the laws governi ng the Army. The General Staff therefore opted to improve
readiness by im plementing as many of the recommendations as possible on the
basis of existi ng legislation. After conferences with general officers, the National
Guard, and concerned congress ional members, sixteen divisions emerged as a
mobilization fo rce. The Regular Army was to furnis h one caval ry and three infant ry
divisions, and the National Guard twelve infantry divisions. With these goals established, the staff developed plans to reorganize the two components.35
On 15 February 1913 1 Sti mson announced his new arrangement for the Regular
Army. To adm inister it, he d ivided the nation into Eastern, Centra l, Western, and
Southern Departments and created northern and southern Atlanti c coast artillery
districts, along with a third for the Pacific coast. These departments and districts
provided the framework for conti nued com mand and control regardless of the uni ts
assigned to them. Second, he arranged to mobilize field un its into di vis ions and
brigades. The 1st, 2d, and 3d Divisions were allotted to the Eastern, Cen tral, and
Western Departments, respectively, and the Cava lry Division ( 1st and 2d Cava lry
Brigades) to the Southern Department. The 3d Cavalry Brigade, a nondiv isiona l
un it, was assigned to the Central Department. When necessary, two regiments in the
Eastern Department were to combine to form the 4t h Cavalry Brigade. The plan
addressed primarily the defense of the continenta l United States, but also included
the rerritory of Hawaii. The three infantry regiments stationed in the islands were to
form the 1st Hawaiian Brigade.36
These arrangemen ts fe ll short of perfection. Divisiona l components remained
scattered unl ilmobilization, thereby precl uding continuous training. For example,
the Ist Division 's elements occupied fourteen posts. All di visions lacked units
presc ribed in the Field Service Regulatiolls. Stimson , however, hoped that
Congress would eventually authorize completion of the un its)7
32
To organi ze the National Guard divisions, Stimson had to gain the cooperation
of state govern ors who contro ll ed the Guard unit s unti l federal ized. Captain
Moseley devised a system to di vide the nation into twelve geographic districts, each
w ith an in fantry di v ision. T hirty-two states accepted the schem e, two states
remained noncommi tta l, and fifteen refused comment. Although the staff failed to
g<l itl unanimous support orits proposal , in 1914 it adopted the twel ve-d ivision force
fo r the Guard (7f1ble I), to which was added three l1luhidistrict cava lry divisions,38
Implementation of the plan moved slowly in the states. Governors hesi tated to
fo rm certai n units needed in the d ivisions, particu larly expensive field artillery and
medical organizations that did not Supporlthe Guard 's state missions. The staff likewise moved slowly in developing procedures to instruct, supp ly, and mobilize the
units. One bright area, the District of New York, which had ma intained a division of
its own design since 1908, quick ly completed its part of the plan, perhaps because
the state had been a pillar of support for the preparedness movement. Pennsylvan ia,
the other state constituting a divisional district, which had sltpp0l1ed a nonregulation division si nce 1879, gradually began to adj ust its organization. Progress in the
mult istate d istricts, not unexpectedly, fell behind Pennsy lvania.39
As it developed plans for the tactica l reorganization of the Army, the General
Staff pionee red the creation o f tabl es o f o rgani za tio n fo r a ll Iypes of unit s.
Foreru nners of those used today, the tabl es brought together for easy compari son
a mass of information about uni t person nel and equipment previollsly buried in
TABLE I
Nati onal Guard Infantry Divisions, 191 4

Division
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
12th
13th
14th
15th
16th
Di.5IriCI
Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, VemlOnt,

Rhode Island, <'Ind Connecticut
New York
Pennsylvania
Delaware, New Jersey, Maryland, District of Colum bia,
Virgin ia, and West Virginia
North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, and Georgia
Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Kentucky
Michigan and Ohio
Illinois and Indiana
Wisconsin, Min nesota, North Dakota, SOUlh Dakota,
and Iowa
Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, and Wyoming
Arkansas, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, Oklahoma,
and Lou isiana
Cali fom; a, Oregon, Montana, Utah, Idaho, Nevada,
<lnd Washington
GENES IS OF PERMANENT DIV ISIONS
33
various War Department publi cation s, greatly eas ing the task of determining
requirements for mobili zations. Alt hough the new tables did not a lter the basic
combat triad st ructure of the infantry division, their form ulation was accompanied by in ternal changes in the in fan try regiments and the divisiona l support echelon. Revisions e liminated the pack train , authorized a small engineer train, and
mann ed the engineer, supply. and a mmunition trains wit h mi litary personne l
instead of civilians. 40
In 1912 Congress created a service corps w ithin the Quartermaster Corps to
rep lace civ ilian employees and so ldiers detailed from combat units for duty as
wagonmaslcrs, teamsters, blacksmiths, and other such laborers and art ificers.
Only ninetcen civ ilians- vcterina rians and clerks- remaincd in the division. For
the first timc , so urces for military poli cc and train guards werc specified.
Traditionally, commanders gave regiments or battali ons that had su ffered severely
in battle the honor of serving as provost guards, espec ially those that had con~
ducted themselves with dist inction.41
In the infantry regiment , besides the provisional machine gun com pany p ro~
vided for in 1910, provisional headquarters and supply companies were to p ro ~
vide mounted orderlies and regimenta l wagon drivers. T he arrangement eliminated the need to detail men from rine compan ies, a practice that had plagued uni t
commanders since the Revolutionary War. These and other changes raised the
division's strength to 22,646 officers and enlisted men and 19 civi lians.42
The place of possible employment continued to inn uence the d ivision's basic
structure. Be fore the tables of organization were prepa re(~ the stall debated whether
a divi sion should have two or three infantry brigades, noting that European armies
continued to lise a two-division corps organization. Maj. Na thaniel F. McClu rc,
appo inted as an in structor in mi li tary art at the Army Se rvice Schoo ls, Fort
Leavenworth, in 19 13, attributed the European organization to economy in the usc
of personne l and to the proper use of sophisticated road networks. Hc concluded,
however, that what the Europeuns reu lly wanted was u corps built upon multiples of
three- regiments, brigades, and divisions. When preparing the Stimson Plan, the
officers determined that a division with hVO infantry brigades limited the commander's ability to subd ivide his forces for frontal and nank attacks while at the same
time attempt ing to mainta in a reserve. Along with ease of command, deployment on
a road influe nced the decision. Because a division containi ng two infantry brigades
would make less econom ical use of road space than one of three brigades, the
three-brigade division remained Ihe Army's basis for combi ning arms. In march
formation, it measured about fifteen miles.43
The revi s io n of the cava lry division in many ways paralle led that of the
infan try division. Mi litary person nel man ned ammunition and supply trains, and
troopers from the cavalry regiments served as mi litary police and traill guards.
Each cava lry regiment was authorized provisional headquarters and machine gun
troops similar to those in the in fantry regiment. The most sign ifi ca nt change was
in the division's three cava lry brigades, wit h each being red uced from three to
34
two regiments since three cavalry regiments in a brigade required 100 much road
space. The div ision's strength stood at 10, 161 , approx imately 4,000 fewe r men
tha n the 1910 unit. 44
To complement the 1914 tables of organization, Maj. James A. Logan revised
the 19 10 Field Service Regulatiolls. The new ed ition emphasized the d ivision as
th e basic orga ni zat io n for conducti ng offensive operat ions in a mobile army.
Logan defined the division as "A self-contai ned uni t made up of a ll necessary
arms and serv ices, and complete in itself with every requirement for independent
action incident to its operations."45 His definition became the customary description of a division.
Operations on the Mexican Bordel; 1913- 1917

The Mexican border rema ined a troubl ed area, Fo ll owing th e mobilization
of 1911, the Army patrolled the fro ntier w ith sma ll units, but when insurrection ists overth rew the Mexica n govern ment in 1913, President Tan decided on a
show of force si milar to the earlier concentration of ('roops. On 21 February he
ordered Maj. Gen. Wi ll iam 1-1 . Carter, commander of the Centra l Department , to
assem ble the most fully manned of the Army's divisions, the 2d, on the Gulf
coast of Texas. Un like its mob ilization of the Maneuver Division in 1911 , the
War Department L1sed a mere five- line telegram to dep loy the unit. Carter, who
arri ved with his staff in Texas within th ree days, establ ished the division headqu arters and its 4th and 6th Bri gades at Texas Ci ty and the 5th Br igad e at
Galveston. The division lacked, however, somc ri e ld artillcry, medica l, signal ,
and engineer elemen ts and all its Irains.46

Tension remained high between the United Stales and Mexico in 1914, and in
response President Woodrow Wilson adjusted the deployment of military units to
protect America n interests. United States naval forccs occupied Vera C ruz,
Mexico, and so ldi ers soo n re lieved the sailors ashorc. On 30 April the 5t h
Brigade, 2d Divisio n, augmented with cavalry, fie ld artillery, engineer, signal ,
bakery, and aviation units, and almost the enti re divisional staff took up positions
in the city. To placate uneasy United States ci tizens along the border, the 21 and
8t h Bri gades, elemen ts of the 1st and 3d Divisions, and some small er units moved
to the southern frontier. In November the cri sis at Vera Cruz ended and the 5t h
Brigade returned to Ga lveston, but activity resumed the following month whcn
thc 6th Brigade, 2d Division, deployed to Naco, Arizona. For the next few mont hs
no major changes took placc in the disposition of forces . Then, in August 1915, a
hurricane hit Texas City and Galveston , killing thirteen enlisted men and causing
considerable damage to the 2d Division's property. Official s in Washington
decided that the division was no longer needed there and ordered its units moved
to other pos ts in thc Southcrn De partment. The divisional headquarters was
demobi lized on 18 October 1915.41
Before the Vera Cruz ex pedi tio n, Gene ral Ca rt er had eval uat ed the 2<1
GENES IS OF PERMANENT DIVIS IONS
35
27,h Infallll)" 2d Dil'isiOIl, encampment. Texas 01),. Texas
Division. Although he fou nd no glaring deficiencies in the unit, he recommended

the maintenance of permanent headquarte rs detachments for di visio ns and
brigades in peacet ime to ease mobilization and to prevent the breakup of regimenta l organizations fo r division details. Carter also recommended that al l communications equipment be centralized in Ihe signal un it because the training of
men assigned to combat arms units to operate signal gear seemed wasleful.48
On 9 March 1916, trouble flared again on the southern border when Mexican
bandi ts raided Columbus, New Mex ico, kill ing and wounding severa l soldiers and
civ ilians. The following day the Sout hern Department commander, Maj. Gen.
Frederick Fu nston, ordered Brig. Gen. John 1. Pershing, commander of the 8th
Brigade, to apprehend the perpetrators. For his mission Pershing organized a provisional divi sion and designated it as the Puni tive Exped ition, United States Army.49
Th is d ivision differed considerabl y from the organizations outlined in the
Field Service Regulations. It consisted of two provisional cavalry brigades (two
cava lry regimen ts and a field arti llery battery each) and one infantry brigade (two
regiments and two engi neer companies), with medical, signal, tran sportation , and
air units as divisional troops. The design of the division fo llowed the organizational axiom that it adapt 10 the terrain and roads where the enemy was located .
In hostile and barren northern Mexico, Pershing plan ned to pursue the bandits
wit h cavalry and to protect his eom lllunication lines with infantry.50
36
MA NEUVE R AND FIRE POW ER
4,11 SOlllli Dakota/n/ allll ), on 'h e Mexica/l borde/', /91 6
Vi o lence intensified along the border during the spring of 1916, causing a
gene ra l mob ili zati o n. After a ra id in May at Gl en Springs, Texa s, Pres ide nt
Wilson called the Nationa l Guard of Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas into fede r~
al service. Following another rai d on 16 Junc, he federalized all Guard units

ass igned to tactical divisions designated in the Stimson Plan,51
This final call exposed flaws in the nation 's war plans. In some stales mobi
lization location s were inaccess ible, quartermaster supplies were insuffic ient, and
even required forms were in short supply. Guard un its were under strength and
poorly trai ned. Some men failed to honor their enl istments, whil e others who
were physically unfit entered the service . Besides these and other defic iencies,
the need to have troops on the border meant thaI only I\vo divisions, the 6th from
New York and the 7th from Pennsylvania, mobili zed in accorda nce w ith the
Stim son Plan. On 4 August th e War Department directed General Fun ston to
organize ten div isions and six brigades provisiona lly from the remai ning Guard
unit s. But not all o f these organi zations cou ld be formed because o f the rapid
shifting of uni ts to and from the border. Although the mobili zation pointed out
many weak nesses in the nati on's preparation for war, it provided an inva luabl e
training opportunity for the Guard.52
The Puniti ve Expedition stayed in Mexico until February 191 7. When hostil e
acts had abated along the border during the fall of 19 16, the War Department had
begun to demobi lize the Guard. By the end of March most units had returned to
state contro l. Pershin g, the new SOllthern Departme nt command er fo ll ow ing
GENESIS OF PERM ANENT OIVISIONS
37
Funston's su dden death from a heart attack in February 1917, realigned the
Regu lar Army forces. He organized provisiona lly a cavalry brigade and three
infantry divisions, bUllhcy existed for less than three months. With the nation 's
en try into World War I and the need for troops in Europe, Pershing 's divisions
were disbanded. Smaller units, however, continued border surve illance.53
Authorization a/Permanent Divisions

While the Army concentrated most of its regu lars in the United States on the
Mexican border in 19 15, the ongoing war in Europe prompted Secretary of War
Lindley M. Garrison to reexamine national defense policies. Among other matlers, he asked the General Staff to investigate the organizations and strength figures needed by the Regular Army and Nati o nal Guard, the rese rve fo rces
rcquired, and the relat ionship of the regulars and gua rdsmen to a volunteer force .
Garrison held the opinion that the federa l government's lack of cont rol over the
National Guard was a funda mental defect.54
Members of the General Staff worked for six months to answer Garrison, and
the War Department publi shed their findings as the Statement of Proper MiJilal)1
Policy in 1915. It outl ined a 281 ,OOO-man Regular Anny and a 500,000-man federal reserve. An additional 500,000 reserve force was 10 buttress the reserves.
Under the new policy the National Guard was downgraded 10 a volunteer contingent force that would be used only during war.55
Proposed legislat ion based on the policy statemen t, which was dubbed the
"Continental Army" plan, qui ck ly ra n into congressiona l opponents who were
unwilling to abandon the National Guard. But the debate led eventually to the
National Defense Act of 1916. The new act provided that the "A rmy of the Un ited
States" wou ld consist of the Regular Army, the Vo lunteer Army, the Officers '
Reserve Corps, the Enlisted Reserve Corps, the National Guard in the service of
the Un ited States, and such other land fo rces as were or might be authori zed by
Congress. The president was to determine both the number and type of National
Guard units thaI each state would mai nta in. Both the Regu lar Army and the
National Guard were to be organized, inso far as practi cable, into permanent
brigades and divisions. Com mand ec helons above divisions reverted to army
corps and armi es, the trad itional co mmand system; no mention was made of
independent Field arm ies directly con trolling d ivisions. Undoubted ly the war in
Europe, which involved large armies, caused the staff to revert to that system. To
rcsolvc the long-standing question of whcther Guard units could be used outside
the Uni ted Statcs, the law empowered the presiden t to draft units into federal servicc under cerl<lin conditions. Men in drafted units woul d be di scharged from
state service and become fede ral troops subjcct to employment wherevcr needed.
Congrcss continucd to dictate regimental organ i;wtions.56
The War Dcpartment published new tables of organization for infa ntry <Ind
cavalry divisions in MOlY 19 17. The structure of the infant ry division remained
38
simi lar to that mandated in 1914. Internal changes dea lt w ith firepower, another
consequence of observing the pattern of the European war. Infantry regiments
gai ned additional riflemen , and th e provisiona l headquarters , supply, a nd
machine gun companies were made permanent. The rield artillery brigade also
gained considerable firepower, with one regiment of3.8-inch howitzers and two
regiments of 3-inc h guns replacing the two regi men ts authorized in 19 14. A
two-batta lion engineer reg ime nt repla ced the batta lion, the s ig na l battalion
grew in size, and an aero squad ro n eq uipped wit h twelve aircra ft joined the
division for recon naissance a nd obse rvat io n. Enlarged ammunition, supply,
engineer. and sa nitary trains suppo rted the arms, and the tables provided for the
trains to be either motorized or horse-drawn. The tables a lso ca ll ed for a headquarters troop for the divis ion and headq uarters detachments fo r infan try and
artillery brigades. These units were to furni sh mess, transport, and admi nistrative support fo r the d ivis ion to o pe rate on a more com plex battle fi e ld. The
redesigned div ision for war numbered 28 ,25 6 olTicers and en li sted men when
the trai ns were au tho ri zed wagons o r 28,334 when they were authori zed motorized equipment (Chart /).57
The staff, in rationali zing the division, divided the road space it would usc
between combat and support e lement's. Combat elements used fourteen miles.
wh ile the support elements, depending on whether the trains were motorized or
horse-drawn. used fi ve to six miles. Although it required about twenty mi les in
march format ion, a 25 percent increase in road space over the 19 14 organization.
the division was sti ll thought to be able to move 10 battle on a single road. 58
T he new tables dramatically changed the st ructure of the cavalry division
for war. CflVa lry brigades reverted to three regimen ts each. and the nine cava lry
regimen ts acquired permanent headquarters, supp ly. and machine gun troops.
As in the infan try divis io n, the cava lry di vision fielded an aero squadron. The
tables also introduced a divi sional eng ineer train and enlarged the ammunition,
supply, and sa nitary trains. The division headq uarters and headquarters troop
and brigade headquarters and headquarters detachments rounded out the unit.
Given these c hanges, the size of the division rose from 10, 16 1 to 18, 164 when
the trains were eq uipped with wagons and 18, 176 when they were equ ipped
w ith moto rized vehic les (Chart 2), and it occupied approximately nine teen
m iles of road space on the mareh.59
To achieve the mobilization force that the Statement of Proper Mifit(UJ' Policy
proposed- six cava lry brigades, two cavalry divisions, and twenty infantry divisions- the Army needed more troops. In 1916 Congress increased the number of
Regular Army regiments to 118 (7 engineer, 21 field artillery, 25 cavalry, and 65
infantry) and increased the size of the National Guard, 800 men for each senator
and representative, to be raised over the next five years. Several developmen ts,
however, interfered with implementation of the Regu lar Army portion of the act,
especia lly activities along the Mexican border, a reduction in the General Staff that
prevented appropriate planning. and the nation's plunge into the European war.60
H~S
_ _-'I "
HQ,
/51
II
L-....:....
FIELD sm BN
259
195 ea
fA BTRY
1 Division trains equipped with wagons
1Division trains equipped with motorized vehicles
1 Chart 2. Cavalry Division, 1917, depicts thl structure of the Cavalry Regiment
Contains two:r gun regimenu and one 3.8" howiuer regiment
I~~~~E~AT ffi
'II
",.
ENGR REGT
CHART I-Infantry Division, 1917
40
TABLE 2
Nationa l Gua rd Infantry Di visions, 191 7

Dis/ricl
Divisioll
191h
Maine, New Hampshire. Massachusetts. Connecticut,

Vermont, and Rhode Island
New York
Pennsylvania
New Jersey, Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland,
and Vi rgi nia
North Carolina, Soulh Carolina, and Tennessee
A labama, Georgia, and Florida
Michi gan and W isconsin
Illinois
Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, and
SOUlh Dakota
Kansas and Missouri
Oklahoma and Texas
Ohio and West Virgi nia
Indiana and Kentucky
Arkansas. Lo uisiana, and Mississippi
Arizona , California. Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico.
20th
Idllllo, Montnna, Oregon, Washi ngton. lmd Wyoming
5th
6th
71h
8th
9th
10th
11 th
121h
13th
14th
15th
161h
17th
18th
and Utah
Meanwhile the Militia Bureau, formerly the Division of Milit ia Affa irs,
began work on new plans 10 organize Guard divisio ns. It scrapped the voluntary
Stimson Plan and directed the organization of sixteen infantry and two cavalry
divisions. Brig. Gen. Wi ll iam A. Mann , Chief of the Militia Bureau, sent the
states advance copies o f the new tables in January 1917 to acq ua in t them with the
types of units they needed to maintain. Then on 5 May he fOlwa rded the plan for
organizing the d iv isions (n,ble 2), which gave the infantry divis ions priority over
the cava lry divi sions. Because the Reg ular Army could more expedi tiously orga~
nize ncw units for the ex isting emergcncy, Mann did nOI ask the Slates to ra ise
any un its at thattimc.61
Between the War wit h Spain and the United States' intcrvention in World War
I, thc Army 's principa l mission was to defend the nat ional territory and its insular
possessions. Duri ng Ihi s pcriod the Army tested and adoptcd the infantry division
as its basic combined arms uni t. The underlying planning <Issumption was that the
infant ry div ision wou ld fight in the United States. This meant, in tUl'll, Ihal one of
the principal determi nan ts ofa division's size was road~marchi n g speed. Thc c a v~
HQs
150
,a
HQs
2
108ea
CAVTRP
CAY SQON
434
95
MG TRP
54
HQs
2
HHB
114
ENGR BN
387
195ea
FA BTRY
FABN
392ea
263'/299 2
85 1&2
ENGRTRAIN
715'-.2
SANfTARYTRAIN
248 '/2242
SUPPLY TRAIN
AMMO TRAIN
242'-.2
HQsTRAIN
1.553 '/ 1,565 2
TRAINS
40
AERO SQON
173
MED & CHAP
SUPPLYBTRY
44
1.374
FA REGT. HORSE
trains equipped with wagons

2Division trains equipped with motorized vehicles
1 Division
MED & CHAP

40
SUPPlYTRP
1,579 ea
HHT
88
CAY REGT
19
259
4,756 ea
HQs
FIELD SIG BN
CAY BOE
CAVALRY DIVISION
18,164 '1/8,176 2
CHART 2-Cava1ry Division, 1917
42
MANEUV ER AND FIREPOWER
airy division, although not neglected, remained morc or less a theoretical unit. As
the Army mobilized for the Mex ican border crisis and look note of trends in foreig n arm ies duri ng th e initial ca mpaign s of World War 1, ils leaders beca me
inc reas ingly co nvin ced of the need to c reate pe rmanen t ta cti cal divi sion s.
Congress approved them in 1916, but the nation entered World War I before these
plans had been perfected.
Events during the next two years, however, profoundly affected divisiona l
organizations, the infantry division in particular. For the fi rst lime in the nat ion'S
experi ence, the United Stales Army mobili zed a huge expeditionary force to fight
overseas in Western Europe, a mission for which it was thoroughly unprepared.
The day of the old constabulary army was over. Faced wit h th reats to national
security of hitherto unimagined scope emanating from the O ld World, the nation
had to revo lutioni ze its army to wage war agai nst a formidable continen tal opponent. The necessity for an e ffective combi ned arms organizat ion wou ld force
extraordi nary changes in its entire structure.
GENESIS OF PERMANENT OIV ISIONS
43
Notes
I Rpl oflhc Sec. o f War, ARIVD. 1899. p. 49.
2 Ibid.
3 WD GO 120, 1903.
4 Llr, Capt Joseph . T . Dickman 10 Brig Gell J. Franklin Bell, 16 Scp 1904, no subject. and lIr,
Brig Gell J. Franklin Oclilo Capi J. T. Dickman, J I Nov 04, no subject, AGO file 1168, RG 393,
NARA: Field Service Regulatiolls. Vlli/ed Slale.I' Anl/)'. 1905, sec tabl e of contents.
5 Field Sen'ice Regula/iam.. 1905 pp. 11- 13: Arthur Wagner, Orglilliz(J/ioll (llId Tac/ics, 7th
cd. ( Kansas City: Hudson-Kimberly Publishing Co., 1906), I'p . 11 - 12; Paul Bronsarl Van
Schcl1cndorff, The Dllfie.f of the Gel/eral SUI]!. 4th cd. (London: Ilarrisoll and Sons, 1905), pp.
223- 26,235-38; William Oalck, T(lkli/( (f(Ielies), vol. ), Kriegsglicllcnmg, NachrichlClI, lie/ehle.
Mtll"schdicllst (Mili/wy Orglwiza/iQII, CommllllicaliollS, Orders, (tlltl Marches). 4th cd. (Berlin: R.
Eiscnschmidl, 1903- 07), pp. 16- 17,28- 33.
6 FieM Service Regllllliiolls. 1905, p. 44: Memo Rpl. War Plans Division to the C of S, 5 May
1905, sub: A Proper Proportion of field artillery for the mobile artilY of the U.S. AGO file, Journal,
Reports and Relat ed Pupcr o flheThird Division, 1903- 1910, ItG 165, NAI~.A.
7 N. F. McClure. "The Infantry Division and Its Composition," JVII/"Iwl of/lie Mili/my SC/"I'ice
Im'li/lllioll 50 (Jan- Feb 191 2): 5- 9.
8 Field Service Regll/miolls 1905. p. 12.87-88. Infantry and cavalry regiments we re Ihe
largest pcnlllment units in the peacetime Anny. In 1901 Congress abolished artillery regiments
(eoost lind field). Field ar1il1ery regiments we re reestab lished in 1907.
~ Field Service Regulations, 1905, pp. 25- 26.
10 Ibid., p. 12.
11 Ibid.
12 WD Cirs 28, 50, and 61. 1905. In 1903 Congress revised the militia systenl, div iding the
militia into Organized Mililia and ReSC:lVe Militia classes. The Reserve Militia consisted of an
unorganized manpower pool, wh ile the Organized Militia , commonly known ;IS Ihe National
GU:l rd, included those units maintained by Ihe stat es, territories. :lnd Dislriet of Columbia. When
discussi ng the Na ti onal Guard. thc District of Columbia is treated as II state un less Olhcrwisc nOlcd.
13 WD GO 7, 1903.
14 T imothy K. Nenninger, 71w Lel/ve//wonll Scllools WId tile Old Arlll)' (Westport. Conn:
Grcenwood Press, 1978). p. 22- 23; Rpt of the Sec. of War, IIRWD. UJ99. pp. 48-49, ARWD. 1902,
pp. 50- 52; Jamieson, Crossillg /ilc Oemll)' Groll/Ill, pp. 60-62. Camp Root, Kans.1s, tod:lY is Camp
Whiteside, a subpost of Fort Ri ley.
15 ARWD. 1904. p. 30, ARWO. 1906, p. 47. ARWD. 1908, p. 37. ARWD, 1909, pp. 28- 32: Rill
oflhe Chief of Staff. ARWD. 1904. p. 223.
16 Rpt of the Chief of Staff, ARIIID. 1906. pp. 552- 53; L1r. Brig Gen 1. Franklin l3elllo Gen
Leonard Wood, 18 Apr 12, Wood Papers, Library or Congress (hercnficf cited as Le).
17 Rpt of the Sec. of War, ARWIJ, 19~, Pll. 28- 32; "The Firsl Field AmlY, the Initial SICP in
the Correlation of Ihe Regular Amly with Ihe National Guard." me N(ltiolllll Guard Mtlg(lzi//e 6
(Apr 1910): 352- 54; WD GO 35.1910.
IS McClure, "The Infantry Division:' pp. 6-9; Fieltl Sen'icc Reglilmiolls, 1910, p. 13.
19 FieM Scrvice Regll/miol/s. 1910, p. 13.
20 Ar",y (llId Nul')' JOIIl"llol 46 (22 May 09): 1063; Llr, CG, I'hilippine Dept, to AmlY C or s,
27 Jan 19 14, sub: Revision of Field Service Regulations. Wood I>"pers, LC; Field Sen'ice
Regllia/iolls. /9/0. pp. 12- 13. 15,42-45; Edgar Raines. "MG J. Fmnklin Bell and Military Reform;
The Chief of Staff Years, 1906- 19 10" (Ph.D. dissertation. Universi ty of Wisconsi n. 1976). p. 470;
Mahon and )),lIIysh, IlIfimtl)1Port I , pp. 38-40.
21 Fielll Se/1'ice Reglllatiolls, 1910. p. 15- 16.
22 Ibid., p. 13.34-35: Memo for SI.'crelary, Second Section, Amly Staff, I Feb 19 10. sub:
Repor1 ofCommiucc of Second Seclion. General Staff. on proposcd scheme for organizing into one
44
MANEUVE R AND FI REPDWER
unit the mobile troops orlhe regu lar nnny and organized mi1ili" now stationed in New York and
New England, AGO Rpl of Second Section, General Staff 11ml- 30 Apr 1910, RO 165, NARA
21 Field Se"l'ice ReglllflliOlu', 1910, pp. 36-37.
24 WI) GO 35,1910.
25 Rpt orthe Chic f ofSlafT, ARWD. 1910. p. 128.
26 Memo, Chief, Div. of Militia Affairs, [0 Cors, sub: Revocation of Gcncrnl Orders No. 35,
WD 1910,8 Jul II , AGO file 6\06-3, RG 168. NARA; RepQl'lol/ Mobilizmioll o/fhe Orgulli;::cd
IHililia llIlll Nli/iolla/ G,ll/rtf of tile VI/iI/HI SImes (Washington: D.C.: GovemmCllt Printing arnec,
1916), p. 48; WO OO 6,1914.
27 Rpl of the Sec. of Wa r, Rpi of TAG, ItPI of 111 QMG , ARWD. 1911 , pp. 12- 16. 238-41.
337; Memo for record, 7 Mar II , no subject, Wood Papers. Le.
28 Rpt orlhe Chief of Staff and Rpt o f TAG, IIRIVD. 1911, pp. 156-57, 238- 42. Russell F.
Weiglcy, HislOlY o/Ille UI/i/{!(I S/(lIe.f Army (New York: Macmi llan. 1%7). p. 334. TIrc quote is
from Itr. Gen Wood to Col James G. Harbord, 26 Apr 19 11, Wood Papers, LC.
29 Clarence C. Clendenen, Blood UII Ihe Border: The U'liled States 111'111)' (lmlllle Mexicml
Irregulars (New York: Macmillan, 1969), p. 148-49; WeD, "Statement for re lease in tnoming
papers on Monday, Fcbrmtry 3," Wood Papcrs, Le.
30 Rpi oflhe Inspector Gencml, ANIVD. 1911, Pl'. 267- 69.
31 Rpt of the Chief Signal Officer, ARIVD. 191 I. pp. 721, 739.
32 LIT, William lIoward Tanto Gen Leonard Wood. 12 Mar 19 12, no subject, Wood Papers.
LC: Rpt of TAG. ARIVD. 1911, p. 242.
33 Llr, John M. I)almer to J . F. Morrison, 22 Ja n 12. John McA. Palmer Papers, LC; L 13.
Ilolley. Jr., Gel/eml Jolrn M. Palmer. Citizen Soldier:;. (lJI(I the Army 0/ (I Dcmocl'(lcy (Westpon,
Conn: Greenwood I'rcss, 1983), pp. 202- 05.
34 Rpl on the Organization ofL,md Forces of the United Stmes. Appendix A, ARII'D. 1912, p.
125.
35 Rpi Sec. of War, ARII'D. 1912, pp. 14- 16; Llr, AG, Mass. to Gen Wood, 3 Oct 1912, Wood
Papers. LC (other letters from slate adj utants general are in the Wood Papers; Memo for CotS, dran
of Llr to governors on the reorgani zation oflhe National Guard, 6 Nov 12. War College Division,
Anlly SlatT (hereafler cited as WCD). 7409-1. RG 168, NARA.
J6 WD GO 9, 19 13; weD, "Statement for release in moming papers on Monday, Fcbnmry 3,"
I Feb 13, Wood Papers, LC.
J1 "Generol Orders No.9," InfilllIIJ' .Jol/l'II(l19 (Mar- Apr 1913): 706-08.
38 George Van Hom Moseley, "One Soldicr's lounlcy," Ms history, 3 vols., 1: 103, Moseley
I'apcrs, LC; Memo 52103, C. Division of Mili tia Aff.1irs, to C, WCD. sub: Organized Mil itary
Divisional Organi7..1tion. 12 Jan 15, AGO fi le 7409- 25. RG 168. NARA: WD Cir 8.1913, and 19,
1914; 'The Divis ion I'lan." Natiollal Gllurd M(lgozillc 10 (Jan 1913): 14.
39 Rpt o f the Sc<:. of War and Rpt of the C of S. ARWD. 19/3, Pl'. 3 1. 174; GO 7, Slate of
New York. 1908, printcd in Rpt of tire Adjutant Gel/eml. Stale of Nell' York. 1908. p. 270; GO l.
I)ctl nsylvania National Gua rd. 1879, prin tcd in Rpl o/Ihe Adjll/alll Gellem/. Pellllsyll,(lIIia. 1879, p.
83.
40 Mcmo, WCD for C ofS, 21 Fcb 19 14 , sub: Tables o/Org(lll;z(l/ioll. US Army. 1914, AGO
file 837 1, RG 165 , NARA; Tables o f Organization : U.S. Army. t9 14 (Was hin gto n: D.C.:
Govemment I'rinting Office. 1914), p. 19 (hereafter ciled as TO. 1914).
41 TO. 1914. p. 19; lames A. Huston, Sillew:,' of W(//,: Army Logislics (WaShington. D.C. :
Govemmcnt Printing Office, 1966). p. 295; Wagner. Org(/llizmioll mId Tactics. pp. 19- 20.
42 TO. 1914, PI'. 12- 13. 19_
43 McClure, "The Infantry Divisio n," p. 10: Repo/"l 011 Ihe O'gtmiztllioll of Lwull:'orces ill
ANII'D. 1912. pp. 103- 04.
441'0. 1914.l'p. 14. 23; Report on Ihe O,gmli:(l/iol/ Q/Lmul Fo/'ces. Pl'. 104-05.
45 Field Sen'ice Rt'glll(l/iolls 1914. 1'. 10.
46 Rpl of the Sec. of War. ARWD. 1912. pp. 13- 14; Rpt o f the Sec. of War and Rpt of the
Second Divis ion. A RWD. 1913, pp. 9- 10. 113; Thomas 11 Burden , "Mobilizations of 1911 and
GENESIS OF PERMANENT OIV ISIONS
45
1913," iHililmY Rel'iew 53 (Jul 1974): 72.

47 Frederic L . I l uidckopcr, Mifiwl')' Unp,'cpal"edllcss oflhe Unilc,/ Simes (New York:
Macmi llan, 1915). ])p . 446-48: Rpl orlhe C ors, 1914, and R])t of TAG, ARWD. 19/4, pp. 13536, 179: RpI orthe C ors and RpI of TAG, ARWD, 1915. ])p. 151 - 52.21 1- 12: Clendenen, BIOOlI
oilihe Bo,.del', p. 162; Burdell. "Mobi lizations of 1911 and 1913," p. 72: RPI of TAG, ARII'D.
1916. p. 278.
~8
Rpl of the Second O;\';S;OIl, ARIVD, 191 J, pp. 118- 19.
49 Rpl of the Chief o f SlafT, ANII'D, 19/6, pp. 186-89: John
J. Pershing, Report of Opera tions
of the Punitive Expedition to 30 June 1916. pp. 4-5, AGO file 2480591 ItO 120. NARA: John A.
]'orter, "The Punitive EX1}Cditioll," Quarlcnn:lstcr Review 12 (Jan- Feb (933): 18- 30.
50 Frederick FUllston. Annual Report for FY 1916. South ern Department. p. 26. AGO file
243231, RG 120. NARA: Robert T. Thomas and Inez V. Allen, "The Mexican Punitive Expedition
under Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing," Ms in the Organi7.ational History Branch, Centcr of Military
m story, hereaftereitcd as DAMH-USO. p. 11- 2; POrler. "The I'unitive Expedition," pp. 22- 23.
SI RptofthcChiefofStaff,ARWD. 19/6. PI'. 186-89.
52 Repor/ 011 Mobifizm;oll of lite Orgal/;Zel/ Militia am/t"e Nm;ol/(I/ Guard of t"e Ullitell
St(l/es. 1916, PI). 10, 50- 5 1; "Mobi lization in Spite of War ])cpartrnel1t," Na/iorw/ Gmml
Magazine, 13 (Aug 191 6): 153+; Ltr, Georgc Van Horn Moseley to Leonard Wood, 3 Sep 1916. no
subject. Wood Papers. LC; John F. O'Ryan, n,e StOl)' of Ihe 27th Oil'isioll, 2 vols. (New York:
Wynkoop Hallenbeck Crawford Co .. 1921). 1:120- 25; Pelllls)'iI'llllia ill lite Worlll WlII': All
IIIl1s/nll'''/ His/OIJ' ofllle Twel/f)I-Eigllllt Dir'is;oll. 2 vols. (Pillsburgh: States Publications Society.
1921),pp.I: 120- 25.
Sl Rpt ofTAG,ARWO. 1917, p. 196-97; GO 8 and 25, Southern Dcparlment, 1917. copics in
Division General files, DAM H-HSO; Order of lillllie of tlte Ulli/ed Silites LUlld Forces in lire
World JV(I/' (191 7- 19). 20l/e ofl/Ie IlIIeriOl" (Washington. D.C.: Govenullent Printing Office. 1949),
pp.602- 05.
S4 John I' . Finncgan, Agllillst the S,H!Cter of (I DmgOlI (Westport. COllllecticut: Greenwood
Press, 1974), pp. 45-46; Rpt of Sec. o f War. Append ix C, Statemcnt of Proper Mili tary Pol icy,
ARWD. 191 5, pp. 11 3. 126- 31.
SS Statem cn t of Propc r Mi litary Pot icy, pp. 126-3 1; Finnegan. Against the Specte r or a
Dnagon, pp. 47-48.
S6 Weigley, History of the United States Anny, 344-48; WD Bul l 16. 1916: Finnega n, Agaillst
the Specter ofa Omgoll.l'. 44- 52; "Mobilization in Spite of War ])el)urtment," 153+.
S7 Table ofOrgtllliZlllioll US Arm)'. 1917 (Washington. D.C.: Governmcnt Printing Omce,
19 17), PI'. 39-40, (hereafter cited as TO 191 7).
S8 Ibid.
s') Ibid., Pl'. 57- 58.
60 SWtelllelll of Proper Militlll)' Policy, 1>1). 124-26; WD Bull 16. 1916; WD GO 22 and 50,
19[6.
6t RpI of the Chicfofthe Militia Bureau, ARWD. 1917, pp. 850-52; Rpt of the Chieroft he
Militia Bureau. ANII'D, 1918, p. 1102: Ll f, Chicf of the Mi litia Bureau. to TAGs o f all States.
Territory of Hawaii, District of Columbia. an d inspector-instructors and officcrs in chllrgc of militia
affairs, department headquarters. 5 May 1917. sub: Organization and entry in Fedcml service of
Nation;11 Guard, (MB) file 325.4. RG 168. NA RA.
CHAPTER 3
The Test- World War I

/Jolh [French lIlIll British] commissiOlls were lll/xious for till AmericlIlI force. 110 lIlt/fIcr how .fllwlf. ... I opposed this all the grollnd 111lI1 the small force II'OllftJ beliflle 0111"
efforl; lI'as lI"digllijiel/ (lIll/Il'OIlItl give II wrollg illlpre:i~;iol/ of OIW il/lel/liolls. I held 0111
for at least (I divisioll 10 show 'he quality of 01/1' troops alld COIIIIII(/lU/ respect for ollrjlag.
M aj . Gen. Hugh L. Scott i
World War I, an unprecedented conflict, forced fundamenta l changes in the

organ izat ion of United States Army f ield fo rces. The in fant ry division remained
the Army's primary combined arms uni t, but the pri nciples governing its organiZ<1tion took a new direction because of French and Briti sh experiences in trench
warfa re. Column length or road space no lo nger controllcd the size and composition of the in fan try division; instead, fire power, supply, and command and control
became paramount. The caval ry division received scant attention as the European
bau le field offered few opportuni ties for its use.
First Revisions
Between 6 April 19 17, when the nat ion declared war, and 12 June, when the
first troops left the Unitcd Statcs for France, the War College Division of the Army
General Staff revised the structure of the infantry d ivision extensively. British and
French otriccrs spurred the changes when they visited Washington, D.C., to d iscuss
the nat ion's participation in the war. T hey believed the American d ivision lacked
firepower and presented command and control problems because of its many small
uni ts. But they also had their own politica l-military agenda. Believi ng that time precluded organizing and traini ng U.S. uni ts, they wa nted the nation's immediate
involvement in the war to be through a troop replacement program for their drained
formatio ns, a scheme that became known as "amalgamation."2
C hief of StafT Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott opposed America ns' serving in A ll ied
units, bclieving that the U.S. division could be reorganized to overcome any
French and British objections. Sueh a unit would p rove the q uality of the
American soldier and ensure that the Allies did not underestimate the nation's war
effort s. Scott directed the War Co llege Division to study a di visiona l structure
comprisi ng two infantry brigades, each having two large infan try regi men t's, as a
mean s of red ucing the span of cont rol. It was also to incl ude light and heavy
48

arti llery, signal and engineer troops,
and serv ice un its . A small divi sion,

so me 13,000 infantrymen, wo uld
allow g rea ter mobilit y and e nhance
the ability to exchange units in the
line and maintain battle momentum .
T he French and the British had found
thaI for eac h unit 011 lin e- army
corps, di vision, brigade , regi me nt ,
battal ion, or company- they needed

a comparable unit prepared to relieve
it without mix ing organizations from
variOliS co mmands. The French had
tried rcl icfby army corps but had settled on relief by s mall di vis ion s.
SCO Il felt lhal hi s prop osa l wo uld
case the diffic ulty o f exchang in g

units on the battlefi eld )
By 10 May 19 17, Majs. John
McAuley Pa lmer, Dan T. Moore, and
Br ian t Well s of th e Wa r College
Division outl ined a divi sion of 17,700
men , wh ich included about 11 ,000
infantr y m e n in acco rdan ce wi th
Scott 's idea. In part it resembled the
French square division . I)lanners eliminaled I infantry brigade and cut the
General SeOI/
number o f infantry regiments from 9
to 4, thereby reducing the number of infantry batta lions from 27 to 12. But regimental firepower increased, with the rifle company swelling from 153 officcrs and
cnli sted men to 204, and the number of regimental machine guns rising dramatically from 4 to 36. To accommodate the additional machine guns, Palmer, Moore, and
Well s outlined a new infantry regi mental structurc that consisted of headquarters
and supply companies and three battal ions. Each batta lion had onc maehinc gun
company and three rifle compan ies. G iven the reduction in the number of infantry
units, the proportion of artillery fire support per infantry regiment increased without altering the number of artillery regiments or pieces. The new division still fielded forty-eight 3-inch guns, now twelve pie(;es per infantry regiment. The division
was also authorized a regiment o f twenty-four 6-inch howitzers for general support,
and twelve trench mortars of unspecified ca liber completed the division 's general
fire support weapons.4
Cavalry s uffered the largest c ut, from a regiment to an clement wi th the
division headquarters, a change in line wit h British and French recommenda-
THE TEST- WORLD WAR J
49
lion s. The All ies arg ued that trenc h

warfare, domin ated by ma c h i ne
gun s and artill ery weapons, denied
cava lry the traditional mi ss io ns of
reconna issance, pursu it, and shock
action. Moun ted troops , poss ibl y
assigned to the div ision 's headqua rters company, 111i g ht serve as messengers with ill Ihe di vision but little
mo re. The A lli es further advised
th at the Army should not co ns ider
send in g a large cava lry fo rce to
Fran ce. Ho rses a nd fod der would
occu py prec iolls shipping space, and
Ihe French and Bri ti sh had an abund ance of cavalry. Engi neer, s ign al ,
and medica l battalion s and an a ir
squadron rou nded out the division.5
To co ndu ct o pe ra t ions, the
French advocated a fun ctional d iv i
General Bliss
s ional staff, Ih<lt would in c lud e a
chie f of sta ff and a chie f of artillery as we ll as intell igence, operat ions, and supply offi cers, along with French interpreters. Alt hough small, such a body would
have sufficient resources to allow the division to fun ct io n as a tact ica l unit whi le
a sma ll headquarters troop would furni sh work detai ls. Adj utants alone were to
comprise the staff of the infantry and art illery brigades, which had no headquarters troop fo r work deta il s. The nex t higher headqumters, the army corps, would
provide plan ning and admini stration for active opcrations.6
Based on the report of 10 May. War Co llege Division officers prepared tables
of organization that authorized 19.000 officers and en listed men for the division
(Chari 3), an incrcase of about 1,300. No basic structural changes took place;
sel f- su ffi ciency justified the addi tional men. On 24 May M<lj. Gen. T<lsker H.
Bl iss, the Acting Chief of Staff,7 approved the t<lbles, but only fo r the initia l ex ped itionary rorce. He hoped, <IS did the staff, that Congress wou ld <luthori ze a larger
infmllry regiment, providing it with more firepower. Bli ss <ll so recognized that the
expeditionary comln<lnder might wish to a lter the di vision . With these ractors in
mind, he felt that time would permit additional changes in the divisional st ructure
because a second division would no t deploy in the ne<lr ruturc. Ir a large ex peditionary force was dispatched in the summer of 19 17, its deployment would rest
Oil pol it ical , not mil itary, objecti ves.S
Early in May SCOIl <ll erted Maj . Gen. John J. Pershi ng, commander of thc
Southern Department, about the possi bility of se ndin g <I n ex peditionary rorce
to France and asked him to select o ne fie ld arti llery <lml rour infantry regiments
inditllHlhatlho IOtIlwlllUI9.
' MttrIO. WCDIo< CotS.21 hit, 1911. wb; I'\IIII'OU

pos.siIIIo upad_ry lore. 111 Fr..,c., indicf{eINt
\lit d"MsIoo1 woMlOIII19.m. bull cllM:k 01 'l1li MIll
CHART 3- lnfantry Divis ion, 24 May 191 7
16111 Il/filllllJI, lsi Dillisioll, 1)(lI"(u/es ill Paris, 4 July 1917: below, GOI/(/!'ecol/l'I,
Fral/ce, Iraining area,
52
for overseas service. Pershing nomi nated the 6th Pie ld Arti llery and th e 16th ,
18th, 26t h, and 28th Infantry. Following a prcplanned prolocol , the French
requested th e deploy ment of a di vision to lift Allied morale, and Pres ide nt
Woodrow Wilson agrced.9
S hortly thereafter an exped itio na ry force was organized. The regiments
picked by Pershing, filled to war strength wi th recruits, moved to Hoboken, New
Jersey. On 8 June Bri g. Gcn.Wi lliam L. Sibert assumed command and began
organizing the 1st Exped it ionary Di vision. Four days latcr its ini tial c lements
sai led for France without most of their equ ipment, as the French had agreed to
arm them. Upon arriva l in France, one di visional unit- the 2d Battalion, 16th
Infantry- paraded on 4 July in Paris, where the French people enthusiastica lly
welco med the Americans. Following the reception , the di visio n's unsc hooled
recruits, except the art illerymen, underwent six months of arduous training at
Gondreco urt, a trai ning area south east of Vcrd un , whi lc the division artillery
trained at a French range near Le Valdahon.IO
The Baker Board and Pershing 's SlajJOlganizational Study

Upon com pl etion of the Army's fi rst World War I divisional st udy the 1st
Ex peditionary Div ision was depl oyed. Even before that investigation was fin~
ished, however, two new groups init iated addit ional studies. Pershing, who had
been appointed commander of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) on 26
May, headed one g roup; Co l. Chauncey Baker, an expert in military transportation and a West Point classmate of Pershi ng, headed the ot her. Prev iou sly
Majors Palmer, Moore, and We ll s had consulted Pershing as they developed
th eir ideas about the infant ry di visio n, and he fou nd no fault w ith them.
Nevertheless, Pershing's staff bega n exploring the o rganization of the ex pedi ~
ti onary forces en route to Fra nce. Lt. Co l. Fox Conner, who had served as the
War Co ll ege Di vision interpreter fo r the French m iss ion whi le in Washington;
the newly promoted Lieutenant Co lonel Palmer; and Majs. Alvin Barker and
Hugh A. Drum assisted Pershi ng in this work .11
Independen tly. Secretary o f War Newton D. Baker directed Co lone l Baker
and twelve other officers to study the British, French, and Belgill n ll n nics. After
six weeks the secretary expected Baker to make recommendations that would
he lp in organ izi ng American forces. Colonel Baker himse lf met Pershing in
England, and both agreed to work together after Baker conducted separate inves
tigat ions in England, France, and Belg ium. A single report, known as the General
Organization Project. resul led from these efforts. Refl ecting a consensus of the
Baker and Pershing planners, it covered all aspects of the organization of the AEF
except for the service of rear Iroops.12
The General Organization Proj ect described an infan try division of about
25,000 men consisting of two in fan try brigades (each wit h two infantry regiments
and one threecompany machine gun battalion), a fi e ld arti ll ery brigade (com-
T HE TEST- WORLD WA R I
53
Officers oj 'he AmericlIlI Expediriollmy Forces mill the Bake,. missioll
prising one I 55-mill . how it zer regiment, two 3- inch [approximately 75-nun.1 gun
regiments, and one trench mortar battery), an engineer regiment, a signa l battalion, and trains. The trai ns included the division's headquarters troop and mi litary
po lice, ammunition, supply, ambulance, fie ld hospi tal , and engineer supply units.
The air sq uadron was omitted from the d ivision,I3
During the course of the ir work, Pershi ng and Baker reversed the rationale
fo r the division. Instead of an orga nization that could easi ly move in and Ou l of
the trenches, the division was to fiel d enough men to figh t pro longed battles.
Both p lan ning g roups sensed that Ihe French and Brit ish wan ted that type of
division bu t lacked the resources to ri eld it because of the extensive losses a n el'
three yea rs of warfare. To susta in itself in combat, the di vision needed mo re,
not less, combat power. T he infantry regiment reverted to its prewa r structure of
headq uarters, mach ine gun, and supply companies and three battal ions each
with four ri n e com panies. The rin e co mpanies were increased to 256 officers
and enl is ted me n, and eac h company f iel d ed s ixtee n auto ma ti c ri n es. 14
Because the law specified only one machine gu n company per regiment, the
Genera l Organization Project recommended the organizatio n of six brigade and
five div isional machine gu n companies. These were to be o rganized into two
batta lio ns of three compa nies each and o ne five-company batta lio n. Eight o f
these compa nies augmen ted the four in the infant ry regiments, thus prov iding
each d ivisiona l infantry battalion wi th a mach ine g un compa ny. T he three
re maini ng companies were ass igned as the div isiona l reserve; two were comparable to those in the infant ry regi men ts, and the ot her was an armored motorca r
machi ne gun company labeled "tank " company.15
54
MANEUVE R AND FIREPOWER
The major dispute between Pershing's staff and the Baker Board developed
over the art ill ery genera l support weapon. The board's posi ti on, presented by
future Chie f of Staff Cha rles P. Summerall, was Ihal one regiment shou ld be
equipped with ei ther the British 3.8- o r 4.7-inch howitzer because of their mobil ity. whil e Pershing's officers favored a regiment of French 155-111111. howir-.Gcrs.
The need fo r firepower and the poss ib ility of obtaining 1555 fro lll Ihe French
undoubtedl y innuenced the staff, and its view prevail ed. For high-ang le fire,
Baker's group proposed three trench mortar batteries in the divis ion, but sett led
for one located in the field artillery brigade and six 3- inch Stokes morla rs added
to each infantry regiment.t 6
The report also recommended changes in cavalry and engineer divisional elements. An army corps, it suggested, needed two three-sq uadron cava lry regiments
to support four divisions. Normally one squadron would be attached to each di vision, and the army corps would retain two squadrons fo r training and rcplacement
un its. The squadrons withdrawn from the divisions would then be reorgan ized and
retrained. Divisional eng ineer forees expanded to a two-battalion regiment, which
would accommodate the amount of construct ion work envisioned in trench warFa re.
Infan trymen would do the simple diggi ng and re pairing of trenches under enginecr
supe rvision, while the eng ineer troops would prepare machine gun and trench mortar emplacements and perform major trench work and other construction. 17
Pershing sought a million men by the end of 19 18. He envisioned fi ve army
corps, each hllving fo ur combat di visions, along with a replacement and schoo l
di vision, a base and tmi ning division, and pioneer in fantry, cavalry, fie ld and anti aircraft artillery. engi neer, signal , aviation, medical , supply, and othcr nccessary
units. The basc and training division was to process incoming personnel into the
theater, and the replacemcnt and school division was to provide the army corps wit h
Fully trai ned and equipped soldiers. Because these SUpp0I1 divisions did not need to
be lit full strength, Pershing foresaw some of the soldiers serving as replacements in
combat divisions and others as cadre in processing and tl'lI ining uni ts. He 1I1so anticipated that some surp lus uni ts would be attached to army corps o r arm ies.
Furthermore, Pershing wanted a seventh division for each army corps, not countcd
in his desired force of II million men, which was to be organized and mllintained in
the United States to train officers beforc they came to France. To asscmbl e thc fi rst
urrny corps, he asked the War Department to send two combat d ivisions, followcd
by the replacemcnt and school division, the other two combat divisions, lind finally
the base and training division . When five army corps arrived in France, Pershing
wou ld have twenty combat divi sions and ten processing lind rep lacement divisions.
Also, fi ve more divisions were to be in training in the United States. IS
The Gelle rul Organi zation Project reachcd Wash ington in Jul y. and Bliss
noted Ihe shift in di visional philosophy. Instead of II division that could move
quickly in and out of trenches, Pershing wanted a uni t with sufficicnt ovcrhclld
(stafT, communi cation s, and supply units) and enough infantry and art ill ery to
permit continUOliS fightin g over cxtended periods. Becausc Pershing would com-
THE T EST- WORLD WAR I
55
mand the di visions sent to Europe, neither Bliss nor the General Sta ff questioned
his preference. Also, the Jack of experienced divisional-level officers and staffs
made a smaller number of larger divisions more practical,I9
Using the General Organ izat ion Project, the War College Div ision prepared
tables of organization, which the War Department published on 8 August 1917
(Chari 4). The tables for what became known as Ihe "square division" included a
few changes in the division's combm arms. For example, the five-company d ivisional mach ine gun battalion was reduced to fOllr companies by eliminating the
mmored car mach ine gun unit. Pershing had decided to submit a separate tank program because he considered tanks to be assets of e ither army corps or fi eld army. In
the infantry regiment, the planners made the 3-i nch mortars optiona l weapons and
added three one-pounde r (37-mm.) gu ns as antiltlllk and anti- machi ne gu n
weapons. The supply traill was motorized, and the ammunition and ambulance
trains were equipped with bot h motor- and horse-drawn transport. The additional
motori zed eq ui pment in the train s stemmed from the quart ermaster general's
attempt to ease an expected shipping sho rtage, not 10 enhance mobility. Craled
motor vehicles occupied less space in an ocean tmnsport than animals and fodder.20
T he War College Division also prov ided a larger div isional statT than Pershing
had recommended because the un it most likely wou ld have both tactical and administrative roles. The statT compri sed a chief of statT, an adjutant general , an inspector
genera l, a judge advocate, and quartermaster, medical, ordnance, and signal officers. In addition, interpreters were attached to overcome any language mlrriers, particularly between the Americans and the French. As an additional dUly, the eommanders of the field arti llery brigade and the engi neer regiment held statT posi tions.
A division headquarters troop with 109 officers and enlisted men would furnish the
necessary se rvices fo r effic ient operations. The infantry brigade headquarters
included the commander, hi s three aides, a brigade adjutant, and e ighteen enli sted
men who furnished mess, transportation, and communications services. The fi eld
arti llery brigade headquarters was larger, with nine officers and fort y-ni ne enlisted
men, but had simi lar functions. Planners did not authorize headquarters detachments for e ither the infantry or field arti llery brigade.2t
Plans To Organize More Divisions

While Pershing and Baker investigated the organizational requirements for
the expeditionary forces , steps were taken to expand the Army at home. These
measures included the forma tion of al l 117 Regular Army regiments authori zed
in the Nationa l Defense Act of 1916 and the drafting of the National Guard inlO
federal service and of 500,000 men through a se lective service system. Draftees
were to fi ll oul Regular Army and National Guard units and to provide manpower
for new units. Organizations formed with all selective service personne l eventually became "Nationa l Army" units. Although the War Department was unsure of
ei ther the fi na l structure of the infantry division or the number of di visions need-
CHART 4--lnfantry Division, 8 August 1917
THE TEST- WORLD WAR I
57
ed, it decided to organize 32 infantry div isions immediately, 16 in the National

Gua rd and 16 in the National Army. T he Army co ntemplated no additional
Regular Army divi sions. Alt hough existi ng Regu lar Army regimen ts cou ld be
shipped overseas and organized into divisions if necessary, most regu lars were
needed to direct and train the new army. Un like past wars, draftees rather than
volunteers would ri ght World War 1.22
To organize National Guard and Nat io nal Army d iv isions, the Army Staff
adopted extant plans. For the Guard it used the Militia Bureau's scheme developed followin g the passage of the National Defense Act , and for the National
Army it turned to a con tingency plan drawn up in February 1917 to guide the
employment of draftees. Divisions in both components had geographic bases. As
far as practicable, the area that supported a Gua rd division coincided w ith a
National Army divis ional area.23
The thirty- two new divisions nceded traini ng areas, but the Army had o nly
one faci lity large enough to train a division , Camp Fu nston, a subpost of Fort
Ri ley, Kansas. Therefore, the stafT in structed terri torial commanders to select
an additional thirty-two areas, each large cnough to house and train a division.
Early in the summer Secrctary Baker approved leasing the sites. To save money,
he dec ided to bu il d ten t cit ies fo r the Nationa l Guard div isions in the sout hern
states, where w inte rs were lcss severe, whi le camps fo r Nationa l Army div isions, which were to have permanent bui ldings, were located wit hin the geog raph ic areas that supported them.24
Establishing a tentative occu pancy date of I Septem ber, the Quartermaster
Corps began constructing the train ing areas in June. It designed each site to
accommodate a th ree-brigade division as called for under the prewar tables of
organizat ion. W hen Bli ss approved the squa re di vision in August, the ca mps
ha d to be modificd to ho use t he larger in fa ntr y regime nt s. Although t he
cha nges delaycd completion of the tra ining areas, the Iroops' arri val date, I
September, remained firm. 2S
The War College Division and the adj utant general created yet anot her system for designating divisions and brigades and their assigned elements. Divisions
were to be numbered I through 25 in the Regu lar Army, 26 th rough 75 in the
National Guard, and 76 and above in the National Army. Withi n the Regular
Army numbers, mounted or dismounted cava lry divisions were to begi n with the
number 15. The National Defense Act of 1916 provided fo r sixty-five Regu lar
Army infantry regimen ts, including a regiment from Puerto Rico. From those
units, excluding the ones overseas, the War Depart ment could organize thirteen
infantry divisions in addit ion to the 1st Expedi tionary Div ision a lready in France.
Th is arrangement exp lains the decision to begin numbering Regular Army cavalry divisions with the digit 15. The system did not specify the procedure fo r numbering National Guard or Nat ional Army caval ry divisions. It reserved blocks of
numbers for infantry, caval ry, and fie ld arti llery brigades, with I through 50 allotled to the Regu lar Army, 51 through 150 to the National Guard, tilld 15 1 and
58
MANEUVER AND FIR EPOWE R
above to the National Army. The designation of each Guard or Nationa l Army
unit, if rai sed by a single stale, was to have that slale's name in parentheses.
Soldiers in National Guard and National Army units were a lso to wea r disti nctive
collar insigni a showing their componcnl. 26
As the summer of 191 7 advanced, the War Department announced additional d etails. In July it identified s peci fi c slates to suppo r! the first s ixtee n
National Gua rd and the first s ixteen Nationa l Army divisions and desig nated
the camps where they woul d tra in . At that lime the department announced that
the designat ions of the Nationa l Guard 's 51h through 20th Di visions were to be
changed to the 26t h throug h the 41 51 to conform with the new numbering system. In August the adjutant general p laced the 76th through the 9 1st Di visio ns,
National Army units, on the roll s of the Army and announced the appoint men t
of commanders for both Nationa l Guard and N<l lio nal Army divisions. In addi tio n to t he 1st Ex peditio na ry Divi sio n in France, the Wa r Co ll ege Di v is io n
adopted plans to o rgani ze six more Regular Army di vis io ns. No p lans were
made to concentrate their div is io nal e lements for trai ning, but they were to be
brough t up to strength with draftees.27
When the initia l planning phase for more divisions close(~ the mobiliza tion
program encompassed 38 divisions-16 National Gua rd, 16 National Army, and
6 Regular Army. With these, exclus ive of the 1st Ex ped itio nary Di v ision in
France. redesig nated o n 6 Ju ly as the 1st Di vision, the War Department met
Pershing's requirement fo r th irty divisions. The divisions in excess of Pershing's
needs were to be held in the United States as replacement unit s.
Organizing th e Divisions
Between 22 August 1917 and 5 January 19 18. the Army Staff authorized
o ne cavalry and three addi tional infan try di visions, for a tota l of fo rty-t hree
d iv isions. But establi shing these uni ts proved a monumental task fo r which the
Army was woefully unp repa red . Besides un fi n is hed training areas a nd the
absence of a system for classifying new recrui ts as they entered service. the
Army faced a shortage o f equipmen t and officers. T he quartermaster ge neral
cla imed that the only items of clothing he expeetC(1 to be avai lable to outfit the
National Army men were hats and cotton undershirts. Except fo r a hand fu l o f
Regular Army officers, the Na tio nal Army made do wit h newly m inted officers
fresh rrom twe lve weeks o f training.28
Fonn<ltion of the new Army nevertheless began with the organization o fl he
Nationa l Guard di visions. In August Guard unit s, which had been drafted into
federa l service and te mporarily housed in state camps and armories, reported to
their designated training camps and formed divisions in agreement with the 3
May tables. During September a nd October the div ision commanders reorganized the unit s to eon rorm to th e new sq uare con fi g uration as the 26th through
4 1st Di visions (Table 3).
TABLE 3
Geographi c Distribution of
Nat ional Guard Div isions, World War I
Old
New
Desigl/(/(iol1
Desig nalioll
5th
261h
Geographic Area
MOline. New Hampshire,
Ca lllP
Greene. N.C.!
Vermont , Massachusetts,
6th
71h
81h
27th
28th
29th
Rhode Island, and

Connecticut
New York
Pennsylva nia
New Jersey, Virginia,
Maryland. Delaware,2 and
District of Columbia
91h
30th
Tennessee, NOl1h
10th
3 1s1
11th
32d
12th
[3 th
33d
34th
14th
15th
35th
161h
17th
18 th
36th
37th
38th
391h
19th
40lh
20th
41st
Carolina, and South

Carolina
Georg ia, A labama, and
Florida
Michigan and Wisconsin
Illinoi s
Minnesota, Iowa.
Ne braska. Nort h Dakota,
and South Dakota
Missouri and Kansas
Texas and Oklahoma
Ohio and West VirginiaJ
Louisiana. Mississippi .
and Arkansas
Caliromia, Nevada. Utah,
Colorado, Arizona, and
New Mexico
Washington, Oregon,
Montana, and Wyoming
Wadsworth, S.C.
Hancoc k, Ga.
McClellan , Ala.
Sevier, S.c.
Whee ler, Ga.

MlIcA rthur, Tex.
Logan, Tex.
Cody.N.M.
Don iphan, Okla.

Bowie, Tex .
Sheridan, Ala.
Shelby, Miss.
Beauregard, Miss.
Keamy. Calif.
Fremont , Calif.4
I Di vision conccnlmled al various locations in Ncw England.

2 Delaware troops relicvcd rrom the di vision 8 Janua ry 1918.
) Reassigned 10 the 381h Division.

4 Camp changed from Camp Fremont. Cal ifonlia, 10 Camp Grecilc. North Carolina .
60
MANEUVER AN D FI REPQW ER
At thaI time division commanders broke up many historic slale regiments 10

meet the required organi zations in the new tabl es, a measure that incensed the
states and the uni ts thcmsclves.29
The hi stori es of the 26 th and 4 1st Di vision s were somewhat difTe rc nt.
Decid ing 10 send another division to France as soon as possible, on 22 August
Secretary Baker ordered Brig. Gen. C lare nce E. Edwa rds, commander of the
Northeaste rn De pa rtmen t, to o rganize the 26th Divis ion in slate ca mps and
armories under the sqll(lrc tables. Without assembli ng as a unit , the 26th departed
Ihe following month for France, where it underwent training. To accelerate the
formation of the 4 151 Division, its tmining site was shifted from Cam p Fremont,
California, which needed a sewage system, to Camp Greene, North Caro lina .
Maj . Gen. Hunter Liggett took over the camp on 18 September and the next day
o rganized the 4 1st under the 8 August tables. In October its first increment of
troops departed for France.30
Be fore the 26th Di v is io n went ove rseas in Se pte mber, many stat es had
wanted the honor of havi ng th eir units become the first in France and pressed
Bake r and the War Depa rtmen t fo r that ass ig nment. To stop the clamor, Baker
proposed to Bli ss that he cons ider sending a di vis ion to Europe represe nti ng
many stales. Maj. Douglas MacArth ur, a Genera l Staff officer, had earlier suggested Ihat when Gua rd di visions adopted the new tab les some militia unit s
wou ld become s urplu s an d mi gh t be g rou ped as a division. MacA rth ur
described the div ision as a " rainbow," covering the entire mltio n. After consulting Brig . Gen. William A. Mann, Chie f of the Militi a Bureau, the War College
Division drafted a scheme to orga ni ze such a di vis ion wi th surplu s units from
twenty-s ix states and the Dislrict of Col umbia. On 14 August the 42d Div ision
was p laced on the ro lls o f the Army, and six days late r its units began arriving
at Camp Mi lls, New York , eventua lly a trans ien t faci lity for soldiers going to
Fra ncc. Th e fo ll owing mo nt h Ma nn , who was reass ig ned from the Militia
Bu reau and a ppo in ted the di v ision co mm a nde r, organized the " Rainbow
Divisio n," wh ich sa il ed for France a few weeks later)1
The o rganization of the sixteen National Army divisions also began in August
when the designated division commanders, a ll Regular Army officers, and officer
cadres reported to the ir respecti ve training camps. Immed iate ly th ereafter th e
commanders establi shed the 76th through the 9 1st Di visions and a depot brigade
for eac h (Table 4). 32 On 3 Se pt em ber th e first d raftees a rri ved . The depo t
brigades processed the new draftees while the divisions began a rigorous training
progra m. Many of these men , however, quickly beca me fillers for National Guard
and Regular Army units going overseas, one of the reasons that National Army
divisions were unready for combat for many months))
One Regu lar Army infantry division, the 2d, was organi zed in France. When
the first troops deployed, the U.S. Mari ne Corps wanted a share of the action, and
Secretary Baker agreed that two Ma ri ne regiments shou ld serve wit h the Army.
The 5th Marines sai led with the 1st Expedit iona ry Di vision, and Pershing assigned
61
THE TEST- WORLD WAR 1

TABLE 4
Geographic Distribu tion of National Army Div isions

World War I
Geograpflic Area
Desig ll(l/iOIl
76th
77th
78th
79th
80th
81st
82d
83d
84th
85th
86th
87th
88th
89th
90th
91st
Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont,

Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
and ConnecticlIt
Metropolitan New York City
New York and northern Pennsylvania
Southern Pennsylvania
New Jersey, Virgi nia, Maryland,
Delaware, and District ofCol tl1nbia
Tennessee, North Carolina,
and Sout h Carolina
Georgia, A labama, and Florida
Ohio and West Virginia
Camp
Devens, Mass.
Uplon, N.Y.
Dix, N.J .
Meade, Md.
Lee, Va.
Jackson, S.c.
Gordon, Ga.
Sherman, Ohio
Taylor, Ky.
Custer, Mich.
Illinois
Grant, 111.
Arkansas, Louisiana.-:md Mississippi

Minnesota, Iowa, Ne braska,
North Dakota, lind South Dakota
Missouri , Kansas, and Colorado
Texas, Oklllhoma, Arizona, and
New Mexico
Washington, Oregon, Californ ia,
Nevada, Utah, [daho, Montana,
and Wyoming
Pike, Ark.
Dodge, Iowa
Funston, Kans.
Travis, Tex.
Lewis, Wash.
them as secu rity detachments and labor troops in France. Shortly thereafter he
advised the War Department that the marines did not fit into his organizational
plans and recommended that they be converted to Army troops. The mari nes, however, continued 10 press for a combat role. Eventually the Departments of War and
the Navy agreed that two Regular Army infantry regiments, init ially programmed
as lines of communi cation troops, and the two Marine regiments (one serving in
France and one from the United States) should form the core of the 2d Division.
The adjutant general informed Pershing of the decision, and Brig. Gen. Charles A.
Doyen, U.S. Marine Corps, organized the 2d Divis ion on 26 October 19 17 at
Bourmont, Haute-Marne, France. The division eventually included the 3d Infantry
Brigade (the 9th and 23d Infantry and the 3d Machi ne Gun Battal ion), the 4th
Marine Brigade (the 51h and 6th Marines and the 6th Machine Gun Batta lion
[Marines]), the 2d Fi eld Artillery Brigade, and support units.34
62
Draftees (h'ill ;/1 civilial1
c/olhe~;.
Camp U,JlOIi. New )'Ol'k.
T he 3d throug h the 8th Di v is ions, Regular A rmy un it s, were orga ni zed

between 2 1 November 19 17 and 5 January 191 8 in the United Stales. Of these
d ivisions, only the 4 th and 8th assembl ed and trained as un its before go ing over
seas because the Guard and Nationa l Army uni ts occupied the div isional tra ining
.. ..cas. The 4th replaced the 4 151 Division at Camp Greene, and the 8th occupied
Ca mp Frem ont upon its completi o n. To fi ll the div is io ns, parti a ll y tra ined
draftees were transfe rred fro m Nationa l Army units, a process thai eroded the
concept of the three sepa rate com pone nt s- the Regul ar Army. the Nation al
Gua rd, and the National Army.35

As the three-component idea deteriorated, Baker di scussed the elimination o r
sllch distinctions altogether with Scott and Bliss. The o ff icers opposed the action,
be lieving it would underm ine the loca l pride that Nati ona l Guard and Nationa l
Army uni ts ex hi bited. General Peyton C. March, who had served as Army Chie f
o f Sta fT since the spring of 19 18, disagreed . He announced that the nation had but
one army, the United States Army, and di scontin ued the distinctive names and
insig nia fo r the three components. A fte r 7 August 19 18, all sold iers, including
those in di v isions, wore th e co ll ar in s ig nia o f the Un ited S ta te s Ar my.
Nevertheless, the men still considered their divisions as belong ing to the Regular
Army, the National G u a r{~ o r the Nati onal Anny,36
A ll-bl ack units compri sed II spec ial category o f troops. T he draft of th e
TI-IETEST- WORLDWAR 1
63
Camp Meat/e. MmY/(lIld. 1917
National Guard included some black units, and the War Department directed the
orga ni zat ion of addit ional regiments if sufficient numbe rs of black dl'artees
reported to National Army cam ps. In October t 917 Secretary Baker ordered the
units at Camps Funston, Grant, Dodge, Sherman, Dix , Upton, and Meade to form
the 92d Division. Brig. Gen. Charles C. Ballou organized a division headquarters
at Camp Fun ston lalcr Ihat month, but the division did not assemble or train in
the United States. The followin g June the 92d moved to France and first saw
combat in the Lorraine area)?
After the organization of the 921 there remained the equivalent of four black
infantry regiments in the United States, and the staff anticipated that their personnel would serve as replacements for the 92d or lines of com munication troops in
France. For admini strative purposes , these black troo ps were orga n ized in
December 1917 as the 185th and 186th Infantry Brigades. Shortly thereafter the
Headquarters, 93d Division (Provisional), a small admini strative unit , was organized. Never intended to be a tactica l unit , it simp ly exercised admin istrative control over the two brigades while they underwent training.38
Puerto Ricans com pri sed another segregated group in the Army, and the
General Staff gave special consideration to them when organizing divisions. Initially
it planned a provisional Puerto Rican division using the prewar tables that called for
three infantry brigades, but that idea was soon dropped. Instead, the War Plans
64
MANEUVER AND FIRE POWER
Division, which had succeeded the War College Division, endorsed the creation of a
Spani sh-speaking square division (Jess the fie ld artillery brigade), to be designated
the 94th Division. Maj. Gen. William J. Snow, Ch ief of Field Arti llery, opposed the
orgrmizalion orthe fiel d artillery brigade because the Army lacked Spanish-speaking instructors and an artillery traini ng area in Puerto Rico. He be lieved that a
brigade could be furn ished from artillery units in the Un ited Slates. Others opposed
fo rmal'ion of the division on ethn ic grounds, arguing that Puerto Ricans might not
do well in combat. Proponents countered that good leadership would guamntee

good performance in combat. The slaff worked oul a comprom ise. The divisional
designation was to be withheld, but the organization of the divisional elements was
to proceed. The infantry regiments were assigned numbers 373 through 376, which
would have been associated with the National Army's 94th Division. During the war
the Army organized only three of those regiments, with approxi matcly 17,000
Puerto Rican draftees, but never for med the 94th Division itsel[39
Pershing ignored French and Briti sh recommendations that caval ry divisions
not be sent to France. Himself a cavalryman, the genera l decided that he migh t
use such a force as a mobile reserve. After ail, both Allies still hoped for a breakthrough a nd maintained 30,000 to 40,000 mounted troops to exp loit such an
opportun ity. Most of the Regu la r Army cavalry regiments, however, had been
scattered in small detachments along the Mex ican bordcr and had furnished pcrsonnel fo r overseas du ty. The cavalry arm needed to be rebu ilt . That process
began when the secretary of wa r approved the formation of the 15 th Cavalry
Division. On 10 Decembcr 1917, Maj . Gen. George W. Reed organized its headquart ers at Fort Bli ss, Texas; the 1st Cava lry Bri gade at Fort Sa m Houston, Texas;
the 2d Brigade at Bliss, Texas; and the 3d at Doug las, Arizona. The d ivision had
two mi ssions: to prepare for combat in France and to patrol the Mexican border.40
T he breakup of thc 15th Cava lry Division began shortly after its formation.
Responding to Pershi ng's req uest for army corps troops, the War Departmen t
detached the division's 6t h and 15th Cava lry and sent them to France. Because of
the paucity of cavalry units, they werc not replaced in the division. In May 1918
Maj. Gen. Wi llard Holbrook, the Southern Department commander, informed the
chief o f staff of the Army that the situation on the border required the remai nder
of the d ivision to rema in therc. Holbrook further stalcd that border-patrol work
cou ld be improved if the divisiona l organization were abandoned. On 12 May the
division headquarters was demobilized, but the div ision's three cavalry brigades
continued to serve on the border until July 1919, when their headquarters were
also demobilized. With the demobilization of the division, Pershing's hope for a
cava lry div ision died . Baker informed him that a ll remaining mou nted troops
were needed in the United Slates. 41
When the first phase of the mobilization ended on 5 January 1918, the Army
had 42 infantry divis ions, I short-lived cava lry di vision, and I provisional divi
sion of 2 infantry brigades. A ll di visions were in various stages of tra in ing.
Shortages of uniforms, weapons, and equipment remained acute.
TH E TEST- WORLD WAR I
65
Expansion of the Divisional Forces

By the spring of 1918 Pershing had requested more divisions than he had outlined in the General Organization Project because the All ies' fortun es had drastically changed. Russia had been forced out of the war, and the Brit ish and French
armies had begun to show the st rain of manpower losses sustai ned since 1914.
Alt hough Germany also fe lt the effects of the long war, it was busy transferring
troops from the now deFunct Eastern Front to the West for one final offensive.
Alarmed, the Allies wanted 100 U.S. Army divisions as soon as possible. Wi thin
the War Department the request caused considerable debate as to its feasibi lity,
particularly with regard to raw materia ls, production, and shipp ing of war suppl ies. Only in July did President Wi lson approve a plan to mount a 98-division
force by the end of 1919, 80 for France and 18 in reserve in the United States. 42
Durin g the debate over force structure, the War Plans Division considered
whether the additional di visions should be Regular Army or National Army uni ts.
Not all Regular Army infantry regiments authorized under the Nat ional Defense
Act of 1916 had been assigned to divisions, th us raisi ng the question of why
those reg imen ts shou ld exist. The War Plans Division recommended that the
Regular Army infantry regiments become the nuclei of the next group of d ivisions, which would be completed with Nationa l Army units. The National Army
units would pass out of existence after the war.43
In July 19 18 Secretary Baker approved the organ ization of twelve more d ivisions. Regular Army infantry regiments in the United States and from Hawaii and
Panama fo rm ed the core of the 9th through 20th Divisions (Table 5).44 These
divisions, organized between 17 July and I September, occupied camps vacated
by Nationa l Guard and Nati o na l Army divisions tha t had gone to France.
Conforming to Pershing's fi xed army corps idea, the 11th and 17th Divisions
were scheduled to be replacement and school divisions, while the 14th and 20th
were programmed as base and training divisions. The only change in these d ivisions from the others was in their arti llery. The I I th and 17th had one regiment
eac h of 3- inch ho rse-draw n gu ns, 4.7- inch motorized howitzers, and 6- inch
motorized howitzers, wh ile the 14th and 20th each had one 3-inch gu n regiment
carried on trucks, one regiment of 3- inch ho rse-drawn guns, and o ne regiment of
6-inch motori zed howitzers. These artillery units were to be detached from the
divisions and serve as corps arti llery, except the 3-i nch gun regiment carried on
trllcks, which was to serve as part of army artillery.45
As the Army Staff perfected plans to organize addi tional Regular Army divisions, steps had been taken to assure adequate mil itary forces in Hawaii. On I
June 19 18, the president ca lled the two infantry regime nts from the Hawa ii
Nat ional Guard into federal service, and they repl aced units that had transferred
to the Uni ted States from Schofield Barracks and Fort Shaft er.46
The Phil ippine Islands also proved to be a potential source of manpower for
fighting World War I. When the United States entered the confl ict, the Ph ilippine
66

TABLE 5
Expansion of Divisional Forces, 19 18

Division
COII/pollent
Camp
9th
10lh
RA and NA
RA and NA
Sheridan, Ala.
11th
RA
RA
RA
RA
Meade, Md.
12th
13th
14th
151h
16th
17 th
181h
19th
20th
95th
96th
97th
981h
99th
100th
lOis!
t02d
and
and
and
and
NA
NA
NA
NA
Funston, Kans.
Devens, Mass.
RA and NA
RA and NA
Lewis, Wash.
Custer, Mich.
Logan, Tex.
Kearny, Calif.
Beauregard, La.
RA and NA
RA and NA
RA and NA
Travis, Tex.
Dodge, Iowa
Sevier, S,c.
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Sherman, Ohio
Wadsworth, N.Y.
itA and NA
Cody,N.M.
McClellan, Ala.
Wheeler, Ga.
Bowie, Tex.
Shelby, Miss.
Dix , N.J.
people offered to raise a volunteer infantry division to be a pari of American forces.

The offer was declined, but Congress authorized federal izing the Philippine Militia
to replace U.S. Army uni ts if necessary. Nine days aOcr thc armistice President
Wilson orde red nascent militia into federal service for training, and the 1st
Division , Philippi ne National Guard, was organized under the prewar divisional
structure. The division, however, lacked many of its requ ired units, and its headquarters was mustered out of federal service on 19 December 191 8.47
There were also two Regu lar Army nondi visiona l in fantry regiments in the
Phi lippi ne Islands. [n July 191 8 they joi ned an international force for service in
Siberia. To bring the regiments to war strength, 5,000 well-trained infantrymen from
the 8th Division at Camp Fremont, California, joined the Siberian Expcdition.48
In July 19 18 Secreta ry Baker approved fina l expansion of divisional forces,
which involved black draftees. The plan required black uni ts to replace sixteen
white pioneer infantry regiments serving in France. These white units were to be
organ ized into eight in fantry brigades and eventually be assigned to divisions partially raised in the United States. By II November the War Department had organized portions of the 95th through the 102d Divisions in the United States (see
Table 5), but the brigades in France had not been organized.49
T HE TEST- WO RLD WAR I
67
Divisional Changes
The General Staff had approved several changes in the August 1917 struclure when the Army began to organize the last group of infantry divisions for
World War I. Changes included reduc ing the di vision's reserve machine gun
battalion from a four-company organization to a two-company unit and
increasi ng the infantry bri gade's machine gun battalions from three to fou r
compa ni es. Altho ugh the total number of machine g un uni ts remained th e
same, the real ignment afforded better comma nd and control withi n the infan try
brigades. More Signal Corps men were added, and more motorized ambulances
were provided for the sanitary train s. Us ually each modifi cat ion brought a
change in th e strength of the division, which by Nove mbe r 1918 stood at
28, I 05 officers and enlisted men.50
The demands of combat led to severa l changes in divisional weapons. The
French agreed to rep lace all U.S. 3-inch guns with their 75-mm . guns in excha nge
for supplies of ammunition. The 3- inch Stokes mortars, optiona l weapons in the
infantry regiment , were made permanent. To defend the division against enemy
ai rplanes, antiaircraft machine guns were authorized in the field arti llery regiments. The most signi fi cant change, however, involved machine guns and automatic rifles. In September 1918 elements of the 79th and 80th Divi sions used
new machine guns and au tomat ic rifl es invented by John M. Browning. The
Browning water-cooled machine gun was a lighter, more rel iable weapon than
eit her the British Vickers or the French Hotchkiss, and the Browning automatic
rine (BA R) surpassed the Briti sh Lewis and French Chauchat in reliabili ty. New
Browning weapons, however, were not <lvailable in sufficient quantities fo r all
d ivisions before the end of the war.51
Pershing fo rmally modified the di vision staff during the wa r. In February
1918 he adopted the European functi onal staff, which he had been tentatively
using since the summer of 191 7. Under that system the staff consisted of five
sect ions: 0 - 1 (personnel), 0~2 (intel ligence), G- 3 (operations), G-4 (supply),
and 0 - 5 (training). Each section coord inated all activ ities wi thi n its sphere and
reported directly to the chi ef of staff, thereby re liev ing the commander of many
rouline deta ils.52
Pershing and his stafr also changed plans for assembling army corps to meel
conditions in France. When four divisions had arrived in France, the 1st, 2d, 26th ,
and 42d, the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) staff began planning a corps
replacement and school division. After reviewing the re<ldiness status of the divisions, the statT recommended that the 42d be reorgani zed as the rep lacement and
school unit. Pershing di sagreed. For poli tical reasons, the " Rainbow" Divi sion
had to be a combat unit. Also, he did nol agree that the army corps required a
replacement and school unit at that time; he wanted a base and training division
to receive and process replacements. For that job he selected the 41 st Division,
which hadjllst begllnto arrive in France.53
68
MAN EUVER AND FIREPOWER
Shortly thereafte r Pershing revised the replacement syste m for the AEF.
Instead of relying Oil a replacement and school di vision and a base and training
d ivision for each army corps, he split the replacement fun ction between the army
corps and the "communications zone," the area immediately behi nd the ballle~
fie ld controlled by the "Servi ce of the Rear." In the com munication s zone a depot
(base and tra ining) di vision would process personnel into the thealer, whi le a
replacement (replacement and sc hool) division in each army corps distributed
new personnel to the ir units. He assigned the 41 sl Division to the Service of the
Rear ( lalcr the Serv ices o f Supply) as a depot divis ion, which was to receive,
t rain , equ ip , a nd forward replacements ( both officers and en lis ted men) to
rep lacemen t divisions of th e corps, and designated the 32d Di vision as the I
Army Corps' replacement unit. But when the German offensive began along the
Somme (2 1 March to 6 April 19 18), the 32d Division was assigned to combat
dUly. To chan nel replacements from the depot division to their ass igned units,
each army corps instead establi shed a replacement battal ion. The depot div ision
processed casuals into the theater, and the replacement batta lions forward ed them
to the unit s. The 41 st served as the depot divis ion for the AEF L1ntil July 1918. No
replacement division was organ ized during World War 1.54
The German offensive on the Somme upset Pershing's organ izational plans. He
offered all American divisions to the French Army. The 1st, 2d, 26th, and 42d
Divisions were sent to variolls quiet sectors of the line, and they and more recent
arrival s d id not come under Pershing's control until late in the s ummer of 191 8. He
also placed the fo ur regiments of the black 93d Division (Provisional) at the d isposal of the French with the understanding that they wou ld be returned to his control
upon request. The French quickly reorgani zed and equipped the regiments under
their tables of organization. Although they were to be relmned 10 Pershing's control
after the crisis, they remained with French units until the end of the war. The headquarters oflhe provisional93d Division was disconti nued in May 191 8.55
The Army and the nation did not have enough ships to transport forces to
France, and this lack was a major obstacle to the war e ffort. After lengthy discussions in early 1918, the Brit ish agreed to transport infantry, mach ine gun , signal,
and engineer units for six divisions in their ships. Upon arriva l in France, these
un its were to trai n with the Briti sh. The divisional artillery and trai ns were to be
s hipped when space became available, and they were to tra in in American train ing
areas. T he Briti sh executed the prog ram in the early spring of 191 8, eventually
moving the 4th, 27th, 281h, 30th , 33d, 35th, 77th, 78th, 80th, and 82d Divisions. By
June 1918 the nation's transport capabi lity had increased marked ly. In addition, the
adoption of the convoy system g reatly reduced the effect of German submarines,
allowing the number of divisions in France to rise rapidly (Table 6).56
As more divisions arri ve(~ Pershi ng revamped his ideas about the army corps.
He made it a command co nsisting of a headquarters, corps art illery, techn ical
troops, and div isions. The divisions and technical troops could be varied for each
specific operation. Under his system, pattcrned after the French, the army corps
THE TEST- WORLD WAR I
69
165,h Illfallll)" 42(/ Division, ill trencltes, Jlllle 19/8
became a more mobile, fl exible command. The concept also took advantage of
the limited number of American divisions in the theater, shifting them among
army corps as needed. Eventually, Pershing organized seven army corps.
To mainta in them, the 39th, 40th, 41 st, 76th, 83d, and 85th Divisions served
as depot organizations. The 3 151 Div ision was slated to become the seventh depot
division but never acted in that ro le, having been broken up for needed rep lacements. Because depot divisions needed on ly cadres to operate, most of the personnel , except For men in the field arti llery brigades, were also d istri buted to
combat div isions as replacemen ts. After addit ional training, the field art illery
brigades assigned to the 41 st, 76th, 83d, and 85 th Divisions saw combat primarily
as army corps arti llery_ Those assigned to the 39th and 40t h were sti ll training
when the fighti ng ended. 57
When the Services of Su pply reorganized the 83d and 85th Divisions as
depot unit s, some of their elements were used as special expeditionary forces.
The 332d Infant ry and 33 1st Field Hospita l, elements of the 83d Divis ion, partie
ipated in the Vittorio Veneto campaign on the Italian fron t during October and
November 1918. The 3391h Infantry; the 1st Battal ion, 3 10th Engineers; the
337th Ambulance Company; and the 337t h Field Hospital of the 85th constituted
the American cont ingent of th e Mu rmansk Ex ped ition , whic h served under
Briti sh command in North Russia from September 1918 to July 1919.58
TABL E 6
Dep loymen t of Division s to France
Divisioll
1st
2d
3d
4th
51h
61h
7th
8th
26th
27th
28th
29th
30th
3 1st
32d
33d
34th
35th
36th
37th
38th
39th
40th
41 st
42d
76th
77th
78th
79th
80th
S i st
82d
83 d
84th
85th
86th
87t h
88th
89th
90th
9 1sl
921
93<1
Dales of Movement Over.I'ells
Remarks
June-December 191 7
September 191 7- March 1918

March- June 19 18
May- June 191 8
March- June 19 18
Organ ized in France

Bri tish shipping progra m
June-July 191 8
July- September 19 18
November 19 18
Septem ber 19 17- January 191 8
May- July 19 18
April- Ju ne 1918
Headquarters only
British shipping program
June-Jul y 1918
May- June 191 8

September- November 19 18
January- March 19 18

Skeletonized
May- June 191 8
Brit ish shipping program

Ske letonized
September- October 1918

April- June 191 8
July- August 191 8
June-Jul y 19 18
September- October 19 18
August- September 19 18
July- September 191 8
November 19 17- February 191 8
October- December 19 17
Jul y- August 19 18
March- May 19 18
May- Ju ne 19 18
Jul y- August 1918
May- June 19 18
Jul y- August 191 5
April- Ju ly 19 15
June-A ugust 191 8
August- October 19 18
Jul y- August 19 18
September- October 191 8
June- September 19 18
Aug ust- September 19 18
June- July 19 18
June- July 19 18
June- Ju ly 19 18
Ju ne- July 19 18
December 19 17- A pri11 9 18
Skeletonized
Depot, later skeletonized
Depot
Depot
Depot
British shippi ng program
British shippi ng program
British shippi ng progra m
Depot
Depot, Iflter skeletonized
Depot
Ske letonized
Broke n up for Iflborcrs
Prov isionuluJlit,
d iscont inued Mfly 19 18
T HE TEST- WO RLD WA R 1
71
Heavy losses during the g reatest American involvement in World War I, the
Meuse-Argonne campa ig n that bega n on 26 September 191 8, created a need for
additional replacements. One week of combat left di visions so depleted that
Pershing ordered personnel from the 84th and 86th Divisio ns, which had just
arrived in France, to be used as replacement s.59 The arrangement was supposed to be tempora ry, and at fi rst only men from infantry and machine gun
un its served as replacemen ts. Eventually a ll di vi sional personn el were swallowed up, except for one enli sted man per company and one officer per regimen t who mai ntained unit records. The manpower shortage persisted . On 17
October the 3 151 Division, programmed as the depot division, was skeletonized
and it s me n used as repla ceme nt s. The 34t h and 38 th Divi sion s were al so
stripped of the ir men as they arrived from the United States. Nevertheless, the
h igh casua lty rale took a to ll on a ll combat units, and Pershing slashed the
authorized strength of infant ry and machine g un companies from 250 to 175
en listed men, the reby temporarily reduci ng each di v isi on by 4 ,000 men.
Smaller combal div isions, however, conducted some of the fi ercest fig hting of
the war- attacks agai nst the enemy 's fortified positions on the hill s between the
Argonn e Forest and the Meuse River.60
While scrambling for personnel, Pershing again reorgani zed the replacement
system , trying to improve its responsiveness to the nexible army corps and army
organizations. Army corps replacement battal ions fa iled because d ivisions left the
corps so rapid ly that the battalions were unabl e to keep up with them. There fore,
he ordered the 40th and 85th Divisions to serve as regional replacement depots
for the First and Second Arm ies, respectively, and the 41 sl and 83 d as depot divisions in the Services o f Supply. The other two depot di visions, the 39th and 76th,
were stripped of their personnel. T he rep lacement system , however, rema ined
unsatisfa ctory to the end of the war.61
Di visions in France al so suffered from a shortage of animals for transport. As
the quartermaster general had pred icted in 1917 , uni ts never had more than ha lf
the transportation authori zed in their tables of organi zation for lack of an imals. In
some divisions artillerymen moved their pieces by hand . To overcome the shortage, Pershing's staff planned to motorize the 155-mm. howitzer regiments and
one regiment of 75 -mm . guns in each d iv ision . By November 1918, however,
on ly eleven ISS-mill. howitzer regiments had been thus eq uipped.62
Troop shortages also hit support units. During the fall of 1918 the commander of the Services of Supply, Maj. Gen. James G . Harbord, requested personnel
from three combat di visions for labor units in hi s com mand. On 17 September
Pershing's headquarters reassigned three divisions schedu led to arrive from the
United States to Harbord. On ly one of these, the 87th, reported before the end o f
the fi ghti ng, and it was broken up for labo rers in the Services of Supply.63
Handicapped by the scarcity of men and anima ls, Pershing sought ways to
make divisions more effective combat uni ts . In October 191 8 he adv ised new
division commanders to lise their personalit ies to increase the patriotism, morale,
72
Traffic cOllgeslioll ill Ihe A'golllle. November 1918
and fighting spirit of their men. One way to deve lop un it esprit, Pershing suggested, was for divisions to adopt di stinctive cloth shoulder sleeve insign ia. At that
lime the 8 1st Division had already begun using slIch insignia. On his return to the
United States aftcr visiting the Western Fron t in the fall of 191 7, the div ision
com mand er, Maj. Ge n. Charl es J. Bailey, had autho ri zed a shou lde r sleeve
insignia for his unit. He instructed the men not to wear the patch until after leaving the Un ited States . When the div ision arrived in France, the insignia carne to
Pershi ng's attention . Bai ley explained thai no official sanct ion existed for the
em bl em, but that it c reated comradcs hip among the me n, helped to deve lop
esprit, and aided in controlling small units in open warfare. Persh ing apparently
liked the idea for he o rdered a ll d ivisions to adopt shoulder sleeve insignia.
Within a short time the other divisions had their own shoulder patches, many
adopting their d iv isional property symbols. A long with the insignia, the men
began 10 adopt divisional nicknames, such as " Big Red One" and "Wi ldcat" for
the I st and 81 sl Divi sions, respective ly.64
Comba t, particul arly in the Meuse-A rgonne campaign , tested the assumptions that lay behind the large square divis ion. Designed to conduct susta ined
frontal attacks, not maneuver, it was thought to possess tremendous firepower
and endurance. The division's firepower, however, proved ineffective. The lack of
wire and the continual movement of in fantry units in the offensive hindered communications between in fant ry and artillery. In addition, the French transportation
THE T EST- WORLD WAR J
73
network could handl e on ly so many men, guns, and suppl ies. Traffic congest ion
bogged down the movement of uni ts and also prevented communication. When
divisions were on Ihe line they su ffered from Ihe lack o f food, ammunition, and
other supplies. Part of the logistical probl ems also rested with a d iv ision's lack of
combat service troops to carry rations, bu ry the dead, and evacuate casualties.65
By Armistice Day, 11 November 1918, the Army had fi elded 1 cavalry d ivision, I prov isional infantry division, and 62 infantry divisions. Of this total , 42
infantry divisions and the prov isional division deployed to Europe (see nlble 6),
with o ne, the 8th Division, not arriving until aftcr the fighting had ended. On the
Western Front in France, 29 division s (7 Regular Army, I I National Guard, and
II National Army) foug ht in combat. Of the others, 7 served as depot divisions, 2
of which were skeleton ized, and 5 were stripped of their personnel for replacements in combat un its, laborers in rear areas, or expeditionary fo rces in North
Russia or Italy. The provisional black division was broken up, but its four infant ry
regiments saw combat. Starting from a limited mobilization base, this buildup,
lasting eigh teen months, was a remarkable achi evement.
Despite the d ifficulties , Worl d War I brought about mo re coordinati o n
among the combat arms, combat support, and comba t service organizations in
the infantry division than ever before. Infantry cou ld not advance without support from engineers and art illery; arti llery could not con tinue to fire without a
constan t supply of ammunition. Transportation and sign al un its prov ided the
vital materiel and com mand connections, while medical units adm inistered to
the needs of the wounded. Thi s comp lex type of comb in ed arms unit became
possible because of advances in tech nology, weapons, comm uni cat ion s, and
transportation.
The adoption of the unwieldy square division, however, proved to be less than
sati sfactory. Pershing 's staff believed that a di vision of28,000 would conserve the
limited supply of trained officers, maximize firepower, and sustain itself effectively in combat. [n practice, the square division lacked mobility. Its defic iencies
became app<lrent du ring the important Meuse-Argonne offensive, when American
divisions bogged down and suffered excessive casualties. The successes and failures of the infantry division's organization set the stage for a debate that would
su rround it for the next twenty years.
74
Notes
! Hugh L. Scott, Some Melllorie.\" v/a So/die,. (New York: Century Co., 1928), p. 552.
2 Scott, Memories, pp. 550- 56; Frederick Palmer, Bli ss, The Peacemaker: The Life and
Letters or General Tasker Howard Bli ss (NelV York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., (934), pr. 146- 56.
1 Memo, We D for CotS, JO May 17, sub: Plans for a Possible Expeditionary Force to
France, WeD file 10050, RG 165, NARA. The We D 10050 file is repl ele wilh background
malerial on the development orthe new division.
4 Memo, WeD, 10 May 1917, sub: Plans for a Possible Expeditionary Force 10 France;
Drafi of MenlO prepared in May 1917, WeD for Cors, 7 Jul 1917, sub: The Organization of an
American AmlY, WeD file 10050, RG 165, NARA. The French used two types of divisions in
191 7, one fielding about 17,000 men based on tlVO brigades of tlVO infantry regiments each and
th e other of 14,000 organized around three infantry regimen ts.
5 Ibid. ; Draft of Memo p repare d in May 1917, WCD for Cors, 7 J ul 17 , sub: The
Organization of an American Army, WC D file 10050, RG 165, NARA.
6 L. Van Loan NaisalVald, The US Infilllll}' Divisioll: Challging COllcepls in Organization
/900- 39, Project Shop, I- ORO S- 239 (Chevy Chase, Md, : Johns Hopkins University, 1952), pp.
12 and fig. 4; Memo, WCD for CofS, 21 May 17, sub: Plans for a possible expeditionary force to
France, WCD file 10050, RG 165, NARA.
7 General Scott had becn sent to Russia lVith a presidential commission to establish eOlllaet
lVith the revolutionary governmcnt Ihat had overthrown the czar. Scott, Memories, p. 570.
8 Memo, WC D for Cors, 21 May 17, sub: Plans for a possible exped itionary force to
FnUlee, and Memo, CotS for WC D, 24 May 17, no subject, WCD file 10050, RG 165 , NARA.
9 John J. Pershing, My /:.:I"periellr;es ill the World Wal'. 2 vols. (New York: Frederick A.
Stokes Co., 1921) 1:2- 3; Llr, The Adjufant General of the Army (hcrcafler eitcd as TAG) to CG,
Southern Department, 23 May 17, sub: Organizations designated for foreign service, and Ltr,
T AG to CG, Southern Department, 26 May 17, same subject, 1st Inf Div file , DAMH-HSO:
Society of the First Divis ion, Histol )' oj the Fi"st /)il'isioll During World War 1917- /919
(Philadelphia: John C. Winston Co.. 1922), p. 2.
t(l Society of the First Division. Hiswry oj the First /)il'l's ioll , pp. 6- 18; GO I , 1st
Expedi tionary Division, 8 lun 1917, 1st Infoi v file. DAMH-HSO; Forrest C. Pogue. George C.
Morslwll: duc(I(ioll oj 0 Generol (New York : Viking I)rcss, 1963), pp. 146-47; John Whiteclay
Chambers, 11. To Noise (/II Army: The Dl'tlji Comes to iHodem America (New York: The Free
Press. 1987), p. 147.
tt Pershing, My E"pe"iellce,~. 1:38-40, 43-44, 100- 10 I; Llr. TAG to Col. Chauncey B.
Baker, 28 May r 7, printed in Ullited St(l/e~' Army ill the World War 1917- 1919: Org(/IIiuitio/l oj
the Amel"ic(/II E\'peditioll(llJ' Forces (Washington, D.C.: Governme nt Printing Office, 1948). p.
55 (hercafterciled as Orgmrizatio/l. AEF): Memo. CofS for Maj Gen Pershing. 21 May 17. sub:
Organizations higher than Divisions, WeD file 10050, RG 165, NARA; Memo. John McA.
Palmer for Gen Pershing. 19 Oct 2 I , no subject. John McA. Pahner Papers, LC.
12 Organizatioll. AEF. pp. 55- 56, 91, 108; Ltr. Baker to Pershing, 7 Jun 17, no subject,
Pershing Papers, LC. The officers who accompanied Baker were Colonels William A. Graves.
Dwight E. Aullman, Mark L. Hersey. :md Charles P. Summerall; Lieutenant Colonels Hanson E.
Ely, Edward D. Anderson, Kirby Walker, and Sherwood A. Cheney; Majors George S. Simonds,
Morris E. Lock , :llId Frederick A, Ellison, :llId C:,ptnin John J. Quakemeyer.
13 Organization. AEF, pp. 97- 98.
t4 The aUlomntie rine lind the machine gun were viewed as similar rapid-fire infantry
weal)ons, and the Baker Board recommended the adoption of concise descriptions for them. It
proposed that the automatic rine be detined as a weapon where recoil was sustained by the bod y
of the firer. while recoil from the machine gUll would lJ.c sustained by some sort of solid lIlount
clamped to th e weal)on, (Sec Org(lllization. A/~T. p. 75).
t5 Organizatioll. AEF. pp. 56- 89 and pp. 93- 114 passim.
TH E TEST- WORLD WA R I
75
16 Ibid .. pp. 109- 14; LIT. Maj Gcn Joh n J. I)ershing to Maj Gcn Taske r H. Bliss, 9 Jul 17. no
subjl.:c[, Pershing Papers, LC; 1'lInes W. Rainey. "Ambivalent Wa rfare: The Tactical Doct rine of
the AE F in World War I," 1'(wall1elel'$ 13 (Scp 1983): 38; Pershing, My Experiellces, I: 106- 07.
11 O''gllllizlIIiOIl. AEF. pp. 83. 99 100.1 05.
18 1bid., pr. 93- 96.
19 I'nll11c r. Bliss, PI}. 170- 7 1; J a rllC~ G . !-Iarlxml. The Americal/ Al'lIIy ill Fl'Clllce /917- /9/9
( Bos ton: Li ul e Brown and Co., 1936), PI'. 102- 04.
20 OrgallizlIIioll. AEF. p. 138: Tables of Organization (hcrcaflcr cited as T /O ), Series A.
Table !.Infantry Division. 1917.
21 T/O. Series A. Table 2, Hcad<luarlcrs. Infantry Division, Table 3, Infan try Brigade, Table
12. Field An illcry Brigade, IIcadquartcrs, 1917.
22 WO Bull 32. 19 17: W D GO 88. 1917: ~I cnry Jcn'cy. "Mobilization of thc Emcrge ney
Anny," lecture at thc Army War Collcge. 3 Jan 1920, copy in DAM II Library. Washi ngton,
D.C.; C hambers, To Rai.~e (/II Arm),. p. 140.
23 Mcmo. WCD for CofS. 20 Feb 17, sub: A plan for nn cxp,LI1siblc arm y of 500,000 men
bllscd on univcrs.!1 liab ili ty to the mi litary service, localization o f organizations, li nd decent l1l lizntion o f administfUtio n. TAG fi le 94)3, RG 165. NA RA (t hc memo offers th e CIS thrce options
to inc re ase the size o f the Army); LtT, Ch of th e M 11, to TAGs of llil Siales, Te rri tory of Ha w" ii,
Dist rict o f Colu m bia, and inspector-instructors .t1ld orficers in ch'lrgc of militia affairs, department head quartcrs, 5 May 17, sub: Org;l1Iiz<l ti on an d cntry in Fedem l service of Nmion al Gu ard.
Mil file 325.4, RG 168, NARA. Also see U.S. Congress, Housc of Represen talives, Comlllillee
on Military Affairs. Tile N(liiolllll Dticllse "eurillgs. 69 th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 May 19 17, pp.
303- 04.
24 Rpt orthe Sec of War. IIRIVO, 1917, pp. 25- 34.
25 Ibid.: Rpi o f the Construc tion Div, AR IIID. 1918. pp. 1283- 86.
26 Memo, WCD for CofS. sub: Designat ion of foree 10 eOIllJlOsc the Arm y of the United
S tates. 23 Jun 17. and Memo. WC D for Cors, sub: Designation of orga ni zmions, 23 Aug 17,
WC D file 9876, ItG 165, NA RA; W I) GOs 88 and 11 5, 19 17; Specia l Rcgul at io ns No, 41.
C h.ll1ge I, Uniform Regu la tions, 19 17.
27 WD GOs 90. 10 1, 109. and 114, 1917; Army War College (hereaf'ler ci ted as AWC)
S t;lIcme nt, Proposed organization of the inc reased mi litary establi~hme n t ,Ind proposed plan for
providing the necessary offiecrs. 9 Aug 17, Co15 files 1917- 1921. file 1080, RG 165, NA RA.
28 Kreidbcrg and I-ienry, Mobifi;:(1/ioll. pp. 320- 21: A WC Statement: Proposed organiza tion
of the incrcased mil itary establishmen t. 9 Aug 17: Order of Bill/Ie of lite Uniled Sillies LUlld
Forces ill Ihe WorM "'{II' (1917- 19). lOIlt' of Ille IlIIeriol' (Washington. D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1949). pp. 79- 80.
29 Orde/' of Bill/Ie of Ihe Ullill'd Slme.\ ,, (///(I Forces ill lite World War. AlJlcric(1II
.I'peditioumy Forces. Dil'i.~iulI.l' (Washington, D.C.: Govcrnment Prin ting Office, 1931), pp.
117- 265 passim. hercafter ci ted <IS Dil';'Iioll.l', and ZOlle of Ihe IIl/eriOI" /1(1/'1 2. Directory of
Trool'~' (Wa~hington, D.C.: Government Printi ng Office. 1949), PI'. 1277- 78, hereafter eited as
Dil'cc/m,)' of Troops: "ellllsyll'llllill ill tile World War. I: 131-40,2: 14 1; O'Rya n, The SIOI,)' Ofllll!
2711, DMsioll. 1:61 - 70; Frederick L. lIu idekoper, The His/OI')' of /Iw 33(1 OMsioll, A. E. !"" 4 vo ls.
(Springfield: Il linois Statc I listorical Library, 192 1) I: 1-7.
30 Ltr. TAG 10 Brig Gcn C larence R. Edwards. sub: Prepar:llion of the 26th Division for service abroad, 13 Aug 17, and Ll r. CG. 26th Division to TAG, sub: Organization of the 26th
Division. 22 Sep 17. eopics in DAM II- I-ISO World War I ordcrofban le file: I-larry A. Benwell,
/lis/Oly of the "(/Ilkee DiI'isioll (Boston, Mass.: Corn hil l Co., 1919), Pil. 20- 2 1: RJlI of the Ch or
the MO. AN"'/). 1918. p. 1104: William F. Strobridge. GOIt/t'1I Gale /0 Goldell HoI''' (San Mateo.
Calif.: San MaleoCounty 1-listorie'll Associmion. 1975). p. 3: Dil'i~iolu. pp. 117.256.
3t Frederick PlIlmer. NewlOII I). B"ker. AllleriCllII til 11'''1'.2 vol5. (New York: Dodd. Mead.
and Co" 1931) 1:356- 57: Memo. WC D for Cors, 30 Jul 17. sub: Composition Division, National
Gu ard ror service in France, ItG 165, NARA: Ll r, TAG to De pt COlllmanders. I Ali g 17, SHllle
subjcc t. TAG 322.07 ce in 42d Inf Oiv Fi le, DAI\-UI -IISO : Divisions. p. 275. Urig Gen William
76
A. Mann was the brother of James Robert Manu. who was the second ranking Republican from
Illinois. His brother's appointment was a bipartisan move for World War I.
J2 Secretary Buker had authorized the camp commanders, who served as div ision commanders, to organize depot brigades as divisional clements. The depot brigade filled IwO purposes:
one was to train rep lacements for the A.E.F. since the War College Division did nOI agree to
Pershing's seventh division for the corps; the olher was to act as a receiving unit for men sent to
the camps by draft boards. David F. T rask, cd., Historical Survey of US Mobilization: Eight
Topical Studies of the Twentieth Century, SlUdy 6, Terrence J. Gough. "Equipment", pp. 6- 7.
Ms. DAM H- IISR.
33 Dil'l'siom;, pp. 291-421 passim; Memo. Office Chicf of StalT(OCS) for TAG, 11 Aug 11.
no subject, OCS 9876-59, RG 165, NARA; WD GO 101 , 1917; Jervey, "Mobilization of the
Emergency Army," pp. 14- 15; Memo. WC D for Corso 19 Oct 11. sub: Plan for Organization ;Uld
Dispatch of Troops to Europe. WCD tile 10050- 119. RG 165. NARA: also scc Julius O. Adler.
!-lis/or)' of Ihe Sel'ellfy-Scl'elllh DiI'isioll (New York: Wynokoop Hallenbeck Crawford Co.,
1919), pp. 11 - 18; John G. LillIe, Jr.. Tlte Official HislOIY oflhe EighIJ,-Sixlh Dil'isioll (Chicago:
State Publication Socicty, 1921), pp. 1- 17; ;lIld Tile 881h Dil'isioll ill Ihe World War of
1914- 1918 (New York: Wynkoop Hallenbeck Crawford Co., 1919). PI'. 21- 36.
34 Memo, WCD for CofS, 21 May 11, sub: Plans for a possible expeditionary force to
France, WCD tile 10050- 21. RG 165. NARA; Mcmo. WCD for CofS, ~ub: Organization of the
2d Division (Regular) for service overseas, approved 20 Sep 17, and Memo. TAG to multiple
addresses, 21 Sep 11, Organization of2d Di vision (Regular), both 2d Inf Div tile, DAMH-HSO;
Ulliled SIMes Army ill fhe World War, 1917- 1919: I~oficy-Formillg Dacl/me",s tllllerict/il
E.\pe(lilioll(ll)' Forces, (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948) p. 35. hereafter
cited as DocIllIICIIIS; Ulliled Slales Army ill lite World War, 1917- 1919: Tmillillg alld Ihe Use of
Aillericull UllifS willi Brilish alld Frellch, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1948)
pp. 491 - 92, hereancr citcd as Tmillillg; Oliver L. Spaulding and John W. Wright. The Secolld
Dil'isioll. Amedc(l1I Expedilioll(llY Forces ill Fi-tillce 1917- 1919 (New York: Hillman Press. Inc ..
1937), pp. 6- 7; Thomas Shipley. TIle HislOJY oflhe A.E.F. (New York: Gcorge H. Dorna Co ..
1920), p. 46; Allan R. Millelt, Semper Fidelis: The HislOlY oflhe Ulliled Slates Marille GO/ps
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc . 1980). I)p. 289- 94.
35 Dilli~'iQI15, pp. 47- 109 passim.
36 Edward M. Coffman, The Hill oflhe SWOI"(/: TIle Career of PC)'1011 C. March (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press. 1966). pp. 129- 30: WD GO 13, 1918.
J7 Memo, WCD for TAG, I Aug 11, sub: Utiliz;Ltion of colored men dmflcd for the NatiOI1<Ll
AmlY. WCD file 8142- 13, Memo, WCD for CofS. 21 Aug 17. same subject, Memo. OCS for
TAG, 24 Oct 17, sub: Organization o f the Division. Colored, WeD file 8142- 24, RG 165,
NA RA ; Divisiolls, pp. 431 - 35.
38 Memo, WCD for CIS, 13 Nov 17, sub: Utili zation of Color cd U nit ~ of the National Guard
and Colored Drafl, and Ltr., TAG to Brig Gen Ray Hoffman, 5 Jan 18, sub: 93d Division
(Provisional), WCD filc 8 142, RG 165, NARA; GO I, Provisional Division (Colored). 24 Dce
1917. 93d Inf Div file. DAMH- HSO: Dil'i.liulls. p. 437.
39 Memo. War Plan Division (WI'D) for Cors, 9 May 18. sub: Organi7.3tion of Troops of
the Puerto Rico Drafl. WPD file 9816- 191, and Memo. WI'D for Cars. 27 May 18, same subject,
WI'D file 9876- 203, RG 165, NARA; ZOlle oflhe IlIIe";or, p. 661 - 62: Dircc/OJJ' oj1i'oops, p.
1400.
40 Memo. WCD for Corso 23 Nov 17, sub: Organization ofthc Cavalry Di vision (Regular),
Memo. WCD for TAG, 27 Nov 17, same subject, weD file 6815- 32, RG 165. NA RA; ZOlle of
Ille IlIIeriol". pp. 673- 74; I'almer. Bakel". 2: 18- 19.
41 MenlO. WPD forCofS. undated, sub: 15th Cavalry Division. and Drafl Tclg, WI'D to CG.
AEF, 10 May 18. WCD file 6815- 64. RG 165 , NARA; Zone oflhe fllieriol', p. 67 1- 74;
DireclOlJ' of Troops, p. 1270.
012 ZOlle oflhe fllleriOJ. pp. 52- 55; Coffman. The Nill oflhe Sword. pp. 85- 90: Edward M.
ColTman. The War To Eml All Wars (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966). pp. 171- 80;
THE T EST- WO RLD WAR I
77
Kriedbcrg ilnd Henry, Mobili;:(lfioll. pp. 302- 09.

H Memo. wro for Dir of Operations. 31 May 18, sub: Qrglmization of the nex t 23 div isions, Wr Q file 848 1-84, RG 165, NARA.
44 Because the 15th Cavalry Division was demobi lized in May 1918, the nu mber 15 was
available in July for a Regular Army infan try division wilhoul a dup licatio n ofnlll11 bcrs.
45 Memo, WI' D for TAG, 8 Jul 18, sub: O rganizlllion of Ihe 91h. 101 h, 11 \h. 121 h, 131h, and
14th Divisions. WPQ fi le 8481 -96, and Memo, W PD for TAG, 19 Jul 18, sub: Organization of
Ihe 151h, 161h, 171h, 181h, 191h, and 20lh Divisions, WI'O file 8481 - 97, RG 165, NA RA; TID 12,
Field Artillery Brigade (Combat Division), 14 Jan 18, correcled 10 26 J un 18; ZOlle o/flle
Illicrior, pp. 641 - 61. Motorized llrtillery during Worl d War I referred to tractor-drawn field
artillery.
46 lOl/e ofthe ""erior, p. 629; Director), ofTrQQps. p. 1405.
H Rpl s of the Governor Gcncrnl o f the Phi lippine Islands. 19 17. printed in ARWD, 1918. pp.
5, find 1918. prin ted in ARWD. 19/9, p. 6; ZOlleoftfle IlIIeriOl", pp. 674- 75.
48 Ol"del" of BailIe of the Uni/e(1 Simes Lalld FOl"ces ill Ihe World Wal". American
xpe(li/ioll(ll), Forces. Gel/eml Ne(ldl/llarler.~. Armies. Arm)' CQlPs. Sen/ices ofSllppf),. Separate
Fmt,:es (Washi ngton. D.C.: Govcrnme nt Pri nting Office. 1949), I). 386, hc reaftcr c ited as
Gellemf Headql/arlerS, Armies.
49 Mcmo. Cors for TAG. 23 Jul 18. sub: Disposal of the Colored draft (Orga nization ofncw
divisions). A WC fi le 8 142- 185. RG 165, NARA; ZOl/e oflhe IlIIeriol" pp. 662- 70.
50 Changes in the tab les o f organization and wea pons can be t"lced through the fo llowing
sources: TIO Series A. 14 Jan uary 19 18, corrC(:ted to 26 Ju ne 1918 (prin ted in Orgalli;wlioll,
AEF, PI'. 335-88). and tab lcs printed in Gel/esis of Ihe Allle";CIII/ Fil":'/ Arlll)' (Washington. D.C.:
Government Prin ting Office. 1938), pp. 59- 61.
~I George M. Chin, The Mllchille GI/II. 3 \'ols. (Washington, D.C.: Govcrnmc nt Pri nti ng
Office. 1951). I: 173- 86; Sevellon Brown. The SIOI)' of Ordllfmce ill the Wodt/ 11'(11" (Washington.
D.C. : Ja mes Will iam Bryan I'rcss, 1920), I)P. 128- 30.
52 AE F G031.1918.
S) " Rcport of Assis tant ColS. G- 1. G. B .O .. A.E.F. and Statis tics," VIIi/eli Stales Arm)' ill
Wodtl Wor: Reports of COII/ II/(/Iu!e,-ill-Chiej. A.E.F. (Washingto n, D.C" Govcrnm ent Prin ting
Office, 1948), PIl, 150-52, hercafier CilCd as Rel)Qr/HfCINC.
S4 Ibid.; AEF GOs9. 46. an d 111. 1918.
55 Pcrshing. M)' 1"jJerif.'lIcf!s, 1:291. 353- 65; ()Qnald Smythe. Persllillg: Geneml oflhe
Armies (Bloomington: Indiana University Prcss. 1986). p. 72; Dil'isiolls. pp. 437-42.
56 Coffman. The WlIr To EII(I All W(U:s, pp. 168- 7 1; Weiglcy. flis/OI)' oflile Vlli/ed Siales
Army, p. 384; [)ocumellts, Tl"flillillg conta ins numerous documen ts pertaining to the agreeme nt
and training with British and French.
$7 Hun tcr Liggeu. AEF. Tell Years Ago ill Fmllce (New York: Dodd. Mead, and Co., 1928),
p. 28 Gel/em/ Neat/ql/lIrters. Arlllies. PI'. 193.220,237,268,290.316, and 329; Dil'isiolls. 1'1'.
251,269.293,363- 64.379.
58 Gellerlll fleadqu{/l"Ien. Al'llIie.\, pp . 38 1- 83; Joe l R. Moorc, " T he North Russian
E",pedition:' 11I/tlllllyJol//'Iw/29 (Jul 1926): 1- 2 1; Richard K. Ko lb. "Polar Bears vs. Bois." 78
IIFW Mflgfdll(, (Jan 1991): 16- 20; Dil'isioll.v. p. 363.
S9 1u addition to combat losses, the f:11I of 1918 witucssed one or the mosl severe innucnza
epidemics in history. which spread 10 over 25 percellt of the Amly in F"mec (sec Coffman. Tlte
War To Eml All Wars. pp. 81 - 84).
60 "Final Rcport" and "Rcport of Assistant Cors, G- I. G. II.Q. , A.E.F., prin ted in Reporl$ of
CINC. PI'. 55. 147- 52; Mauriec Matloff. cd .. AlllericlW MilitalJ' t/islOl)' (Washington. D.C. :
Government Printing Office, 1969). p. 40 I.
6t "RCI)ort of Assis tant ColS. G I. G. B .O .. A.E.F.," printed in Reports ofCINC. I'p.
147- 52.
62 " Final I~cport of Assistant Chief of Staff (G- 4)." and "Final Report of Ihe Chicf of
Artillery, American E"'pedi l ion:lry Forces ." printed in RI!IIOI'IS of CINC. PI'. 77. 205- 06;
78
McKenney. "Field A rtillery:' p. 188.

63 10hn Hagood, The Sen'ices of Supply. A Memoir of ,IIe Gl"lml Wll/" (Boston: Houghton
Miffiill Co., 1927), pp. 3 17- 20: DM$ioIlS, p. 389.
64 L1 r, Pershing 10 Maj Ge n George Bell, Jr. , 24 Oct 18, no subject, Pershing Papers, LC; lSI
Endorsement 323.3 (GS) Military Department and Di visions, Uq. Slst Division to CinC, AEF, 4
OCI 18, no subject, GS file ]23.3, and Memo, Cors AEF for TAG, 18 Oct 18, no subject. The
Institute o f Heraldry (T[OH) Library, Fort Belvoir, Va.; Ken Sltwi tzkc, "The Shoulder Palch,"
II/fill/II)' 65 (Dec 1975): 40-42.
65 Conr-Id H. Lanzc. "The Artillery Support o f the Infantry in the A.E.F," Fielll Ar/illery
Jo ur/wi 26 (Jan- Feb 1936): 67- 68; TimOlhy Nenninge r. "Tactical Dysrunction in the AEF,
191 7- 1918," ,"'ili/(/ry Affairs 5 I (Oel 1987): 177- 81: Robert H. Fleleher, Jr., "The 351h Division
in the First Phase of Ihe Meuse Argonne Operalion, Seplembcr 26- OcIODer, 1918:' p. 2 1, Ms,
35th lnfDiv file, DAMI-I-H SO.
CHAPTER 4
The Aftermath of World War I

I IlIillk 'hat /he work of {his Board 1m,\' IIl1derlakell so Joon after the close of Imstililies ,hal (he members \I'ere IIlIduly il/j/llel/ced by the special Sill/aliol1 which exisled during
01/1"
parlicipalioll ;11 'he World War.
General John J. Pershing l
Th e abrupt end of World War 1 and the immed iate demand for demobilization
threw the Army into disarray, but out of the disorder eventually came a llew military establishment. Bet ween the armistice in November 1918 and the slimmer of
\923 the Army occupied a porti on of Ge rmany, demobilized its World War I
forces, helped revise the laws regu lating ils size and structure, and dev ised a
mobilization plan to meet fut ure emergencies. Am id the turmoil Army officers
analyzed and debated their war experience, arg uing the merits of a large, powerful infan try div ision designed to penetrate an enemy posi ti on w ith a frontal
assault versus a lighter, more mobile unit that could outmaneuver an opponent.
The cavalry d ivision received a si milar but less extens ive examination. After
close scrutiny. the Army adopted new infantry and cava lry divisions and reorganized its forces to meet postwar condit ions.
Occupation and Demobilization

Hosti lities ended on II November 19 18, but the Army sti ll had many tasks to
perform, including the occupation of the Coblenz bridgehead on the Rhine River.
For that pu rpose, Maj . Gen. Joseph T. Di ckman, at the direction of Gene ral
Pershing, organized the Th ird Army on 15 November. Ten U.S. divisions eventually served with it- the I st through 5th, 32d, 42(~ 89th , and 90th in Germany and
the 33d in Luxembourg- as well as the French 2d Cava lry Div ision. Also e lements of the 6th Division began moving toward the bridgehead in later April
1919, but that movement was halted in early May. Di visional missions included
the administration of civi l government, the maintcnance of public order, and the
prevention of renewed <lgg ression. 2
The divisional structure proved unsatisfactory for thc mi litary government
rol e. Its organization could no! mesh w ith the civil government of Germ<lI1Y,
and the Third Army lacked the lime and experti se needed to mature a uniform
civil affairs program. Furt hermore, assigned areas for the divisiona l units shift-
80
Americall OCCIlPlIf;OIlII'OOPS (;1'0$$ the Rhille at Cob/ell:!. GermallY. JlIlllftUY 1919.
cd rapidly as d ivisions departed Ihe bridgehead fo r Ihe United States. Yet, under
the terms of occupat ion, the entire bridgehead had to remain under American
su pervision. By the summer of 19 19 American d ivisions had len for home, and
the military gove rnme nt fu nctio ns moved from the tactica l un its to an a rea
command, the Office of Civil Affai rs. With the departure of Ihe divisions, o nly
brigade-size or sma ller units remained in Germany, and they too departed by
January 1923.3
As the Third Army grappled with occupation duty. offic ials in Washington COIlfronted the problem of demobil izing the wartime army. On II November 19 18 a
quarter of a million draftees had been under orders to report fo r military duty. With
the signing of the armist ice the War Department immedi ately halted the mobiliZ<ltion process, but it had no plans fo r the Army's transition to a peacet ime roleA
One man, Col. Casper H. Conrad of the War Plans Division, had begun to
study demobilization, and he submitted his report eleven days after the arm ist ice.
From Conrad's severa l proposals on disbanding the forces, Chief of Sta ff March
decided to discharge so ldiers by units rathe r than by ind iv iduals. Becau se
National Guard and National Army divisions originally had geographica l ties, he
also ruled that units returning from overseas would be demobilized at the centers
nearest to where their men had en tered the serviee.S
Demobilization began in November 1918. March fi rst disbanded the partially
orga nized divisions in the United States, making their camps available as di s-
THE AFTERMAT H OF WORLD WAR 1
81
/sl Field ArlillelY Brigafle. /sl Divisiol/, 01/ OCCllpllliol/ dilly ill Germany. Augusl 19 J9
charge cen ters. In January 1919 Pers hing sent home the divisions that had been
skeletonized or had perfo rmed replacemen t func ti ons. Comba t div isions followed, beginn ing wi th Ihe 92d, the Army's only black division. A year after the
armistice the Army had demobil ized fifty-five of its sixty-two divisions, including all the National Guard and National Army units (Table 7). Before the units
left service, the War Departmen t gave the American people the opportu nity to
show their appreciation to the men who had fought in the war. Boston, New York,
Phi ladelphia, Ba ltimore, and Washington held divisiona l parades and ovcr fi ve
hundred regiments marched through the streets of their homctowns.6
After November 19 19 only the 1st through the 7th Divisions and a few smaller units remained active. All were Regular Army units. These divisions retained
their wartime configurations, but personnel au thorizations fo r fisca l ycar 1920
prevented ful l manning. Divisional regiments had the strengths prescribed in the
prewar tables oforganiZ<1tion issued on 3 May 191 7, and the ammunition, supply,
and sanitary trains hnd only enough men to care for their equipmenl. Wi thin only
a year, the mighty combat force the Army had struggled to build during 1917- 18
had vanished without any plans to replacc it.7 The heltcr-skelter pace of dcnlObilization and the lack of a ny sound tra ns itional planning grently undermined
efforts to create an effect ive peacetime force. A student of demobilization ,
Frederic L. Paxon, chamctcrized this situation as worse than a " madhouse in
which the cmzy might be incarccrated. They were at large." 8
TABLE 7
Demobi li zation of Divisions
/)i1'i~'iQII
I"
2d
3d
4th
51h
6th
7th
81h9 th
10th
11th
12th
13th
14th
151h
16th
17th
18th
19th
20th
261h
27th
281h
29th
30th
31s1
32d
33d
34th
35th
36th
37th
38th
39th
40lh
41st
42d
761h
77th
78th
79t h
80th
81s1
82d
83d
841h
851h
86th
871h
88th
Rellll'II1!tliO
u.s.
September 191 9
August 1919
August 1919
August 1919
July 19 19
June 1919
June 1919
September 1919
April 1919
March 1919
A1)ril 1919
May 1919
Apri1191 9
December 19 18
May 1919
May 19 19
Jan uary 1919
April 191 9
JU lie 191 9
Apri l 1919
December 1918
December 191 8
March 1919
February 19 19
May 1919
December 1918
Apri l 1919
June 1919
May 1919
May 1919
June 191 9
May 1919
January 191 9
January 1919
March 19 19
Janu,lry 191 9
January 191 9
June 191 9
Delllobifi:c(/
CiIlIlI)I Loc(lliol1
Zachary Taylor, Ky.

Travis, Tex.
Pike, Ark.
Dodge, Iowa
Gordon , Ga.
Grant, III.
September J 919
Fcbnmry 1919
Fchnlary 191 9
FchOlary 1919
February 191 9
March 1919
Fcbnll'lry 1919
February 191 9
March 1919
Fcbn13ry 1919
Fcbrunry 1919
Fcbnmry [91 9
Fcbmary 1919
May 1919
AI)ri11919
Mll y 1919
Ma y 1919
May 1919
January 1919
Ma y 191 9
June 19 19
February 1919
May 1919
June 191 9
June 191 9
January 1919
January 1919
Apri11919
February 19 19
May 1919
Janu:uy 1919
May 1919
June 191 9
June 19[9
June 1919
June 1919
May 1919
October 191 9
July 1919
April 1919
JilIlUary 191 9
February 1919
JUlie 19 19
Funston, Kans.
Dix, N.J.
Sheridan. Ala.
Funston, Kans.
Meade, Md.
Devens, Mass.
Lewis, Wash.
Custer, Mich.
Logan, Tex.
Kcamy, Calif.
Bea uregard, La.
Travis, Tex.
Dodge. Iowa
Sevier. S.C.
Devens. Mass.
UpIOIl, N,Y.
Oix, N.J.
Dix, N.J.
Jackson, S.C.
Gordon. Ga,
Custer, Mich.
Granl. Ill.
Grant, 111.
Funston, Kans.
Oowie, Tex.
Shennan, Ohio
Zac hary Taylor, Ky.
Oeaurcgard, La .
Kea rny, Calif.
Dix, N.J.
Di 1t, N.J.
Devcns, Mass,
Upton, N.Y.
Oix, N.J.
Di1t. N.J.
Lee. Va.
Ilobo ken, N.J.
Upton, N.Y.
Shernlan. Ohio
Zacha ry Taylor, Ky.
Custer, Mich.
Gra nl, III.
Dix. N.J.
Dodge. Iowa
83
THE AFTERMAT H OF WORLD WAR I

TAB LE 7- Colllillllefl
u.s.
Demobilizel/
Call1plLocfllioll
July 1919
June 19 19
May 19 19
Funston, Ka ns.
9 1s1
May 1919
June 1919
April 1919
92d
February 1919
Fcbru3ry 1919
Meade, Md.
DiI'isioll
89th
9O,h
93d@
95th
96th
97th
981h
99,h
100lh
lOI s!
102d
Rellll'//e,11O
,,
,,,
,
,,
Bowie, Tex.
Presidio of
San Francisco, Calif.
December 19 19
Shem131l, Ohio
January 1919
December J 9 18
Wadsworth, N.Y.
Cody, N.Mex.
November 19 18
November 19 18
McCle llan, Ala .

Wheeler, Ga.
Bowie, Tex.
November 19 18
November 19 18
November 1918
Shelby, Miss.
Dix, N.J.
Notes: .. Only part of the division overseas.

/I Did not go overseas,
@ Provisional di vis ion, headquarters demobilized in France in May 1918.
The AEF Evaluates World War I Divisional Organizations

A lthough rapid demobilization destroyed the Army 's combat e ffectiveness, military and congressional leaders wanted to avoid what they considered the major
mi stake made after every earlier wnr- the loss of well-trained, experienced, combat
soldiers. Notwithstanding that World War I was to have been "the war to end all
wars," perceived intenwt ional realities required that the nation be prepared for war.
80th Cong ress and the War Department had been considering changes in the
National Defense Act , and Brig. Gen. Ly tle Brown, C hi e f of the War Plan s
Division, s uggested that March obtain the AEF's views on the new Army establ ishment. He sllspected that division, corps, and army organizations used in the "Great
War" might not meet future batt lefield requirements because they were tied so
closely to trench w"'J.rfare, a type of warfare he thought unlikely to recur.9
Under War Department orders, Pershing set up boa rds in France to examine
the AEF experiences wit h the arms and services and to draw appropriate lessons
for the future. At hi s sta ff's suggestion, he also cOllvened the Superior Board to
review the other boards' fin d ings. In April Persh ing re lieved Dickman as the
commander of Third Army and appointed him and other senior officers to the
review board. All its members had close professiona l tics to Pershing and had
witnessed from various posit io ns the "success" of the heavy in fant ry division
during the war. The board's primary mission was an examination of that in fant ry
div ision. After a two-month investigation, the Superior Board tendered its recolllmendation, basically endorsing the World War I square division with modifications. Changes centered on improvement s in combat and service suppor!, firepower, and command and control.IO
84
MANEUVER AND FI REPOWE R
5,h Fieltl ArfillelY tmops lIlllte h'l Oil'i.\';oll parade, September 1919
C hanges in command and control touched all d ivisional echelons. The board
recommended headquarters detachments for artillery and infantry brigades along
with larger staffs. Because the ammunition train served primarily wi th the artillery
brigade, it proposed making the train an organic clement of that unit but serving
both artillery and infantry troops. Similarly, the board members believed that the
engineer train should be a part of the engineer regi ment. Following the principle of
placing resources under the control of those who used them, the board wanted to
drop the machine gun battalion from the infantry brigade and place a machine gun
company in each infantry banalion . The board members believed that only when
the infan try cOlllmander had his own machine gun company cOllld he learn to handle it properly. For training in mass machine gu n fire, the board advised that the
companies assemble occasionally under a brigade machine gun officer. [t also
advocated the retent ion of a div isional machine g un officer and a di visiona l
machi ne gun battalion to provide a reserve for ba rrage or mass fire.
The board regarded th e rear area div isio n tra in headquarters and the accompanying military po li ce as unnecessary. W hen needed, the div ision com mander
could appoi nt an officer to co mmand the rear elements. The military po li ce
coul d become a separate company. T he war had di sclosed comp lex commu ni cation problems, particularly in the use of radios, but no uniform s ignal orga ni zation existed. To overcome Ihat defect, the board advised that a closer exami nation of divisional signa l needs be conducted with considerat ion g iven to di viding them along fu nctio nal lines.
Turning to firepower, the Superior Board recommended the elimination of
ineffect ive weapons and the addition or retention of effective ones. Based on
wartime experience, the 6-inch mortar battery in the field arti llery brigade was
THE A FTERM ATH OF WORLD WAR I
85
deleted and a how itzer company added to the infantry regiment. The infantry was
to continue to use 37-l11 m. gu ns and 3-i nch Stokes mortars temporarily, but eventually howitzers were to replace the mortars. The board found that mortars lacked
mobility, accuracy, and range and were difficult to conceal and su pply. The board
looked upon tractor-drawn arti llery pieces as a success in combat and felt that
retention of motorized art ill ery was appropriate if future wars were fO llgh t in
countries having an extensive road net like thai in France. For flexibility, however,
the board adv ised that one 75-mm. gun regiment remain horse-drawn and the
other be motor-drawn, along wit h a motorized ISS-mill. howitzer regiment. They
decided Ihat Ihe new weapon, the tank, used during the war to break up wire
en tanglements and to reduce machine gun nests, belonged to the infantry, but
instead of assigning tank units to the division, the officers placed them at army
level. Tan ks could then be parceled out to divisions according to need.
The board also addressed the com bat support needs of the division. Since the
division routinely employed aircraft for artillery observation, liaison, registration
of fi re , and reco n naissance , the board suggested the ad d ition of an a ir
squad ron , a ba lloon company, a photographic section, and an intelligence officer to the d ivision. The board endorsed the addit ion of a litter batta lion 10 the
san itary trai n to improve med ical support and the el imination of all horsedrawn transportation from that unit and from the rest or the division , except for
artillery. Because engi ncers had often been used as infantry in co mbat , some
board members proposed reducing the number of engineer troops. The board
concl uded, however, that while engineers often had been emp loyed as infantry,
this practice stemmed from a failure to understand their role. It advi sed the
retention of the engineer regiment.
Summarizing the requirements for the fu ture infantry division, the Superior
Board recommended that it be organized to meet varying combat and terrain conditions encountered in maneuver warfare but have only those elements Ihal it customari ly needed. The army corps or army level would supply infrequently used
organizations. The board's report endorsed a square division that num bered
29,000 officers and enlisted men- an organization " imbued with the divisional
spirit, sense of com radeshi p and loyalty, that wi ll guarantee service . .. in critical
moments when the supreme effort must be madc."11
Although Pershing had not employed a cava lry divi s ion in France, the
Superior Board also examined its structure in light of Allied cx periences, particularly in Italy and Palestine. The board concluded that, except for distant reconnaissance by ai rplanes, the missions of mounted troops- screeni ng, shock act ion,
and tactical reconnaissance- remained important on the postwar battlefield. To
conduct such missions. the caval ry division nceded to capitalize on its mobil ity
and firepower. Finding the 1917 unit of 18,000 men too large, the board entertained two proposals for reorganizing it. One cal led for a division of three cava lry
regimen ts, an art ill ery regiment, and appropriate combat and service support
units; the other comprised two cavalry brigades, each with two cavalry regiments,
86
MANEUVER AND FIREPOWE R
Superior BOlml J/IembeD', Left to right, /I1aj. Gel/s. Joseph T Dickman, Johll L.
Hilles, (/I/d Willialll Lassilel'. Col. Geolge R. Spa/dil/g, IJrig. Gell. William 811rtt.
mI(l Col. Parker Nifl.
and a machine gun sq~lad rOI1, <Ill artillery regiment, and auxil iary uni ts. The board
rejected the three-regiment unit because it eliminated a general officer billet, recommending instead a square cavalry div ision of some \3,500 men.
The Superior Board completed ils work 011 I July 1919, but Pershi ng held the
report to consider its findi ngs. He did not forward it to the War Department until
almost a year later.12
Development of Divisions Under the 1920 National Defense Act

Although Pershing temporarily shelved the Superior Board Report, Congress
and the War Department proceeded to explore postwar Army organ ization. On 3
August 1919, Secretary Baker proposed a stand ing army of approximately 500,000
men and universal mil itary training for eighteen- and nineteen-year-old males, With
that number the department envisaged maintaining one cavalry and twenty infantry
divisions. March test ified that before 1917, when the Army was stationed at small,
scattered posts, officers had no occasion to command brigades or divisions or gain
experience in managing large troop concentrations. Under the proposed reor'ganization, officers would have the opportunity to command large units and to train combined arms units, thus correct ing a major weakness of past mobilizations. 13
THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR [
87
After much debate Congress amended the National Defense Act on 4 June
1920, providing for a new military establishment but scuttl ing the unpopular univ
versal military training proposal. Instead it authorized a Regular Army of296,OOO
officers and enlisted men, a National Guard of 435,000 men, and an Organized
Reserve (Officers Reserve Corps and Enlisted Reserve Corps) of unrestricted

size. To improve mobil ization the law required that the Army, as far as practical,
be organized into brigades, divisions, and army corps, with the brigades and div j ~
sians perpetuating those that had served in the war. The new law replaced the old
territorial departments with corps areas, which assumed the lasks of administer
ing and training the Army. Each corps area was to have at least one National
Guard or Organized Reserve division. Corps areas were to be combined into
army areas for inspection, mobilization, maneuver, and demob ilization. Rather
than mandati ng the structure of regiments as in the past, Congress authorized the
number of officers and enlisted men for each arm and service and instructed the
president to organize the units. To adv ise o n National Guard and Organized
Reserve matters, Congress di rected the format ion of com mittees with members
from the Regular Army and both reserve components. t4
On I September 1920, the War Department established the general out line of
the postwar Army. It consisted of three army areas divided into nine corps areas
(Map 1). Each army area supported one Guard and two Reserve cavalry divisions,
and each corps area mai nta ined o ne Regular, two Gliard, and three Reserve
infantry d ivisions, all to be sustained by combat support and combat service sup
port units to be perfected later. ls
Six committees of the War Plans Div ision developed the postwar Army. Only
one, however, the Committee on Organization, dealt directly with the structure of
the division through the preparation or organizational tables. Until that work was
completed, no rea listic calculation orrutu rc military requirements could be made.
The other committees derined the roles or the Nat ional Guard and the Organized
Reserves, estimated the number or Rcguln r Army person nel required to trai n nnd
administer them, established mann ing requirements ror rore ign garrisons, deter
mined the number or regulars needed ror an ex peditionary force , and fixed the
dist ri bution of the Regular Army in the United States to meet strategic and train
ing considerations. 16
The Committee on Organ ization prescribed a 23,OOO*man square division
patterned after the unit or World War I. Seek ing comments from beyond the
conrines or the General Staff, Col. William Lassiter or the War Plans Division
sent the tables to the comma ndants of the Infantry School at Fo rt Benni ng,
Georgia; the Ge neral Service Schoo ls at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and the
General Staff College in Washington, D.C., as well as to General Pershing's
A EF headqua rters in Washington.17
Faced with the possibility or having a decision made without his views being
considered, on I G June Pershing fina lly forwarded the Superior Board report
along with his comments aboul the in fant ry div ision, which differed substantially
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90
from the board's findings , to Baker. [n comments prepared mostly by Col. Fox
Conne r, Pershing suggested a 16,875man division having a single infantry
brigade of three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, a cavalry squadron , and
combat support and combat service support uni ts, a design that foreshadowed the
triangular division the Army adopted for World War 11 .18
Pershing felt the Superior Board undertook its work 100 soon aftcr the close
of hostilities and that its report suffered unduly from the special circu mstances 011
the Western Front. After examini ng all organi zationa l features, he concl uded that
no one divis ional structure was ideal for all batt lefi eld situations. Factors stich as
the mobi lity and flexibility of the division to meet a variety of tasks, the probable
theater of operations, and the road or ra il network available to support the division had to be weighed. The most likely future theater of war for the Army was
still considered to be Nort h America, and he believed that the infan try divisions
employed in France were too unwieldy and immobile for that region. Therefore,
he recommended a small mobi le d ivision.19
According to Pershing, specific signposts marked the path to a smaller d ivision, among them putting infreq uently used support uni ts at the army corps or
army level, organizing the divisional staff to handle needed attached units, making a machine gun company an integra l part of the infantry battalion, and providing horse- or mul e-drawn veh icles throughout the division because of the poor
roads in the United States. Sum marizing the requirements for the infantry division, he wrote: " T he division should be sma ll enough to permit its bei ng
deployed from ... a single road in a few hours and, when moving by rail, to permit all of its elements to be assembled on a si ngle railroad line within twenty-four
hOllrs; thi s means that the division must not exceed 20,000 as maximum."20
On 18 June representatives from the General Staff and Pershing's headquarters conferred to iron OLi t the differences between the two posit ions. The conference failed to reach agreement. Therefore, at Baker's di rection , a special commitIce met to solve Ihis organizational issue,2!
Like the Superior Board, the Spec ial Committee, commonly referred to as the
La ssi ter Commi ttee, drew upon the talents of fo n ner AEF officers. From the
General Staff, besides Co lonel Lassiter, came Lt. Col. Briant H. Wells, Maj. John
W Gulick, and Capt. Arthur W Lane. Maj s. Stuart Hei ntzelman and Campbell
King represented the General Staff Co llege; Maj. Hugh A. Drum, the Genera l
Services Schools; and Col. Charles S. Farnsworl h, the Infantry School. Col. Fox
Conner and Capt. George C. Marshall spoke for Persh ing. Except for Farnsworth,
who had commanded the 37th Div ision during combat, all had held army corps,
army, and General Headquarters staff positions where they had gained firsthand
knowledge about the operation of div isions and higher commands in France. [n
addition, Wells had helped draft the initial proposal for the square div ision adopted during the war; Con ner had been a French interpreter for the General Staff in
19 [7 when the proposal was prepared; and Hein tzel ma n had edited General
Pershing's report of operations in France.22
THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR 1
91
Meeti ng between 22 June and 8 July 1920, the commi ttee examined three
questions: Was the World War I division too large? Irso, should the Army adopt a
smaller division comprising three in fantry regiments? Finally, if a division of four
infantry regiments were retained, could it be reduced to fewer than 20,000 men, a
figure acceptable \0 Pershing?23
The committee reviewed all previous divisional studies and recommendations; acquainted itself w ith views held by officers of the General Staff, departments, and operating services of the Army about divisions; and investigated the
views about them developed al the service schoo ls since the end of the war.
Approximately seven ty officers appea red before the committee, including Col.
William (Billy) Mitchell of the Air Service and Brig. Gen. Samuel D.
Rochenback, the former chief of the Tank Corps, who testified about two new
weapon systems lIsed in the war- the airplane and the tank.24
From the evidence, the committee concluded that the wartime infantry division was 100 large and unwieldy. In reality it had been an army corps without the
proper organ ization. The division's size made moving the unit by road and railroad 01' passing through lines an extremely complex and time-consuming process.
Furthermore, its size had compl icated the problems of command and control of
all activities in combat.25
The committee examined various organizational options. The argument for
th rce (versus four) infantry regiments in the division centered on the division's
probable area of employment, North America. Experts deemed another war in
Europe unl ikely, and they doubted that the Army would agai n fight on a battlefield like that see n in France. They felt technological advan ces in artillery,
machine guns, and aviation made obsolete stabilized and highly organ ized lines
and flanks resting on impassable obstacles , such as those encountered 0 11 the
Western Front. Future enem ies would most likely organize their forces in g reat
depth; therefore, the Army had to be prepared to overcome that cha llenge.
Nevert heless, the committee bel ieved a div ision of four infa ntry regimen ts,
although lacking the flexi bil ity of Pershing's suggested unit, would have the necessary mobility and striki ng power. Divisional support troops needed to be reduced,
but the retention of the square d ivision preserved the organizations for army corps
and armies that had been developed during the war. Because most officers were
famil iar with those uni ts, no change in doctrine was required above the d ivision
level. On a more mundane level, the retention of general officers' billets also inn uenced those who wanted to keep the square division. Its brigades requi red brigadier
generals, which allowed ofl'icers to rise from second lieutenants to general officers
within their specialties, while a smaller triangular division would term inate that
progression at the colonel level. Concluding its examination, the committee decided
a fie ld commander could more readily modify the square di vision to oppose a lesser enemy than strengthen a smaller organization to fight a powerful foe.26
The third question remained: Could the Army reduce the size of the square
d iv ision to increase mobi lity? Recolll mendation s to achieve this included a reduc-
92
lion in the !lumber of platoons in the in fantry company from four to three and a
cut in the number of companies in the battalion by a like amount, a realignment
of the ratio between rifles and machine guns, elimination of the 155~mm. howitzers, and the removal of unnecessary support troops. The division could obtain
add itional I'roops from pools of combat support and service units located at the
army corps or army leveL The Lassiter Committee concl uded that the square division cou ld be cui in size yet retain much of its firepower.27
After making its report, the Lassiter Committee prepared tentat ive tables of
organization for the div ision, wh ich March approved on 3 1 August. When the
War Department d ist ributed the draft tables in the fa ll of 1920 for the divis ion,
it totaled 19,385 officers and enlisted men (Cho!'1 5) and covered about thirty
miles of road space in march formation. To arrive at that strength and size, each
of the four infantry regiments lost 700 men. T he regiment cons isted of three
in fantry battalions and su pp ly, howitzer, and headquarters com panies. Each battalion included o ne machine gun compa ny and three rifle companies. T he
assignment of a machine gun com pany to each infantry battalion simp li fied
command and con trol of those weapons, and the realignment of the guns created a substan tial saving in personnel. Machine gun units were e liminated from
the infantry brigades, and the divisional machine gun battalion was replaced by
a tank company, which was 10 serve as a di visional mobile reserve. The committee endorsed Pershing's suggestion of a divisional tank company bu t was
aware that a single company could not mOll nt an effective attack on a stabilized
front; the la rge numbers of tanks requ ired for that type of operation would have
to come from the army level. T he committee dropped the 155-mm. howitzer
regiment but stipulated its return to the d ivision whcn these weapons acqu ired
the necessary mobility for use on the North American con tinent. The engineer
regiment and train were combined and reorganized initially as a battalion
because the planners thought that the divis ion had little nced for large numbers
of engineers in mobile warfare, which precluded building ex tensive fortifications, trenches, and simil ar works. The chief of engineers and others, however,
insisted that the regiment be retained to assure mobility, permit training of lieutenant co lonels and co lonels, and prov ide the opportunity for higher grade officers to serve at least olle year in five with troops. March thus deci ded to retain
the engineer regiment but red uced its number frolll 1,83 1 officers and enlisted
men to 867. All these changes husbanded personnel spaces an d increased
mobility without lessening fi repower.2 8
Substantial reductions also took place in d ivisional services. The committee
cut the size of the ammunition train from 1,333 to 169 officers and enlisted
men and changed its missio n to serve only the field artillery brigade.
Ammunition resupply for all other divisional elements shifted to the tactical
units and qua rtermaster train. T hat train consisted of half motorized and half
animal-drawn transportation, presuming the potent ial theater of operations to
be the rugged North American continent. Ordnance personnel formerly
On 20 April 1921 the motor'Vcl. company wu moved 10 the trains and
the serviet company added 10 speci.ltroops.
, Oivt"on hndQu,nef$ detachmentatrnMtled 27 Apra 1921 by the division

hlldquartlrl company.
IiOU
FA BTRY
CHART 5- lnfantry Division, 7 October 1920
MEDICAL
PERSONNEL
18
94
attac hed to th e va riolls regiments and the mob ile repa ir shop were gro uped in
an ordnance com pany, central izi ng all ordnance maintenance. A signal company replaced the signa l battalion , and it assumed responsibilit y for message traffic between division and brigade headquarters. Withi n the infantry and fi eld
arti llery regiments, men from the combat arms were to handle a ll communications. The new division abandoned the traill headquarters and military police
organization , following the recommendation orthe Superior Board, but retained
a separate mi litary police company. Given the many small separate compani es
in il s structure (d ivision headquarters, signal, lank, service, ord nance, and mili
tary police), the division incl uded a new organization , headquarters, speci a l
troops, to handle their administration and discipline.
The committee substitutcd a medical regiment for the san itary train and
revamped health services. Three hospital companies replaced the four used during the wa r, and the number or ambulance compani es in the regiment was similarly reduced. In addition, a sani tary (collecting) battalion compri sing three companies corrected the need for li tter-bearers, who had previously been taken from
co mbat units. Veterinarian s, forme rly scattered throughout the di vision , now
formed a veterinary com pany. A laboratory sect ion, a supply section, and a service company compl eted the new regiment. Despite the innovations, the regiment
fi elded about the same number of men as it s World War I eounterpart. 29
Allesting to the greater depth envisaged for th e battlefield, an air squadron
of thirteen airp lanes was to serve as the reconna issance unit for the divi sion. As
undcr the wartime configu ration, unit s for grou nd reconnai ssance were to be
attached as needed .30
Al though the comm ittee 's infantry divis ion was larger than that contemplated
in Pershing's proposal, the planners believed it had only those organic elements
necessary ror immediate employment under normal conditions. In an emergency,
the new di vision could be quickly adj usted to meet an enemy armed with inferior
arms and equipme nt. The problem the pl anners tried to address was how to
design a d ivision to deal with superior forces without significant ly modifying il.
The committee's div ision, nevert heless, had it s opponents. Conner and Marshall
of Pershing's staff sti ll preferred the small er triangular division for its mobility
and ease of command and co nt rol. Years later Marshall reca ll ed that if
Heintze lman and King had not been such " kindly characters," the triangular division would have been adopted instead of Drum 's large division ) 1
The question arises why Pershing, after becoming chief of staff on I July
192 1, fai led to replace the infantry div ision wit h one more compatibl e with hi s
co ncept ofbattlerield mobility. Marshall pointed out later that the basi c recom mendat ion for retaining the square infantry division came from his own ofTi eel'S, the Superior Boa rd. To d isavow their ad vice would have been an embarra ss ment. Furthermore, by July 1921 th e reorgani zation of the divi sions had
already begun. To undo so much work would have been unrea list ic and wou ld
have implied a lack or leaders hi p within th e Ar my. Th erefore , the sq uare
T HE AFTERMATH OF WOR L D WAR I
95
infantry division stood with the understanding that il might be modified to deal
wit h a pa rticular cncmy.32
T he Lassi ter Commi ttee appare ntly devoted li tt ie atten tion to the cava lry
div ision and recorded less about its rat ionale for retaini ng the unit. Mobi lity
and firepower dominated the new organizat ion . T he COl/al,y JOI/I'I/(//, the offic ial organ fo r the ann , had repeated ly condemned the 19 17 o rganizatio n as an
absu rd ity. Burdened w ith Illorc than 18,000 men and J 6,000 an ima ls, Ihe division was 100 large and cu mbersome. It required a preposte rous amoun t of road
space, roughly thi rty m iles. and was incapable of maneuver because il lacked
an efficie nt communication system.33
The postwa r caval ry di visio n, approx imately two-fift hs the size of its predecessor, abandoned thc thrce-bri gade structure (Chol'l 6). It incl uded two cavalry brigades (two cava lry regi men ts <1I1d one machi ne gUll squadro n each), one
horse arti ll ery batt alio n, and combat a nd service support units. Each cava lry
regi mcnt cons istcd of two sq uad ro ns (of threc troops each), a headquarters and
hcadq uarters troop and a scrv ice troop. Init ially Ihe comm ittee desired a thi rd
squadron to train men and horses . wh ich rcp rcscnted a major invcstm ent in
timc and money. Ma rch denied the rcquest bccausc the Army was to ma intai n
twini ng centers. Unlike the infa ntry, which incorporated the mach inc gun in to
the regi ment, cavalry mai nta ined sepa rate mach ine gun squad rons of th ree
tTOOpS each because of the pcrcc ived im mobi lity of such weapo ns compared
wit h other d ivisio nal a rm s. A headquarters for speci al troops was authorized,
under whi ch wc re pl aced the d iv is io n hcadq uarters troop, a s ig na l troop, a n
o rdna ncc mai nte nance com pany, and a vctcrinary co mpany. All transportatio n
was pack- or anima l-drawn, except fo r 14 cars, 28 truc ks, and 65 moto rcycles
scattered throughout varioll s headquartc rs ele mcnts in the d ivis ion. Wi thout
trains, thc d iv ision measured a p proxi m atcly 6.5 mi les if the men rode in
columns of twos. The Army c hief of stafT approved the new cava lry d iv ision on
3 1 August 1920.34
After approving both types of di visio ns, March di rected thc preparation of
final tables of organ ization. When published the follow ing year, the infantry division fc ll just below Pershing's recom mcndat ion of 20,000, !l umbering 19,997
ofTicers and en listed mcn. T he cava lry d ivision tota led 7,463.35
As the War Plans Div ision prcpared the new tabl es, it also deve loped tables
for underst rcngth peacetime units bceause the Army's lelldershi p did not cx pect to
be able to maintain the nu mber of mcn authorized under the National Defense
Act. These tables werc designed so tha t the un its could expand withou t having to
undergo reorganization. The peacetime infan try division was th us cut to 11,000
with all e lemen ts retaining thc ir intcgrity cxeept the div ision hcadquarters and
military police compan ies, which were combined. T he peaceti me cava lry div ision
strcngth was set at 6,000. But scvere cuts in the Wa r Depa rtmen t's budget made it
impossi bl e ini tia lly evcn to publish the peacetime tabl es. Fort unately, the serv ice
jOlll'1l11 ls undertook that task.36
I.
418/111
"
MEO&CHAP
131"
CAVTRP
SUPPLVTRP
ISQONMHD
35
'"
CAVSQON
III
I
31J
MED&CHAP
/6188
276
OIV TRAINS (aMI
1Includes lour Medical Department personnel and two Chaplains that were attached.
MED&CHAP
15
'"
MG TAP
"
FA BTRV
TO'
HHD
227
HHT
HHB&C8TTRAlNS
392
790
FABN
MG SOON
63
MEO CO (AMBI
I,I55e8
357
ENGR BN
CAY REGT
2,803ea
34'
HHT
CAY BOE
OIVHQ
CAVALRY DIVISION
7,463
CHART 6-Cavalry Division, 4 April 1921
~3CHAP ~
38
VET UNIT
ORO MT CO
MEO
~
~
" ~
~
78
SIG TRP
'"
DIV HQ TRP
"
HQ
337
SPECIAL TROOPS
THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WA R I
97
Reorganization ofDivisions
March directed the War Pla ns Div ision to implement the tentative tables of
organization he had approved. Plranni ng for reorganization of the Army had been
under way si nce 5 June 1920, when the War Plans Division had sel up committees
to carry out the provisions of the National Defense Act. Officers from the Genera l
Staff, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserves helped formulate the plans)7
One com mi ttee, origina ll y charged w it h defining the miss ions of the
National Guard and the Orga nized Reserves, widened its task to encompass the
Regular Army. The committee del ineated fo ur missions for the regulars: form
an expeditionary force in an emerge ncy; furn ish troops for foreign and coastal
defense ga rrisons; provide person nel to develop and train the reserve compo
nents; a nd su pply the ad m in ist rative overhead of the Army. T he National
Guard's dual m iss io ns rema ined unc ha nged . It contributcd to the federa l forces
during nationa l emergencies or war and supplied the states w it h forces to main
taill law and o rder and cope with loca l disasters . The mission of the Organized
Reserves was to expand the Army d uri ng war or nationa l emergencies. Because
of the strong antiwar sentiment afler World War I, the cxpense of mai ntaining
large numbers of enlisted men, the lack of trai ning fac ilities, and the possibl e
adverse effec t o n the rec ru itment for the Guard, u n its of the Orga n ized
Reserves were to have only o ffi cers and en listed cadres. Afler a declaration of
war or nationa l emergency, the rema inder o f the en listed men woul d come from
volu ntary enlistments or the drafl.38
Anot her committee looked into the number of divisions that cou ld be orga
nized and supported d uring peaceti me. Given a Regular Army of296,000 officers
and en listed men, the commi ttee determ ined that the War Depart ment cou ld
mai ntain nine infa nt ry divisions (one per corps area), three cavalry divisions (one
per army area), and one infan try brigade of black troops in the Un ited States. Of
these divisions, one cava lry and three in fan try div isions were to be ready for war
whi le the ot hers were to be at red uced strength. Th is arrangement evenly distributed the ex peditionary fo rces throughout the nation and provided an infan try division to serve as a mode l for the reserves withi n each corps area.39
In view o f the g reat personne l tu rbulence caused by the rap id demobilization,
the commi u ee recommended that the Regul ar Army quickly rebu il d its seven
existing in fantry divisions to meet the strength in the new peacetime tables and
permit the units to conduct realistic training. T he other two plan ned infantry divisions could be organized aner the first seven had reached their reduced strength
leve l, and whe n a ll nine atta ined that level one or more divis io ns cou ld be
increased to ful l man ning for war. How the Regu lar cavalry divisions were to be
formed remained unaddressed . With 486,000 men in the National Guard. the
committee envisioned forming eighteen Guard infan try div isions, two for each
corps area , and three or more Guard cava lry di visions, at least one fo r each army
area. For the Organ ized Reserves, twenty seven infan try div isions were contem-
98
plated, three PCI" corps area, and three or morc cavalry divi sions, at least one for
each army area .4 0
When March approved the structure of infantry and cavalry divi sions, he also
sanctioned the formation o f divisions based on that report. Instead of three Regular
Army cava lry divisions, he saw a need for only two. The Army's mobilization base
would thus be fifty-four infantry divisions and eight or more cavalry divisions.41
Reorganization of the Regular Army began in late 1920 as the infantry elements of the 151 through 7th Division s began to adopt the new peacetime tables.
In the 2d Division a Regular Army infantry brigade, the 4t h, replaced the Marine
Corps unit that had been attached to Ihe div ision in France. As tables for other
d ivisional units became available, they too were put into e ffeCl.42
All this work quickly appea red somewhat premature. By the fall of 1921, cut s
in Army appropriations indicated that the Regular Army could not support seven
infantry divisions in the United States. Secretary of War John W. Weeks, there~
fo re, instituted a po li cy allowing inactive units to remain on the " roll s" of the
Army but in an inoperable status -that is, without personnel and eq uipment.
Congression al in sistence o n maintaining the tactical di v ision framewo rks to
ensure immediate and comp lete mobili zation made such arrangements necessary.
Judging that nothing was wrong with the mobil ization plan, but recogni zing the
shortage o f fun ds for the fiscal year, Weeks directed that some units be taken "out
of commi ssion" or inactivated. The policy represented a marked departure from
past Army experience. PreviolLsly, when a unit could not be maintained or was
not needed. it was removed from the roll s of the Army either by disbandment or
conso lida tion wi th another unit. Acting othe rwise threatened to obscure the
Army's reduced strength through a faca de of paper units.43
Nevert he less, under the new system the Army cut the div isional forces in
September and October 1921 by inactivating the 4th through the 7th Divisions,
except for the even numbered infantry bri gade in each. These brigades- the 8th,
10th, 12th, and 14th- remained active to serve as the nucle i of their parent divisions upon mobilization. To save even more personne l, th e 2d Divi sion , prog rammed at wartime strength, was placed under the reduccd strength tables, leaving the Army wi thout a fully manned divi sion in Ihe United States.44
During the summcr of 192 1 the General Staff turned its attention to Regu lar
Army cava lry divisions. On 20 August the adjutant general constituted the 1st and
2d Cavalry Divisions to meet partial mobil ization req uirements, and the fol lowing month the commandcr of the Eighth Corps Area organized the 1st Cavalry
Di vision. Thc headquarters of the division and it s 2d Bri gade were located at Fort
Bli ss, Texas, and that of the I sl Cavalry Bri gade <It Douglas, Arizona. Resources
were not available to organize a second cava lry division unlil World War 11.45
T he Regular Army di visions underwent postwar reorgani zation and reduct ion
even before the War Departmcnt could determi ne thei r permanent station s. A
comrnitlee establ ished in June 1920 to make recommendations about posti ng
units never submitted a report because of the unsettled size of the Regu lar Army.
THE AFTERMAT H OF WORLD WAR I
99
When Congress funded a Regular Army of 150,000 enl isted men for 1922, the
Acting Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, directed a new war plans
group to prepare an olltl ine for stationing these troops. If possible, he wanted
un its to have adeq uate hOllsing and training facili ties as we ll as to be located
where the men cou ld assist in the development of the reserve components. The
recom mendations ca lled for the Second and Ninth Corps Areas each to have an
infantry division, the Eighth Corps Area to have both infantry and cava lry divisions, and the remaining corps areas each to have a reinforced brigade.46
As the ex isting div isions and brigades moved to their permanent stations in
1922, the Army organized the 16th and 18th Infantry Brigades to complete the
Regular Anny portion of the plan (Table 8). To fulfill mobilization req uirements
for nine Regular Army infantry divisions, the adjutant general also restored the
8th and 9th Divisions to the rolls in 1923, but they remained inactive except for
their 16th and 18t h Infantry Brigades. The stationing plan allowed the regulars to
su pport the reserves, but only the 2d Div ision was concentrated at one post- Fort
Sam Houston, Texas. 47
The last large unit recommended for the Regular Army in 1920 was a black
brigade schedu led for service along the Mexican border. However, only four
black regimcnts, two cava lry and two in fan try, remained after the war, and the
War Department decided Ihal thcy should not be brigaded. In 1922 IwO of them,
the 10th Cavalry and the 25th In fant ry, served along the border. Of the remainder,
the 9t h Cclvalry was stati oned at Fort Ri ley. Kansas, the home of the Cavalry
Sc hoo l, and the 24 th Infantry was posted to Fort Benn ing, Georgia, where the
lnfanl'ry School had been established. 48
The post- World War I Army al so maintained force s in the Ph ili ppine Islands,
China, the Panama Canal Zone, Puerto Ri co, Germany, and Hawaii. To assure
that these areas were adequately garrisoned, the Wa r Plans Di vision examined
their manning needs. Based upon its findings, March approved the formati on of
the Panama Canal , Hawaiian, and Philippine Divisions. In 192 1 the commanders
of those overseas depa rtments organized their units as best they could from avai lable person nel and equipment. The infantry and field artillery brigades and many
of the other divisional elements had numerical designations that wou ld be associated with the 10th, II th , and 12th Divi sions. These elements, all table of organi zation units, could be assigned wherever needed in the force. Because the divisions themselves were not expected to serve out side of their respect ive territories,
they had territorial des igna tions. The d ivision headqu arters were at Quarry
Heights, Canal Zone; Schofield Barracks, Hawaii ; and Fort Wi lliam McKinley,
Phil ipp ine Islands. Personnel for the Hawaiian and Panama Ca nal Di visions came
from the Regular Army, but the Phi lippine Di vision was fi lled with both regu lars
and Philippine Scout s, with the latter in the majority.49
Section V of the Nat iona l Defense Act prescribed a committee to devise plans
for organizi ng the Nat iona l Guard di visions. Formed in August 1920, this g roup
consisted of Regular Army and Guard officers who represented thei r embryonic
100
TAB LE 8
Distribution of Regular Army Divisions and Brigades, 1922

COIl'S Area
First
Second
Third
Vllif
18th Infantry Brigade

(9th Division)
1st Division
[6th Infantry Brigade
(8th Division)
Stafioll
Fort Devens, Muss.

Fort Hamilton, N.Y.
Fort Howard, Md.
Fourth

(4th Division)
Fort Mc Pherson, Gn.
Fifth

(51h Division)
12th In fantry Brigade
(6th Division)
(7th Division)
2d Division
1st Cavalry Division
3d Division
Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind.
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ni nth
Fort Sheridan, Ill,

Fort Omaha, Neb.
Fort Sam Houston, Tex.
FOri Bliss, Tex.
Fort Lewis, Wash.
(Units in parentheses arc the inactive parent organizations.)
corps areas. Wi thin a short lime the committee presented the states with a blueprint
fo r eighteen infantry divisions. Corps area commanders were to resolve any divergent views or disputes among the slates over the allotment of the units. The plan
offered the states the 26th through the 41st Divisions, organized during World War
I, and three new units, the 43d, 44th, and 45th Divisions, as Guard uni ts. The 42d
" Rainbow" Division was omitted because it lacked an association with any pm1ielllar state or geographic area. All corps areas except the Fourth received two divisional designations. Thc states in the Fourth Corps Area, which had raised the 30th,
31 st, and 39th Divisions during World War I, decided to reorganize the 30th and
39th Divisions. By the spring of 192 1 the states had agreed on the allotmen t of
most units in the infantry div isions, the War Department had furnished the new
divisional tables of organization, and the states had begun to reorganize their forces
accordingly. Between 1921 and 1935 the National Guard Bureau granted federal
recognition to the headquarters of all eighteen Guard infantry divi sions (7i:lble 9).
Although a few divisions lacked federally recogn ized headquarters unti l the 1930s,
most of the divisional clemcnts were granted federal recogn ition in the 1920s.50
The historical continu ity of Guard units rested upon geographic areas that
supported the organizations, and during the reorganization most units adopted the
designations used during World War I. Some shifting of units to new geographic
areas took place, resulting in some designation changes. For example, in World
War 1 Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi had ra ised the 39th Div ision , but
THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR 1
101
when the 39th was reorgan ized in the postwar era Florida, Alabama, Mississippi,
and Lou isiana supported the unit. Subsequently. a j o int board of Regular and
Guard officers recommended that the division be renamed the 3151 Division, a
unit that during the war had rai sed troops from Florida, Alabama, and Georgia.
Secretary Weeks approved the change, and on I July 1923 the 391h Division was
replaced by the 3 151 Div ision.51
The allocation and organization of the Guard cava lry divisions fo ll owed the
same procedure as the infantry divisions. But in order to lise all ex isting cavalry
units, a fourth cavalry division was added to the force. In 192 1 the formation of
the 21 st through 24th Cavalry Divi sions began with the First, Second, and Third
Army Areas supporting the 21 st, 22d, and 24t h Cava lry Divisions. respectively.
The 23d was the nat ion's at-large cavalry divi sion, supported by all army areas
(Table 10). In a short time the division s had the prescribed cavalry regiment s and
machine gu n sq uadrons but not thc majority of their support organizations.52
The organization of the third component's units began in 1921 when the War
Depa rtm en t published S pecia l Reg ul at ions No. 46, General Policies alld
Regulatiolls for the Orgallized Reserves. The regulations cxplai ned the procedures for adm ini stering, train ing, and mobilizing the Organized Reserves and
provided a tentative out line for thc corps area commanders to fo llow in organizing the units. Using the out line and a 6 Apri l 1921 troop allotment for twentyseven in fant ry divisions, corps area commanders set up plan ning boards to establish the units. In locating them, the boards considered the dist ribution and occupations of the population , attempting to station the units where they would be
most li kely to receive effecti ve suppo rt. For exa mpl e, a medi ca l unit was not
located in an area where there was no civ ilian medical faci lity. Arter determining
the location of the un its and giving the Guard some time to recruit, thus avoiding
competition with it, officers began to organize the 76th through the 91st and the
94th through thc l04th Di visions.53
Recruiting the units proved to be slow. Regular Army advisers were armed
with lists of potential reservists and little else. There were not enough recruiters,
office spa ce a nd eq uipm en t, or fu nds avai la bl e to accomplish th e wo rk.
Furthe rmore, a marked apathy towa rd the mi li tary prevailed throughout the
nati on. By March 1922, however, alltwenty-sevcn infantry divisions had skeletal
headquarters (see Table 9).54
To complete the di visio nal forces in the Organized Reserves, the War
Department added the 61 st through the 66th Cavalry Divisions to the rolls of the
Army on 15 October 1921. Corps area commanders followed the same procedures used previously for the infantry divisions in allotting and organizing them.
Within a few months they too emerged as skeletal organizations (see Table 10).55
Thus. in ea rly 1923 the Army had 66 divisions in the mobilizat ion force
shared aTllong three compo ncnts- II in the Regu lar Army (2 caval ry and 9
infant ry), 22 in the Natio nal Guard (4 c avalry and 18 infantry), and 33 in
Organized Reserves (6 cavalry and 27 infantry). In addit ion, three understrength
TABLE 9
A llotment of Reserve Com ponen t Infantry Divisions, 192 1
Corps Arett
First
Second
Dil';SjOIl
CQlllpo"t!II'
Loclltioll
43d
NG
NG
761h
941h
971h
OR
OR
OR
Connecticut and Rho<lc Islnl1d
27th
44th
NG
NG
New York
New Jersey, New York, and
77th
New York
981h
OR
OR
OR
281h
291h
NG
NG
791h
80th
OR
OR
99.h
OR
Pennsylvania
Maryland, Virginia. and
District of Columbia
Pennsylvania
Mmyland, Virginin, and
District of Colul11bill
Pennsylvania
30th
NG
Georgia, TcnncsSl.'C.
North Carolina, and
South Carolina
39th
NG
Alab:lIna. Florida,
81s1
87th
OR
OR
OR
37th
38th
NG
NG
8Jd
OR
OR
OR
Ohio
Kentucky. Indian:l. and
West Virginia
Ohio
Indiana
Kentucky and West Virginia
85th
861h
10Ist
NG
NG
OR
OR
OR

Illinois
Michigan
Illinois
Wisconsin
34th
NG
35th
88th
NG
OR
Iowa, Minncsota, North Dakota.

and South D:1kota
Ncbrnska, Kans.1S. and Missouri
MinncsOIa. Iowa. and North DakOla
26th
MIlSsachusclIs
Connecticut, Maine,
Rhode Island, :md Vermont
Mltssachusctls
Maine. New lIampshire, and
Vennonl
Delaware
78th
Third
Fourth
82d
Finh
84th
looth
Sixth
Sevcnth
J2d
J3d
New Jersey and Dclnw:1re

New York
Mississippi, and Louisiana

North Carolina and Tennessee
Soulh Carolina lind Georgia

Louisiana, MissiSSippi. and
Alabama
TA B LE 9 - Colllinued
Cmps Area
Eighth
Nim h
Dil'i.l'ioll
CompOlrellt
89!h
OR
102d
OR
36th
45th
NO
NO
90th
95!h
103d
OR
OR
OR
40!h
4 Is!
NO
NO
91st
96th
100th
OR
OR
OR
LoeatiOIl
South Dako!a. Nebraska, and

Kansas
Misso uri and Arkansas
Texas
Oklahoma, Colorado, New Mexico.
and Arizona
Texas
Oklahoma
New Mexico, Colorado, and
Arizona
Califonlia, Nevada, and Uta h
WashingWII, Oregon, Wyoming,
Momana, and Idaho
California
Oregon and Washingwn
Nevada, Utah. Wyoming, and
Idaho
TA BLE 10
Allotment of Reserve Component Cava lry Divisions, 192 1

Dh';sioll
COII/pollellt
21s1
NO
22d
NO
23d
NO
24th
NO
61st
62d
OR
OR
63d
OR
64th
OR
65th
661h
OR
OR
Locatioll
Ncw York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and

NelV Jersey
Georgia. Illinois, Indiana. Kcrnueky, Louisiana,
Michi ga n. Ohio. West Virginia,
and Wisconsin
Alabama. MassachuseUs. New Mexico,
North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and
Wisconsin
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Vlah, W,Lshinglon,
and Wyoming
New York and New Jersey
Maryland, Virginia, Distri ct of Columbia,
and Pennsylvania
Termcssce, Louisiana, Georgia, North Cllrolinll,
Texas, Oklahoma, and CoJomdo
Kentucky, Massachuscl1S, Vennolll, and
New Hampshire
l1Iino is, Michig,Hl, and Wiscons in
Nebras ka, Missouri , Utah, and Nort h Dakota
104
MANEUVER AND FIR EPOWER
infantry divisions were located overseas. No separate brigades ex isted. [n almost

every case, however, these divisions, which varied frolll inactive units to partia lly
manned organizations, were "paper tigers."
After World War I the Army quickly demobilized its force s, but memories of
the unpreparedness of 191 7 caused the nation to change Ihe way it maintained its
mil itary forces. Infantry and cavalry divisions, rather than regi ments or smaller
units, became the pillars that would support fu ture mobilization. Officers examined the st ructure of those pillars and adopted a modified, but powerful, sq uare
infantry division designed for frontal attack and a sma ll light cavalry division for
reconnaissance. Although the lessons of war in nuenced the structu re of these
divisions, morc traditional criteria regarding their local geographical employment
continued to affect their organization. Bul with no real enemy in sight and the
nation's adoption ofa generally isolationist roreign pol icy, it is not surprising that
Congress provided neit her the manpower nor the maleriel to equip even a caretaker force adequately.
THE A FTERMATH OF WO RLD WAR [
[05
Notes
I Wrapper Indorsement (Forwarding Report of AE.F. Superior Board on Organization and
Tactics). General Helldquartcrs (GHQ), AEF, to Sec of War, 16 Jun 20. AGO 322 (4- 19- 19), RG
407, NARA.
2 General HeailqlUlrler.l'. 1/l'lIIies, pp. 170- 91; Henry T. Allen, The Rhille/(md Occupation
(Indianapolis; Bobbs-Merrill Co .. 1927), p. 13 ; Huidckopcr, The His/Ol y oj the 33n/ Divi~'ioll , 1:
257- 95.
3 Gel/eNd Hemlt/tll/l'lets. Arlllie~', pp. 399- 404 ; Irwin L. Hunt , Americal/ Military
GOI'/:mml!llf a/ Occllpied Gel'll/(/IIY 1918- 1920 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1943), pp. 76- 84; Robert S. Thomas, "The United Stales Army 1914- 1923 ," pI. I, pp. XIX48-49, Ms in Historical Resources Branch. Center of Military History. hcrcaner cited as DAMHHSR.
4 Secolld Repol"I of the Promst MarsllUl Genera/to Ihe Secret(ll:V of IVar 011 the Operations
of Se/ecth'e Ser vice S)I.I"lelll 10 December 20. 191 8 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1919), p. 239.
5 Rpt of the Cors, ARIVO. 1919, pp. 451 - 52; lohn W. Sparrow, History of PerSQIIlle/
Demobilization of the Unitell States (W:lshington. D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952), pp.
11- 19.
6 WD Cir 77, 2 1 Nov 1918 ; Thomas, "The United States Arnly 1914- 1923," p. XX- 22;
DireC/oIJ ' ofTl"{)ops, pp. 1310- 16; Peyton C. March, The Nation at War (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, Dorn, and Co. , 1932), PI). 310- 25 . The New York Times /Ildex, vol. 7, nos. 1, 2, and
3, provides a quick guide to the divisional parades.
7 Memo, Ch of Operations Branch to TAG, 12 Aug 19, sub: Retention of Divisional
Organization, WPD filc 8481 - 131, RG 165. NARA; WD GO 91, 1919.
S Frederic L. Paxson, The Grellt Demobilizatio/l (Il/(l Ollw/" ES~'ays (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1941), p. 7.
9 March, The Na/ioll at /Va!", pp. 330- 33 , 336--41: Memo, WP D for Cors, 24 Feb 19, sub:
Tactical org:mizalioll of the division and higher tactical units, WrD 8481 - 116, RG 165 , NARA;
lohn MeA. Palmer, 'The Military Policy of the Uni ted States as Settled by Recen t Law and
Executive Order," lecture at the A WC, published in WO Bull 19, 1921.
to Memo, 0 - 5. AEF. to General Nolon, sub: Board of Rev icw, 16 Mar 19, RO 120, NARA;
Special Orders (SO) 98, AE F, 8 Apr 19, and Rpt ofthc Superior Board, AEF, on Organization
and Tactics, AGO 320 (6- 21- 20), Bulky Files, RG 407, NARA. Unless otherwise indicated, thc
following discussion of the infantry and cavalry divisions is based on the board report. Also see
rcports of the various postwar AEF boards 011 the arms and services, which are included in the
same file. Sec John B. Wilson, "Mobility Versus Fi repower: The Post-World War I Infantry
Division," P(//"{/II/elers 13 (Scp 1983): 48, for biogr:tphiea! data .. bollt the board members.
t t Rpt of the Superior Board, p. 85.
t2 Wrapper Indorsement (Forwarding Report of the AEF Superior Board), 16 lun 20.
Although Pershing held the report, its recommcndations werc widely known by the Army StalT.
t3 John Dickinson. The Bllilding of (/11 Arlll)' (New York: Century Co. , 1922), pp. 330-34.
t4 \VD Bull 25, 1920.
t5 WD GO 50, 1920; MCl11o, WPD for Oir. WI'D, 10 luI 20, sub: Committee No.2 Report
on Army Reorganization, AWe file 52- 21 , Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa,
hereafter cited as MHI.
t6 Melllo, WPO, 5 Jun 20, sub: COlllmittees for Working out An11 y Rcorganization, A we
file 52- 2 1.
t1 Memo, WPD to Gcneral StalT Collcge (hereafter cited as GSC), 14 lun 20. sub: Anny
Organization, 14 lun 20, with enclosures, Memo, WPD to GSe, 151un 20, sub: An11y Organization,
AWe file 52- 10. Pershing maint:tined an AEF headquartcrs in Washington between the time he
retunted from France and the time he assumed the position of Chief of StalT, AmlY.
106
MANEU VE R AND FIREPOWER
III Wra ppe r Indorsement (Forwardi ng Report of AEF SUllCrior [roard). 16 Jun 20: Dmll ent itled "Noles on O rgan izat ion" wilh Fox Conner's initials. undated. A we file 52- 21.
19 Wra pper Indorsement (Forwarding Report of AEF Superior Ooard). 16 Jun 20.
20 Ibid.
21 Me mo WPD to ase, IS Jun 20. sub: Army Organizalion. AWe file 52- 10. MHI ; Memo,
W]>I) 10 TAG. 2 1 JUI1 20. sub: Spcci(tl CO tllm iuee on Rco rgani z<ltion of the Army. AGO 320
(6- 2 1- 20), itO 401. NARA .
22 Rpl of Special Comm il1cc Appointed by Dir, WPD, to De fin e th e General I'l an of
Organi;r.3tion to be Adopted by the Anny of th e United Slaies provided by the Act of 4 June 20, 8
Jul 20, A we course material 52 51. M H L hcreaflcr cited as Rpl of Special CommillCc, WI'D. 8
Jul 20 : Wilson, "Mobility Versus FircllOwer." p. 49.
23 Ar1hur W. Lanc, "Tablcs ofOrgani z;! ti on," 111/011'1), JOI/I'lwl 18 (May 1921): 489- 91.
24 Ibid.; Wilson, "Mobilit y Versus Firepower," p. 49.
2S Lane, "Tables ofOrganiZ1\1101l," pp. 489- 91.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid. ; ApI). 2 10 Rpl of Special Commiuec, WI' D. 8 Jul 20: Memo. CofS, 3 1 Aug 20, no
subj ect. WPD fi le 6935- 1, RG 165, Draft T/Os. 7 Oct 1920. WI'D fil e 6935- 8. RG 407, NARA:
1'/0, 15 Oct 1920, DAMI-I-J-I SO.
29 Lane. "Tables ofOrganiz'ltion." pp. 489- 9 1; App. 2 to Rpl of Special COlll miuee, WI'D.
8 Jul 20 : T/O 1921, Table I W~r ( W), Infantry Di vision, 4 Ma y 1921.
)0 T IO, 192 1. Table I W, Infanl ry Division. 4 May 1921: HeM Sen'ice Regulations. 1923. p.
IS.
J I La ne. " Tables of Organization." pp. 489- 90; L1r. George C. Marshall to Fox Conner, 17
Jan 38, and lIr, Mnrshall to William M. SI)Cnccr. 18 Mar 38, Mars hall Papers, George C .
Marshall Rescarch Foundation, Lexington. Va.
J2 L1 r, George C. Marshall 10 Walton H. Walker, 2 1 Dec 37. Marshall Papers.
JJ Rpt of Special Committee. WI' D. 8 Jul 20; "Cavalry Organization." Ctll'O ft"), JOIII"II(lI 29
(J ul 20): 116; "Cavalry Reorganization," Cm'aftyJoul"llal30 (Jan 2 1): 62- 63.
)4 T/O 1921 , Table 401 W, Cavalry Division, 4 AI)r 2 1: Memo, GSC for DirofOpe T3lions.
30 Jul 20, sub: Comments on rel)on o f Special Commitlee on Reorganization o f the Reg ular
Army, Memo. eh of Cavalry for Col'S. 10 Aug 20, sub: Comments on l~ecommendat i ol1s of
Special Committec on Reorgani:llltion of the Army, II Aug 20. CSC file 848 1- 136. RG 165,
NA RA: Memo. Cots, 31 Aug 20 .
JS T/O. Table I W, Inr.,n try Oivision.4 May 2 1: TIO, Table 40 1 W, Cavalry Division. 4 Apr 2 1.
16 T/O, Table I Peace (I'), Infantry Division. 192 1: T/O, Table 401 I', Cava lry Division. 2 1:
"Tables of Organization", e m 'llll")' JOllrno/ 30 (Oct 192 1): 422- 15.
J7 Memo, Cots. 3 1 Aug 20 : Memo. WPD. 5 JUII 20 . sub: Committees for Worki ng Oul
Army Reo rga nization, A WC file 52-2 1.
311 Memo, WPO for Dir. WI'O. 10 J ul 20. sub: COlllmittee Rellorl on Army Reorgan ization.
A WC fil e 52-2 1.
39 Ibid. : R]>t ofCommillee 5. nppoinlcd by Dir. War Plans Di vision. Jun e 7, 1920,30 Ju1 20.
John L. 1-1 illCS Papers. LC.
40 Rpt ofCOlllmillce 5, 30 Jul 20.
41 Me mo. Cots, 3 1 Aug 20.
42 WD C irs 400 an d 415, 1920: GO 2, 1st Di vision. 1921: GO I, 3d Division, 1921; GO 2.
4th ~ivision. 192 1; GO 10. 5th Division. 192 1: GO I, 6th Division. 192 1: GO 23. 7th ~i v i s ion.
1921. copics of these and othcr divisional gelleral orders re lating 10 the I\:organi za tion of Rcgular
Army units in Oi \' isioll Gencral file . DAMH-I-ISO. Circ ular 400 ,authorized thc 2d Divis ion to be
at war strength. whi ch included its 41h Bri gadc.
43 WDG03I,I921.
44 WD GO 33, 192 1; GO 19 . 2d Di v ision. 1921. Di visio n Ge ne ral file, and 3d Ind.
lli slorica l Section. A WC to T AG, 15 No\' 21. 2d Inf Oiv file. both in DAM1-l-Ii SO.
T HE AFTERMATH OF WORLO WA R I
107
45 LIT, TAG to CG of all Corps Areas. 20 Aug 21. sub: Organi zation of lhe Cavalry. Cavalry
Reo rga ni zation file . 1921 .28, J-lis torical Data Card. \SI Cllvalry (Cav) Di v. DAMH-HSO. By 30
Jun e 1922 aOOll! 10,000 officers and enlisted men were aVlli lab1c in the fourteen active cavalry
regiments (see Annual Rpt. Sec o f War, 1922, p. 30 5).
46 Memo, WilD, S lUll 20, sub: Committee;; for Working out Army Reorganization; Memo
Ollcnllions (lnd Training Division. 0 - 3.1 1575 fo r DealS, 27 Dec 2 1, sub: COl11l11enls on Report
of Boa rd of GS officers relati ve 10 distribution. shelle r, and tmining areas for the Army (basic
report aHachcd). AGO 320 fil e. 27 Dec 2 1, RG 407, NARA,
47 LI T. TAG to CGs. all Corps Areas Oln<l Depls: Chief of Infan try; CO. American Forces in
Ge rman y: CG. FOT1 Benning, Ga.: :lnd COs of Exe mpted Places concerned. sub: Organization
and Redistribution of the Infantry, AGO Central file 1917- 25.320.2 (7- 15- 22) RG 407. NA RA :
WD GO 10. 1923.
48 Memo, WPD fo r Dir. WPD. 10 Ju l 20. sub: Committee RepoT1 on Army Reorganization:
" lJ rief History of the 24th Infantry." 27 Sep 26. Ms, 24th Infant ry fil e, DAM H-IIS0: Hisforieal
(lII(II'iefor/al Rel 'iew Secoud Cm'tilly Divisioll, Vllifetl SillIes Army (lJaton Rou ge. La.: Army
and Navy Publ ishing Co.. 1941). p. 50.
49 Mcmo. WPO for Oir. WPD, 9 Jul 20. sub : Strength of the Foreign ga rrisons requi rcd and
the ir s pccial organization. Availab lc troops to bc considered in the conncction (Report of
Committee No.3), 9 Jul 20, A WC 522 1, MHI ; WD C ir 149. 1921: WO GO 15, 192 1: Ltf. TAG
to CG. I' hilippine Dept., 22 Oct 22, sub: Completion of overseas gllrrison. 320 (10- 7- 2 1). 12th
Inf Div file. OAl\'IH-HSO: Relurns. Panama Cana l, I-Iawaiian, and Philippine Divisions. divisional liles, DAMH- HSO. Thc Nati olHII Defense Act contin ucd dep.1r1lllcnts in the Ilawai ian Islands,
thc Philippine Islands. and thc Panama Canal Zone.
50 Mcmo G- 3 for Corso 14 Mar 22, sub: Basic plan for the organiz,1tion o f the National
Guard . AGO 320 G12253 (10- 3 1 22) to (7- 28- 22). Bulky Fi les. RG 168, NA RA : Llr. TAG to
CGs all Corps Areas, 19 Oct 20. slI b: A llo tment of Na tional Guard troops, 323 (Misc. Div.); Llr,
Fourth Corps Area 10 TAG, 17 Nov 20. sub: AlIotmcnt of National GUlird Troops: and Ll r, TAG
to CG of all Corps Areas, 7 Dec 20, sub: Designation an d location of units of the National Gua rd
and lhe Orgililized Reserve, 325.344 (Misc. Div.). a ll Reference Files, Niltional Guard. DAMI-I
HSO. The g rantin g of federill recogni tion to divisional clements ma ybe Irllced through the
Official Nlllivl/al GI/ard RegiS/f'r 1931. 1936, (II/d 1939 and state and unit records in DAMI-II-ISO.
Regular Army members of the Section V committee were Col. Briant I-\, We lls. Lt. Col.
John W. Gulick. and Maj. William Bryden: the National Guard officers were Cols. Walter E.
Bare of Alaba nJa, Grced G. Ilammond of Oregon, Milton A. Reekord o f Ma ryland, George C.
Richards of Pen nsylvania. Frank M. Rumbold o f Missouri. and Franklin W. War of New York:
Lt. Cols. Chalmer R. Wilson o f Ohio and Guy M. Wilson of Michigan: and Majs. J. Ross Jves of
Connecticut and J. Wall Pilge of Texas.
51 Lt r., TAG to CGs of all Corps Areas. 7 Dec 20. sub: Designation and location o f units of
Ihe NlItional Gunrd and the Orga ni zed Reserves. Reference Files. Nationnl GUHd. DAMH-HSO:
RepfJI'l Offf/(' Chie/o/lhe Mililia Oil/Will, 1923, p. 11.
52 nfH oflhe ellie/v/fhe Militia Bureau , 1922. pp. 24- 26: Memo. WPD to TAG, 15 Feb 22.
sub: Normal numerical des igllil1ions o f un its of NlI1ional G uard Cuvu lry Divisions, WPD 9691.
AGO 325.455, a nd Llr. TAG to CGs al l Corps Areas. 29 Nov 21. sub: Revised Tables of normal
numerical designations of units NlI1ional Gua rd Cavalry Divisions, 325- 455 ( 11 28- 21) (Mise.
Div.), Reference Files, Natio nal Guard, DAMI-I-tISO.
53 Special Reg ulations No. 46. Gel/eNd Policies (I//(I Regllimiolls /01' the Org(lllized
Reserw!s. 1921: Ltr. Maj Gcn John L. tlines to John J. Pershing. 26 Dec 2 1. John L Hines
Papers, LC: L1 r. TAG to CGs all corps arcas, 24 Jun 21, sub: Nornlal numerical designa tions of
infantry divisions. AG 325.455, ReJcrcnce Files. Army Reserve, DAMII HSO.
The numbers 94, 103, and 104 werc new dcsignations, and Ihe num bers 92 and 93 were
omilled because during Ihe wa r these divisions had not come from anyone state or group of
st:lle5. Furtherlllore. Ihe 92d Division and 93d Dil'ision (Provisiona l) in Wo rld W:lr I had bcen
108
MA NE UVER AND FIREPDW ER
organized with Negro soldiers, and the department's pol icy WlIS 110t 10 maintain large Negro ullit s
during ]lcacctimc.
54 Repor/ oflfte Set:rCIlII'Y of Wlir. 1912. p. J 8; Organized Reserves (infantry di vision nOlcs).
Reference Files. AmlY Reserve, DAM II USO. Also sec Markell's notcs on Organizational 0313.
ROAD Brigades, Brigade General Files, DAM II-IIS0.
55 LIT. TAG \0 CGs all Corps Areas, 15 Oct 21, sub: Numerical designations of AmlY and
GHQ Reserve Troops, First, Second, and Third Ficld Armies, Organized Reserves, AG 320.2
Organized Reserves (10- 2 1- 21) (Misc. Di v.), AG Reference fi les, 1921 . OAMI I-I-ISO.
CHAPTER 5
A Return to the Past; A Look

to the Future
Nor call il be quesiiolleli llia( 'he Division as 11011' OIgallized (/11(/ composed . .. offoot.
(llIilll(ll, (111(/ 1II0/or elelllelll~. (Ill wil1t 1'(U),illg rales ojspeed, is III/eCOnomical, I/l/Il'ieldyalld
III/{u/apfel/to Ihe dem(Uuls o/mot/em lllo"ile \\'mfill"e.
General Malin Craig1
After establi shing post- World War I divisions, the Army experienced a prolonged period of stagnation and deterioration. The Nationa l Defense Act o f 1920
authorized a Regular Army of 296,000 men, but Congress gradually backed away
from that number. As wit h the Regular Army, the National Guard never recruited
its authorized 486,000 men, and the Organized Reserves became merely a pool of
reserve offi cers. The root of the Army's probl em was money. Cong ress yearly
appro priat ed o nl y a bo ll t hal f th e fund s tha t th e Ge ne ra l Staff requ es ted .
Im poverished in manpower and fund s, infantry and cavalry divisions dwindl ed to
ske letal organizations.
Meanwhile, the Genera l Sta ff and service schools searched for a divisional
structure, particularly for the in fantry. that best suited the conditions of modern
warfare. Like their European cou nterparts. American military pla nners remembered, above all , the indecisiveness that had dominated the battlefield in World
War I. The result had been a protracted war of hitherto unimagined devastation.
The sea rch for a sound divisional organization was part of the effort to find the
means of restoring decis iveness to warfare. Otherwise, victo rs might suffer as
much as, or even more than, the vanqui shed. These considerati ons drew attent ion
especia lly to va rious means of improv ing the di vision's mob ility and maneuverability so that the Army could avoid future wars of posit ion that would force it to
adopt the bloody strategy of att rition.
Paper Divisions
Between 1923 and 1939 divisions gradually declined as fighting organizati ons. A ft er Reg ul ar Army d ivis io ns moved to per ma ne nt P OS IS, the Wa r
Depa rtment mod ified command relat ionships between divisiona l units and the
corps areas. It placed elemen ts of the 1st and 3d Divisions and the 8th , 10th,
110
261h Divisioll parade. For' Del'el/oI'. Man'm: /Illsell.l'. 1925
12th, 14th, 16th. and 18th Infantry Brigades directly under Ihe corps area COTn*
manders, making d ivision and brigade com manders responsible only for unit
training. They were limited to hVO visits per year to their assigned clement s- and
that only if corps area commanders made funds avai lable. Latcr, as a further
economy move, the War Department reduced the number of command visits to
one pcr year, a restriction tha i dfectively dest royed the possibility of traini ng
units as com bined arms teams. 2
In July 1926 the co mmand er of th e 1st Division, Brig. Gen. Hu g h A.
Drum, wrote 10 Ihe Second Corps Area comma nder, Maj. Gen. Charles P.
Su mme ra ll , that "i t is not an exaggeration to say that the division as a unit
ex ists on ly o n paper."3 Drulll requested the return of all admi nistrative, logisti
ca l, and d iscip linary functions for hi s divi sional clements withi n the corps area
and aut hority to visit each div isiona l regiment once a month and each brigade
every three mont hs. He also wanted to o rganize a proper divi sion hcadquar
ters. Summera ll concu rred with Drum's requcst, but Chi c f of Staff Maj. Gen.
John L. Hinc5 denied it in thc in terest of cconomy and simp licity of adminis
tration, sup ply, and discipli ne. O n 31 Dcecmber 1926 Summe rall , by then
C hi ef of S taff, reve rsed the decis ion and gave Drum command of all 151
Divis ion units in the Second Corps Area and permission to reorganize the divisional headquarters. Drum could also coordi nate inspection arrangements with
other corps area com manders where his units we rc sta lioned. The following
July Summcra ll restored the samc privileges to thc 3d Division's commander,
A RETURNTOT I-I E PAST; A LOOK Toni E FUTURE
III
Bri g. Ge n. Richmond P. Davis. at

Fort Lewis, Was h ington. Bri gad e
co mmand e rs, howeve r. we re not
granted similar aU lhority.4
While discussing the need to
reconst itute the 151 Div ision as a
co mbat uni t, Drum stressed the
importan ce of buildin g es pr it.
Unro rtunate ly, the few tangible
sy mbol s the A rm y had lI sed to
e nh a nce mora le were init ially

denied to divisions and brigades
after the ""m', Regular Army soldiers
returning fro rn France were not
al lowed to wcar div isional shoulder
sleeve ins ignia because they "cl uttered " the uni fo rm . The men
appea led to Secretary of Wa r

Newton O. Bilker, who subsequently
approved the lI SC of s houlder sleeve
insi g ni" throughout t he Ar my.
When a division adopted a " patch" design, soldiers put it on their uniforms and
emblazoned it on their divisiona l nag. The other item, the ca mpaig n s trea mer,
representing participation in a major operation was denied to headquarte rs of
divisions and brigades because they were command and control units rat her than
righting organizations. Alt hough the policy was contested, it was not unt il aOer
th e I s t an d 3d Div is ions reestabli s hed effective hea dquart ers that the War
Depa rtmen t granted division and bri gade headq uarters the right to di splay on
their flags streamers symboli zing the campaigns in which they had directed their
subordinate units.S
A sharp decline in divisional readiness occurred aOer 1922, when Congress
<lgai l1 cut the Regular Army's size, th is time to 136,000 orricers and en li sted men.
T he C hief of Staff, General of the Armies John J. Pershi ng, reduced the strengt h
of the infan try d ivision from 11,000 to 9,200 men, but he did not authorize the
inactivation of any divisional elements. Four years later Congress expanded the
Army Air Corps wi thout a corresponding increase in the Army's total strength.
Rather than cut the size of ground combat units, the War Department turned
agai n to inactivating units. The Panama Canal Division lost an infan try regiment,
the 8t h Brigade an infantry battalion, and the 16th Brigade two infantry baltal
ions. Given con tinuing person nel shortages, the chief of infantry com plained in
1929 that not another man could be taken from his units if they were to conduct
cffective training. Therefore, another rou nd of inactivations look place. The 8th,
10th, 12th, 14th, and 18th Brigades and the Philippine Division each 10s1 a battalGel/eral SUlllmerall
11 2
MA NEUVER AND FIREPOWER
iOIl . A year later the Philippine Di vision inacti vated an infant ry brigade headqua r*
(ers, and in 193 1 the division lost another infantry regiment. 6
Infantry divisio ns also suffered shortages in the area of combat support. By
1930 the 151 and 2d Divisions and the Philippine Divisioll had the only active
medica l regiments in the Regular Army, and they were only partially organi zed.
During the previous year the War Department h.. d removed the air squadron and
its attached photographic section from the di vision. Simplic ity o f supply, maintenance, and coordina tio n and be tter use of pe rsonne l justified the reduction .
OfTsclling that loss, a small aviation section was added to the division headqua rters \0 coordinatc air activit ies after air units were attached. In 193 1, to provide
quartermaster personnel for posts and stations in the Unitcd States, the qua rt e r~
master train in each active divisio n except the 2d was reduced to two motor com ~
panics and a motor repair section . Bes ides these units the 2d retained one wagon
company. No train headquarters remained active )
Unlike the oth er orga nization s, in theory d ivi sional fi e ld arti ll e ry wa s
increased during the interwar years. Unti l 1929 the Army maintained two 75-mm .
gUll regiments for the 1st, 2d, and 3d Divisions and a battalion of 75s each for the
Panama Cana l Di vis ion , th e Ph ilippine Di vis ion , and the separate infantry
brig'ldes. The Hawaiian Divi sion fie lded one I 55-mill. howitzer and two 75-mm.
gun regiments, a [1 motorized. During 1929 Summ era ll restored the 1 55~ mm .
howitzer fi eld artillery regiment to all infantry divisions. Although the 155-mm .
howitzer still lacked the mobil ity of the 75 -mm . gun, the change made di vis iona l
artillery, in theory, commensurate wit h that found in fore ign armies.8
Bes ides a shortage of person nel, the 2d Di vision , the only di vision housed on
one post in the United States, lacked adequate troop quarters. Living conditions
at its home, Fort Sam Housto n. Texas, were deplorabl e for both offi cers and
enlisted men by the l1lid ~ I 920s. To remedy the s ituation the War Department
dec ided to break up the div ision in 1927 and move its 4th Brigade to Fort D. A.
Russe ll, Wyoming, where suita bl e quarters were available. That move left only
the Hawaiian Division concentrated at one post, Schofield Barracks, a situati on
that continued until the Army began to prepare for World War II. Thus, despite
the wishes o f Army leaders, by 193 0 the Army was agai n scattered throug ho ut the
eOUlnry in a number of iso lated bases.9
The cavalry di vision il lustrated other aspects of the Army's dilemma between
reali sm and idealism. In 1923 the 1st Cavalry Division he ld maneuvers for the fi rst
time, intending to ho ld them annually thereafter. However, fin ancia l constmints
made that impossible. On ly in [927, through the generosity of a few ranchers who
provided free [and, was the d ivi sion able to conduct such exerci ses again. to
In 1928 Maj . Gen. Herbert B. Crosby, Chief o f Cavalry, faced with personnel
ClilS in his arm, reorganized the cava lry reg iments, which in turn reduced the size
o f the c~l va l ry division. Crosby's goal was 10 decrease overhead whi le mainta ining
or increas ing firepower in the reg iment. After the reorgani zation the cava lry regiment consisted of a headquarters and headquarters troop, a machine gun Iroop,
Officers ({lIal'lers, ForI Salll HOlIstOIl, Texas; below, lsI C(J\I{/hy Divisioll
mallell vel'S,
",
349.-
113 ..
CAVSQON
M,~RP
.11 MfO;CHAP_1
92
I."lea
88
HHe
CAY REGT
233
MEO SOON
HHT
l~ l"""-~
HHT & BAND
411
2,972ea
37
ENGR SOON
CAY BOE
HHT
HHS& TRAIN~
27l
I
161 ..
FABTRY
46
SERV BTRY
IMED~CHAPI
I-
OROCO
" ~
155
TANK CO
IMED~CHAP ~
156
SIG TRP
DIV HO TRP
I "
HQ
555
278
SPfClAl TROOPS
420
CARSQON
I
r.JTRAlNS(OM
I
ARMORED
I
FA REGT
1.717
FABN
760.,
9.595
CAVALRY DIVISION
CHART 7-Cavalry Division, 1928
A RETURN TOTHE PAST; A LOOK TOTHE FUTURE
11 5
and Iwo squadrons each with Iwo troops. The cavalry bri gades' machi ne gun
squadrons were inactiva ted, while the responsibi lity for training and employing
machine guns (cillo the regimental commanders, as in the infantry. I I
About the same time that Crosby cui the cavalry regiment, the Army Staff,
seeking to increase the usefulness or the wartime cavalry division , published new
tables of orga ni zation for an even larger unit. The new structure summarized
changes made in the division since 1921 (Char' 7), which involved increasing the
size of the signal troop, expanding the rnedicaluni llo a squadron, and endorsing
Crosby's movement of the machine gun units from the brigades to the regiments.
A divisional aviation section, <In armored car sq uadron, and tank company were
added, and the field artil lery battalion was expanded to a regiment. Divisiona[
strength rose to 9 ,595. Allhough the new tabl es had little impact on the peacetime
cavalry structure, the 1st Cavalry Division did eventually receive one troop of an
experi mental armored car sq uadron, and a field arti l[ ery regiment rep [aced its
field arti[ lery ballalion.12
Even with austere cond itions, the Army did not lose sight of its tactica l missions. For exa mpl e, Maj. Gen. Preston Brown, commander of the Panama Canal
Department, urged the replacement of the Panama Cana l Division with Atlantic
and Pacific command groups. I-laving examined the supply system, the probabl e
tact ical employment of troops, and the adva ntages of other command system s, he
decided that a divi sional structure did not represent the best solution in the Canal
Zone. The War Department agreed to inactivate the division headquarters in 1932
with the understanding that spec ial tables of organization would be kept on file to
faci litate the reorganization or the division within a few hours. Such a si tuation ,
however, never occu rred, and Ihe division remained inactive. I)
Reserve Divisions
The condition of reserve divisions paralleled that or the Regu[ar Army. In
1924, th ree years after the states began reorganizing the Nat ional Guard divisions, the Militia Bureau suspended federal recogni tion of new uni ts because of
the chronic lack of money. The sllspension lasted two years, until Secretary of
War Dwight F. Davis lifted it to provide additional units for the states. T hat dec ision permitted further organization of the 40th Division (Ca lifo rnia), the least
developed ora ll the Guard infantry div isions . The repeal also allowed Minnesota
and New York to organize two infantry brigade headquarters, the 92d and 93d,
respectively, for nondivisionaluni ts to meet mobilization needs. 14
Infant ry divisions in the National Guard remained basica[ ly stabl e organizations despite being extreme ly under strength, and before 1940 only a few regimenta l changes were made. [n most divisions the art illery brigade's ammunition
train was not authorized because it had an exe[usively wartime mission . As in the
Regu lar Army, the 155-mm. howitzer regiment was authorized in 1930, and by
rnid-1937 all divisions had a federally recognized I 55-mm. howitzer regiment or
116
TABLE I I
Allotment of Nalional Guard Caval ry Brigades, 1927

Cmps Area
Vnif
First
59th
51 SI
Second
Th ird
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ni nth
52d
55th
Slales SI/pporfing
fI
Brig(l(le
Massachusetts and New Jersey

New York
Pennsyl vania
Louisiana, Tennessee, North Carolina,

and Georgia
54th
53d
Ohio and KCnlucky
57th
56th
58th
Iowa and Kansas
Wisconsin, [Ilinois, and Michigan

Texas
Wyoming and Idaho
part of one. The strength of in fan try div isions varied, but no di vision reached the
11 ,000 men prescribed in the peaceti me National Guard tables of organization.
The nadir was in 1926, fo llowing the suspension of federa l recognition. By 1939
Guard in fan try divisions averaged 8,300 troops each,lS
Nati onal Guard caval ry divisions proved unsati sfa ctory because they were
scattered over too large an area for effective trai ning. The Militia Bureau first
attac ked Ihe problem in 1927 , when it realigned some divisional elements to
reduce the geograph ic size of the divisions. Two years later the bureau limited
cava lry formation s 10 brigade-size units, assigning one brigade to each corps arca
(Table II). The format ion of the 59th Cavalry Brigade was authorized to meet the
need for the additional brigade called for in the plan . At that time the bureau
w ithdrew federal recogniti on from the 22d Cava lry Division headquarters, the
only cavalry division to have a federa lly recogni zed headquarters. Unlike Regular
Army cavalry regiments, Guard regiments reta ined their six line troops, except
those in the 52d Cavalry Brigade, whose regiments were able 10 recruit and maintain suffi cient personnel to support nine Iroops. 16
Brigades remained the 1 ~lrges t caval ry uni ts in the Guard unti l the l11 id- 1930s,
when Congress authorized an increase in its strength. In 1936 the Nationa l Guard
Bureau , form erly the Milit ia Bureau, returned to federally recognizing cava lry
division headquarters. By mid- 1940 the bureau had federa lly recognized headquarters for the 22d, 23d, and 24th Cavalry Divisions, but not for the 2 1sl. At that
time the 21st consisted of the 5 1st and 59th Cav<l lry Brig<ldes, the 22d of the 52d
<lIld 54th, the 23d of the 53d and 55th Brigades, and the 24t h of the 57th and 58th
Cavalry Brigades; the 56th Cav<l lry Brigade served liS a no ndivisional unil.17
The Organized Reserves maintained infantry <lnd cava lry div isions that were
authori zed a full complement of officers but only enli sted cadres. Many divisions
met or exceeded their manning leve ls fo r officers, but enl isted strength fell below
A RETURN TO THE PAST; A LOOK TO THE FUTURE
117
cadre level. In 1937 Secrctary of Wilr Harry W. Woodring he ld the opinion that
the dearth of enl isted men kept the Organized Reserves from contributing much
to mobilization. Under these conditions effective uniltrailling was impossible. 18
More Realistic Mobilization Plans

Mobilization underpinned the maintenance of divisions, bUllhc Army's preparedness program lacked substa nce. Undermanned divisions had no higher
command headquarters despite ambitious plans to g roup a ll 54 infantry divisions in the United Slates into 18 O rgmlized Reserve army corps and these
corps into 6 Organized Rese rve armies with each army also having 2 cavalry
divisions. In 1927 the General StafT began to shift toward more rea listic war
plans. When division and corps aret. commanders met in Washington to discuss
Army programs that year, one of the topics th ey examined was the sta tus of
Regular Army divisions and brigades. The senior ofTicers believed that reinforced brigades serv ing as nuclei of division s were impractical. Chief of StafT
Summera ll argued that 10 mobilize a ske letal division (a re inforced brigade)
wou ld take the same amount of time as organizing a comp letely new division
since both would have to be fill ed with recruits. 19
In August 1927 the stafT released new war plans for the Regular Army that
reassigned the active brigades of the 8th, 9t h, and 7th Divi sions to the 4th, 5th,
and 6th Divisions, respectively, and the inactive brigades of the last three divisions to the fi rst three. These were paper transactions only. In an emergency, however, the Regu lar Army wou ld now be able to field th e I st through the 6t h
Divisions. For the 4t h, 5th, and 6th , it needed only to activate divisional headquarters and support units. But with no station changes, the Army leadership lost
further sight of an important World War I lesson: the need to have divisions concentrated for combined arms training.20
Also in 1927, for echelons above div isions in the Regular Army, the adjutant
general constituted one army, one cavalry corps, and three army corps headquarters. In addition, the 3d Cavalry Division, a new Regular Army unit, was added to
the rolls to complete the cavalry corps. No army corps, cavalry corps, or army
headquarters was organized al that time, but moving these units in the mobilization plans from the Organized Reserve to the Regular Army theoretica lly made it
easier to organize the units in an emergency. The Organized Reserve units, after
all, were to be used to expand the Army following the mobi lization of Regu lar
Army and Nat ional Guard units.21
Wi th increased tens ions in the Fa .. East and the rearmamen t of Eu ropean
nations, Chi e f of StafT General Doug las MacArthur scrapped existi ng plans for
echelons above divisions and created an army g roup in 1932. He establi shed
Genera l Headquarters (GHQ), United States Army, with himset fa s commander,
and ordered the acti vation of four army headquarters, one each for the Atl antic
and Paci fi c coasts and th e Mexican and Canadian borders (Map 2). To the four
I
I
~l
THIRI
. . ------1. ....;-.. -
~~
O~.
FORT SAM HOI.

SAN ANTONIO
FI ELD A Rl\ IIES IN TilE UN ITED STATES

1932
(.
U. &. F...JJ .\"", '1<-"~I""1<"
I) . ~ .
MAP 2
V"M
'\""~' n, ,,,,~I
..)
".-,~
.'
-- .......
l
-.
l ' II .\
120
MANEUVE R AND FIRE POWER
army headquarters he ass ig ned e ig hteen army corps headquarters, and to the
corps headquarters the fifty -four infant ry di vis ions. The Regular Army caval ry
corps, which comprised the lSI, 2d, and 3d Cavalry Di visions, was assi gned to
the Fourth Army, and the fo ur mounted National Guard di vis ions to the GHQ.
Organi zed Reserve cavalry divisions remai ned in those areas where the armies
were to raise units.22
In plan ning fo r the four armies, Brig. Gen. Charles E. Kilbourne, chief ofthe
War Plans Di vision, suggested to MacArthur that he drive home to the president,
the secretary of war, and th e Cong ress exactly how the Army's streng th had
affected readiness. The Army could not even fie ld four infan try divisi ons as a
quick respon sc force because of the lack the men to fill such a force and the
bases to accommodate it. Furthermore, if sllch a forc e were c on ce ntrat e(~ or even
committed, it would be unable to support tra ining of the reserves. Kilbourne
viewed an increase in Army strength as unl ikely but nevertheless recommended
as a goa l the maintenance of four peace-strength infantry div isions, one for each
army, and fi ve rei nforced in fantry brigades.23
The War De partm en t established a n e mbryoni c rea din ess forc e on I
October 1933. Di visional forces returned to their pre-I 927 confi guration, wit h
the 1st, 2d, and 3d Di visions having two active infa ntry brigades and th e 4t h
through 9th Divi sion s hav ing only o ne active brigade each. In the Fourth Corps
Area the 4 th Divi sion also rece ived a thi rd active infantry reg im ent, another
step closer to the four-di vision ready force . Th e next year the f ield artillery
brigades of the Ist through 4th Divi sions were rea ligned to consist of one 155111m. howitzer and two 75-l11m. g un regiments, and each active infantry brigade
was aut horized a 75-mm. gun regiment. All fie ld arti llery units were parti ally
active. No d ivision or brigade was conce ntrated on a sing le post during the
reorganization.2 4
The fou r-army plan introduced some rea lism into the arrangements for mobi li z ing Regular Army infantry di vision s, bu t no true emergency force ex isted
because of personnel shortages. During the next few years the Army revised the
preparedness pla ns by reassigning divis ions and ass igni ng new priorities to them,
but no di vision could meet an immed iate threal.
Motorization and Mechanization

Even thoug h the statu s of div ision s betwecn the two world wars fell far
short of readiness because of low manning levels, deve lopme nts in at least
organi zat ional theory were significant. Di vision s designed to fight on a stati c
front and endure heavy casua lti es were no longer accep table. World armie s
sought div isions that could defeat an opponent with maneuver and firepower.
Writers such as the Eng li shmen J. F. C. Full er and Basil Liddell Hart led the
way, advocating the employment of machines to restore mobi lity and maneuverability to the battlefield.
A RETURN TO TH E PAST; A LOOK TO TH E FUTURE
12 1
Motori zation , Ihe use of machines to move men and eq uipme nt , had begun
ea rly in the twenti eth century and prog ressively increased thereafter wit h technological advances. As a mean s of movement and transportati on behi nd the
fron t li ne in Fra nce, infantry div is ions used cars, motorcycl es, truck s, and
motorized ambu lances. Some fi eld artil lery regime nts also used c<ltcrpi llar Imetors to move heav ier art ill ery pi eces. After Worl d War I a ll d iv ision s were
authorized some motorized vehicles, but neit he r in fa ntry nor caval ry divisions
had enough to move all their men and equipment. Field Service Regula/ions
stipulated that infan try divisions woul d depend upon army corps or army uni ls
10 provide transportati on in the field.2 5
In 1927 the 341h Infantry, an element of the 4th Division, conducted experi ments using trucks to move itself, disembark, and fight. Two year later, in 1929,
the Army started a program to motorize e ig ht infa ntry regi men ts, four in the
Hawaiian Divi sion und four in the United States assigned to the 4th and 5th
Di visions. To equip euch of these small peacetime regiments, the statT aut horized
I passenger and 4 cross-country cars, 15 motorcycles, and 50 trucks, with most
vehicles com ing from obsolete World War I stocks. [n 193 1 Congress uppropriatcd money for the first significant purchase of tfuck s since Worl d Wa r I, enabli ng
the Army to motorize the supply train s of the 1st, 2d, and 3d Divisi on s. One
wagon com pany in the 2d Di vision remained however, because of the relucta nce
to consign the horse and wagon to the pa st.26
By 1934 the Army had deve loped motorized equ ipmen t for fi eld artillery that
equaled the cross-country mobility of the horse and had suffic ient endurance to
conduct high-speed marches. Motorization of the Regu lar Army 's field arti llery
began when Congress gave the Public Works Admi nistration money to buy veh icles for the Army. Within fi ve years a ll Regular fie ld artillery regiments assigned
to infantry di visions had truck-drawn pi eces)?
Besides providing mobility on the battlefield, trucks helped the Army save
money between World Wars [ and II. In 1932 a crisis developed in the Nationa l
Guard infantry divi sions because they lacked a suffic ient nu mber of horses to
train the field arti llery. After exte nsive evaluation , the Guard determined that
trucks were more economica l than horses, and the fo llow ing year it began to
motori ze the 75-ml1l. guns. By the end of 1939 all Guard div isions had truckdrawn fi e ld artillery, except for one regiment in the 44th Di vision.28
Mechanization involved empl oying machines on the battlefie ld as dist inct
From transporting personnel and equipment. During World War I the Brit ish and
French had developed tanks to aid the in fan tr y in the assault , and, using borrowed
equipment , the AEF had organized tank brigades before the end of the war. In
combat, however, tanks fo ught in small units, usually platoons, in in fantry support roles. Thei r slow speed and lack o f electronic comm unication s capabi lity
made any ot her tactica l employment impractical. After the war the tank company
replaced the motorized machine gun battalion in the American infantry di vision.
Postwar Army doctr ine for tanks still prescri bed that they sllpport infantry in
122
MAN EUV ER AN D FIRE POWER
close combat to provide "cover invul nerable to the ord inary effects of rifle and
mac hine g un fire, shrapnel, and she ll spli ntcrs."29 Alt hough the British and
French Armies adopted simi lar doctrine, contin uous im provements in engines,
suspension, a nd radios steadi ly increased the capilbil ities of suc h machines. In
1926 the British, respond ing to the prodd ing of Fu ller, Lidde ll Harl, and ot hers,
tested an independen t mechanized force that cou ld make swift, deep penetrations
in an enemy's rear, d isorgan iz ing and defeating an opponen t before efTec tivc
resistance cou ld be mou nted.30
The fo llowing yem' Secretary of War Davis observed a mechan ized demonstration at Aldcrshot, England, and upon returning home ordered development or
a simi lar force. On 30 December 1927, he approved an experimental brigade consisti ng of two light tank batta lions, a medium tank platoon, an in fantry battalion,
an armored car troop, a field arti llery battal ion, an am muni tion trai n, chemical
and ordna nce maintenance platoons, and a provisional molor repa ir section, all
exist in g uni ts. In J uly 1928 units of what was ca ll ed th e Experimen tal
Mec ha nized Force asscmbled al Fort George G. Meade, Mary land, under the
comma nd of Col. Olive r Estridge. For the nex t three mon ths the fo rce, more
motorized than mechan ized, conducted fie ld tests. Automobile ma nufactu rers
contributed trucks and cars, but the rew avai lable pieces or mcchan ized equi pment were obsolete)1
Short ly after Davis approved the organ izatio n of th e Exper imental
Mechanized Force, Maj. Gen. Frank Parker, Assistllllt Chief of Staff, G- 3,32
adopted another approach toward mecha nization. He concluded that thc mechanized experiment would lead nowhere because Ihe rorce "would lack the fixi ty of
tactical purpose and pcrmaneney of personne l Oil which to base experimell tal
work, and its equipment will be so obsolete as to render its employment very dissimilar to that of a modernly-equipped mechanized force.")) Parker recommended that SUlllmerall appoin t a board to prcpare wbles of organization and equi pment ror a mechanizcd force , cstabl ish the characteristics of its veh ic les, and
develop doctrine. Summerall , with Davis' co ncurrence , estab lished the
Mechanized Force Board on 15 May 1928.34
Wit hin six months the board designed a combined arTllS armored force of
approximately 2,000 officers and en listed men. [t consisted of a headqua rters
and he<ldquarters company, a light tank battalion w ith an attached chemical
company, a field artillery battalion, an enginecr company, and two infant ry battalions each consisting of two rine and two machine gun compa nies (CharI 8).
A medium tank compa ny, an armored car troop, and a .50-calibcr antiai rcraft
artillery detachme nt were to be attachcd to the rorce. Probable miss ions
embraced spearheading an attack, scrving as a eountcrofTensive rorce, penetrating enemy defenscs, tcmporarily holding a kcy position , and operating in the
enemy's rear area to disorganize his reserves. To carry out these missions. the
olTicers drew up a "shopping list" for light and medium tanks, armored reconnaissance ca rs, semiautomatic rines, rapid cross-coUll try veh icles for inrmll ry,
A RETURN TO THE PAST; A LOOK TOTHE FUTURE
123
se lf- propelled 37-111111. antitank

guns, se lf-propelled 75- mm . and
105-mlll. howitze rs, and two-way
radios. The report re co mmend ed
that the force begi n (IS a small unit
and build gradually to full strength.

Since new mechanized eq uipm ent
would not becom e <Iva ilable before
fiscal ycar 1930, the board saw 110
need \0 assembl e Ihe unit until thell.

Da v is endorsed th e plan In
Nove mber 1928)5
Two yea rs later, just before
Summerall left office, Co l. Dani e l
Van Voorhis organized the first increment of the unit, which was designatMe(/ill/II armorell ellr of the
ed the Mechanized Force. at Camp
Mec/ulllized Foret:
Eustis, Virgi nia. Consisting of a tank
c ompa ny, an armored car troop , a
field artill ery battery, and an engineer comp,my, it total ed roughly 600 men .
There, however, the project stopped . Because of the Great Depress ion, Congress
never appropriated money for more new equ ipment, <lnd Van Voorhis' force had
to make do with World War I- vintage equipment along with horses and wagons.
Of more co ncern , the infantry, cavalry, and other arms and services opposed thc
lise of scarce Anny funds to finan ce the new organization. With limited amounts
of new wine aV<lilable, customers wanted their old bottles filled rirst)6
In May 1931 the new Chie f of Staff, General Doug[<ls MacArthur, changed
the di rection of mec hanization. I-I c observed that rccent experimental unit s had
bee n ba sed on equipment rather Ihan on mission and that <In item of equipment
W<lS nOI limited to one ann o r service. He there rore instructed all anns or ser~
vices to develop rully their mechaniziltion and motorization potential. Under
MacArthur'S concept, cava lry was to eontinuc work with combat vehicles to
enhance it s rol e in suc h areas as reconnaissance, nank action, and pursuit,
while inrantry was to exp lore ways to increase its strikin g power by using tanks.
Hi s dec ision spe ll ed the end of the sepa rate Mechanized Force, and five months
later it wus disbanded. Units and men assigned to the rorce were returned to
their rormer ass ign ments, except ror abollt 175 o ffi ce rs and e nli sted men ,
including Van Voo rhi s, who remain ed with mechani zed cavalry. They tra ns
rer red to Ca mp Henry Knox (later Fort Knox), Kentucky, to crea te a new
armored caval ry lInit )7
On I March 1932, Van Voorhi s organized the 7th Cavalry Brigade to experi~
ment with mechanization . At that time it consisted of on ly a headquarters, but the
rollowing January the 1st Cava lry moved from Marfa, Texas, to Fort Knox where it
.,
---1
19'
AAA UNIT
28'
CAR UNIT
ARMORED
HHC
90
6ge8
TANK CO
54
HQ
65'
, - CHEM CO
i...
f-
261
lTTANK BN
'---
I--
'i05-mm
75mm SP
75-mm
FA BTRY
TRAINS
HHB&
298
FA BN
'---
I--
I--
8gea
MG CO
16188
RIFLE CO
153
HHC
533ea
units.
Internal strengths not provided.
1 Anached
108
MEO TANK CO
92
IN F BN, MECH
ENGR CO
MECH FORCE
2,027
CHART 8- The Mechanized Force, 1928
A RETU RN TO TH E PAST; A LOOK TO THE FUTURE
125
became part o f the brigade. Short ly thereafter the regiment adopted tentative tables
of organizat ion that provided for a coveri ng squadron, a combat car squadron, a
mach ine gun troop, and a headquarters troop. Each squadron had two troops, and
the regiment had a total of seventy-eight combat cars. That structure lasted until 1
January 1936, when the War Deparlmcl11 outlined a new organization that consisted
of a headquarters and band, two combat ca r squadrons of two troops each, and
headquarters, service, machine gun, and armored car troops. The new tables authorized the regiment to have seventy-seven combat vehicles, all developmental items.
Eventually the War Department assigned a second cavalry regiment, a fiel d artillery
battalion equ ipped with 75Mmm . guns (mounted on selfMpropelled half tracks), ord M
nance and quartermaster companies, and an observation squadron to the brigade.
The brigade became the Army's fi rst armored unit of combined arms, contri buting
much to the deve lopment of mcchanized theory in the intelwar years. However,
bureaucratic inMfighting o nen sti fled the unit's development.38
Although many European theorists urged the development of independent
armored forces, their armies made little progress toward the formatio n of such
uni ts. The British abandoned their experiments in 1927 and did not organize their
first armored divisions until 1939. The French organi zed light armored div isions
in the 1930s, but put most of the ir tanks in variolls infantry support roles. [n the
United States the Regular Army fielded two partially organized tank regiments as
a part o f the infantry arm between 1929 and 1940.39
Both German and Russian Arm ies took a different approach. Neither had
empl oyed tanks in World War I, but both saw their potential. Only after Adolph
Hitler abrogated the military provisions of the Vcrsail les Treaty in 1935, however,
did the German Army develop offensive-oriented armored panzer divisions. BlLt
thei r interest in mechan izat ion , especially tanks, was evident throughout the peri M
od, as witnessed by the several visits by German officers to the 71 h Cavalry
Brigade at Fort Knox in the mid- 1930s. The Russians experimented wit h ta nks
from a ll indust rial nations and favored the use of mass armor in the midMthirties.
On the eve of World War II , however, the Russians had shi fted emphasis to small
tank units in support of an infantry role.40
A New InfanllY Division

January 1929 marked the beginni ng of a ten-year st ruggle to reorganize the
infantry division. The Assistant Chief of Staff, 0 - 3, Genera [ Parker, reported that
European countries were developing arm ies that could trigger a war of greater
velocity and intensity than anything previollsly known. Great Britain, France, and
Germany were engrossed with "machines" to increase mobility, minimize losses,
and prevent stabili zation of the battlefron t. The British favored mechanization
and the French, motorization, whi le the Versa illes Treaty limited the Germans to
ideas and dreams. Some Europeans adopted smaller, more maneuverable, IrianM
g ular infantry divisions that were easier to com mand and co ntrol than the
126
ullwieidy sq uare division. Since the Army planned to introduce semiau tomatic
fiOes and light air-cooled machine guns, Parker suggested that the 2d Division
conduct tests to determine the most e ffective combination of automatic riOcs and
machine guns. Sum mera ll agreed to the proposa l but exte nd ed the st udy to
encompass the total infantry division. The st udy was to concentrate on approved
standard infantry weapons , an ima l-d rawn combat trains, and motori zed field
trains. The chief of sta ff placed no limit on road space, a princi pal determinant of
divisional organization before and immediately aficr World Wllr 1.41
The Chie f of Infantry, Maj. Gen. Robert 1-1 . Allen, who had responsi bility for
organ izing and training inrant ry troops, agreed to the examination but objected to
having the commander or the 2d Di vision supervise the tests, which he believed
rell within the purview or hi s own office. Eventua lly Summcrall agreed, and
All en assigned the job to the Inrantry Board at Fort Benning. Gcorgia .42
During the invest igation scve ral proposa ls surraeed ror a triangula r inrmllry
divi sion , which promised greater maneuverabi lity, better command and control,
and simpl ified communications and supp ly. Neverthe less, Army leaders turned
down the idea. Maj. Bradrord G. Chynoweth or the Inrantry Board attributed the
ret enti on or the sq ua re d ivision , whi ch was immi nent ly su itable ror rrontal
all'lek s, to Summe rall. As a rormcr divis ion and army corps commander in
Fmncc, Su mmerall smv no need ror change.43
The question orthe inrantry division's organization lay dormant until October
1935, when Maj. Gen. John B. Hughes, Assistant Chie r o r Sta ff, G- 3, revived it.
In a memorandum ror Ge neral Ma lin Craig, MacArthur's Sllcccssor as Chi er o r
Sta ff, Hug hes suggested that the General Stan" cons ider mode rni zation or the
Army's combat organizations. Al though great strides had been madc in weapons,
equipmen t, transportati on, and communications, organizations were still based on
World War I experiences. He also noted that such organizational ini liatives were
the purview or the Genera l StafT, an obvious rererence 10 Ihe resistance or the
chieror in rantry in 1929 to reexamine divisional organizations. Si nce the Genera l
Staff was responsible ror 10lal Army o rganizat ion, Hughes thought it shou ld conduct any such examination.44
In November Crai g ca nvassed sen ior commanders rega rding reorganization
issues. He noted the inranlry division in pa rti cul ar had foot , animal , and motor
units. all with varyi ng rales or speed. wh ich did not meet the demands of modern warra re. Cra ig wondered if the divisio n were 100 large, and, if so, whet her
or not could it be red uced in size. Possibilities ror reduct ion included moving
support and service ru nctions to army corps or army leve l. cu tting inran try to
th ree regiments. and reorgan izi ng the field artill ery into a three-batta lion regi ment. No conse nsus eme rged. Even the three c hampi o ns or inrant rY- lh e
Inrantry School , the Inranlry Board, and th e chier or inrantry- railed to agree
011 a suitable o rgan ization , differing espec i'llIy on the co ntinued ex istence or
inrantry and fie ld artillery brigades as intermediate headquarters between the
regiment and the divi sion.4S
A RETURN TO TH E PAST; A LOOK TO T HE FUTURE
127
On 16 Ja nuary 1936 Craig created a new bod y, the Mode rn iza tion
Boa rd, to exami ne the orga nization
of the Army. Under the su pervision
of Hughes, the board was to explore
suc h areas as fi rc power, su pply.

motorization . mecha nization, hOllsing, perso nllel authoriza ti o n, a nd
mobilization . II was to consider recommenda tion s from the field , the
General Staff, service schoo ls, and

ally ea rlier studies, includi ng those
conce r ned with foreign armies.
Despite this broad cha rter, Ihe boa rd
members nevert he le ss addres se d
only the infantry di vision, considering the total Army orga nization 100
extensive and too comp lex to be
covered in one study. Besides, the
Genemf Cmig
board concluded that the fo rmation
o f higher commands rested upo n the structu re of the infantry divi sion.46
The board's report, submitted on 30 July 1936, rej ected the sq uare infan try
division and endorsed a sma ller triilllgular division (Cha}'1 9), which could easily be
organized into three "combat teams." li s proposal cut the infant ry d ivision from
22,000 officers and enlisted men to 13,500 and simplified the command structure.
The brigllde echelon for infantry and field artillery was climinated, enabl ing the
division commander to deal dif(,,'Ctly w ith the regiments. The enduring problem of
where to locate the mach ine gun was dealt with again; one mach ine gun battalion
was included in the infantry regiment, which also had three riOe battalions. Thc
ficld artillery regiment consisted of one 105-mm. howitzer battalion and three
mixed battalions of 75-mm. howi t7..crs and 8 1-mm. mortars. The latter were to be
attached to the infantry regiments in combat. To assist in mov ing, sea rching, and
operating quickly on a bro<ld front. caval ry returned to the division for the firs t time
si nce before World War 1 in the form of a reconnaissance squadron, to be equ ipped
with inexpensive unarmored or lightly armored cross-coulltry vehicles. The allticipated mpid movement of the division minimized the need for extensive engineer
work, except on roads. Therefore, an engi neer battalion replaced the existing regiment. Because engi neers would be primarily concerned wi th road conditions, they
were also to provide traffic control in the divisiona l area. A signal com p~lIly was to
maintain commun ications between the division and regimental headquarters, and
attachcd signal detach ments were to perform these services within regiments.47
To increase mobility, the division's combat servicc support elcments undcnvent
radical changes. A battalion of trucks and a quartermaster serv ice com pany of
129
laborers formed the heart of a new supply system. They handled the baggage and
noncombat equipment of all divisional elements. Each divisional un it was responsible for its own ammun ition resupply. The new arrangement led to the elimination of
the ammunition train, regimenta l field trains, and the quartermaster regiment. A
quartermaster light maintenance company was added to service the motor equi pment. The mai ntenance of hospitals passed to the army corps. A newly organ ized
med ical battalion collected and evacuated casua lt ies, whi le infantry, field artillery,
cava lry, and engineer units kept thei r medical detaclunents to provide immed iate
aid. All service elements were placed under a division service troops command.
headed by a general officer, with a headquarters company that performed the
provost marshal 's duties and included the division's special staff.48
To co mply w ith C raig's d irective for the division to e mploy the lat est
weapons, the board recom mended that its infantrymen be armed with the new
semi automatic Garand rifle, which the War Department had approved in January.
For field artillery, the board wanted the even newer lOS-mill. howitzer, which was
nOI yet even in the Army's inventory.49
Members of the board concluded that they had given the d iv ision all the
combat and serv ice support resources needed for open warfare. Those e lement s
not requi red were moved up to Ihe army corps or army echelon. Additiona l
unit s, stich as heav ier field arti llery, ant imechan ized (a ntitank), tank , ant iaircraft , aviation, motor transport, engineer, and medica l units, m ight be required,
but the board made the divisional staff large enoug h to coordinate the attachment of sllch troops. Although sma ll , the new division was thought to have
eq ual or greater firepowe r than the square division and occupied the same
fron tages as its predeccssor. 50

In a separate letter to Cra ig, Hughes summarized the advantages and disadvantages of the new infa ntry division. Pluses included its highly mobile nature,
the ease wit h which infantry and fie ld arti llery could form combat teams, and the
reduction in the number of command ec he lons and amoun t of adm inistrative
overhead. He also pointed to improvements in transportation, su pply, and maintenance, since a ll animal transport was e liminated. Given such a divis ion, he
believed that the Regular Army could achieve a viable read iness fo rce without an
increase in authorized personne l. Drawbacks appeared minor. The states might
not accept a reallotment of National Guard infantry divisions in peacetime. As a
federal force, those d ivisions served only in national emergency or war, but as
state forces they had been located and frequently used to cope with local emergencies and d isasters . Hughes questioned spl itting co mmuni cation func tions
between the arms and the signal company and Ihe pooling of transportation for
baggage and other noncombat equipment into the service echelon. Both arrangements could generate friction because the functio ns would be outside the control
of the user. He was also concerned about the loss of the infant ry and field
artillery brigades because they eliminated genera l otTicer positions. Finally, training literature would need revision and disseminat ion to the field. 5l
130
After reviewing the report, Craig decided 10 test the proposed division wit h
attached antimechanized (an lil<lIlk) and antia ircraft artil lery battalions and an
observation squad ron. He selected the 2d Div ision, comm<lndcd by Maj. Gen.
James K. Parson, to cond uct the test between September and November 1937.
The resulting Prov isiona l Infant ry Division (P ID) included 6,000 men from the
2d Division and a similar !lumber from olher commands, which also furni shed
much ort he equipment. T he examination, the first in the history of the Army, was
he ld in Texas, where space and terra in permitted a thorough ana lysis of the un i1.52
Even before the lest ended, Maj. Gen. George A. Lynch, C hief of Infant ry,
vetoed the proposed organization in a report to the stafT in Washington. Hilving
wit nessed part of the exercise, he viewed the separat ion of the machine gun from
thc ri nc battalion and the altachment of the signal detachment illld mortar ballery
to the infantry regiment as mistakes. The fi rst preven ted teamwork in the regi
mcn t, and the second interfered with un ity of command . Lynch considered the
attachcd antitank battalion an infant ry unit bccause it used the same anti tank
weapons as the infantry regiment. He objected to the commander of the scrvice
troops, contending that the prcsence of a gencral ofTicer in thi s position compli
cated the c hain of command. Furthermore, since the movement of Ihe train s
depended on the tactical situation, only the division commander could make the
decision to move them . Because field, sllpply, and ammunition trains opcmted to
the rear orthe combat units, Lynch discerned no need for them in the division . He
suggested that the Army return to the fixed army corps, in which div ision s did the
fighting and the corps prov ided the logistica l support.5J
Shortly after Lynch 's negative account, the Nell' York Tillles reported that C ra ig
planned to appoint a sl>ccial comlllillee to design an infan try division based on the
PIO test. The article claimed that the committee was to include Maj . Gen. Fox
Conner, Col. George C. Marshall, and a third unnamed officer. Eventually Brig.
Gen. Lesley 1. McNa ir, the Chief of Staff of the PIO, was identified in private cor
respondence as the third member. Con ner and Marshall, former members of the
Lassi ter Board, had supported I>ershing 's small division . Conner had also servcd as
C raig's l>ersonnel representative at the PID test. Within a few days Marshal l, writing
from Vancouver Barracks, Washington. to ld a frie nd that slieh a board would look
like a "stacked deck" to secure a small division. As it happened, any plans for the
group felllhrough when Conner retired for medical reasons.S<I
The final report on the PI D test, mostly the work of McNair, noted many of
the divisional weak ncsses idcntified by Lynch, but , instead of assigning the division to a fixed army corps, McNair proposed a new sma ller and marc powcrful
division. To attain it , he recommended that the in fan try regiment have an antitank
company and three ballalions, each with one machine gun and three rine campa
nics. The machine gun cOlilpany was to be armed with both machine guns and
mortars. Inclusion of the nntitank company in the regiment eliminatcd the need to
attach s uch a battalion to the div ision. Like Lynch, he suggested eliminating s i g~
nal detac hments in favor of infant ry, arti llery, and cavalry troops. To increase
A RETURNTOTHE PAST; A LOOK TOT HE FUTU RE
131
fi repower and range, McNair wanted to replace 75-111m. howitzers with 75-mm.
gUllS and one battalion of lOS-mill. howitzers wi th 155-111111. howitzers. He felt
that mortars had no place in the division art illery because they could not provide
close support for infantry and their rate of fire, range, and accuracy fa iled to meet
field arti llery standards. Another battery of 75-mm. guns in each direct support
battalion was to replace the mortars. Because the reconnaissance squadron operated considerably ill front of the divisioll and on its flunks , he proposed that it be
moved to the corps level. McNair sensed an overabundance of engineers . In a war
of movement , engi neers wou ld not have the lime to do extensive road work.
Another responsibility, that of traffic control, could return to the military police.
T herefore, the engineer battalion could be reduced to a company and a separate
military police unit would combine provost marshal and traffic cont rol missions.
McNair also fa ulted the special command for the serv ice troops organization and
advised its elimination. He believed the ordnance company and band were unnecessa ry and advocated their reassignment to higher echelons. The quartermaster
service company and motor battalion were to be com bined as a quartermaster
battalion , which was to supply the division with everything except ammunition.
Each combat clement was to remain responsible for its own ammunition supply.
These changes produced a division of 10,275 officers and enl isted men.55
After analyzi ng a[[ reports and comments, the Modernization Board redesigned
the division, retaining three combat teams built around the infantry regiments. Each
regiment consisted of a headquarters and band, a service company, and three battalions, each with one heavy weapons company armed with 8 1-mm. mortars and .30and .50-caliber mach ine guns and three ri ne companies, but no antitank unit. The
.50-caliber machine guns in the hcavy weapons compan ies and the 37-tll111. gUlls in
the regimenta l headquarters companics wcre to se rve primarily as anti tank
weapons. The large four-battalion artillery regiment was broken up into two smaller
regiments, one of three 75-m111. gun battalions and the other with a battalion of
I05-1111ll. howitzers and a battalion o f 155-mm. howitzers. Although the tcst had
shown that the field artil lery commander had no problems with thc fowbatta lion
unit, school commandants and corps area commanders questioned the quality of
command and control within the regiment. Two general officers assisted the eommander, one for infantry and one for fi eld artillery, but they were not in the cha in of
cOlllmand for passing or rewri ting orders. Within the combat arms regiments, signal
functions fell under the regimental commanders, while the divisional signal company operated the communication system to the regiments. The engineer battalion
was retained but was reduced in size and consisted of three li ne compan ies in addition to the battalion headquarters and headquarters company. Traffic control duties
moved to a new military pol ice company that combined those activities with the
provost marshal's office.56
The board completely reorganized the supply system. The combat arms wcre
given responsibility for their own ammunition resupply and baggage. Therefore, the
1110tor battalion was eliminated. A new quartermaster battalion was established,
132
MA NEUVER AND FIR EPOWE R
which included a truck company to transport personnel and rations, a serv ice com-
pany to furni sh laborers, and a headquarters and headquarters company. The headquarters company could do minor motor mai ntena nce requiring less than three
hours, while major motor maintenance moved to Ihe army corps level. The quartermaster tight maintenance and ordnance comp..1nies were removed from the division.
Medical service within the division was based on the assumption that it would be
responsible for the collect ion and evacuation oflhe sick and wounded to field hospi tals established by corps or hi gher echelons. T he former headqumtcrs company,
service troops, was incorporated into the division headquartcrs company.S7

With no change expected in total Army strength , the new division had two
authorized st rengths, a warti me one of 11 ,485 officers and enli sted men and a
peacetime one of 7,970. During peacctime all elements of the division were to be
fiUed except for the d ivision headquarters and mi lita ry police compani es, which
were to be combined. Other divisional element s required only enli sted personnel
to bring them up to wart ime manning leve ls.58
After the Modern ization Board redes ig ned the division, C ra ig dec ided to
spend a year evtlluating it before he determined its fate. The 2d Division, selected o nce more fo r the task, again borrowed personne l and equipment from other
units to fill its rank s . Be twee n February 1939 and Germany's invas ion of
Poland on I September, the " Provisional 2d Divi sio n" conu1HlIlded by Maj.
Gen. Walter Krueger tested the proposed unit. Krueger found th e organ izat ion
sound except for the quartermaster batta lion and the need to make some minor
adjustments in a few ot her c lements. The quartermaster batta lio n lacked enough
laborers and trucks to supply the division, and he recommended increases in
both. With its many pieces of motorized equipment, the di vision req ui red more
maintenance personnel. Minor changes included augmentations to the divis io nal inte lli gence (G- 2) and opera ti ons (G- 3) starT sections, a slig ht increase in
the signa l company to handle communi cations for the second field art il lery regiment, a complete motorization of the eng ineer battalion, and the replacement
of the five regimenta l bands with one divisional band.59
Maj. Gen. Herbert J. Brees, E ighth Co rps Area commander and the test
director, concurred with most of Krueger's findings except for the e ng ineer and
qua rtermaster battalions. He opposed comp lete ly motorizi ng the eng inee r unit
beca ll se the enginee rs were to be limit ed to the d ivisional area in stead of a
broad fro nt. He favored an increase in the number of trucks in the qua rtermaster ballalion but not 10 the extent suggested by Krueger. Brees a lso saw no need
for in fa ntry and artillery sectio ns havi ng their own general officers, because the
commander cou ld eas ily deal with a ll e lements, but he recommended a stafT
officer, not necessarily a genera l offi cer, to coordinate field a rtill ery rire . To
make room fo r a second genera l officer in the division, he suggested that the
di v is io n 's c hi ef o f staff become th e seco nd-in-co mmand with th e rank of
brigad ier genera l because he would know more about the di vision than anyone
else except for the commander.60
A RETURN TO T HE PAST; A LOOK TO THE FUTURE
133
On 14 Se pte mbe r 1939, LI.

Col. Harry Ing lcs of the Modernization Board summarized the evolution of the div ision 's organi zation, foc li sing on t he report of
Kr ueger a nd t he co m m e nt s of
Brees. He also recommended resolutions to the d isputed points. Two
days late r Ma rs hall, w ho had
replaced Cra ig as Chicf of Staff on
1 Septembe r, approved a new
peacetime d ivision, which incl uded
infantry and artillery sections headed by genera l officers in the division headquarters, a moto rized
engineer batta lion , a d iv is iona l
band withi n the headquarters com-
pany, and an increase in the number

of trucks in the quartermaster battal ion (CharI 10). Marshall's division was com pletely motorized.61
Gel/eml Marshall
Sti ll, the new organization did
not totally sati sfy Marsha ll. Hav ing fo llowed its deve lopment closely as chief of
the War Pl ans Division and later as deputy chi ef of staff, he believed that the d i vi~
sion shou ld be even stronger to cope wi th susta ined combat. In Marshall 's view,
however, the new organization's overwhelming advantage was that the National
Guard divisions could easily adopt it. Furthermore, the onset of war in Europe
added urgency because the Army could no longer de lay moderni Z<1.tion.62
A few days after Marshall approved the new structure he authorized the reo r~
gani Z<1.tion of the 1st, 2e1, and 3d Divisions and the act ivation of the 5th and 6th
Divisions, each with a strength of 7,800 officers and enlisted men. No d iv ision
was concentrated because the Army d id not have a post large enough to house
o ne. Divisional elements, however, were convenient ly located wit hin corps areas
to ease trai ning. Geographically, the div isions were d istri bu ted so that one divi
sion was on each of the seabonrds (A tlanti c and Pac ific), one near the southwest
front ier, and two centra lly located to move to e ither coast or the southwest. Wit h
the o utbreak of war in Europe, Congress q uickly authorized increases in the
strength of the Army, and by ea rly 1940 Ihe infantry d ivision stood al 9,057.63
A New Cavahy Division

The Modern ization Board look up the cavalry d ivision in 1936. Most officers
still env isioned a rol e for the horse because it could go places inaccessible to
-I
HHe
18
135
HHe
OIVHQ
110
118ea
RIFLE co
lNF BN
510ea
79
eTN" Combat Train

WPNS" Weapons
SV" Service
I MEO & CHAP I
"'
'TRY
II
428ea
IOJe8
75mm BN
33
-I
I
-m
I I
36gea
-I
126ea
BTRv
I
_~
I,MED ~2 CHA~ I
24'
OM BN
155mm aN
-I
IHH~~CTN_ I
HHB
90
[. FAREGT, 155-mm_1
850
I MED&CHAP I I
234
MEO BN
1A17
FA REGT, 75-mm
HHB&CTN_I
100
HHB
-I
184
SIG CO
ENGR BN
325
-l
INFANTRY DIVI SION

9,057
] I WP,~:co_1
74
DIVHQ&MPCD
139
svco
IN F REGT
1,818ea
CHART IO-Infantry Division (Peace), 1939

Corrected to 8 January 1940
135
lsI Ca l'llliy /)il'isio/ll//(/llelivers, To),alil'(l/e. Texas. 1938
motori zed and mechanized equipmen t. Taking into accoun t recommendations

from the Eighth Corps Area, the Army War Col lege, and th e Command and
General Staff School, the board developed a new sma ller triangular caval ry div ision (CharI II), which the lsi Cavalry Div ision evaluated duri ng maneuvers at
Toyahvale, Texas, in 1938. Like the 1937 infantry di vision test, the maneuvers
concen trated on the di visional cava lry reg iments around which all other units
were 10 be organized ,64
Following the test, a board of 151 Cavalry Division officers, headed by Bri g.
Gen. Kenyon A. Joyce, rej ected the three- regiment di vision and recommended
retention of the two-brigade (four-regiment) organi zation. The latter configuratio n allowed the d ivision to deploy eas ily in two column s, which was <lccepted
standard cavalry tactics. However, the boa rd advocated reorganizing the cavalry
regiment along trian gular lines, which would g ive it a headquarters and headquarters troop, a machine g un squadron wi th speci al weapon s a nd machine g un
troops, and three rifle sqlladrons, each with one machine gun and three rifle
troops. No significant change was made in the field artillery, but the test showed
that the engi neer element should remain a squadron to provide the divisional elemen ts g reater mobility on the battlefield and that the specia l troops idea should
HHB
BTRY
HHB &
CBTTRAIN
HHB&
CBTTRAIN
BN
BN
105-m m
ENGR
TROOP
75-mm
FA
REGT
RECON
SQON
HQs
TROOP
HQs
CAY
REGT
CAVALRY
DIVISION'
BTRY
MEO
SQON
QM
SQON
CHART II-Cavalry Division, 1938
CHEMICAL
OET
ORO
COMPAN Y
OBSERV
SQON
A RETU RN TO THE PA ST; A LOOK TO THE FUTURE
137
be extended to include the div ision headquarters, signa l, and ordnance troops;
quartermaster, med ica l, engineer, reconnai ssa nce, and obse rvation sq uadro ns;
and a chemical wa rfare detachment. One headquarters would assume rcsponsibil~
ity for the administration and disciplinary control for these fo rces.65
Although the study d id not lead to a general reorgtlniz..1t ion of the cava lry division, the wanimc caval ry regiment was restrllCI'Ufcd, effcctive I December 1938, to
consist of a headquarters and headquarters troop, machine gun and special weapons
tTOOpS, and three squadrons of th ree rifle troops cacho T he special troops remained
as structured in 1928, and no observation squadron or chemical detachment found a
place in the div ision. Wi th the paper changes in the cavalry divisions and other
minor adjustments, Ihe strength of a wartimc divisional rosc 10 10,680.66
S uch paper c ha nges c harac terized mu ch of the inte rwar Army's work.
Although planners lacked the resources to man, equ ip, and tcst fun ctional division s, they gave considerable thought to th eir organ ization . They deve loped a
new concept for the infant ry division , ex perimented w it h a larger cava lry division, and explored the organization of a mec hani zed unit. Des ig ni ng the new
infa ntry division wi th a projected batt le fi e ld in North America, officers took
into account the spa n o f control, the number of req uired com mand echelons,
thc statT, the ba lancc between infantry and field art illery, the loca tion of the
reconnaissancc clcment, th e role of eng ineers, and the best way to orga nize the
serv ices and supply system. The triangu lar infantry d iv ision appeared to offer
the best so lution to these requirements accordi ng to the p lan ners, who Ma rsha ll
though t were among " the best in the Army."67
138
NOles
I LIT, Cors to COs ;111 corps areas anti other addresses. 5 Nov 20. sub: Reorgani zation of
Di visions and Higher Units, AG 320.2 (1 1-4-35), RG 177. NA RA.
2 LIT, TAG to CGs of all corps areas. 9 Oct 22. sub: COlllmnnd. AG 320.2 (10-4-22), and
Memo. 0 - 3 10 ColS, 27 Aug 26, sub: Reconstitution orthe lSi Di vision, AG 320.2 (7- 19- 26), RO
407, NA RA.
3 LIT, CG, 1st Division to CO, Second Corps Area, 19 Jul 26, sub: Reconstitution orthe Fi rst
Division, AG 320.2 (7- 1726), ItO 407. NA RA .
.. Ibid .. wi th 1st Ind. CO, Second Corps Area. to TAG. 5 Aug 26. and 2d Ind. TAG to CO,
Second Corps. ) I Aug 26. Memo. G 3 for Cors, sub: Reconstitution of the 1st Di vision, 27 Aug
26, and Llr. TAG 10 CGs of all corps areas, 3 1 Dee 26. sub: R CCOIiSli lUli on of Ihe First Divisiol1.
AG 320.2 (7- 19-27). RG 407. NARA: llr. Maj Gcn Suml11cr.all to Brig Gcn Richmond r . Davis. 6
Jul 27. and Llr, Summcrall to M:ti Gc n John L. 1lines. 6 Ju127. John L. lI incs I'apers. LC.
5 WD Cir 42, 1919; Memo, Wf'D for ColS. f6 Jan 20. sub: Recommendations of Conference
of Department and Division Coml11anders, Memo, ColS. no subject. 23 Jan 20. Memo. Newton D.
B:Lker to Gen Mnrch, 20 Apr 20, Memo. WIlD for TAG. 28 Apr 20, sub: Shoulder Patch Insignia
for Di vision, Corps. SelViees. etc.. copies TIOH; ltr, Pershing to Maj Ge n Clarence R. Edw:trds.
27 May 20. Pershing Papers. LC; WD Cir 59. 1928.
6 Rpls of the Sec of War. ANII'D 1912. PI'. 15- 16, and ARWD 1913. fl. 125; "New Tablcs of
Organiz.1Iion." 11I/(lIIIIY )0/11"1/(/1 2 1 (Aug 1922); 186- 92 (The new tllblcs CUI Ihe inr.1ntry regiment
from 1.490 101.205 officers and enliSled men.); "llatealions Declared Inaeti ve."llijallIIJ' )mll'll(11
30 (Jun 1927): 660: Annual Report of the Chiefof Infantry. FY 1929. p. 38, RG 177. NARA: "Five
Ballalions of Infantry to be Made Inlletive." IlIfilllll)' JOllrl/1I1 32 (ScI' 1929): 317; Returns,
Philippine Division. 193 /. RO 94, NA RA: also see nOI,,:S "Infimtry During Ihe Inlerwar Years,"
ltuthor's files.
7 Army f)irecIOIJ'. July 1929. p. 28: Llr. TAG to Chief of .he Ai r Corps. 17 Jan 29. sub:
Princ il}/es to be followed in assignment of Air Corps Troops to highe r tactie:!1 organization, with
Endorsements, AG 320.2 Air Corps (12- 20- 28) Pub., Microfilm A 2765, Albert F. Simpson
1listoric:tl Rese:!rch Center, M:t;o;well Air Force Base. Alabal11:l : WD Cif 14, 1931 ,
8 TIC. Table 3 1 W, Field Art illery Brigade. Infantry Division, 18 AI)r 1929: WDCir 39,1929:
Llr, TAG 10 Chiefs of all Anns and Services, and other addresses, 7 Dec 29. sub: Assignment of
Troops, AG 320.2- FA (/ 1-4-29) Misc. (Ret)C, DAMII-IISO.
9 Memo, G- 3 for Cors, 2 May 27, sub; G- 3/ 17531-Change in Cenain Regul3 r AmlY Units,
AG 370- 5 (4-28-27). RG 94. NARA: LIT, SULIlmer;LlIto l'larry M. Worsb..1ck. MC, I Jun 27, AG
370- 5 (5 2 1- 27), Llr. TAG 10 CO. Eighth Corps AfC3. 6Jlln 27, sub: Troop Movement, AG 370- 5
(5 2 1 27) (Mise). RG 94, NA RA; "Shift ing of Infantry Units," IlIjimllJ' Jollnm{ 3 I (Ju l 192 7): 89.
to Adna R. Chaffee. "The M:!neLlI'ers of Ihe First Cava lry Di vision, Scptember- Oetober,
1923," COl'll " ), JOIII"II(l{ 33 (Apr 1924): 133- 6 2; Geo rge Dillman , "1st Cava lry Di\'isio11
Maneuvers," CaI'{jI!J,.I()Il/"Iw{ 37 (Jan 1928): 47.
t t Aubrey Lippincol1, "New Regi me L11al Orga ni za tion," CaI'llIiJ' JOllrnal 32 (Jan 1929):
22 24,
t2 T /O. Table 401 W, O I":llry Division. 10 May 1928; "btrac ts from the Annual Report of
the Chief of Cavalry, Major Geneml lIerbert 13. Crosby," Cm'fl/lJ' )0/11"11(11 37 (Jan 1928): 108:
Llr. TAG 10 All Corps Areas, DepartmeL11s. and E;o;elllpted St:ltions Commanders and other
addresses, 26 OCI 34, sub: Reorganizlltion oflhe Field Artillery. AG 320.2 FA (12- 26 33) Pub,
AG Reference files. DAMII , II SO; Llr. TAG to CO. Eighth Corps Area, 16 OCI 28. sub: Annored
Car Unit, 320.2 Cavalry (10228) Mise'C, and Lt Col Regnier, " lIi story of the 91st
Reconna issa nce Squ adro n, lSI Cava lry Division." undated Ms, 91st Ar mored Cavalry
I(eeonllllissance Bal1:llion file, DAM II- II SC.
13 Llr, Panama Canal (I'C) DeJlt to TAG. 7 May 3 1, sub: Crganitation of .roops wilhin PC
Department, LtT. I'C Dept to TAG,S Feb 32, sub: Reorganization or the l':tnallIa Can:!1 Departmenl,
139
wi th 1st Ind, TAG 10 CO. I'e DePI, 17 M:lr 32, AG 320.2 PC (5- 7-3 1), :md Rctums. PC Division.
all RG 407. NARA.
14 Reports oflhe ellil!/oflile ,\Iili/ill Burellli. 1925, p. 13, and 1926. pr. 11- 18: Memos for
Assistant Chief of Sta ff (ACofS), G 3, 30 Apr 26. 28 Feb 27. and 31 May 27. MIJ ]25.4 Gen- G,
War DepMtlllCI11 MobiliZ;lIion Pl,m, 19 Mar 26. Misccl l;lIlcous files, DAM I I- IISO.
15 Memos for Statistical Section. ACors G 3.31 Mar 27 and 2 Jan 30. MO 325.4 Gen 6,
DAMII IISO: Report (iflhe C/u'(iojl/II! Mililifl Burcall, 1926. Appendix C; Repom' o/rlle Naliomd
GilaI'd IJmwlII, 1936, p. 7, and 1939, I). 27; also sec author's nOh::S "National Guard Interwar
Years:'
16 Repol"' o/fhe Alljll/tllli Gel/emf ofNell' JCI:n')'. 1927, p. 7: SUI/I! ofNe,.. York. Allmwf R!.'I)(Jr'
of 'hI! "(ljl/ifllll Gel/em/. 1918, p. 2 t ; Reporl.l of Ihe Chi!.'f of lhe Mililia HII/WIII. 1928. pp. 25- 26.
and 1929, Pt>. 14,22-23: Memos for Statistical Section. ACofS. G 3. 28 Feb 27. 31 Mar 27. and 3
Scp 29, Mil 325.4 Oen- 6, DAM II- IISO.
17 Memos for Statistical Section. A Cors, [ Apr 36, I Nov 39. I Mar 40, MI3 325.4 Ge n.
DAMI I- IISO: John 13. Smith. "Our First Nalional Guard Cavalry Division," ('(lI'(IIr),JOIIl'llol 46
(Se p OCI 1936): 378- 79; "Two More Caval ry Divisions Authori7etl." elll,tlIi), )0111'1/11/48
(ll1n Feb [939): 67; Nmiollill Gmll'd Regislel' ([ 9]9). p. t 5.
11( "Progress of Assignments of IIlf"n ntry Reserve O fTi cers 10 Infanlry Division of thc
Orgllllized Reserves,"
I/ rlll)' Uecl'llilillg Neil'S 5 (May 1922): no jlllginalioll; Comptroller's
Records. US Amly Divisions- Inf:mlry !Lnd Cavalry Strength,]O Jun 1928 1931, Reference 1':lper
Files, Anny Reserve 1916-1 9]9, DAM II-IISO: UPI of III<' Sec ofll'(II. /937, p. 6.
19 War Departmellt Mobili7..1tion Plans. 1923. 1924. and 1926. Miscellaneous files, DAMII II S0: Proceedings of Conference of Corps Arca alld Divisioll Commanders held al Washingloll.
D.C.. June 1927, p. 140. A WC course material 1927, MII!.
20 Ltr. TAG \0 Chiefs of:11I War Dcl):tnmenl I3 rancht.'S and other addresses, 15 Aug 27. sub:
Constitution, Reco nstitution, or Redesignation of Certain Units of the Regular Army and the
Reorgau izlltion of Regular Army Divisions, AO Refcrcnee files. 320.2 (6 5- 27) Mise (Ret ).
DAMI I-IISO.
21 Ibid.
22 UPI (ifilli! Sec of WOI'. 1932. I). 53; Ltr. OCS to CGs o f Corps Areas and Depts. 9 Allg 32,
sub: Establishment of Field Amlies. oes 20696. Four Anny Plan file. 1933. DAMII IISO.
23 Mell1o, WI'D for Cors, Sub: Four Army Organi zation, 27 Mar 3]. WPD ]56 1- 15, AG
]20.2 (8- 6 32). Section I-A, ItO 407, NA RA.
2-1 Ltr. ColS to CGs of Annies and Corps Area, 18 Aug 33. sub: Development or Four Anny
Organization. AO 320.2 (8- 1633) (Misc.) M-E (WPD) ]56 1- 27. Four Anny Plan file. 1933. Ltr.
TAG to eGs all Corps Areas, Dcp.1rtments, and Exemptt.'d Slat ions. 26 Oct 34, sub: Reorganiz.1tion
of Field Arti llery, AG 320.1 FA ( 12- 26- ]3), Pub, AO Reference Jiles, DAMI I-IISO.
25 T /O. Table I W. lnraillry Division. 192 1: T ID. Tab le 401 W, Cavalry Division. 192 1: Field
Sel'l'ice Ueglllflliolls Ullited St(l/e~' AI'II/)' (192]). I). 66.
26 UI'I oflhe Sec ofWol'. 191/1, p. 82; WD Cir 29. 1929; Ema Risch. QIIl/l'tel'lIl11stel' Support of
Ihe AI'III,I': II 11i.~101)' o.flhe CO/p.l 1775 1939 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Oniee.
1962). pp. 717- 19; WD Cir 14, 19] 1.
27 UI'I of the St.'C of War. 1934. pp. 40-41. and /935, I). 7; Ur. TAG 10 COs all Corps Areas,
Departments, and Exempted Stations. 26 Oct ]4. sub: Reorga niz.1tion of Field Artillery: Al'lIIy /.isl
tI//(I/)iI'l'CIOI"J'.2 0Qct 1939. pp. 9 10,15.
211 John S. Shetler, "Motors for the Guard." Quarterlllaster Rel'ie,, 14 (Mar-Apr 1935): 47-49;
NmiO/wl GII(lrtf RegiSler (19]9). pp. 1422 2].
2'l Field Service Regulations (192]). p. 13.
30 J. F, C, Fuller. "Tactics and Mecha niz.1tion: and "Editorial Comment: Mechanization of
Military Forces," IlIfilllll)' JO/ll'/la/ 30 (May 1927): 457- 76. 533 35. The entire issue is devoted 10
mec hani zation.
3t Timothy K. Nenninger, "The Experimclltal Mechanized Forces," /lrl/lor 78 (May- Jun
1969): 33 39; GO 16. Third Corps Arc:1. 5 Jul 1928, 66th Armor fi le. DAMII -IIS0; Brig Gen
u.s.
MANEUVER AN D FI REPOW ER
140
Daniel Van Voorhis. lecture, "Mcch,mization," 13 Oct 1937. at the Army War College. AWe
course mnlerial 1937- 1938, MHI.
32 A ftcr World War I, the Amly Staff was reorganized 10 consist of the Chief of Slafl', Deputy
Chief of SlatT. and Assistant Chiefs of Staff, 0 - 1. 0 - 2. 0 - 3. and 0-4. lind WilT Plans Division.
The 0 - 1 position corrcspondcu to personnel. 0 - 2 to intelligence, 0 - 3 to operations, and 0-4 10
sliPllly.
33 Memo, 0-3 for ColS, 20 Mar 28, sub: A Mechanized Force, A We Course material ,
0 - 3/10677,84-- 17, MHI.
34 Ibid.; W D SO 110, 10 May 1928, extract printed in RPI, Mechanized Force, I Del 28, A we
course material 84-20, M II!.
35 Rpl, sub: A Mechanized Force, 1 Oct 28, Melllo, Deputy Cors for Cors, 31 Oct 28, sub: A
Mechanized Force, AWC coursc mntcrial, OCS 18500- 57,84- 20, M HL Thc bonrd includcd Mnj.
Adna R. C haffcc, who would bccomc n bencon for mechanilmtion in the ncxt decade.
36 Mildred Hanson Gillie, Forgillg Ille Thullderbolt ( Hnrri sburg, Pn.: Military Service
Publishing Co., 1947), I)P. 36--40; Charles L. SCOIl, "Early History of Mechnnization," draft Ms.
C hnrlcs L. Seoll Pnpcrs, LC; Nenninger, "The Experimental Mechani zed Forces," pp. 33-34.
l7 Nenninger, "The Expcrimental Mechnnized Forces," p. 39; Memo, OCS, I Mny 3 1, sub:
General Principlcs to Govcm Meclmnization and Modcmization Throughout thc AmlY. Mi[itnry
Intelligence Division Correspondence, 1917- 1941,2045- [ 192/ 12, RO 165 , NARA; Nomlnn Millcr
Cary, "The Use of Motor Vehicles in the United States Army, 1899- 1939," Ph.D. disse rtMion,
University of Georgin, 1980. p. 244; Rpt of the Sec 0/ War. 1931, p. 43; Daniel Van Voorhis,
"Mechnnization"; Robert W. Grow. "The Ten Lean YeaTS," Ms. Feb 1969, pp. 19- 22, DAMH
HSO.
l8 Ltr, TAG to CG of nil Corps Areas and Depts and other addresses. 16 l an 31. sub: Changes
in Assignment of Divisionnl Cavalry units, AG 320.2 ( 12- 24- 3 I} Misc. (Ret) MC, 1st Annored
Div file, DAMH.IISO; GO 2. Fifth Corps Area, 6 Feb 1932. Records of U.S. Anny Contin ental
Commands, 1920-42, RG 394, NARA; Guy V. Henry, "The Trend of Organization and Equipmcnt
of Cavalry in the Princi pal World Powers and Its Probable Role in Wars of the Ncar Futuro,"
e m'all)' JO/I/"IIlI141 (Mar- Apr 1932): 5- 9; T /O. Table 423 P, Cnvlll ry Regime nt (Mcchnnized), I
Jan 1933; Grow, "Thc Tcn Lean Years," pp. 22-38; 1'/0 , Table 423 p . Cavalry Regimen t
(Mechanized), 14 Oct 1935; Daniel Van Voorhis, "Mcchnnization"; SCOII, '"Early History of
Mechanization."
39 Corelli S amell, Bri/ail! (111(/ Her Army /50 7- /970 (Wlln1lOlldsworth. England: Allcn Lane,
Penguin Press, 1974). p. 469; Glenn S . Hel[mich. "ChMlcs de Gaulle: His Ideas on Mechani zed
Warfare and the Anny of thc Future and the Application of These Ideas," Master thesis. Xavier
University, 1955. p. 68; Jeffcry A. Gunsburg, Dil'/'(/ed alld COllqrlered: Tlte Fr'ellch Nigh Command
(/lid the Defcat of tire Wesl. /940 (Wcstport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1979). p. 9- 10, 15.41-42;
Timothy K. Ncnninger, "A Rcvised Meehaniz.1lion Policy," AmlOr 78 (Sep- Oct 1969): 45-49.
40 Hcinz Guderian. I>unzer Lel/der (New York: E. P. D ullon and Co ., 1952), pp. 36, 316;
Gillie, Forging the Thunderbol t, p. 85- 89; Richard M. Ogorkiewcz. Arm ol': A HistOt)' tlf
Mechanized Forces (New York: Fredcrick A. I'raegcr, 1960). pp. 222- 28.
4t Mcmo, G- 3 for CofS, 23 Jan 29, sub: Recent developments in organization and training in
amlies of England, France, Gcnnany. and Japan. Melllo, G- 3 for CofS, lan 32, sub: Prospective
changes in organization based on recent dcvelopments in organizati on and tra ining of foreign
llTrnies, Memo on confercncc. Office, Chief of Infant ry (CI). 5 lui 29. G-3 21930 and CI files.
400- 112- 7988, 13- [V. RG 177, NARA.
42 Melllo on Confcrcnce. 5 Jul 29; 1st Iud CI to G- 3, 2 Feb 29. C I 320/8510,B, C I files,
400- [ 12- 7988, B- 1V. RG 177, NARA.
43 Minority Repon. Infantr y Reorganization Project. 20 Oct 29, Division General file ,
DAMH- HSO; Llr. Clto TAG. 23 Nov 29. sub: Reorganization of the Infantry Battalion. and 1st
Ind. Clto TAG. 5 Dec 29. Llr. TAG toC I. 18 Dec 29, sub: Reorganization of the Inr..1ntry Division.
War, Ltr, Infantry Board to CI, 2 Apr 30, sub: Reorgani7..,tioll of the Inr..' lItry Division. Memo. LI
Coll3mcc Magmdcr for General Fuqua, 7 May 31, sub: Ren sons for not delaying reorga nization
A RETURN TO TH E PAST; A LOO K TO HI E FUTURE
141
Project, all CI files 400- 112- 7899, RG 177, NARAj Uf, Brig Gell Chynoweth to author, 30 Aug
77 author's l11e.
44 Memo, 0 - 3 for CofS, 5 Oct 35, sub: Modernization of Ihe Organization of the Arm)"
Memo, DeS for A CotS, 0 - 3, 28 Oct 35, sub: Modcmization of the Organization of the AmlY,
WDp 0 - 35651, RG 165, NARA.
45 leT, DeS to all CGs Corps Area and other addresses, 5 Nov 35, sub: Reorganization of
Divisions and Higher Units, A we Course material, AG 320.1 (11-4-35) (Mise) F M, 52- 12, MH1;
LIT, Commandant of the Infantry School to Ihe C I, 13 Dec 35, sub: Review of Plans for
Reorganization of the Division and Higher Units submitted by the Academic Dcp,Lrtmcnt of Ihe
Infantry School and by the Infantry Board, Llr, C l IO TAG, 31 Dec 35, sub: Reorganization of the
Division and Higher Units, C I files 400- 12217988 B H, C4-1, RG 177, NARA.
46 Lt r, TAG to Brig Gell John H. Hughes, 16 Jan 36, sub: Modemization of the Organiz.1tion
of the Anny, AO 320.1 ( 1-6- 36) (C) Off, Memo, 0 - 3 fo r Cors, 21 Dec 35, sub: Model11ization of
the Organization of the AmlY, Memo, G- 3 for Cors, 30 Ju! 36, sub: Initial Report of Organization
Committee on 'Modemization of the Organization of the Army" with special reference to the
Infantry Division, 0 - 3 35651, all RO 165, NARA; Harry C. Ingles, "The New Division," Sigllal
COI1)S Dllllelill No. 108 (Apr- Jun 1940): 15- 31. The board consisted o f Brig Ocn John H. Hughcs,
Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, as the presidcnt; Cols. Philip B. Peyton (0- 1) and Fay W.
Bradson (0-2), Lt Cols Gilbert R. Cook (0- 3) and Leonard C. Sparks (0-4), and Maj . Harvcy O.
Allcn, War Plans Divisions. Between 1936 and 1940 the membership on the board changed, but thc
0 - 3 remained its presidcnt and Ingles, who replaced Cook in 1936, servcd thc longcst and perf0n11Cd most of the work relating to thc 0 -3 .
47 Memo for Cors, 30 Jul 35, sub: Initial Report of Organization Committce.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Memo, 0 - 3 for Cors, 4 Aug 36, sub: Ini tial Report on the Organization Committee on
"Modemization of the Organiz.1tion of thc Anny"' wi th special refcrence to the Infantry Division,
0 - 3/35641- 12, RG 165, NARA.
52 Ibid.; Menlo, 0 - 3 for CotS, 5 Dec 36, sub: Tcsts of Propos cd Inf:mtry Division, with TAB
A, Mcrno, Lt Col Ingles for Oenera! Hughes, 14 Jan 1937. no subject, G- 3/3565 1- !2, RO 165,
NARA; Memo 2, Proposed Infantry Division (PID), 20 May 37. sub: Composition of Proposed
Inf:mtry Division and Attached units, and Mcmo 4, 1'10, 4 Jun 37, sub: Armament, AG 320- 2
(1- 6-36), RG 407, NARA; !-Icrbert E. Smith, "The Proposed Infantry 'Streamlined' Division,"
RccmiliJ/gNews 20 (Jan 1938): 9-11 and (Feb 1938): 8- 10.
53 Ltr, ClIO TAO, 26 Nov 37, sub: Report of Observation, Proposed Infa ntry Division Test,
Vicinity of San Antonio, Texas, October 18- 28, C I 4ooI112- 7988- B 11 C (4- 1) Inf. Div., RO 177,
NARA.
54 Ltr, George C. Marshall to Walton H. Walker, 21 Dee 37, Marshall Papers; " Push Plan To
Lin Mobility or An11Y; New York Times, 13 Dec 1937; Lt r, Marshall to William M. Spencer, 18
Mar 38, Marshall Papers.
S5 Lesley J. McNair, High Lights of Report by CO. 2d Division of the Field Service Test of
the I'ID including the Division Reeolllnlcnded, 31 Mar 1938, McNair Pal}Crs, RG 407, NA RA.
S6 Harry C. Ingles, "The New Division," IlIfilllll}' 49 (Nov- Dec 1939): 521-29; Llr, TAO to
CG, Eighth Corps Area, 24 Jan 39, sub: Directive for extendcd field service test of new division
organizmion, AO 320.2 ( 12- 29- 38) Misc. (Ret) M-C, 2d Infantry Division file, DAM H-HSO.
S7 Ltr, TAG to CG, Eighth Corps Area, 241an 39.
S8 Ltr, TAO to CO, Eighth Corps Area, 15 Oct 38, sub: Rcorganization of the 2d Infalllry
Division, AO 320.2 (9- 3- 38) Misc. (Rct) M-C, 2d lnf Div tilc, DAM H-HSO.
59 Memo, G- 3 for Cors, 3 Sep 38, sub: Reorganization of the Infantry Division, 0 - 3/3565 I- 55,
RO 165, NA RA; Special Report based on Ficld Service Test of the Provisional 2d Division conducted
by the 2e1 Division U.S. AmlY, 1939. AWCeoursc material. MHI; Lt r, Provisiona12d Division, 7 Scp
39. sub: Thc test orthe New Division Organi1..1tion, AG 320.2 (9- 7- 39), RO 165, NARA
142
MANEUV ER AND FIREPOWER
60 Llr, Provisiona12d Division, 7 Sep 39, sub: The lest of the New Division Organization. lind
lsl lnd, CO, Eighth Corps Area 10 TAG, Sep 1939. AG 320.2 (9- 7- 39) RG 165, NARA.
61 Memo, 0 - 3 for Cors, 14 Sep 39, s ub: R corganiz~l[ion of the Infantry Division ,
0 - 3/3565 1- 55, RG 165, NARA; TaMes o/Organizatio/l lind Reference /)(Ilajor lite "!filllll
lJil'isioll. Trial/gulor (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and General Slaff School, 1939), I'p.1-
37.
62 L1r, M:lfshallto lames L. Collins, 4 Oct 39, Marshall Papers.
63 Memo, 0 - 3 forCofS, 16 Scp 39, su b: Org,lIlization of Regular Anny, First Priority (17,000
increase), 16 SCI) 39, 0 - 3/6541-0el1 697, Llr, TAG to CI, Ficld Artillery, Engineers and other
addresses, 8 Scp 38, sub: Preliminary measures in connection with the organization of the new
Ill falltry Division, AG 320.2 (8- 31 - 39) M (Het) GM. all Study on Triangular Divisions, 1939.
DAMH-IISO.
64 LIr, TAG to CG, Eighth Corps Area, 12 Oct 36, sub: Orgnniz;ltion of thc Cavalry Division,
AG 320.2 {10- 6- 36 Misc. (Rel)-C. Mcrno, G-3 for the Cornmandnm. AWC, 30 Dec 36, sub:
Reorgan;z;Ltion. Cavalry Division, G- 3 35651. LIr. TAG to CG, Eigh th Corps Area. 15 Fcb 38,
sub: 1st Cavalry Division MnneLlvcrs. Fiscal Year 1938,353 (1- 29- 38) Misc. c., Rcport of 130ard
of Review, vol. I, Fort Bliss, Tex,ls, 2 lun 1938, all;11 AWC eou rse materi.. l, MHI.
65 Report of Board of Review, vol. J, Fort Bliss, TCJlas, 2 Jun 1938, A WC course material.
MHI.
66 " Revised Tables of Organization, Cavalry Regiment, Horse," Comll)' )olll"llal 48 (MllrApr 1939): 58- 63.
67 Ltr, Mm-:;Imllto Collins, 4 Oct 39, M;Lrshall f>;LJX:rs.
CHAPTE R 6
Prelude to Combat
Mililmy opera/iam abroad constitufe a grcallabom/ory and proving groundfol' fhe
delle/oplllelll and les/ing of OIgallizlIIioll (lml materiel. These o/Jerations have beell eha/'aCferized by increasing use and impol'fal/ce of armored /IIolorizetl, and olher specialized
divisiolls and by COIICI/,./,elll ejfol'lJol' fhe development of means /0 COli/lie!' armored
(/(llIk) division.s operating ill c/o~'e coordilla/ioll wirll air and motorized IIlIi/s.
General George C. Marshall I
The German invasion of Poland in September 1939 marked the beginning of

World War II in Europe and the beginning of the gradua l end of American isolationism. As the Axis threat g rew ever larger, it soon became evident that paper
units would no longer suffice for the nation's defense. In thi s new international
environment, the Army began its rebuilding program. Initi ally an emphasis on
protection o f the Western Hemisphere drove mobil ization, and the victories of the
German Army and Navy and their possi ble th reat to the Americas accelerated the
expan sion. As events in Europe unfolded, relations between the United States and
Japan deteriorated, eventua lly culminati ng in the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7
December 1941. Meanwhile, the Army steadi ly mustered forc es, gaining fresh
manpower from the rirst peacetime draft. Army leaders and their staffs worked
overtime attempting to create an effective military force from the hollowed-out
interwar Army. Along with new weapons and new concepts of warfare, new divisiona l tactica l organizations appeared, most of which underwent severa l transformations before seeing comb<lt.
fnJantlY and Cavahy Divisions Revisited

In 1939 the Army created a protective mobilization force fo r the defense of the
Western Hemisphere. The force included the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th , and 6th Divisions,
which were organ ized under the new triangular configuration. These forces , however, sti ll needed to be manned <lnd trained for war. Congressional increases in the
size of the Regul ar Army, which began thaI year, provided much of the needed
manpower, while the largest peacetime maneuvers ever undertaken by the Army to
date provided a taste of war in 1940.2 Between 5 and 25 May 1940 the 1st, 2d, 5th,
and 6th Infantry Divisionsjoined the lsi Caval ry Division, the 7th Cavalry Brigade,
a provisional brigade of light and medi um tanks, and other units for maneuvers near
144
67tft Infilll/IJI (Prol'isiol1a/ Tank Brig(l(lej, (II ThiNI Arm)' maneuvers, /940
the Louisiana and Texas border, a step envisaged at the turn of the century to train
an army corps. Not surpri singly, the exercises highlighted weaknesses in most un its
in almost every area of concern, incl uding organization)
To improve the infantry di vision, it was again reorgan ized, making it more
powerful and eas ier to command and cont ro l. A headqua rters and headq uarters
battery, which provided a fire direction contro l center and a brigad ier general as
com mander of the d ivision artillery, replaced the field arti llery section in the
division headq uarters. Four field arti ll ery battalions, three direct su pport and
one general support , replaced the two regiments. The direct support battalions
were to be armed wit h newly approved 105-mm. howitzers, while the general
support battalion fielded 155-111111. how itzers and 75-111111. gUllS, the latter
retained primarily as antitank weapons. Each field art ill ery battalion also was
outfitted with six 37-111m. antitank guns. To counter operations suc h as the
Ger man b litzk rieg, wh ic h ha d proven so s uccessfu l in Po land, an titank
resources were cen tralized in the infantry regiments to form regimen tal antita nk
compa ni es outfitted wi th 37-111111. anti tank guns. [n infantry battal ions the number of antitank "guns"- the .50-caliber machine guns- was doubled. For targets of opportunity, more 8 1-mm. mortars were added to the heavy weapons
company and three 60-l11m. mortars were aut horized for eac h rifle company. A
reconna issance troop appeared in the division, reflecting the growth in it s operational area on the battlefield, and the number of co llecting companies in the
medical ba11alion was in creased from one to three. Finally, new tables o f orga-
145
PRELU DE TO COM BAT
37-111111. gun fllld erell', 1941
nization eliminated the infantry section with its genera l officer in the division
headquarters but provided an assistant division commander w il h the rank of
brigadier general. These changes brought the strength of the division to 15,245
officers and enl isted men, wi th its combat power st ill foc lised in the th ree regimental combat teams (Chal'! 12),4
Despite the trend in foreign armies to rep lace horse cavalry wit h mechanized
units, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, decided to
table any organizational decisions affect ing the cavalry. Until a de finit e theater o f
operations cou ld be ascertained, the Army needed to prepare general purpose
forces. The horse was capable of goi ng where a machine cou ld not, and the cavalry division appeared to have a place in the force. Among the questions Andrews
wanted answered was, again, whether the divis ion shou ld be built on a triangular
or square configuration. He a lso wa nted to explore if and how horse and mechanized units could operate together wi thin a cava lry corps.5
After the 1940 maneuvers Maj. Gcn . Kcnyon A. Joyce, com manding the 1st
Cavalry Division, recommended rctention of the sq uare cavalry division. A division with two brigades, each with two cavalry regiments, was eas ily split in to
strike and reserve forces. If the division wcre organi zed along triangular lines, the
regimen ts would have to be enlarged to maintain their firepower, but it would
make them too large ror effective com mand and control. Joyce suggested that the
cavalry regimellt comprise a headq uarters; headquartcrs and service, machine
gun, and special weapons troops; and two rinc squadrons of three troops each. He
, Includes t9n p90ple for the surgeons OffiC8 in the division heodquerte,s.
Ar. AnIitanI:
CHART 12- lnfantry Division, I November 1940
PRELUDE TO COM BAT
147
wanted to st rengt hen the t\Vo~battalion field artillery regiment by creating batteries of six rather than four 75-llltll . howitzers and adding a truck-drawn I05-mm.
howitzer battalion. To improve mobi lity, the division needed enough trucks to
move horses and equipment to the battlefield. He suggested the elimination of
only one organization- headquarters, special lroops- which fac ilitated admini stration in garrison, but not in the ficld,6
Joyce decided that horse and mechani zed uni ts were compat ible within a cavalry corps s in ce the 151 Cava lr y Di v is ion and the 7th Cava lry Brigade
(Mechanized) had sllccessfu lly conducted joint operations during the maneuvers.
He urged the Army to maintain a corps that incl uded both types of units. The proportion of horsc and mechanized units could vary to meet various tacti cal situations, but he thought the corps should be strong in artil lery and engi neers and
contain suffic ient support troops to enable it to operate with maximum speed,
flex ibility, and stri king power)
T he reviscd cavalry division remained squarc and was to have I 1,676 officers
and enli stcd men (Cftarl /3). Divisional cavalry regiments conformed to Joyce's
recommendations, bu t instead of increasing the size of the field artillery regi men t, one truck-drawn 105-1111ll. howitzer battalion and two 75-mm. pack howitze r battalions rep laced it. As in the infantry di visio n, the cavalry d ivision
received antitank weapons. T he new warti me division tables authorized a d ivisiona l antitank troop fielding twelve 37-mm. antitank guns and a weapons troop
having antitank guns and 8 1-mm. mortars wit hin eac h brigade. The engineer,
quartermaster (formerly the div ision train), and medical squadrons were enlarged
to meet the needs of the bigger di vision. Draft , pack, and riding horses were limited to the cava lry brigades and the d ivision artil lery, while other elements of the
division were motorized. Headquarters, special troops, was e liminated.8
As the 1940 Loui siana man euvers drew to a close and the fall of France
appeared imminent, the War Department authorized an increase in the number of
active Regular Army infantry divisions and the adoption of the new tables. Between
June and August 1940 the Army act ivated the 4th, 7th , 8th , and 9th Divisions.
Neither those divisions nor the other act ive divisions had sufficient personnel
to meet the new manni ng levels. The I st Cavalry Division did not adopt the revised
configuration until early in 1941 when it concentrated at Fort Bl iss for training.9
Organizing Armored Divisions

During the 1940 maneuvers the Army also had tested a provisional mechanized division . After the German invasion o f Poland in 1939, Brig . Gen. Adna R.
Chaffee had call ed for "armored" divisions separate from both infantry and cavalry. Chaffee's 7th Cavalry Brigade (M echan ized), Bri g. Gen. Bruce Magruder's
Prov isional Tank Bri gade (organized in 1940 with infantry tank units), and the
6t h Infantry made up the new unit. At the conclusion of the exercises, Chaffee;
Magruder; Co l. Alvan C. G ill em, Magruder's executi ve officer; Col. George S.
"
149
PRELUDE TO COM BAT
Patton , commander of the 3d

Cava lry at Fort Myer, Virginia; and
other advocates of tank warfare met
with the G- 3, General Andrews, in a
school house
at
A lexandria,
Louisiana , to disc uss the future o f
mechanization. All agreed that the
Army needed to unify its efforts.
Th e question was how. Both the
chief of cavalry and the chief of
infantry had attended the maneuvers, but th ey were excluded from
the meeting because of their expected opposition to any change that
might dcprive their arms of personnel, equipment, or missions. IO
~
Returning to Washi ngton,
Andrews proposed that Marshall ca ll a
conference on mechanization. The crisis in Europe had by then increased
Genemf Chaffee
congrcssional willingness to support a
major rcarmament effort, and at the same time the success of the German panzers
highlighted the need fo r mechanization, however costly. Andrews' ini tiative, made
three days aftcr the British evacuated Dunkirk, noted that the American Army had
inadequate mechanized fo rces and that it needed to revise its policy of allowi ng
both infantry and caval ry to develop such units separately. He suggested that the
basic mechanized combined arms unit be a division of between 8,000 and 11 ,000
men. With the chief of cavalry planning to organize mechanized cavalry divisions,
which mixed horse and tank units, such a conference seemed imperat ive. Marshall
approved Andrews' proposal. l l
From 10 to 12 June 1940 Andrews hosted a meet ing in Washington centering
on the organ ization of mechan ized divis ions. Along with the General Staff and
the chiefs of the arms and services, Chaffee, Magruder, and other tank enthusiasts attended. Andrews disclosed that the War Department would organize an
independent armored force, belonging to neither the Infantry nor Caval ry branches, in the form of "mechanized div isions." In such divisions the command and
control echelon wou ld consist of a headquarters and headquarters company and a
signal company. A recon naissance battalion wit h an attached aviat ion observation
squadron wou ld constitute the commander's "eyes," which would operate from
100 to 150 miles in advance and reconnoiter a fro nt from 30 to 50 mi les. At the
heart of the division was an armored brigade made up of a headquarters and
headquarters com pany, one medium and two light armored regiments, a field
artillery regiment, and an engineer battalion. Using the two light armored regi-
..
..
"..
ISO
MA NEU VER A ND FI REPOW ER
ments as the basis for two combat teml1S, the di vision was to conduct reconnai ssance, screening, and pursuit missions and exploit tacti cal situations. An armored
infantry regiment, along with armored field arti ll ery, q uartermaster, and medica l
battalions and an ordnance company, supported the armored brigade. Similar to
the German panzer di vision , it was to number 9,859 offi ce rs and enlisted mcn.1 2
Whe n approving the establi shme nt o f the A rmored Force to oversee th e
o rgani za ti o n a nd trainin g of two mecha ni zed di vis ion s o n 10 July 1940,
Ma rshall al so ap p roved d es ig natin g th ese unit s as " armored" divi s ion s.
Furth ermore, he directed the chi e f o f cavalry and the chie f of infantry to make
personnel who were experi enced with tank and mechani zed units available for
assignment to the di vision s. On 15 July, without approved tabl es o f organ izati on, Mag ruder organi zed the I st Armored Divi sion at Fort Knox from personne l and e quipm e nt of th e 7 th C a valr y Bri g ad e and t he 6th Infantry.
Con currently, Brig. Gen. Charl es L. Scott , a form er reg imenta l commander in
the 7th Cavalry Brigade, acti vated the 2d Armored Div ision at Fort Benn ing
using men and materie l from the Provisional Tank Brigade. Marshall se lected
Chaffee to cOlllmand the new Armored Force .13
Four months later the War Department publi shed tables of organization for
the armored division (Charf 14). It resembled the unit deve loped during the summer, except that the engineer battalion was removed from the armored brigade
a nd ass ign ed to the d ivi s ion headquart ers, and th e ordnan ce company wa s
expa nd ed to a batta lion . To the surprise of Chaffee, who had supervised the
preparation of the tables, the authorized strength of the di vision rose from 9,859
to 12,697, including attached personnel.
The di vision fi elded 381 tanks and 97 scout cars when all units were at war
strength. 14 Cha ffee envisaged the establishment o f corps-s ize units comma nding
both armored and motori zed divisions, the latter essentially an infantry division
with suffic ient motor equi pment to move all its personne l. On 15 July 1940 the
War Department selected the 4t h Division, whi ch had recently been reacti vated as
pa rt o f th e Regul a r A rmy's expan sio n, fo r thi s rol e. Co ll ocated w ith the 2d
Armo red Di vision at Fo rt Bennin g, the 4th 's di vis ional el eme nt s had earli er
ex pe rim ented w ith moto ri zed infantry. Eventua lly th e de pa rtm ent publi shed
tables of organization for a motori zed division that retained the triangular structure but fielded 2,700 motor vehi cles incl ud ing over 600 armored half-track personnel carriers. IS
Along with the reorgani zati on and ex pansio n of di visio nal forces, the Army
increased un it manning levels and concentrated un its for training. A peacetime
dra ft, adopted on 16 Septe mbe r 1940, prov ided the men, a nd eventuall y th e
strength of a ll divisions neared war level. Prior to 1940 units were scattered over
130 posts, camps, a nd st atio ns in the Unit ed St at es , but wi th mobi liza ti on
Congress provi ded fun ds for new facil it ies. The Quartermaster Corps, during the
wi ntcr of 1940-4 1, built accommodat ions for 1.4 mill ion men, incl ud ing divisiona l posts o f the type constructed in World War J. 16
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152
H(llf-track {Je/'SOllllel ca/', 1941
But as in World War " eq uipment shortages could not be quickly remedied
and greatly inhibited preparation for war. Among other thi ngs, the Army lacked
modern rie ld arti llery, rifl es, tanks, and antitank and antiaircraft weapons.
Although acutely aware of the shortages, Marshall bel ieved that the Army could
conduct basic training while the production o f weapons caughlup,l7
Mobilization of National Guwd Units

As the possibility that the nation might be forced into the European war
increased, some members of the War Department favored federalization of the
National Guard to correct defic iencies in its training and equipment. In August
1940, after much debate, Congress approved the induction of Guard units for
twelve months of training. It also authorized their use for the defense of the Western Hemi sphere and the territorics and possessions of the United States, including the Philippine Islands. IS
Induction of Guard units began on Monday, 16 September, with federalization of the 30th, 41 st, 44t h, and 45th Divisions, less their tank and av iation units.
These latlcr units eventually served in World War II , but not as divisional organ izations. The divisions were considerably underslrength , eaeh having approximately 9,600 men, but training eamps were 110t prepared even for that number. To
bring the divisions to war level , the War Department suppli ed draftees, and within
PRELUDE TO COMBAT
153
six mon ths all e ighteen Guard infan try divisions had entered federal service and
were training at divisional posts. 19
Federa l law required Gua rd units to be organized under the same tables as
the regulars. But the Guard divisions had not yet adopted the triangular config
unltion , and the General Staff hesitated 10 reorganize Ihem immed iate ly as they
were in federal serv ice only for training. Furth ermore, the staff fe ared politica l
repercuss ions when general and field grade officers wcre el iminated to con form to the new tables.20
The National Guard also maintained two separate infantry brigades, the 92d
and 93(~ which did not fit in to any war plans of 1940. At the request of the
National Guard Bu reau, New York COllverted the 93d to the 7 1st Field Artillery
Brigade, and Minnesota reorganized the 92d as the 10l st Coast Arti llery Brigade,
and the units entered federal service as such)l
Although war plans did not ca ll for separate infantry brigades in the United
States, the War Department authorized a new 92d Infant ry Brigade in the Puerto
Rico National Guard to command forces there. T he new headquarters came into
federal serv ice on 15 October 1940, but served less than two years without seeing
combat. In July 1942 the Caribbean Defense Command inactivated the brigade
and replaced it with the Puerto Rican Mobil e Force. 22
Besides in fantry di visions and brigades, the Nat ion al Guard mainta ined
four partially organ ized cavalry d ivisions and on e cava lry brigade. As these
forces did not fit into any curren t war plans, the Gencral StafT initiated a stud y
in August 1940 to determ ine the Guard's requirements for horse and mec hani zed unit s. It concluded that the Guard needed both types of organizat ions, but
not fou r horse cavalry divisions. At the time of the study it was rumored that
the personnel from two cavalry div isions would form the nucl ei of Iwo armored
divisions. The states, however, objected to the loss of cavalry regiments, and
Armored Force leaders believed that armored divi sion s were too bi g and complicated for the Guard. On I Novem ber 1940 the National Guard Bureau withdrew the allotment of the 2 1st through 24th Cavalry Divisions, which in effect
disbanded them. Some of their elements were used to organ ize mechani zed cavalry regiments. Afte r Novem ber th e 56th Cavalry Briga d e, a Texas unit ,
remained the only large unit aut horized horses in the National Guard. It entered
federal service before the end of the year.23
With 18 infantry divisions, I infantry brigade, and I cavalry brigade from the
National Guard undergoing training in 1941 , a cri sis soon developed regarding
their future. The 1940 law had authorized the federa lization of the Guard for only
one year, and that pcriod was about to exp ire for some units. But the units were
now filled with both draftees and guardsmen, and the release of the latter from
federal serv ice would complete ly break up these units. In the su mmer of 194 1 the
War Department thus prevailed upon Congress to extend the Guard units and men
o n active duty. This decis ion allowed Marshall to cond uct the g reat General
Headquarters Maneuvers in the summer and fa ll of 1941.24
154
Expanding Divisional Forces

Using the protective mobili zation plan, in 1941 the Army also proceeded to
increase the number of cavalry, armored, and infantry divisions in response to the
growing th reat of war. The Regular Army organized a second caval ry div ision
against a backdrop of domestic po litics. As a resu lt of debates over increasing the
size of the Army, Congress had provided "That no Negro because of race, shall
be excluded from enlist ment in the Army for service with colored military units
now organi zed and to be organized."2S In the midst of the 1940 presiden tial campaign prominent black leaders complained bitterly to President Frank lin D.
Roosevelt about the limited number of black units. Under political pressure the
Army activated the 2d Cavalry Divis ion at Fort Riley, Kansas, on I April 1941 ,
wit h o ne black and one whi te brigade,26
Armored divisions were viewed as far more essential than cava lry div isions.
As early as 6 August 1940, Chaffee, commanding thc Armored Force, plan ned
morc armorcd divisions, and he di rected the 1st and 2d Armorcd Divisions to
mai ntain a 25 percent overstrength as cadre for addi tional units. In January 1941
the War Department approved the establi shmcnt of two morc armored division s,
and on 15 Apri l the Armored Forcc activated the 3d and 4th at Ca mp Beauregard,
Louisiana, and Pine Camp (later Fort Drum), New York , respecti ve ly. Shortly
thereafter plans su rfaced for two more armored divisions. T he 5th Armored
Di vision, added to the rolls in August, became a reality in October, and the 6th
joined the force in January 1942,27
Thc European war cl ea rly demonstra ted a need to have antitank forces.
Marshal l had decided thaI all units had an antitank role, bUI he also recognized
the requirement for specific countcr-armor unit s. He did not want to assign them
to an ex isting ann bcctluse thei r organization, tactical doctrine, and devclopment
secmed beyond the scope of anyone arm. The problem struck the ncw Ass istant
Chief of Sta ff, G- 3, Bri g. Gen. Harry L. Twadd le, as sim ilar to that ofemp loying
the machine gu n during World War I. As an ex pedient, separate mach ine gun batta lions had been establ ished, although the guns were prevalent in all combat formations. Twadd le believed that antitank units. which would not be a part of any
ex isting arm, should also be organized as an ex pedient to provide the strongest
antitank capabilit y possible; later the Army could sort out whet her they were
infantry or field artillery weapons,28
Twaddle's sta ff developed plans to provide fOllr antitank battal ions for each
ex isting division. One batta lion wou ld serve with the division and the three others
would be held at higher echelons for employment as needed. For the upcoming
maneuvers the War Department authorized the formation of provisional an titank
battalions in June 1941 , using the antitank gun s from fie ld arti ll ery battalions.
Thc following December, a ft er the maneuvers, the battalions were made pennanent organizations and redesignated as tank destroyer units to indicate their offcnsive nature. They wcrc not divisional elements, as recoml11cnded by First, Third,
PRELUDE TO COMBAT
155
Tanh oj ,lte 681h Armored, 2(1 Arll/ored Division. jJarlicipate ill fhe LOllisio/lo
Malleuvers, J94 /.
and Fourth Army COlllmanders after the 1941 maneuvers, but assigned to General
Headquarters (G I-I Q). This arrangement placed the units outside the control of the
exist ing arms, thu s creating basically a new homogeneous antitank force. The
independent tan k destroyer batta lions would later prove an organ izational error,
denying division commanders a major resou rce that they hab it ually needed. It
did, however, foc lis attention on an area that was a growing tactica l concern .29
The possible theater of operations shifted from the Western Hemi sphere to
the Pacific in 1941 as relations deteriorated between the Uni ted States and Japan.
To be prepared for that contingency, LI. Gen. Walter C. Shorl, commandi ng the
Hawai ian Department, requested permission to expand the squ are Hawaiian
Division into two triangula r infantry divisions with the primary mission of
defend ing Oahu, the most populous of the islands and a major base of the U.S.
Pacific Fleet. Recognizing that the Regular Army lacked the un its required for the
reorganization, Short proposed that Guard units complete the two divisions. T he
departmen t approved Short's proposal, and on I October he reorganized and
redesignated the Hawaiian Division as the 24t h Infantry Division and activated
the 25th Infantry Division. Elcmcnts of the Hawaiian Division were distributed
between the two new divisions, and, as planned, each had one Hawaii National
Guard and two Regular Army infantry regiments. Divisional strengths hovered
around 1 1,000 men.30
156
Provisional Tank Des/royer Ballalion, Fori Meade. MtIIJ'ltmd. 1941
About the same time the Army int roduced two new distinctions into its official lexicon. First, the word "infantry" was made a part of the official designa-
tion of sllc h divisions. In the past the wo rd infantry was understood, but,
because of the expanding variety of divisions, the Army needed some way to
distinguish among them. The adjutant general specified that unit designations
thus include the major combat e lement or even the Iype of unit when Ihe form er
was not sufficiently descriptive. Some divisions issued genera l orders introducing infantry as a part of the official name, and the adjutant general constituted
the 25th specifically as an infantry division. The term, however, was not officia lly added 10 the tables of organization, documents that tech nically controlled
the names of units, unli l 1942.31
The second change concerned Ihe meaning of Ihe term "Army of Ihe Un ited
States." Before 1940 it had embraced the Regula r Army, the National Guard
whi le in the service of the United States, and the Organized Reserves. With the
growth of the force , the term Army of the United States was broadened to encompass units that had not been a part of the mobilization plans during the interwar
years. The 25th Infantry Division was the firs t division-size uni t act ivated under
the expanded definition,32
In the Pacific area, the defense of the Philippine Islands presented unique
problems. They were too distant and 100 scattered fo r ground defense. Nevert heless, Marshall asked the local commander, General Douglas MacAnhur, whet her
TABLE 12
Divis ions Active on 7 December 194 1

COIIIPQlI(tIIl
RA
RA
Dillisi()11
1st Infantry
2d Infantry
Dale ACli\l(l/cd ol'lndlicled

11110 FCl/eml SCl'l'il:e
L()(;(lliot1
FOri Devens, Mass.
RA
3d Infantry
RA
RA
RA
41h Infantry
5th Infantry
61h Inr.1nlry
I June 1940
16 October 1939
10 October 1939
Fort CUSter. Mich.

Fort Ll:on;lrd Wood, Mo.
RA
RA
RA
RA
71h Infantry
81h infarury
9th Infantry
24th [ nf~ntry
1 July 1940
1 July 1940
1 August 1940
Fort Ord. Calif.

Fort Jackson, S.C.
Fon Bragg, N.C.
AUS
25th Infantry
I Oc tober 1941
Schofield Barracks, Hawaii

Schofield Bamlcks, Hawaii
NO
NO
NO
26th Infantry
27 th Infantry
16 January 1941
IS October 1940
17 Febnl;lry 1941
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NG
NO
NO
291h Infantry
30th Infantry
3 1st Infantry
32d Infantry
33d Infantry
341h Infantry
351h Infarllry
361h Inf:ulIry
371h Inf.1ntry
381h Infantry
40lh Inf.1111ry
41stlnfanlry
43d Infant ry
44th Infantry
45th Inf.1ntry
1st Cavalry
2d Cavalry
1st AmlOrcd
2d Annored
3d AmlOrcd
4th Annored
5th Annored
RA
RA
RA
"A
RA
RA
RA
NOTES:
28th Infantry
3 February 194 I
16 September 1940
25 November 1940
15 <ktObeT 1940
5 March 1940
10 Febnmry 1941
23 December 1940
25 November 1940
16 October 1940
17 January 194 1
3 March 1941
16 September 1940
24 February 1941
16 September 1940
16 September 1940
15 April 1941
151uly 1940
15 July 1940
15 April 1941
15 April 1941
I <klober 1941
Fon Sam Houston, Tex.

Fort Lewis, Wash.
Fon Benning, Ga.
Camp Edwards, Mass.

Fort McClellan, Ala.
@ lndiantown GapMilitary
Reservation. I'a.
@FOr1GeorgeG. Meade, Md.
FOr1 Jackson, S.C.
Camp Blanding, Fla.
Camp Li vi ngston, La.
Cam p Forrest, Ten n.
Ca mp Claihome, La.
Camp Joseph T.Robinson, Ark .
Carnp Bowie, Tex.
Cmlll) Shelby, Miss.
Camp Shelby, Miss.
For1 Lewis, Wash.
FOr1 Lewis. Wash.
Camp Shelby, Miss.
FOr1 Di,.;, N.J .
Camp Berkeley, Te,.;.
FOr1 Bliss. Tex.
FOr1 Riley, Kans.
FOr1 Kno,.;, Ky.
Fort Benning, Ga.
Camp Beaurega rd , La.
I'ine Ca mp, N.Y.
Camp Cooke, Calif.
Acli ve before I September 1939.

@En routefrornmaneuvers, arrivcdathome stati on9Deccmber 1941.
158
General Shor' reviews fhe liall'aiian
Di"i.~;oll,
September 1941.
he wanted a Guard di vision to reinforce hi s g round unit s. MacArthur instead

asked for aut hority to reorganize the Philippine Divis ion as a triangu lar uni t and
to fill its regimental combat tea ms wi th Regular Army personnel. Since the d ivision's fo rmation in 192 J, most of its en listed men were Phi lippine Scouts, and he
wanted to use t he m to help organ ize new Ph ili ppine Army un its. Marshall
approved the request and initiated plans to send two infantry regiments, two field
"rtill ery battalions, a headquarters and headq uarte rs battery for the div ision
artillery, a reconnai ssance troop, and a military police platoon to the islands. The
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor an d other installatio ns in the Pac ific on 7
December 194 1 aborted the plan .33
At the time of the attack the Army had thi l'l y~s i x div isions, excluding the
Philippine Div ision ('J(,ble 12), and two brigades on active duty. The nation was
thus much better prepa red for war in December 1941 than in Apri l 1917.
Reorganization of th e National Guard Divisions

The Japanese atta ck and th e e nsui ng American declaration of war on
Japan , Germany, a nd Italy immediately shifted the fo ell s of Army plann ing
from hemi s ph eri c defense to overseas operations. Th e firs t priori ty was to
strea mline the sq uare National Guard d iv isions. Eve n before the attaek Marsha l! had asked Twaddle to exp lore that possibi lity, be li ev ing that the s ur plus
PRELUD E TO COMBAT
159
units coul d be used ove rseas or to creale new o rganizati ons as S0111e divisions
appea red 10 lend themselves to ex pan sion. In November 1941 Twaddle took
the 121st and 16 1st In fant ry from the square 30th and 4 1st Di visions and reassigned them. At the lime of the attack on Pearl Harbor he had replaced the
34 th Infantry with the 121s1 In fantry in the 81h Division and had slated the
34 th and Ihe 161s1 for deployment to the Philippines. The day ancr the attack
he attached one in fantr y regiment eac h from the 32d, 33d, and 36t h Divisions
10 th e Fourth Army to augment the force s protecting the West Coast. A week
later the 124th Infantry from the 3 1st Div ision was assigned to the Infantry
Schoo l al Fort Benning, Gcorgia .34
On 3 1 December 194 1, Marshall asked Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, Chief of
Staff, GHQ, to investigate bottlenecks that had developed during attempts to ship
units overseas. Six days later McNair told Marshall that the Guard divisions used
to organ ize task forces going overseas had "overheads" (noncombat personnel)
that approached the "grotesque" and recommended their immediate reorganization as triangular divisions.35 Shortly therea fter Marshall directed the staff to prepare plans for reorganizi ng thirteen of the eighteen Guard di visions, omitting five
because they already had orders for overseas duty. Ultimately either Marshall or
hi s deputy approved the conversion to triangular formati ons of a ll Guard div isions except one, the 27th, which was targeted for Hawaii where that command
was planning to receive a square division. Twaddle's staff prepared in structions
for the reorganiz<1Iion, which he sent to the division commanders for commcnt.
Units that the states had not adequate ly supported were to be e liminated.36
The reorganization began wit h the 32d and 37t h Divisions on I Fcbruary
1942. All infantry brigades were disbanded except the 5 1st, an element of the
26th Di vision. One infantry brigade headquarters company from each div ision
was converted and redesignated as the div ision reconnai ssance troop, except in
the 28th and 43d Divisions. In the 43d both infantry brigadc headquartcrs companies were disba nded, and in the 28t h one brigade headquarters company became
the recon naissance troop and the other the di vision's military police com pany.
The headquarters and headquarters battery of each fie ld arti llcry brigade became
the headquarters and headquarters battery, division art illery. Other divisiona l e le
ments were reorgani zed, redesignated, rcassigne(~ or d isbanded. The reorgani zation was completed on I Septcmber 1942 when the 27t h Di vision, whic h had
arrived in Hawai i that sum mer, adopted the triangular con fi guration.37
In January 1942 the War Dcpartment created Task Force 6814 from surplus
National Guard units to help defend New Caledonia, a French possess ion in the
Pacific. Among these units were the 51st Infantry Bri gade headq uarters and the
182d Infant ry from the 26t h Di vision (Massachusetts) and the 132d Infantry from
the 33d Division (Ill inois). The uni ts arrived in New Ca ledonia in March and others quick ly followed. Eventually the Opcrations Division (OPD), War Depart ment
General Staff,38 instructed Maj. Gen. Alexa nder M. Patch, comma nding Task
Force 6814, to organize a division. Because he lacked men and equipment for a
160
CalliI' Shelby. Missis:;iP!);. !tollle oflhe 37,It (11/(/ 38,h Divisiol/s, /941
complete table of organiza tion unit , the slaff decided that the division wou ld
carry a name rather than a numerical des ignat ion. Titles such as "Ncen l" and
" Bush" surfaced, but Patch turned to the men assigned to the task fo rce for sugges tion s. Pre . David Fonesca recommend ed "Ame ri ca]" frolll the phra se
"American Troops on New Caledonia," and on 27 May 1942 Patch activated the
America! Division.3 9
Another Reorganization
With the aHack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December the "great laboratory" phase
for deve loping and testi ng organ iz.1tions, about which Marshall wrote in the summer of 1941 , c losed, but the War Depa rtme nt still had nOI develo ped idea l
infantry, cavalry. armored, and motorized div isions. In 1942 it again revised the
divisions based on experiences ga ined during the great G l-I Q maneuvers of the
previous yea r. As in the past , the reorganizations ranged from mi nor adjustments
to wholesa le changes.
The Chief of In fantry, Maj. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges, proposed the principal
change in the infantry division, the addition of a cannon compa ny to the infantry
regiment to provide it with arti llery that could move forward as rapidly as the
troops advanced on foot. The Chi ef of Field Arti ll ery, Maj. Gen. Robert M.
Danford, opposed the idea, contending that al l cannon should be in artillery uni ts.
McNair, appointed Chief of Army Ground Forces (AG F) in March 1942 and
responsible for organizing and training all ground combat units, a lso objected.
For fi ve years the division had been in a state of nux in an effort to make it light
PRE L UDE TO COMBAT
161
and therefore easier to handle. Command and control had rep laced road space as
the bas ic factor behi nd divisional size. Constant changes were destroying those
goals. McNai r ad vised Marshall that the division s hould have a maximum of
\5 ,000 men with the arms being fixed accordingly and thai it should not be
increased in size at the insistence of arm-conscious chiefs. His view did not prevail. Hodges won the armament battle, and a cannon company became a part of
each infantry regimcIlt. 40
The add ition of regimental cannon com panies was not the only change in the
infantry division . To increase arti llery fi repower, the tables provided twelve rather
than eight 155-mm. howi tzers and eliminated the 75-mm. guns, which had been
assigncd to tank destroyer units, as an ti tank weapons. To protect the division from
hostile aircraft, the number of .50-ca liber machine guns rose from sixty to cightyfour. Improved reconnaissancc capabil ities were also added to the infantry d ivision, with ten light armored cars rep lacing the sixteen seoul cars in the reconnaissance troop. In the infantry regimcnts themselves, intell igence and reconna issance platoons replaced intelligence platoons. 41
The G HQ maneuvers of 1941 had also revealed a need for more trucks in the
division. McNair, howcver, beli eved that the suggested number of trucks was
excessive, requi ring 100 much space on ships when sent overseas. Although the
number of trucks was cut at his insistence, the division still had 315 more vehicles under the 1942 tables than those of 1940. Finally, the new tables sp li t the
div ision headq uarters and mi litary poli ce company into Iwo separate un its, a
headquarters co mpany and a military pol icc plaloon. These c hanges together
added about 270 men to the division (CltarI 15).42
Modifications continued even after publication of the new tables oforganization for the infan try di vision. Army Ground Forces withdrew the small ordnance
maintenance platoon from Ihe headquarters company of the quartermaster battalion and reorgan ized the unit as a separate ordnance light maintenance com pany to
improve molor repair. After th is cha nge, food ,md gasol ine suppl y fun ctions
became the responsibil ity of the regimen ts and separate batta lions in thc division,
and the quartermaster battalion was reduced to a company to provide trucks for
water supply and emergency rations and to augment the di vision's ability to move
men and equipment.43
The cavalry division retained its squ a re con fi gura ti on after the 1941
maneuvers, but w ith modifications. The division lost its antitan k troop, the
brigades their weapons troops, and the regime nts their machine gun and special weapons troops. These changes brought no decrease in divis ional firepower, but placed most weapons within the cavalry troops. The number or .50-caliber mac hine gu ns was increased almost threefold. I n the reconnaissance
sq uadron , the motorcycle and armored car troops were e liminated, leavi ng the
squadron with one support troop and three reconna issance troops equipped
with ligh t tanks. These changes increased the division from 11 ,676 to 12, 112
officers and enlisted men.44
313
HHe
164
I
I
I HHC&BAN~I
132
'"
916e8
198e8
123
I
3,472ea
INF REGT
136
I. MED DET
[ ~P~! CO_J
ICANNON C~ I
INFBN -
[_RIFLE CO
~j
169
201
RECON TRP
ATCO _I
MPP~TOON_I
SVCO
I
SIGCO
322
-I
15,514
[-
H,~
-J
ENGR BN
768
INFANTRY DIVI SION
BTAY
/II
e8
593e8
I 15Smm BN
62'
MEO BN
505
105mm BN
-m
[ .ME~7DE!. j
[ME~7DET_ j
SV~RY_ I
BAND _I
28
-I
I MEDsDET_ ]
QMCO
352
1_ IZOO8
BTAY - ~
l SV~RY_ j l H,~ J
118
HHB
2,557
I DIV ARTILLERY
CHART IS-Infantry Division, I August 1942
PR ELUDE TD CDM BAT
163
T he G I-IQ maneuvers also had a significant impact on the organization of the

armored di vision. The exercises led to numerous situations that called for infantry,
artillery, and armor to form combat teams, but the division lacked the resources to
organi ze them. The division as organized was heavy in armor but too light in both
infantry and artillery. The armored brigade complicated Ihe command chan nel,
while the service clements needed g reater control. To COlTect these weaknesses, the
Armored Force, under the direct ion of Maj. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, dramatica lly
reorga ni zed the division (Chal" /6). The armored brigade headquarters and one
annored regiment were eliminated. and the remain ing two armored regiments were
reorgan ized 10 consist of one light and two medium tank battalions each. Three selfpropelled I05-mm . howitzer batta lions replaced the field 3I1illery regiment and battalion, and control of the di vision artillery passed to an artillery section in the di vision headquarters. The infantry regiment was reorgan ized to consist of three battalions o f three companies each, and trucks replaced armored personne l carriers. The
engineer battalion was authori zed four, rather than three, line companies and a
bridge company. Two combat command headquarters wcre au thori zed but were to
have no assigned units. allowing the division commander to bui ld fighting teams as
the tactical si tuation dictated yet still have units in reserve. Maintenance and supply
battalions replaced ordnance and quartermaster battalions, the maintenance unit
I<lking over all motor repairs in the division. For better control o f the service elemellts, division trains were added and placed undcr the command of a colone l. A
service company was also added to provide transportation and s uppl ies for the rear
echelon o f the d ivision headquarters company.45
The 4th Division had tested the motorized structure along with attached tank ,
antitank , and ant iaircran arti llery uni ts during the Carolina portion of the G I-I Q
maneuvers in the fall o f 1941 . At thcir termination , the di visio n commander,
Brig. Ge n. Fred C. Wa ll ace, rcported to General Twaddle that the forc e was
" undesirably large." Furthermore, de fici encies ex isted in command and control ,
traffic conlrol , admini strati ve support, rine strength , commun ications, motor
maintenance, ammunition s upply, and engi neer capabilit ies. Also, the attached
uni ls- tank , antitank, and antia ircran artillery battalions- needed to be permanelltly assigned to the d ivision. 46
Wh en the War Departmcnt pub li shed new tab les of organ izat ioll for the
motorized divi sion in the spring o f 1942 (Cllarl / 7), it differed considerably from
the Structure tested by Wal lace. In those tables, the hand of McNair, who almost
always opposed "specia l" units, was ev ident. The di vision closely resembl ed an
infantry division. Motorized infa ntry regiments were to have an organization similar to standard infantry regi ments. Gone were armored ha lf-track personnel carriers, but the regiment was 10 have enough trucks to move all its men and equipment. T he division headq ua rters and headquarters company and the arti ll ery were
identie,il to their counterpa rts in the infantry division, and the reconna issance battalion was the same as that of the cava lry division. A reconnaissa nce company
WllS addcd to the eng ineer batta li on. The ordnance unit remained company size,
...
N
'"
.c
~
rn
:2
c"
,S!
';;
~
is
-0
~
~
E
~
1
~
<
;t
.it
<
166
and a mi litary police company was added. As redesigne(~ the motorized division
fielded ne'lrly 17,000 men. Following McNair's idea that a unit should have only
those resources il habitually needed, the division , as other infantry divisions,
lacked organic lank , tank destroyer, and antiaircraft artill ery baualions.47
Before al l the tables for the revised divisions were published in 1942 , the War
Department alerted the field commands about the pending reorganization or their
units. Divisions were to adopt the new configurations as soon as eq uipment ,
hOllsing, and other facilities became available. Most divisions adhered to the
revised strllctures by the end of 1942.48
[n the Slimmer of 1942 the Army organized a fifth type of division. Between
World Wars I and II it had experimented with transporting units in airplanes, and
in 1940 the chief of infantry studied the possibi lity of transporting all elements of
an infant ry division by air. When the Germans success fully used parachutists and
glidcrs in Holland and Belgium in 1940, the Army reacted by developing parachutc units. The mass employment of parachutes and g liders on Crete in 1941
stimulated the developmen t of gl ider units. Both types of units were limited to
battal ion size because tacticia ns did not envision airborne operations involving
la rger units. Brig. Gen. William C. Lee, com mander of the U.S. Army Airborne
Command, which had been established to coordinate all airborne training, visited
British airborne trainin g faci lities in England in May 1942 and following that
visit recommended the organization o f an airborne division.49
At that time the British airborne division consisted ofa small parachute force
capable of seizing a target , such as an airfield, and a glider force to reinforce the
parachutists, leaving the remainder of the div ision to join those forces through
more conventiollalmeans. Lee reported to McNair that the British had found the
movement of ordinary troops in gliders wasteful because about 30 percent of the
troops suffered from air sickness and became ineffective during air-land operations. Since the Brit ish were organizing airborne divisions, in which glider personnel were to receive the same training as parachutists, Lee suggcsted the U.S.
A rmy also organize them. Heeding Lee 's suggestio n, McNair ou tlined to
Marshall a 9,OOO-man ai rborne division that cou ld have a varyi ng number of
parachute or g lidcr units in accordance with tactical circumstances.50
Although the General Starr accepted the proposal , it had several reservations.
The div ision selected for the airborne role had to have completed basic training
but should not be a Regular Army or National Guard unit, as many traditionalists
in those com ponents wanted nothing to do wi th such an ex perimental force. For
ease of training, it also had be stationed where air facili ties and flying condi tions
were good. The 82d Division met the criteria. It was an Organized Reserve unit ,
training under Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, and located at Camp Claiborne,
Louisiana. McNair recommcnded that it be the basis for two airborne division s
with the existing parachute infantry regiments assigned to them. For the designation of the second airborne div ision, the staff se lected the 10 I st , an Organized
Reserve unit that was not in active military service.5t
PRELUDE TO COM BAT
167
Paratroopers stage (/ special demOlls/ralion for melllbers of COlIgre~'s, Fori

Belvoir. Virginia, 1941.
The Third Army and the Airborne Com mand executed McNair's rCcotnmcn~
dation on 15 August 1942. The 82d Infantry Division (less the 3271 h Infantry. the
321s1 and 9071h Field Arlillcry Ballalions, the 82d Cavalry Reconnaissance
Troop, and the Mil itary Police Platoon) plus the 5041h Parachute Infantry became
the 82d Airborne Division. Concurren tl y, the adjutant general disbanded the
101 SI Div ision in Ihe Organized Reserve and reconstituted it in the Army of the
United States, activating it as the 10 1s\ Airborne Division at Cmnp Cl aiborne,
Louisiana. T he 502d Parachute Infantry, the 3271h Glider Infantry, and the 32lst
and 9071h G lider Field Artillery Battalions were assigned as d ivisional clemen ts.
Shortly thereafter each division was authorized an anliaircnlft artillery battalion,
an ordnance company, and a military police platoon. The parach ute infantry c le*
ments did not immediatc ly join their divisions, but by early October 1942 all ele*
ment s of both divisions asscmbled at Fort Bragg fo r training. 52
On 15 October 1942 thc War Department published the first tables of organi*
zation for the airborne divi sion (Charf / 8). Reflecting the light nature of the unit ,
the parachute infantry regiment had only .30*cali ber machine guns and 60*mm. and
81 *mm. mortars besides the individual weapons, and its field artillery battalions
used 75*mm. pack howitzers. In the division artillery, however, a new antitank
weapon was introduced, the 2.3 6*inch roc ket laun c her (the " bazooka").
Transportation cquipmcnt ranged fi'olll bicycles and handcarts to 2*II2*ton trucks,
CHART 18- Airborne Division, 15 October 1942
PREL UDE TO COMBAT
169
bu t the airborne div ision had on ly 40 I trucks as opposed to over 1,600 in an

infantry division. T he new division numbered 8,505 o fficers and enlisted men, of
whom approximately 2,400 were parachutists. 53
T he Airborne Command also tra ined smaller parachute and gl ider units and
requested the authority to organize tactical airborne brigades in 1942. The Deputy
Chief of StafT, Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNamey, turned down the request, believing
that only div isions should conduct operations involving more than a regiment.
Th e A irborn e Co mmand, nevert heless, orga ni zed the l si Parachute Infantry
Brigade, a nondeployable un it, to assist in train ing parachute unit s.54
Increases in th e Force Structure

A ft er 7 December 1941 (he General StafT a lso tu rned its attention to the
future size of the Army and the number of divisions required to wage and win the
war. Some officers believed that as many as 350 divisions might be needed, while
ot hers estimated considerably fewer. Outs ide considerations included the manpower needs of the other services and civilian industry as well as the speed at
which divisions could be organized, equ ipped, and trained g iven the limited pool
of experienced leaders and indust rial limitations. On 24 November 1942, nearly a
year after Un ited States en tered the war, the War Department published a troop
basis55 that called for a wartime fo rce structure of 100 divisions- 62 infantry, 20
armored, I 0 motorize(~ 6 airborne, and 2 cavalry- to be organized by 1943 wi thin a total Army force of 8,208,000 men.56
Meanwhi le, the Army continued to expand the number o f divisions. Working
wi th tentat ive troop bases early in 1942, the General Staff decided to bring the
Organized Reserve divisions into active mi litary service. President Fran klin D.
Rooseve lt signed an execut ive order calling uni ts of the Organized Reserves into
active mi litary service for the duration of the war plus six months. The order was
a public re lations documen t more than anything else because most Organized
Reserve person nel were already on active duty.57
Members of General Twaddle's staff nex t exam ined the sequence for inducting infant ry divisions. They considered such factors as the number of World War
1 battle honors earned by units; the location and availabi lity of training sites, pa rticularly in the corps areas where d ivisions were located; and the abili ty of the
Army to furnish divisional cadres. Based on these considerations, the staff established a tentative order, beginning with the 77th Di vision, which had the most
combat service in World War 1, and end ing with the 103d, which had not been
organi zed duri ng World War 1. 58
Meanwhil e, corps area commanders prepared the Organ ized Reserve units
for induction early in 1942 by placing the infantry divisions under the 1940 tables
of organizat ion. Infantry and field arti llery brigades were eli minated, w it h the
headqua rters and headquarters compani es of the infantry brigades consolidated to
form division"l reconnai ssa nce troops . As in the Nationa l Guard divisions, the
170
headqua rters and headquarters batteries of the fi eld artillery brigades became the
headquarters and headquarters batteries orlhe division arti llery. Other units within the div ision were reduced, redesignated, reassigned, or disbanded to fit the triangular con riguration. The six Organized Reserve caval ry divisions were dropped
from the tentative troop prog ram and di sba nded.59
Induct ion of the infantry d ivis ions began on 25 March 1942, and by 3 1
December, twenty-six of the twenty-seven di visions were on active dUly (Trible
13). The 97th Infantry Div ision was not inducted into active military service until
February 1943 because personnel were not available for its reorgan ization. Si nce
nonc of these divisions had rcservc cadrc or equi pment, the Army Ground Forces
had to reb uild them tota lly. That process started when the War Department
a ss igned a co mmand er and se lec te d a parent unit to provide a cadre.
Approximately thirty-scven days before reorgan ization o f the division, the COlllmander and his staff reported to the unit 's station. Officers and enlisted cadrc,
about 1,400 men from the parent unit , followed some seven days later, and shortly thereaftcr the rema ining 500 officers arri ved. With in five days after the arrival
of all officcrs and cadre, a stream of about 13,500 recrui ts began 10 report. The
div ision was considcred reorganized and active fifteen days after the firs t fillers
reached the di vision. Fifty-two weeks of training fo llowed, wh ich incl udcd seventeen weeks of basic and individual training. The divisions, aftcr their initial fil l,
were to re ly on replacement centers for personnel.60
Along with the reorgani zat ion of the Organi zed Reserve units, th e War
Departmen t expanded the number of divisions in the Army of the United States.
Reversing a post- World War I policy, the staff planned to act ivate somc all -black
divisions to accommodate the large number of black draftees. On 15 May 1942
Army Ground Forces organized the 93d Infantry Div ision at Fort Huachuca,
Arizona. A lthough it had the sa me number as the provisional Negro unit of World
War I, it had no relationship or lineal tie with the old 93d. Follow ing its act ivation, the Army Slaff chartered at least three more all-black infantry divisionsthe 92d, 1051h, and 107th. The 92d Di vision, the all -black unit of World War [,
was to be reconstituted, but the other two were to be new units. Under the plan,
the 93d Infan tr y Division was to furnish the cadre for the 92d, the 92d fo r the
I 05t h, and the 105th for the I 07th. Army Ground Forces organi zed the 92d on IS
October 1942 , but a shortage of personnel for worldwide scrvice unit s prevented
the formation of thc olhers. Eventually th e 105t h and 107t h Divi sions were
dropped rrom the activation li st.6 1
To meet the number of divisions in the troop basis, the Armored Force activated nine more armored divisions in 1942, the 6th through the 14th. In organizing them, it followed the sa me cadre system as the Army Ground Forces used for
in fan try divisions.62
With the increased number of armored divisions, Brig. Gen. Harold R. Bull,
the G- 3 Oil the General Staff, di scerncd a way to eliminate unwanted cavalry divisions. He suggcsted to Army Ground Forces that it consider converting the two
TABLE 13
Divisions Act ivated or Ordered Into Active Military Service
in 19421
C OIII/JO/WIII
AUS
AUS
OR
OR
OR
AUS
OR
AUS
AUS
OR
OR
OR
AUS
AUS
OR
OR
OR
OR
AUS
OR
OR
OR
OR
AUS
AUS
OR
OR
OR
OR
AUS
OR
AUS
AUS
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
Division
Dale
6th Armored
7th Armored
J March
77th Infantry
82d Airborne
90th Infanlry
8t h Armored
85th Infantry
931 Infantry
America!
76th Infantry
79th Infantry
S 1sl Infnntry
91h Armored
10th Armored
80th Infantry
88th Infantry
89th Infantry
95th Infantry
11th AmlOred
78th Infantry
83<1 Infantry
91st Infantry
96th Infantry
10I st A il'bom e
12th A mlOred
94th Infantry
98th Infantry
102e! In fantry
1041h Infantry
13th Annored
84th Infantry
92<1 Infantry
14th AmlOred
99th Inf.1nlry
100th Infantry
103d Infantry
86th Infantry
87th Infantry
I Table in chronological order.
15 February
25 March
25 March
25 March
1 Apri l
15 May
15 May
27 May
15 June
15 June
15 June
15
15
15
1;5
July
July
July
July
15 July
15 July
15 August
15 August
15 August
15 August
15 August
15 August
15 September
15 Septcmber
15 Seplcmbcr
15 Septcmbcr
15 September
15 October
150ctobcr
15 October
15 Novembcr
15 November
15 November
15 November
15 December
15 December
Localioll
Fori Kno x, Ky.

Camp Polk, La.
F011 Jackson, S.c.
Camp Claiborne, La.
Camp Berkeley, Tex.
Fon Knox , Ky.
Camp Shelby, Miss.
Fori Huac huca , Ariz.
New Caledonia
Fort George G. Meade, Md.
Camp Pickell, Va.

Camp Rucker, Ala.
Fort Riley, Kans.
Fori Benning, Ga.
Camp Forrest, Tenn.
Camp Gruber, Okla.
Camp Carson, Co lo.
Camp Swift, Tex.
Camp Polk, La.
Camp Butner, N.C.
Camp Atterbury, Ind.
Ca mp White, Oreg.
Camp Adair, Oreg.
C,llllP Claiborne, La.
Ca mp Campbell, Ky.
Fort Custcr, Mich.
Ca mp Brcckinridgc, Tcnn.
Camp Maxcy, Tex.
Camp Adair, Oreg.
Camp Bea le, Calif.
Ca mp Howze, Tex.
ForI McClellan, Ala.
Camp Chaffee, Ariz.
Camp Va n Dorn. Miss.
Fort Jackson, S.c.
Camp Clai bornc, La.
Camp Howze, Tex.
Ca mp McCain , Miss.
172
Regu lar Army horse divisions to mechanized cavalry because there was no forcsee~
abl e role for horse-mounted units. Maj. Gen. Mark W. Clark, Chief o f Staff of
Army Ground Forces, disagreed, as did Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson. The
latter opposed the conversion because the war was worldwide, and he believed that
horse cavalry could be lIseful in many places, particularly in areas where oi l was
scarce, a reference to the other types of divisi ons thaI required large quantities of
petroleum products. He also opposed the conversion because orthe lime requ ired to
tra in new horse cavalry uni ts. Nevertheless, because of a shortage of men in the
summer of 1942, the 2d Cava lry Di vision was inactivated to permit organization of
the 9th Armored Division . White cavalrymen were assigned to the 9th, and the allblack 4th Cava lry Brigade became a nondivisional unit. Later, when preparing
troops for operati ons in the North African theater, the engineer and reconnaissance
squadro ns and the 105-mm. howitzer batta lio n were w ithd raw n from the 1st
Cava lry Division and sent to North Africa.63
With the activation of additional armored divisions, General Twaddle decided
to convert some infantry divisions to motorized divisions. He se lected the 6th,
7th, and 8th Divisions for reorgani zation, which was accomp lished by August
1942 . The staff planned to form three more such divisions that year, but Army
Ground Forces reorganized only the 90th because of shortages in personnel and
equ ipment. On 9 Apri l 1942 the adj utant general officially redesignated the 6th,
7th , and 8th Divi sions as motorized. The 4th Di vision issued general orders
adopti ng the " motorized" designation under an Army Grou nd Forces direet ive.64
From the fall of 1939 to the end of 1942 d ivisional des igns fl uctuated as the
nation prepared fo r war. The War Depa rtment revised infantry and cavalry di visio ns, developed and revised armored and motorized divisions, and created airborne d ivisions. During this per iod of organizational upheaval , the Army
retai ned the basic idea of three regimental combat teams fo r the infantry div i
sio n and adopted the same concept for the motorized and airborne di visions.
The armored di vision was he ld to two fi gh ting teams, as was the horse cava lry
divis ion. Many o ffi cers, however, wanted to eliminate the laller because they
saw no role for the horse on the modern batt lefield . Th e trend wit hi n all types
of divisions was to increase fi repower and sta ndardize div isional elements so
that they cou ld be interchanged. Organizational questions remai ned, however,
stic h as the nat ure and location of antitank weapons or the amount of organic
transportation in any tact ica l unit. The peri od proved frui tful , for the Army
organ ized the divisions needed to pursue the war. By 3 1 December 1942 the
A rmy had fielded I cavalry, 2 airborne, 5 mo torized, 14 armored, and 51
in fan try d ivisions, for a total of73 active combat divis ions.
173
PRE L UDE TO COMBAT
Notes
I Rp/ oflhe Sec ojWm", 1941, p. 60.
2 Kreidbcrg and Henry, Mobilizatioll, pp. 563- 68, From the summer of 1940 to the Slimmer of
1944 General Headquarters (G HQ) and its successor, Army Ground Forces (AG F), conducted
large-scale maneuvers 10 provide and evaluate training at the corps level, often piuing corps against
corps. Each corps fielded two or more divisions and support Imils, and they also came under scnJti
ny. Maneuver afCas were al limes established in New York, North and South Carolina, Tennessee.
Louisiana, Texas, Oklahoma, California. Arizona, and Nevada. Oller the years the Louisiana
Maneuvers have received the most attention.
3 Jean R. Moenk, A His/oly of Large-Scale Arm)' MllI/CIiVers ill the Ulli/ed Slates, 1935-/964
(Fo rt Monroe, Va.: Continental Army Command (CONARC), 1969), pp. 26- 37; fli.~tO/y oj tile
Third Army, AG F Study 17 (WaShington, D.C.: Historical Section, AGF, 1946), p. 7; Army alld
Nm'Y Register 61 (14 Scp 1940): 10.
4 TID 70, Infan try Division (Triangular), I Nov 1940; TID 6-80, Division Artillery, TnlckDrawn, Infantry Division, I Oct 1940; TID 7- 11 , Infantry Rcg iment, I Oct 1940; TIO 8-65 .
Medical Battalion, I Oct 1940; Field Manual ( FM) 7- 5, /lIfilll/lY, 1940.
5 Rpt oJthe Sec oj War. /94/ , p. 60; Ltr, TAG 10 CG, 1st Cavalry Division, 24 Apr 40, sub:
Report on Corps and Anny Mancuvers, AGO 320.2 (4- 15-40) file, RG 407, NARA.
6 Llr, CG, 1st Cavalry Division to TAO, 91u140, sub: Report on Corps and AmlY Maneuvers,
AGO 320.2 (4- 15-40), RO 407, NARA.
7 Ibid.
8 TID 2, Cavalry Division, I Nov 1940; TIO 2- 11 , Cavalry Regiment, Horse, I Nov 1940; TIO
6- 110, Division Artillery, Cavalry Divis ion, Horse, I Nov 1940; Llr, TAG to Chicfofall anllS and
services and other addresses, 13 Sep 40, sub: Cavalry Division, Horse, AO 320.2 Cav (9- 11-40)P,
AGO 320.2 Cavalry 8- 1-40 to 4-30-41 file, RG 407, NA RA; "Notes from the Chief o f Cavalry,"
Cm'ally )0111"11(1149 (Sep-Oe\ 1940): 408- 11.
9 LI T, TAG to CO of all Corps Areas and other addresses, 22 Jun 40, sub: Organization and
Movement of Units and Cadres in connection with Augmentation 10 the Anny to 280,000, AG
320.2 (6- [8-40) M (Ret) M-C, Llr, TAG to CG of all Corps Areas and other addresses, 20 Ju l 40,
sub: Organization and Movemcnt of Units and Cadres in Connection with Augmentation o f the
Amly 10 375,000, AG 320.2 (7- 10-40) M (Ret) M-C, LIT, TAG to CO o f all Corps and Corps
Areas, 10 Sep 40, sub: ReorganiZation of Triangular Divisions, AG 320.2 (8- 31-40) M (Ret) M-C,
Lt r, and TAG to CO of all Annies, Corps Areas, and othcr addrcsses. 13 lan 41, sub: Constitution
and Activation of Units, AG 320.2 (1- 7-4 1) M (Ret) M.C, all AG Reference files, DAMHHSO;
Memo, 0 -3 for TAO, 81an 41, sub: Concentration of 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Bliss, Texas and
method of filling lower bordcr posts vacated thereby with elements of the 56th Cavalry Brigade, 8
lan 41 , G-4/43327. AG 320.2 (8- 26-40), RG 407, NARA; Bertram C. Wright, eomp .. The 1st
C(/I'(dry Division ill Wor/(/ War If (Tokyo: Toppan Prinling Co., 1947), p. 3; C harles E.
Kirkpatri ck, All Ullk/IOJllII FlIIllre (I//(/ (/ DOllbtfll1 Presellt: Writillg the VictOlY Plal/ oj 194/
(Washington, D.C.: Govemmcnt Printing Office, 1989), pp. 44- 47; See Historical Data Cards for
4th, 7th. 81h, and 9th Divisions, DAM H-HSO.
to Adna R. Chaffee, "Mechanized Cavalry," A WC Iccture, 29 Scp 1939, A WC coursc material, MHI; Gillie, Forgillg the Thullderbolt, pp. 109, 162- 64: HislOl")' oJ tile Armored FOIcc.
COlllllllllld. (///(/ Cellter, AGF Study 27 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Section, AGF, 1946), p. 7.
t t Melllo, G- 3 for Col'S, 5 Jun 40, sub: Mechaniz., tion, G- 3/41665, AGO 320.2 (6-5-40), RG
407, NARA. General Andrews' background was not wit h cavalry, infant ry, or mechanized forees,
but with the U.S. Anny Air Corps.
t2 Me lllo, 0 - 3 for Cars, 5 lUll 40, sub: Mechanization; Notes on G- 3 Mec hani zed
Conference, G-4 /235 18- 69, AGO 320.2 (6- 5- 40), RG 407, NARA.
13 Mcmo, G- 3 for Col'S, 23 Jun 40, sub: Mechanization. 0 - 3/41665, AGO 320.2 (6-5-40),
RG 407, NARA; Llr. TAG to CG of all Anllies, CO'1)S Areas. and othcr addresses, 10 lui 1940,
174
sub: Organization of the AmlOrcd Force, AG 320.2 (7- 5-40) M (Ret) M-e, AG Reference files,
DAM H-HSO: Historical Daln Cards, lSI ,HId 2d Armored Oivisions (Anlld Divs), DAM I-I-I-lSO.
14 T /Q 17. Armored Di vj~ion, 15 Nov 1940: LIT, ChafTcc to Scott, 9 Scp 40, and LIT. ScotllO
Chaffee, 12 SCI' 40, Clmrlcs L. Scolll'apcrs, Le.
tS Statement of Adna R. Chaffee, 14 May 1941, Document Collection, U.S. Army Armor
School Library, Fort Knox, Ky.; LIT, Seolllo Grow, 3 Sep 40, Scott Papers, LC; LIT, TAG
[0
CO of
all Corps Areas and olher addresses, 20 Jul 40, sub: Organization and Movement of Units and
Cadres in Connection wit h Augmentation of Ihe Army [0 375,000; TIO 77, Infantry Di vision
(Triangular, Motorized), I Noy 1940.
16 Biel/llial Reporl oflhe ChiefoJSll1}f. July I. 193910 Jlllle 30. 1941 , pp. 1- 3: Rpl oflhe Sec
of War. 1941, pp. 61- 68.
11 Rpl oflhe Sec of lVI/I'. 1941, pp. 62, 68- 10; Erna Risch and Chester L. KielTer. 2 vo ls., Tile
QI/{/l"Ic/"lI/(/Slcr GOIpS: Orgallizfllioll. SlIpply. ali(I Serl'ice~' ( Washington, D.C.: Government
f>rinting Office, 1955),2:293
18 Kreidbcrg ,md Henry, Mobilizmioll, pp. 515- 11: WD Bull 22, 1940.
19 RepoI"I oj Ihe Chicf of Ihe NaliOlw/ Guard Bllreau. 1946, pp. 24- 21; Roben Bruce Sligh,
The Nmiol/al GilaI'd alld Nmioll(11 DeJellse: The Mohilizalioll oJlhe Gmll"ll ill Wol'ld War /I (Ncw
York: Proeger, 1992), pp. 126- 28.
20 Memo, G- 3 for Corso 6 Nov 41. :;ub: Triangulation of National Guard Di visions, and
Memo, Mobilizmion Branch 10 G- 3, 12 Nov 41, same subject. G- 3/41141 , AGO 320.2 (8- 2-40).
RG 401. NA RA.
21 Memo, ACors. G- 3. I Aug and 1 Nov 1940, NG1l325.4 Gen.-6, DAM 1-I HSO; Rpl oflhe
Chief of Naliollal Cuan/lJureall. 1946. pp. 220,230.
22 92d [nf:mtry Brigade. Organizational History From 25 August 1940 to 31 December 1941.
Ms. Ltr. f'uerto Rican DeJlt to TAG. [0 Ju142, sub: Inactivation ofllni!. HHC, 92d Infantry
Brigade, 320.2 Gen, and Llr, Opemtions Division (OPD) to Caribbean Defense Command, 24 Ju[
42, same subject, MR-OPO, a[1 in 92d Infant ry Brigade file, DAM1-l[-fSO.
23 Rpl oJlhe ChieJoJlhe Naliollal Cuard Burcal/. 194f. p. 14: Urs, ChaITce to Seoll. 5 Aug
40. and Scoll to ClmlTec, 8 Aug 40, Scoll f>aJ}CTS, LC; Ltr, TAG 10 Natioll:ll Guard Bureau, 8 Nov
40. sub: Withdrawal of Certain Cav:l1ry Units from Allotment to the Nationa[ Guard. 325.4
(10- 21-40) M (ReI), AG Reference file, DAMHHSO; Rpt of th e Chief of Ihe Naliol/al GII(IJ"(/
8ul"e(lu. f946, p. 2 11: WD Bull 26.1940: Wright. The lSI Cm'(lliJ' Dirisiol/ ill WorM War/l. p.3.
24 Mark Skinner Watson, ChiI'JoJSlaf): Prcwar PlallS (lwl P/"(:pa/"(/liOlI. United States Anny
in World War [) (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 2 14-3 1.
25 WD Bull 17, 1940.
26 Ltr, TAG to CO of All Annies and Olher addresses, 10 Oct 40, sub: 2d Cavalry Division.
AG 320.2 (10- 8-40) M (Ret) MC, 2d Cav Div file. DA MI-I-HSO; Ulysscs Lee, The mplo)'mellt
of Negro Troops. United Slates Army in World War [) (Washington, D.C.: Govemment Printing
Office, [966), pp. 65- 68, [22- 28: Morris J. MacGregor. Jr .. IlIIegralioll of llie AmiI'd Forces
1940- 1965 (WaShington, D.C.: Govcmmenl Printing Office, 198 I). PI). 30- 31.
27 Hi~'lory of Ihe Armored F(JI"{:e, p. 50: Ltr. TAG to CG of all Annies and othcr addresses, 13
Jan 4[ , sub: Constitution and Ac ti vation of Units, AG 320.2 (1 - 1-4 1) M (Ret) MC, Llr, TAG to
Chicf. Armort!d Foree, and other addresses. 28 Aug 4 [. sub: Constitution and Activation of 5th
Armored Division. AG 320.2 (8- 22-41) MR-M-C, and Llr, TAG to Chief, AmlOrcd Force, and
other addresses. 8 Jan 42. sub: Constitution an d Activation o f the 6th Armored Division, AG 320.2
(12- [ 1--41). MR-M-C, nil [etters in DA MHHSO: John B. Wilson. AnI/iI'S, COIpS. Dil'i.iolls. (///(1
SefJIII'me Brigades, Anny Lineage Series (Washington. D.C.: Govemmcnt Printing Office, 1981).
Pt). [69, [81,203, and 2 15.
2S Memo, OCors lor G- 3, 14 May 4 [, sub: Defense Against AmlOrcd Forces, G--412 [ [03- 6.
and Memo. G- 3 for Cars. 18 Aug 41 sub: Orgnniz<l1ion of Antitank Units in the Army. OCS
2 [ 103- 6. AG 320.2 (8- 16-4 I). RG 407, NARA.
2<) Memo, 0 - 3 for Cors, 18 Aug 41. sub: Organization of Antitank Un its in the Army, and Ur.
TAG to CG all Armies. 24 lun 4 [, sub: Organization of Provisiomtl Division ;md GI-lQ Antitank
PRELU DE TO COM BAT
175
I3 nllalions for Usc in Current Maneuvers, AG 320.2 (6- 19-41) MIt-M-e, RG 407, NARA; L1r,
TAG 10 CO orall Annics and olher addresses, 3 Dec 1941, slIb: Organization of Tank Destroyer
Battalions, AG 320.2 (11- 17- 41) MR-M-C, Tank DeS1foycr File, DAM H-HSO; Christopher R.
Gable, HIe U.S Army GHQ MallCI/I'crs of 1941 (Washington, D.C.: Govcmrncnt Printing Office,
1992), pp. 174-76; Kent Roberts Greenfield. Robert R. ]'almer, and Bell J. Wiley, The Org(/I/;zolioll ojGmlllu/ Comba! 7i'oops , United States AmlY in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Govemmenl Printing Office, 1947), p. 82- 84.
30 Llr, CO, Hawniian Dept to TAG, 26 Apr 41, sub: Reorganization of the Forces in the
Hawaiinn Department, AG 320.3137. AG 320.2 (9- 27-40), and Llr, TAG 10 CO, Hawaiian Dept,
26 Aug 41 , sub: Constitution and Reorganization of Units, Hawaiian Department, AG 320.2
(8- 1-4 1) MR-M-C, AG 320 .2 (8- 1-41), RG 337, NARA; GO 53, Hawaiian Department, 1941 ,
Hawaiian Dept. RG 338. NA RA.
31 Memo, G- 3 for ColS, 19 May 41 , slIb: Designation of Divisions, Amly Corps, and Annies,
G- 3/45832, Division Gcneral file , DAMH -HSO; WD Cir 197. 1941; "AmlY Designations," Arm)'
and Nm')l Regis/er, 9 Aug 1941 ; author's notes. The use of the word infantry in divisiona l dC5 igna[ions; TIO 7, I Aug 1942.
32 " Li neage and Honors: History, Principles, and Prepara tion," Organiz,ltio nal History I3 raneh,
Officc, Chief of Military History (OC MH ), June 1962; Ll r, TAG to CG, Hawaiian Dept, 26 Aug
41. sub: Co n5titution and Reorganization of Uni ts, Hawaiian Department, 241h Inf Div file,
DAMH- IISO.
33 Louis Morton, Th e Foil of/he Philippines, United States Anny in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Govemment Printing Office, 1953), pp. 31- 37.
34 Memo, G- 3 for ColS, 18 Sep 41 , sub: Triangularization of Square Divisiou to Removal of
Elements for l3ases, G- 3/4174 I , AGO 320.2 (8-2-40), and Memo, G- 3 for TAG, 22 Nov 41 , sub:
Assignment of the 121st Inf.1ntry from the 30th Division to 8th Division, G- 3/43726, AGO 320.2
(8- 2-40), RG 407. NARA; L1r, TAG to CG. Thi rd and Fourth Annies, 8 Dce 41, sub: Attachment
of Thrce Infan try Regimcnts, Thi rd Army to Fourth AmlY, AG 370- 5 ( 12- 8-41) MC-M-C, and
L1r, TAG to CG, Third Army, 15 Dec 41, sub: Assignment of 124th Infantry. AG 352 InfSch
( 11- 27-4 1) MR-M-C, AG Reference file s, DAMH-HSO.
JS Memo, GHQ for CG, Field Forces, 6 Jan 42, sub: Triangulating Square Divisioll, 322.13/22
( 1-6-42), AGO 320.2 (1 - 6-42), RG 407, NARA.
36 Memo, OCS for G- 3, no subj ect, 8 Jan 42, OCSI20117- 124, RG 407, NARA. Memos pertaining to the reorgani zation of the National Guard di visions in 1942 arc in National Guard Induction and Reorganization fil e, 1938- 1942, DAM H-HSO.
37 Lellers of inslnlction for reorgani zing the National Guard divisions and divisional general
orders implementing those instructions are in Nat ional Guard Induction and Reorganization file,
1938- 1942, DAM II-IISO
38 On 9 Mareh 1942 thc War DCllarttllent's Gcneral StafT was reorganized and many of the
functions of the five assislanl chiefs of staff (G- l to G-4 and Ihe War Plans Di vision) were
rea ligned. Much of the responsibility for organizing and training combat units, fomlcrly he ld by the
G- 3, was passed to Army Ground Forecs (AG F), and th e Opera.tions Division (O PD), formerl y the
War Plans Di\' ision, focused on the cmployment o f units. All three, G-3 , AOF, and 01'0, however,
would eo nlinue to deal with di visional orgnnizalion during World War 11 .
39 Francis D. Cronin. Undel'/he SOll/hel'1I Cross. The f)(lga oflhe AlI/eric,,1 Divisioll (Was hington, D.C.: Combat Forees Press, 1951), pp. 4-29; Llf, TAG to CG, U.S. AOIlY Forces in New Clledonia, 24 May 42, sub: Constitution and Org'Hl ization of AMERICAL Di vis ion, 24 Mn y 42, AG
320.2 (5---23--42) MR-M-OPO: and GO 10, US Amly Forees in New Caledonia, 1942, 23d Inf.1l11 ry
Division file , DAM H-HSO.
40 Memo, Lcsley J. McNair for CG. Field Forces, 2 Fcb 42, sub: Field arti llery organi1..ll1ion,
triangul<Jr divis ion, 320.2/37 (I'A)-F (2- 2-42), McNair Pal)Crs: T/O 7- 1 I. Infantry Regiment, 1942.
On 9 Mareh 1942 the chiefs of the combat anllS were abolished ns a part oflhe reorganization of
thc General SlafT(sec I'[ewes, Pi'olll Roo/lo McNmlltlm, pp. 67- 76).
4t T/O 7, Infanlry Division, 1942.
MANEUVE R AN D FIRE POWER
176
42 Memo, CO, AGF, for Requi rement Division, AGF, 4 Apr 42. sub: New Infantry regiment.
320.2 Gcn-(Clear), McNair Papers; Greenfield Cl al., Orglllli;:(lliOIl ojG/"Q/llld Combal Trool's, pp.
281 - 86; TIO 7.1nfanlry Division. I Aug 1942.
43 TIO 7, Infantry Division. I Aug 1942; WD Cirs 245.267, and 274, 1942; Memo, AGF for
TAG, 11 Scp 42, sub: Organiz.nlion ofOrdllullcc Light Maintenance Companies, Infantry Division.
320.2/43 (Ord) (R}-GNGCT/ 10922 AG 320.2 (9- 11--42), RG 407, NARA.
44 TIO 2, Cavalry Division. I Aug 1942.
45 Gabel, me
Anll)' Mmwl/\>er$ 0/ 1941, pp. 176- 79; Llr, Hqs, AmlOred Force to 0 - 3, 20
Sep 4 1. sub: Proposed Armored Division. 20 Sep 41, and Memo. G3 for eolS, I Scp 41, sub:
Roorganizalion of Armored Divisioll. 320.2 (03/41665. both AG 320.2 (9- 20-41), RG 407,
NARA; T /O 17, Annorcd Division, 1 Mar 1942; His/()IJ' ofllle Arlllol"(.'f/ Force, Pl'. 29- 32.
46 Llr, TAG to Third Amly. 8 Jul 41, sub: Test of Motorized Division Organization, 320.2
(6- 25-41) MR-M-C. 4th Infantry Division Iile, DAM H-I'ISO: Ltr, 4th Motorized Division to TAG,
9 Dee 4 I. sub: Test of Motorized Dh' ision Organization, 353- I'MD, AG 320.2 ( 12- 9-41). RG 407,
NARA.
41 TID 77, Motorized Division, I Aug 1942.
4H Ltr. TAG to CGs, AmlY Air Forces. Amly Ground Forces, and Olhcr addrcsses. 16 JUIl 42,
sub: Allotmen ts of G rades and Ratings and Au thorized Strength to T"clical Un its, AG 221
(6- 3-42) EA-M-C, AO Rcferenee liles.llnd Divisional Historical Data Cards. DAM H-HSO.
49 Tile AirbQl"lle COllllllalll/ (lIId Center, AOF Study 25 (W:lshington. D.C.: Historical Section,
AGF, 1946). pp. 1- 12, 21; James A. Huston. Oul oflhe Blue: U.S. Arm)' Air!Jo,."e Ope/"(/Iiol/.~ ill
1I'0l"ld 11'(11" 1/ (West Lal:1yelle. Ind.: Pu rdue University Studies, 1962). p. 48.
50 Memo. AOF for ColS, 2 Jul 42. sub: Policy re Training of Airbome Troops, 320. 1126 (Inl)
(ONTRO) (7- 2-42), AO 320.213 Airbome, RG 337, NARA.
5t James M. Gavin, 011 10 Bedill: Bal/le of (/1/ Airoomc COII!III({/ufer. 1943- 1946 (New York:
Viking Press, 1978), p. 3; Memo, AGF for TAG. 29 Ju142, sub: Airbome Division. 320.21 10 (AO
Cmd) (R) ONGCT/06440 (7- 29-42). AG 320.2 (7- 29-42), RG 407, NARA.
52 Lt r, AGF to CG, Thi rd Army. 30 Ju l 42. sub: Ac tivation of 82d and 10 l st Airborne
Divisions, 30 Jul 42, 320 .2/9 All Cmd (R)-GNGCT (7- 30-42), (sec nmendments nnd revisions o f
this let ler in the Iiles o f 82d and 10lst Airbome Divisions). DAMH-HSO; The Airbomc CQlIIlIWlld
(/1/(/ eenfer. p. 21.
5) T /O 71, Airborne Division, 15 Oct 1942.
54 lIr, AGF to CG, Ai rborne Command, 4 Jul 42, sub: Activation of HUC, 1st Parachute
Infantry Brigade, AG t: lile, DAMI I-HSO: Memo, AGF to ColS, 21 Nov 42, sub: Tactical Airbome
Inf.1ntry Brigades, 320.2 (Airbomc)(R) GNGCT ( 11- 21-42), and Memo, G- 3 forColS, 14 Dec 42,
S.1mc subject. WDCGT 320.2 Aetiv (1 1- 21-42). 320.2 ( 11 - 2 1-42), RG 407. NA RA.
55 A troop basis was the list of military units and individuals required for the perfonnanee ofa
panicular mission. by nu mbers, organization, C<\uipment, deployment. and types of personnel.
56 Kreidbcrg and Henry, Mobili;:(liioll, PI). 625- 26; Green lield ct .11.. Tlte Orgalli:;afioll of
GrOUlld COl/lbm TI"OOps, Ill). 164-84.
S7 Memo, G- 3 for JAG. 8 Jan 42, sub: En try o f Org;mized Reservcs into active Fcderal service, G- 3/6457-404, Memo, JAO ror G- 3, 12 Jan 42, same subject, 210.455. Military Affairs, and
Memo. G- 3 for Cors, 14 Jan 42. same subjcct, 0 - 3/6457-404 . .111 Re ference PnjlCT liIe, Army
Reserve, DAM H-HSO; WD Bull 7, 1942.
58 Memo. A WC for AColS. G- 3, 30 Dec 41. sub: Order of div isions, and Memo, G- 3 for
eolS. 17 Jan 42. sub: Order of activa tion of Reserve Divisions. G- 3/6457-435, Refercnee I)apcr
liles, Anny Resen'e, DAM I-l-I ISO.
59 LIT. TAG to CG. All Corps Areas and Depanmcnt 30 Jan 42. sub: Reorganization of
Org.1nized Reserve (less Army Air Force un its). AO- 320.2 OR (1 - 22-42) MR-M-C; GO 15, First
Corps Area, 12 Feb 42; LIT. Second Corps Area to Executive Omces. Firsl, Second, and Third
Mi litary Areas. 20 Feb 42; sub: Reo rganization of the Organized Reserves (less Anny Air Force
units): GO 17. Third Corps Aren. 12 Feb 42; L1 r, Fourth Corps Arel! to Commanding Omcers all
Posts and Stations. 13 Feb 42. sub: Reorglt1l izalion of Units of the Army Rescn'cs (less Army Air
u.s.
PRELUDE TO COM BAT
177
Force units), Foul1h Corps Area; Uf, l=i Oh Corps Area to TAG, 23 Feb 42, sub: Rcorgani7..1tion of
lhe Organized Re se rves (less Army Aif Force Un it s); lIr, S ixth Corps Area [0 TAG,
Reorganization of Ihe Organized Reserves. 3 1 Mar 42, sub: Rcorg:mi z3 lion or Ihe Organized
Reserves: Llf. Seventh Corps Area [0 TAG, 22 Feb 42. sub: Rcorganiz'llion of the Organized
Reserves (less A1111Y Air FOl"(;c Units): GO 2, First Militnry District. 1942. GO 27. Second Military
District. 1942, GO 11 , Third Mi litary Distri ct, 1942, Eighth CO '1)S Arcll; lsI Ind, Ninth Co rps ATCn
10 TAG \0 Llf, TAG 10 CG, All Corps Arc<ls and Departillent, 30 Jan 42. sub: Reorga nizati on of
Org.mi zcd Reserve (less Amly Aif Force units). all Re ference I'aper fil es, Amly Reserve. DA MIIIISO.
60 Historical Data Cards. Rescrve Di visions. DAMH-HSO: Robert R. Palmer. Bell I. Wiley.
and William R. Keast, The Procuremell/ (///(I Trail/illg 01 Groll/ul Comlxll Troo/'S, Un ited States
Army in Worl d War II (Washin gton. D.C.: OOVCnlment Printi ng Omce. 1948), pp. 434-41.
61 Lee. The Elllplo)'1II1!1II olNegl'O Troops. pp. 128.407.424: MacGregor.II/IL'grtllioll olllll!
Anl/I!(I l:o/'cl!s. pp. 32- 33. Also see unit files of the 92d and 93d Infantry Divisions in DAMHII S0.
62 Scc uni t filcs for the 6th through 141h Armored Divisions in DAMII-I-1S0.
63 Lt r. AGF to I3rig Gen H. R. Bull . 5 May 42. sub: Cavn lry Organi zH ti on. 320.2/51 (OwGNTIIG) (5- 5-42), and Memo, SW for the Under Secreta ry of Wa r. 2 1 Jul 42. AGF 32 1 Cavll lry.
RG 337. NA RA; Llr. AGF \0 CG. Second Anll Y and Chief of the AmlOred Foree, 3 Jun 42. sub:
Activa tion ofthc 9th and 10th Annored Divisions. 320.2 (Ar1l1d Forec)(R)-GNOPN (6- 3-42): also
AGF letters, same subject, 4 :md II Ju l 42. 9th Annd Di... file. DAM ll II SO; Llr, TAG to CG. Task
Force "A," 7 Scp 42, sub: Assign ment of Uni ts to Task Force "A," AG 320.2 (9- 7-42) MR-M-ON,
AG Reference files, DAMH-HSO.
M Ltr. TAG to CG. Fourth Anuy. 18 Nov 42. su b: Reorga nization of the 7th Infantry Divisio n.
AG 320.2 ( 10- 15-41) MR- RC. 7th Inf Div file. DAM I-I-I'ISO; Memo. G- 3 for TAG, smue subject, 28 Jan 42, 0 - 3/43930, AG 320.2 ( 1- 28-42), RG 407, NARA; L1 r, CG. Seventh Corps Area to
TAG, 24 Mar 42, sub: Designation of the 6th Infant ry Division. MRD 320.2 Designat io n, 24 Mil r
42. 6th lnf Di v file. DAM H-II SO; Ltr, TAG to CGs, First. Second, and Fourt h Amlies. 8 Jan 42,
sub: Equil)lllent for Motorized Division, AG 320.2 (1 - 6-42) MR-M -C, L1r, TAG 10 CGs, First and
Second Armies, 27 Nov 41, sub: MOlorization o f Regular AnllY Division. AG 320.2 (11 - 14-41),
Ln. TAG 10 eGs Eastem and Westem Defense Commands an d Second Army, 9 Apr 42, sub:
Redesignation of Infant ry Divisions. AG 320.2 (4-2--42) MR-R-GN, :md lIr, AGF to COs, Second
an d Th ird Armies, 7 Aug 4 2, s ub: Armored and Motorized Divisions. 320.2153 (R)GNGCT
(8- 7-42). all AG Reference files, r>AM II-llS0: GO 14. 4th MotOri7.l.>d Division. 1942, RG 407.
NARA.
CHAPTER 7
The Crucible-Combat
Whell A(/miml Doellilz l'ltIT(!.lI(lel'(!.(J Ihe Gerll/al/ GOI'f!mmel/l. (!1'eIY Americal/ tiil'iill I"e opemliol/a!lheafer.\'. All but 111'0 II(/(/ seel/ acliOIl; olle I/(/d 'he mission oj
.~ecll"illg rhe I'i/{l/ illSlllllllfiolls ill 'he H(Ill'(liiall Isl{/IId.~: Ihe olhel' W(J.~ (11/ airbome d;I/;~;ioll II'(lS
.~ioll
ill SHAF Resen'e.
GClleral George C. Marshalll
At the end of 1942, with divi sions on the offensive in North Africa and the
South Pac ific, World War II became the crucible in which divisions tested their
combat skills. After the attack on Pearl Harbor the Army accclcmtcd mobiliz.1tion,
but only a few divisions were parceled out to meet threats. For almost another year
the W<lr Department failed to decide on the ultimate number of divisions needed to
fight the war in European and Pacific theaters. Force planners, however, continued
to increase the size and number of d ivisions without regard for the domestic econo~
my. Planners also paid litt le heed to logistic[l[ requiremcnts, especially the means of
moving units overseas. When logistical problems came to the fore , their solutions
brought about changcs in the st ructure of the d ivisions. Infantry, armored, [lnd air~
borne divisions were reorganized; horse cavalry and motorized di visions were e lim
inated; and experi ments with light divisions began. When victory came in Europe.
the combl.lI Iheaters fielded a lotal of e ighty~nine divi sions. These units had under
gone considerable changes in less than three years.
Wartilll e Reorganization, 1943

In the latc sli mmer and early fall o f 1942, while prepa ring Task Force "A" to
participat e in Operation TORell , the invasion of North Africa, trained so ldi ers
were still ex treme ly scarce. To fill the task fo rce, the War Department deferred
reorganizing and filling the 97th Inf'lI1try Division, Ihe last o f the Organized
Reserve divisions to en ter active military serv ice, and reduced three partially
trained divisions 10 less than 50 percent of their authorized strengths. To avoid
stri pping divisions again and disturbing their training, Ihe War Department desig~
nated the 76th and 78th Infantry Divisions as replacement units to receive, train ,
and hold men until needed. The divisions served in that capaci ty from October
1942 to Ma rch 1943, when replacement depots took over. Both divisions, refilled,
then began the ir combat training program anew.2
180
In latc 1942 the War Department selected the 7th Motorized Division to be
pa rt of the assaul t forces to be used to dri ve the Japanese from the Aleuti an
Islands. In spite of growing doubts by Army Ground Forces about the useful ness
of fu lly motorized div ision s, the d ivision was chosen because of its high state of
readiness. Furthermore, it was located Ilcar Fori Ord, California, an amphibious
training site, and cou ld conven iently undergo Ihe training required for the operatio n. On [ January 1943 the 7th Motorized Div ision reverted to a standard
infantry d iv ision)
Besides the shortage of trained manpower, the nation al so faced a severe

shortage of shi ps large enough to transport divisions to the combat theaters. For
this and other military and political reasons, plans for an early invasion of Europe
across the English Channel were postponed. Also, the expansion and deployment
of Army Service Forces and Army Ai r Forces units placed heavy demands on
avai labl e shi pping, whil e the success of German submarin es ofT the Eastern
Seaboard of the United States made that shortage of tonnage even more acute.
Fina lly, the demands of the hard-pressed Pacific theaters put an unprecedented
strain on shipping faci lities. Therefore, from October 1942 to March 1943 no
d iv ision departed the United States, and from March to November 1943 only
eleven went overseas.4
In October 1942, acting to alleviate the g rowing shi pping problem, Marshall
directed Army Grou nd Forces, Army A ir Forces, and Army Serv ice Forces to
eli minate unnecessary vehicles and excess noncombatants. He sought a 15 percent reduction in personnel and a 20 percent reduction in vehicles. In particular,
he deemed the requi rement s for divisional transportat ion in the tables of organization and eq uipment to be extravagant because they represented what div ision
commanders asked for rather than what they actually needed.S
To accomplish these objectives, McNai r established the Army Ground Forces
Reduction Board to review all uni ts under his contro l. Two principles, streamli ning and pooli ng, guided the work. The fo rmer limited a unit to what it needed on
a daily basis, whi le the laller gathered at corps6 or army levels resources that
were bel ieved to be only occas ionally required. Pool ing was derived from the
assumption that a divis ion would be lIsually assigned to a corps or an army.?
After the Reduction Board concluded its work on the infan try division in
March 1943,2, 102 officers and en li sted men and 509 ve hicl es were stripped
from the divisional tables of organization. The scalpel slashed most di visional
element s. The cuts eliminated 363 men and 56 vehicles from the in fantry regiment, with the can non company deleted entirely. The regiment retained six 105mm. towed how itzers, which required less shipping space than 75-mm. self-propelled guns, used less gasoline, and did less damage to light bridgi ng. These were
placed in the regimental headquarters company. The number of automatic rines
was pruned from 189 to 81, but the introduction of the new 2.36-inch roc ket
launchers (bazookas) provided powerful antitank and antipi ll box resources that
required no designated operator in the regiment. Reductions in medical, commu-
HIE CRUCIBLE- COMBAT
181
ni ca lian , an d serv ice person nel

accounted for most of the other regimental pcrsonnellosses.8
The board carved 475 men and
95 trucks from the div ision artillery.
Firepower did not decline since the
number of arti llery pi eces remained
at twelve 155-111111 . an d thirt y-six

lOS-mill. howitzers. Th e headquarters and service batteries were combined, a nd a ntitank and a ntiairc raft
platoon s were e liminated . An anti tank capabi lity re mained wit h the
addition of 166 bazookas. To save
pe rso nnel s pa ces, the numbe r of
truck drivers, mechani cs, cooks, and
orderli es was reduced.9
The board provided for the return
General McNair
o f the airplane to the infantry di vision, a step thai reflected the expanded width and depth of the batt lefi e ld. The
aero squadron had been e liminated from all divisions by 1940, but field arti llery
o ffi cers continued to request their own aircraft to guide counterbattery and indirect fire. In 1941 and 1942 the field artillery experimentcd wit h light planes, and
on 6 June 1942 two lig ht obscrv.lIion ai rcraft were added to each field art illery
battal ion and two to the headquarters of the div ision artillery. The board 's dec ision forma lized these addit ions.tO
Divisional combat support and service support units were severely cut. The
eng ineer batta lion and signal company each lost about 100 men, mostly because
certa in bridging equipment was taken from the eng ineer battalion and the radio
inte lli gence platoon was detached fro m the signa l company. Both funct ions
moved to army leve l. The quartermaster company lost about 150 men, but the
number of trucks remained approximately the same. No basic changes took place
in the medical battalion, ordnance compa ny, or military pol ice platoon. I I
The board also bel ieved that the div ision headquarters and its headquarters
company had g rown too large. To reduce the size of the headqua rters company,
il s strength was cut almost in half by e li minating the de fense platoon and some
vehicles, drivers, and orderlies. The band assumed the mission o f protecting the
divisional headquarters as an additional duty. Divisional sltlff sect io ns remained
the same, but the board cuI some ass istant staff o ffi cers and enl isted men. Total
reductions in the division represented a 13.5 percent decrease in all ranks and 23
percent in vehicles.12
Marshall tentati vely approved the new division but directed that its tables of
organi zation be sent to the theater commanders for comme nt. To sell the new
182
st ructure, General McNa ir and Maj. Gen. Idwal Edwards, Assistant Chief of
StafT, 0 - 3, wen t to North Africa, where they found no support. The division and
corps commanders in the combat zone rejected the euls on the g rounds thai the
division had already been reduced to the lowest acceptable minimum. 13
With sh ipping and m<lnpawer shortages sti ll severe, Edwa rds' siaff prepared
another set of tables for the infantry div ision that was a compromise between the
Army Ground Forces proposal and the desires of the overseas division and corps
commanders. The new division had 14,253 officers and enli sted men (Cha,., 19).
Its combat su pport and combat serv ice elements remained about the sa me as
those proposed by the Reduction Board. To satisfy division and corps commanders in North Africa, cannon compani es were restored to the infantry regiments
and service batteries to the field artillery batta lions. The 2.36-inch rocket launchers were retained as antitank weapons, but 57-mm. antitan k guns replaced the 37mm. gu ns. In the d ivis ion headquarters company the defense platoon reappeared,
as did the service platoon in the quartermaster company. Finally, Edwards' sta ff
added a new u n it~h eadql1arte rs, special troops-wh ich provided administrative
support to Ihe reconnaissance troop; 10 the signal, ordnance, and quartermaster
companies; and to the military police platoon. As for vehicles, the new compromise organization had 2,01 2, almost the same as in the 1942 tables .14
In Janua ry 1943 the Red uction Board tu rned its atten tion to the motori zed
div ision concept. Several alternatives had always ex isted. Si nce the motori zed
and infantry divisions had similar organizations, the latter could si mp ly be augmented as needed with 2- 1/2 -ton trucks, permitting the simultaneolls movelllent
of all divisional c lements. Another opt ion was to "a rmori ze" the organization
by equi pping it with tanks, armored personne l carri e rs, and self- propelled
artillery. McNair recommended to the Army Staff the reorgan iza tion of all
motorized di visions as standard infantry div isions, except for the 4 th , which
was to be eq ui pped with armored personnel ca rriers . The sta ff supported
McNair's recommendation. IS
On 12 March 1943 the Act ing Chicf of Staff, General Joseph T. McNarncy.
approved replacing motorized divisions with infantry divisions. He also approved
the activation of addit ional truck com panies organ ized w ith black sold iers to
motorize the infantry division when necessary. The 4th Motorized Divi sion, however, was to remai n intact pending its possible usc overseas. Also, the armored
division was to be reorganized to achieve a better balance between infantry and
armor e lements. The following May the 6t h, 8th, and 90t h Motorized Divisions
were reorganized as infantry divisions. Because the revised structure of the
infantry division was not settled. the divisions adopted and retrained under the
1942 infantry division tables.16
After the March decision, none of the overseas commanders wanted the 4th
Motorized Di vision because they thought it would make inordinate demands on
critical shipping space and the already limited supply of tires and gaso line. The
tires for a motorized division's vehicles alone required 318 tons of rubber eOI11-
'Includes chaplains.
CHART 19-1nfantry Division, 15 July 1943
184
parcd to 166 tons for those in the infantry division. Besides, the 4th was the
only motorized div ision authorized a full com plement of equipment plus addi lional personnel and eq uipment to constitu te a special task fo rce. Its potential
punch in com bat , however, did not appear to justify the costs of sh ipping and
logistical su pport. On 1 August 1943 the 4th reverted to the standard infant ry
divis ion struct ure. 17
T he organization of the armored divis ion had been in question for severa l
mont hs because of the imbala nce between armor and infa ntry forces . So me
options exis ted for imp rovement. Lt. Gen. Ja cob L. Devers, C hi ef of th e
Armored Force, wanted to obtai n a better balance at corps level by having one
motori zed and two armored divisions in a corps and by "a rmori z ing" the
motori zed division,18 McNair be lieved that the armored d ivision was "so fat
the re is no place to beg in."19 He wa nt ed c ither to increase the infantry or
reduce the armor in the exist ing div ision, changes that wou ld result in a sweeping reorganization oflhe unit. 20
Eventually McNai r directed the Reduction Board to cut the divisional armor,
believing the use of tanks had cha nged since 1940. Both the British and the
Ge rmans had success full y llsed a division that fiel ded fewe r tanks than the
American armored division. The armored division was not free to roam at will , as
firs t envisioned, because o f improvemen ts in antitank weapons. McNa ir saw it as
a unit o f opportuni ty to explo it a breakthrough, to take part in a pursuit, or to
cover a withdrawal- all fonner cavalry missions. Therefore, the (ln1lOred division
could be smaller. Furthermore, McNair saw the need for fewer armored div isions
in the total force, and wi th fewe r armored divisions more separate tank battali ons,
which were needed to support infant ry divisions, could be organized )1
Com bat-experienced officers in the North African th eater opposed a major
reorgan ization of the armored di vision. In March 1943 the Fifth Army convened a review board, chaired by Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon, the commander
of the 21 Armored Division. The boa rd recommended reten tion of the existing
division structure with the add it ion of more infantry <l nd the assignment of tan k
desl'royer and antiaircraft artillery battalions. To si mplify logistical and ma intena nce operations, the board wanted to reduce the types of vehicles w it hin the
d iv ision, recommending that motorcycles and amphib ious trucks be replaced
with II4-ton trucks and that obso lete tanks be removed. Si nce the 1st Armored
Di vision had been lIsed in piecemeal fashion on the Tun isian front and the 2d
Armored Division was the on ly such division to gai n ex perience as a di visional
organization, the board believed that a major reorganiza tio n of the armored
div ision was premature.22
After months of study and di scussion, the War Department rejected the field
reeo111mendations and on 15 September 1943 published new armored division
tables of organizat ion that followed McNair's ideas (Chari 20) . Three tank and
three armored infantry battalions replaced the armored and infantry regiments.
Each la nk battalion included Ol1e light and three medium tank companies, and the
TI-IE CRUCIBLE-COMBAT
185
armored infantry battalion had three line companies. For selfsufTiciency, infantry
and ('ank batta lions each had a service company thai assumed many of the fu nctions of the former regimental headquarters and service compani es and rendered
some mainte nan ce. No bas ic c hange took place in the divi s ion 's three field
art illery battalions but, as in the infantry division, the ta bles prov ided for liai son
aircra ft for Ihal arm. The results reduced the vari ety of vehicles . No additional
o rgan ic a ntitan k or antiaircraft artille ry battalions were in c luded, for Army
Grou nd Forces believed that the divis ions had sufficien t antitank and antiaircraft
resources wi thin their infantry, armor, and fie ld artillery units. Besides, the command felt the divisions cou ld obtain additiona l antitank and antiaircraft artillery
resources from pools of such un its at higher eche lons))
The armored division continued to fi e ld two combat commands as task force
headquarters, which were to be used to bui ld fl exible fi ghting teams of armor,
infantry, and art illery with support appropriate for the tacti cal requiremen ts. A
brigadier genera l led one command and a colonel the other. The Reduction Board
gave no ex planation for this curious ra nk arrangement. Undoubtedly one of the
billets permitted the assignment of a second genera l officer to the division to
replace the assistant division commander, whose slot had been eliminated. The
reserve command, a new orga niL.l tion led by an infantry colonel wi th a sma ll
staff, served to clarify comma nd and control in the division's rear area. In the past
the reserve commander had been the senior officer among those units.24
The tables made substa ntia l changes in the armored division 's combat support
nnd combat service support arena. The engineer battalion lost its bridge company
(higher headquarters were to supply bridging equ ipment) and the number of engineer line compnn ies fe ll from four to three. To compensate fo r the removal of
reconnaissance elements from tank and infa ntry uni ts, the reconnaissance squadron
included a troop for each of the combat commands. In addition , the squadron had
two reconnaissance troops for divisionnl missions, an assnu lt gun troop of four platoons (one for each reconnnissance troop), and a light tank company. The division
trdi ns comprised only medical and maintcnance battalions, the supply battalion having been eliminated. Each unit was made responsible for its own resupply. Also, the
divisional supply company was discarded and its functio ns divided between the
headquart'e rs compm1y of the division and the headquarters company of the trains.
These changes pared the division's stre ngth from 14,630 men to 10,937, slashed the
number of tanks from 360 to 263, reduced the variety of vehicles to ease repair
problems, and el iminated the maintenance-prone motorcycles)5
The War Deparrment on 16 October 1943 summarized why the reorganizing
of divisions and ot her units was necess..1 ry in Circular 256. It ci ted the need to
secure the maximum use of available manpower, to permit transporr overseas of
the maxim um amount of fig hti ng power, and to prov ide greater fl exib ility in
organization in keeping wi th the principle of economy of force and massing of
military strength at th e dec isive poi nt. In addition, the reorganiza tion was to
reduce headquarters a nd other noncombatants in ordcr that co mmand fu nction
309
HHe
TANK co
122ea
HHe
147
--1
--j
MED DEl
22
119
svco
97
--1LTTANK CO
--1
HHC COMBAT
COMMAND
99/97
-[
TANK BN
751 ea
RECON TRP
145 ea
HHe
173
1 Includes
chaplains.
MEO OET
36
MEDDEl
14
I sv co I
251 ea
J _RIFLE CO
ASSAULT
GUN TROOP
116
302
SIG CO
ARMORED
INFANTRY BN
1,037 ea
75
y.
I-
I
I
97
HLTTANKCO
HHH&SVTllP
142
Has RESERVE
COMMAND
94'
RECON SUON
ARMORED DIVISION
10,937
-I
m
yME~,D~1
H SV:;RY_I
/IOu
f-iFA BTRY_
772
58
BAND
MEO BN
417
IMP PLATOON
91
ORO BN
103
FABN
545 ea
HHe
1
1,445 1
TRAINS
21
HQ,
1,656
H~I
111
DlV ARTILLERY
I'
ENGR BN
708
CHART 20-Armored Division, 15 September 1943
~
~
~
~
T HE CRUCIBLE- COMBAT
187
might keep pace wit h modern communication and tnmsport facil ities and to provide commanders with the g reatest possi ble amount of offensive power th rough
reduction in passive defensive elements.26
Reorganization of infantry and armored divisions began shortly after publicalion of the new tables. infantry and armored div isions, including those most
recently activated in the United States, adopled the new organizations between I
August and 11 November 1943. Overseas com mands reorganized their infantry
divisions as soon as possible but had the authority to delay Ihe changes if units
were under alert, warning, or movement orders or if they were engaged in maneuvers or active operations against an enemy. T he divisions needed time to retra in .
Except for the 3d and 34th Infantry Divisions, the eight infantry divisions in the
European and Medi terranean theaters were reorgan ized by the begin ni ng of the
new year. The 34th came under the tables immediate ly prior to its participation in
the Anzio campaign in March 1944 and the 3d after Rome fell in June. Of the
twe lve infantry d iv isions in the Pacific thealer, eight were converted by th e beginning of 1944 and the remain ing four by the fol lowingAugust.27
Reorganization of the three overseas armored di visions followed a somewhat
different course. The 1st Armored Division adopted the new st ructure whi le in a
rest and training area in Italy in 1944. The 2d and 3d Armored Divisions retai ned
the 1942 confi guration th roughout the war. During the fal l of 1943 the comman der o f the Eu ropean Theater of Operations. General Devers, who had been a leading s pokesman for the heavy armored division decided that the war was too
adva nced to permit changes in those uni ts.28
When the division s in the Pacific adopted the new tables, MacArthur restructured the Americal Divis ion to conform to other infantry divisions. On I May
1943 he placed it under th e tables prepared by the Reduction Board, the only division to use them, but in September it was reorga nized under the 15 July struct ure.
Because o f the unit's widely acclaimed comba t reco rd, which included a
Presi dcntial Citation (Navy) fo r its clements' service on Guadal canal , the War
Departmcnt retaincd its name rather than g ive it a numerical designation.29
Light Divisions
Early in 1943 Army Ground Forces deve loped a new type of unit , the light
division , which the Operations Division of the Army Staff had suggested earli er
as a possibility for the Pacific theater. Planners thought sllc h a divi sion could
func tion in a variety o f combat condi tions, such as j ungles and mountains, simply
by varying the unit's mode of transportation. Init ially, McNai r, who disli ked specia l units, opposed the idea becallse of the unique training it required. Given the
shortage of shipping in the fall of that year, the Operations Division again put
fo rth the proposal. By this time pla nners had extended the idea to include
amphibi ous operations. When prepari ng fo r the invasion of North Africa, the
Solomon Islands, and New Guinea , infantry d ivisions had to be reorganized,
188
MANEUVER AN D FIRE POWER
reeq uipped, and retrained to make assauh landings. In add ition, a light division
structure also seemed appropriate for the airborne division.30
On 17 January 1943 McNai r appointed Co l. Michael Buckley fro m the Army
Ground Forces G- 3 section as chairma n of a comm ittee assigned Ihe task of
developing a structure for light units using pack animals or light trucks. The committee's report ca lled fo r a 9,OOO-l11al1 tr iangular infan try division (Cha ,., 21) with
two types o f fi e ld arti llery and quartermaster units. T he pack div ision had over
1,700 animals. 1110s1 of which were mu les for the field art illery and qua rtermaster
units, whi le the truck d iv ision had only 267 114-lon trucks and 200 1/4-lon tra il ers. Both divisions were also authorized numerous handc<lrts.3 1
Geneml McNamey, the Deputy Chief of Staff, decided to test these organ izations and on 2 1 June approved the fo rmation of three rather than two light divisions. One was to be truck, anoth er pack, and the third a modi fi ed pack. The mod ified l)Hc k division 's men and uni ts were to be equipped wit h sk is, snowshoes,
toboggans, and cargo sleds. Because of the growing number o f troops undergoing
spec ia l winter trai ning at Camp Hale, Co lorado, Army Grou nd Forces suggested
they be organized under a divisional structure. The adj utant genera l added the 10th
and 71st Lig ht Di visions to the rolls. On 15 Ju ly 1943 Bri g. Gen. Robert L.
Spragi n, a veteran of the Guadalcanal campaign, assumed command of the 71st at
Camp Carson, Colorado , and Maj. Gen. Lloyd E. Jones, former commander o f the
U.S. Army Forces at Amchi tka, Alaska, took over the 10th at Camp Hale. T he 7 1st
was built around the 5th and 14th Infant ry, regiments that had served in the j ung les of Panama. T he 10th was based on the 86t h Infant ry and ot her units at Camp
Hale that were undergoing winter warfare training. Eventually the 87th Infantry,
which had served in Alaska, joi ned the 10th. The 89t h Infantry Division at Cam p
Carson supplied fill ers fo r both divisions. On I August 1943 the 89th itself was
reorgani zed and redesignated as the 89th Light (Pack) Di vision. Ne ither light
amphibious no r light a irborne di v is ions were organ ized because the War
Department opposed any cha nge in the exis tin g ai rborn e division a nd the
Southwest Pacific Area Command lacked confid ence in the light amphibious concept, preferri ng standard infantry divisions for amphibious opcrations.32
Army leaders qu ickly noted some major problems in the light di visions during
thei r training. Neither the 7 1st Light (Truck) nor 89th Light (Pack) Div ision incl uded adequate infantry staying l)Ower; the II4-ton trucks lacked sui table mobility on
wet, mountainolls, makeshift roads; the 75-mm . pack howitzer provided inadequate
firepower; the division lacked reconnaissance resources and had insufficient engineer and med ical capabi lities; and the division staff was unable to operate twentyfO llr hours a day withi n the authorized assigned personnel. T he divisions were not
self-sllstai ning. Maj. Gen. John Millikin, who tested the divisions in maneuvers,
recommended, "That unless a defin ite need for these types of d ivisions can be foreseen, the present Light divisions (motor and pack) [shou ld) be returned to a standarel division status."33 No nced seemed to exist for the divisions, and even the
Southwest Pacific Area, the command for which they were origina lly desig ned,
J Pack
'Includes mtclical deta chment

15mm Howitzer Battalions. When the situation warranted, the Truck-drawn
15mm Howitter Battalions (362 men) may be substituted.
J Includes chaplains.
' OM Truck Company (209 menl may be substituted for the 3 OM Pack Companies.
"3
$IG PLAT
LIGHT DIVISION
CHART 21~Light Division, 1943
190
wanted noth ing to do with them. Army Ground Forces therefore reorganized the
71st and 89th Divisions in May 1944 as standard infantry divisiollS.34
The 10th Light (Alpine) Division proved unsat isfactory fo r many of the same
reasons as the truck and pack units. Marshall, however, wanted it reorgan ized and
retained in the force because of ils mountain warfare ski ll s. Eventua lly Army
Ground Forces recolllmended the addition of three weapons companies to each of
the division 's infantry regiments; an increase in the size of the engineer, signal ,
and medical elements; and the provision of mul e transport for all combat elements. [n Novem ber 1944 the War Departmen t published tables o f organizat ion
and equipment renecting these changes, whieh gave the div ision 14,101 officers
and enlisted men and 6, 152 animals. The same month , the 10th Light Di vision
became the 10th Moun ta in Division , and in December it moved to th e
Mediterranean theater. The division went overseas without animals, recclvmg
them from remount stations ill the theater before going into combat. 35
Expanding Divisional Forces: Meeting the Troop Basis

While Army Ground Forces and General Staff officers revised divisional
organizations, the number of div isions ex panded and a final determination was
made rega rding the total number needed. Army Ground Forces organized the last
reserve infantry division, the 97th, in February 1943. By August 1943 it had also
activated as 11 part o r the Army of United States the 42d, 63d, 65th, 66th, 69th ,
70th, 75th, and J06th Inrantry Di visions; the 16th and 20th Armored Div isions;
and the 11 th, 13th, and 17t h Airborne Divisions (Table /4) .36
The 42d was a unique ullit , for it was a reconstitu tion of the World War I
"Rainbow Division." Except for the division headquarters, none or its earli er clements were returned, but Army Ground Forces filled its new units with personnel
from every state. To emphasize the divi sion 's tic to its World War I predecessor,
Maj. Gell. Harry J. Collins, the commander, act ivated the unit on 14 July, the cve
or the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Champagne-Marne cam paign in France
du ring which the " Rainbow" had helped to stem a Germa n drive on Pa ris.37
[n addition to activating more a irborne divisions in 1943 , the War
Department made changes in the ai rbo rne brigade rorce. To emphasize both
th e parachute a nd the glider training missions, th e 1st Airbo rn e Infantry
Bri gade replaced the lsi Parachute Infantry Brigade as a tra ining unit. The
Airborne Command also form cd the 2d Airborne Infantry Brigade that year to
help in training. The Jst Brigade ex isted for approximately seven months and
was d isbanded after most nondivisiona l airborne un its had gone overseas. In
the fall or 1943 the 2d Brigade deployed to Europe where it con tinued to su p ~
port airborne tra ining)8
T he need for the cavalry division remained questionable. Because Secretary o f
War Henry L. Stimson had insisted 011 mai nta ining large horse units, A rmy
Ground Forces replaced the organizations withdrawn from the 1st Cava lry Division
THE CRUCIBLE- COM BAT
191
for the North African campaign and

reactivated the 2d Cavalry Di vision
early in 1943 as an all-black unit split
be tween Ca mp C lark , Texas, an d
Camp Lockett, Ca li fornia.39
Dep loyme n t of cavalry di visi on s, however, proved to be a
thorny probl em. The units remained
unpopular with theater commanders
because of the shi pp ing space they
required and the log isti ca l nightmare
th ey prese nted, give n their horses
and equipment. The need for units in
the South west Pacifi c Area, however, led MacArthur to accept the 1st
Cavalry Divi sion as a di smou nted
un it. The divi sion turned in its horsMaj. Gell. Elbrillge G. Chapmall and
es
and associated gea r in Ma rc h
Gel/emf McNair inspect the 13/h Ai,.
home Dil'is;oll. 13 May 1944.
1943 and left for Australia in June.
Many of th e horses of th e 1st
Cavalry Division fo und a ho me in the 2d Cava lry Oi vision.40
In Aust ra lia the di vision was reorgani zed partly under infantry and partly
under cava lry tables. Each cavalry squadron was allotted a heavy weapons troop
si milar to the weapons company in the infantry battalion . The veterinary Iroop in
the med ic al sq uadron became a co ll ec ting troop, and th e reco nna issa nce
sq uadron was reduced to a troop similar to the uni t in the infantry div ision. Some
o r the personnel and equipment o f the reconnaissance sq uadron were used to create a light tank company. The addition o f a I05-mm. how itzer battalion gave the
arti llery two I05-mm. and two 75-mm . howitzer battalio ns. A long with the reorga nization, Ihe adjutant general redesignated Ihe unil as the 1st Cavalry Division,
Specia l, because of its unique orga nizat ion under infanlry and cavalry tables and
the desi re to reta in the cavalry " name" among the d ivisiona l forces. Having cornplcted a ll changes by 4 December 1943, the div ision moved to New Guinea for
combat. More organi zational chan ges took place thereafte r, particularly in the
artillcry, which eventually included four tractor-drawn I05-mm . howitzer battalions and an attached 155-mm. how itzer battalion.41
Personnel shortages dictated a different fate for the 2d Cavalry Division and
the 56t h Cava lry Brigade. The Mediterranean theater needed service troops, and
in Septcmber 1943 the War Department decided to lise the personnel of the 2d
Cavalry Division in Ihal role. Leav ing the eountry in February 1944, the division
was inactivated short ly thereafter in North Africa and its men reass igned 10 a
va ri cty of serv ice unit s . Army Ground Forces e limina ted th e 56th Cavalry
Brigade when no lise for it developed overseas. It s headquarters troop became the
192
TABLE 14
Divi sions Act ivated in 1943

Compollelll
Division
Dale
RA
AUS
OR
AUS
AUS
AUS
AUS
AUS
AUS
AUS
AUS
AUS
AUS
AUS
AUS
AUS
AUS
2d CflVUlry
11 til Airborn e
25 February
25 February
25 February
97th Infantry
20th Armored
106111 Infa ntry

17th
66th
75th
69th
Airborne
Infantry
Infantry
Infant ry
15 March
15 March
15 April
15 April
15 April
15 May
Locatio"
Fort Clark, Tex.
Camp Mackall , N.C.
Camp Swift, Tex.
Camp Campbell, Ky.
Fort Jackson, S.c.
Camp Mackall , N.C.
Camp Blanding, Fla.
ForI Leonard Wood, Mo.
Camp Shelby, Miss.
63d Infantry
70lh lnfalltlY
15 June
42d Infantry
10lh Light
Camp Gruber, Okla.

Camp Hale, Colo.
Camp Chaffee, Ark.
71s1 Light
14 luly
15 July
15 July
15 July
131h Airborne
[J August
Fort Bragg, N.C.
65th Infantry
16 August
Camp Shelby, Miss.
161h AmlOrcd
[5 June
Camp Bland ing, Fla.

Camp Adair, Oreg.
F011 Benning, Ga.
56th Cavalry Reconnaissan ce Troop, Mcchani zed, but did not see combat. The
fonner brigade's cavalry regiments wcn t on to fight in the Pacific and Chi na
Burmalndia theaters.42
With ongoi ng manpower shortages, the Army cont inually ex amined the
relationshi p between the tota l mi li tary force and the manpower pool available
for military service. That relationshi p was constan tly bala nced against the man
power required to maintain th e productive capacity of indust ry, which remained
vital to the overall Allied war effort. As the war progressed, staff studies sug~
gested that the number of divisions mobili zed cou ld be cut. Soviet armies had
checked the German advance, and it appeared that the All ies would ga in air
superiori ty over Europe. Th erefore, short ly before the invasion of northern
France in 1944, the War Department approved a troop basis that contained 90
divisions rather than 100 wit hin a total Army strength of 7,700,000. The French
were to raise ten divisions, and the Un ited States was to eq uip them , wh ich ere
ated equipment shortages. That troop basis called ror I light, 2 cavalry, 5 air~
borne, 16 armored, and 66 infant ry d iv isions. With the inactivation of the 2d
Cava lry Div ision in May 1944, the number or divisions in the troop basis was
reduced by one a nd the num ber or d ivis ions raised durin g Worl d War II
remained at eightynine. The decis ion to limi t the number of divis ions haunted
War Department planners during the remai nder of the war fo r they feared that
mobilizat ion had nOI gone far enough. Marsha ll , however, hel d to the eighty
nine div isions in the troop basis.43
THE CRUCIBLE- COMBAT
193
Deployment and More Organizational Changes

Although the Army began deploying divisions shortly aOcr the nation entered
the war, Ihe number of trai ned and partially trained divisions still located withi n
the Un ited Slates mount ed in 1943 because of porI and shipp i ng problem s.
Unlike World War I, no troops were to be sent to foreign stations unless the Wa r
Department could guarantee their supply. In August 1943 sixty divisions were at
various stages of readiness in the United Stales. 44
Toward the end of 1943 the de ployment pi cture bri ghtened. With th e
natio n's mass ive ship-bui ld ing prog ram and the relreat of German submarines
from the weste rn Atlantic, the War Department was able to acce lerate the
deploymcnt of divisions. Most went to Europe to take part in the cross-Chan nel
attack and th e d rive to strike at th e German heartla nd. Event ually 68 divisions--47 infantry, 16 armored, 4 ai rborne, and I mou ntain- fought in Europe
and 2 1 div is ions- I ai rborn e, I cava lry (orga ni zed as infantry) , and 19
infantry- in th e Pac ifi c area. (Ttlbles 15 (jlld 16 g ive the dat e that each division
movcd to the port of emba rkat ion.) No divis ion remained in the cont inental
Un ited States after February 1945.45
Alt hough most in fantry and armored divisions had been reorganized prior to
seeing combat because of the delay in moving them overseas, Ihe Army reorganized il s airborne divisions to mect specific combat nceds. The first modifi cation , involving only the 82d, took place during the preparation for the Sicil ian
cam pai gn. Because o r a shortage of shipping space ror gliders, a crated glider
being one or Ihe largest pieces or eq ui pment sent overseas, a parachute infantry
regi ment replaced o ne of the g lide r regiment s, and a second parachute fie ld
artill ery battalion was added. The change was in keeping wit h the original plan
for thc division, which envisioned a task force organizalion.46
After the S icily campaig n, Gene ral Ridgway. the commande r of the "A ll
American" 82d, organi zed a small pathfinder team to he lp divisional e lements
reach their targets. The team's mi ssion was to jump into the assault area and guide
the remainder of the division to the drop zone. After the team proved success ful
in Ita ly, other airborne divisions organized similar units.47
Combat operations soon demonstrated that the airborne div ision lacked suffi c ient manpower and equipm ent ror sustained operat ion s. In Sic ily and Italy
resources were not ava il able to relieve or replace the di vis ion wilh either an
infantry or armored division as quick ly as planners had envi sioned. In December
1943 Ridgway recommended changes in the airborne divis ion to correct major
deficiencies. Because it served primarily as infantry, he wantcd more transportation resources; additiona l medi ca l, engineer, and quarterma ster support ; and
g rea ter infantry and artillery firepower. Planne rs in Wa shing ton opposed the
changes because they thought the additiona l equipment and personne l would prevent the di vision rrom serving as a light , mobile roree, stripped to the bare essential s and easily air transportable.48
194
TABLE 15
Deployment of Di visions to the Pac ific Theater
DiI)i~'ioll
DlIIe
1sl Cavalry
6th Infantry
7th rnfalltry
June 1943
11th Airborne
24th In fantry
25th Infantry
27t h Infa ntry
31st Infantry
32<1 Infantry
33<1 Infantry
37th Infantry
38th Infantry
40th Infa nt ry
4[st Infantry
43d Infantry
77th Infantry
Slst Infantry
93<1 Infantry
96th Infantry
98th Infantry
Americal
Phi lippine
July 1943
April 1943
Ap ri11944
March 1942
Fcbnmry 1944
April 1942
June 1943
May \942
December 1943
August \942
March [942
September 1942
March 1944
June 1944
January 1944
July 1944
April 1944
Unit organized outside the continental United States.

#Partially organized in 1941; surrendered in April 1942.
After the aSS<'1lI1t landings by the 82d and 10Ist in Holland in 1944, Ridgway
aga in attempted to revise the authorized structure of the divisions. The 82d had an
additional 4,000 troops attached in the Normandy ju mp and over 5,000 for its operations in Holland. The IOlst had a lso bee n augmen ted for both operations .
Frustrated with the bureaucracy, Ridgway, then commanding the XVIII Airborne
Corps, appealed personally to General Marshall fo r aid in reorganizing the d ivisions. Marsha ll di rected hi s staff to reconsider their str ucture and invited Ridgway
or his representative to Washington to ex plain his ideas. Instead of coming himsel f,
Ridgway sent Maj. Gen. Maxwe ll D. Taylor, the 10 lst's commander. On the day the
German Ardennes offensive began, the War Department publi shed new tables of
o rganization and equ ipment for the airborne division. Marshall described it to
Ridgway as "in all probabili ty wholly acceptable to you and your associates."49
The new airborne division consisted of one g lider infantry and two parach ute
infantry regi ments, div ision artillery, antia ircraft arti llery and engineer battalions,
195
THE CRUCIBLE- COM BAT

TABLE 16
Deploymen t of Divisions to the European Theater

Division
1st Annorcd
1st In fantry
2e1 Anllorcd
Dale
May [942
June 1942
September 1942
2d Caval ry
February 1944
2d Infantry
September 1943
September 1943
September 1942
December 1943
January 1944
February 1944
April 1942
February 1944
MlIY 1944
October 1944
November 1943
August 1944
September 1942
September 1944
December 1944
September 1944
September 1944
January 1945
January 1945
October 1944
January 1945
August 1944
January 1944
August 1944
September 1943
September 1942
January 1944
January 1942
May 1944
April 1943
3d AmlOfcd
3d Infitntry
41h AmlOred
4th Infantry
5th Annored
5th Infantry
6th Annorcd
7th Annored
8th Annored
8th Infantry
9th Armored
9th Infa nt ry
10th Armored
10th Mountai n
11th ArnlOred
12th ArnlOred
13th Airborne
13th Anllored
14th Annored
16th Armored
17th Airborne
20th Armored
26th Infantry
28th Infantry
29th Infantry
30t h Infantry
34th Infantry
35th Infantry
36th Infantry
Division
42d Infantry
44th Infantry
45th infantry
63d Infantry
65th Infantry
66th Infantry
691h lnfanlry
70lh In fantry
7lslinfHtliry
75th [nfantlY
76th Infant ry
781h Infantry
79th Infantry
80th Infantry
82d Ai rborne
83d Infantry
84th Infantry
85th Infantry
86th Infantry
87th Infantry
88th Infantry
89th Infantry
90th Infantry
91 sl Infantry
92d Infantry
94th Infantry
95th Infantry
97th Infantry
99th Infantry
100th Infantry
IOl st Ai rborne
102d Infantry
103d Infantry
1041h Infantry
I06th Infantry
Dale
November 1944
A ugust 1944
May 1943
November 1944
December 1944
November 1944
November 1944
November 1944
January 1945
October 1944
November 1944
October 1944
March 1944
June 1944
April 1943
March 1944
September 1944
December 1943
February 1945
October 1944
November 1943
January 1945
March 1944
March 1944
September 1944
Ju ly 1944
Jul y 1944
February 1945
September 1944
September 1944
August 1943
September 1944
September 1944
August 1944
October 1944
medical and parachute maintenance companics, and spccia l troops, to which the
division hcadquarters, ord nance, and quartermastcr companies; military poli ce
and reconnaissance platoons; band; and med ical dctachmcnt reportcd (Chart 22) .
The tables reversed the proportion of parachute and glidcr infantry regiments and
considerably strengthened the units. The glider in fantry regiment was authorized
196
a third batta lion and an antitank company, and both types of regiments fielded
heavier weapons. In the engineer battalion the number of parachute and g lider
companies was also reversed . The four battalions in the division artillery, both
parachute and glider units, were authorized 75-mm. pack howitzers, but a note on
the tables indicated Ihal one gl ider artil lery battalion CQuid be equipped with 105mm. how itzers if morc firepower was necessary. As in the ot her divisions, the
field artillery was au thorized observation and liaison a ircraft. The number of
trucks jumped from 400 to ',000, and the authorized strength soa red to 12,979.
Approximately 50 percent ort he men were parachutists. SO
To adopt the new structure, the overseas commands were fo rced to rely on
their own resources because the War Department made no additiona l men available. Existing nondiv ision al parachu te infantry and fi eld arti ll ery un its were
assigned to the airborne divisions, and othcr units, including 2d Airborne In fantry
Brigadc headquarters, were disbanded to obtain personnel. In March 1945 the
European Co mmand reo rganized thc 13th, 17th, 82d, and IOlst Airborne
Div isions. The 11 th Airborne Division in the Pac ific was reorganized in Ju ly but,
unlike the European divisions, the unit was authorized two 10S-mm. howitzer
glider battalions in place o f two 7S-mm. pack units, and one glider in fantry regiment was converted to parachute infantry. Throughout the war Maj. Gen. Joseph
Swing, the 11t h's commander, had insisted upon cross-training glider and parachute Iroops. Only the 17th Airbbrne Division participated in an assaul t landing
after the reorganization; all others scrved as infantry fo r the rema inder o f the
war.51
Combat experience also led to alterations in both the infantry and armored
divisions after the 1943 revision. The most signi fi cant change took place in the
armored division, where the sma ll headquarters of the division artillery command
was expanded to a headq uarters and hcadquarters battery, prov id ing the div ision
w ith a fire di rec ti on center. Because of t he many minor cha nges , the War
Depa rtment pu blished new tabl cs for both types of div isions in January 1945,
incorporating all the changes sincc 1943. At that timc the sl'rength of the infantry
division stood at 14,037 and thc armored division at 10,700.52
Correcting Organizational Problems

Ne ithcr in fantry nor armored divisions proved to be completely satisfactory
during combat becausc they lacked all the resources habitually needed to operatc
efficien tly. In the European theater, when an infan try division conducted offensive operations it almost always had attached tank, tan k destroyer, and antiaircraft
arti llery battalions . Beca use of the shortage of tank and ta nk destroyer units,
these units were not availablc to serve regularly with the same division, resu lting
in cons iderable shuming of attached units, which diminished effective teamwork.
The cannon company in the infantry regiment was hampered by the lim ited crosscountry ability ofthc 10S-mm. howitzer's prime mover. Often tied to the division
"
i
J
198
arti llery, the company also created ammunition shortages for that headquarters.
Di vis ional reconnaissance suffered because the troop lacked sufficient st rength
and its vehicles were 100 lightly armored and armed. The deci sion to have fewer
divisions and to maintain them th rough a consta nt flow of rep lacements proved
costly. Ma ny recruits were killed or seriolls ly wounded before they cou ld be
effectively worked in to the fabr ic ofrranlli ne units.53
T he armored d ivis ion lacked suffi c ien t infant ry and medium arti llery. To
solve this probl em, att ac hme nt s look place when slich unit s were availab le.
Combat ex pe ri ence al so di ct ated thaI the division have three co mbat teams .
Under the \942 struct ure the infantry rcgi mcnt's headquarters in the 2d and 3d
Armored Div isions was often provisiona lly organized as a third co mbat command. In the other div isions, under the 1943 configuration, an armored group
headq uarters and hcadquarters com pany was attached to serve as a combat command. 54 These exped ients created command and contro l problems and complicated tea mwork . The d iv ision 's reconnaissance unit and replacement system stdTered
from the same weaknesses as in the infantry division.55
In Ja nuary 1945, recogniz ing these organ iza ti o nal pro b lems, th e War
Department began to rev ise the infa ntry div ision structure for units planned for
redep loyment frolll Europe, after the defeat of Germany, to the Pacific theater
to aid in the conquest of Japan. The War Department cast as ide its policy of
rej ect in g changes in units because of personne l considerations and directed
stafT agenc ies to prepare tables for sound fighti ng teams. It ordered the e limination of dua l assign men ts fo r personnel, the addition of any eq uipmen t listed
ea rl ier as special but that had been used routi nely, provis ions for more adequate
cOlllmunication s in a ll compone nt s, and an ex pan sio n o f milita ry police
resources. Th e infan try regiment was to receive more mobil e, se lf-propell ed
howitzers and better anti tank weapons. Later the War Department inst ructions
indicated that the rev ised structu re would not be limited to use in the war
against Japan .56
On I March 1945 Army Gro und Forces subm itted three proposals for reorgan iz ing the infantry division. Each spec ified different mann ing levels, but the
planners recommended the one that maximized the division's size and firepowe r. An enlarged infantry regi ment wi th 700 add itional men provi ded mo re
punch. The weapons platoon in each rifle company had two new sections, one
wit h six 2.36-inch rocket launchers and the ot her with three 57-mm. recoilless
rifl es . 57 In the battalion's weapons company a new platoon o f six 75-m111.
recoilless rifles augmented the two platoons equipped w ith ligh t and heavy
machine gUllS. Because the regiment's 105-mm. howitzers lacked cross-count ry
mobility for close support, com manders had tied the can non co mpany to the
fi eld arti llery fire direction center to serve as an additi onal indirect fire battery.
Army Ground Forces thus replaced the cannon company w ith a tank com pany
com pri sing nine tan ks. T he tanks also replaced the 57-111m . towed gun s in the
an titank company, which were too lightly armored and judged to be too road-
199
TH E CRUCIBLE-COMBAT
bound. The number of truck drivers, communications and postal personne l, and
ammu nition bearers was increased. The mi litary police force grew from a pla
loon to a company and a signa l battalion rep laced the sig nal company. A lank
batta lion was added to the di vision and a fou rt h com pany to the division engi
neer batta li on. To expand the "eyes and ears" of the division , the reconnaissan ce troop was inc reased in size and autho ri zed two li ght ai rcraft. These
changes together resulted in a proposed di vis ional st rength of 18,285 personnel,
an increase of 4,248 men over the January 1945 figure.5 8
On 5 Apri l the Army Staff informed Army Ground Forces that because of
ex pected personnel shortages divisions could not be reorganized accord ing to any
of the proposed changes. In stead, the stafT directed the command to prepa re
another set of tables that would increase personnel for communicat ions, replace
the military police platoon with a company, en large each lOS-mill . and 155-mm .
howitzer battery from four to six pieces, and restrllcture the infant ry regiment
along the lines of the March proposal. Shortly after issuing these instructions, the
staff told Army Ground Forces that about fifty more men could be added to the
division for various service duties.59
On I June the War Department publi shed tables for the infantry division calling for 15,838 officers and enli sted men. The di vision met most of the Army
Staff 's gu idance, except for the proposed increases in the artill ery batteries. The
planners be lieved that the new organizatioll gave the division more mobility, fl exibility, and fi repower, in particula r for tank warfare. No unit, however, adopted
the structure ullti l October 1945.60
w
Redeployment
The war ended in Eu rope in May 1945, and the Army had to come to g rips
with demobi lization whi le still engaged in the war against Japan. Aware that the
cal l to "bring the boys horne" wou ld eventua lly be irresistable, as early as 1943
Act ing Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson had appointed Maj . Gen. William F.
Tompkins to head the Special Plans Division (S PD), Wa r Department Spec ial
Sta ff, to plan for demobil ization and reorganization of the postwar Army.61
Tompkins began wit h the assumptions that the war in Europe would end first ,
that an occupation force would be needed there, and that those who had served
the longest should be released as quickly as possible. Enough soldiers had to be
retained to conclude the war in the Pacific. Wi th these ideas in mind, the Special
Plan s Division and the overseas comma nds worked out a redeployment pol icy
based on a point system. Under it, men received po ints for length of serv ice,
combat participation, mili tary awa rds, and ti me spen t overseas. Soldiers who
were parents were also to receive special consideration. Out of thi s rati ng system,
four categories of soldiers emerged: those to be retai ned for service in a command ; those to be transferred to a new command; those to fo rm new uni ts in a
command; and those to be discharged.62
200
8,h II/filllll)' Divisioll arrives (If Hall/plOIl Roads PorI ojEmbwkaliol1, /945.
When the War Department approved the redep loyment policy in the spring of
1945, planners believed the European command would need to furnis h fifteen
divisions to end the war in the Far East and twcntyone to the United States to
reconstitute a strategic reserve, which had ceased 10 exist in February 1945.
Followi ng the German offensive in the Ardennes in December 1944, the last
seven divis ions in the ninctydiv ision troop program had been sent to Europe.
With the point system and a ten tative troop basis in place, redep loymen t waited
only for the fig hting to end in Europe.63
On 12 May, fou r days a ft cr the surrender of Germany, Genera l Dwight D.
Eisenhower, the Supreme Allicd Commander, scI the rcadj ust mcnt progra m in to
molion. High and low po inl lllcn switched units, and in June the 86t h, 95th, 97th,
and 104t h In fantry Divisions left Europe for reassignmen t. Arriving home, the
men look thi rty-day leaves before undergoing training to prepare for the Pacifie
thealer. 8utthe successful use of atomic bombs agai nst Hiroshima and Nagasaki
in Augusl skewed a ll readjustment plans toward demobilization. By Septembcr
1945, 19 d ivisiolls- J airborn e, I mou llt ain , 2 a rmored, and 15 infantryreturned from Europe for use elsewhere. Of those unit s, on ly the 86th and 97t h
Infantry Div isions moved to the Fm' East, arri ving in the Ph ilippines and Japan
a ft cr the fig hting had ended.64
T HE CRUCIBLE- COMBAT
201
Compared to World War I, d ivisional organizations had rap id ly adjusted to

the demands orthe Second World War. Ini tially three considerations greatly in fl uenced the organization orthe various divisions: the availabi li ty afmen to field the
units desired by the Army; the availability of shippi ng space to move them to the
combat theaters; and the avail abili ty and quality of equipmen t. The last proved
influential , continua lly forc ing the Army to make structural changes to accommo-
date improved weapon systems or, in some cases, to eliminate those that proved
less than successful in combat. In 1943 McNair attempted to reorganize divisional structu res based on experiences acqui red d uring the ma neuvers of 1940
through 1942 and on the battlefield, where infantry, armored, and airborne divisions had to be augmented routinely, in parlicular to oppose tanks and airplanes.
As the Eu ropean war came to a close, the Genera l Staff attempted to give infantry
divisions the addit ional resources they habitual ly needed, but this effort came too
late to benefit them during the conflict.
Before and during World War 11 the Army also sought to develop several new
lypes of divisions and to achieve an acceptable balance between firepower and
mobility. Planners tried not to sacrifice either capab ility to the other, seeking
instead to serve both masters. T his effort proved reasonably successful in the acid
test of battle, especially by comparison with the performance of divisions during
World War I. The accumulated ex perience of the twentieth century eased the task
of maki ng periodic organizational adjustments to satisfy changing requi rements.
Nevert heless, th is evolutionary process wou ld conti nue after World War II as the
pace of tech nological developments and expanded global security roles of the
Uni ted States Army fo rced it down roads that had never been traveled before.
MANEUVER AN D FIR EPOWER
202
Notes
I Biellllia/ Report o/fhe Chief 0/ Staff oj file United S/(/Ie.~ Army. JlIly I. /943. /0 Jlllle 30.
1945, to Ihe Secretary of War, p. 106.
2 Memo, AOF to CofS, U. S. Army, 24 lui 42, sub : Modification of Troop Basis, 1942,
320.21267 (S)-GNGPS (AGF, Plans Section) (7- 22-42), and lSI Ind, same subject, 8 Aug 42,
AG 320.2 (7- 24- 42) MS-C, AG 320.2 (7-24- 42), RG 407, NA RAj Palmer c\ aL. The
Pl'ocl/l'clllel!! alld Tr(lillillg a/Ground Combat Tmops, PI'. 175- 79; Joseph J. Huln ik and Leonard
Kobrick, cds., We Ripened Fast, The Unofficial His{OIY of the SCI'Cllly-Sixlh III/WillY Dil'isioll
(Frankfurt, Germany: Otto Lcmbcck, 1946), pp. 19- 2 [ ; Ligh/llil/!;: Th e His/ol}' oj fhe 78th
[n/rlll/i), Division (WaShington, D,C.: 111fatllry Journal Press, 1947), pp. 9- 11 .
J Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, Byron Fairchild, Glll/nlillg lite Ullited Slales (lnd lis
OIiIPOSIS, Un ited States Amly in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1964), p. 277; Llr, TAG to CGs AGF and II Armored Corps, I Jan 42, sub: Redesignation and
Reorganizatio n of the 7th Motorized Di vision, AG 320.2 (1 2-3 1-42) OB IGNM (Order of
Battle, Intell igence. AGF), 7th Inf Div file, DAMH- HSO.
4 Green field et aI. , Orgallizaliun uj Ground Comb(/{ TI"oops. p. 286: Palme r et al..
PmCIII"emelll (lnd n'ail/illg ojGI"Olllld Comb(/{ Troops , pp. 489- 93,
S Gree nfield et aI., Ol"g(//Iiz(/{ioll ojGro/llld Comb(/{ Troops, I)P. 286- 87.
6 On 19 August 1942 arl\lY corps were officially redesignated as corps.
7 Greenfield et al., Org(lIIizalioll ojGI"ound Combal TI"oops, Pl'. 288- 89, 29 1.
8 Ibid., pp. 274-75, 303- 14; 1'/0 7- 11 , Infantry Regiment, I Apr 42; 1'10 7- 11 , Inf.1ntry
Regiment, I Mar 43. The 1942 cannon compan y had six 75-mm. self-propel led howitze rs and
two 105mm. self-propelled howitzers.
9 Greenfield et aI., Orgtlllizalion ojGrO/md Combal TI"oops, pr. 304- 05.
to 1'10 6- 10, Divi sion Artillery, Motorized . Infantry or Motori zed Division, I Mar 43 ;
Memo, G-3 for AGF, 6 Jun 42, sub: Organic Air Observation for Field Artillery, WDGCT
(Assistant Chief of Stafl', G- 3, General Stafl) 320.2 (2- 5-42), reprinted in Richard Tiemey. The
Army AI'/'al;ol/ Sial), (Northl)Ort. Ala.: Colonial Press, 1963), pp. 68- 69; William E. Vance,
" History of Army Aviation." ,Ivill/ioll Digest 3 (lun 1957): 7- 12.
II 1'/0 5- 15, Engineer Baualion, In fantry Division. 1 Apr 42; 1'10 5- 15, Engineer Ballalion,
1 Mllr 43; 1'/01 1- 7, Signa l Company, Infantry Division. I Apr 42; TID 11- 7, Signal Company.
In fant ry Division, I Mar 43; TIO 10- 17, Quartcrmastcr Comp,my, Infanuy Di llision, 15 Sel} 42:
TID 10- 17 , Quarterma ste r Co mp,lny, Infant ry Div is io n, I Mar 43; Grecnfield ct at.,
Orgmlizal io/l ojGrolllld Com/WI Troops. pp. 309- 11.
12 1'/07- 1, Headquilflers, Infantry or Motorized Division. I Jun 42; TID 7- 1, Headquarters,
Infantry Division, I Mar 43; 1'/0 7- 2. Headquarters Compnny, In fan try or Motorized Division, I
Jun 42; 1'10 7- 2, Hcadquarters Com pany, In fantry Division. J Mar 43; Greenfield et a1..
Orgallizalio/l ojGroulI(/ Comblll Troops. pp. 311 - 14.
13 Greenfield et aI., OrgollizlIliOil ojGroll/li1 COIII/)(11 Troops, pp. 3 14- 17.
14 Ibid., pp. 317- 18; TOE 7, Infantry Division. 15 Ju143. While prcp:lring the 1943 tables,
the Wnr Departme nt combined T:lbles of OrganiZiltion and Tables of Equipment into a single
document, a Table ofOrgnnizatioti and Equipment (TOE).
IS Memo, GN DCG (Commanding General. Anny Ground Forces) for 0 - 3, 28 Jan 43, sub:
Basis of Organi7.mion of Motorized Division. 320.2119 (Annd.F) (S)-ONDCG, Memo. OrganiZillion
and Mobili7...1tion 13mneh. G- 3. to Edw:lrds. 18 Feb 43. sub: Conference on Motorized Division. AG
320.2 ( 1- 28-43). amI Memo, WDGCT for Cors, 24 Feb 43, sub: Reorganization of the MOlOrized
Division, WDCGr 320 (2- 24-43), AG 320.2 (2- 24-43), all RG 407, NARA.
16 Memo. WDGCT for CotS. 24 Feb 43. sub: Reorganization of the Motorized Division,
and Llr, TAG to CGs. II Armored Corps and other addresses, 7 May 43. sub: Redesignation and
Reorgani zation of 61h, 8th, and 90th Motorized Divisions, bOlh AG 320.2 (4- 30-43) OB-IGNGCT-M. AG Refcrcnce files, DAM H-l-lSO.
THE CRUCIBLE-COM BAT
203
17 Greenfield ct aI., OrglllliZlllioll o/Gro/lllli COlllbm Troops, pp. 337- 39; Llr, TAG to COs,
AGF and XIII Corps, 30 lui 43, sub: Rcdcsignation and Reorganization of the 4th Motorized
Division, AG 322 (28 Ju143) OI3-J-GNGCT-M. AG Reference tiles. DAM H-HSO.
L8 Greenfield et ,II., Organization ojCrOI/I/(! Combat Troops, p. 324.
19 Ibid., p. 322.
20 Memo. AG F for CofS, 7 Dec 42. sub: Organization of Armored Units, 320.2 (Armd
Force) (R) (11 - 6- 42), lind Memo. WOGCT for ColS. 16 Jan 4), sub: Organizational of Armored
Units, wooer 320 ( 12- 7--42), both RG 407, NA RA.
21 Memo, WDGeT for Cors, 16 Jan 43, sub: Organization of Armored Units; Greenfield CI
al .. O''gtlllizlIlioll a/Gmllllt/ COIII&(I/ Troops, pp. 3 19- 26.
22 Repor t of Proceedings of a 13 0ard of Officers, 27 Mar 194 3, Mcmo, AGF for
Requiremen ts Section, and CG, AGF, lmdalcd. sub: Comments on 1larmon Board report, both
Ground AG Section. Project Decimnl file 1942- 1943, AG F 319.1, North African Binder, RG
337, NARA.
23 Memo, AGF for Req uirements Section a nd CO, AG F, undated, sub: Comments on
Harmon Board report; TOE 17, Armored Division, 15 Sep 43: Greenfield etll!., Ol"g(llliZ(lliOIl of
GrOlllld Comb(/{ Troops, pp. 327- 3 I.
24 TOE 17. Armored Division , 15 Sep 43; O recnfield el nl., Organization 0/ Groulld
Combal ]i'OOps, pp. 327- 31.
25 TOE 17. Armored Division, 15 Sep 43: Oreen fi eld el nl. , Orgallizmioll o/Grolilld
Comb(/{ Troops, pp. 329- 35; J. M. I' iumnn. "Reorganization of the Armored Division," Milil(llJ'
Hel'iew 24 (April 1943): 4~7.
26 WD Cir 256,1943.
27 Llr, TAG to CGs. AG F and other addres~es, 20 Aug 43. sub: Uliliznlion of Personnel. AO
320.2 (31 Jul 43) PEA MC, Ll r, TAG 10 CGs, AGF and XIII Corps, 30 Jul 43. sub:
Redesignalion and Reorganization of41h Motorized Division, Ltr, TAG to CGs, AO F lind Olher
addresses, 2 Aug 43 , sub: Reorgllnizalion of Infanlry Divisions, AG 322 (28 Jul 43) OB-[ONOCT. M, LIT, TAG to CGs. AGF and Thi rd Army. 20 Sep 43. sub: Reorganization oflhe 381h
Infantry Division, AG 322 ( 18 Sep 43) O B-[-GNOCT-M, Ltr, TAO 10 CGs, AOF and other
addresses, 23 Sep 43, sub: Reorganization of the 93d [nrantry Division, AG 322 (22 Sep 43) OBI-GNGCT, Ltr, TAG to CinC, Southwest Pneilie Area and other addresses, 12 Oct 4), sub:
Constitution of Units. AO 322 (6 Oct 43) OJ3- I-GNCGT-M. Llr. TAG to CG, North African
Theater of Operations, 29 Ju[ 43, sub: Reorganization of the 34th Infan try Division, AG 322 (26
Ju[ 43) OB-I-ONGCT, Ltr. TAO to CG, South Pacific Area, 20 Sep 43, sub: Reorganization of
the America[ Division, AG 322 (17 Sep 43) OO- I-ONGCT. L1r, TAG to CG U.S. Army Forces,
Central Pacific Arell, slIb: Reorganizlllion oflhe 33d Infantry Division. AG 322 (30 Sep 43) 00I-GNOCT.M, Llr. TAG to AGF and other addresses, [5 Sep 43, sub: Reorganization of Armored
Divisions. AG 322 (10 Se[) 43) OB-l-GNGCT-M, Llr, TAG to CGs. AGF and Third Army, 3[
Alig 43. sllb: Reorganization oflhe 4th Armored Division. AG 322 (29 Aug 43) OJ3- I-GNOCTM, Ltr. TAG to CGs, AGF and Armored Command, 3 Sep43, sub: Reorganization of the 16th
Armored Division. AG 322 ( I SCI' 43) OJ3IGNGCT- M, and Ltr. TAG to CGs, AGF and
Armored Command, 3 Sep 43. sub: Reorglll1izlltion of the 20th Armorcd Division, AG 322 (1
Sel) 43) OB[-ONGCT-M. all AG Reference files, DAM H. HSO; Historical Datn Cards,
Divisions. The si:<ty infantry divisions in the United States did not include Ihe 89th [nfnntry
Division, which was reorganized as a light division on I August [943 (sec below).
28 GO [18, Fifth Army. 1944. 1st Armel Div file. DAM H-HSO: L1r, Dcvers to A.C. Gillcm
Jr., 29 Nov 43, Dcvers P,lpers, MH [.
29 Memo, AGF to TAG, [ Apr 43. sub: Rcorg,mizalion of the Amel'iea[ Division, 320.2il 9
(PTO) (S)GNG CT/064[4 (3- [8- 43),320.24- [- 43 (18), RG 407 , NARA; Llr. TAG to CG,
South Pacific Area, 3 Apr 43. sllb: Reorgallizntion of Ihe Ameriea[ Division. AG 320.2 (4- 1-43)
OJ3-[-GNGCT, AG Refcrence files, [)AMI I- IISO; L1r. TAG to CG, South Pacific Area, 20 SCI'
43, sub: Reorganization of America[ Division; Cronin, U"der/he SOlilhem emS.I, pp. 104, [28;
Department of the Army (DA) GO 73, [9410:.
204
30 Greenfield \:1 al., Org(wiullioll o/Groll/lll CommIt Troops, PI). 331 - 43.
31 Memo, AGF ror G3, 2 Mar 4), sub: Light Division, 2 Mar 43, 322.2 (Di v) (S), RG 407,
NARA; TOE 72 (Trk) and (Pack). Light Division, I Jul 43, 891h and 7151 Inr Div files, DAMH
IISO.
J2 Greenfield ct al. . Org(wizalifJ/I of Gr(JIllld COlllba/ 7h)ops, 1)1'. 345-46; Fred Clinger,
Arthur Johnson, an d Vincent Masci, //iSIOI)' of IIII! lIs/llIjalllly D;";$;OIl (Augsb urg, German y:
E. Kieser KG, 1946), PI'. 1- 2; /-liS/DI')' of the
Ligh' Dil'isioll, AGF Study 28 (Washington.
D.C.: Historical Section, AGF. 1946).1'. 1; Ma ynard L Diamond, Willard E. Simllls. Ed ward 11.
Ilaldi ngcr. a nd Meyer Sicgclbaulll , 891h Ill/olllr), Dil'isloll, 1942- 1945 (Washington, D.C. :
Inrantry Journal Press, 1946), pp. 47-48. Also see the IOlh, 7 lst, and 89th Infantry Di visions
Iiles in DAMH-IISO.
) 3 Diamond el al.. 89th II/fill/try Divisiol1. p. 61.
34 Ibid., pp. 60-61; Greenlield ct lll.. Org(lIIi:atioll o/GrOtlllcl Combat Troops, pp. 347- 48;
Lu. TA G to CGs, Second Army and other addresses. 16 May 44, sub: Redesignation and
Reorganization of71st Light Division, AG 322 (12 May 44) OB-I GNGCT-M, 1 1st Inf Div, and
LtT, TAG to CGs, Fourth Army and other add resses, 16 May 44, sub: Redesignation and
Reorgani zation of the 89th Light Divi sion, AG 322 ( 12 May 44) OB- I-GNGCT-M, 89th In f Div,
both AG Reference liles, DAM II-HSO.
35 Tmill;IIg ill MOllllla ill (Illd lVilller !l'miore. AGF Stud y No. 23 (WaShi ngton, D.C.:
Historical Section, AGF, 1946), pp. 11- 12 ; TOE 10_ Mountain Division, 4 Nov 44; L1r, TAG to
CG, Fourth ArnlY, I Nov 44, sub: Reorganization and Redesignation of the 10lh Lighl Division,
AG 322 (25 Oet 44) O B-J-GNGCT, 10th Mt Div lile, DAM I-I -II SO; Inlerview, aut hor with
Walter L. Galson, National Association of the 10th Mountain Division, Washington, D.C., 28
Nov 79, au thor's Iiles.
16 Historical Data Cards for the 42d, 63d. 65th, 66th, 69th, 10th, 15th, and 106th Infan try
Divisions; the 161h and 20th Armored Divisions; and the 11th, 13th, and 17th Airborne Divisions
and unit Iiles for each division in DAM H-HSO. In addition to the di visions listed, TAG also
l)laeed thc 6lst, 62d, 67th, 68th, 12d, 13d, and 141h In fantry Divis ions and the 18th, 19th. 21sl,
;lIId 22d Armored Divisions on the rolls, bulthcy were neve r organ ized du ring the war. The 15th
Airborne Division was also placcd on thc rolls but never organized.
37 "The ' Rainbow Division'," N(I/;OIIl1I GII(JrdsmaJl 3 (Aug 49): 18- 19; Uf, Harry J. Collins
to George C. Marshall, 19 Ju n 43, Marshall Papers.
}II Llr, TAG to CG, Airborne Command, I Jul 44. sub: Organization or HHC, lSI and 2d
Airborne Infantry Brigades. AG 322 (29 Ju n 43) OB- I-GNGCT-M, and L1r, TAG to CGs, AGF
and Airborne Command, sub: Disbandment ofliHC, 1st Airborne Infan try Brigade, 23 Nov 43,
AG 322 (2 1 Nov 43) O B-I-GNGCT-M. both 1st Bde, ISllnf Div, liIe, DAMH-HSO; Ltr, TAG to
Chief, Historical Section, AWC. 21 Feb 45, sub: Orga ni zational History, AG 314.7 OB-I, and
Unit Di ary. Second Airborne Infantry Bri gade, 1943- 1944, both 2d Bde. lSI Inf Div f'ile,
DAM H-IISO.
39 Llr, AGF to CGs, Thi rd Army and IX Corps, 12 Sep 42, sub: Activ;ltion of Elements of
lhe l SI Cava lry Division, 322. 13/1 ( 1st Cav Di v) ( R)-GNGNT (9- 12-42), 1st Cav Di v file, and
Ltr. TAG to CGs, Services of Supp ly and other addresses, 23 Nov 42, sub : Ac tivation of 2d
Cavalry DiviSion, AG 320.2 (1 1- 2 1-42) 013.I-GN-M, 2d Cav Div IiIc, both DAMH-HSO.
"0 Greenlield ct a l., Ol'gcllliulliol/ o/Groll/u/ Combat Troops, p. 336: L1 r, TAG to CG, Third
Army, 2 Mar 43, sub: ReorganiZation of lSI Cavalry Division, AG 320.2 (2- 28--43) OB-IGNGCT-M, lSI Cav Div lile, DAM H- HSO; James W. Uinds, Sec01I(1 Cm'alry Dil'isiol/ (no pub.
lisher, (981), pp. 60-61 .
.. t Ltr. TAG to CinC, Southwest Pacilie Area, 17 Scp 43. sub: Rcorganization of Unils in
South west Pacific Area. AG 322 (14 Scp 43) OB- I-GNGCT-M, and Llr, TAG to CinC,
Southwest Pac ific Area, 13 Nov 43, sub: Redesignation and Reorganization or 1st Cavalry
Division, AG 322 (9 Nov 43) OB- I-GNGCT-M, both AG Reference liles, DAMH-HSO: Wright,
The /:;1 C(lm/IJ' Dil'isioll ill World War II, p. 240 .
..2 MacGregor, IlIIl'gm/ioll o/Ifle AI'II/ed FOl'ce.~. I). 33; Ltr. TAG to CGs, AG F and North
/0,,,
TH E CRUC1BLE-COMBAT
205
African Theater of Opcr'dtions. II Apr 44, sub: Inactivation and Disbandment of Units, AG 322
(8 Apr 44) OI3-I-GNGCT-M, AG file, DAM H. HSO; Hinds. SecQl/d Caw/lry DMsiol/, pp. 64--67:
Llr, TAB to COs. Fourlh Anny and Southern DdclIsc COlllmand. 24 Apr 44, sub: Assignll1crll,
Reorganization and Rcdcsignation ofCcrtuill Cavalry Units, AG 322 (22 Apr 44) OB-I-GNGeTM. AG Reference files, DAMII -HSO; Mary Lee Stubbs and Stan ley Russell Connor, Armorem'ally Par' II: Army Naliullal GII{/rd, Army Lineage Series (Was hin gto n, D,C.: Government
Printing Office, 1972), pp. 167- 87.
~3 Greenfield ct aI., Org(/lIi:(/I;OI/ a/Grollml Combill Troops, table, "Ground Forces in the
A rm y. Dec 41 - Ap r 45," and pp. 163- 8 1: Maurice Malloff, "The 90 Di vision Gamble,"
COI/IIIUII/(1 D<.'(;i5ioIl5, Kent R, Gree nfield, cd. (Washi ngton, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1960), pp. 365- 81.
44 Malloff, "The 90-Division Gilmble," p. 374.
45 Roberl W. Coakley illld Ri chilrd M. Leighton, Glo/)ol LngislicSfllld Slr{J/cgy: 1943- 1945,
United Statcs Anny in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968).1'.
246-47; Palmcr et ill., Procllremelll alld T/'{/illillg ofGl'ol/lul Com/)m TI'OOP5, pp. 489- 92.
46 Lu, TAG to CGs, Second Army and Ai rborne Command. 4 Feb 43, sub: Changes in
Assignment of Units to the 82d Airborne Division and Airborne Command, AG 320.2 (2- 3- 43)
03-I-GN-M, 82d Abn Di v file, DAM II -I'ISO: James E. Mra ze k, TIle GlideI' IVaI' (London:
Robert lIale and Com pan y, 1975), p. 108.
47 James M. Gavin. 011 10 Ber/ill, pp. 49- 50.
48 Memo, AGF for Cors, 17 Dec 43. sub: Change in T/O, Airborne Division, 320.3n5 (S)GNGCT, and Memo. G- 3 fo r ACors, 17 Dec 43 , sa lllc s ubject, WDGCT 320.2, both
Correspondence, Matthew Ridgway in Marsholl l'apers.
49 Ltr, Ridgway to Marshall, 1 Nov 44, Ltr, Rid gway to MarshalL 4 Dec 44, Summary Sheet
(SS), G- 3 for Cors. 8 Nov 44. sub: Reorganization of th e Airborne Di vision, all in Manhcw
Ridgway, Marshall Papers; Maxwell D, Taylor, Swords {/luI PlOlI'slwre.f (New York: W. W.
NOrlOI1 and Co .. 1972), PI', 97- 98: TO E 7 1, Airborne Division, 16 Dec 44; cited milterial from
Ltr, Mllrshall to Ridgway, 18 Dec 44, Ma rs hall Papers.
50 Memo, G- 3 for CotS, 15 Dec 44, sub: Reorganizati on of the Airborne Division, WDGCT
322 ( 15 Dec 44), RG 407, NARA: TOE 7 1, Airborne Division, 16 Dce 44,
Sl SS, G- 3 for DCors, 16 Dee 44, sub: Reorganization of Airl>orne Divisions, 322 (16 Dec
44), RG 407, NARA; Llr, TAG to CG US Forces in the European Theater of Operations (ETO).
16 Jan 45, s ub: Reorganization of the 10I st Airborne Division, AG 322 (8 Jan 45) 013-1
GNGCT-M. Llr, TAG 10 CG. US Forces in the ETO. 22 Feb 45. sub: Reorganization oflhe 13th,
17th and 82d Airborne Di visions, AG 322 (18 Feb 4 5) 013-I-GNGCT-M, an(1 Llr, TAG to CinC,
USAF, I'ncific, 4 Jul 45, su b: Reorganiz:tlion and Redesigllllt ion of Certllin Airborne Units, AG
)22 (30 Jun 45), OO- I-GNGCT-M, all AG Reference files. DAMH-HSO; Edward M. Flanagan,
Tlte AlIgel5: A I-lislOIY of IIIe IIIIt Airborllc D;";sioll 19431946 (Washinglon. D.C.: Inr.,nlry
Journal !'ress. 1948), pp. 1- 2; also see 11th. 13th, 17th. 82d. and 101 st Abn Divs files , DAM 11IISO.
52 TOE 6- 160- 1. lI eadquMlc rs and lI eadquarl ers Bauery ( HI'lI), Division Artillery,
Armored Division, 12 Feb 44; TOE 7, lnfalllry Division. and TOE 17, Armored Division. 24 Jan
45.
53 General Board, ETO. Rcporl 17, Typcs of Divis ions- Postwar Army, pp. 8- 9, 1945,
DAM II-Library,
54 The Ilrmored group headquarters and headquarters eomp.my WIlS organi zed almost idellli
cal 10 Ihe he;ldquaners and headquaners eoml)any of a combat command in an armored division.
It contained the necessary stati, communication. an d transporlnlion to enable it to function as the
headquarlcrs of a task foree comparable in size to a eOlllb.1t command.
55 General Bo.ard, ETO, Rcporl 17, Types of Di\,isions, pp. 12- 1).
S6 Greenfield et Ill. , OrglllliZ(l/iOIl afGmllllt1 Call1blll 7i'oops, pp. 454-55,
57 Recoilless rifl es had been developed during the war, and the weapons combined the eOcet
of arlillcry with the mobility of hand-carried ;lrIns by using high velocil), gas pOl1s 10 eounlenlet
206
MANEUVER AND FI RE POWE R
recoil, as Ol)posed \0 absorption of recoi l by springs and/or oil OOll'ing through various orifices.
S8 Greenfield ct al.. OrgllllizlIfioll o/GrOlllld Com/Hil TrQQP.f, pp. 456- 75 .
59 Ibid., pp. 476- 77.
60 Ibid .. pp. 477- 83: TOE 7, Inr.11l1ry Division, 1 lUll 45.
61 Hewes, From Roo/tQ McNulIl(lra, p. 112.
62 WO Readjustment Regulations. I- I, 12 Feb 1945.
63 Coakley and Leighton, G/omll Logistics (ll1d Smileg)'. PI'. 584- 85.
64 "Redeployment," Ms, Occupation Forces in Europe series. pp. 82- 84, 89. and Bell I.
Wite y, "I\GF on the Eve o f Demob i lizat ion Period:' Ms, History of AOF durin g t he
Demobilization Pe r iod. chan, "Arrivlll of Major Ground Un its for Redeployment to 10
September 1945." both OAMU-IISR.
CHAPTER 8
An Interlude of Peace
II seems cerlllill thar (/folllie. and other /l ew weapO/lS, which we lIIay expect a majol'
/"II/Mess appol/ellifo lise ill ,heforeseeablefillllre. will 1/01 allel' 'he 11(11lwe ofll'mfare 10
sllch {III eXfelll IIulI 'he immediale ground COli/mIl need fo/' vel'sali/e, lIIobile, {Iud hard
/tiffing divisions will be diminished or altered.
Genera l Jacob L. Devers]
By the summer of 1946 the peacet ime Army fielded sixtee n act ive divi
sions, to be backed by an additional fifty -two in the reserve components. For
the firsllime in its hi story the United Slates kepI more than a token army in the
aftermath of victory. Thi s rad ica l departure from trad ition resulted from the
in ternational instability that characterized the postwar yea rs and spawned the
Cold War, an era of confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United
Sta tes. To counter the th reat of Soviet expa nsion, successive admini stra tion s
mad e ex tens ive po litica l an d mil itary comm itm ents around th e world that
matured into a fore ign policy known as "con tai nment." Associated wil h containment we re seve ral co ll ective defense treati es, most nota bly th e Nort h
Atlantic Treaty Organi7.3tion (NATO), wh ich required a signi fi ca nt degree of
peacet ime readiness on land and sea and in the a ir.
Shortly after establishing the postwar force, the Army leadership reorganized
div isions based upon the lessons from World Wtlr II. Despite the Soviet mi litary
th reat, various obstacles hindered the Army's effort to mainta in readiness- the
totality of the recent victory, tin apat hetic publi c, and a n economy-mi nded
Congress. One of the most crit ical, but widely ignored, issues ftlc ing the ntlt'ion
was the possible lise of atomic weapons in future wars. That nuclear war did not
receive ex tensive anenlion during Ihe etlrly postwar yetlrs was a consequence of
the nation's short-lived monopoly of atomic weapons and the complex ity of mili tary decision making in a dangerous international environment.
Demobilization, Occupation, and the General Reserve

In late 1945 the Army began to retool for new mi ssions, which included
occupying former enemy territories and establishing a Geneml Reserve, while
demobi lizing the bul k of the World War II forces. The poinl system deve loped
carlier. which served as an interim dcmobilizat ion measure until the defeat of
208
41 sl II/jill/II)' Dil'/sion deparfS fhe PhililJpille Isl(flld.~. July 1945.
Japan, provided the basic methodology for execution but did not control the pace
of the reduction. As after World War I, the Army rai led to prepare a genera l
demobi lization plan. Demobili zati on thus proceeded rapidly, driven largely by
public pressure and reduced resources, without the benefit of sOllnd estimates
aboul the size and location of the occupation forces thai the Army would need or
the length o f time that Ihey would have to serve overseas. The divi sions that
returned to the Uni ted States in 1945 and 1946 were genera lly administrative
holding organizations without any combat capabi lity. They were paper organ izations " to bring the boys homc."2
Wi thin a year after the end of the war in Europe, the number of divisions on
active duty dropped frolll 89 to 16 (Table 17); of these, 12 were cngaged in occupation duty: 3 in Germany, 1 in Aust ria, 1 in Italy, I in the Philippine Islands, 4 in
Japan, and 2 in Korea. The remaining 4 were in the United States. By the end of
January 1947 three morc infa ntry divisions overseas were inactivated: the 42d in
Austria; the 9th in Germany; and the 86t h in the Philippi ne Islands. In addition ,
the 3d Infantry Division was withdrawn from Germany and sent to Cam p (later
Fort) Campbell , Kentllcky, where it replaced the 5th Div ision. When demobilization cndcd in 1947, the number of active divisions stood at twelve)
TABLE 17
Status of Divis ions, 1 June 1946
Dil'i.fi()11
Sill/liS
lsI Armored
1st Cava lry
1st Infantry
2d Armored
2d Inflltllry
3d AmlOrcd
Inactive
Active
Active
Active
Act ive
itmcl ivc
Active
Active
3d Infill1lry
41h AmlOrcd
41 h
51h
51h
6th
61h
71h
7th
Infantry
Amlorcd
[nr.' lllry
Armored
lnfim lry
Amlorctl
Infantry
81h Annorcd
81h Inf.1nlry
9th Annored
9th Infa ntry
10th Annorcd
10th Moun tain
II th Airbome
11th Armored
12th AmlOrcd
131h Ai room"
13th Annorcd
14th Amlorcd
16th A rmorcd
17th Airborne
20t h A nllOrcd
24 th Infan try
25th Infantry
26th Infan try
27th In fantry
28th Infa ntry
29th Infa llI ry
30th Infan try
3 1st Infantry
32d Infuntry
33d Infa nt ry
34th Infantry
35th Infml try
36th Inf<lntry
37th Infantry
38th Infan try
Inactive
Inac tive
Act ive
Inac tive
Act ive
Inaclive
Active
Inactive
Inactive
Inactive
Act ive
Inactive
Inactive
Act ive
Disb,lIlded
Inactivc
Inactive
In..1ctivc
Inactive
Inac tive
Inac tivc
Inactivc
Activc
Active
Inactivc
Inactive
Inac tivc
Inactivc
Inac tivc
Inac tive
lrHLctivc
Inac ti ve
Inac tive
Inac tivc
hmc tivc
Inactivc
Inactive
Remarks
Inac ti vated 25 Apri l 1946

Ja]);l n
Gcnnany
Fon Hood, Texas
Fon Lewis, Washington
Inac tiva ted 10 November 1945
Gcnnany
Rcorgani;~l'{\ as Constabul ary
Inac tiva ted 12 March 1946
Inactivated II October 1945
Cam p Campbell, Ke ntucky
lrHlc li v,lICd 18 Septembe r 1945
Korea
Inac tiva ted 9 October 1945

Korea
Inactivated 13 November 1945

Jnac liv(llcd 20 No\'cmbcr 1945
Inact iv.lted 13 October 1945
Genmmy
Inactiva ted 13 October 1945
Inac tivated 30 No\'ember 1945
Jnp.U1
Disba nded 31 August 1945
Inactiva ted 3 Decemocr 1945
Inacliv<l ted 25 Fcbmary 1946
Inactiva ted 15 Novcmber 1945
hwc tiv<lted 16 September 1945
hmctiv<l tcd 15 October 1945
Inacti v:J ted 14 September 1945
Inactiva ted 2 April 1946
Japan
Jarm n
Inac tivated 29 December 1945
Inactiva tcd 31 Decem ber 1945
In<lctiv:lIed 13 Dcce mber 1945
Inactiva ted 17 January 1946
Inactiv<l tcd 25 November 1945
Inactiva tcd 21 Dt:ccmber 1945
In<lctiva tc(t 28 Febnlnry 1946
Innctiv:JICd 5 Febnla ry 1946
In<lctivated 3 November 1945
In<lctivated 7 Deccmocr 1945
Inactiva ted 15 December 1945
In<lctivn led 18 D\,'Cember 1945
Inacliv:Jled 9 November 1945
TABLE 17-Colllilll/(!fJ
f)h'is;(m
401h Inf,1ntry
4l sllnf,1nlry
42d InfalUry
43d Inf,1nt ry
44th Inf,1ntry
451h Inr.1nt ry
63d Infantry
651h lnfiml ry
66lh Infant ry
69th InfalUry
70th Inf.1nl ry
71sl lnf,1ntry
75th Inf,1ntry
76th InfiUltry
77th Inf.1ntry
78th Infant ry
79th Inr.1ntry
80th Inr.1ntry
8 1stlnfantry
82d Airbornc
83d Inr.1n lry
84th Inf.' lltry
85th Infa ntry
86th Inf,lI1t ry
871h Inflnnry
88th InfalUry
89th Infa ntry
90lh Inf,1ntry
91st Infarn ry
92d Inr.1lU ry
93d Inr.1lU ry
941h Illfa ntry
95th Infa ntry
961h Infa ntry
97th InfalU ry
981h Inf:Ullry
991h lur.,nlry
l00l h Infantry
10Isi Airbo rne
102d Infantry
103d Infantry
100th Inf.1lltry
106th Irlfantry
Americal
SIlIIIIS
Inacli vc
In"cti ve
Active
In"cti vc
Imlcti ve
Inactivc
Inacllvc
Disbanded
Inacli,'c
hlllClivc
Inaclivc
Inac ti vc
In<lctivc
Disbanded
In<lctivc
Inacti vc
Inacti vc
Inacli vc
Inacli vc
Activc
Inaclivc
Inacli ve
Disbanded
Active
Inacti ve
Active
[nlIcli ve
Inacti ,'e
hl<lCli,'c
Inacli,c
Inaclive
Inaelivc
Inaclivc
Inaclivc
Inaclive
In;tcti ve
Inaclive
[naclive
[nacli,'c
Inaclive
Inacti"e
inaClive
Inacllvc
[naclive
Remarks
Inactivalcd 7 April 1946
Inactivated 3 1 Dcccmhcr 1945
Austria
Inactivalcd I Nove mber 1945
Inaclivalcd 30 November 1945
InaCli\'alcd 7 1)".-ccmber 1945
Inactivated 27 Septcmber 1945
Disbanded 3 1 August 1945
Inact ivatcd 8 Novcmber 1945
Ina ctivatcd 18 Septcmber 1945
Inaclivatcd I I Oclobcr 1945
Ina ctivatcd II March 1946
Inact ivated 14 Novcmber 1945
Disbandcd 3 1 August 1945
Ina ctivatcd 15 March 1946
Inactivatcd 22 May 1946
Inactivated II Decclll hcr 1945
Inacti vated 4 Janullry 1946
Inacti vated 20 )<l nu<lry 1946
Fon Bragg, Nonh Carolina
Inactivatcd 27 March 1946
Inactivatcd 2 1 Jmlllary 1946
Disbanded 25 August 1945
Philippine Ishmds
InaCli vatcd 2 1 Septcmber 1945
Italy
Irlllcti valcd 17 December r 945
Ina ctivated 27 Dccemhcr 1945
Inactivated I o...'Ccrnber 1945
Inactivated 15 Oclober 1945
Inactivated 3 February 1946
Inactivated 7 Febnmry 1946
Inactivatcd 15 October 1945
Inaclivated 3 Fcbnl3ry 1946
Inaclivatcd 3! March 1946
Inaclivated 16 February 1946
Inaelivated 27 Septcmber 1945
Inactivated 10 Janumy 1946
InnClivntcd 30 Novemhcr 1945
Inacti vatcd 12 March 1946
1n.1ctivated 20 Septcmber 1945
Inactivated 20 Decemhcr 1945
Inactivated 2 Octohcr 1945
inaclivalcd 12 Decemhcr 1945
AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE
2 11
711,IIl!aIlf/J' Dillil'iol/ Ballll OIllhe C(lpillli grmllltl'i o/Seollf, Korea, 1945
To replace the divisions on occupation duty in Germany that were being inactivated, the U.S. European Command o rganized the U.S. Constabulary. Heavi ly
armed, lightly armored, and highly mobile, the Constabulary served as an instrument of law enforce ment, supporting civ il authority, quelling civi l disorders, and
providin g a covering fo rce 10 engage a hostil e enemy unt il the United Slaies
cou ld dep loy larger tactical unit s overseas. The 1st and 4th Armored Divisio ns,
both experi enced in mobi le warfare , furni shed many orthe Constabula ry's unit s.4
Although the U.S. Army saw no act ion in Korea du ring World War II , the 6th,
7th, and 40th Infantry Divi sions arrived there in September and October 1945 to
occupy the southern portion of the COlllltry and assist in the demobi lizati on of the
Japanese Army. An agreemen t w ith the Sov iet Union had divided the fo rmer
Japanese co lony at the 38th Parallel. The Korean continge nt fo r a short time
rema ined at three divisio ns but soon dropped to two, the 6th and 7th Infa ntry
Divi sions. Following establishment of an independent South Korean government
in 1948, the Far East Command inactivated the 6th and moved the 7th 10 J<lP,II1 ,
leaving on ly a milita ry advisory group in Korea.S
Demobi li zation and the ensuing personnel turbulence played havoc wit h the
active d ivisions. During a twelve-month period the 88th Infantry Division in Italy
received 29,5 00 officers and en li sted men and shipped out 18,5 00. Th e l SI
Cava lry Division in Japa n opera led at one-fourth o f it s authorized strength during
2 12
MANEU VER AN D FIREPOW ER
Ihe first year on occupat ion duty, and most replacements were teenaged recruits.
Divisio ns in the United States fared no bett er. Th e 3d Infantry Di vision was
authori zed approximately 65 percent of its wartime strength but fell well below
that fi gure. Demobi lizatio n, rar from be ing orderly. became what General George
C. Marshall described as a "tidal wave" that comp letely di sru pted the internal
cohes ion of the A rmy.6
As the nat ion demobilized, Con g ress a pproved, with the con se nt of the
Philippine government , the ma intenance of 50,000 Philippine Scout s (PS) as
occupation forces for Japan. On 6 April 1946 Maj . Gen. Loui s E. Hibbs, who had
commanded the 63d In fan try Di vision during the war, reorganized the Philippine
Division, which had surrendered on Bataan in 1942, as the 12th In fantry Division
(PS) . Un li ke its predecessor, the 12th 's enli sted perso nne l we rc exclus ive ly
Philippine Scouts.7
The War Department proposed to organize a second Ph ilippine Scout di vision, the 14th , but never did so. After a short period Pres ident I-larry S. Truman
dec ided to d isband all Ph ilippinc Scout units, determ ining that they were not
needed for duty in Japan. The United States cou ld not afford them, and he fe lt the
Republic of the Philippines, a sovereign nalion, should not furni sh mercenaries
fo r the United Stales. Therefore, the Fa r East Command inacti vated the 12th
Infa ntry Di vis ion (PS) ill 1947 a nd eve ntually inacti vated o r di sbanded all
Philippine Scout units.S
Bes ides the requ irement for occupation forces, an urgent need exi sted for
some combat-ready divisions in the United Slates, where none had been rnaintained since Februa ry 1945. The War Depart ment scaled back its earlier estimate
for "strategic" forces and dec ided to main tain one airborne, one armoreel, and
three in fa ntry divisions, all at 80 percent strength. Init ia lly the department designated the force as the Strategic Stri king Force but soon rcnamed it the Gencral
Reserve, to re necl its missio n more adequately. But Ihe Genera l Reserve quickly
felt thc effects of demobilizat ion, and it was soon reduced to fo ur divisions- the
82d Airborne, the 2d Armored, and the 2d and 3d Infantry Di visions.9
Departing from its post- Wo rld War I poli cy, the War Department kept di visionalunit s in the United States concentrated on large posts to foster training and
unit cohesion. However, shortages in personne l, obsol ete equipment , mId insuffi cient maintenance and tra ini ng runds preventcd the d ivision s from being combat
effective. By the winter of 1947-48 the Genera l Reserve consisted of Ihe airborne
div ision at Fort Bragg at near war strength , two ha lf-st rength in fantry divisio ns,
one at Fort Campbe ll and the ot her at Fort Lewis, and the armored d ivision at
Fort Hood wi th fewer than 2,500 men. to
As many di visions were elim inated from the act ive roll s, variolls divisio na l
cOlllmanders jockeyed to have the ir units reta ined in the act ive roree . By what
some thought was chicancry. thc 3d In fantry and 82d Airborne Di visions had
replaced the 5th In fantry lind the IOl st Airborne Di vision s on the active rolls.
These changes caused con siderabl e resentment within the rank s, and unit desig-
2 13
nations became a contentious issue with many active duty personnel as well as
veterans. Thus, the adjutant genera l solicited recommendations from the commanders of Army Ground Forces and the overseas theaters for divisional numbers
to be represenl'ed ill the Regular Army. In the ensuing study. the adjuta nt general
recommended the numbers I through 10 and 24 and 25 for infantry div isions (lile
10lh Mountain Divis ion to be redesignated as the 10th Infantry Div ision) ; the
numbers 1,2, 3, and 4 for armored divisions (when element s
the 4th Armored
Division serving in the Constabulary were inactivated, they were to revert \0 divisional units); and 82 and 10 1 for airborne divisions. The recommendations also
incl uded the priori lY fo r Ihe retention of divisions on the act ive rolls. 11
The study recommended Ihat the I st Cavalry Division be inactivated upon
completion of its occu pation duties and its elements reta ined as nondivisiona l
units. Large horse units were not to be included in the post- World War II Army.
Chie f of Sta ff General Dwigh l D. Eisenhower disagreed wit h the elimination of
the division. There fore, the Army Staff reworked th e list, designating the 1st
Cavalry Division eighth on the retention list for infantry (the division had been
organized partially under infantry and partial ly under cava lry tables during World
War II ) and recommending modificati on of the unit's designation to show its
character as infantry. After examining several proposals, Eiscnhower approved
the name " 1st Cavalry Division (lnfantry)."12
No change in the numbcr of div ision s on active duty resulted From the study;
it si mply provided the nomenclature fo r the Reg ula r Army 's divisiona l forces.
Eventua ll y the I st Cavalry Di vis io n, the 10th Mountain Di vis io n, and the
Constabula ry units conformed to these dec isions. A lso, the 10lst Airborne
Divi sion and the 10th and 25th Infantry Divi sions (Army of the United States
uni ts) and the 82d Airborne Divis ion (an Organized Reserve organi za tion) were
allotted to the Regular Army.13
or
Reorganization of Reserve Divisions

With the nation victorious in war and alone armed wilh the most awesome
weapon known 10 man, the atomic bomb, a lasting peace appeared at hand. Some
military pl anners believed, howeve r, that the need for ground combat units
remained unchanged. Plan ning For a postwar conventional force had begun in
1943, and over the next three years those plans, which included reserves, were
debated in Congress and by the War Department and state officials. 14
When Maj . Gen. Ellard A. Walsh, president o f the National Guard Association,
learned the sta fTwas studyi ng a postwar reserve structure, he pressed fo r consideration of reserve officers ' views, pet itio ning Congress to ensure that the Wa r
Department establish reserve affairs committees in agreement with the provisions
of the National Defense Act. In August 1944 Deputy Chie f of Staff MeNarney
appointed a six-member committee of Regular Army and National Guard officers
to prepare pol icies and regulations for the Guard. Then, in October, he aut horized a
2 14
similar committee for the Organi l'..cd Reserves. He also arranged for j oint meetings
of the two groups where they disclissed matters common to both. IS
On 13 October 1945 the War Department published a postwar policy statement for the enti re Army. It call ed for a g round military establi shment consisting
of the Regular Army, the National Guard of the United States, and the Organ ized
Reserve Corps, 16 whi ch were to form a ba lanced force for peace and war. The
Regular Army was to retain o nly those unit s required for peacetime missions,
which were the same as those identified after World War I. The dual-mission
Guard was to furni sh units needed immediate ly for war and to provide the stales
with military resources to protect lifc and property and to prcserve peace, order,
and th e public sa fety. The Organi zed Rese rve Corps was to suppleme nt th e
Regular Army and Nat ional Guard contributions suffic iently to meet any projected mobi lization requirements. 17
Arter the policy statement was published, the Army Staff prepared a postwa r
Nationa l Guard troop basis, wh ich included twenty-four di visions. [t derived that
nu mber by co untin g th e prewar e ig htee n Na tiona[ G uard infantry and four
Natio na l Guard cavalry divisions, the Ameri cal Division (whi ch had been large [y
composed of Guard units), and the 42d In fantry Di vision. Most soldiers con sidered the 42d, initially o rgani zed with slate troops in 19 17, as a Guard unit. The
fa ct that the new plan allowed each of the forty-eight states to have at least o ne
genera l o ffi cer al so he lped earn il s acceptance. In the end it was necessary to
approve a 27-division structure wit h 25 infantry divisions and 2 armored di vision s to accommodat e the desires of a[ 1 the stales. Durin g this process New York,
fo r example, success full y petition ed the Wa r Depart ment for the 42d In fantry
Di vis ion . When the allotme nt was co mpl eted, th e G uard contai ned th e 26th
thro ugh 48th and the 5 [st and 52d In fantry Di vis io ns and th e 49th and 50th
A rm o red Di visions . The number 39 was used fo r th e first time since 1923 .
Ahhough a 44th In fa ntry Division had ex isted during the interwar years, the postwar 44 th in Illinois was a new unit , as were the 46th , 471h, 48th, 5 1st, and 52d
In fa ntry Div isi on s a nd 4 9th Arm ored Div isio n. Th e 50lh A rmo red Di vision
replaced the 44th Infantry Division in New Jersey. 18
Whil e the stat es and th e War Depa rtm ent se ttl ed troop ba sis issues, th e
National Guard Bureau changed the procedures for organi z ing the unit s. In the
pa st states had rai sed compani es, rorming reg imcntal headq uarters on ly whcn
suffic ient companies ex isted to ma ke a regiment. Under the new regulations, divisiona [ and regimental headquarters were to be organized first, and they were to
assist the d ivisio n commander in ra ising the smaller units. t9
Duri ng the spring or 1946 the Nat ional Guard Bureau surfaced the complex
problem of how to preserve historical co ntinu ity in the G uard uni ts. In 1942 the
divisions had been reorga nized rrorn square to triangu lar units, which le ft them
only vaguely resembling the form ations inducted into redera l service in 1940 and
194 1. Furthermore, the ex panded troop basis o r 1946 com pounded the probl em
by adding units that had never be rore exi sted. To keep rrom losing the historical
AN INTERLUD E OF PEACE
2 15
link with the prewar units, some dati ng as far back as 1636, the bureau and the
Historical Section , Army War Co llege, reaffirmed an earlier po li cy validated

between World Wars I and II. Units were to perpetuate organiz'ltions that had
been rai sed in the sa me geographic areas, rega rdl ess of type or designation. For
example, New Jersey, which had supported part of the 44th Div ision before the
war, now supported the 50th Armored Division . Therefore most of its elements
"inherited" the history of the organic uni ts of the old 44th, and elements of the
new 44th perpetuated the history and traditions of fo rmer units in Il linois.20
T he command arrangement within the Inulti statc divis ion s presented another quandary. The War Department di d not rul e on the question, but some states
that shared a divi sion developed and signed fo rmal command armngement doc
uments. Fo r exa mpl e, Fl orida, Georgia, and Sout h Carolina, states that con
tributed to the 4 8th a nd 5 1st Infantry Divi sions, contracted 10 rotate command
of the unit s every five years) I
After the stale governors rormally notified the Nationa l Guard Bureau that
they accepted the new troop allot ments (ulble 18), the bureau authorized reorga
nization o f the units with 100 percent or their officers and 80 percent or their
enlisted personnel. The rirst division gra nted fed eral recognition after World War
II was the 45th Infantry Division from Ok lahoma on 5 September 1946. Within
one year al l Guard di visio n headquarters had rece ived fed eral recognition )2
On Veterans Day 1946, at Arlington National Cemetery, Pres ident Truman
announced the return of the National Guard colors and flags or those units that
had served during the Wilr. In concurrent ceremonies in state capital s, fort yfive
governors rece ived those colors and nags. The other th ree states obtained their
standards in separate ceremonies. These actions did much to express the tie of the
postwa r National Guard forces to prewar units))
The rebu ilding of the Orga nized Reserve Corps divisions posed some similar
problems and ot hers that were unique to it. A tentative troop basis, prepared in
March 1946 (after the National Guard organizational structure had been present
cd to the states), outli ned 25 divisions- 3 armored, 5 airborne, and 17 infantry.
These divisions and all other Organized Reserve Corps units were to be main
tai ned in one of three strength categories, labeled Class A, S , and C. C lass A
units were divided into two groups, one fo r combat and one ror service, and units
were to be at required table of organ ization strength ; Cla ss B units were to have
their full complement of officers and enli sted cadre st rength ; find Class C were to
have officers only. The troop basis li sted nine divisions as C lass A, nine as Class
B, and seven as Class C.24
Maj . Gen. Milton A. Reekord, the adjutant general of Ma ry l an(~ and General
Walsh of the National Guard Association protested the provision ror Class A divi
sions, whose cost, they bel ieved, would detract great ly from funds avai lable to the
Guard. They argued that if Class A units were needed, they should be allotted to
the Regular Army or the National G uar(~ not to the Organized Reserve Corps,
beca use these unit s were augmentati ons to rather than essential components of
216
TABLE 18
Location of Nat ional Guard Divis ions
Post- World War II
Division
26th Infantry
271h Infantry
28th Infantry
29th Infantry
30th Infantry
3 1s\ Infantry
32d Infantry
33d Infantry
34th Infa ntry
35th Infantry
36th Infantry
37th Infantry
38th Infantry
39th Infantry
40th Infantry
4 151 In fantry
42d Infantry
43d Infantry
44th Infantry
45th Infantry
46th Infantry
471h
481h
49th
49th
50th
Infa ntry
Infa nt ry
Am lOrcd
InfantryAm lOfcd
5 1s\ Infant ry
52d Infantry
S{lIfes
Massachusetts
New York
Pennsylvania
Maryland and Virg inia
Te nnessee a nd North Caro lina
Alabama and Mississippi
Wiscons in
Illinois
Iowa and Ne bras ka
Kansas and Missouri
Texas
Ohio
Indiana
A rkansas and Louisiana

Califo rnia
W ashington and Oregon
New York
Connecticut, Rhode Islund, and Vermont

Illinois
Oklahoma
Michigan
Minnesota and North Dakota
Georgia
Texas
California
New Jersey
Florida and South Carolina
California
The 52d Infantry was redesignated the 491h Inf.1nt ry in 1947.

t he im medi ate mo hili z<ltio ll fo rcc. Maj. Gen . Ray E. Po rter, director o f th e
Spec ia l Plans Divisio n, s upported the Guard 's view regarding fund s and noted
that faci lities were not ava ilable for use by C I<lsS A divisions. Furthermo re, he
bel ieved the O rganized Reserve Corps divisions would com pete with G uard form<lt ions for available personncl. Porter there fore proposed reclass if ication of all
Class A divisions as C lass B units. Eventua lly the War Department agreed and
made the appropriate changes.25
Althoug h th e di s pute over C la ss A un its la sted seve ral months, the War
Department proceeded with thc reorga ni zation 0 1" the Organi zed Reserve Corps
217
divisions du ring the summer of 1946. That all div isions were to begin as Class C
(officers only) units, progress ing to the other categories as men and equipment
became avai lable, undoubtedly in fluenced the decision. Also, the War Depa rtment wanted to take advantage of the pool of trained reserve officers and enlisted
men from World War II. By that time Army Ground Forces had been reorganized
as an army group headquarters that commanded six geographic armies (Map 3).
The armies replaced the nine corps areas of the prewa r em, and the army commanders were tasked to organ ize and tra in both Regu lar Army and Orga ni zed
Reserve Corps uni ts. The plan the army commanders received called for Iwcntyfive Organized Reserve Corps divisions- the 19th, 2 1Sl, and 22d Armored Div isions; the 15th, 84th , 98th, 99th, and 100th Ai rborne Divisions; and the 76th,
77t h, 79th, 81st, 83d, 85th, 87th, 89th, 90th, 9 1st, 94th, 95th, 96t h, 97th, 102d,
103d, and 104th Infan try Divisions. Dcmography served as the basic tool for
locating the uni ts within the army areas, as a fter World Wa r 1.26
The twen ty-rive reserve div isions act ivated between September 1946 and
November 1947 (Table /9) d iffered somewhat fro m the o riginal troop bas is.
The First Army declined to support an airborne division, and the 98th Infantry
Di vision replaced the 98th Ai rborne Di vision. A note on the troop list nevertheless indi cated that the unit was to be reorgan ized and redes ig nated as an ai rborne unit upon mobil ization and was to trai n as such. Afier the change, the
Organized Rese rve Co rps had fo u r airborne, th ree armored, and eighteen
infa ntry divisions. The Second Army insisted upon the ll umber 80 fo r its airborne unit because the division was to be raised in the prewar 80th Divi sion 's
area, not that of the 99th. Finally, the 103d Infantry Di vision , orga nized in
192 1 in New Mexico, Colorado, and Arizona, was moved to Iowa, Minnesota,
South Dakota , and North Dakota in the Fifth Army area. The Seventh Army
(la ter replaced by Third Army), allotted the 15th Airborne Division, refused
the designat io n, and the adjuta nt gene ra l replaced it by eonst itllt ing the 108th
A irborne Di vision, which fe ll withi n that component's list of infantry and airborne di visional numbers.27
A major problem in fo rming divisions and other units in the Organized
Reserve Corps was adequate hOllsing. Wh ile many National Guard unit s owned
their own armories, some dating baek to the nineteenth cen tury, the Organized
Reserve Co rp s had no fa ci lities for storin g equipm e nt and for training.
Although the War Department requested funds for needed faci lities, Congress
moved slowly in response)8
Given a smaller Organized Reserve Corps troop basis that called for infantry,
armored, and airborne divisions, six prewar infantry divisions in that component
were not reactivated in the reserves. The War Depart ment deletcd the 86th , 97th,
and 99th Infantry Di visions when other div isions took over their rec ruiting
areas, and the Regular Army, as noted, retained the 82d and 10I st Divisions,
whi ch had been reorganized as airborne during the wa r. The future of the 88th
Infantry Division, still on occupat ion duty in italy, remained unsettled. Within the
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MANEUVE R AND FIREPOWE R
220
TABLE 19
Location of Organized Reserve Corps Divisions

Post- World War II
DilrisiOIl
131h Armored
21st Armored
22d Armored
761h Infantry
Stale~'
A/'lI/yArea
Sixth
Fifth
Fourth
First
Califomia, Oregon , nnd Arizona
Michigan and Illinois

Texas and Oklahoma
Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Hampshire,
Maine, and VCnllOnt

77th Infantry
78th Infantry
791h Infantry
First
First
New York
New Jersey and Delaware
Pennsylvania
Maryland, V irginia, and District ofColu mbiH
Georgia, North Carolina, and Soulh Carolina
Ohio
80th Airborne
81sI Infantry
83d Infantry
84th Airborne
Second
Second
Third
Second
Fifth
85th Infantry
Fifth
Illinois, Minnesota, South Dakota, and
87th Infantry
89th Infamry
90th Infantry
91st Infantry
94th Infantry
95th Infantry
96th Infantry
Third
Fifth
Fourth
Sixth
Fi rst
Fourth
Sixth
98th In fantry
100th Airborne
I02d Infantry
I03d Infantry
Fi rst
Second
Fifth
Fifth
104th Infantry
108th Airborne
Sixth
Third
Alabama, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Florida

Kansas, Nebraska, Wyoming, and Colorado
Texas
Californ ia, Oregon, and Washi ngton
Massachusetts
Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Louisiana
Montana, Washington, Idaho, Nevada,
and Utah
New York
Ke ntucky and West Vi rgi nia
Missouri and Illinois
Iowa, Minnesota, South Dakota, and
Nonh Dakota
Washington and Oregon
Georgia, Florida, Nonh Carolina,
and Alabama
Indiana
North Dakota
13th Annorcd Divisio n rcplaced the 191h ArnlOred Division in 1947.
Organized Reserve Corps' block of numbers fell the 92d and 93d Infa nt ry
Divisions, but they were not c lassified as a part o f that com ponent. The War
Depart ment, however, decided not to maintain all-black divisions or lise their traditional numbers in the postwar reorganization.29
Two changes took place shortly after the reorganization o f the reserve divisions. [n [947 the 13th Armored Division replaced the 19th in the Organized
Reserve Corps, and the 52d Infan try Division became the 49th in the National
AN INTERLUD E DF PEACE
350111 II/jill/'ry, 881h
[1/!tIllIIJ' Dil'isi()II.I'(f/'(/de.~ ill
221
Gorizia, /(aly. 1945.
Guard. Redcsignation of Ihe 52d coi ncided with California '5 centennial celebration. The division's home area covered the region where gold had been discovered
in 1849, and the state requested the name change to honor the "Forty-Niners" of
that era. The 13th replaced the 19th Armored Division, also at C<lIifornia's bidding, because o r the former unit's association with the state; the 13th had served
there during and aftcr World War 11 .30
The War Department tentatively planned to o rganize the 1061h Infantry
Division in Puerto Ri co using unit s from all three components. The Regular
Army and the National Guard were to furn ish the regimen tal combat teams and
the Organized Reserve Corps the combat support units. By early 1948 the combat elements had been organized, and the formatio n of most other units had
been authorized, including the headquarters company of the divis ion. The War
Department determ ined, howeve r, that the 106th Infantry Di vision was not
needed and never added it to the reserve troop list. The division headquarters
company was inact ivated in 1950, but most other units remained active as nondivis iona l organizations)1
Manning reserve units proved to be a difTicult task. Ini tially the Army
planned that the rank and file of the units would be men who had undergone un iversa lmilitary training in centers operated by Regular Army divisions. With public se ntiment opposed to unive rsal m ilitary Iraining, Congress d eclined to
222
TABLE 20
Div isions Designated as Training Centers, \947- 50
Dillisioll
Locatioll
3d Annorcd
Fort K nox, Ky.
4th Infant ry
Fort Ord, Cali f.
5th AmlOred
51h Infa ntry
9th Infantry
10lh Infantry
171h Airborne
JO ist Airbomc
Camp Chaffee, Ark.

Fort Jackson, S.c.
Fort Dix . N.J .

Fort Riley, Kans.
Camp Pickell. Va.
Camp Brcckinridge, Ky.
DlIIes
Jul y
Jul y
July
July
July
July
July
July
1947- Aclivc
I 947- Acti vc
1948- Fcbruary 1950
I 947- April 1950
I 947- Active
I 948- Acti ve
J948- Junc 1949
1948- May 1949
npprove it. The reserves there rore relied upon volunteers who had prior service,
the Reserve O ffi cer Tra in ing Corps (ROTC), and personnel who had 10 compl ete
a commitmen t aftcr serving on active duty in conj unction with the draft , whi ch
was reenacted in 1948. That year to stimulate interest in the Organized Reserve
Corps, Congress authorized pay for inactive duty training. With a sma ll p Ori ion
of the postwar Army dependent upon the draft, it generated few reservists for the
National Guard and the Organ ized Reserve Corps, and those units fe ll considerably below full strengt h.32
Although th e War Department did not lise di vision s as a part of a universa l
mili tary training program . it deci ded to use divisional designations fo r rep lacement tra ining centers in the summer o f 1947. The 3d Armored Di vision and the
4th, 5th, and 9th Infa ntry Divisions were activated and their clements reorgani zed fo r that purpose. The cad res who trained the recrui ts responded favorab ly
to the use of di visions as a mea ns o f building esprit since they wore the di vis io nal shoulde r sleeve ins ig nia, and the recruits were inspired by the accomplishmen ts of historic units. The Army authori zed more tra in ing centers divisiona l designations in the summer of 1948 (1(lble 20). As the trai ni ng load Ouetuated, so d id the number of "d iv isional " tra ining centers, which stood at four
two years later.33
Postwar Divisional Organizations

In reorganiz ing the postwar divisi ons, the Army used World War 11 tabl es of
organization and equ ipmen t, but studies of combat experience that were under
way pOrlended revisions. The U.S. European Theater of Operations established
the Genera l Board, consist ing of mally committees, to analyze the strategy, tactics, and admi nistration of theater forces. A committee headed by Brig. Gen. A.
Franklin Kibler, fo rmerly the G- 3, 12th Army Group, exa mined the requirements
ror vari olls types of divi sions. A Hcr we ighing division"l strengths and weaknesses
and considering new combinat ions of arms and servi ces, the committee reeom-
AN INTERLU DE OF PEACE
223
mended the retention of infantry, armored, and airborne divisions. The committee
concluded that a standard infantry division could accomplish missions Ihalmight
requi re ei ther ligh t or mountai n troops, and that therefore such special divisions
were unnecessary. However, it also recOlllmended that the Army maintain at least
one horse caval ry division to guanllltee that a few officers and enl isted men
would contin ue to be tra ined as mounted troops. No other postwar study urged
the retention of the cavalry division, and, as noted, the War Department rejected
any large horse un its for the futu re.34
Other General Board committees examined the requirements for each type of
divis ion. The commi ttee for the infantry division surfaced many of the same
requirements identified previollsly in the spring of 1945 and recommended a unit
of 20,578 men. Additional men were needed in the infantry regimen t to provide
comm unications, intelligence, reconnaissance, and administration, and improved
weapons were required for cannon and antitank com pani es. The comm ittee proposed the development of a low sil houette 105-mm. self- propelled howitzer, but
unti l its adoption the cannon company was to use a 105-mm. howitzer mounted
on a medium tank. To arm the antitank company, the planners proposed either a
self-propel led antitank gun or a medium tank, with most favoring the latter. Some
committee members advocated removing the antitank company from the infantry
regiment and add ing a three-battalion tan k regiment to the division. Because of
the size and complexity of the infantry regiment, the committee urged that its
commander be a brigadier general.35
Cavalry and field art illery arms were also expanded within the infantry
division. To ensure adeq uate intell igence and counlerrecon nai ssance (i.e., security), a d ivisional caval ry squad ron rep laced the troop. Because the division
often lacked sufficie nt field a rtill ery, the committce recommcnded add ing a
towed 155-mm. howitzer battalion for a total of two ISS-mill. howitzer battalions and three self-propelled lOS-111m. howitzer battalions. A ll fifteen art illery
batteries were to have six pieces each)6
Di visional combat and comba t service support a lso grew. An antiaircra ft
artillery battalion was added fo r air defense, an engineer regiment replaced the
battalion, and a milit ary po lice com pany supplanted the platoon. Given the
increases in the arms and combat support elements, the div ision needed greater
ma intenance and quartermaster resources, and the commi ttee urged expansion of
these uni ts to battalions. Fi na lly, a new reinforcement battalion was suggested to
process and forward replacements. In SU Ill , the General Board cOl11mittee preserved the division's th ree regimental combat teams used during the war, bu t
added or enlarged units that had been organic or habitually attached and organizations to service them)7
The comm ittee analyzing the airborne di vision concluded it should have the
same orga ni zation and equipment as the infa ntry division, along wit h augmentations needed to perform it s airborne mi ssions. Two sets of equipment were
thus recommended for the divis ion, a lightweight set fo r airborne assaults and a
224
heavy set fo r sustained ground combat. All di visional clements were to be

trained in parachute, gl ider, and a ir transport techn iques, making all divisional
clemen ts airborne unils)8
The General Board 's third co mmittee on divisional organ ization reviewed
the armored div ision . Examination of both the early heavy armored division
and the lighter va riant introduced in 1943 revea led defect s that had been CO f rected by attaching units. Usin g the 1943 di vis io n as a base, the commi ttee
added a fourth 105-mm. howitzer battalion , an antia ircraft artillery batlalion ,
and a lank destroyer battalion. During combat operations these units had been
added to the division, as was an infantry battalion or regiment, when available.
The committee viewed the combat command as a major weakness because it
did not have assigned units, a violation of unity of command. Furthcrmore,
bot h types of armored divi sions had o nly two authori zed combat commands,
but in combat they normally had operated wi th th ree. To prov ide the third command in the heavy division, the headquarters and heudquarters company of the
armorcd infantry regiment had been organ ized provis io nally as a combat COmmand headquarters, and in the light division a headquartcrs and headquarters
compa ny of an armored g roup augmented the reserve command. The committee recommended that the comba t commands be replaced wi th three regiments,
each made up of one tank and two armored rifle battalions, and that brigadier
generals command the reg imen ts. Upon re fl ection, thc committee omitted o ne
unit previously attached to the divi sion , the tank destroyer battalion, because of
the wa rtim e trend toward arming American tank s with high -veloc ity weapon s
capable of destroying cnemy armor, an evol ution that made the lightly armored
tank destroyer redundant. The strength oflhe projected armored divi sion rose to
19,377 officers and enlisted men, nearly double thc size of light armored divisions of 1943.39
The Army Staff received the reports from the Genera l Board and passed them
a long to the Army G ro und Forces. In September 1945 that co mmand began
preparing new tabl es of organization for the postwar Army, but General Devers,
commander of Army Ground Forces, refrained frOIll making any decisions about
divisional organization pendi ng review of the boa rd 's findin gs and the recommcndations of infantry and armored conferences being he ld in the spring of the
fol lowing year. In July 1946 he finally forwarded proposals to the General Staff
for ncw infantry and armored divisions that combined recommendations or the
committees and of the conferences. The new tables for the infantry di vision were
similar to those developed in 1945 when restrictions were lifted on their manning.
The armored division retained its 1943 configurati on with augmentations to correct organ izational deficiencies. Devers believed these divisions would meet the
Army's needs for versatile, mobile, ha rd-hitting units. Despi te the avai lability of
the atom ic bomb, the nature of g round combat had not chan ged. The infantry
division was capable of operating in jungle, arcti c, desert , and mountain terrain or
011 plains; the armorcd di vision remained a hi ghly mobil e unit to break through 11
225
line or exploit success o n Ihe battlefield. He quest ioned, however, the appropriate
rank for commanders of Ihe new infan try combat teams (formerl y in fantry regiments) in the infantry div ision and combat commands in the armored d ivision- a
colonel or brigadier gcncr<l1.40
Eisenhower sent the di vis ional proposals 10 senior officers, including his own
advisory g roup, fo r commcnt.41 He was concerned that units were too large, possessi ng everyt hing they might need under almost any cond ition, vio lating the
principles o f ncx ibility and economy of force fo ll owed during the war. I-Ie a lso
requested the officers' views as to whether the Army should break each division
into three smaller units, and if so whether the infantry regiment should be
renamed an infantry combattea m.42
The advisory group concurred with the Army Ground Forces proposals. It did
not believe that di visions had too many people and too much equ ipment; they had
o nly those units habitua lly allaeh ed duri ng combat. T he g ro up d id not fear a
diminution of morale because the infantry regiment was to be known by another
name. Moreover, it supported the rank of brigadier general for the commanders of
infantry comba t teams in the infant ry di vision and combat commands in the
annored division because it was commensurate with the assigned rcsponsi bilities.43
Among the other general officers who com mented on the divisions, General
Omar N. Brad ley, head of the Veterans Administration, wanted the staff to develop a division organization that combined aspects of both infantry and armored
d ivisions. For the time being, however, he deemed the proposed units sound. Lt.
Gens. Wa lton H. Wa lker and Oscar W. Griswol d, the Fifth and Seventh Army
com manders, also endorsed the organiza tiona l proposals bu t di sagreed on the
ap propriate ra nk for comba t co mmand a nd infan try co mbat learn leade rs.
Eisen hower approved the div isions on 2 1 November 1946, but di sapproved the
change in general officer positions and the new name for infantry units. The fo llow ing month Army Ground Forces prepared draft tables of organization for a
17,000-man in fantry division and a IS,ooO-man armored di vision. 44
In 1948, when the Department of the Army4S finally publi shed new tables for
the infantry division, il authorized 18,804 officers and enlisted men (Cllar' 23). The
di vision, however, remained basica lly the sa me as approved by Eisenhower. The
rati o of combat to service troops was 4 to I, and a 50 percent increase in firepower
was atta ined by merely authorizing each fie ld artillery firi ng battery six pieces.46
Somc changes made betwecn thc time Eisenhower approved the division and
publication of its tables, howevcr, are noteworthy. In thc medica l service, a medical company replaced the allached medica l detac hment in each infantry regi ment, and artillery, engineer, and tank ballal ions fielded organic medical detachments as did the division headquarters. The medica l batta lion was to provide only
clearing and ambulance services. Thc reconnaissance troop was redes ignated as a
reconnaissance company to eliminate the lerm "Iroop" from the Army's nomen
clm ure except for cavalry and constabulary units. At the insistence of officers
who nllcnded an In fan try confcrcnce in 1946 that discussed thc slntus of the arm ,
AN INTERLU DE O F PEACE
227
A rmy Ground Forces added a rep lace ment co mpany to rece ive and process
incoming personnel. One unit thai did not survive the postwa r revision was headquarters, spec ial troops, beca use it was deemed un necessary. A major genera l
continlled to command the d ivision, and it was authorized Iwo brigadier ge nerals,
the assistant division com mander and the artillery commander. Reg imental commanders remained colone l5.47
A controversial area that a rrected development of Ihe wbles for the in fantry
divi sion was the postwar battlefield's greater depth and breadth, which increased
Ihe difficulty of conduct ing reconnaissance and intelligence collection. Ten ai rplanes had been assigned to the division arti llery in 1943 and an additional three
to the infantry regiments in 1945. In 1946 Army Grou nd Forces proposed assigning aircraO to the division headquartcrs and to lank and enginccr battalions. The
Army Staff endorscd thc add iti onal planes but wanted them poo lcd in one uni t,
except for those in the d ivision art illery. Opposit io n to that proposa l came from
thc Ar my Air Forces, w h ic h arg uc d tha t a ll air un i ts came u nde r their
juri sdiction.48 The Army countered that the National Securi ty Act of 1947 authorized it to organize, train, and cquip aviat ion resourccs for prompt and sustaincd
combat incident to opcrations on land.49 Nevert he less the tables provided no aviation unit, but ten planes were assigned to the d ivision arti llery and eight to the
d ivision headquarters company.so
Thc postwar armored division (Char, 24) retained the nex ible command structu re of the 1943 organization wit h three mediulll tank battal ions, th ree armored
infantry battalions, and three 105-1111ll. howitzer battalions, along wi th some significant changes. Army Ground Forces made the reserve command identica l to the tvro
existi ng combat commands, replaced the attached tank destroyer batta lion with a
hcavy lank battal ion, and added an antia ireraO art illery battalion, and a replacemcnt
company. Para lleling the infa ntry division, the mi litary police platoon was expanded to a company and the reconnaissance squadron was redesignated as a battalion.
A ISS-111m. self-prope lled howitzer battalion was added to give the d ivision 1110re
general support fire, and, in the division trai ns, the quartcrmastcr supply battal ion,
climi nated in 1943, was restored to transport fuel, provide bath and laundry fac il ities, and assume graves registration dut ies. Besides thc ficld artillery'S aircraft, ten
pillnes werc placcd in the div ision hcadquarters company to serve division and
combat command headquarters, the eng ineer battalion, and the reconnaissance battalion. The number of general ofl"icers was increased from two to three, a d ivision
commander and IwO combat comma nd com manders. The commanders of the
reserve command and the d ivision artil lery remained colonel billets.5t
Infantry and armored divisions were reorga nized between the fall of 1948
and the end of 1949. Most d ivisions, however, never attained their table of organization strengths prior 10 the Korcan Wa r. O nly the 1st Infantry Division in
Germany was authorized at ful l strcngth. Strengths in ot her Regu lar Army d ivisions fell between 55 and 80 percenl. In the Nati ona l Guard the strengt h of the
d ivisional elemen ts varied. wit h some un its being cu t by individuals, by crews
AN INTERL UDE OF PEAC E
229
(th e fi eld artillery batteries had fOllr rather than six g un crews), or by companies
(Ihe engineer battali on had three instead of fOllr line compani es and there was no
divisional replace ment company). St rengths in the Guard unit s ranged between
5,000 and 10,500 men of all ranks. The divisions of Ihe Organized Reserve Corps
rema ined either Class B or Class C units. 52
The development or the postwar ai rborne division took almost two years longer
than infantry and armored divisions. On 16 August 1946 Army Ground Forces forwarded to the General Staff an out line for an airborne division . It was an infantry
division with the addition of a pathfinder platoon and a parachute maintenance
company. The d ivision had approximately 19,000 jump-qualified o ffi ccrs and
en listed men and two sets of cqu ipment, one for air assault and the other for sustained combat. Eisenhower rejected the proposal because the unit could not be airtransported. He directed Army Ground I-o rces to prcparc an organization that could
be llloved by ex isting aircra ft. Ei senhowcr also rejected the resulti ng proposa l, but a
thi rd idea developed by thc Organiz.1tional and Training Division o f the General
Staff won acccptance. T he sta ff proposed an airborne division with two categories
of units, organic elements that could be airliftcd and attached ground units that
were to link up with them. To makc the unit air-transportable, the sta ff eliminated
heavy mortars and tanks from infantry regiments and restri cted the numbcr of howitzers in fie ld artil lery batteries to four. Thc attached units included two heavy tank
battalions, a 155-mm . howitzer battalion, a reconnaissance company, a mediulll
maintcnance company, and a quartermaster compa ny, wh ich totaled 2,580 o ffi cers
and enlisted men. Those units along with the division 's organic elements, which
numbered 16,470, made the division 's size approx imately the same as the Army
Ground Forces pro]>05..11. 53
With the proposed airborne division attempting to meet two competing needs,
strategic mobility and tactical sustainment, the General Staff decided to test it. The
82d Airborne Division (less one regimenta l combat team at Fort Benni ng) adopted
the new structu re on I January 1948. After the test, Army Field Forces (AF F), the
successor of Army Ground Forccs, recommended organizing the airborne division
in thc smne manner lIS an infantry d ivision. As organized for the test, the ai rborne
d ivision was not air-transportable. T he Army Staff, nevertheless, still sOllght a large
a irborne unit for stratcgic mobility. Therc fore, on 4 May 1949 the new Chie f of
Staff, General Omar Bradley, dirccted that the attached combat elements be made
organic to the di vision and that only 11,000 of its 17,500 men be ai rborne qualified.
The Department o f the Army published new tables (Chal" 25) mirroring these dec isions on I April 1950. Reorganization of Regular Army and Organized Reserve
Corps airborne divisions fo llowed shortly thereafter.54
The Stale 0.( Divisional Forces

While the Army dcvc loped and reorgan ized its postwar divis ions. it con tinued to maintain and redcploy its cx isting fo rces to meet chang ing internationa l
'C
0-
o>
"E
1
N
b2
:I:
Ajilla/ parade ill Gorizi(l, be/ore

,lie 88,h Divisioll dep(lrls, 1947;
below , 82d Airbol'l/e Di vision
,roops (II Ihe Nelli York Cily
ViC/OI ) 1parade, 1946.
232
situations. Wit h the ratification of the Italian peace treaty in the fall of 1947,
the Army inactivated the 88t h Infantry Division (less one infan try regiment,
which remained in Trieste) and, as noted, wit hdrew it s forces from Korea at the
end of 1948. To make room in Japan for the 7th Infantry Di vision, the 11th
Airborne Div ision, which had been stationed there since 1945, redeployed to
Fort Campbe ll , Ken tucky, where it was reorganized wi th on ly two of its three
regimental combat teams. The reduction of forces in Korea a lso resulted in the
inactivation of the 6th Inf<uHry Division.55
Four years aRer the end of World War II the number of Regular Army divisions had fall en to ten. Overseas Ihe 1st Infantry Division was scattered among
installations in Germany, while the 1st Cavalry Division and the 7t h, 24t h, and
25t h Infantry Divisions were stationed throughout Japan. In the Uni ted States the
2d Armored Division was split between Camp (later Fort) Hood, Texas, and Fort
Sill, Oklahoma. The 2d Infant ry Di vision W,IS based at Fort Lewis, Washington;
the 3d Infantry Division at Fort Benning , Georgia, and FOri Deven s,
Massachusetts; the II th Airborne Division (less one inactive regimental combat
tcam) at Fort Campbell, Kentucky ; and the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg,
North Ca rolina. The twen ty- five Organized Reserve Corps (lnd twellty-seven
National Guard divisions were at various leve ls ofread iness.
Initially overwhelmcd by the tidal wave of demobi lization afier World War II ,
the Army had struggled to rebuild both Regular Army and reserve divisions during the late 1940s. Its ncw divisional strllctures were based on combat experiences during the war, under the assumption Ihal atomic weapons would not alter
Ihe nature of g round combat. Uni ts previollsly attached to divisions from higher
headquarters during combat were made organic to divisions, which al so received
additional firepowcr. Although thc postwar divisions or the era wcre not rully prepared for combat becau se they were not properly manned and equipped, they
nonetheless represe nted an unprecedented peacetime rorce in the Army of the
United States, reflecting the new Sov iet-American tensions.
233
Notes
1 Disposition Form (DF). AG F 10 Cors. USA, 22 Jut 46, sub: New Infantry and Armored
Divisions, Appll, AO F/AG 322 Divisions. case 100. RG 337. NARA.
2 Sparrow, /liS/VI)' of PersOllnel Ikmubi!i:aliOIl, pp. 229- 30.
3 Willi1ll11 W. Epley, All/erica's First Cold Wa/' Army. 1945- 1950 (A rl ington. Va.: Institute of
Land Warfare, Association orthe U.S. Anny, 1993), p. 4; Llr, AOF to CO, Second Army, ) 1 Aug
46, slIb: Inactivation o f 51h l nf,lrllry Division, 322/ 107 (5th InfOi \l) (31 Aug 46), and lIr, TAG [0
U.S. Forccs. European Theater, 13 Feb 47, sub: Inactivation of Uni ts, AOAO-[ 322 ( 13 Feb 47)-M,
both AG Reference fi les. DAM H HSO; lIr, TAG \0 U.S. Forces, Eu ropea n Theater, 6 May 46,
sub: InaCliv(l[ion of Units, AG 322 (29 Apr 46) AO-I-E-M. 42<1 Inf Div file. and Llr. TAG 10 CinCo
Far East. 30 Dec 46. sub: Ac tivation, Inactivlltion. Reorgani;wtion Ilnd Redcsigll:ltion of Certain
Uni ts in the !'acific Theater, AG 322 (13 Dec 46) AO-I-WDGOT-M, 86th In f Div file. both
o AMH-i'lSO; AHssioll Accomplish,'(I: Thinl Ullile(1 Slates Art")' OcCllpllliOIl 0/ GertlulI/y. 9 M(IY
1945- 15 FC'lmlfll), 1947 (n.p., 1947), p. 23.
4 Emest N. llannon, "U.S. Constabulary," Armore(1 C(ll'{tfry.lollnla/55 (Sell- Oct 1946): 16;
James M. Snyder. The E!}lablislllllelll (11/(/ Op el'll/iolls of Ihe
COIlswlmlary ( Frankfurt,
Gennany: Historical Sub-Section. G- 3, U.S. Constabulary, 1947), Ilil. 52- 59; Ltr, TAG to CG, U.S.
Forces, European T heater. 17 Jun 46, sub: Reconst itution. Redesignation. Reo rganization,
Activation and Assignment of Units for Constabula ry Force in Europe, AG 322 (II Jun 46) AG-I
GNGCT-M. 4th Am1d Oiv file. oAM H-HSO.
5 James F. Schnabel. 1)01iC)1(jllfl DircctiOIl: 'i11C Finl l'lmr, Uni ted St~ltes Am1y in the Korean
War (Washington, o .c.: Government Printing Office, 1972). PI). 6- 12; LIT. TAO 10 COs, BOSlon.
New York and olher ports ofemb.1rkation. 7 Jan 46, sub: Inactivation of Certain Anny Air. Oround
and Scrvicc Forces Type Units, AO 322 (4 Jan 47) OB-I-SPMOUM. 40th Inf Div file, Llr, TAG to
CinCo Far Eas!. 24 Jan 49. sub: Inactivation of Certain Units in FECOM, AGAO-1322 (31 Dec 48)
CSGOT (Organizalion and Training Division. General Stafl).M. 6th Inf oiv file, and AGAZ 373,
Historical Data Cards, 6th. 7th, and 40th In f Oivs, all oAMH-Il S0; HisfOlY of lIte 7111 llIfillll/'y
(BaYOIlCI OMS/Oil) (Tokyo. J ~llllln: o ai Nippon Printi ng Co" 1967), 110 pagination.
6 John I'. Delancy, The Illi,e f)CI'i1.~ ill fllIly: A /JiSIQ/)' of Ihc 88,,, II/filllfl)' Dil'isioll ill World
"'tII'/I (Washington, D.C.: Inrantry Joumal Press, 1947), p. 275; Wrigh t, The lsI ClIw/lry Dil'isioll
hI /l'orM Wa/' II, p. 206: Llr, TAO to CG. Second Am1Y, 26 Sep46, sub: Reorganiz.1tion of Ihe 3d
Inf.1ntry Di\'ision, AG 322 (20 SCI' 46) AOI-ONGCT-M, 3d Info;v file, oAMH. HSO; George C,
Ma rshall, Rem,lrks by the Sccretn ry of o efcnse nt the Na tio nal Prep nr edne~s Orientation
Conferencc, 30 Nov 50. Marshalll'apcrs.
7 WD Bull 19, 1945: Ltr, TAG to C inC, US Army Forces, Pacific, 26 Mar 46, sub:
Constitution, Ac tivation, Inactivation. oisb.1ndment, Reorganiza tion and Redesigna tion of Certain
Philippine Scout Uni ts, AG 322 (19 Mar 46) O B- IGNGCTM, 5th Ind. U.S, Army Forces,
Western Pacific, 10 CinC, Anny Forces, Pacific, 20 A.ug 46. 12th Infoiv file, oAMH-HSO.
8 Ltr, TAG to CinC. US Army Forces, I'aci lic, 26 Mur 46, sub: Constitulion, Activation,
Inacliva tion, Disbandmcnt. Reorganization and Redesignation o f Certain Philippine SCOUI Units:
SemiAml/wl Report; U.S. Army Forces lI'estel'll Pacific. / )ml- JO)IIII 46, p. 33: Robert R. Smith,
"The Status of Members of the Philippine Military Forces During World War II ," Ms, PI'. 45-47,
Refcrence Papcr files, Philippine Scouts, DAMH-I-ISO: "Philippine Scouts," MilittllJI Rel'iell' 29
(Jul 1949): 72; Ll r, TAG to CinC, Far Eas t. 29 Apr 4 7, sub: Reorganization, A.ssignment and
Inactivation of Certain Uni ts in Ihe Far East Command, AGAO I 322 (28 Mar 47) WOGOT-M, and
OF, TAO to lI istorical Di\'ision, WO Specinl Sta ff, sub: Shoulder Siceve Insignia, Ph ilippineRyukyus Command, 27 Aug 47, AOAO[ 42 1.4 (30 Apr 47), both 12th Infoiv file, oAM H I-ISO.
9 Joseph Rockis, " Rcorgani7A1tion of AGF During Demobil;zulion," Demobil ization Scries,
Stud y No.3 ( Historical Section, Am1y Ground Forces, 1948), pp. 36-46. oAM11-HSR.
10 Ibid.; Fir.~1 Reporl o/Ihe Sec/'CUII)' o/Ifi.jellse. 1948. pp. 60-63: Strength RejXlrts of Ihe
A1l11Y, I Jml 1948, pp. 4- 6,
u.s.
234
11 Missioll AccomplMlI!d. p. 23; James M. Gavin. all 10 BCI'IiIl, p. 295; 55, WOOOT 10 ColS.
27 Aug 46, sub: Regu lar AmlY Divisions to be RClaincd in the l'osllVar AnJI Y, 27 Aug 46, WDGOT
322 (26 Jlln 46), 1st Cay Div file, DJ\MII-II SO.
12 Statetllent by th e CotS. Approved WD Policies Relati ng to PosllVnr National Guard and
Organized Reserve. 13 OcI4S. Reference I'U IlCT files, AmlY Reserve, DA MH- HSO: S5, WDGOT
to ColS, sub: Regular Anny Di visions to be Retai ned in the I'ost\\,ar AmIY, 27 Aug 46; Memo,
WDGOT for Assistant Dep uty Cors, same suhjt'Cl, 30 Scp46, W DGDT 322 (26 Jun 46), 151 CaY
D iv file, DA MI-I-I-ISO.
13 LIT, TAO 10 C inCo Fa r E.1St, 14 M3T 49, sub: Redcsigllation and Reorgani7.8lion of the 151
Cavalry Division, Special. AGAO-l 322 (28 Feb 49) GCSGOTM (Ge nernl and Special Staffs, U.S.
Anny, Organi"llltion lLild Trni ning Divis ion), lst Cav Div file: Ltr, TAG to CG, Armies. Zone of the
Interior (ZI), 25 Jun 48, sub: Activation and Rcorgani ....ation ofCenain Divisions (Trnining), AGAO I
322 ( 18 Jun 48) CSGOT.M, 10th Mt Div file: Ltr, TAGO to TAG, 27 Jun 49. sub: Designation ofthc
25th In fantry Division as Reg ular Army. AGAO-I (27 Jun 49).M, 25th InfOiv fil e; and Ltr, TAGO to
TAG. 15 Nov 48, sub: Designation o f the 11th and 82d Airborne Divisions as Regular Anny. AGAO
1322 (15 Nov 48). 82d Abu Div file, all AG Reference fil es, DAMI I IISO.
t4 Memo. AG F for chi efs a ll staff sections, 6 Ma r 48, sub: Interrelati ons between professional
and non.profess iona l person nel in th e arm e d forces o f a democ rat ic s tat e, GNGSE (AGF
Secretari at) 300.6 (6 Mar 48). National Guard, Reference Paper files, DAM H ]-I SO.
15 Ibid.; Merna, Anny Servi ce Forees for Corso 4 Aug 44. sub: Appoi ntment of Committee
under Section 5 of the Na tional Defense A<.;t o f 1916, as amended. Memo. OCS for G- I, G-2. G- 3,
G-4, 0 1'0. 3 Oct 44, su b: Committee to st udy policies a ffectin g the Officers' Rc.."SCrve Corps. the
Organized Reserve Corps. and the Enl isted Reserve Corps, and Memo, OCS for Cors. 21 Sep 44,
sub: Recommended War Depa rtmcnt Policies for the Post War Na ti onal Gua rd and Organized
Reserve Corps, all Nat ional Guard Refe rence Paper fil es. DAMII HSO.
t6 The 1920 amendments to the National Defense Act designated the third com ponent of the
Army lIS the Organized Rese rves, but in all post.World War 11 plan ni ng documen ts the tenn
Organized Reserve Corps was used and it was offi ciall y adopt ed in 1948. Therefore. to be eo nsislent with the planning documents. the tern1 Organized Reserve Corps is used hereafter.
17 Stat ement, App roved W D I'olicies Re lating to Postwar Nat ional Guard and Organized
Reserve, 13 Oct 45.
18 Memo, W!XiCT for CotS. 2 Nov 45. sub: National Guard T roop Basi s. WDGCT 320
Troop Basis (2 Nov 45). National Guard. Reference PallCr files, DAMH HSO; RelJOI"f o/Ihl! Cltie/
o/Ilte Nt/liollal GI/t/rd Ill/refill, 1946. PI' . 324- 76: Natio ll lll Gua rd T roop Basis and Troop
Allotmen ts, I Sep 46, National Guard. Reference Paper liles, DAMH -HSO: L1r. See of War to W,
G. Andrews, House of RcpfCsentatives. 13 May 46, and OF, Chief, NGB, to TAG, 26 Jun 46. sub:
Numeri ca l Designat ion, 325.4-42 Div 3, AG 322 file. RG 407. NA RA: Ltr, TAG toCG. AGF. and
Chief, NG B. 17 Sep 46. sub: Allotment of 42d Infantry Divis ion to the National Guard, AG 322
( 17 Sep 46) AG- IW DSNG-M (National Gua rd Bureau, WD Special Staff). 42d Inf Di" file,
DAM II IISO.
t9 RcpoI'1 o/fhe Chitioffhl! Nmiol/a/ GI/ard IllII"CUl/. 1946. pp. 11 0- 11 .
20 Memo, NG B for Chief. BiSlorical Section. A WC, 18 Apr 46. sub: Co ntinuit y of History of
the National Guard Units, WDNGR (National Guard Register. WO) 3 14.7 Gen.23 ( 18 Apr 46),
NGB C ir 9. 1932. and Memo, Historical Section, A WC. for Col. E. Colby. National Gu~rd Bureau.
19 Apr 46. all National Guard, Pol icy and I' rccooence liles, DAMIIHSO.
2t Draft agreement between the States of Gcorgia. South Carol ina, and Florida. undated. and
Ltr. Florida Natio nal Guard (FNG) to Ch ief. NG B, 25 Feb 59. sub: Reorganization of 48th
Amlored Division. FNG- IO. both 481h Anlltl Div file, DAMII IISO.
22 L1r, AGF to CGs First. Second. Founh. Fifth, Sixth. and Seventh AIll1ies and other address
es. 6 Jun 46, sub: Trnining and Admi nistration of the Civilian Components. Incl I, AGF plan for
the National Guard of the U.S . 6 JUl1 46, 326/2 15 (6 Jun 46) GNGCT II, AGF PI. 1. RG 3 19,
NARA; sec National Guard Fedeml Recognit ion Reports. 1946-47. Na tional Guard Geneml files.
DAM I IIISO: RI'/JOI"f o/"//! Chief lite of Nl/I;Oll/l1 Gill/I'd Hl/rl!(III, 1947. p. 73.
AN INT ERL UDE DF PEACE
235
23 Repor, o/fhe Chief ofthe N(lIiolluf GI/Clrrl B"reml, 194 7, pp. 8- 10.
24 Statement. Approved WD Policics Relatin g 10 the POSllvar NO and ORC, 13 Oct 45; LIT.
AOF 10
First. Second, Fourth. Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Armies and olher addresses. 6 JUIl
46. sub: Training and Adminis trat ion of th e Civi lian Components, Incl 3, AOF Plan for the
cas,
Organized Reserve Corps; Richard O. Crossland and
JalllCS
T. Currie, Twice the Cili:ell: II
His/or)' of the Ullitcd Siaies Arm)' Resene. 1908- /983 (Washington. D.C.: Government I'rinting
Omec, 1984), p. 86.
25 Memo. \V DSS I' (Special Planning Division, Gcncml and Special Staffs). for AColS. 0 - 3,
14 Mar 46. sub: Class A UllilS. Organized Reserve Corps, and Memo, WD Gell Siaff, Org:U1i za ti oll
and Training Divis ion , ror a ll WD Agencies, 20 Dee 46, sub: Clarification or WD Pol icies
Pertaining to the National Guard and the Organized Reserve Corps, WDGOT 325 (9 Oct 46), both
Amly Reserve, Rererence Paper files, DAM H-HSO.
26 Ltr. AGF 10 CGs, First and Second Armies, and other addresses, 6 Jun 46, sub: Training
and Administration of Ciyilian Componen ts, Incl 3, AGF I'lan for the Organized Reserve Corps;
WD Cir 138, 1946; C. T . Tench, "The New Organization." II/filllll )' JOIlrl/al 59 (Jul 46): 18- 22.
27 Ur, AGF to CGs. First and Second Annies, and other addresses, 6 Jun 46, sub: Training and
Administrmion of Civilian Components, Incl 3. Plan for Ihe Organized Heserve Corps: see author'S
notes lor activation da lf.:s of ORC diy isions, which arc based on unit divisional file s in DAM II-IISO.
28 "Our Floundering Anny Reserve Program," Hesen 'C Officer 25 (Jul 1948): 4-6ff.
29 AGF map showing location of division headquarters and states 10 which di vis ion ha ve been
allol1ed, 27 Apr 47, Anny Reserve Reference Paper files, DAMH-HSO: WD C ir 124, 1946.
30 Ltr, TAG to CG, Sixt h Arm y, 8 Aug 47, sub: Inactivation and Assignment of 19th Armored
Divisio n and Assiglltllent and Aetivalion of 13th Armored Di yisioll, AGAO- I ]22 (31 Jul 47)
GNGCf-M, 13th Anlld Di v file , DAM H-I-ISO; Assembly Joint Resolution No. 38 Relative to the
perpet uat ion of the 13th AmlOred Division to this State, Cit. 191. 571h &ss. Cali/orllia Slale
Legislalllre, 131h Armd Div file , DAM H- HSO: 8iellllial Heporl of Ihe Adjil/lllll Gell eral.
Coli/omi(/. 1947- 1948. p. II. and GO 56. Adjutant General of California, 1947, reprinted in the
report, pp. 72- 73.
31 Llr, Michael S. Davison 10 aut hor, 13 Feb 78: Ltr, TAG to CG. U.S. Amly Cnribbean, 25
Mar 48, sub: Acti vation of Units or the Organized Reserves, AGAO-322 Org Res (8 Feb 48)
GSCOT-M, L1r, CG, U.S. AmlY Cnribbcan to TAG, 21 Aug 50, su b: Jrmclivnlion or ORe TOE
Un its not included in the New ORC troopl'rograill. AG 326 (CG), and Ltr. TAG to CG. U.S. Amly
Caribbean, 27 Sep 50. sub: Inactivat ion of Units of the Organized Reserve, AGAO- I Org Res (21
Aug 50) G- 3- M, all l06th InfDi y liIe, DAM ~I - H SO.
32 Allllllal Repor' of Ille SecrCIW)' oflile Army. 1948, pp. 34-35; Joint AmlY and Air Foree
Bull No.9. 1948 (i n 1948 and 1949 the Departments oflhe Army and Air Foree jointly published
bulletins).
3J Llr, TAG to CGs, First. Second , Third, and Sixth Amlies, 8 Ju14 7, sub: Discontinua nce of
Replacement Training Centers and Activa tion or the 3d Annored and the 4th, 5th, and 9th Infantry
Divisions, AGAO- I 322 (10 Jun 47), GNGCf-M, 3d Anlld Div file , DAM II-IISO: C. D. Dunlap,
Jr .. "The Third Armored Training Divisio n," Ar/l/ored C(lI'ally JO/l/"lwl 57 (Jul- Aug 48): 26- 29;
Llr, TAG to CG, Annies. Z I. 25 Jun 48, sub: Ac ti vat ion and Reorga ni7.l1tion of Certain Division
(Trai nin g), AGAO- 1322 ( 18 lun 48) CSGOT-M, 3d Amw Di y liIe, DAMII HSO: also sec the unit
files of 3d and 51h Annored. the 4th. 5th. 91h, and 10th InC and the 17th and 10 Ist Abn Divs in
DAMH-IISO.
3~ Genemll3omd. "Types of Divisions Postwllr Am,y," Rpl 17. U.s. Forces, ETO.
3S Ge neral BO.1fd, "The Infantry Division." Rpt 15, U.S. Forces, ETO.
36 [bid.
31 Ibid.
3H Gene ral Board, "Organi zation, Equipmcnt, and Tactica l Employment of th e Airborne
Division," Rpt 16, U.S. Forecs, ETO.
39 Genera l Board. "Organ ization, Equipment, and Tacti cal Employment of Ihe Armored
Divis ion:' Rpt48, U.S. Forces, ETO.
236
M ANEUVE R AND FIREPOWER

40 DF,I\GF to CofS, 22 Jul 46, sub: New Ini:U1t ry and Armored Di visions, Apl>cndix 11 .
41 The Chief ofSlafT's Advisory Group. esta blished in May 1946. consisted ofscnior officers
who advised him on matters pertaining \0 the Army's long-I'lmge program. U Gell Wade H.
Haislip; Maj Gens Gilbert Cook (who had wrjllcn the 1935 memorandUIll to General emig ndllo-
eating the studies that rcsultt-d in the triangular division). Alexander D. Surles, and I-Ioward M.
Snyder; and Elrig Gen William E. lIali made up the group. Memo. OCS for COs, AAF. AGF. AS F,
and olher addresses, 8 May 46, oes (1946) )34 "1\," RG 165, NARA.
42 Memo. Deors for CofS's Advisory Grou p. 10 SCI' 46, no subject. WDeSA 322 (6 Aug 46).
ocs ( 1946) 334 "A," RG 165, NARA.
43 Memo. Lt Gell Hais lip \0 Deal'S, 13 Sep 46, no su bjlXt, OCS ( 1946) 334 "A," RG 16S,
NAKA,
44 Memo, Acting Cors for Generals Stilwell, Bradley, Wlllker, Eddy, and Griswold, 24 Sep
46. no su bjlXt, Memo, Omar N, Bmdley to Gen Thomas T. I-lan dy, 6 Nov 46, sub: Comments on
proposed di visional organization for Infantry and Anllored Divisions, Memo, Lt Gen Walton H.
Walker to Gen Handy, 29 Oct 46, no subject. Lt r, Lt Gen O. W. Griswold to General 11andy. 3 Oct
46, no subject. Memo. Maj Gen Louis A. Craig for Anny Commander. 27 Sep 46, no subjlXt,
WDeSA 332 file, and Llr, C. 1'. I-I all 10 CG. AGF, 22 Nov 46, sub: Types of Divisions in the
Postwar Anlly (Anllored and Infantry). WDOOT 370.01 (22 Nov 46), G- 3 (1946) 370.01, vol. 3.
all RG 165. NARA.
45 In 1947 Congress established the Department of Defense comprising the DeplIrtrnents of the
AmlY. Navy, and Air Foree. The War Departmcnt was pcrpchmlcd by the Department oflhe ArIllY.
46 TOE 7 N. Infantry Division. 1948.
47 [bid.; Ltr. AGF 10 CGs, First. Second. Fourth. Fillh. Sixth. lind Seventh Annies and other
addresses. 28 Feb 4 7, sub: Charts for New Infantry Division. 32211 01 (Divs) (28 Feb 47) GNGCT711436S, Division Gelleral file. DAMH-11S0: DA C ir 47. 1947: ''The Division Rcplacement
Comp.1ny," 11/flm/lJ' School QlllIrlcrly 33 (Oct 48): 67- 74.
48 Llr, AOF to Dir ofOrganizHlion and Training. WoGS. 161un 47, slIb: I-Ieadquaners and
1-leadqulIrters Company Ncw Divisions ( [nfantry and Annored). wi th [st. 2d. and 3d [nds. 322
(Divs) (16 lun 4 7) GNGCT- 71 - S066. and Memo. Organiz.1tion and Training Division, Gencral
StalT, for Orig Gen Benjamin F. CalTey. 31 Oct 47, sub: Liaison Aireraft in New Divisions TOEs.
with Bolte's hand wril1cn comments, 3 Nov 47, AFG/AG 322 Divisions, case 100, RG 337,
NAKA; Wilson B. I'owcll. "Army Ground Force During th e Demobilization I'criod,"
Demobilization Series. Stud y 4 ( Historical Sect ion. Army Ground Forces. undated). I). 149.
DAMI I-IISR.
49 Kcnneth W. Condit, The Joilll Chiefs ojSlajJ(/IId NaI;ol/ol l~olic)', 1955- 1956. voL 6.
I-listory of the 101m Chicfs ofSta rr(Washington. D.C.: Govemrnent Printing Omce, 1992). p.n.
50 TOE 7 N, Infantry Division. [948.
51 Llr. AGF to CGs. Firs\, Second, Fourth. Fifth. Si;l(th. and Seventh Armies and other
addresses, 13 Mar 47. sub: Charts for New Armorcd Divis ion, 3221101 (Divs) ( 13 Mar 47)
GNGCT- 71-4556, Division Generallile. DAMH-IIS0: TOE 17, Annorcd Divis ion, 1948; lames
L King and Melvin A. Goers. "Modem Annored Cavnlry Organi z'llion," Armored GII"lIIIyJOIIl"llal
57 (Jul- Aug 1948): 47- S0.
52 See AG lcllers of illstnJetioll. "Reorganization of Regular Anny Divisions. 1948- 1949,"
and " Rcorganizntion ofORC Divisions, 1949." author'S file~: also see division files. DAMH-HSO;
" The Ncw T/O- Greater Firepower, Greatcr Strength," Nationa[ Guardsman 2 (Nov 48): 2S;
Report of fhe Chief of fIll! NaI;ollal Gllanl BurC'lll/. 1949, pp. 3. 29, and 109: l'rogmm Review and
Analysis Division, COml)tro)[Cr of the AmlY, TIle Tro<J{J Progmm (IIIlI Tl'Oop Li$/: 1~lIn (fl, Arm)'
ResC'/,\'C' ESllIbfishmC'lIl, I lun SO, CM U Library,
53 DF, \VD Dir Organizati on and Training. to CG AGF, 26 Aug 46. sub: Orglmization or thc
Airbomc Division. 322 (Div) (26 Aug 46- ONGPS. AGF/AG 322 Div. Case 100, RG 337, NARA;
oona[d T. Kcllctl and William Friedman. "Airborne On Parler Wings," I'"rt I, IlIfmlll)' JOIWIIIII 62
(May 1948): 9- 14, Part 11 (lu n 1948): 30-33; Powell. "AGF During the Demobilization Period:' p.
ISO: Llr. AGF to CGs First. Second, Third, Founh. Fifth. and Si;l(th Amlics and other addresses, 16
AN INTERLUDEQFPEACE
237
Oct 47. sub: Charts for New Airbomc Division, ]221 101 (1)1\'s) (16 Oct 47) GNOCT- 71- 5521.
Division Gc ncral lilc. OAM H-IIS0.
Sol Annual History, Office, Chief of Anny Field Forces (OCAFF). I J,Ul 1949 31 Dec 1949,
Ch. 8. Ill). 4- 6, Manuscript Collection, DAM II-IISR; TOE 71, Airborne Division. I Apr 1950: LIT.
TAG to COs. Z I, 19 May 50. sub: Rcorgnnizlllioll of Organized Reserve Ai rborne Divisions.
AOAO- I-322 (O R Res) (24 M,IT 50) G 3 lvi , UT. TAO to CO, Second ArI11Y, 14 Jun 50, sub:
Rcorgllniz(llion of the lllh Airborne Division, AOAO-I 322 111h Abu Diy (3 1 MOlY) G- I- M, :Ind
LIT, TAG to CO, Thi rd Army, 12 Jun 50, sub: Reorganization orthe 82J Airborne Division.
AOAO-I 322 82d Abn OJ,, (25 May 50) G I- M. all AG Reference files an d airborne div isions
fi les. DAM II -II SO.
55 Ur, TAG to CG, USAF in the Mediterranean T heater of Openllions, 12 Nov 47. sub:
In"ClivRtion of Unils. AGAO- I 322 ( 12 Nov 47)- M. Ltr. TAG 10 CG. Second Anny. 10 Mar 49,
sub: Reorganization of the II th Airborne Division, AGAO- I 322 II th Abn Div (12 Feb 49)
CSGOTM. Ur. TAG 10 CinC, Far Easl, 24 Jan 49, sub: Inaclivntion ofCertnin Units in FECOM.
AGAO-I 322 (31 Dcc 48) CSGOTM, and Llr, TAG to Ci nC, Far E~I SI, 22 J ul 49. sub:
Reorg,m iznlion of Certa in Inf:ul1ry Divisions, AGAOI 322 (22 Ju149) M. all AG Reference files,
and AGAZ 373 HistoriC'11 Datn Cnrds, 6th, 7th, and 88th Infantry Divisions mid I 11h Airborne
Division. div ision fi les, all DAM IIII SO.
CHAPTER 9
The Korean War and Its Aftermath

lib; apparellf ,ha( the Ullifell Stales is reqllired 10 iI/crease ill' mililmy strellg,h lIlIt!
prcp(/l'ellllCSs 1101 ollly 10 dealll'ith Ihe aggressiol/ ill Korell but (I/SO (0 incr ease 0"1" COII/ 111011 tie/elise. willi olher/ree /la/iOIlS, against fWlher aggressioll.
President I-larry S. Tnunan l
In Ju ne 1950, when a Soviet trained and armed North Korean army attacked
South Korea, the Cold War turned hot. The U.S . Army was forced to adopt emergency ex pedients during the first months of the war, but the ma intenance of a signi ficant mi li tary sustaining base a ner World War II , a respon se to SovietAmerican tensions, allowed the natio n to mobilize morc quickly and easily than
in the past. Within a year and a ha lf the number o f Army combat divisions on
active duty went from ten to twen ty. The Army, reacting to chang ing politica l,
strategic, and operational requirements worldwide, for the first time in its hi story
reassessed its reserve forces during a major war. Neverthe less, the end of the
fi g hting in Korea brought new reductions, whi ch resulted in fewer Army div isions by the end of the decade than during the war.
Deployment oj Forces to Korea

Th e invasion of Soulh Ko rea on 25 June 1950 ex posed a ho ll ow A rmy.
Div isio ns in Japa n we re compl e tin g a reorgani zat io n that re n ected g reat ly
reduced manning and equipment levels. The 1st Cava lry Di vision and the 7th ,
24th , and 25 th In fantry Divisions all lacked reconnai ssance, m ilitary poli ce,
and rcplacemcnt compani es, medi cal detac hment s, and bands. Their infa nt ry
reg iments were each short o ne battal ion and the tank company, and the 105mill . howit zer battalion s had only two firin g batt eries . Only on e co mpany o r
battery was fill ed in the tank and antillircra fl arti llery batta li ons. Tank companies we re equi pped with the M24 lig ht tank because the Far East Command had
fell red that heavier tanks would damage Japanese roads and bridges . The one
except ion was the 25 th Infa ntry Di vis ion, whi c h fie lded a black regimental
combat team buill around the 24th In fantry. In that team the infantry reg iment
and th e fi eld arti llery battalio n had all their clements, but at reduced level s. The
aut hori zed strengths o f the di visions ranged between 12,500 and 13,650 01Tieel'S and enlisted men)
240
Although the divisions fell well below war levels, President I-larry S. Truman
responded to the United Nations resolution to stop aggression in SOllth Korea by
ordering troops to Korea on 30 Junc. T he next day Task Force Smith, elements of
the 24th Infantry Div ision , the closest to Korea at Kobura, Japan, deployed to
Suwon, South Korea , by air. The rest of the division qu ickly followed by sea.
Shortly a n er the 24th's departure. the Far Eas t Co mmand brought the 25th
Infantry Di vision and the 1st Cavalry Divis ion to some semblance of effective
fighting strength by sl'ripping the 7th Infantry Division. By the end o f Ju ly both
d ivisions had joi ned in the rig ht, w ith the almost totally gu tted 7th Division
remaining in Japan)
As the three underst rengt h div isions fought in Korea, the Army Staff set
about to bring them to Full strength, along with the 7th Infantry Division in Japan .
Personnel were involuntarily extended, and the length of their overseas tours was
increased. Other commands were cannibalized for units, personnel, and equipment. Particularly scarce in the Far East Command were tanks and antia ircraft
arti llery. Because a ll the div isional tank and antiaircraft artillery battal ions there
had been reduced to a company or battery, replacement units had to corne from
the United States . Wit h the divisions in Korea taki ng heavy casualties and the
replacement system on the verge of bank ru ptcy, several mon ths elapsed be fore
the units neared war levels .4
Heavy losses and the amount of time required for units and personnel to
reach the Orient resulted in an agreement on 15 August between the Far East
Command and the South Korean govern ment fo r the temporary assignment of
Korean nationals to U.S. Army units. Under the Korean Augmentation to the
United States Army ( KATUSA) program , approximately 8,600 Koreans were to
serve in each American division as sold iers. Various barriers- language, cul tural
d ifferences, in adequate train ing, and unfamilia rity wi th Army organiza tion,
weapons, and tactics- hinde red the program from achieving its goal. A few
months after the plan's inception, the command curtai led it because of improvements in the replacement system and the desire to concentrate on rebuilding the
Republic of Korea Army. Although U.S. divisions continued to rece ive some
Korean recruits, no d ivision received the 8,600 initially envisaged.S
With United Nations troops being overwhelmed in South Korea, General
Douglas MacA rthur, the United Nations Forces commander, requested immediate
reinforcemen ts from the Un ited States. In July he asked for the 21 Infan try
Di vis ion, stationed at Fort Lewis; a regimental combat team from the 82d
Airborne Division at Fort Bragg; and some sma ller units. Army Chief of Staff
General J. Lawton Co llins refused to send a regimental combat team from the 82d
Airborne Div ision , preferring to keep the d ivision intact for other contingencies.
Instead, he favored dispatching a team from the 11th Airborne Division at Fort
Campbell built around the 187th Airborne Infan try. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
obtai ned Presiden t Truman's approval for the moves on 9 July, but many units in
the Uni ted States had to be stripped to fill the 2d Di vision before it could deploy.
THE KOREAN WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH
2d Il/filllll)1 Dil/;sioll elements II/OW! through
(I
241
1I/0/l/lW;II I)(ISS SO/II11 of WOII}II,
Korea, /951 .
Elements of the 2d arrived in Korea on 3 1 July, and the division entered combat
in late August. The 187th did not arrive unt il Octobcr.6
The arrival of the 2d In fan try Di vis ion in Korea allowed Lt. Gen. Walton 1-1 .
Walker, comma nd ing the Eighth Army there , to withdraw the 24th Infantry
Division from combat aiong the Naklong River. Due to the heavy losses sustained
by the division, Walker decided to transfer all personnel and equipment from the
341 h Infantry and the 63d Field Artillery Battalion to ot her units in the divis ion,
replacing them wit h the 5th Regimental Combat Team (organ ized around Ihe 5t h
Infantry), which had recently arrived from Hawaii. Wi th the infusion , the division
was ready for combat agai n by the end of August. Subsequently the 34 th Infant ry
and 63d Field Artillery 8allalion returned to Japan, where they were reorga nized
to train replacements.7
In A ug ust 1950 MacA rt hur plan ned an amphibio us assau lt at In chon,
Korea, Ihat would include the 7t h Infan try Div ision , the o nly U.S. Army di vi
sion left in Japan. To replace it in hi s reserve, hc requested deploymc nt of the
3d Infantry Di vision, the lasl Regu lar Army infantry d ivis ion in the Un it ed
States. After much debate in Washington, Truman sanctioned its deployment.
Sinee a large portion of its personnel and equipment had been wit hdrawn carli
242
er to meet other demands in Korea , the 3d Di vision had fewer than 5,000 men.
To address the personnel probl em, the division commander reass ig ned the personnel from one of its reg im ental combat team s and one general support fie ld
artill ery battalion elsewhere in the di vision . At the same time, the Army StafT
assigned two field artillery battalions and attached the 65 th Infantry, the Puerto
Ri ca n reg im ent , to the division . The 3d Infantry Di vision arrived in Japan on 15
September, except for the 65th Infan try, which had moved direct ly to Korea
from Camp Losey, Puerto Rico. In Japan the di vision rece ived a Korean augmentation and began to tra in fo r combat. As e le me nts of the 3d arri ved in
Japan, elemen ts of the 7th Infantry Divisi on landed at Inchon. Following the
Chin ese int erve ntion in the wa r durin g the fal l of 1950 , the 3d Infantry
Division al so moved to Korea where the 65 th Infantry joined it. 8
The attachment of the 65th In fa ntry to the 3d Infantry Div ision ma rked a
dcparture in the Army's segregation policies. In the pa st nati ve Puerto Ri cans
were assigned exclusively to Puerto Rican units. In September 195 1 the only
units in whi ch Puerto Ri cans could serve outside the Cari bbean area were elemen ts of the 65th Regimental Combat Tea m in Korea. However, si nce more
Puerto Ricans had e ntered the Army than were needed for these segregat ed
Spanish-speaking units, the Army removed all restri ctions on the assignments of
Puerto Ricans who spoke English.9
The first few months of the war the Army relied on stopgap measures to fie ld
its six undermanned divi sion s in Korea but was still able to evolve a strategy for
co ndu ctin g the war. Under Mac Arthur, a strat egy of att rition wa s qui c kly
replaced by a strategy of annihilation. When the Chinese entered the war in the
fall of 1950 the United Nations reverted to an attrition strategy, but one which
depended on firepower rather than manpower. No major reinforcements would be
provided to the forces in Korea. Although limited manpower mobi lization in the
Uni ted States solved many personnel problems in the Fa r Easl Command, divisions continued to lack trained infantry and artillery troops. After the United
Nations spring counteroffensive, which ended on 8 July 1951, negotiations began
for an armi stice, with the number of Army di vision s in Korea rema in ing fixed at
six unti l the summer of 1953.10
Rebuilding the General Reserve

To fiel d the divisions dest in ed for Korea, the Army stripped the Genera l
Reserve of its resources. After the summer o f 1950 it s di visional unit s consisted
of only the understrength 2d Armored Division, the partia lly organi zed 11th
Airborne Di vision , and, c losest to its wartime authori zed streng th , the 82d
Ai rborne Division . The reserve had to be qui ckly rebuilt for other conti ngenc ies, partic ularly for Western Europe, whe re many nat ional lcaders feared a
major c hall enge from the Sov iet Uni o n. In July defense official s began discllssi ng the means for enl arging the Army, but many months passed before they
THE KOREAN WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH
243
decided upo n a program. [n the meantime, the Army ex panded piecemeal.

Secretary of Defense Lou is Johnson approved the activat ion of another infantry
d ivision on 14 July 1950, but it was not until October that the 4th Infantry
Division, which had been serving as a training division at Fort Ord, moved to
ForI Benning to be reorganized as a combat unit. The Army Staff expected the
division to be trained by the latc spring of \951.1 t
Because it would have taken 100 much l ime to organize new Regular Army
divisions and Class B Organized Reserve Corps di visions (officers and enlisted
cadre), the Army's leadership decided to recommend bri nging some undcrstrcngth
Nationa l Guard divisions into federal service. On 10 August the president approved
inducting four Guard infantry divisions. To accommodate them, the Army reactivat
cd four World War [I camps, and early in September the 28th (Pennsylvania), 40th
(Cali forni a), 43d (Connecticut, Rhode [sland, and Vermont), and 45th (Ok lahoma)
Infantry Divisions entered active federa l service. Army Field Forces and the Army
Staff selected those units because of their geographic distribution, the status of their
equipment, and their strength , which ranged from 8,000 to 9,500 officers and
enlisted men each. The Army Staff immediately began working to bring the divi
sions up to their fuillable of organization and equipment strength. 12
Initially individual reservists recalled to active duty fill ed Regular and Guard
divisions, but to maintain them and other d ivisions, as well as organi ze new units,
the Army Staff relied on volunteers and draftees who were schooled in existing or
reactivated training cen ters. To operate the cen ters, Army Field Forces activated
fi ve Regular Army divisions, the 8t h Infantry at Fort Jackson, South Carolina ; the
10I st Ai rborne at Camp Breckinridgc, Kentucky ; the 5th Armo red at Cam p
ChatTee, Arkansas; the 6th Armored at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri ; and the 7th
Armored at Camp Roberts, Ca lifornia, between August and November 1950. The
6th Infan try Division was also reactivated to rep lace the 4th at Fort Ord.13
The Chinese intervention in the fall of 1950 stimulated broader mobiliza
tion measures. After considerable debate, Presiden t Truman declared a nationa l
emergency, which required additional military force s to meet the Soviet threat
in Europe as we ll as to fig ht the wa r in Korea. The mobilization plan ca lled for
eighteen comba t divisions to be on active duty by June 1952. To obta in the
addi tion al di visio ns, the presi d ent a pproved the induction of th e Nationa l
Gua rd's 3 1st (Alabama and Mississ ippi) and 4 7 th (Min neso ta a nd North
Dakota) Infantry Divisions into federal serv ice in January 1951. These were
reorgan ized under reduced tables that ca lled for approximately 14,500 officers
and enl isted men. For the eighteenth divisio n, the Army reactivated the Regu lar
Army's lSI Armored Division in March . Thi s last unit improved the bala nce in
the active force ,mlong infantry, armored, and a irborn e d ivisions, whic h slood
at 2 armored, 2 ai rborne, and 14 infan try.14
In the fall of 1951 the Joint C hie fs of Staff reevaluated the mob ili zation
program and set a new goa l of twentyone active duty combat divisions by 31
December 1955. FrOIll the Nationa l Guard, the 37th (Ohio) and 441h (Illino is)
244
TABLE 21
Combat Divis ions on Act ive Duty Du ring the Korean War
Di"i.\";OIl
COlI/pOllell1
1st Armored
Regular
Regular
Regular
Regular
Regular
Rcgulnr
lsI Caval ry
lsI Infantry
2<] Allllorcd
2d Infantry
3d Infantry
4th Infantry
7th Infantry
Regular Army
Regular Army
Regular Army
11 th Airborn e
24th Infantry
25 th Infantry
28th Infantry
31 st Infantry
37th Infantry
40th Infantry
43d lnr.'lt1lry
44th Infantry
45th Infa ntry
47th In fa ntry
82<1 Airborne
Army
Army
Army
Army
Army
Army
Regular Army
Regular Army
National Guard
National GUflrd
National
National
National
Natiol1<l1
National
National
Guard
Guard
Guard
Guard
Guard
Guard
Regular Army
Infantry Div isio ns were brought into federal service in early 1952, but the
twenty-fi rst div ision was not federalized or activated because of budgetary limitations. Thus the Korean War and the Cold War mobiliza tion peaked at twenty
div isions (Table 21) .15
Personnel po licies for manning divis ions duri ng the Korean War ditTe red
from those used in World Wars I and 11. Prior to [951 , when soldiers went overseas to fight , thei r tour was usually for the durntion of the war. With far-fiung
commitments th roughout Europe and Asia, Army leaders adopted a personnel
rotation policy during the second year of the Korean Wa r. They hoped such a system would avoid alienating the general public and maintain the morale of the soldiers themselves. To accommodate the add itional personne l needed to implement
the rotation , the trai ni ng base was further expanded in the spring of 1951. The 5th
Infantry Division was activated at Ind ia ntown Gap M ilitary Reservation,
Pennsylvania, increasing the number of training divisions to ten, the maximuill
number during the Korean War (Tc/hle 22). General Reserve divisions were also
tasked to train reel"uits.t6
By April 1951 the Army was able to provide additional forces to improve the
security of Japan , where no divisional reserve had existed since the Chi nese inter-
TH E KOREAN WA R AND ITS A FTERMATH
245
TAB L E 22
Regular Army Training Divisions, 1950- 56

Divisioll
LOC(lliOI1
Remarks
3d Amlorcdl
Fon Knox, Ky.
Reorganized as a combat
41h In fantry I
Fort O rd, Calif.
5th Armored
Cam p Chaffee, Ark.
Rcorglll1izcd as a com bat

di vi sion in 1950
Act ivated in 1950 ; inactivated
Sth Infantry
Indiantown Gap
Activated in 195 1;
Mil itary Reservation, Pa.
inactivated in 1953
61h Armored
Fon Leonard Wood, Mo.
Activated in 1950; inactivated

in 1956
6th Infantry2
Fort Ord, Cali f.
71h Annorcd
Camp Roberts, Ca lif.
Activated in 1950; inacti vated

ill 1956
Activated in 1950; inactivated
in 1953
81h [nfa lllry
Fort Jacksoll, S.C.
9th Infant ry'
Fort Di x, N.J.
10lh Infa ntry I
Fort Riley, Ka ns.
691h Infantry]
lOis! Airborne
Fort Dix. N.J.

CHlllP Brccki nridgc, Ky.
division in 1955
in 1956
Activated in 1950; reorganized

as a combat di vision in
1954
Rcorgfl1lized as a combat
division in 1954
Reorganized as a combat
division in 1954
Activalcd in 1954
Activated in 1950; inacti vated in
1953; aclivated in 1954;
reorganized as a combat
division in 1956
I Activ,ltcd before 1950.

2 Replaced the 41h Inran try
J
Division.
Replaced the 9th Infantry Divisioll.
venlion in Ihe Korean War. The 40th and 45th Infantry Di vis ions moved to Japan,
where they completed thei r tra ining. Congress insisted, however, that the National
Guard divisions have an opportunity to fight, and in the winter of 195 1- 52 the
40th and 45th Divisions replaced Ihe lSI Caval ry and 24 th Infantry Di visions in
Korea. The melhod of exchange revived a technique that had been deve loped dur
ing World War II. Ships Ihat carried the 40th and 45t h Infantry Div isions to Korea
brought the 1st Cavalry Div ision and 24th Infanlry Division back 10 Japan. The
246

units swapped a ll heavy equ ipment
and suppl ies wh ile the men carried
only their personal arms and eq uipment with them . T hus the units experienced only a limite d decline in
combat clTiciency. T he two seasoned
divi sions returned to Japan to serve
as a rescrve. Until July 1953 the 2ei,
3d, 7th, 25th, 40th, and 45th Infantry
Divisions carried the figh t in Korea.
During the wan ing days of the conflict , immediately before t he
armis t ic e on 25 Ju ly. the 24th
Infan try Division ret urned to Korea
as a rear area force to bolste r the

secu rity of prisoner-of-war cam ps.17
I n 19 52 Congress authori ze d
what were in e ffect eigh t more divi ~
s ions for the Na t ional Guard to
replace the unit s in federa l service.
40lh Il/fillIlIJ' Division lroo".~ preT hese organizations gave some areas
pare 10 rep/ace the 241h Infollll ),
of the country military forces where
Division, Jail/wI}' 1952.
none had existed s ince units we re
fede ra lized two years earlier for the Korean War. Under the new law the federal
government could retain National Guard units (exclusive of personnel) for five
years, but the states could organi ze replacements for the units in federal service.
The new local units were to have the same designations as the uni ts in federal service, with the additional identification NGUS (National Guard of th e United
States) . Furt hermore, th e leg islation required thai when the Guard units in federal
service were returned to the states, Ihey were to be consolidated with their sister
organizations. States began organizing NGUS units in 1952, and by the end of the
Korean War on 23 July 1953, six out of the eight Guard divisions in federal service had local counterpart s. Of the remaining two, the 37th Infantry Di vis ion
(N GU S) reecived federal recogn ition on 15 January 1954, but the 44th never had
an NGUS counterpart. The governor of Il linois, as an economy move, declined 10
organize it and requested the state's troop allotment be amended to de lete the
44th Infantry Di vision . The division was removed from the force when it was
released from federal service in December 1954. t8
In addition to fighting the war in Korea in the early 1950s, the nation committed forces to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Since 1947 on ly
the I st Infa ntry Division had been stationed in Europe, but wit h the establishment
of NATO President Truman announced a substantial increase in forces there.
Between May and November 1951 the 2d Armored Div ision <ltld the 4th, 28th,
T HE KOREAN WAR AND ITS AFTE RMATH
247
4,,, II/filll/I)I Division le(ll'es Ne ll' York ell rOllle /0 Germall),. 195 J.
and 43d Infan try Div isions joined the 1st In fant ry Division in Germany. The
cOlllmillnenl of these forces and similar actions by the NATO partners demonstrated a new reliance on collective securi ty to deter aggression. 19
Organizational Trends
During the Korean War the Army modified some aspect s of it s di visiona l
organizations, but the basic triangu lar structures adopted during World WlIr II and
revised in the immediate postwar period fo r infantry, "rmarcel, and ai rborne divisions rema ined intact. In 1952 a divisiona l ordnance battal ion replaced the ordnance company, which increased self-sufficiency in e<lch Iy pe of division. The
trend in most organizations, however, was to save personnel and increase firepower. Chief of Staff Coll ins estimated that the clmnges in the in fantry division
enhanced its firepower by 68 percent compared to its World War II counterpart
with only a 20 percent increase in personnel. 20
Firepower in the infantry regiment was increased through tl series of changes. A
105-mm. recoilless rine found a pl,lce withi n the regime nt , as did the more powerful 3.5-i nch " bazooka ," a rocket fired from a shoulder posit ion. In the first engagements o f the Kore,HI War, the 2.36-ineh bazooka had proved inadequate against the
Soviet T- 34 tanks supplied to the North Koreans. To meet the Far East Command's
requirement for an improved antitank weapon, 3.5-inch rocket launchers were
nlshed to the theater. On 20 Ju ly 1950 elements of the 24th Infantry Di vision used
248
3.5-illclt rocke/lalillcher ill (Ic/ioll agaillslllie Nor'h Korealls
them to knock oul several Russian-built tanks, and thereafter the weapon rece ived
wide use. Infantry lIsed new models of the S i-mlll. and 4.2-inch mortars, and the
number of automatic ri ncs was increased in the regimcnt .2 1
Improved aircraft technology provided a ll three types of div isions with new
resources. The hel icopter, boasting bot h vertica l lifl and hover capabi lity, became
11 practical tactica l and transport asset, playing a key role in supply and medical
evacuation in Korea. Infantry and airborne divisions were authorized sixteen tradit ional fixed-wing a irc raft and ten he li copters, while eac h armored divis io n
fi e lded eighteen aircraft and tcn he li copters. The debate agai n su rfaced as to
whet her all divisional aviation shou ld be located in one unit si nce they usually
used the sa me airfield. No scparate aviat ion unit won approval, and technica lly
the aircraf! rema ined di spcrsed to the various units throug hout the divis ions.
Di visions in combat, howevcr, centralized their aircmf! under divisional av iation
officcrs who organized provisional aviation compani es.22
The Army madc morc signi fi cant changes in the armored division. Although
largc armored formati ons were considered unsuitable fo r the rugged terrain in
Korea, the AmlY still faced a massive Soviet armored threat in Europe. In response,
the armored division fi elded the first new family of tanks since World War II . The
M I 03 (T43) tank armed wi th a 120-mm. gun was authorized fo r the heavy tank
batta lion. Weigh ing about sixty tons, it was the largest and 1110st powerfu l American
combat vehicle adopted to datc. The new medi um tank, the M47, had an improved
fire contro l system and a hi gh-velocity 90-tlllll. gun, which enhanced its letha lity,
but it did not become available in any quantity until 1953. For the reconnai ssance
THE KOREAN WA R AN D ITS AFrE RM ATH
249
squadron the tabl es prov ided for the

new M4 1 li ght ta nk, nicknamed the
" Wa lker Bu lldog" for General Walker,
who had been ki lled in a jeep accident
in Korea. In all , the armored d ivision
field ed 343 tanks.2)
Th e di v is io n s d e pl oye d i n
Korea, Japan , and Germany lIs ually
adopted chan ges short ly after th ey
were announced, in con tra st to those
in th e Un it e d S ta tes. T he la ll e r,
exce pt fo r th e 82 d A irb o rn e
Division, served in a training capac
il y, mostly prov iding rcp t<l ce mcnt s
for the overse as for ces . As not ed,

training ce nte rs fail ed to mee t th e
demand for repl ace ments, but the

polit ical decision to lim it mobilizatio n precl uded expandi ng the ex isting traini ng centers or opening others, fo rc ing the Army to usc combat
divisions to perro rm that runetion.24
The Korea n War brought abollt a major social change that to uched all units
througho ut the Army. The Army had ma intained all black units since the Civil
War, but military effic iency tests showed Ihal blacks rought and perrormed better
in integrated unit s than in segregllted o nes. Also, post- World War II socia l aui
tudes increased the demand ror integrati on. In 1948 Pres ident Truman had direct
ed desegregation or the armed rorces, but the Army was slow, as were the other
services, to respond . By May 195 1, however, 6 1 percent or the line in rantry com
pl.lllies in Korea had both white and black so ldiers because little consideration
was g iven 10 replacement by race. On I Ju ly or that year the Army authorized the
new Far East commander, Generll l Malthew B. Ridgway (Truman had relieved
MacA rthur thc prev iolls April) to integ rate all units under hi s control , except for
the 40t h an d 45 th Infantry Di visions. These units, which had rece ntly arri ved
rrom the United States, were exempt rrom the order because they were National
Gua rd organizations. T he Army reared pol itical repercussions from the states if
their units were rac ia lly mixed. Nevert he less, despite the ini tia l hesitation, the
40t h and 45th were integrated shortly a fter they entered com bat in Korea.25
The Far East Command us ually integrated unit s through normal ad lll inistra
live processes. For exa mp le, the 3d Baltalion, 9th Inrantry, and the 3d Batta lion,
15th Infan try, clements ort he 2d and 3d In rantry Divis ions that had been rilled
with black so ldiers. were desegregated by simp ly reassigni ng them. The 25 th
Infantry Division had the 24th Infantry, the only a llblack regiment in the Regular
All M 41 light tallk (Walker Blllldog)
desfillell jor fhe 705tll Tallk Baffalio /l .
102d IlIfill/ fly Divisioll
25 0
Army, and Ridgway approved inactivating the regiment to d isassociate all divisiona l elements with segregation. The Army StatT transferred the 14th Infantry,
less its perso nnel and eq u ipment , from the United S tat es to t he Far East
Com mand, and 011 I August 195 1 the regiment replaced the 24th in the d ivision .
Most of the 24th's black soldiers were di spersed throughoLlt the command, whi le
white soldiers to fill the 14th were drawn from the 34t h Infantry in Japan . Units
in the other regional commands integrated soon thcrcaftcr.26
Readjustment qf Divisional Forces

Hostilities ended in Korea on 23 J uly 1953 when the United Nations and
North Korea signed an arm istice, but demobil ization, like mobil iza tion, did not
fo llow a preplanned course . A th reat sti ll hung over Korea, and the defense of
Western Europe remai ned of paramount concern . The size of the Army depended on the new presiden t, Dwight D. Eisenhower, inaugurated in January 1953,
who was commi tted to reducing m ilitary ex penditures. Bet ween I July 1953
and I July 1956, the Congress, at the president 's request, cut the active Army
from 1.5 to I million men, a reduct io n tha t required major adj ustment s in di visiona l forces.27
By that ti me the an nual load in the training centers had stabi lized at a lower
peacetime leve l, and the Army StafT had turned its attention to im proving the
Genera l Reserve, particularly as a reenforcement force for Europe. [n October
[953 the staff designated the 1st Armored Division and 44t h Infantry Divis ion as
30-day rei nforcement un its for NATO and named the 82d Airborne Division as
the Western Hemisphere's contingency force. To bring these and other divisions
in the General Reserve lip to war levels, the 5th Infantry, 71h Armored, and 10 Ist
Airborne Divisions, which had been operating training centers, were inacti vated
and their personnel reass igned . T he training center operated by the 10th Infant ry
Di vision was also closed, and a new mission was planned for the d ivision .28
In Decembe r 1953 Eisenhower, who had hesitated to reduce fo rces in Korea
because of the precarious armistice, announced that two of the seven U.S . Army
div isions there were to return home, a step permitted by improved capabilities
of the South Korean Army. United States Army Forces, Far East, se lected the
40th and 45th Infantry Div is ions fo r return to th e Uni ted States, and they
departed Korea in the spring of 1954 wi th only a token personnel com pl ement.
Short ly thereafter the divisions were re leased from active federal service and
reverted to st ate control. Co ncern ed abou t the effects of demobili zati on because
of events in Southeast Asi a (t he French were on the verge of withdrawing from
th at area), Sec retary of Defe nse C harles E. Wil son sllspended further reductions in the Far East Command on 7 April 1954.29
Although the Army could reta in Natio nal Guard designations for five years,
Secreta ry Wilson decided to release the 28 th , 3 1s t, 37th , and 43d In fantry
Divisions 10 state contro l in June [954. This decision was primarily an admin is-
THE KOREAN WA R AN D ITS AFrE RMATH
37/h I"Jall/IY Divisioll

For' Riley.
pa.~ses
25 1
/Olh I,,!(//IIIY Divisioll ill re view before leallillg
tralive action and did not affect Ihe actual number of combat or training divisions
in acti ve service. In Europe the 9t h and 5th Infantry Di visions replaced the 28th
and 43d Infantry Di visio ns, whil e the 8th and 10th In fantr y Di visions in the
United States replaced the 3 1sl and 37th at Fori Ca rson and Fort Ri ley. The 69th
In fa ntry Di vision and the 101 s1 Airborne Di vision were reactivated 10 fi JI the
gaps le ft by the 51h and 9th in the training basc)O
By the sum mer of \954 th e Mutual Defense Treaty with the Repub li c of
Korea and the ex pansion of its army to twenty di visions pe rm itt ed additiona l
American reductions in Korea and allowed the Departmen t of Defense to release
all reserve units from active dUly. In October the 25t h Infantry Division with its
personnel and equipment moved from Korea to Hawa ii . where it became part of
the Pac ific area reserve. Sho rtly thereafter the 2d a nd 3d Infantry Divisions,
reduced 10 near zero strength in Korea, replaced the Nationa l Guard 44th and
47 th Infan try Di vision s a t Forts Lew is a nd Benni ng. The Guard di vis ions
returned to stale con trol, thus ending the involvement of the reserve d ivisions in
the Korean War. When those di visions leO fede ral service, only their designations
reverted to the states si nce the guardsmen themselves had been released earli er.
The states reorgani zed the uni ts, except for the 44th. which Il linoi s d id not want,
by using the NGUS divisions as the nllclei, as planned) 1
A ft er many revisions of the blueprint s for a res idual force in Korea , Ihe
Department of Defense instructed the services 10 plan for three divisions, one
Army, one Marine, and onc Uni ted Nations, plus combat support and combat service support units to remain there. In December 1954 Secretary Wi lson decided
that the Marine uni t wou ld return to the United States, leaving two Army d ivisions in Korea. As a rcsu lt, the 241 h Infantry Div ision, in the midst of moving to
Japan , reversed its course and rejo ined the 7th In fant ry Divis ion in Korca.32
252
MANEUVE R AN D FIRE POW ER
To im prove the balance withi n Regul ar A rmy divis ional forces after the
Ko rea n War, Genera l Ridgway, who had become Army C hi ef of Sta ff in 1953,
decided to rev ise the ratios among infantry, armored, and airborne units. In Ju ne
1954 the Fou rth Army activated the 4th Armored Division , the first division to be
eq uipped with the new M48 90-l11m . tank. Ridgway planned to organize another
armored div ision, ra ising the Reg ular Army lola I to four, but tank production
lagged, preventing its formatio n until 1955. The 3d Armored Division was then
converted from a trai ni ng to a combat unit )3
Although tota1 Army streng th decli ned and the reserves were rel eased, the
Army remained committed to an active force of twenty divisions. The Department
of Defen se, there fore, authorized the acti vation of the 23 d and 7 1st Infa ntry
Di vision s. Those units, dubbed " Wil son Divisions" after Secretary of Defense
Wilson, who approved their activation while cutting the strength of the Army, made
use of ex isting regimental combat teams. The 23d Infarll"ry Division, the former
Americal Division of World War II fame, controlled uni ts stationed in the Canal
Zone, Puerto Rico, and the southeastern Un ited States from its headquartcrs at Fort
Amador, Panama Cana l Zone. The 7 1st, with its headquarters at Fort Richardson,
Alaska, included units in Alaska and the northwestern United States. Because of
the ir scattered divisional elements, the Army StatT labeled the div isions "static
units," indi cating that they were not capable of early dep loyment.34
With further cuts on the horizon for the Regular Army, the Army Staff had to
economize on manpower if it was to maintain twenty d ivisions. A review of all di v i ~
sional tabl es of organ ization resulted in slightly smaller divi sions. For example,
without a change in structure, the infantry d ivision dropped from 18,2 [2 men of all
ranks to 17,452. In addit ion, the tables provided for a reduced peacet ime strength
division, with some 2,700 fewer men for each di vision in the General Reserve.
Before its divisions were sent into combat, they wou ld, of course, need sufficient
time and personnel to be brought to war strength as required for sustained opera~
tions. The lessons of Task Force Smith and the deployment of other units to Korea
in the Slimmer of 1950 thus appeared to be already lost. General Reserve divisions
adoptcd the new tables in the summer of 1955. In addit ion, because of the Army's
severc manpower shortages divi sions in Europe were also reorgani zed under the
reduced tables that same Slimmer, and the tables were app lied to the 25th Infantry
Division, posted at Schofield Barracks, the foll owing ycar.35
Besides looking at the organizational tables for poss ible personnel cuts, the
Army exami ncd th e indi v idual repl acement system . T he system trad itionally
required the Army to mainta in a large manpower overhead as a substantial pe r~
centage of it s soldiers were a lways in transit. Lt. Gen. John E. Dahlquist, C hief of
Army Field Forces, and Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, the Army StatT's Deputy
Chi ef of Staff for Personnel (G- I), believed that a unit replacemcnt system would
be more econom ical, improve esprit de corps, and provide more etTic ient units. In
response, the Army StafT developed the GYROSCOPE progra m, which paired a div i ~
sion in the Un ited States with an overseas div ision. Personne l from the paired
TIIE KOREAN WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH
253
divisions were to exchange p laces every three years. In addition, the divisions in
the United States were to conduct basic and advanced indiv idual training. cUlling
the trai ning base and provid ing each so ldier with a home throughout most of hi s
career. It also theoretically Illtldc it possible to replace an entire division if it were
destroyed in a nuclear atlnck)6
Beginning in 1955 fOllrteen divisions participated in the GYROSCOPE program

CTable 23). To meel the chang ing needs of the Army, however, some deviation
occurred during the duratio n o f the program. For exa mple, the 11 th Airborne
Divi sion from Fori Campbell replaced the 5t h Infantry Division in Germany in
1956, but the 5th 's new stat ion was Fort Ord, a former training center. Severa l
benefits resulted: the Europeml command received an airborne division, a unit it
had wan ted for some time; the U.S. Continenta l Army Command (CONARC),
Sllcccssor to thc Army Fic ld Forces, ga ined a post, Fort C.ltllpbell, and equipment
to tcst a new div isiona l struct urc fo r the airborne division; and the number of
d ivisions rcmaincd unchanged .37
As the div isions rotatcd, the U.S. Army, Europe, and Seventh Army closely
moni tored their activities and readiness to determ inc the effect of the moves on
the units. They found that divisional combat efficiency decli ned for a number of
weeks before and after rotation, and Lt. Gen. Bruce C. Clarke, Seventh Army
commander, recommended limiting GYROSCOPE to uni ts sma ller than divisions. In
1958 the last divisiona l exchange took place when the 3d Infantry Division from
Fort Ben ning replaced the 10th In fant ry Di vision. The reafter the p rog ram
invo lved on ly s mall e r~s i ze units. On I Septe mber 1959 the Army terminated
GVROSCOI' E, fo ll owing the recommendati on s of General C lyde O. Edd leman ,
Commander, U. S. Army, Europe, who believed that ot her replacement systems
worked better with less disruption. GYROSCOPE helped to susta in morale, but the
scheme did not save money or improve combat readi ness.38
TABLE 23
Operation G YROSCOPE
YeaI'
CONUS
Divisioll
10th Infant ry
lllh Airbome
3d Annored
1956 2d Infantry
1956 81h Infantry
1958 41h Armored
1958 3d Infantry
1955
1956
1956
OCONUS
S/(llioll
Fon
Fon
Fort
Fon
Fort
Fon
Fan
Riley, Kans.
Campbell , Ky.
Knox, Ky.
Lewis, Wash.
Carson, Colo.
I-I ood. Tex.
Benning, Ga.
Dillisioll
1st Infantry
51 h Infantryt
4th Inf.1tll ry2
71st lnfan try3
9th Infantry
2d AmlOred
10th Infantry
Slation
Germany
Genllany
Gennany
Alaska
Gemlany
Genllany
Gentlany
I The 5th tnt:1nlry Di vision's ncw station was Fon Ord, Cali fornia .
2 The 41h Infiullry Di vision was rcduccd to zero slrcngth.
) The 71st Inflmlry Division was inllctivalcd, and thc 41h Infnnlry Division replaccd it.
254
MANEUVER AN D FIRE POWER

With divis ions in the GVROSCOPE program conducting individuallrai ning, the
Department of the Army reduced Ihe number of training centers. By I July 1955
only seven major training cellters remai ned, of which five were operated by d ivisions. The continued lise of di visional names for the centers, however, was being
questioned. Lt. Gen. Walt er L. We ibi r, the G- I, wanted to change the centers'
names to reneet their mi ssions more accurately. For some time the divisional designations had confused the genera l public, government officials, and the trainees.
In th e s p rin g of 195 6 th e Army thu s in ac ti vated the 61h and 69th Infantry
Divisions and 5th and 61h Armored Divisions and reassigned the 10I st Airborne
Divisio n as a test unit. Branc h replacement cen ters replaced Ihe trai ning divisions. For example, the organization at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, beca me the U.S.
AnnyTraining Cen ter, Field Artil lcry.39
The savi ngs that resu lted from the revised tables of org<l1li zat ion, modificatio ns in the rep lacement system, and a reduction in the training base did not
eq ual the req uired cu ts in Army strength. The Army was therefore unabl e to
maintain twenty Regu lar Army di visions. Further reductions req uired the commanders of Uni ted States Army, Caribbea n, and Sixth Army to inactivate the 23d
and 7 1st Infa ntry Divi sions in 1956. Some of the ir clement s, however, continued
to serve in the active force.40
Improving the Reserves

The structure of the reserve components came under close scrutiny du ring the
Korean War. By then military leaders had decided the large underman ned force of
fifty-two divisions developed aftcr World War II waS unreali stic. On 24 October
1950 the chief of sta ff directed a committee to reevaluate the reserve structure
and develop plans to meet both limited and major mobi lizat io ns. Six months
latcr, before the dec ision to mobilize 20 di visions due to the Korea n Wa r, the
committee reported that the Army needed 18 d ivisions o n active dut y- 12
Rcgular Army and 6 National Guard- and 33 reserve divis ions to back them up.
The lattcr divisions fcll into two c<ltcgorics for mobi lizat ion, un early ready force
or9 divisions from the Nli tionul Guard and a late ready force of24 divisions wit h
12 from the Guard and 12 Frolll the Organ ized Reserve Corps. The uni ts in the
Na tiona l Guard were to be maintained at 100 perce nt offi cer and 50 percent
enl isted strength, whi le those in the Organized Reserve Corps were to have 100
percent of their officers but only an enli sted cadre. The committee decided that
the remaining thirteen Orga nized Reserve Corps divisions \vcre unnecessary and
recommended their immediatc inactivation.41
During the su mmer and fall of 1951 the six army comma nders in the United
States, slaffageneies, and the Section V Com mittee, created aftcr World War I for
the reserve components to have a voice in their a ffairs. eval uated the plan. The
army commanders urged th at all divi sions in the Organi zed Reserve Corps be
infantry divisions because Ihey believed that the reserves cOli ld nOI adequately
TI-I E KOREAN WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH
255
su pport armored and airborne training. They thought thirteen, rather than twelve,
reserve divisions should be maintained to provide a bellcr geographic distribution
o f the uni ts. The Section V Committee opposed the reduction of the Organized
Reserve Corps from twenty-five to thirteen div isions because it feared unfavor"ble publicity, particu larly with the nation at wa r. On 20 December the Vice Chief
of Staff, General John E. l'lull, delayed reduction in the number of Reserve Corps
divis ions until 31 December 1952 but directed the reorganization and redesignalion of airborne and armored divi sions as infa ntry as soo n as pract icable. In
March 1952 the 80th , 841h , 100th, and 1081h Airborne Divisions were reorganized and redesignated as infantry divisions, and the 63d, 70th, and 75th Infantry
Divisions replaced the 13th, 2 1st, and 22d Armored Divisions. The Army made
no other di visional changes in the reserve troop basis at that time.42
Along with the reorgani zation of the Organ ized Reserve Corps divisions, the
Army published new regulations forma li zing a "Ready Reserve" concept. Under
the ncw rules the Ready Rescrvc comprised Early and Late Ready Forces, categories which replaced the old Class A, B, and C ullits. The Early Ready Force
was to have 110 percent officer and 100 percent enlisted strength, whi le the Late
Ready Force, which incl uded all Organizcd Rcscrve Corps divisions, was to have
100 percent officer and 5 percent enlisted strength. In July 1952 Congress passed
new legi slation that redesignated the Organized Rese rve Corps as the Army
Reserve and gave legal status to the concept of the Ready Reserve.43
Be fore the dust had sett led on the reforms, the Army realized that it had failed
to improve unit manning or meet reasonable mobil izat ion requirements. [n the fall
or 1952 Army leaders thus proposed that the personnel rrom the thirteen inactivated
Army Reserve di visions be assigned to strengthen the remaining twelve divisions.
A new reserve troop basis resulted, this time ca lling ror 37 divisions, 27 in the
Nationa l Guard and 10 in the Army Reserve. To kccp the unneeded fifteen Army
Reserve divisions active, they \VCI'C to be reorganized as training divisions to staff
trai ning centers upon mobiliZ<1lion or man maneuver area commands for training
troops. The continental army commanders implementcd the new Army Reserve
troop basis in 1955 piecemeal. They reorgan ized, without approved tables of organization, thc 70th, 76th, 78t h, 80th, 84th, 85 th , 89t h, 91 st, 95th, 98th, 100th, and
108th Infantry Divi sions as cadre ror rep lacement trai ning centers and organized
the 75t h "Maneuver Area Commands" using the resources of the 75t h Infa ntry
Division. Two years later the 75 th Infantry Division was inactivatcd along with 87th
Infantry Division. Assets of the 87th were lIsed to organ izc a maneuver area comm<lnd; thus onc unneeded division rcmai ned in the troop basis.44
To prepare for challcnges in Westcrn Europe, the new troop basis authorized
the conversion of fo ur Nationa l Guard infantry divisions to armored divisions. New
York, C<llifornia, Gcorgia, and Florida agreed to convert the 27th, 40th, and 48th
Infantry Divisions. For the fourth armored division, the Army planned to usc the
slot temporarily occupied by the 44th Infantry Division, wh ich Illinois no longer
wanted. Eventually Tennessee and North Ca rolina, which shared the 30th Infantry
256
Di v ision, each agreed to maintain a divis ion; Te nnessee orga nized Ihe 30t h
Armored Division, wh ile North Carolina organized the 30th Infantry Oivision,45
In 1955 Congress again legislated measures to improve the reserves. Among
the amendments to the 1952 law was a prov ision that al lowed young men eighteen and a half years o ld to en list in the Army Reserve for eight years. Not less
than three and not morc than six months of that obl igation was to be spent on
active duty for basic trai ning. The law also provided that reservists who did not
perform sat isfactorily aocr basic trai ning might be ordered, without their consent ,
to active duly not to exceed forly-fi ve days. Although the Army Reserve hoped
these prov isions would he lp to meet manning problems, Ihe measure failed. Most
young men were uninterested in military service, and for Ihe few who were Ihe
acti ve Army lacked the resources to provide ba sic traini ng and the Nat ional
Gua rd proved more attractive than the Army Reserve.46
At the beginning of 1957 the Army thus had 56 combat divisions and 12
training di visions. Of thcse, the Regular Army fielded [8 combat divisions, many
not fully manned; the National Guard 27; and the Army Reserve II . Of the 56
divisions. 3 were airborne. 10 were armored, and the remainder were infantry.
Between 1950 and 1957 Army di visions fou ght a war in Korea and deterred
the Sov iet challenge in Western Europe. At the hcight of the Korean War the
active Army had eight divisions in the Far East, rive in Germany, and a sevendi vision General Reserve in the United States. Di visions retained thcir World War
[I structure wi th modifications whi le gaini ng additional fire power. As the United
Stllles assumed leadership of the Western democracies, a rcady fo rce, backed by
fully manned and equipped reserves, took on added significance . Nevertheless,
the Regular Army, Nationa[ Guard, and Army Reserve division s all su tTered from
a lack o f personnel. After the Korean War budgetary constra ints exacerbated the
manning conditions, while the genera l reliance of the Eisen howe r administration
on nuclear deterrence put the fi scal emphasis on weapons systems rather than on
the combat divisions.
T HE KO REAN WA R AN D ITS AFTERMATH
257
Notes
! Public Papers oflhe PrcsidCllls oflhe VIIi/eli Slates: Han y S. Tmlllllll. JalllUIIY I. 195010
December /950 (Washington, D.C,: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 532.
2 Llr, TAG 10 CinC, Far East, 121uI1 50. sub: Activation, Inactivation, Redesignalion, and
Rcorganiz;lIion of Certain Units in the Far East COl11mand, AGAO-l 322 (10 Apr 50) G- I- M,
AG Reference files. DAMH-i-ISO; Schnabel, Polic)1 alld Direc/ion, pp. 86- 87, 90- 94; Stubbs
and Connor, Armor-em'ally, p. 77.
J Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 80- 88.
4 Llr, TAG to CinC, Far EaSI, 26 lui SO. sub: Reorganization of Certain Units in the Far East
Command, AGAQ- I 322 (21 lui SO) 0 - 1 M, AG Reference files , OAMH-HSO; Elva StilllVaugh.
"Personnel Policies in the Korean Conniet:' eh, I, pp. 32-40, Ms, DAMH-HSR.
5 Roy E. Appleman, SOlllh 10 lire N(lktollg. Nortlr 10 the YlIllI. United States Army in the
Ko rean War (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 385- 89; Charles G.
Cleavcr, " History of the Korcan War." vol. 3, pI. 2, Pe rsonnel Problems. pp. 7- 12. Ms. DAM HHSR ; David Curtis Skaggs. "The KATUSA Ell perimcnt: The Intcgration of Korean Nationals
into the U.S. Army, 1950- 1965," Milil(ll)' Affairs 38 (Apr 1974): 53- 58.
6 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 92-96, 168- 71.
7 Applcman, SOlllh 10 Ihe NlIklOllg, pp. 389- 90; T.R. Fehrcnback. This Kind oIIV(I/'; A Sllidy
ill Unpreparedness (New York: Macmillan Company, 1963), p. 202; Llr, Henry P. Carrington to
Edgar M. Howell, 18 Nov 50, 63d Ficld Artillery Banalion filc, DAMH- HSO; Military History
Section, "A Brier History of thc 34th Infant ry Regimcnt" (United States Amly Forccs. Far East,
Nov 1954), 34th Infantry file, DAMH-HSO.
8 Schnabcl, Policy amI DirecliOIl. pp_ 13 1- 34; Mall W. Dolcala, 3d II/jilllll)' lJil'io5ioil i/l
Ko/'ea (Tokyo: Toppan Printing Co" 1953), pp. 57- 65; L1r, TAG to CGs, Third and Second
Armies, 25 Aug 50, sub: Organization and ReorglmizlLtion of Certain Units, AGAO-I 322 (17
Aug 50) G- l- M, Ltr, TAG 10 CinC, Far East, 6 Oct SO, sub: Changes of Certain UnilS in thc Far
East Command, AGAO- I 322 (4 Sep SO), G- I- M, and Llr TAG to CG, Third Army, 19 Mar 5 1,
sub: Change in Status of Certain Units, AGAO-I 322 (2 Mar 5 I) G- I- M, all 3d Inf Div file,
DAMH-HSO.
9 Stillwaugh, "Personncl Policies," eh. 6, I)P. 1-4 .
10 Billy C. MOSSLlHltl , Ebb (111(1 Flow. Now:mber 1950- J/lly 1951, United States Army in the
Korean War (Washington, D.C.: Govemment Printing Officc, 1990), PI'. 237, 247, 503; Wlliter
G. Hemles. Truce Telll {lnd Fighlillg PrOIlI, United Slll!es Army in Ihe Korean WlLr (Wllshington,
D.C.: Governmentl'rinling Officc, 1966), p. 472.
It Schnabel, Policy (/1/(1 Direclioll, pp. I 17- 20; Sti llwllugh. "Personnel Policies," ch. I. pp.
9- 12; Llr, TAG to CGs, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Annies, 16 Oct 50. sub: Change in Sla!us of
Certain Units, AGAO-I 322 (29 Aug SO), G- I- M, 4th Inf Div file , DAMH-HSO.
12 Schnabel, Policy alld DirectiOIl, Pl'. 122- 25,294; National GUlLrd OurCll U, " Induction
and Release or Army Nationlll Guard Units," Pl'. 21 - 24, NllIionlll Guard Induction, Korean
War, Refercncc Papcr filcs. DAM H- IISO; OCAFF DilLry, "Action in Support orFECOM 3 July
1950- 30 September 1950:' Ms, DAMH-HS R: Ltr, TAG to CGs, First. Second. Third, Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Armies. 6 Sep 50, sub: Reorganizlltion of Certain Units Ca lled to Active Duty
from Civilian Components, AGAO-I 322 Gen Res (23 Aug SO) G- I- M, AG Reference files,
DAMH -HSO.
t3 Crossland and Currie, Twice (I Citi:;en, pp. 96- 97; Llr, TAG to CG, Third Army, 10 Aug
SO. sub: Activation ofthc 8th Infantry Division (Training), AGAO-[ 322 (7 Aug SO) G- I- M. 8th
InfDi v file, GO 51. Fort Jllekson. South Carolina. 1950, Ltr. TAG to CG. Second Army, 10 Aug
50, sub: Activation of the 10l s1 Airborne Division (Training). AGAO-I 322 (7 Aug 50) G- I- M,
10Isl Abn Div file , Ltr, TAG to CO, Fourth Army, 2 1 Aug SO, sub: Ac tivation of the 5th
Armored Division, 2 1 Aug SO. /\GAO-I 322 Training Di v (I S Aug 50) G- l- M, 5th Annd Div
file, Ur. TAG to CG. Fifth Army. 2 1 Aug SO. sub: /\etiv;lIion of the 6th Armored Division,
258
1'101'10-1 322 Training Div (15 Aug 50) G- I- M, 61h Armd Div file. LIT. TAG to CG, Sillth
Army, 10 Nov 50, sub: Activation of the 7th Armored Division, 1'101'10-1 322 ( 11 Oct 50)
G I- M, 71h Armd Djv file. L1r, TAG to COs, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Armies, 16 Oct 50. sub:
Change in Status of CCr1nin Uni ts, AOAO- I 322 (29 Aug 50), 4th lnf Div file. and Divisional
I-[istorical Data Cards, "I! DAMH-HSO.
14 Schnabel, Pulicy (Iud Directioll. pp. 298- 300: Truman, Papers of lite President, 1950, PI),
746- 47; "Induction and Release of Army National Guard Units," I'p. 39--41; Ll r, TAO to COs,
Third lind Fourth Armies, 26 Apr 51. sub: Reorganization of Certain Gene rJI Reserve Uni ts.
AGAD-l 322 Gen Res (2 Apr 5 1) G- I- M, AG Refere nce files, LIT, TAG to CGs. Third and
Four!h Amlies, I Mar 51, sub: Ac ti va tion of the 1st Annored Division, AGAOI 322 (24 Feb 51)
G- I- M, 1st AmId Div file. DAMIIHSO.
IS Still waugh, " Personne l Policies." ch. r. PI'. 51 - 60; "Induction and Release of Army
National Guard Units," PI'. 48 58.
t6 Sti llwaugh, "Personnel Policies:' ch. 3, 1). I : Llr. TAG to CG. Second AmlY, 21 Fcb 51.
sub: Activation or the 5th Infantry Division (Training). AGAOI 322 (2 Feb 51) G- I- M, 5th Inf
Div file, and Historical Data Card 5th Inf Div, DAMHHSO; Rober! W. Conk1cy, Karl E. Cocke,
D,111iel p, Griffin, "Dcmobilizntioll Following the Korean War," OCMH Study 29, pp. 7 1- 73,
Ms, DAM I-I HSR.
17 Hermes, Truce Telllll/Ill Fighlillg Pi'Qllt, PI'. 202- 04. Prior to the redcployment of 24th
Infantry Division to Korea in su mmer of 1953, clements of th c 1st Cavalry Di vis ion and 24th
Infantry Division had scrvcd there as security forccs on a rotation basis sillce October 1952.
t8 DA l1ul1 15, 1952; AIIII/mi Repor, of Ihe Chief of Ihe NOliollal GlI(II"cl BI/reoll. 195], PI'.
2- 3, 1954, P, 15; see notes based on NGAROTO (National Guard BureauOrganization and
Tnlining Branch) 325.4 le tt ers, 1952- 54, author's files; " Illinois Declines Allotment to
Reorganize 44th Di vision." Arm)' Times. 9 Jan 54; " Protcsts Rip Illinois Guard; Generals Urge
Boyle's Removal ," ' /I"IIIY Tillles, 16 Jan 54 ; leT, NGB to AG. 11lilloi s. 17 Feb 54, sub:
Withdrawal of Federal Recognition, National Guard Uni ts, NOAROTO 325.4- 111, 44th Inf Div
file. DAMH HSO.
t9 Truman, Papers of (I/e Pl'csidclII, 1950. p. 626; Dean Acheson, PI'CSCIII m Ihe Cremioll:
My YCl/I'S ill lire Stale OelUlrllllell1 (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1969), PI' . 437- 40;
Historical Data Cards for the 4th, 28th, and 43c\ Inf Oi vs and the 2e1 Anll(1 Div, DAMH HSO.
20 TOE 7, Inr;1 ntry Di vision, 15 May 1952; TOE 17, Armored Di vision. 29 Dec 1952: TOE
57, Airborne Division, I Jan 1952; Lloyd Nornlan, "The New Look Stmtegy," Comool Forces
)0111'1/(/14 (Feb 1954): 15- 20.
I t TOE 7- 1\. Infant ry Regiment, 15 May 1952; "Tools for the Fighting Man: Small Arms,"
ArIIle(1 Forces T(llk ( 18 Jan 1952) pp. I- IS; Walter II . Ramsey, "The Big Bazooka: Russian
Tanks Were No Match for Our 3.5 lnch Weapon," Onlllllllce 35 (May- Jun 195 1): 638-40.
22 TOE 7, Infantry Division. 15 May 1952; TOE 17. Armored Di vision, 29 Dec 1952; TOE
57, Airborne Division, I Jan 1952; James C. Smith, "Centralized Operations:' Army AI'ialioJ}
Oige.\( 1 (Mar 1955): 19- 25; Joseph Bonanno, "The Hclicopter in Combat," Ordn(lnce 37 (MarApr 1954 ): 868- 72; Donald F. Harri son , "A Hi story of Army Aviatio n," eh. Y, PI'. 11 - 20,
25- 27, Ms, DAMHHSR.
13 TOE 17, Armored Division. 29 Dec 1952: Stubbs and Connor. Armor.emall)" [Jp. 7778: "Thc T43 Heavy Tank." A"nwr 63 (May- Jtlll 1954): 32- 33; "Army's Ncw M48 Medium
Tank Ready fOT Distribution to Armor Troops," Armor 61 (May- JIm 1952): 30- 31.
24 Llr, TAG to CinC, U.S. ArnlY. Europe. 6 Fcb 53, sub: Change in Status of Certain Units.
AGAO I (M) (28 Jan 53) G- 1. and Ltr, TAO to CG, U.S. Anny Forces, Far East (Main). 9 Feb
53. s ub: Change in Status or Cerlliin Units, AGAO I (M) 322 (4 Feb 53) G- \. bot h AG
Refercnce files, DAMII HSO; OCAFF, "Summary of Major Events an d ProbJcms, FY 1953," ch.
9,1)11. 1- 18.
25 DA Bull 23,1948; Morris J. MacGregor. IJllegrtJ/ion of/he ,Irlll"d Forces, PI'. 428- 59
passim.
26 MacGregor, IJllegl'(llioJl oflhc Al'lIIed Forces, PI). 442- 4 5: Bernard C. Nally and Morris J.
T HE KOREAN WAR AND ITS AFTE RMATH
259
MacGregor, Blacks ill the Mili/(//")': Essell/iol f)o c lIlIlellls (Wilmingwll, Del.: Scholarly
Resources Inc . 1981). Pr>. 309- 11: LIT. TAG to COs, Third 1111U Fifth Armies. 9 Aug 51, sub:
Clmngc in Status of Certain General Reserve Units, AOAO I 322 (26 Jul 51) G- I- M, 14th Inf
file. DAMH-HSO; "FE Racial Integration Means New Names for 2 Regiments," Ann)' Times, 4
Aug 52.
27 Pub/it: Papers oj tile Presidents of lite Ullitcd Siale.f. Dwight D. Eisenhower. 1954
(Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1960), pp . 121 - 25; Coakley cl ai.,
" Demobilization," pp. 8- 9.
28 Coakley ct aI., "Demobilization;' pp. 69- 72, 85- 87.
29 Eisenhower, I>apers of Ihe Presidellts. 1953 , pp. 860- 61: Coakley ct aI.,
"Demobilization:' pp. 28- 29; "[nduc[ion and Release of Army Nationa[ Guard Uni ts," pp.
2[ - 24. In 1952 Gener<ll Mark W. C lark reorganized the Far East Command as a unified command with U.S. Army Forces. Far East, as the Army's clement.
30 Llr, TAG to CinC, U.S. Anny, Europe, <lnd CG, First Army, 7 Apr 54, sub: Change in
Status of Certai n Di visions, AGAO- [ (M) 322 (2 Ap r 54) G- I, 9th [nfDiv file, L[r, TAG to CGs,
Third <llId Fifth Armies, 27 Apr 54, SlIb: Chan ge in Statns of Ceria in Di visions, AGAO-I (M) 322
(22 Apr 54) 0 - 1, 8th Inf Di v file, Llr, TAG to CG, Fifth Army, 27 Apr 54, sub: Reorga ni z'lIio n
of the 10th Inf:m[ry Division, AGAO-I (M) 322 (22 Apr 54) G- I, 10lh [nfDiv fire, Llr. TAG 10
CG . First Army, 23 Apr 54, sub: Activalion of th e 69th Inl;1ntry Division (Training), AGAO- [
(M) 322 (22 Apr 54) G- I, 69th Inf Di v fi le, aud Historical Data Cards for the 5th. 8th. 9th, 28th.
31st, 43d, and 69th Inf Divs and Ihe 101s[ Abn Div, all DAMH-HSO.
31 Semiallilal Report uf tile Secretar), of Defellse, 1954. pp. 56- 57; Coakley ct aI.,
"Demobilization." pp. 39-43; Llr, T AG to CG, Sixth Army, 27 Scp 54 , sub: Reorgan ization or
the 2d Infantry Division. AGAO- I (M) 322 (16 Scp 54) G- I, 2d In f Di v file, an d Llr. TAG 10
CG, Third Army, 27 OCI 54, sub: Reorganization of the 3d Inf~ntry Division. AGAO- I (M) 322
(19 Oct 54 ) G- I , 3d Inf Div rile, both DAM H-HSO; "Schofield Ready to Welcome 25th
Division," Arm)' Tillle~', 18 Sep 54; '"Indu elion an d Release of Army Nationa l Guard Units," pp.
48- 58: Repol'l of the Clliefof/lle Natiol/al GII(/rd Bllreml. 1955, pp. 14- 15.
J2 Coakley el aI., '"Dcmobilization," Pl'. 29- 38.
33 Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 1954, OCAFF, eh. 14, pp. 1-4; Llr. TAG to
CG, Founh Army, 28 M~y 54, sub: Activation of the 41h Armoreel Division, AGAO- l (M) 322
(26 May 54) G- I, 4th Armd Di v file, and Lt r. TAG 10 CGs, Second Army and Continental Army
Command (CONARC). 9 Mar 55. sub: Change in St.I!US of 3d Armored Division, AGAO- I (M)
322 3d Armd Div (8 Mar 55) G- I , 3d Armd Di \' file, both DAMH-HSO: "4th Armored
Reactivated al Ft. l'lood," Arlll)' Tillles, 26 Jun 54; "4th Armel Build-Up Underway," Army Tillies.
3 Jul 54; Will iam R. Rock. 3d Arlllvred 1Ji\'isiol! (Spear/teml). II HistO/')1 vf Ihe 3d Ilrllloret/
Dil1isioll (Darmst:ldt, Germany: Stars and Stripes, 1957). pp. 45-46.
34 Llr. TAG 10 CGs, U.S. Army, Caribbean, and Third Army, 2 Dec 54, sub: Organization
of the 23d Infantry Division. AGAO-I (M) 322 ( 17 Nov 54) G- , 23d InfDiv file, and Ltr, CGs,
U.S. Army, Alaskn, and Sixth Army, 27 Oct 54. sub: Organization of Ihe 71st Infantry Division,
AGAO- I (M) 322 71 st Inf Di v ( 12 Oct 54) G- 1. 71 sl Inf Div file. bOlh DA M I-I- I-I SO : Sell/iall/wal
Repol"I of the SeCl'e/tIIJ' of tile Arllly. I Jld- Dec 54, p. 20: "Scallcred fro111 Hcre [0 Yon, Two
' Wilson Divisions' Formed," tll"l/lY Times, 20 Nov 54,
35 Coakley et aI., '"Delllobi liz,ltio n," pp. 88- 89; TOE 7 R, Infantry Division. 1955; TOE
l7R, An110red Division, 1955: TOE 57, Airborne Division. 1955: Ltr. TAG to CGs, CO NARC,
and Second and Four1h Armies, 23 May 55. sub: Reorganization of lsI . 3d, an d 4th Armored
Divisions, AGAO-I (M) 322 (18 Ma y 55) G- I, Llr, TAG to CGs, CON ARC, and Third. Fifth,
nnd Sixth Armies. 23 May 55. sub: Rcorg;mizUlion of Certain Infantry Divisions, AGAO- I (M)
322 ( 19 May 55) G- 1. Llr. TAG to CGs. CON ARC, lllld Third Army. I Aug 55. sub:
Reorganizat ion of the 11th Ai rborne Division, AGAO- I (M) 322 (20 lui 55) G- 1. Llr. TAG 10
CGs, CONA RC and Third AmlY, 26 May 1955. sub: Reorganizalion of 82d Airborne Division,
AGAO-I (M) 322 (24 May 55) G- I, Ltr, TAG to CinC, U.s. Army, Europe. 9 Sep 55, sub:
Confirmati on of Reorganiza tion of Cerlain Units, AGAO-O (M) 322 ( 16 Aug 55) G- I , and Llr,
260
MANEUVER AND FIREPOW ER
TAG to CG, U.S. AmlY, Pacific. 5 Mar 56, sub: Change in Status of Cert ain Units, AGAO-O322 (27 Feb 56) DCSI'ER (Depu ty Chie f of Sta rr for Personnel ), all AG Reference liIes. DAMH
I-ISO; Historical Data Cards for di visions. DAM II-I-ISO.
36 Memo for Record. sub: Unit Rotat io n Plan , 23 Feb 54 , and lIr. John E. Dahlquist 10
Malthcw 11. Rid gway, 7 Apr 54, Records orlhe Army Staff, G 1, 2 10.2 1 Feb- Mar 54, RO 319,
NA RA ; " World-wide Unit Rotation," Arm)' Comblll Forces JOIII'I/(/i 5 (Nov 1954) : 37; Robert N.
Young. "Operation G VROSCOI' I: , Rotation Plus Stabili ty," Army Ill/o/'/llu/io/l Dige.w 10 (Mar
1955): 2- 6; Historical Division. U.S. Army Europe (USA REU R), Operlllioll Gl'ROS<"OPE ill the
US Arm)' Ellrope. 1957, pp. I 2 (Secret. material used unclassified), DAM I-I-HS R.
J7 Historical Secti on, USA REU R, O,Je/"m;oll GYROSCOI't: il/ Ihe US ArlllY Ellrope, pp. 2640; SS, G- I fo r Cof'S, sub: Training Center Desig nations, Tab A, 15 Dec 55, G~ I S 323.3,
Division Ge neral file, DAMI-I I-ISQ.
38 1listorical Section, USAREUR, "The Replacemcnt an d Augmen tat ion Systcm in EurollC
(1945- 1963)," pp. 4 7-48, Ms, DAM I-I- I-ISR.
39 Coakley et aL , "Demobi lization," pp. 72- 80; U,S. Congrcss. Sellate, Elel'ellih Repori of
Ihe PreW/lwlncss SubcOlllll1 ilfeC of Ihe COlllmilfee 011 AnI/cd Sen 'ices of Ihe Unilell Stales SCl/rIIC
IlIIdc //he AUI//Oril), ofS.Re,I'. 18, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., Apr 195 1; SS, G- I for Cof'S, s ub:
Training Center Designations, 15 Dec 55, SS, DCS PER fo r Co f'S, same snbjec t, 27 Jan 56.
DeS PER S 323. and DOD News Release No. 152- 56. s ub : Army to Stop Us ing Di vis ion
Designations to Ident ify Training Div isions, 23 Feb 56, all Division General file , DAM II-I-ISO;
also see unit files of the 10 Ist Abn, 6th and 9th InC an d 5th and 6th Armd Divs, DAM H- HSO.
40 Lt r, TAG to CG, U.S. Aml Y, Caribbean, I Mar 56, sub: C ha nge in Status of Cerlain
Units, AGAOO (M) 322 ( 10 Feb 56) DCS PER , 23d Inf Di v liIe , and Ltr, TAG to CGs.
CONA RC and Sixth ArIlI Y, 6 Sep 56, s.1me su bject, AGAO-O 322 (9 Aug 56) DCSPER, 7 1st Inf
Div file . DAM H-HSO.
4t Memo, G- I for G- 3, 24 Oct 50, sub: Development of Arm y's I'osit ion in a Com plete
Review of Civilian Components Structure, G- I 326 (24 Oct 50), and SS, G- 3 for Col'S, 5 Apr
5 1, s ub : Deve lo pment o f Army Position in a Co mpl ete ReviclV of C ivi lian Compone nts
Stru ct ure, G- 3 326 (2 4 Oct 50), both ArlllY Reserve filc, DAM H-HSO.
42 SS, G- 3 for Cof'S, 18 Dec 5 1, sub: Im plementation of the Approved Outline Plan. Afln y
Reserve Forces, 326 (5 Dec 5 1), Arm y Reservc Forces Confercncc, Dcpanmem of th e AmlY,
Army Field Forces, Contine nta l Arm ies, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 5- 9 Nov 1951. Memo for
R\.'Conl, OCof'S. 20 Dc<: 5 1, sub: Imp lementation of th e Arm y Rescrve Force Reser\'c Divisional
Reorgani za tio n, GS 326 ( 19 No\' 51), and DA Army Rcserve Forces Program Summary, I Mar
52, all Anny Reserve Re fere nce fi les, LtT, TAG to CG, Second Army, 18 ApT 52, sub: C hange in
Status of Certain Amly ReseTve Divisions, AGAO- I 322 Army Res (6 Mar 52) G- 3- M, LtT,
TAG to CG, Third Army, 23 Feb 52, same subject, AGAO I 322 Army Res (28 Jan 52). Ltr,
TAG to CG, Fourth Amty, 21 Feb 52. same subject, AGAO- I 322 Army Res (30 lan 52) G- 3- M,
Ltr, TAG to CG, FiO h Army, 13 Feb 52. samc subject. AGAO- I 326 (25 Jan 52) G- 3- M. Lt r.
TAG to CG, Sixth Anny, 22 Feb 52. sa me subject. AGAO-I 322 Army Res (29 Jan 52), all AG
Reference fil es, and Hi stori cal DatH Cards, Army Reserve di v is ions, all DAM H HSO . The
Secti on Five Committee, es tab lished in 1920, was the ve hicle for reserve officers to provide
input noo ut rese rve affairs.
4lA R 140-305, 1 Feb 1952: DA Bull 7, 1952.
44 Karl Cocke, "The Reserve Compo nen ts," OCM H Study 130. pp. V- 38-49, VI- I-45 passim, Ms, DAMHRA D: "General SlaffSlud y Leading to the PreparJtion o f Rescrve Components
Mobiliz.1 tion Preparedness Objectives Plan L" I Jul 53. DAM II -HS R: Lu. TAG to CG, First
Army, 15 Mar 55, sub: Dcsignation and Organization of Cenain Divisions or the Army Reserve,
AGAO I (M) 322(2 1 Feb 55) Army Res, Ltr, TAG to CG, Secolld Army. 19 May 55, same subject. AGAOI (M) 322 Army Res (21 r.,ll,r 55) Amly Res. Lt r, TAG to CG, Third Arm y, 15 Feb
55. sub: Desig nation and Organiz,uion o f 108th In fa ntry Di vision ( Repl,lceme nt T raini ng),
AGAO- l (M) 322 (9 Feb 55) Army Res. Ltr, TAG to Fourth Army, 25 lan 55, sub: DeSignation
and Orga ni za tion of th e 95th lnl:1ntry Division, AGAO-I (M) 322 95 th InfDiv (1 8 Jan 55) Army
THE KOREAN WAR AND ITS A FTERMATH
261
Res. and LIT, TAG 10 CO. Fiflh Army. 23 May 55. sub: Designation and Qrganiz,Llion ofCcrlain
Divisions of Ihe Army Reserve, AGAO-J (M) 322 Army Res (II May 55) Army Res, all AG
Reference /lie, DAMI I- II SO; GO 152. Sixth Army, 1955; Llr, TAG 10 CO. Fourth Army, 11 Mllr
55, sub: Ch'lIlgc in SIal us of Certain Army Reserve Units, AGAO-l (M) 322 Army Res (17 Feb
55) RES, and LIT, TAG 10 CGs, CONARC. and Third ,1Ild Fourth Armies, 10 Jan 57, sub:
Change in Status of Certain Units orlhe Army Reserve, bOlh AG Reference files, DAMI-I-I-ISO.
45 Uf, NO B \0 AG. Cillifornia. IS JUI1 54, sub: Organization. Conversion, Rcorgani7.:lIion.
and Redesign,llion of National Guard Units (40th D il'i.~ion), NOAROTO 325.4-Calif (4 Jun 54),
401h lnf Oil' file. Ur. NGI3 10 ColS. Div of Militllry llnd N(n'al AlTllirs, New York. 15 Dec 54.
sub: Organization. Reorganization. Conve rsion. and RcdesigrHllion, Naliolllli Guard Unils of the
27th Infantry Division to be the 27th AmlOfed Division. NOAROTO 325.4-NY (13 Dee 54).
27th Inf Bde file , Ltr, NGBto AG. Georgia. 17 Oel 55. sub: Allotllleni. Conversion.
Redesignation. Organization. Reorgllnizlliion and Withdrawal of Federal Recognition. Army
Naliona l Guard UniiS. NG-AROTO 325.4 (30 SCI) 55) GA, GA NG file, L1r, NG O to AG,
Florida. 17 Oct 55. sub: Allolment. Conl'ersion, RedesigrHllion. Orgnniz,Llion, Reorgnnizntion
and Withdrawal of Federnl Recognilion, Army N;Ltional Guard Units. NG-AROTO 325.4-Fla. FL
NG file. Lif, NGB 10 AG, T ennessee, 20 Oct 54. sub: Nation al Olwrd Troop AIlOlment
(Tennessee), 20 Oct 54, NO-ARaTa 325.4Tenn, TN NG rile. and GO 33, North Carolina
National Guard. 18 OCI 54, NC state file. DAMII- I-ISO; RepQI"/ of Ihe Chief Ntlliol/a/ Guard
B"reall, 1955.1'. 15.and 1956,1'. 21.
46 DA Bull 12, 1955; Crossland and Curri e, Twice Ihl' CilizC!lI, Pl'. 120- 27.
CHAPTER 10
The Search for Atomic

Age Divisions
Since we call1lOI equal 01/1" po/ellfial el/emies 011 a IIIWI jo/' 111(111 basis. we mils/ gilre
01/1' soldiers fhe means of increasing their ejJeclil'e firepower and we IIIIISI create (III
organization
fO
cOlI/l"ol il.
Col. Stanley N. Lonning]
After the Korean War the Eisenhower adm in istration adopted a military posture that emphasized nuclear capability through air power rather than ground
combat. Three considerations dictated this change: limited resources, a worldwide commitme nt to conta in commu ni sm, and the desire to reduce defense
spending. Given the declining number of ground combat troops, the Army fielded
fewer divisions, but because the possibility of nuclear war remained, Army leaders wanted to devise units that could fight and survive on a nuclear as well as on
a conventional battlefield. The divisions developed by the Army for the two combat environments we re sma ll er tha n in Ihe pasl , and they we re a uthorized
weapons and equ ipment sti ll under development and not yet in the inventory. The
newly designed divisions, however, staked out a role for the Army on the atomic
battlefield, which justified appea ls for funds to develop new weapons.
Exploring Alternative Divisions

Some Army planners thought a general war would be too costly to wage by
convent ional mea ns because the Commu ni st bloc coul d field more men and
resources than the Un ited States and its allies. Fi repower appeared 10 bc the
answcr for overcoming the enemy. Evcr sincc the Uni ted States dropped the first
atomic bomb in 1945, American military planners had pondered the use of
nuclear weapons on the battlefield. The Army, however, was hampered in its
effort to understand the effects of tactica l lluclear wea pons by the lack of data.
Studies suggested that nuclear weapons eoul d be used much li ke conventional
artillery. To achieve Ihe aim of increased firepower w ith decreased manpower, the
Army began to take a closer look at that proposition in the early 1950s.2
As had happened between World Wars I and II , the new divisional studies
began with the infant ry reg iment. Army Field Forces initiated the studies in 1952,
264
MA NEUVER AND FIR EPOWER
when it asked the Infantr y School to examine both infantry and airborne infantry
regiment s. FOllr goal s were to guide the effort: e limination o f non fi ghters; expan-
sion and more efTective use of firepower; simplifi cation and improved organization and con trol; and a reduction in the size of the regiment. Army Field Forces
dropped the last goal when it decided austerity should begin in serv ice and support units before being applied to in fan try and a irborne infantry regiments. Both
regiment s were to be ali ke except for the number of ant itank weapons)
The infantry regimen t recommended by the Infantry School consisted o f
three rine bHltalions, a headquarters and headquarters company, a service company, an antitan k company, and a weapo ns co mpany a rm ed wit h .50-ca liber
machine gu ns. Removed from the regiment were the medical, heavy mortar, and
tank comptlni es. Assets of the tank company were transferred to the division and
those of the heavy mortar company to the div ision artillery; instead of the medical company, medical personnel were assigned di rectly to the infantry batta lions.
The study proposcd mergi ng the heavy weapons company of each infantry ballal ion with the battalion headquarters company, except for the heavy .50-caliber
mach ine gun s, which were to be integrated into each batta lion'S three rine companies. Additional automatic rines were placed in the battalions, and more communicat ion personnel were assigned throughout the regi ment. 4
Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, COlllmandant of the Infantry Schoo l, had many
reservation s about the proposed changes and believed that thorough fi eld testing
was needed to evaluate thelll . As a result, an underequipped and understrength
325th Infantry, an clement of the 82d Airborne Divis ion, began testing the organiz.l tion in May 1953 and completed the eva luation in September. The results indicated that the proposed regimental organization was less effective than the one
then being used in Korea. S
In the meantime, the Tactical Department o f the Infantry School had al so
begun work on a new type of infantry division. The redesign effort also sought 10
e liminate nonfighters and to increase fire l>ower as well as to simplify the organi z.lti on and improve control at the divisional level by using task force organizations similar to those in the armored division. A fixed o rganization such as an
infantry regiment, the studi es noted, forced the comma nder to ba se hi s operatio nal plans on the organi zation rather than on the mi ssion. Task force structures
would permit him to organize his fo rces to accomp lish a broader vuriely of mi ssio ns. The di vision that evolved consisted of three brigade headquarters, nine
infantry battal ions, two armored batta lions, division arti ll ery, and combat and
combat service su pport. The brigade headquarters elements had no permanently
assigned combat or support units. No reduction resulted in the size of the di vision, which totaled 18,762 officers and enli sted men.6
In April 1954 Army Chi ef o f Staff Ridgway shined the emphasis of div isional studi es. Under pressure from the Defense Department for sma ll er units, he
noted that divisions had increased firepower and capabiliti es but were larger and
less mobil e than their World War II counterparts. The possib ility ex isted, he
THE SEARC H FO R ATOM IC AGE DIV ISIONS
265
believed, to make divisions more

mobile, morc fl exible, and less vulnerable to atomic attack. To achieve
suc h goa ls he directed Army Field
Forces to exp lore the fol low ing
seven objectives : ( I) greater combat
manpower ratios; (2) greater combat
to s upport uni t ratios; (3) greate r
nex ibi lily an d g reater mobi li ty in
combat units; (4) maximum use of
techno logical imp rovements; (5)
improvements in the Army's capability to sustain land combat; (6) development of tactica l doc trine to support the changes; and (7) reorganization of the un its by I January [956.7
Alt hough Army Fiel d Forces
L.;;..oIlI_ _
_ ~
became the executive agent for the
study, the Command and Ge ne ral
Gel/eral Ridgway
Staff College at Fort Leavenworth
did much of the work required to meet the tight sched ule. The study centercd
on infant ry and armored divisions bec<l llse of the simi larity bctween infantry
and airborne divisions. C hanges in the infa ntry division would automatically
apply to major aspects of the a irborne division. By the fall of 1954 Army Fie ld
Forces had developed the Atomic Field Army, or "ATFA- l," which it believed
could be organized in 1956.8
Under ATFA- l infantry and armored divisions were as similar as possible
(CharI 26). The infantry division included a separate headquarters battalion; signal , engineer, and tank battalions; seven infantry batl<llions; division arti llery; and
a support command. Withi n the di vision headquarters battalion were aviation and
reconnaissance com panies, and wi th ill its headquarters and service company were
three combat com mand headquarters along wi th the divisional staff. One 4.2-inch
mortar and two I05-rnm . how itzer battalions made lip the d ivision artillery. The
su pport command, a ncw orga nization, compri sed a battalion, which included
medical , maintenance, supply and transport, and personnel service companies.
Divisional elements lost all administrative Functions except those needed to maintain un it efficiency. Personnel for administration, mess, and maintenance functions
were concentrated in batta lion headquarters companies throughout. All staffs were
mi nimal ; the d ivisional G- I and G-4 func tions were reduced to policy, planning,
and coordina ting activities . Routine administrative and logistical matters were
moved to the support command. Infantry divisions, simi lar to armored divisions,
were to use task force organ izations as sit uatio ns required. Co mbat command
headquarters, the combat arms batta li ons, and the support units were the building
AVIATION CD
140
RECON CO
151
MEDICAL DET I
16
L
I
I
I COMMAND
COMBAT
m
363
HH&SVCO I
lNfBN
1,01998
D'VHQSBN_I
670
1
I
SIG BN
617
128
HHB
MEODET
33
'4<1
JU'MORTARBNI
81ge8
J
I
TANK BN 9O-mm
611
I lQ5-mm fA BN
I DIV ARTILLERY
2,539
-I
1
INFANTRY DIVISION
13.542
---1
-1
-1
-1
--1
PERS SV Co
SUPPLY &
TRANS CO
MAltfT CO
MED CO
HHe
SUPPORT BN
1,323
ENGR BN
639
CHART 26-Atomic Field Army Lnfantry Division, 30 September 1954
THE SEARCH FOR ATOM IC AGE DIVIS IONS
267
blocks. The strength of the di vision stood at approximately \ 3,500 officers and
en li sted men, a cut of nearly 4,000 from the 1953 division.9
The armored division (CharI 27) retained its task force structure. It consisted of
hClIdquarlcrs, signal, engineer, and reconnaissance battalions; three mediulll and
three heavy lank battalions; three armored infantry battalions; division arti llery; and
a support command . The headquarters batta lion was the same as in the infantry
division except for the reconnaissance unit , which was ,\ separate battalion. The
artillery was also similar to that in the infantry divi sion, but Ihe l OS-mill. howitzers
were sclf-prol>e llcd rather than towed. A maintenance 1>.111<11ion and a supply and
transport battalion were assigned to the support command, but the division had no
separate medical or personnel service units, those function s being integrated into
the support battalion. The strength of the division was approximately 12,000 ofTi
cers and enlisted men, a drop of almost 2,700 soldiers. 10
Wi thin both divi sions the designers of the Atomi c Field Army- I introduced
some sign ificant changes. Al l aircraft were gathered into an aviation company in
the headquarters battalion. The signa l battalion, rather tha n maintaini ng communications along various axes, provided a grid system that encompassed the en tire
division area. New FM (frequ ency modu lation) radios permitted that change.
Ant iaircraft gu ns were placed in the field arti ll ery battalions, and the military
police fun ct ions we rc s plit between the personnel service and the supply and
transport units in the support commands. Separate antiaircraft artillery battalions
lUld military pol ice companies disappeared from both divisions. Neither division
fielded nuclear weapons, which were in stead located at the f ield arllly level. I I
In February 1955 the 3d Infantry Divi sion in Excrcise FOLLOW M e and the
I st Armored Division in Exercise B LUE BOLT tried out these new organiZlilions.
The resu lts of the infantry division test showed that independent infantry battal ions and the combat commands added flexib ility and that the support COlllmand
provided an acceptable base from whi ch to improve logistical functions.
Generally, however, the division lacked Ihe capability to wage susta ined combat
operations. It needed more on-the-ground strength to execute norma l battlefield
missions during an atomic war and larger reconnaissance forces to cove r the
extended fro ntages and depths envisaged for the nuclear battlefield. Add itiona l
antitank and arti llery weapons were also required. Staffs at division, combat command, and battalion levels were too s mall to be fully e ffective. BLUE BOLT neither
proved nor disproved that the 1st Armored Division possessed less vulnerabi lity
to atom ic attacks. But the usc of the smne command posts for combat command
headq uarters and tank battalions increased the div ision's vulne rab il ity to air
attacks, as did the omission of the antiaircraft art illery batta lion.t2
Following the exercises Army Field Forces revised the two organizations, and
the 3d In fantry Division and 1st Armored Division again tested them, this time in
Operation SAGEBRUSH, a joint Army and A ir Force exercise. Both div isions
reta ined combat commands, but their statTs were increased to allow them to con
duct operations from separate command po!';ts. T he infantry di vision had two tank
HH&SVCO
MEODET
COMBAT
COMMANO
~
1
762"
11OS-mm FA BN
'" -I
HHB
876 ea
672
n
'45
14ZMORTARBNI
ME~fT _I
I HH
I
I
IARMORED ENGR BNI

741
I
I OIV ARTILLERY _I
l433
1 TANK BN 12C1-mm I
ARMORED INF BN
RECDN BN
8Ii8
59ge6
I' TANK BN 9O-mm
AVIATION CO
'15
DIV HQs BN
11,938
ARMORED OIVISIDN
-[
I
I
1 MAINT BN
1 I PE~tO~o"m I I MEDICAl CO I
1 SUPPORT BN I
SUPPlY &
TRANS BN
& SV CO
47J
SIG BN
1,859
I' SUPPORT CMD
CHART 27-Atomic Field Army Annored Division, 30 September 1954
THE SEARCH FOR ATOMIC AGE DIVISIONS
269
b.1ltalions and eight four-company infantry batta lions, while the armored division
had one heavy and three medium tank battalions and four infantry battalions of four
companies each. To improve command <lnd control, separate divi sion headquarters,
aviation, and administration companies replaced the headquarters battalion . The
divi sion 's artillery reverted 10 its traditional structure of a headquarters and headquarters ballcry, a medica l detach ment , and one ISS-mm. and th ree IOS-mm. howitzer battal ions with an antiaircmfl artillery battery in each batlalion. A reconnaissance battalion, identical to the one in the armored division, improved the "eyes and
ears" o rthe infantry division. Engineer resources were increased in both divisions,
and a bridge company was restored to the annored division. The support commands
in both organizations were restructured to consist of a headquarters and headquarters company, a band, military policc and medical companies, a maintenance battalion, and a supply and transport unit. In the infantry division the supply and transport unit rcmained a company, wh ile in the tank division it was a battalion. The signal battalion in both divisions continued to furn ish an area system of communications. These changes increased the st rength of the infantry division from 13,542 to
17,027 troops and the armored di vision from 11,930 to 13,971.13
Maj. Gen. George E. Ly nch, the "Marne" Di vision comma nder, and Maj.
Gen. Robert L. Howze, commandin g "O ld Ironsides," reached different conclusions about the revised divisio ns. Lynch found that the infan try division operated in much the same man ner as a conven tional division with an improved logistica l system. He nevertheless concluded that the Army shou ld return to the tradi tional divi sio n organ iza tion with three regimental combat team s, which, he
believed, were as fl ex ible as com bat cOlllmands. Furthermore, Lynch thought
regi mental organization fostered morale; encouraged teamwork between subordinate and superior commanders, as well as their staffs; provided know ledge
about capabilities and weaknesses of units and their leaders; and stimulated
cooperative working methods. Lynch's proposed changes raised the divi sio nal
strength to 2 1,678 officers and enl isted men. Howze, on the other hand, fo und
the imllored di vision genera lly acceptabl e. He suggested returning all mess and
second-echelon maintenance to the company level, converting the medical unit
to 11 b;:lttal io n, forming headquarters and service compani es or batteries fo r battalions ill all the arm s, conce ntniling antia ircraft resources into olle battalion,
and augmenting mai ntenance througho ut the division. Howze di d not specify
the strengt h of his proposed d ivision, but Lt. Gen. Jo hn H. Co ll ier, Fourth Army
com mander, in whose area the operation was conducted, reported on the test
and recommended 15,8 19 of a ll ranks.l4
In 1956 the U.S. Continental Army Command, whi ch had rep laced Army
Ficld Forces, distributed revised tables of organization fo r Atomic Field Army
divisions throughout the Army for review and comment. Whilc controversies persiste(~ the command noted that gain s had been made in the infantry division's
abil ity to carry Ollt a variety of missions and to prOtect itself aga inst atomic attack.
The Atom ic Field Army st udies refra ined from making IIny revolutionary changes
270

the
armored
div i sion.
Recommended changes incorporated
such desirable fea tures as the area
sys tem of communications , the
administrative services company as a
home for special staffs and the
replacement section, an aviation company for more Oexibil ity in the lISC of
a ircraft, and the new support command for better logistical support. IS
AI this poin t Chief of Staff
General Maxwell D. Taylor ca lled a
halt. On 10 April \956, he decided the
111
Army would not adopt the recommenda t io ns o f the Atomic Fie ld Army
studies. They were not achieving more
austere d ivisions, but, in fact , were
recommending units that were larger
Gel/eral Taylol"
than the post- World War II ones. He
directed the Continental Army Command to termi nate all init iatives concerning the
Atomic Field Army but to complete reports for future reference. 16
The Army 's search fo r austere units that could survive on bot h conventional and
nuclear batt lefields thus appeared to have gone nowhere. Those who had tested or
commented on the Atomic Field Army divisions either disagreed with or had misunderstood the overa ll objectives of Ridgway and the Army Staff. Maj . Gen,
Garrison 1-1 . Davidson, Commandant of the Command and Genera l Staff College,
opposed a " lean" division because he thought it would sacrifice tra ining between
the combat arms and services. He also thought that such a division was inappropriate for use as a mobilization base. The college, he noted, preferred "a very flexible
outfit , which could be beefed lip or skinned down as necessary on deployment."!7
Furt hermore, those who eval uated th e d ivisions paid li ttle heed to usc of
tactical atomic weapons . Over 250 sim ulated tests had been cond ucted in the
SAGEBRUSH excrcise. Taylor concl uded a ft er the exerc ises that "we in the Army
have a long way to go before we unde rstand the p ro blems of usi ng these
weapons," noting that "we wou ld have probab ly dest royed ourse lves and a ll our
friends had we tossed atom ic weapons about a real battlefiel d in the way we did
in th is maneuver." IS
Pentomic Divisions
In response to Ridgway 's directive in November 1954, the Army War College
had begun work on a study en titled " Doctri nal and Organizational Concepts for
Atomic-Nonatornic Army During the Period 1960- 1970," which had the shorl tit le
HIE SEA RCH FOR ATOM IC AGE DI VISIONS
27 1
of PENTANA. Ridgway wa nted the

study to outline broad doctrinal and
organizational concepts appl icabl e to
sustai ned ground co mbat on th e
Eurasian land mass during the period
1960- 70. Whil e the s tu dy was 10
make usc of the maxi mum technologica l developmen ts, includi ng nucl ea r
weapons of all types, Ridgway also

desired that the Army retai n a c.:'lpabil-
ity for conventiona l warfare. 19

Completed in December 1955. the
Army War College study ca lled for 11
completely air transportable 8,600man di vision to replace infantry, airborn e, a nd a rmored div isions . Th e
new di vision was to be built around
IOlsl Airborne Division simlilares
all l/fomie bomb blasr. ForI
Campbell. Kellfllcky. 1957.
f ive small , se lf- sufficie nt " battl c
groups" that would include thei r own

artillery. The ballte g roups were to
meet the tactical requirements for dis
persion of lorees, operations in depth, and increased Oex ibili ty and mobility on the
atomic battlefie ld. Organic divis ion artillery, although meager, included the Honest
John , a surface-to-s urface rocket with a nuclear warhead. The division had min imal
logi stical and admini strati ve support and lacked tanks, antiaircraft artillery, engineer, and reconnaissance units (ChaI'128).20
Not surprisingly, many Army leaders found the PENTANA division urla C
ceptable. When Genera l John E. Dahlquist, commander of the Continenta l Army
Command, forwarded the st udy 10 Washington, he noted that the reaction of the
arms and services to the division was directly related to the impact of the proposal o n their strengths and missions. Those who perceived an increase in responsibility endorsed the idea , those who saw no change acqui esced, and those who discerned a diminution o r strength s and responsibili ties vio lent ly opposed it. The
Armor School objected to the lac k of d ivisional tank s, th e Artillery Schoo l
desired more conventiona l artillery, and the Com mand and Genera l Staff Co llege
questio ned the division 's stay ing power. The most damning comment ca me rrom
Chief of Engi neers LI. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr., who considered the concept
"comp letely unacceptabl c inrellect ually and scientifica lly."21
Nevertheless, Ch ief of Sta fTTaylo r approved the PE NTANA study on I June
1956 as a goal for future research and deve lopment of new weapons, equipment .
and organizations. It was not an entirely new idea for him. As Ihe commander of
the Eighth Army he had ex perimen ted with a division havi ng five subordinate
elements in the Korean Army. In th e meantime, the Army wa s to fill the gap
272
'. , '
Honcsl johll rockel laUl/cher
between what it had and what it wan ted by adopli ng modified versions of the
concep t, using new weapo ns and eq uipm e nt as th ey became avai lab le. He
beli eved that until the goal of a PENTANA div ision could be reached, the Army
wou ld conti nue to need infantry, airborne, and armored divisions.22
Be fore Tay lor approved the PENTANA study, he had d irected the reorganization of the airborne division using a modification of the concept. He j udged the
ex isting airborne di vision incapable of function ing effective ly either in an airborne role or in susta ined ground combat. It could nei ther be divided into balanced task forces nor be ai rl ifted. Taylor suggested a division of 10,000 or 12,000
men organi zed in to five battl e g roups Ihal fie lded nuclear weapons. Including
such arms in the division, he believed, would bolh sti mulate the ir deve lopment
and assist in developing doctrine for their Llsc.23
On 15 December 1955, the Continenta l Army Command subm itted a proposal for an airborne di vis ion that incorporated feat urcs of bot h the PENTANA and
ATFA studies. Each one of its five battle groups would consist of fou r infantry
com panies; a 4.2-inch mortar battery; and a headq uartcrs and service company
co mp ri s ing engi neer, signa l, su ppl y, maintenance, reco nnai ssance, assa ult
weapons, and medical resources. A di visional support group made up of a maintcnance battalion and admini st rati ve, medical , and supply and transport companies provided logist ica l services. The di visional command and control battal ion
assets incl uded the di vision headquarters, a headquarters and service company, an
aviation com pany, and a reconna issance troop. A signal battalion furnished a grid
communication system, and a sma ll engineer battalion provided Ihe resources
needed 10 const ruct an airst rip within fo rty-eight hours. The artillery fi elded three
c-
AOMIN CO
114
MEO CO
136
210
SPEC OPS CO
147
20Bea
240
MAl NT CO
196
ARTIlLERY BTRY
215
INFANTRY CO
HH&SV CO
HH & SV CO
82
SUPPORT GRP
528
AVIATION CO
209
400
ARTILLERY BN
772
1,279 ea
SIG BN
HQs BN
566
HH&SVCO
COMBAT GRP
PENTANA DIVISION
8,661
CHART 28- PENTANA Division
274
105-mm. howitzer batteries (eigh t pieces each) for direct support an d one nuclear
weapons battery. equipped with two cumbersome 762-111111 . Honest Joh n rockets,
for general support. Planners sacrifi ced the range of the I 55-111m. howitzers to
gain lhc air deliverability of the I05-mm. howi tzers and their prime movers. No
command leve l intervened between the division headqu arters and the bailie
groups or between the battle groups and company-size units, speedi ng response
time. StatTs for all un its were minimal. Because orthe lean nature orthe division,
mess fac ilities were e liminated except in the med ical company and the headquarters company oCthe support group . ln stea(~ the Continental Army Command recommended the attach ment of a food service company in garrison.24
Tay lor approved the concept in Februa ry [956 with the followi ng mod ifications: the addition ofa fifih infantry com pa ny 10 each battle group, an increase in
the number of 105-111m. howitzer batteries from three to fi ve (while reduci ng Ihe
number of pieces from eight to five), inclusion o f a band, and Ihe eliminat ion of
the attached food service com pany. He al so wanted the admin istration company
moved from the support group 10 the com mand and conlro l ba tt alion and Ihe
artill ery group redesignated as div ision artillery.2S
Followi ng Taylor's guidance, the command published tabl es of organization
and eq uipment on [0 August 1956 known as ROTAD (Reorganization of the
Airborne Division). The division had 11 ,486 officers and enlisted men (CharI 29),
and, for the first time in its history, all men and equipment, except for the Honest
Johns, could be carried on ex isti ng aircraO. The des igners of the new division
thought that it was capable of operating from three to five days independently, but
it would need to be reinforced fo r operations that lasted for a longer period.26
To teSI what Taylor ca lled the new "pcntomic"27 division, he se lected his former unit, the IOlst Airborne Divis ion , then serving as a training division at Fort
Jackson. On 31 Apri l [956, the d ivision moved without its personnel and equipment to Fort Cam pbe ll, Kenlueky, where it was reorganized, acquiring personnel
from the 187th and 5081h Regimental Combat Teams and equ ipment from the
I I th Ai rborne Division thai had been left at Fort Campbell after the unit had participated in the GYROSCOPE program.28
The "Screamin g Eagles" conducted a series of individual unit eva luations
rather than one divisional exercise. LI. Gen. Thomas F. Hi ckey, the test director,
judged the new division suitable for short-duration airborne assaults, with improved
prospects for survival and success during eit her an atomic or a conventional war.
However, he noted mitior deficiencies in the direct support artillery- its short range
;:md lack of lethal ity; in logistical resources, which were less effective than in the
triangular division; and in the total st rengt h of the division. The division was so austere that it could not undertake garrison duties and ma intai n combat readiness.29
To remedy these weaknesses, Hickey recommended replacing the 105-mlll.
howitzers wi th 155-111111. pieces except fo r parachute assaults. Instead of five howitzer batteries, he proposed folll'. The larger howitzer would give the direct support
art illery the range he believed that the division required. Also, si nce the fifth battle
AM'
, Includes the division band.
I AIRBORNE DIVISION
CHART 29- Airborne Division (ROTAD). 10 August 1956
276
group in the division was to be held in reserve, he proposed deleti ng its direct support artillery battery. Other recommendations included elim inating the support
g roup and reorganizing the logistical resources, except for mai ntenance organized
<llong func tional lines, in a pre- Atomic Field Army configu ration. A 10 percent
increase in divisional strength was suggested, as well as an enlarged garrison complement wherever a pentomic d ivision was stationed. Hickey wished to move the
administration company to the rear because ils fu nctions d id not require the uni t's
presence in the forward area; he thought the infantry p1<lloon should be eliminated
from the reconnaissance troop because it lacked the mobility of the troop's other
clements; and he wanted a mi litary intel ligence detachment added to the division's
headquarters batta lion to help with order of battle, photograph ic interpretation, and
other 0 - 2 duties. Fi nal ly, he advocated an increase in the grades of the eomman ~
ders of the riOe companies, morl'ar batteries, and howitzer batteries to make their
nm k commensurate with the responsib ilities associ,lIed with independent actions
requ ired on the " pentomic bl.ltt lefield."30
The test find ings and Hickey's recommendations worked thei r way through the
Continenta l Army Comma nd. Dah lqu ist agreed with most o f Hickey's proposals
except for the art illery and support g roup. He believcd that 105mm . howitzers
shou ld be retained as direct support weapons becausc they could be airlifted in two
helicopter loads or towed by 3/4-ton trucks. Rather than decreasi ng the number of
artillery batteries, he wanted the di vision to retain fi ve, each wi th six pieces. He
opposed changes in the support g roup because its structure had not been fully test
ed, and he fel t that Hickcy's reeommcndation to cli mi nate it was premature,3'
T he Army Staff ag reed w ith Da hlqu ist's views regarding the nu mber of
arti llcry batteries but 1I0t 011 increasing the number of pieces in each battery. No
change in the support g roup won approval , and the sta fT opposed the eliminat ion
of the infantry platoon from the reconnai ssance troop, the addition of the military
intelligence detachment, and alterations in the rank of company and battery com
manders. The Continental Army Command published tables of orga nization for
the pentomie airborne division reflec ting the views of the Army Staff in June
1958 without a change in unit's overa ll strength. Both the 82d and 10 I st Airborne
Di visions adopted them by December,32
Shortly after the 101 5t Airborne Divi sion began testing ROTAD, Taylor d irect
ed the Continental Army Command to develop a new infant ry divi sion along simi
lar pentagonal lines. It was to have fi ve battle groups (a headquarters and scrvice
company, one mortar battery, and fou r in fantry com pan ies each); conventional and
nuclear arti llery; tank, signal, and engi neer battalions; a reconnaissance sq uadron
with g round and air capab ili ties; and train s. T he trains, who commander was
responsible for the activities of the service troops in the rear area, were to incl ude
a transl>ortation battalion, an avi ation company, and an admi nist ration company.
The transportation batta lion was to have sufficient armored personnel carriers to
move an en tire batt le g roup at o ne ti me, and the aviation company was to be
placed in the trains fo r beller supervi sion of its ma intemU1ee. Taylor wanted to
THE SEA RCH FOR ATOM IC AGE DIV ISIONS
277
optimize the span o f control in the division by giv ing cflch commander the maxi
mum number of subordinate c lement s that co uld be co ntro ll ed effectively. He
be lieved such a division could be organ ized wilh \3,500 men of all ranks, a reduclion of nearly 4,000 from the 1955 inFantry division.3)
On 15 October 1956 the Continent"] Army Command forward ed manning
charts (Chart 30) for " ROClD" (Reorganization o f the Current Infantry Division)
to Washington. The planners followed Tnylor's general guidance but recommended
a division slightly larger than expected. They provided the tank and engineer battalions with five companies each and the division arlillcry wi th two battalions- five
batteries of I05-mm. howitzers in one and an Honest John rocket, one 8-i nch howitzer, and two 155 -mm. howitzer batteries in the other. Each 105-mm. howitzer battery fielded six pieces and boasted of its own fire direct ion center, and each mortar
battery in the battl e group had assigned liaison, fire direction, forward air controller, and forward observer personnel. In addition to headquarters and headquarters detachment and band, the division trains included medical , ordnance, and transportation battal ions and aviation, administrative, and quartermaster companies. 34
Taylor hesitated to adopt the pentagonal structure fo r the armored di vision
because he fea red that such a change would make the organization too large.
Nevertheless, Lt . Gen. Clyde Eddleman , the Deputy Chief of Sta ff fo r Military
Operations, instructed the Continental Army Command to mode rni ze the division by adding atomic weapons, increasing target acq uis it ion capabi lities, and
reduc ing the number o f vehicles. To ca rry out his wishes, the com mand added a
reconnaissa nce and survei llance platoon to the recon naissance batta lion , provided ai rcraft in the aviation company to support it, and replaced the 155-mm .
howitzers in one battery of the general support battalion w ith 8-i nch howitzers
that could fire nuclear rounds. No signifi cant reduction in the number of vehi c les took place becau se the atomic and conventional battlefie lds req uired more
transportation resources than au thorized in the exist ing divi sion. A comma nd
and con trol batta lion that included administration and aviation companies was
added. To o ffset increases in the divis ional elements, the comma nd e liminated
the antiaircraft artill ery balta lion.35
On 5 Nove mber 1956 the Army Staff approved the pen tomic armored division wit h some exceptions. The staff directed the formation of se parate divi sional headquarters, aviation, and admin istrative compani es in place of the suggested command and contro l battal io n and moved th e administration company
to the tra ins. The fanne r 155- mm . how itzer battal io n was reorgani zed as a composite unit compri sing an Honest Jo hn, an 8-i ncll howitzer, and two I 55-ml11 .
how itzer batteries. The Army published the 'ROCA D" (Reorganization of the
Current Armored Di vision) tables rcnccting these changes in December 1956.
They call ed for a d ivision o f 14,61 7 offi ce rs and enli sted me n (Cha,., 31) , 34
fewer than included in the 1955 tables. The tan k cou nt stood at 360, of which
54 were armed w ith 75-111111. guns and 306 with 90-mm . guns. All the medium
tanks were in four tank ballalio ns.36
279
Reorganization of the Divisions

After the Con tinental Army Command compl eted the tables o f organization
for infantry and armored divisions, Taylor met with Army school commandants
all 28 February 1957 to sell them on the pentamic reorganizat ion ort he Army. He
noted that the doct rine of massive retaliation ruled oul nuclear war, but that the
chance existed that war might stem from unchecked tocal aggression or error.
The Army had to be prepared to preven t or SlOp a sma ll war as well as conduct a
nucl ear conflict. He believed that the new divisions, although controversial , cou ld
meet both challcnges)7
More importa nt was what Taylor did not say about the pentam ic divisions and
why the Army was adopting them. The Army's budget called for unglamorous
weapons and equipmen t such as rines, machine guns, and trucks, which had little
appea l for Cong ress or the nation . Secretary o f Defense Charles E. Wilson earli er
had returned the Army's budget to Taylo r, di recting him to substitute "new fan gled" equipment that Congress would support.
The Army's literature soon reported on such ideas as "convertiplanes," which
combined the advantages of rotary-wing and fixed-win g aircraft ; one-man " nying platforms"; and the adoption of pentomic di visions, which fie lded nuclear
weapons. Later Tay lor wrote, " nuclea r weapons were the going thing and, by
including some in the division armament , the Army stClked out its claim to a share
of the nuclear arsenal."38
When reorgani zing Regular Army infantry and armored div isions in 1957
under the pentomic structure, several major changes were made in the fo rce to
accommodate a cut o f 100,000 men and changing world conditions. In the Far
East, the United StCltes agreed to withdraw a ll ground combat troops fro m Japan.
Subsequently the 1st Cava lry Di vision moved to Korea, where it replaccd the
24 th Infantry Division. While the 7th Infant ry Division rema ined in Korea, the
24 th was eventually reorganized in Germa ny to replace th e 11 th Ai rbo rne
Division. Also in Germany, the 3d Infantry Division rep laced the 10t h Infantry
Division, which was returned to Fort Benning as part of GYROSCOPE. With these
changes U.S. Army, Europe, st ill fielded five d ivisions, the 3d and 4th Armored
Divisions and the 3d, 8th, and 24t h Infantry Di visions. The European command
also retained an airborne capabi lity by reorga nizing two battl e g roups in the 24th
Infa ntry Di vision as ai rborne units. At FOri Benning, Georgia, the 2d Infan try
Division, whi ch ea rlier had been reduced to zero strength, rcplaced the 10th
Infantry Divi sion, wh ich was inactivated. T he 5th Infantry Division was al so
inactivated at Fort Ord ; the I st Armored Di vision , less it s Combat Com mand A,
was reduced to zero strength ; and the 25 th Infantry Division was clli onc battle
group. When the g.lme of musical chairs wit h d ivision s was over, the Regular
Army consisted of fiftee n div isions. In most cases only the division names and
nags moved, not the person nel and equipment. These changes in the di visional
designat ions reflected the desire of Army leaders to keep divisions wi th outstand-
uc,.,
ARMOR EO OIVISION
CHART 31 - Annored Division (ROCAD), 1956
THE SEA RCH FOR ATOM IC AGE OIV ISIONS
281
ing histories on the active rolls. Most soldiers, however, did not understand the
rationale, and unit morale su ffcred.39
As the Army reorganized and shumcd divi sions around the wo rl(~ it adopted
the Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS) for infantry, arti llery, cavalry. and
armor. During the ATFA and PENTANA studies a debate arose regarding unit
designations. Traditionally regiments were the basic branch element , espec ially
for the infantry, and their long hi stories had produced deep traditions considered
essen tial to unit esprit de corps. The llew divisional structure, replacing infantry
regiments wit h anonymous bailie groups, th reatened to destroy all these trad ition s. Sec rcta ry of the Army Wilbe r M. Brucke r sClIled the question on 24
January 1957 when he approved the Combat Arms Regimental System. Although
regi ments wou ld no longer exist as tactica l units except for armored cava lry, certain dist ingu ished regiments were to become " parent" organizations for the combat anns. Under the new concept, the Department of the Army assumed control
of regimental headquarters, the repository for a un it 's lineage, honors, and tradition s, and used elements of the regiments to organize battle groups, battal ions,
squad rons, companies, batteries, and troops, which shared in the history and honors of their parent units.40
When infantry regiments were e liminated in di visions as tactic,,1 units, they
wcre also elimiml tcd as nondiv isional organizations. The Army rcplaced the nOlldivi sional regim e ntal combat teams w ith se parat e, flexible com bin ed arms
" brigades," shi fting the concept o f a brigade. Instead of being composed of two
or more regiments or battalions of the same arm or service, the concept encompassed a combined arms unit equivalent to a reinforced regiment. Initially only
two brigades were formed. First was the 2d Infantry Brigade, activated at Fort
Devens on 14 February 1958 to replace the 4th Regimental Com bat Tem11 . No
tables of organization ex isted for the unit , which at the time consisted of a headquarters, two batt le groups, one artil lery battal ion, a reconnai ssance troop, two
engineer and two armor companies, and trains. The last e lement was an adaptation o f the trains of an infantry division and consisted of a headquarters clement
and administration, ordnance, quartermaster, and medical companies. A miniature division, the 2d Brigade had 4 , 188 omcers and enlisted men commanded by
a bri gadier general. To support the Infantry School at Fort Benning, the Third
Un ited Stales Army organized the 1st Inrantry Brigade on 25 July 1958. It contained two bailie groups; one arti llery battalion (onc Honest John, onc ISS-111m.
how itzer, and two 105-mm. howitzer batteries); armor, transportation, and eng ineer companies; and signal and chemica l platoons, but no trains. A colonel commanded the 3,600 officers and en listed men assigned to the unit Al
Evaluating ROCID and ROCAD

After com pl et in g the pentomic reorgan izat ion in the Regular Army, the
Cont inental Army Command conducted rurther tests ort he new organizations. In
282
general , such efforts eli cited favorab le reports, fin ding the divisions to be adequate for atom ic and convent ional warfarc. In particular, the com mand noted the
new infantry d ivision's flexibility, unity ofcomrnalld, mobility, and decisive combat power in terms of nuclear firepowe r. The infantry d iv isi on, however, suffered
from deficiencies in four arcas- stayi ng power, grou nd surveillance, artillery
support , and staff organization. To correct these problems, the command made
several recommendations: addi ng a fiflh rifl e company and a radar sect ion to
each battle g roup; eliminat ing the 4.2-illCh mortar as an art illery weapon (but
retaining some in the headquarters company of the batt le g roup); reorga nizing the
artillery into one d ivisional composite battalio n (one Honest John and two 8- inch
howitzer batteries) and five I05/ 155-mm . howitzer battalions (two self-propelled
a nd three towed); and bo lstering the aviation company wit h an ai rcraft fi el d
mai ntenance element, an av ionics repair team, and approach control teams. More
staff offi cers were esse ntia l, part icul arly for th e G- 3 operation sections. The
transportati on battalion's truck com pany was found to be inadequate, and officers
in the field suggested that a ll com pa nies in the battalion be equ ipped wi th
armored personnel carri ers.42
As in the development of the pentomi e airborne di vision, rank structures also
ca me under sc rutiny. Beca use of the increased com mand respons ibilit y, the
Continental Army Command recommended that the commander of the headquarters com pany of the bail ie g roup be raised from a capta in to a major and that
commande rs of the small er art il le ry battalions be redu ced fro m lie utenant
co lonels to maj ors. Compared to an infantry regiment , th e new battle group
lacked bil lets for majors, a circumstance that would adverse ly affect the career
pattern of infantry ofTicers.43
On 29 December 1958 Depu ty Chief of Staff for Military Operations Lt.
Ge n. James E. Moore ap proved the recomm endat ion s for reorgani z in g the
infantry division with some changes. He rej ected changes in the grades of the
commanders of artillery batta lions and the headquarters company of the battle
g rou ps and vetoed additional armored personne l carri ers for the transportation
battalion. He dropped an 8-i nch how itzer battery from the composite art ill ery
battalion , leav ing it with on ly one 8- incll howitzer battery and one Honest Joh n
battery, and split the headquarters company of the battle g roup into two organizat ions, a headquarters company and a combat support com pany. All tactica l
su pport, includin g the radar section and the reconna issance, heavy mortar, and
assault weapons platoons, were to be co ntained in the batt le grou p's combat
su pport company to achieve improved command and control. A separate transportat io n detachment was added to provide thi rd-echelon aircraft maintenance .
With this g uidance in hand, the Cont inental Army Command publi shed new
tables of o rga ni zation for the division , wit hou t a c hange in its overall
strength- 13,748 of all ranks (ChoI"l32).44
For the armored division , fu rther tests led to a number of minor adjustments.
These incl uded mov ing the reconnaissance ,md surveillance platoon in the recoll-
." .,. "
StG BN
531
INFANTRY DIVISION
261
AV!AT!ON CO
CHART 32- Pentomic Infantry Division, I February 1960
O!VTRA!NS
284
naisSClncc squadron to the aviation company, providing a transportation aircraft

maintenance detachment to support the aviation company, and reorgani zing the
reconna issance squadron as in the infantry divis ion . Observers also saw the need
for an a lternate , or backup , div isional command post, a larger starr for the
artillery coordination center, and the establishment of a radiological center to
detect radioactive contaminates. Minor alterations were also to be made in the
service units to slipport these new a lign ments. All changes in the armored divi ~
sia n were made withoul increasing its strength of 14,61 7.45
In 1959 and 1960 the Army placed Regu lar Army infan try and armored divi*
sians under the revised tables that resulted from the field tests. Also, to meet a
Depal1ment of Defe nse manpower ceiling of 870,000, the Army Staff decided to
eliminate the 9th Infantry Division at FOri Carson, Co lorado. The Fifth United
States Army reduced the division to zero strength and later inactivated it, cutting the
number of active Regular Army divisions to fourteen. In Korea the Army conti nued
to resort to the Korean Argumentat ion to U.S. Army (KATUSA) program, begun
during the Korean War, to keep the 1st Cavalry Div ision and the 7th Infantry
Division al Fu ll strength; each division was assigned about 4,000 South Koreans.46
The Army Staff had delayed reorganization of the reserves, but in 1959 it
decided to realign National Guard and Army Reserve d ivisions under pentomic
structure s. A controversy immediate ly surfaced over the required number of
reserve di visions. Secretary of Defense Neil H. McE lroy dec ided on 37 divisions,
27 National Guard and 10 Army Reserve. By I September [959 the twenty-one
infantry and six armored divisions in the Guard had reorgan ized, and one month
later ten Army Reserve infan try divisions completed their transit ion, bu t at a
reduced strength. T he eleventh combat division, the 1041h, in the Army Reserve
was converted to training, For a tota l o f th irteen trai ning d ivisions, all of which
were in the Army Reserve.47
Fo llowi ng the pattern establ ished by the reg ulars, the states elim inated nOI1div isional regi mental com bat teams From the Guard and replaced th em with
separate combined arms brigades. Hawaii , Puerto Rico, and Arizona organized
the 29th, 92(~ and 258 th Infantry Brigades, respectively. T hese units had varying numbers of combat arms elements but lacked trains needed to support independent operatioll s.48
When reserve units began to adopt pentomic con figurations, the Continental
Army Command developed separate organizational tables for train ing div isions.
These tables perm itted the Army Reserve to retai n the ex isting authori zation o f
th ree genera l ofTicers- the commander and two ass istant comm anders- and
ensured standardization of these noncombat divisions. Each training di vision COllsisted of a headquarters and headquarters company, five regiments (an advanced
indi vidual , a common spec ialist, and three basic combat training regiments),49 a
rece iving company, and a band (Charf 33). Each div ision in reserve status had
about 3, I 00 o f all ran ks and on mobi lization would rUll a rcplacement training
center capablc of training 12,000 men. The cont inen tal armies reorgani zed the
NOTE'3d Bn lAdY Indill Tngl include$:

lemll
IAdvlndiv l'ng)
lOrd!
IAdvlndilll'ngl
IMed) (Ady Indiy Tng)
IMP)
(Adv Indill Tng)
NOTI'2d Bn (Ado Indill Tng!ineludes:

(AD AllY! IAdv Indiy Tng)
(FA!
IMylndillTng)
2 (EnO') (Ady IndillTng)
CHART 33-Training Division, 1 April 1959
286
M ANE UVER AN D FI RE POWER
training divisions in 1959, and the adjutant general offic ially redesignated them
as " divi sions (training)."50
One of the objectives of the pentamic reorgani zation was to enable the units
10 absorb new eq uipment. The M I4 riflc, a 7.62-calibcr fifl e that could fire in
semiautomatic or automatic modes, rcplaced the vi ntage M 1 rifle, the carbine, the
subma c hin c g un , and the Brown ing automat ic rin e; th e 7.62 -calibc r M60
machine gun rcplaced the heavy water-cooled and light air-cooled Browning .30caliber machine guns. These new weapons simplified production ; reduced spare
pa ris, maintenance, and training time; and used standard NATO cartridges, permitti ng greater compatibility with Western European weapons. The diesel-powered M60 tank , armed with a 105-mm. gun , and the low silhouette, ai r-transportable M 11 3 armored personne l carrier also entered the Army 's inventory.
Work began on new antiaircraft weapon s, recoilless rines, and 4.2-inch mortars,
but most did not become available for several more years.51
When the Army completed the pentomic reorganization in 1960, it had 5 1
combat divi sions in its three com ponents ( 14 in the Regular Army, 10 in the
Army Reserve, and 27 in the Natio nal Guard), 5 infantry brigades (2 in the
Regular Army and 3 in the Guard), and I Regular Army armored combat command. Although divisions were organi zed for nuc lear warfare, only a few were
actually ready for combat. Some Regular Army divisions continued to conduct
their own ba sic trainin g courses to reduce costs and personnel , and Korean
nati onals served in the di visions in Korea . Guard units ranged between 55 and 71
percent of the ir authorized strength s, while Army Reserve organi zations vari ed
from 45 to 80 percent. 52
[n sum , as the Ei senhower administration reduced the Army's budget from
$ 16 billion to $9.3 billion between 1953 and 1960, the total force dropped to the
lowest number of divisions since the beg inning of the Korean War. On the surface, chang ing concepts of warfare during thi s period led the Army to adopt pentamic divisions, structures that fell ou tside traditional organ izational practices.
But whatever the concerns of Army leaders for opcratin g on a nuclear baltlefiek~
Taylor, the primary force behi nd the new divisions, clearly was using the pcrllomic concepts to get increases in the military budget from political leaders who were
less interested in supporting more conventional military systems. Nevertheless,
the fertile ideas of this period resulted in new organizational concepts and ncw
eq uipment and weapon systems, all of which were to see further development in
the next two decades.
THE SEA RCH FO R ATOMIC AGE DIVISI ONS
287
Notes
1 Col Stanley N. Lanning 10 Acting Assistant Commalldlllll, The lnf.1ntry School (TIS). 23
Apr 53, sub: Proposed Reorganization orthe Infantry and Airborne Divisions, UA 27.51 15
(4/23/53), Infantry School Library (ISL), Fort Benning, Ga.
2 John J. Midgley, Deadly /IIusivlls: Arm)' Polity for the Nuclear Balllefieid (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1986), pp. 2- 5.
3 LIT, OCAFF to CG, Infantry Center, 28 Apr 52, sub: Organization or the Infant ry Regiment.
28 Apr 52, AnNO (Deputy ChicfofSlafT, G- 3-Tmining)-23 32216 (Regt) (28 Apr 52), ISL.
4 Report of 0011rd of Officers, 10 CG. Infantry Cemer, 11 Aug 52. sub: Report of Board of
Officers, ISL.
5 lsI Ind, T IS 100CAFF. 11 Aug 52. sub: Report of Board of Officers. GNKEAD-R 320 (11
Aug 52), and Ltr, In(hntry School Rcprcscntnti vcs, XV III Airbome Corps, to CG, XVIII Airbonlc
Corps, 25 SCIl 53, sub: Rcport of Evalu:llion, Phasc III, Operation FA LCON, Infantry School
Represcntativcs, AIlCGC (Airbornc Corps General Correspondcncc) 353 Opn FALCON , ISL;
OCAFF, "Summ:lfY of MajoT Evems and Problems, FY 1953," ch. 8, pp. 1- 12, DAM H-I-ISR.
6 Llr, Attack Group, Tactical Department, T[S, 28 Jul 52, sub: Proposed Reorganization of
Infam ry Units, ISL; Col Lonning to Acting Assistant Commandant, T IS, 23 Apr 53, sub: Proposcd
Reorganiz..1tion ofthc Infant ry and Airborne Divisions.
7 Matthew Il, Ridgway, Soltlier: The Memoirs ofMllllhcw B. Ridgway (Ncw York: Ha rper and
Brothers, 1956), pp. 286- 87; Llr, OCors to OCAFF, 19 Apr 54, sub: Organizational Studies to
Improve the Anny Combat Potcntial-Io-Manpower Ratio, RG 337, Anny Field Forces, NARA.
S Midgley , Deadly IllusiollS, pp. 44 - 45; Llr, OCo fS 10 OCAFF , 19 Apr 54, su b :
Organizational Studies to Improve the Anny Comb:ll Potential-to-Manpowcr Ratio, LIT, OCAFI: to
Chief of Information , Department of the Army (CINFO), 13 Sep 54, slIb: Fact Sheet, Project
ATFA-I (hereafter cited as Fact Sheet, Project ATFA-I , 13 Scp 54), both An'IS (OCAFF,
Infonnation Section) 320, RG 337, NARA.
9 Fact Shcct, Project ATFA-I, 13 Sep 54; TOE 7 ATFA, Infantry Division, 30 Sep 1954.
to Fact Sheet, Project AT FA-I, 13 Sep 54; TOE 17 ATFA. AmlOrcd Divisio n, 30 Sep 1954.
II Fnct Sheet, Project ATF A-I, 13 Sep 54.
t2 LIT, CQNA RC 10 TAG and othcr addrcsscs, 25 Apr 56, sub: Concept and Technical Rcview
of the Tentative 1956 ATFA Inf.,ntry Division, A'n'NG-D&R (Office of the CofS, G- 3- RC SC:L rch
and Development, 322150 ( Div) (25 Apr 56), and Llr, CO NARC 10 TAG and other nddrc~ses, 23
May 56, sub: Concept and Technical Review of the Tentalivc 1956 ATFA An1lOred Division,
ATTNG-D&R 322/ 16 (Div) (23 May 56), both Division General file, DAM H-HSO; Midgley,
Deadly Iffusiom', p. 49.
t3 Moenk, Large-Scale Arm)' Mall/tllL'e/':;, pp. 205- 20; TOE 7, ATFA Jnf.1nl ry Division, 30
Jun 1955; TOE 17, ATFA AmlOred Division, 30 Jun 1955.
t4 3d Infantry Division, Final Evaluation Report on thc ATFA Infantry Division (TOE 7T), 15
hn 56, Command and General Staff Collegc (CGSC) Library, Fort Leavenworth. Kan s.; Llr,
CONA RC to TAG and olhcr addrcsses, 25 Apr 56, sub: Concept and Technical Rc vicw of thc
Tentative 1956 AT FA Infantry Di vision, ATTNG-D&R 322150 ( Div) (25 Apr 56), RG 337.
NARA; Llr, 1st Armd Div to CG, Fourth An11Y. I Jan 56, sub: Final Report on Exercise B LU E
BOLT II , AKDHD-CG 354.2, and Llr, Fourth An11Y to CG, CONARC, 13 Fcb 56, Final Report,
Exercisc BLUE BOLT II, AKADC-M-BEG 354.2, both casc Library; Llr, CONARC to TAG and
other addresses, 23 May 56. sub: Concept and Technical Review of the Tentative 1956 ATFA
Armored Division. ATTNG-D&R 322/ 16 (Div) (23 May 56). RG 337, NARA.
15 Ltr, CONARC to TAG and other addresses, 23 May 56. sub: Concept and Technical
Review of the Tentative 1956 ATFA Armorcd Division, :wd Llf, CONARC to TAG and other
addresses, 25 Apr 56, sub: Concept and Technical Review of the Tentalive 1956 ATFA Infant ry
Division.
16 Ltr, TAG to CG, CONARC, 6 Jun 56, sub: The 1956 Army Rcorganization, AGAM-I'
288
(Office of the Adjutilnt General, Pllblications Branch) 320 (5 Jun 56) DCSOPS, Division General
file.DAMH-HSO,
17 Llf, Garrison H. DavidSOillO Willard G. Wyman. 2 1 Feb 56, cose Library.
18 Mocnk, La/'ge-St:alc Arm)' MtII/el/l'(!rs, p. 212; Transcri pt of Address by Gcncml Maxwell
D. Taylor, Chief of Slaff. United SI,ltcs AmlY, Before the Amly School Commandants, Room 2E7 1SA . The Penta gon, Washington, D.C" Thursday, 28 Feb 57, CS 322 (I Feb 57). RO 319, NARA.
19 lIf. 0 - 3 10 CO, CONARC, 17 Nov 54, sub: Organization of the Amly During the Period
FY 1960- 1970, RO 319. NARA; Midgley, Deadly IIIIISioIlS, pp. 58- 59.
2Q L1f, CO NA RC 10 TAG and olher addresses, 28 OCI 55, sub: P ENTANA Army ( U) ,
ATSWD (Combat DcvcloJltllcl1ts)-G- 322/4 (Anny) (28 Oct 55), 322/4 (A rmy). RO 3 19. NARA.
21 Ltr, John E, Dahlquist to Maxwe ll D. Taylor, 12 Dee 55, 3221191AmlY 6- 10 Aug 56, RG
3 19, NA RA,
22 Taylor. Sll'Qrd~ (Illd Ploll'sllflres, pp. 152- 53; John M. Taylor, Gel/aliI Maxwell T(I)"for:
The Swol'ff alld Ihe Pel/ (New York: Doublcday, 1989). PI), 198- 99; Ltr, Maxwell D. Taylor to CG,
CONA RC, sub: Amly Organization. I Jun 56. Division General file, DAMH-HSO.
23 lIr. Cors to CG . CONARC. s ub : Reorganization of the Airbome Di vision and the
Development of Special Airbome Reconnaissance Units, 20 Sep 55. RG 3 19, NA RA.
24 Llr, CONARC to Cors, 15 Dec 55, sub: Reorgani zation of the Airborne Division (S),
ATSWD 322/3 1 (Div) (15 Dec 55), 10l st Abn Div fite, DAMH-HSO. During the planning for the
pentomic reorganiziltion the Army returned to use troop and sq uadron for cavalry reconnaissance
units.
25 Llr, DCotS for Military Opernliol1li to CG, CONARC, 20 Fcb 56, sub: Reo rganiza tion of
the Airbornc Division, O PS OT DC 2, IOlst Abn Div Iile, DAMH-HSO.
26 TOE 57T, ROTAD, Airborne Division, 1956; CONARC, "Summary of Major Events and
r' robl ems, 1956," vo l. I, Doct rine and Req uirement s Divis ion, G3 Section, I Jan- 30 Jun 56,
Reorganization and Test of the Airbome Division (Project ROTAD). pp. 1-4, DAM H-I-l SR.
27 Taylor coined thc Madison A\'cnue tC1l11 " pentomic" to describe units org(LIlized with pentago nal stnl ct ures and atomic capllbililies. Sec T;lylor, Swords IIlId Plowshares. p. 17 1.
2H DOD News Re lease No. 1205--55, 14 Dec 55, Ltr, TAG 10 CG, Third Army. 4 Jutl 56, sub:
Reorgani za tion of th e 10Ist Airborne Division. AGAOO (M) 322 (23 May 56) DCSPER. and
Wil ber Dnlckcr, Address before AMVETS N:ltion:ll Conven ti on, I Sep 56,:111 IOlst Abn Div fil e,
DAMH-HSO; "Run Dow n on the 101," 111'111)17 (Oct 1956): 5 1- 53,
29 CONA RC, "Suillmary of Major Eve nts and Proble ms, r Jul 56- 30 Jun 57:' vol. I, ch. 2, pp.
1- 5.
30 Ibid., p. 6- 12.
31 Ibid,
J2 Ibid., p. 13; CONARC, "Suillmary of Major Evenlsand Pro blcms, I Jul 57- 30 JUIl 58." vol.
3. Organiza1ion and E<tuip lllc nt Division. pp. 1-4. DAM H-HSR; TOE 570. Airbome Division.
1958; Ltr, TAG to CG, Third Army, 19 Nov 58, sub: Rcorgani za tion of the 82nd and IOls1
Airbomc Divisions, AGAO-O (M) 322 (20 Oct 58) DCSPER, 10lst Ab n Div filc, DAMH-HSO ;
"The Army's Mont h," ;/1'111), 8 (Ap r 1958): 20.
JJ Ltr, CofS 10 CONARC, 23 Aug 56, sub: Reorgani zat io n o f Current Infantry Di vis ion,
Division Gcncrnl file, DAMH-HSO.
34 lIr. CONARC 10 DCotS for Military Operatio ns and oth cr addresses, 15 Oct 56, sub:
Reorg:mization ofCurrcnt IllfiUltry Division, ATI'NG-D&R 322/53 (Div) (15 Oct 56). and lI r, CG,
CO NARC, 10 Cors, 2 1 Dec 56. sub: Basic Doctrinal G\lidance in Connection with New (ROClD)
Division Organization, ATeG (CG, CONA RC), both Di vis ion Genernl fite, DAM H-HSO.
3S Taylor' s address. 28 Feb 57: CONA RC_ "Major Events an d I'roblems, r Jul 56- 30 Jun 57."
vol. r, Doctrine and Rcquircmcnts Division. G3 Section _ 1 Jan- 30 Jun 57. pp. 20- 23.
36 CONARC, "Major Evellts and I'roblems. I Jul 56- 30 Jun 57," vol. 3, Orga ni za ti on and
Equipment, G3 Section, pp. 3- 7; TOE 17T ROCAD, AmlOred Division, 1956.
37 Taylor's addrcss. 28 Fcb 57.
38 T;!ylor, Swords (Illd P/olI"sl/fll"es. p. 171: Glcnn Hawki ns. "Un ited States FOl"Ce Structure
289
and Force Design lnilillli vcs, 1939- 1989," Ms, pp. 35- 36, DAMI-I-RAD; "rnfnntry of Tomorrow,"
Anny, 6 (Sep 1955): 47--48; "Let's All Fly on PlullonllS," Army 6 (Dec 1955): 25.
39 OF, omcc, Deputy Chief ofStafi" for O]>CJ1llions (DDeSOrS) 10 Sec of the General SlatT
and other addresses, sub: Reorga ni zation of Di visions. 2 Ma y 57, O I'S OT OR I, I'c ntollli c
Divisions, Di vision General file , Ur. TAG to CinC, U.s. Anny, Pacific (USARPACj, and olher
addresses, 22 Aug 57, sub: Transfer of the 241h Infantry Division and Reorgani zation o f the ls\
Caval ry Division, AGAO-O (M) )22 (16 Aug 57) DeSPER, Ll r, TAG 10 CinC, USA R.I'AC, and
olher addresses. 29 Aug 57, same subject, AGAO-O (M) 322 (2 7 Aug 57) DeSPER, Llr, TAG 10
CinC, U.S. Army Euro pe (USAREU R), and other addresses, 8 Feb 57, sub: Reorga ni zation of
the I st Infantry Di v is io n, AGAO-O (M) 322 (5 Feb 57) DCS I' ER. LtT, T AG to C inC,
USA REUR, 21 Jun 57, sub: Reorgani za tion of the 2d Armored Divisio n, AGAO-O (M) 322 (13
Jun 57) DCSPER , L1r, TAG to CGs, CO NA RC, and Third U.S. Arm y. 17 Mar 58, sub: Change
in Status of the 2d and 10th Infantry Di vis ions, AGAO-O (M) (5 Feb 58) DCS PER, Llr, TAG to
CinC, USA RE U R, and other addresses, 30 Aug 57, sub: Reorga ni zation of the 3d Armo red
Di vision, AGAO-O (M) 322 (26 Aug 57) DCSPER, Ltr, TAG to CinCo USA REUR, 26 Dee 57,
sub: CIl<lnge in StalllS of Certain Units, 26 Dec 57. AGAO-O (M) 322 (1 3 Dec 57) DCSPER , Ltr,
TAG to CinC, USA REUR , and othcr addresses, 12 Mar 57, sub: Reorgani zation of the 4th
Armored Division, AGAO-O (M) 322 (6 Feb 57) DCS PER, Ltr, TAG to CG, CON ARC, and
other addresses. 27 Mnr 57. sub: Reorgani za tion of the 4th Infantry Div is ion. AGAO-O ( M) 322
(25 M;Lr 57) DCSPER, Ll r, TAG to CG, U.S. Army Far East, and other addresses, 3 1 May 57,
sub: Reorgani za tio n of the 7th Infantry Divisio n, AGAO-O (M) 322 (24 Ma y 57) DCS I' ER, L1r,
TAG to CinC, USA RE UR. 16 Jul 57, sub: Reorgani zation of the 8th Infantry Di vis ion, AGAO-O
(M) 322 (10 Jul 57) DCSPER, LtT, TAG to CinC, USA RE UR, and other addresses, 13 Nov 57,
sub: Reorgani zation of the 9th Infantry Division, AGAO-O (M) 322 9th Inf Div (8 Oct 57)
DCSPER, LtT, CinC, USA RE UR, and o ther addresses, 14 Jun 47, sub: Reorga ni zation of the
10 t h Infantry Division, AGAO-O ( M ) 322 (3 1 May 57) DCS PE R. Ltr. TAG to C in C,
USA REUR, 20 Feb 57, sub: Reorgani zation of thc 11th Airbornc Di vision. AOAO-O ( M ) 322
( 19 Feb 57) DCSPER, Draft leller. un dated, sub: Organization of the 24th Infnntry Di vision, LIT.
TAO to CinC, USA REUR , I I Fcb 57, sub: Reorga ni zation of the 1st ArnlOred Division, AGAOo (M) 322 (5 Feb 57) DCSPER , Ltr, TAG to COs. CO NA RC and Fourth U.S. Arm y, 5 Dec 57,
sub: Change in Status of Certain Uni ts, AGAO-O (M) 322 ( 13 Nov 57) DCSPER, and Llr, CGs,
CONA RC and S ixth U.s. Ar my, 27 Ma y 57, sub: Inacti vill ion of the 5t h Infantry Division,
AGAO-O (M) 322 (24 May 57) DCSI)ER , all AG Refere nce files; and Historical Data Cards.
Di visions, DAMH -HSO.
40 Memo, St'C of Aml y for See of Defcnse, 31 Jan 57, sub: Comblll AnllS Reg imenta l System
(CA RS). and Fact Sheet, undated. sub: Combol Arms Regimell1al System, both CARS fiks, and
News Relense, Historic Tmditions of Regiments to be Preserved in Pentomic Army. 7 Feb 57.
Division General file. all DAM H HSO.
41 CONARC, "Summary o f Mlijor Evell1S and !'roblems. I Jul 56- 30 lUll 57;' vo l. 4, Doctrinc
and Re(luireLllents Division, G3 Section . I Jan- 30 Jun 57, pp. 18- 19; Infomlll!ion Paper: Scpamte
Combined Anns Brigades in the Reserve COmlXl1lents. 30 Apr 58. Brigade General file. Llr, TAG
10 CGs, CONA RC and First U.S. AmlY, 12 Feb 58, su b: Organization of the 2d Infantry 13rigllde,
AGAO-O (M) 322 (5 Feb 58) DCSPER, and Ltf, TAG to CG, Third Army, 8 Jill 58, sub: Change
in Status of 1st Infantry Brigadc and other units. AGAO-O (M) 322 ( I 1 Jun 58). DCSPER. all AG
Relcrcnce fi les: and Historic;ll Dnta Cards, 1111 DAM H-HSO.
~2 Llr. CONA RC to DCors for Military OI}cl1ltions, 28 Aug 58. sub: Evaluation of ROClD,
ATING- D&R 3221 17 (Div) (28 Aug 58). Division Gencml fi le, DAM H-HSO.
43 Ibid.
4~ 1st Ind, O DCSOI'S to CG. CO NA RC, 29 Dec 58, sub: Evoluotion of ROCID. OI'S OT OR
2, Division Geneml file, DAMI I-I ISO; TOE 7D. Inf.1ll1 ry Di vision, 1960.
4~ John A. Beall. "Revisions of ROCAD," Armor 68 (Mar- Apr 1959): 48- 51; TOE 170,
Armored Division. 1960.
46 Ltf. TAG to CG, Fifth U.S. Army, 14 Jul 60, sub: Reorganization of the 9th Infantry
290
Division, AGAO-O (M) 322 (27 lUll 60) DeSPER, and Ltr. TAG to CG, Fifth U.S. Anny. 30 Jan
62, sub: inactivation of 9th Inf;'utry Division and 9th Mili tary Intelligence Detac hment, AGAO-O
(M) 322 (23 Jan 62) DeSPER. 9th Inf Div file. DAMH-I-ISO; HistoriC(Ll Data Cards for the 1st, 2d,
3d, 41h, 7th, 81h, 9th, 241h, and 25th Inf Oivs, the 2d, 3d, and 4th Anlld Divs, and lSI Cav Div.
DAM H-l-ISO: Ullile(1 Siules f)l1ell.I'(I P()licie~' ill 1959 (WashinglOll . D.C.: Government Printing
Office, (964). p. 32; Amlllaf Report oflhe SecrCI(II), of lite , 11"111)'. Jllly I. 1959. /0 Jlllle 30. 1960, p.
143: Skaggs. "The KA T USA EI>pcrimcnl." p. 55.
4110hn W. Bowell, "Reorganizing the Reserve Components," AI"/I/)' Ill/orma/ioll Digesl 13
(Nov 1959): 11- 15; AIIIIlIO/ Report 0/ tile Chie/. Natiollal GlI(mi BIII"(!(II/. FY 1960, p. 33; Fact
Sheet on Department of the Anny Revised Plan for Reorganization of the United States Army
Reserve, unda ted, Army Reserve liIe; Ltr, TAG to CG. Sixth U.S. Army. 31 Mar 59, sub:
Reorgani:anion of the 63d Infa ntry Division. AGAO-O (M) 322 (16 Mar 59) RES, Ltr. TAG to CG,
First U.S. Anny, 7 Apr 59, sub: Reorganiza tion of the 77th Infa ntry Division, AGAO-O 322 (20
M:,r 59) RES. Ll r, TAO to CO, Second U.S. Amly. 17 Mar 59, sub: Reorgan ization of the 79th
Inl;1 ntry Division, AGAO-O (M) 322 (2 M:lr 59) RES, LIT. TAG to CG, Third U.S. AmIY, 10 Apr
59. sub: Reorganization of the 81st Infllntry Division, AGAO-O (M) 322 (26 Mar 59) RES, Ll r,
TAG to CG, Seeond U.S. AmI)" 19 Mar 59, sub: Reorganiz'lIion of the 83d Infantry Divisio n,
AOAO-O (M) 322 (2 Mar 59) RES, leT, TAG to CG, Fourth U.S. Army, 19 Mar 59, sub:
Reorga ni7.ntion of the 90th Infantry Division, AGAO-O (M) 322 (3 Mar 59) RES, Ltr, TAG to CO,
First U.S. Anny, 6 Apr 59, sub: Reorga niz.1tion of the 94th Infantry Division. AGAO-O (M) 322
(16 Mar 59) RES. Ltr, TAG to CG. Sixth U.s. Anny, 29 Apr 59, sub: Reorganization of the 96th
Infantry Division, AGAO-O (M) 322 (10 Apr 59) RES. L1r, TAG toCG. Fifth U.S. Anny, I I May
59. sub: Rcorganiz,1t ion of the 102d Infantry Division, AOAO-O (M) 322 (I May 59) RES, Ltr,
TAG to CG, Fifth U.s. Ann)'. 20 Apr 59. sub: Reorganization of the 103d Infantry Division.
AOAO-O (M) 322 (10 Apr 59) RES. Ltr, T AG to CG, Sixth U.S. Army, 30 Apr 59, sub:
Redesigna tion and Reorganization of the 1001h Infantry Division, AGAO-O (M) 322 (24 Apr 59)
RES, all DAM H-J-ISO.
48 Infommtion Paper, Separa te Combined Arms Brigades in the Reserve Components, 30 Apr
85; Ltr, NG B to AG, Hawa ;i, 23 Jan 59. su b: Troop Allotment. ConSOlidation, Conversion,
I~e designation , and Reorganization, AmI)' NG Units, NG-AROTO, Ltr, NG B to AG, Arizona, 4
Feb 59, sub: Reorgan ization of AmlY NG 1958- 60, NO-A ROTO 325.4 Arizona. Llr. NG B to AG,
Puerto Rico, 6 Feb 59, sub: Reorga niz.'Ition of the Amly NG 1958- 60, NG-AROTO 325.4-Puerto
Rico, all National Guard state liles, OAMH-HSO.
~9 Regiments in training divisions were nOi tactical units, therefore fell outside the Combat
Anus Regimental System.
SO TOE 29- Tf. Division Trnining, 1959; Fact Sheet, Department of the Amly Revised Plans
for Reorganization of the United Slates Ann)' Reserve; see notes, Historical Data Cards for the
70th. 76th. 78th. 80th. 84th, 85th, 89th. 9lst. 95th, 98th. lOOth. 100th. and 108th Divs (Training).
OAM H-HSO.
St AIIII//al Reporl 0/1/1(' Secl"ct{IJJ' 0/ D,1clI.\e. 1959. pp. 169- 81.
52 DCSPER, The Troop Progr;lI11 of the Amly, Annex I, TrOOI) BlLses Dllta, Current Ac tions
Strength. 30 J Uri 60. liP. 29- 35. ACot'S Reserve Components. Reserve Components Control
Program of the Anny, FY 1960, Pl'. 53- 96. Omee. Chief of Amly Reserve and Reserve Omecr
Trnini ng Corps. "Summary of Major E\'ents and Problems, I Jul 60- 30 Ju n 61:' p. 14. all OAM II!-I SR: /1111/11(11 RepoI"I o/Ih" ellie/. Nmiomt/ Glford 8111"c(IIl. F;.~c(ll I'C(lI" 1960. p. 33: Donald
McGowan. "Anny National Guard Today," A,.my III/OI"II/(/lioll Digest 15 (Mar 1960): 17.
CHAPTER II
ANew Direction-Flexible Response

I alii directillg Ihe Secrcrmy oj DeJellse 10 /lllderlllke {/ reorganization (1l1d lIIodem-
iZ(llioll oj Ihe Army '0\' divisiol/al structure, /0 increase ifs IIOu -lIl1e/car firepower. to
improve its tacticaf lIIobility ill (IllY cl/viral/melll, fa insure ilsjlexibility 10 lIIeel (IllY db'eel
or illdirect '''relll, /0 fiu:iliflllC i/~' coordillmiOll wilh 0111' major allies, (lmiIO provide //lure
lIIodel'll mechanized divi~'iolls ill EUl'ope alld bring 'heir equipment lip 10 date. alld [IV
provide) /lew airbome brigades ill b011l th e Pacific ({lid Europe.
President John F. Kennedy !
President John F. Kennedy ushered in the era of " flexible response" in 196 1,
deciding that the threat of a general nuclear war had become remote, but Ihat the
possibility of brush- fi re wars had increased. To meet the varied challenges of the
era, the Army soon abandoned pentomic structures and struck out in new directions. Even tually divisions with a standard divisional base and interchangeable
maneuver elements- infantry, mechanized infantry, airborne infantry, and armor
baual ions--cmerged as a means of tailoring units for service in diverse environments. The idea theoretica lly resulted in more nex ible forces and divisions that took
ful l advantage of new equipment, in particular new tanks, armored personnel carriers, and helicopters . International events delayed immed iate reorganization, and
when the Army was able to act , constra ints on personnel and fu nds forced the adoption of many compromises in the structure of the divisions that emerged.
MOMAR-I
To move beyond the unrealistic PENTANA concept of a universal d iv ision,
General Bruce C. Clarke, com mander of the Continenta l Army Command, put his
staff to work in early 1959 on a new organizational model, the "Modern Mobile
Army 1965 (MOMAR- I)." Clarke, who had served as Gene ra l Maxwe ll D.
Taylor's deputy in Korea, believcd the Army of the future had to be capable of
operating effectively on both nuclear and nonnuclear balllefields anywhere in the
world against a variety of threats. Its units had 10 be capable of fighting independently or semi-independently under a diverse set of geographica l and climatic
condit ions. Furth crm ore, he be li eved that conve ntional fire power had to be
increased and tactical mobi lity and maneuverability improve{~ primarily by using
armor-protected vehicles and aircraft.2
The M60 alld. below, M48 f(lnks
A NEW DIRECTION- FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
293
When completed, MOMAR-l called for heavy and medium divisions (Clwrls
34 (lnd 35), Both types had five combat commands, but within the commands
were th ree task fo rce headquarters to which commanders could assign tank and
infant ry compani es and clements of a train (su pport) company and "morilzer"
battery. The proposed morilzer was to be a cross between a mortar and howitzer.
Thus, the new models retained the fl exible command structure of the armored
division and foreshadowed the idea of "bui lding blocks" around which to organi ze forces. Every man and every piece of equipment in both divisions was to be
ca rried or mou nted on veh icles)
War ga mes indicated that medium and heavy MOMAR-J divisions cou ld not
meet the Army's needs in many potential trouble spots throughout the world, and
they were never fi eld tested. In December 1960 the Vice Chief of Staff, General
Clyde Eddl eman, rejected the concept entire ly. He noted that MOMA R-I divisions lacked the si mplici ty, homogeneity, versati lity, and fl ex ibility that the Army
needed to fulfil l its worldwide responsibility in the coming decadc.4
The Development of ROAD

General Eddl ema n set the Army o n a new organizat ional co urse on 16
December [960 when he directed General Herbert B. Powell, who had replaced
C larke as commander of the Continental Army Command, to develop d ivisions
for the period 1961- 65. The vice chie f wanted the command to consider infant ry,
armored, and mechani zed di visions. The heart of his mechani zed division was to
be armored infantry units that had the mobility and the survi vabi lity needed for
the nuclear battlefield. But all divisions were to have both nuclear and conventional weapons, as well as any other new wea po ns o r eq uipment that might
become available by 1965. Because of the many areas for potential employment
throughout the world, Eddleman suggested that divisions be tailored for d ifferent
environmen ts. However, since he still wanted 10 make the types of divisions as
simil"r as possible, Eddleman instructed the planners to weigh the retention of
battle g roups or their rep lacement with infant ry battalions in bot h infantry and
ai rborne divisions. Hc quest ioned whether those divisions should have a combat
command or a reg imenta l command level between the division com mander and
the battal ions as in the armored division. Furthermore, preliminary evidence suggested the possi bility of interchanging battalion-size armor, mech"ni zed infantry,
infantry, and artillery uni ts within the divisions. No set strengths were establ ishcd
for divisions, but Eddleman expected nonc to exceed 15,000 men,S
Eddl eman 'S instructions renectcd many of th e orga nizational ideas he had
developed after leaving the position of dcputy chie f of staff fo r military operations
in May 1958 and before returning 10 Washington as the vice chief of slMT in
November 1960. In the intervening period he served as commander of U.S. Army,
Europe, and Sevent h Army, becoming involved with the establishment of the West
German Army. That army, unlike those of some NATO countries that had "dopted
CHART 34-Medium Divis ion (MOMA R), 1960
296
pentagonal di vis ion s, employed a

bui lding-block approach to organiza-
tion. Rather than establi shing permaIlC ll t
infantry and armored div isions,
Ihe Germans rel ied on infantry and

a r mored brigade s that would be
formed into divi sions tailored for specific mi ssions. The German brigades,
although fixed organ izations, could
a lso control additional ballalions. To
increase flexibility, elements of armor
and mechani zed infantry batta li ons
could be interchanged to form combat

teams heavy in infantry or annor.6
In less than three months Powell
subm itt ed
s tud y
entitled
"Reo rga n iza ti on Objective Army
Div isio ns ( 196 1- 1965) ," usua ll y

called ROAD, 10 the Army Chi ef of
Staff, Genera l George H. Decker.
Un like the
P EN TANA
and
MOMA R- I studi es, ROAD did not address the gene ra l reorga ni zat ion of the
Army; it dea lt only wi th infa ntry, mechanized in fantry, and armored div isions.
Using the armored divis ion as a model, the study ca lled for all three to have a
common base to which commanders could assign varyi ng numbers of "maneuver" (i.e., g round combat) c lements- infantry, mechani zed infantry, and tank battalions. The predomi nant maneu ver element determined whether the division was
classified as infantry, mecha nized infantry, or armor.7
The base for every ROAD divi sion wou ld consist of a hetldquarters element,
which included the divi sion commander and two assistan t division commanders;
three brigade headquarters; a military police company; aviation, engineer, and signal battalions; a reconnaissance squadron with an air and three g round troops; division artillery; and a support command. The di vision arti llery incl uded three 105mm. howitzer battalions, an Honest John rocket battal ion, and a composite battalion (one 8-inch and three 155-mm. howitzer batteries). All artillery was self-propelled. The division artillery commandcr, however, WllS reduced from a brigadier
general to a colonel. The support command embodied a headquarters and headquarters company, an admini stration company, a band, and medical , supply and
tmnsport, and maintcnancc battalions. Although structured alike in all divisions, the
supply and transport and the maintenance battalions varied in strength and equipment to accommodate the missions of the divisions. Thc commander of the support
command assumed responsibility for all di visional supply, maintenance, and medica l services and the rear mea activi ties, includ ing security. Supply and maintenance
Gel/eml El/d/ell/tlll
A NEW DI RECT ION- FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
297
functions were to be provided at onestop service points. Elements of the support

command were designed so that they could be detached and sent to support task
fo rces in independent or semi-independent operations. The brigade headquarters,
like the combat commands in the existing armored di vision, were not to have permanent ly assi gned uni ts and were not to enter the adm inistrative chain of command; instead, they wcre to functi on exclusively as command and control headquarters, supervising from two to five maneuver elements in tactical operations.8
Respond ing to Edd leman 's wishes, the designers of ROAD determined that an
infantry battal ion was more appropriate than a battle g roup as the main build ing
block of the infantry division. Benefits of a battalion inc luded a better span of control, simpler traini ng procedures, g reater dispersion on the battl e fi e l(~ and more
career opportu nit ies fo r infantry offi cers. In the batt le g roup, the commander's
effecti ve span of control was too great. He had so many diverse elements to supervi se (infantry, arti llery, engineer, med ical, signal , reconnaissance, supply, and maintenance) that he found it difficult to manage the uni t. A return to the infantry battalion would simplify command and control , log istics and maintenance, and al so
training. Gi ven the need for d ispersion on the battle field, the study noted that 20
percent o f the pcntomic infant ry di vision 's com bat strength was in each battle
group. The loss ofa single battle group in combat wou ld be Significant. With nine
infa ntry battalion s, the new di vis io n would lose o nly II pe rcent of it s battl e
strength if one o f its battalions were hit by nuclear fi re. [n addition, many situations
in combat required a greater variety of responses than the batt le group could easily
provide. Some tasks werc too large for a company but too small for a batt le group;
others call ed for a forcc larger than one battle g roup but sma ller than two. The
smal ler-size infantry battalions appeared to answer those needs. Finally, the batt le
group provided little oppo!1 un ity for infantry officers to gain command experience.
If the batt le group were ret a i ne(~ only 5 percent of the Army's infantry lieutenant
colonels wou ld receive command ass ignments and only 4 percent of the majors
would serve as second-in-command. Weighing all these aspects, the planners recommended that infantry battalions replace batt le g roups.9
In an e ffort to provide maximum homogeneity, simplicity, and fl exibility, the
maneuver battalion s were kept as simi lar as poss ible consistent with their individual roles . Each infant ry, mechani zed infa ntry, and armor battalion comprised a
headq uarte rs, th ree lin e compani es, and a headqua rters and se rvice company.
Similarity among the maneuver batta lions extended to the reconna issance platoons, which were the same in all battalions, and to the platoons in the reconnaissance squadrons. Given battalions of this nature, companies and platoons could
be lIsed to bui ld task forces for spec ifi c operations with a minimum of turbulence. Taking advantage of the latest weapons, all infantry battalions and reconnai ssance squadron s had two Davy Crockett s, low-yield nuclear weapo ns that
were considered the " Sunday punch" of tile ROA D divisions. Infantry and mechanized infantry battalion s also had the new ENgin-Teleguide Anti-Char (ENTAC)
missi le, a French-designed antitank weapon . to
298
With fixed bases and va rying

numbers and types of maneuver bat ~
la lions, planners env isaged that d ivi
sia ns could be tailored in three ways.
The first, "strategi c t,lilori ng," gave
the Army Starf th e op portunity 10
design un its for a part icular environment; the second, "i nlernallaclica llailori ng," allowed the division commander to build combat teams for specific
missions; and the third, "external tactical w iloring," pe rm itted army or
Davy Crockelf rocket laul/cher
corps com manders 10 alter divis ions
according to the ci rcumstances. In the past, divisions had been adapted in all three
ways, but ROAD made such tailoring easier at all levels. 1I

On 4 April 1961 officers from the Continenta l Army Command and the Army
Staff briefed Decker on the concept, and he approved it nine days later. He told
Powell, however, that divisions were to be largely fixed organizations because the
Army lacked the resources to maintain a pool of nondivisional maneuver ballalions
for intra- or inlenheater tailoring. In Decker's opinion, the interchangeable characteristics of the battalions were sutricicnt to provide tai lori ng within and among divisions wi thout keeping ext ra units. He asked Powell only to consider substituting
towed artillery for self-propelled artillery, elim inating the I 55-mm. howitzers, and
reorganizing the rocket balla lion SO that it would includc both an Honest John rocket
and two 8-inch howitzer batteries. The amount of organic transportation in the
infantry battalion also seemed excessive, and Decker wanted reductions if possible.
The st udy provided only two Davy Crocketts for each infantry battalion and reconnaissance squadron; Decker suggested adding a third, making one available for each
line company or troop in those units. As a priority, Decker wanted doctrine and
training literature to be quick ly developed, panicu larly for the support command.
Doctrine for the employment of nuclear weapons rema ined unclear. 12
Within a few months the Continental Army Com mand published draft tables
fo r ROAD infantry, mec hani zed infantry. and armored divi sions (CharI 36). They
ca lled for I05-mm. howitzers in the infantry division to be towed and a 30 percent reduction in the organ ic transportation of the infantry battalions. The 155mm .l8-inch howitzer battalion remained as planned, but a new rocket battalion
was designed consist ing of a headquarters and service e lement and two Honest
John batteries. Each in fant ry batta lion and reconnaissa nce squad ron had three,
instead of two, Davy Crocketts.13
Be fore briefing Chief of StalT Decker o n ROAD, Eddleman asked Powe ll 's
Conti nental Army Com mand to have ava il able a concept for reorganizing the
airborne divisio n along s im ilar lines. Th e v ice ch ief of staff believed that
ROAD cou ld be modi fi ed to incorporate lighter eq uipment for such forces. Fo r
286
HHe
/Ian; I Strength
wi.
YlUY
PLUS
RECON SOON
788
II
11
T~:K
4D5tARMORED)
401 iMECHI
SIGBN
S17
depending On the combination 01 m8nuever elements assigned.
II
ME~INF
VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF
:; II
"
Includes one 8" HOW BTAY
290
AVIATION BN
ROAD
CHART 36-ROAD Division Base, 1961
810 (ARMOREDI
1,879 (ARMORED)
300
U"/e Johll rocket lallllclte,.
example, the a irborne division would not need as many infantry or tank batta lions <IS other units, towed art ill ery could be substituted for self-propelled, the 8inch how itzer battery cou ld be elim inated, and a ligh ter rocket cou ld be used in
place of the Honest John. 14
Afte r the ap proval of ROAD, the Contine nta l Army Command qui ck ly
applied the concept to the airborne division. It s airborne study ca lled for a division base similar to ROAD units. For the arti llery. the 3 18-111111. Little John rocket
replaced the larger Honest John, and two batteries of Little Johns along wit h a
battery of 155-mlll. howitzers formed a composite artillery batta lion. They recommended deleting the bridge company from the ROAD engineer battalion and
reducing the airborne d ivis ion 's reconnaissance squadron by one ground troop.
The light tank battalion was to be equipped wi th new M551 Sheridans, armored
reconnaissance airborne assault vehicles, but, pending thei r avai labil ity, the unit
would employ I06-lllm. recoill ess rifles mOllnted on 1/4-lon trucks. 15
In September 1961 the Army Staff approved the concept in principle with
minor modifications. The new 90-mll1. self-propelled antitank guns (M56 SPATs)
would replace the recoilless rifles, and the number of vehicles was cuI throughout
the division. When the tables (Char' 37) were published, the airborne divi sion
tdso lacked the COIll I)Qsite art illery battalion because the 155-111111. howitzer was
not air-transportable. Instead, the Litt le John rockets were organized into a twob.. ttery bmta lion.16
The doctrine of flexible response requ ired combi ned arms units smaller than
divisions, ilnd the Continental Army Command responded by developing an air-
BOE HHC
118 ea
-I
II
TANK BN
492*
828
I05mm HOW
FABN
4508a
INFBN
II
FA BTRY
LITTLE JOHN
123
I
1 ,HHC
witt vary depending on the number and type of manuever elements assigned.
351
I. MAI:;BN_I
SUPPLY III
TRANS BN
396
1.702
SUPPORT CMO
I MEDICAL BN_I
I. AOMINCO_I
314
&~AND
4f)7
SIG BN
643
579
CAVSQDN
ENGR BN
3/0
1,661
AVIATION BN
-I
I
OIV ARTILLERY
* Number and type of maneuver battalions may vary.
NOTE 1 Strength
1/8
HHB
156
134
MPCO
HHC
NOTE I
AIRBORN E DIVISION
CHART 37-Airborne Division, 1961
RECON TRP
171
HHO
39
TANK CO
101
99
MEO CO
ENGR CO
147
SUPPLY &
TRANS CO
188
MAINT CO I
173
SUPPORT BN
635
NOn: 1Strength will vary depending on the combination of manuever elements assigned.
ADMIN CO
136
450
FA BN
105-mm TOWED
* Number and type of maneuver battalions may vary.
HHC
248
NOn: 1
AI RB ORN E BRIG AD E
CHART 38- Airborne Brigade, 1961
A NEW DIRECTI ON- FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
303
borne brigade. Like divisions, the bri gade had no fixed structure but consisted of a
base, which could command and control from two \0 five maneuver battalions. The
brigade base consisted of a headquarters company; a recon naissance troop; light
tank and engineer companies; a lOS-mill. howitzer batta lion; and a support battalion (Cllarl 38). Within the latter organiz.1lion were admin istrative, med ical, supply.
transport, and ma intenance resources that allowed the brigade to conduc t indepen-
dent operations. The brigade, however, had limitations, incl udi ng inadequate air
defense arti llery and ai rli ft resources. Its mobility on land was rest ricted by its limited number of org<lnic vehicles. Nevertheless, the brigade met most of the Army 's
requirements fo r a small airborne combat team. At the Army Sta ff 's direction, the
idea was extended to armor, infantry, and mechan ized infantry brigades. Since such
units could operate independently or rei nforce divisions, thcy prom ised to greatly
increase the overall fl exibility of the fi cld army.! 7
Powell suggested to Eddlemen during the early development of ROAD Ihal if
il were .Ipproved the Army s hou ld have a comp rehens ive inform ation plan
explaining the rat ionale for sueh a major reorga nization. Both the mi li tary and the
general public had to be rcminded that organizati ons evo lved in respon se 10 past
experience and new eq ui pment. Furthermore, politica l implications had to be
consi dered. General Taylor, the primary advocate o f pentomic d iv isions, then
servi ng o n the Wh ite HOllse statT, migh t question the radical shifi. Also, the
reserve community might object to the turbu lence so soon aOer com pleti ng the
penlomie reOlgan ization.1 8
Powe ll 's des ire for a publicity plan received a boost when the new Kennedy
admin ist ration , reacting to the worldwidc struggle with comm uni sm, dcc ided to
improve the readiness of th e na tion's mili tary forces. 011 25 Ma y 196[ ,
Pres ident Joh n F. Kennedy announced to a jo int sess ion of Co ng ress thaI the
Army's di visiona l fo rces wou ld be moderni zed to increase conventi ona l firepower, im prove lactical mobil ity in any environment , and ensu re nex ibi lity. In
addition, separat e bri gades wou ld be organi zed to hel p mcct direct o r indi rect
threats th roughou t the world .19
ROAD Delayed
Kennedy's statement im pl ied an immed iate l-corganization, but international
events delayed changes. Du ring the summer of 1961 relations between the Sov iet
Uni on and the United States deterioratcd, particularly over the status of Bcrlin ,
and o n 25 July the president asked Cong ress for fund s to fill cx isting pentomic
d ivisions and modernize their equipment. He also sought authority to order the
reserves to a yea r of acti ve duty. Congress agree(~ and the Army postponed the
ROAD reorganization.20
To answer Sovie t in iti a tives in Be rlin , Sec re tary of Defe nse Robe rt S.
McNamara d irected that the five divisions in Europe be brought to full table of
o rganization strength and that th e 3d, 8t h, and 241h Infa ntry Di visions each be
ElcmellfS oJ the 32tf Il/fill/tlY /JiI'isiulI trllill lit Fort Lewis. Wushillgtull. durillg
the Berlin (; ,.i.~is: below, pre-positiol/ell equipment ill GermallY (limits the
(//.,.;\'(// oJthe 4th Armorell /Jil'isiull ill Operatioll BIG LtFT.
A NEW DIRECTI ON- FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
305
au thorized an additiona l 1,000 troops. The troop increase permitted the complete mechanization of the divisions with additiona l armored personnel carriers. The read in ess of the Strateg ic Army Force wa s in creased in the United
Stat es and the training ba se WlI S expanded, e lim ina ting the basic training m ission in combat div ision s.2l
In the summer of 196 1 Congress al so authori zed the De fense Department
to order 250,000 reserv ists (ind iv id uals as well as those in units) to acti ve duty
for twe lve months. The subseque nt closing of the Berli n border on 13 August
1961 sparked another series of mo bili zat io n mea sures. In October the Army
Reserve's l Oath Division (Tmining) was ordered to active m ili tary duty to open
the traini ng cenler al Fort Ch afTce, Arkansas. That same mo nlh the Kennedy
admin istration approved the depl oyment of two additional combat divisions to
the Euro pea n command . Two Nat iona l Gua rd di visi on s were fe dera li zed in
October to replace the d iv isio ns programmcd to be deploycd from the strategic
force, bring ing the Iota 1 numbcr o f d iv isions on acti ve du ty 10 six tecn. T he 32d
In fa ntry Division (Wisconsin) was sen t to Fort Polk , Loui si ana, and the 49th
Armo red Di vision (Texas) repo rted to Fort Hood, Texas. In a ll , 113,254 officers
and enl isted me n of the Army National Guard and Army Resc rve were ordered
into active military serv ice.22
During the cri sis no division deployed to Germany, but during the nex t few
months thc Army took othcr steps to strengthen it s force s in Europe. Measures
included eq uipping the troops with new M 14 ri nes and M60 machine guns and
accelerating product ion of M60 ma in battl e tank s and M 11 3 armored personne l
carriers, actions that permitted the Army to field those systems ea rli e r tha n
planned. To shorten the time required to move units to Europe, the Army positioned suffic ient materie l in Germany to equip one armored di vision, one in fantry
divi sion, and several nondivisiona l battal ions. To maintain the equipment, personnel from the 2d Armored a nd 4t h In fantry Divisions moved to Germany, but
eventually permanent caretaker units replaced these men. Shortly afler the eq uipment was placed in Germany, the Army launched Operation BIG LIFT, with units
fro m the Uni ted States traveling to Europe and conducting exercises with the
stockpi led equi pmen t, a preclll"Sor o f similar exercises that were soon to become a
regular fixt ure in the Army.23
The Anny also increased combat readiness in other commands. It replaced the
cumbersome Honest Jo hn s wi th Litt le Jol111s in the 82d and 10lst Airbo rn e
Divisions and 4th and 25 th Infantry Divisions, a step directed toward improving the
ability to move these units by air. The 25th Infantry Division was brought to full
strength in Hawaii , and the reinforced airborne balt1e group that had been sent to
Okinawa in June 1960 was re lieved from assignment to the di vision but remained
in Okinawa. In Korea the strengt h of two divisions was !l lso incrclIsed.24
Fol lowi ng the ca ll -up of the reserves for the Berlin crisis, Cong ress au thorized .1 modest penllllllcnt increase in the strength of the Regular Army, and in
January 1962 Secre tary Mc Namara app roved th e act iv,lIi on o f the fi rst two
306
ROAD div isions. wh ich were eventually to replace the two National Guard units
in the strategic fo rce. On 3 February the Fou rth U.S. Army reorganized the l SI
Armored Division , using its Combat Command A as its nucleus, at Fori Hood.
The division became a mechanized infantry unit having four armor and six mechanized infantry battal ions. Sixteen days latcr the Fifth U.S. Army reactivated the
5th Infantry Di vision (less its 2<1 Brigade and a lank battalion) at Fort Carson,
Colorado , by abso rbing th e personnel of the training ce nt er th ere. T he 2d
Bri gade, 51 h In fantry Division, was activated at Fo ri Devens, Massachusetts,
lI sin g the resources of the 2<1 Infa ntry Bri gade, wh ich was inacti vated . Th e
brigade cont inucd to support reserve traini ng in the First U.S. Army area, wh il e
one of the 5th Di vision 's tank battalions stationed at Fort Irwin, California, supported the Comba t Developments Comm and 's test and eva lua tion programs.
Stretched from coast to coast, the 5th Infantry Di vis ion had three in fantry batta lions at Fort Devens, onc armor and six infantry batta lions at Fort Carson , and one
tank battalion at Fort Irwin .25
Whcn McNamara approved the act ivation of the two Regular Army divisions
in early 1962. he decided to delay reorganization of the remainder of the Army
until fisca l ye'lr 1964 because o f the Berli n crisis. But events soon overtook that
decision. For example, during the spring of \ 962 Powell di rected that all instruction at th e Infantry Schoo l an er I July re n ect ROAD doctri ne. Thereforc. the
In fantry School asked for perm ission to reorga nize the 1st Infantry Bri gade under
a ROAD structure. Instead, the Army Sta ff decided to inactivate the pentomicstructured brigade and replace it w ith a new ROAD unit , the 197th In fantry
Brigade, which reso lved a unit designat ion issue.26
The ROAD reorganization once again brought up the matter of unit des ignations. Di visiona l brigades had not appeared in the Army force structure since
the dem ise of the old squa re di vision. Army leaders dec ided that two out of the
three new brigade headqua rters in each infantry divi sio n would inherit di sbanded or inactiva ted infantry brigade headquarters assoc iat ed wit h the former
square di visions. Wi th the designation 1st Infantry Brigade slated to ret urn to
the 1st In fantry Di vis ion when it converted to ROA D, the ex istin g unit at Fort
Bcnning required a new nam e. Fo r it and ot her se parate b ri gades, the st afT
se lec ted infantry bri gade numbe rs that had been assoc iat ed wit h Organ ized
Reserve divi sions that were no longer in the force. For the new ROAD brigade
at Fo rt Benning, Georgia, for example, the adju tmll general on I August 1962
restored e le ments of the 99t h Reconnaissance Troop, which thirty years earlier
had been orga nized by consol idating infantry brigade headquartc rs and headqua rters co mpanies of th e 99th In fan t ry Di vis ion , as He adquart ers and
Headq uarters Companies, 197th and 198t h Infantry Bri gades. The fo llowing
month the 197th In fan try Brigade was acti vated at Fort Benning. For the thi rd
brigade in each infan try divis io n, the stafT redesignated the division headquarters company, which had been di sba nded duri ng the pentomic reorganizlllion, as
a brigade he"dq uarters. For example . the 3d Bri gade, 5th Infan try Div ision,
A NEW DIRECTION- FLEXIBLE RES PON SE
307
perpe tuated Headquarters Company, 5th Infa ntry Di vis ion, which had bee n
inacti vated in 1957 . In the armored div ision, Combat Command s A, S , and C
were redesignated as the 1st, 2d, and 3d Brigades.27
W hen the T hird U.S. Army activated the 1971h Infa ntry Brigade at Fort
Benning to support training at the Infa ntry Center, it consisted of a composite
artillery battal ion (105-rnm. and IS5-mm. how itzers and Honest Johns), an armor
battal ion, a mechani zed infan try battal ion, two infa ntry batta lions, an engineer
company, and a chemical platoon, but no support battalion. The strength of the
brigade was approx imately 3,500 Illcn,28
Aficr the abofted Bay o f Pigs invasion and rumors of Soviet assistancc to
Cuba, McNamara decided to bolster available Army forccs in the Ca ri bbean area.
The Army replaced the battle g roup in the Canal Zone with the 193d In fantry
Brigade, whieh was activated on 8 August 1962. Init ia lly it con sisted of only one
infan try batta lion and one airborne infantry battalion, bu t short ly after activation
lln art illery baltery and an engineer company were added. 29
By mid-A ugust 1962 the I st Armored and 5th Infantry Divisions atlllined the
approved readiness status for the strategic fo rce, and the Army readjusted its divisions by rcleasing the reserve units three months early. Subsequently the National
Guard's 32d Infantry Division and 49t h A rmored Di vision left federal service and
revcrtcd to state control, and the 100th Di vis ion (Training) a lso reverted to
reservc statu s, closing the training cen ter at Fort Chaffee.30
In Octobcr 1962, less than three months after the 1st Armored Division hlld
become pa rt of the strateg ic force, the Army lIsed it <I S part of an cmcrgency
assault force be ing llsscmb1cd to countcr the buildup of Sov iet missiles in Cuba.
For morc immed iatc access to port fa cili ties, the divi sion moved from Fort Hood
to Fort Stewart, Georgia, where it conducted a series o f amphibious exerc ises. As
tensions eased during thc late fall, " Old Ironsides" rct urned to Fort Hood without
conduct ing any active opcrations against Cuba .3t
When the Army put ofT reorganizing the remainder o f the Regula r Army divisions under ROAD un til Jan uary 1963, the delay pcrmitted the 1st Armorcd and
5th Infant ry Di visions to evaluate the conce pt. General Dec ke r re ported to
Secrctary of the Army Cyrus R. Vance that " ROAD provides substantial improvements in command structure, organi zation fl ex ibility, capab il it y For sll stained
combat, t<lct ica l mObility (grou nd and air), balanced fire power (nuclear and nonnuclear), logist ical support, and compatibi lit y with Alli ed forces (part icula rly
NATO)."32 The chief of sta lT added thaI commanders of the 1st Armored and 5th
In fant ry Di visions had not identified any major problems Ihat wou ld req uire
changes in Ihe general concept)]
Decker 5.1W advantages and di sadvantages in the pending ROAD reorganiz.1lion. A comparison between the ROAD infantry and mechanized infant ry divisions
wi th the augmented pentomic infnntry divis ion showed somc sign ificant gains for
the new organi zation . With only a 2 percent increase in manpower strength , the
ROAD organization exhibited .1 profound g rowth in combat power, which in some
308
weapons systems was over 200 percent. But the new divisions were going to be
costly and the full implementation of ROAD would have to await the arrival of new
equipment. Until then fixed-w ing aircraft wou ld have to be lIsed in place of he licopters, and infantry battal ions would substitute for mechanized infantry battalions
until armored persollnel carriers were available. Furthermore, because of insufficient personnel, the divisions wou ld be maintained alless than idea l strength ,34
The ROA 0 Reorganization

The Army Staff began planni ng fo r the ROAD reorganization during the summer of 1962. It sci the combination o f ma neuver clements as fo llows: for the
armored di vision, six tank and five mechanized infa ntry battal ions; for the mechanized infant ry d iv ision , three tank and seven mechani zed infantry battal ion s; for
the infantry div ision , two tank and eight infantry battalions; and for the ai rborne
division, one assault gun (tank) lind eight airborne infantry batta lions. The planners <tnticipaled difficulty in finding the men to fill the units because the <tuthorized st rengt h of the Regu lar Army w<ts only 960,000. Decker recommended that
Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance seek Department of De fen se approval fo r an
increase in Army strength as well as the retention of 3,000 KATUSA personnel in
both the I st Caval ry and 7th Infantry Divisions stationed in Korea. If no increase
could be ob ta i n e(~ then Decker recommended that divisions in the United States
and Korea have fewer maneuver battalions than outlined in the pla n.35
Reorgani zation of the remaining divisions look place betw een January 1963
and May 1964 (Table 24). BUI , as fea red, the Depart ment of De fense deci ded not
to seek an increase in the size of the Army. and the reoftJanization left the Army's
divisions at reduced strength except for the units in Europe. Infantry, mechanized
infantry, and armored di vision s ra nged between 14,000 and 16,000 me n each,
except for th e I st Cava lry and 7th Infantry Di vision s, whi ch were authorized
about 12,000 men each plus their KATUSA I>crsonnel. In the airborne di visions,
nine airborne infantry battal ion s and a tank battalion replaced the e ight airborne
infantry battalions and assaul t gun (tank) battalion, but the airborne tank batta lion
was alloned only experimental equipment. The 82d and 10I st Airborne Divisions
fi elded about 13,5 00 men each. In Germany the ai rborne ca pabi lity was moved
from the 24th Infantry Division at Augsburg to the 8th In fantry Division at Bad
Kreuznach, with one brigade conta ining all the airborne assets.36
As the Regu lar Army completed the ROAD reorgan ization, the Army made
rllrthcr revisions in the d ivision organizations. Headq uarters and service batteries
in all arti ll ery battalions except fo r the Honest John unit were combined to save
l>ersonnel. More important , the Davy Crocketts were restricted to infantry battalions, and the weapons were to be issued on ly in response to spec ific instructions.
The Army had debated the appropriate level at which to control nuclear weapons
sinee thei r introduction. Like its predecessors, thc Kenned y ad mini stration continued to stress pol it ica l control of such weapons.3?
A NEW DIRECTION- fLEXIB LE RESPONSE
309
Departing from past practice, the Defense Depa rtment decided to reorganize
the reserve divisions concu rrently with the Regular Army's cOllversion 10 ROAD.
Immed iately the old question arose about the number of divisions needed in the
reserves to meet mobilization requirements. Studies after the pentamic reOl"ganization suggested that the Army needed forty-t hree divisions, including twentynine in the reserves. The new numbers gave the Army a surplus of eight reserve
divisions, but Army leaders also wa nted more separate brigades to add flexibility
to the fo rce. Laic in \962 the De fense Department approved reorganizing reserve
units under ROAD.38
Following the Defense Department's guidance, thc Army Staff decided to
retain one Army Reserve division in each of the six Army areas and to eliminate
four divisions. Army commanders selected the 63<1. 77th, 81 st , 83d, 90th, and I02d
Infantry Divisions for reten tion and reorganized them under ROAD by the end of
April 1963. Each division had two tank and six infantry battalions. With the elimination of the 79th, 94th, 96th, and I03d Infantry Div isions, the Army decided to
reta in thci r headquarters as a way to preserve spaces for general and field grade
officers. It reorganized the un its as operationa l headquarters (subsequently called
command headquarters [division]) and directed them to supervise the training of
combat and support units locatcd in the former divisional areas and to provide for
their administrative support. If an extensive mobilization were to occur, the staff
believed that these units could become the nucle i for new divisions.39
In December 1962 Sccreta ry Vance asked the states and territories to accept a
new National Guard troop allotment contain ing 23 divisions (6 armored and 17
in fantry). The Army Staff initia lly planned to mechanize two of the seventeen
infantry d ivisions, but shortages of equipment forced their retention as standard
infantry organizations. Somewhat reluctan tly, the governors <lccepted the new
troop basis. By 1 May 1963 the states completed the reorganiz<lt ion, a mon th
ahead of sched ule, with the in fantry d ivisions having two tank and six infantry
battalions and the armored d ivisions contrOlling five ta nk and four mecha nized
infantry battalions.40
Because of equipment shortages each National Guard infantry division lacked
its full ROAD base. The stales were allowed to omit two company-size units in each
division base from the following menu: an airmobile company in the aviat ion battalion, an air cavalry troop in the reconnaissance squadron, or the Honest John battery in the composite art il1ery battalion. They chose not to organize a total of 16 air
caval ry troops, 13 airmobile companies, and 5 Honcst John batteriesAl
In planning the ROAD reorganizat ion, the Army Staff determined that the
Regular Army needed one airborne and five infantry brigades for uniq ue missions not appropriate for a division. The airborne brigade was to replace the battle
group on Okinawa, thus significantly increasing the forces there, and the infantry
brigades were to serve in Berlin, Alaska, the Canal Zone, and the United States.
No fixcd combination of maneuver clements was est'lblished for the brigades,
which were, instead, to be tailored for thcir special missions.42
30th Infantry
315t Infantry
28th Infantry
29th Infantry
BOSlon, Mass.
Syracuse, N.Y.
Harrisburg, Pa.
Baltimore, Md.
and Staunton. Va.
Raleigh, N.C.
Binningham, Ala.
and Jackson, Miss.
27th Armored
Hawaii
FI. Bragg, N.C.
Ft. Campbell, Ky.
Gcmlany
Germany
26th Infanll)'
National Gllard
IO! SI Airborne
82dAirbomc
25th Infantry
5th Infantry
7th Infantry
8th Infantry
24th Infantry
4th Infantry
Germany
Germany
Ft. Lewis, Wash.
FI. Carson. Colo.
Korea
Mar 63
Mar 63
Apr/May 63
Apr 63
Apr 63
Mar 63
6
6
6
6
5
4
9
9
8
8
8
8
2
2
2
to
10
10
8
10
10
I'
I'
2
3
6
2
2
7
5
Aug63
Oct 63
Feb 62
Jul63
Apr63
Feb 63
Aug 63
May 64
Feb 64
10
II
9
9
9
9
9
9
II
(8 b)
Towl
Oct 63
Aug 63
Ft. Benning, Ga.

Germany
Apr64
2d Infantry
3d Armored
3d [nfant!)'
4th Armored
2
2
Jan 64
2
2
Jul63
5
5
Ft. Hood. Tex.
I SI Infantry
2d Armored
Feb 62
Jul 63
Ft. Benning, Ga.

Fe Riley, Kans.
Maneuver Batta/fQIlS
A, AlI1b
Mech Abn
Fe Hood, Tex.
Illf
1st Cavalry
0."
1st Armored
Localion
oj Headqllarters
Division
Reglliar Army
Maneuver Element Mix of Divisions

ROAD Reorganizati on, 30 June 1965
TABL E 24
Dil,isioll
Bell. Calif.
New York, N.Y.
Atlanla, Ga.
Cleveland. Ohio
Austin, Tex.
SI. Louis. Mo.
Milwaukee. Wise.
Urbana, Ill.
Austin, Tex .
Columbus. Ohio
Indianapolis, Ind.
New Orleans, La.
and Little Rock. Ark.
Los Angeles, Calif.
Portland. Ore.
and Seattlc, Wash.
New York. N.Y.
Oklahoma City, Okla.
Lansing, Mich.
SI. Paul. Minn.
Macon, Ga.
Dallas. Tex.
Alameda. Calif.
East Orange. N.J.
Locatioll
oj Headquarters
a Equipment only.
b Reorganized as an aimlObile division 30 June 1965.
63d Infantry
77th Infantry
8lst Infanlry
83d Infantry
90th Infantry
102d Infan try
Army Reserl"e
42d Infantry
45th Infantry
46th Infantry
47th Infantry
48th Armored
49th Armored
49th Infantry
50th Armored
40th Armored
41st Infantry
(cont.)
32d Infanuy
33d Infanlry
36th Infanlry
37th Infantry
38th Infan try
39th Infantry
NatiOlla! Guard
Apr 63
Mar 63
Apr 63
Apr 63
Mar 63
Apr 63
Apr63
Apr63
Mar63
Apr63
Apr 63
Mar63
Mar63
Jan 63
Mar63
Mar63
Apr 63
Apr 63
Mar 63
Apr 63
Mar 63
May 63
Dale
6
6
6
2
5
5
2
2
2
6
2
2
2
4
4
2
2
2
2
2
2
Mallel/I'er Btllratiol1s
Mech Abll A, Amb
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
"i
TABLE 24-Collliinued
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
9
9
8
9
9
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
Tora!
312
Even tually four more Regul ar

Ar my bri gades were o rga ni zcd in
a d di t ion to the 19 3 d and 197th
Infantry Bri gades (Table 25). To test
new materie l al Fori Ord, California ,
Co mb ,l t
Deve lopmcn ts
th e
Co mmand formed th e 194t h
Ar mored Brigade, whi c h assumed
the mis s io n of the 5 th In fa ntr y
Di visio n c leme nt. U nit ed States
Army, Alask a, o rganized the 171s1
and 172d Infan try Bri gades al Fo rts
Wainwrig h t and Richard so n, and
U. S. Army, Pacific , organi zed the
173 d Airborne Brigade in March
1963 on Oki nawa. T he 2d Battl e
Group , 5 0 3 d Infantry, s tation ed
there si nce 1960, and the I st Battl e
Group , 503d Infantry, d e pl oyed
lSI Om/alioll. 60/11 IlIfilllll),. al For/
from Fort Bragg, formed the nueleus
Ricl/(//'d~oll. Alaska
o f tha t bri gade. Short ly thereafte r
the 173d's bailie g rou ps were reo rgani zed as ni rbornc in fantr y battal ions.
Berlin , howcver, did not receive a tabl e of o rga ni zation infantry brigade but
reta ined the Berli n Brignde orga ni zed in 1961 under a rni ssiollworientcd table of
distribu tion and allow<lnccs.43
In the Army Reserve some former di visiona l unit s assigned to thc 79th,
94th, 96th, and 103d Infantry Di visions were used to orga nize four brigades,
wh ich added n exibi lilY to the force as well as provided fou r genera l o ffi cer
reserve billets. In Jan uary nnd February 1963 the 157th, 187th , 191sl, and 2051h
Infant ry Brigades we re orga n ized wit h headquarters i n Pennsy lva ni a,
Massach usetts, Montana, and Min nesota, respectively (see Table 25). As with
the Regu lar Army brigades, the number and type of maneuver e leme nts in each
ArlllY Reserve brigade vfl ricd.44
The 34th, 35t h, 4 3d, and 5 1sl Infantry Divisions, lllult istate National Guard
units, dropped Ollt o f the force during the reorganiza tion , and in pari we re
rep laced by the 67th (Nebraska and Iowa), 69th (Kansas and Missouri ), 86t h
(Vermont and Connect icut), a nd 53d (F lorida and Sout h Caroli na) In fantry
Brigades. Each brigade fielded five maneuver clements. In addition, the governors a lso agreed to mai n tain the 34t h ( Iowa), 35 th (M isso u ri), 43<1
(Con n ecticut), 51st (South Ca ro li na), a n d 55 th ( Fl orida) Co mm and
Headquarters to supervise the training of combat and support unit s located in
the former divisional areas. The st al es also reorgani zed the 29t h, 92d, and 258th
Infantry Brigades, which had been formed in 1959.45
."
205th Infantry
258th Infantry
AR
a Company-size unit
NG
Ft. Benning, Ga.

Ft. Snelling, Minn.
Phoenix, Ariz.
Boston, Mass
Helena, Mont.
Ft. Wainwright, Alaska

Ft. Rich3rdson, Alaska
Okinawa
197th Infantry
187th Infantry
191 SI Infantry
193d Infantry
173d Airborne
171s1 Infantry
[ 72d Infantry
RA
San Juan, Puerto Rico

Upper Darby. Pa.
Montpelier, Vt.
Topeka, Kans.
Honolulu. Hawaii
Tampa, Fla.
Lincoln. Neb.
Ft. Kobbc, Canal Zone

Ft. Ord, Calif.
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
194th Annored
29th Infantry
53d Annored
67th Infantry
69th Infantry
86th Annored
92d Infantry
157th Infamry
Compollem
Location
of Headquarters
AR
RA
RA
RA
AR
AR
RA
RA
Brigade
Mar 63
Feb 63
Aug 62
Dec 62
Sep62
Apr 63
Feb 63
Apr 63
Apr 63
Apr 63
May 64
Jan 63
Jut63
Ju163
Mar 63
Jan 63
Feb 63
Reorgani=ed
Date
Maneuver Element Mix of Brigades

ROAD Reorganization, 30 June 1965
TABLE 25
2
3
4
1
3
2
2
1
2
1111
2
4
4
3
4
3
3
3
5
5
2
A,. Towl
Manel/ver Blllfaliolls
Inl Mech Abn
JI4
The following year, to increase fUrih er flexibility in t he rese rves, the

National Guard's 53d and 86th Infantry Brigades were converted to armored
brigades , and the 671h Infant ry Brigade was reorganized as mechanized
infantry. The 53d and 67th retained their five maneuver elements, but the 86th
lost one batt ali on. The 1964 reorgan ization also provided the 2581h Infantry
Brigade in Arizona with an armor battal ion from Missouri and a field artillery
batta li on from fa r-away Virginia.46
Airmobility
The ROAD reorganization sought nex ible fo rces to meet worldwide commitments on various battl efields, but by April 1962 McNamara had become COIlcerned about unit mobility. He believed thai firepower had been favo red over
maneuverability and that morc aircraft. could achicvc a bctter balance. T he Army's
earl icr explorations had focused primarily on thc number o r aircraft., airplanes
and helicopters, needed for observation and transportation , bu t some cham pioned
a tactica l role for the latter. McNamara wanted the Army to take a new look at thc
employment of aircraft in land warfare, particularly the helicoptcr.47
In th e s pring of 1962 the Con tine ntal Army Command appoi ntcd the
Mobility Requirements Board, often referred to as the Howze Board aftcr its
president , Ll. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, to study the matter. After three months
of frantic work , including fi eld exerciscs, the board came to the general conclu~
sion that the adoption of air mobil ity, the capabi lity ofa unit to deploy and receive
support from ai rcraft. under the control of a ground com mander, was necessa ry
and desirable. In some ways, Ihe transition seemed as inevitable as that from ani~
mal to molor transporl.48
The Howze Board recommended sweeping cha nges in the usc of aircraft.,
including the organ ization of air assault di visions. Although combat support e l e~
ments were not idenlifie(~ these divisions were to resemble ROAD organizat ions
(CharI 39) and were to have sufficient aircraft to lift one~third of the divisional
combat elemcn ts at one time. The d ivision had some fi xed~w in g aircrart, but most
were to be in <In air transport brigade, a nondivisional unit, which was to reinforce
the transport capabilities of the division. To keep the d ivision as light as possible,
the board suggcsted the use of new, lighter I05~mm. howitzers, Little John rock~
cIs, and air~to~groun d rockets mou nted on helicopters as replacements for the 155~
mill. howitzers. In addition, infantry was to be relieved of all burdens except ror
those associated with combat. The board 's estimates for divisional aircraft. ranged
between 400 and 600, but g round vehi cle requirements fell from 3,400 to I, I 00.
Air assault divisions were to rep lace airborne div isions, and the board recom~
mended ass igning airborne~qllalified personnel to the new units. Air cavalry com~
bat brigades (ACCB) were endorsed for class ic cavalry mi ss ions-screening,
reconnoitering, and delaying actions. Such brigades werc to be strict ly air units,
and they were to employ attack helicopters in antitank roles. The board also rec~
AERIAL ROCKET
BN
LlTILE JOHN
BN
105-mm
HOWITZER BN
DI V
ARTILLERY
MAl NT
SUPPORT BN
TASK FORCE
HQ
ASSAULT
SUPPORT BN
DI V
AVIATION
ASSAULT
HELLICOPTER BN
SURVEILLANCE
ATIACK BN
AI R CAVALRY
BN
AIR ASSAULT
DIVISION
CHART 39- Howze Board-A ir Assault Division, 1963
3 16
ommcnded more aircrafl for infantry, mechanized infantry. and armored divisions;
and the formation of aviation unit s for corps, army, ilnd special warfare un its.49
Th e Co ntin ental Army Com mand developed tabl es of organization for a
ROAD~ t ypc air assault di vision , which the Department o f the Army dec ided to
test. The first step was the activation orthe 11th Air Assau lt Div ision (the form er
11th Airborne Di vision) on I February 1963, along with the 10th Air Transport
Bri gade, at Fort Benning, Georgia . As proposed by the Howze Board, the ai r
tran sport brigade was not organic to the division. but was to serve as a lines of
communications unit for hau ling men , equipment, and supplies in the field. In
October and November 1964 the experimental division, including 3,250 soldiers
from the 2d Infantry Division, and the transport brigade conducted full -sca le tests
of assault tactics. At the conclusion of the test the di rector, Lt. Gen. Charles W. G.
Rich, recommended the addition of both units to the permanent force structurc .
He reported that the integration of Army ai rcraft into the g round units provided
the crucial maneuver capability for light mobi le forces to close wit h and destroy
the enemy. Operati ng with other d ivis ions, airmobi le units offered a balance of
mobi lity and increased Army combat readiness on a theater level.50
The rccommendatio n to organize an airmobile division set offa debate wit hin
the Joi nt Chiefs of Staff. The U.S. Air Force had been watChing the development
and g rowth of Army aviation for years with increasing concern. Eaeh divi sional
reorgmlization after World War I I resu lted in more aircraft being added to these
unit's . T he chief of staff. U.S. Air Force, believed acti vation of the div ision premature and j udged it too speciali zcd to be cost effective. Although nOI slated, the Air
Forcc rell that airmobi lity in rringed on its g round support mission. Earlier in the
1960s the Air Force had cond ucted tests to en hance the mob ilit y and combat
e ffectiveness of divisions by improving troop lift , aerial resupply, close air support, and aeri al firc sUPI>Ol't, but found most of the Army's eq ui pment 100 large
for its aircraft. At the time thc Air Force had recommended that the Army develop
equipmen t in the infantry di vision that was more compatible with ex isting Air
Force planes. McNamara now disagreed. He and the Defense Dcpartment sta ff
had been pu shing for greatcr Army involvement in aviation s ince 1962. The
Army's proposa l met his approval , and he d irected the forlllll tion of an ai rlllobil e
div ision as part of the permanent rorce. T he air tra nsport brigade, however, did
not win a place in the forcc.5 t
T he Army Staff selected the I sl Cavalry Di vision 10 become the Army's first
airlllobi le division. Since that uni t was serving in Korea, thi s resulted in a massive paper shuffle, wit h men and materiel remaining in place tIrld unit designations moving back and forth . In the end the Korean-based 1st Cavalry Divis ion
was rep laced by the 2d Infantry Di vision while the assets of the 2d Infantry
Di vision and II tit Air Assau lt Division at Fort Benning were used to reorgani ze
the 1st Cava lry Division (Airlllobil e).52
Thc 1st Cavalry Di visions configuration differed from the teslunit (Cha ,., 40).
It had no Little John rocket batta lion or attack helicopter battalion because the Air
52iU
AVN BN
ASSAULT
' On, firborn. b'ltllion.
' One .1rllornt bngede.

IThle, .,rborn, bftuoliof'ls.
CHART 40-Airmobile Di vision, 10 July 1965
318
MANEUV ER AND FI RE POWER
Force o r other orga nic d ivisiona l wcapons assumed the lludcn r fire suppo!'t mi ssion
of the rockets. The di vision fi elded an aviation group (<1 general aviation support
company and one assault support and two assau lt aviat ion ballaliolls). Divisional
he licopters numbered 335. A lthoug h the Howze Board believed the !lumber o f
ground vehicles could be cuI by two-thirds, the division was authorized 1,500, or
approximately half the number in the other types of ROA D divisions. The vehicles
moved supplies, artillery, and antitan k weapons and helped in g round reconnai ssance. The airmobile infan try battalion had one combat support company (reconnaissance, mortar, and antitank resources) and three rifle companies. Although the
battalion lacked ENTACs, 4.2-inch mortars, and .50-caliber machine g un s, the
Infantrymen had a number of new weapons. The M 14 rifle was superseded by the
lighter MX 16E I (M 16), wh ich put out more firepower and was supplemented by
the M79 40-111111. grenade I,llltlchcr with a dedicated grenadier. S3
The question as to whether the ai rmobile d ivision should replace the airborne
division had not been reso lved. Planners decided that one brigade- three in fantry
battalions and one artillery battalion- was to be authorized airborne-qualified
personne l as an in terim measure.54
In s ummary, the ROA D reorganizat ion ensured the Army's ability to offer
flex ible responses to chang ing world conditions. On I July 1965, the Army 's division and brigade forces consisted of 45 d iv ision s (16 in the Regular Army, 23 in
the National Guard, and 6 in the Army Reserve) and 17 bri gades (6 in the Regular
Army, 7 in the National Guard, and 4 in the Army Reserve). Of the Regula r Army
di visions, e ight se rved outside the co ntinental United States and e ight with in .
Di visions and bri gades in the three components had more fl ex ibility than ever
before. As in the past, personne l problems prevented the Army from fi elding division s at their ideal strength, but ROAD 's inherent capability for interchang ing
battalions meant that, if necessary, some units could be brought to wa rtime standards quickly. T he di visions, however, still awaited their true test-combat.
From the Army's poin t of view the Ken nedy era had produced measurable
organ izational gains. The budget-driven pentomi c division s had been adopted pri marily fo r politica l purposes and had never been popul<l r within the Army. W hile
Army leaders were enamored of the new airmobi le concept backed by McNamara
and others, Ihe ROA D divisions werc morc popular, providi ng the Army with
so lid standard d ivisional bases and the abi lity 10 tailor brigade-size task fo rces
w ithin the d ivis ion usi ng a va riabl e mix of co m bat battalions. A nd with
Kennedy 's support for expanding the g round componcnt s and technolog ica l capabi lities, the future of the Army seemed morc secure in the budget-driven defense
community.
A NEW D[RECT[ON- FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
J[9
Notes
I Public I~{/"en' of {he Prcsidel1ls of 1111: Ullited Stales: ./01111 F. Kennedy. /961 (Washinglon.
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 401.
2 Robert A. Doughty, 711(: E\'{III/mioll of us A rill)' TaClic(I/ Doc/rillc, J 946- 76: Lcm,cl/l1'orlh
/Japers (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combal Stlldics Insti tute, J 979), p. 19.
3 Modern Mobile Army 1965- 1970 (U) (S hOfl Title: MOMAR I), ( Fort Monroe. Va.:
COlllincntal AmlY COtnl11l1nd, 1960), DAM H-HSO; Gordon 13. Roger. "Ground Mobility," Armor
69 (SCp- OCI 1960): 24-26.
4 Ltr, aeors 10 CO, CON ARC, 16 Dec 60. sub: Reorganization of Infantry nnd Armored
Divisions and Creation ofa Mccllllnizcd Division, Division General file, OAMH-HSO.
5 Ibid.; Inter view, nuthor with Col George Sedberry, 19 Jun 78, DAMI-I-HSO; Memo, George
Donmis for General Starry, sub: Historical Background of Three Versus Four Companies, 16 May
69. Historielll Office, U.S. Amly Training and Doctrine Command (T RADOC).
6 Interview, author with Edd leman. 18 Scp 74. DAM H-HSO: J. Perret-Ge ntilll, "Divisiol1sThree or Five Elements?" MifiWIJI Rel'ieu' 41 (Feb 1961): 16- 25.
7 Llr. CG. CONARC, to CofS, 1 Mar 61 , sub: Reorganization Objective Army Oi"isions
1961 - 1965, ATCO 322 (Oiv). Divisiol1 General file. OAMH -HSO; Reorganization Objective
Army Divisions 1965 (hereafter dted as ROAD (5) (Fort Monroe, Va.: U.S. Army Con tinenta l
Army Command, 1960). Some speculate thnt the ROAD concept was worked out at the Arnly War
College before Eddleman instructed the command to undertake the study. (Sec Memo, Donmis to
Starry, sub: HistoricallJackground on Three Versus Four Companies.)
S ROAD 65, Annex E.
9 Ibid., Annex A.
10 Ibid .. Annex E. Annex F.
t t Ibid., Annex 13.
t2 Ltr, 0 - 3, CONARC, to DCofS for Military Orcrations, DA, 10 Apr 61 , sub: Prepnmtion of
TOE for ROAD-65 Concept. ATrNG-O&E 320.3, and Llr. CofS to CG, CONARC, 13 AI}r 61 ,
sub: Reorganization of Army Di visions. both Di vision General file, DAM H-HSO.
tJ TOE 7E (Draft), Infantry Di vision, undated; TOE 17E (Draft), ArnlOred Division, undated:
and TOE 37E (OmO), Mechanized Infantry Di vision, undmed.
t4 Memo for Record, CONARC. Combat Developments Plans Division. 23 Mar 61. sub:
DCSO PS I'reliminary Report to the Vice Chief of Slnff on "Reorgani zat ion Objective Army
Division 1965 (ROAD-65):' ATSWD-P 322 (Army). Divisio n Ge nernl file. DAMH-HSO.
t5 Reorganiza tion Objective Army Divisions 1965 (ROAD-65) Airborne Division (Fort
Monroe. Va.: Co ntin en tal ArmyCo mm,md. 1961), DAMH-HSO.
t6 CONARC, "Summary of Major Events and Problems. FY 1962," vol. 3, pp. 3- 7, DAMHI-ISR; TOE 57E, Airborne Division, 15 Aug 1963.
t7 Llr, CONARC to DCofS for Militnry OI}cTntions, 31 M;IY 61. sub: ROAD-65 Type Brigade
(Separatc, Airborne), ATSND-P 322 (Di\'). and Ltr, CONARC to Commandant, U.S. Armor
School, 28 Sep 61, sub: Separate Brigade Organizations Under ROAD, AlTNO-D&R (Div), both
Brigade General file, DAMH -I-ISO.
t8 Llr. Powell to Eddleman. 23 Feb 61 , Division General file. DAM II-I-ISO.
t9 Kennedy. Papers of the Presidell/s. 1961. p. 401.
20 Ibid., pp. 533- 36; DA Bull 5, 1961.
2t Robert W. Coakley, Walter G. I-i ermes, J:mles 1'. Schnabel, and Earl F. Zie mke, "U.S.
Army Expansion and Readiness. 1961 - 1962:' Ms. eh. II. DAMH-HSR. The Slralegic Army Force
(ST RAF) was comprised of units to provide a mobilization expansion base. a source of trained
units and replacements to support forces deployed overseas. and a combat-ready elemem designed
to serve as a readily aVllilable force for usc wherever needed.
22 Ibid.; Executive Order 10957. OA Bull 5. 1961; Department of Ihe Army. Forces ill
Depth. "Olle ArIllY " ill Actioll. /96/ - /962 (W:lshingtotl. D.C.: n.p .. (962) (herealkr cited as
320
"Olle Arm)''' ill ;/cliQII).
23 Fom::SI K. Kleinman. "Front lmu Ccnlcr: The Chunging Army," An11Y 12 (Feb 1962): 16;
DepW"/lIIelll of Defellse Al/lll1at Uep0rl. FY 11)62, PI'. 100, 110, 113; Public AITairs Division. Big
Lift /963 (U.S. Army. Eu rope, 1963).
24 Kleinman, "Front and Ccnlcr." PI'. 17- 18; Llf. TAG 10 CGs, Third and Sixth Armies. (md
Chief of Engineers, 28 NOli 61, sub: Rcorgallizlllion of Units, AOAO-O (M) 322 (6 Nov 61)
DeSPER, Llr, TAG to co, Third U.S. Army, 27 Feb 62, sub: Reorganization orlhe 82d Airbol11c
Division, AOAO (M) 322 (16 Feb 62) DeSPER. LIT. TAO to CinC, USARI'AC, 14 JUIl 61 , sub:
Ch:mgc in Status OfUllils, AOIIO-O (M) 322 (2 Jun 61) DCsrER. Llr, TAG 10 CinC, USARI'AC,
27 Mar 62, sub: Change in SIMllS ofUllilS. AOAO-O (M) 322 (14 M:lr 62) DCSPER, and Ur, TAG
to CG, Sixlh U.S. Army, 15 Feb 62, sub: I~eorganiz:llion of the 4th Il1fhl1try Division, AGAO-O
(M) 322 (15 Feb 62) DCSPER. all AG Reference files, HistoriClll Dula C;lrds, Divisions, DAMHIISO.
25 COllkley et ;11., "Army Expansion, 1961 - 62," IIp. 124-57 passim; Mcmo, Deputy Sec o f
Defense to Scc of Defense. sub: Plan fOT Activation of Two Additional Active AOlly Divisions, 18
Jlln 62, Division General file. llnd Llr, TAG 10 CGs, CONARC. and other addresses, 22 Jan 62.
sub: Change in Status of Units. 22 Jan 62, AGA O-O (M) 322 (22 Jan 62) DCSPER, and Llr, TAG
to CGs. CONARC, and olher addresses, 26 Jan 62. same subject, AGAO-O (M) 322 (26 Jan 62)
DCSI'ER. both AG Re ference files, all DAMH-I-ISO.
26 Llr, Corso U.s. Anny Infantry Center. to CGs. CONARC and Third U.S. AOllY, 12 Mar 62.
sub: Reorganization of 1st Brigmlc under ROA D, AGICT (Adjutant General, Inf)uI1rY Center), Ltr.
CONARC to CG, U.S. Army InJ:1ntry Center, same subject. 13 Jun 62; ATUR- I'&O (Unit Tmining
:lnd Readiness-I)lans and Operation Branch. DF. DCors/Unit Training and Relldiness), CONARC,
to DCG :'Ind CotS. CONARC, same subject, 23 May 62. and Ltr, TAG to CG. Third U.S. Anny, 20
Sep 62. sub: Change in Status of I St and 197th Infantry Brigade, AGAO-O (M) 322 (5 Sep 62)
DCSPER, all lSI Brigade, IstlnfDiv, DAM H- J-ISO.
27 John W. Wike, ., 173d AirbonlC Brig;HJe," Fact Sheet for DOD I-Iearings, 30 Apr 63. 173d
Airborne Orig;lde file , DAM H-HSO; Llr. TAG to CG. Third U.s. Anny, 20 Scp 62, sub: Change in
St,ltus of lsI and 1971h Infantry Briga de.
28 Ll r, TAG to CG, Third U.S. AnllY, 20 Sep 62, sub: Ch,mge in Status of 1st and 1971h
Infantry Brigade.
29 Mallofr, IIl11cl'ic(II! Mili/(I/}' His/VI}'. pp. 594- 95; Memo, Cors for SA, 15 Aug 62 , sub:
Schedule for Conversion o f Army Divisions to ROAD, 320 (15 Aug 62), Division Generlll tile.
DAMH-HSO: Ltr. OTAG to TAG. 27 Aug 62, sub: Change in StllluS of Unit, AGAO-O (Ml 322
(15 Aug 62), GO 69, U.S. Army Caribbean, 1962, and Ltr, TAG to CG, U.S. Amly Caribbean, II
Feb 63. sub: Cllllnge in StlltuS of Units, all 193d [nfOdc tile, DAM H-HSO.
30 Dcp(ll'/mcl!I oj DeJellse ;IIII/UIII ReIIOI'/. F)' 1963, Jl. 109: Arrny Neil'S Service, Release No.
46, 191ul 62, SA Sends Message to Army National Guardsmen and Reservists, Berlin Crisis
1961 - 1962, Reference Paper files, DAMH-HSO; "Ol!e Army" in Ac/iol/.
31 Depa!"lmen/ oj Defense I ll!Inl((l Repor/, FY 1963, I)P. 111 - 14 ; Joseph R. Wisnaek, "Old
Ironsides' Response to the Cuban Crisis,"Army 13 (Apr 1963): 26- 30: LtT. 1st AmlOred Division to
ca, [II COl'])s. 20 Apr 63, Incl, sub: Historical Narrative of the lsI Annored Division in the Cubnn
Crisis, 1962, AKDFA-CG, lSI Armd Div file. DAM H-J-1S0.
J2 Memo, Cots to SA, 15 Aug 62, sub: Schedule for Conversion of Army Divisions to ROAD.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
JS Ibid.: F,lel Sheet on Reorganization of Army Division (ROAD). 10 Jan 63, Division
Geneml file, DAMH-HSO.
36 Llr, TAG to CG. Four1h U.S. Anny, lind olher addresses, 31 May 63, sub: ReorganiZation of
lhe 2d Anllored Division Under ROAD, AGAO-O (M) (10 May 63) DeSPER, LIT, TAG to CinC,
USAREUR, 21 Jun 63, sub: Reorgani~.ill ion of 3d AmlOrcd Division Under ROAD TOE, AGAO-O
(M)(22 May 63) DCSPER. Llr. TAG to CinC. USAREUR, 19 Jun 63, sub: Reorganization of the 4th
Annored Division Under ROAD TOE. AGAO-O (Ml (22 M3Y 63) DCSPER, Llr, TAG to CinC,
A NEW DIRECTION- FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
321
USAR I)AC, and CO, CONARC. 15 Jul63, sub: Reorganization of the l SI Cavalry Division. AGAD
o (M) ( 14 Jun 63) OCSPER, Llr, TAG lOCO, Fifth U.S. AmlY, 23 Oct 63, sub: Reorganization orlhe
lSI Infillltry Division. AOAO-O (M) (30 Scp 63), DCSPER. LIT, TAG to CinC, USAREUR. and olher
addresses, 25 Jan 63. sub: Change in SIt1ll1SofUnils, AOAO-O (M) (22 Jan 63) DeSPER. UT. TAO
10 C INCs, USARE UR find USA RPA C, 23 May 63, sub: Rcorgani7.;ltio n of 3d Infantry Di vision.
AOI\OO (M)( 18 Apr 63) DeSPER, Llr, TAG to CGs, CONARC and Si.~lh U.S. Army. 21 Aug 63,
sub: I~corgani;r,.ation oflhe 4th Inr.11l11)' Di vision Under ROAD. AOAO-O (M) (29 Jul 63) DeSPER,
LIT, TAO to CinCo USARI'AC, and CO, CONARC, 7 JU1163. sub: Roorg.1ni7.11Iion orlhe 71h Inf.1nlry
Division. AGAOO (M) (31 May 63) DCSPER. Llr, OTAG to TAG. 20 Sep 63, sub: Ch,mgc in
Stalus of Unils. 20 Scp 63, AGAOO (M) (13 St:p 63), Llr, TAG 10 CinC, USAREU R, 8 May 63,
sub: Reorganilation oflhc 241h Infinury Division (Ml'Chaniloo). AGAOO (IO Apr 63) DeSPER,
Llr, TAG 10 CinC, USARI'AC, ,md CG, CONARC. 17 Ju l 63. sub: Reorganization of Ihe 25th
Infantry Division. AGAOO (M)(24 Jun 63) DCSI'ER. Ltr, TAG to CG. Third U.s. Anny. 2 1 Jan 64,
sub: Roorganization ofSTR AF Units. No. 18. FY 64, AGAOO (M) (31 Oct: 63) DCSPER. U r, TAG
to CG, Third U.S. Anny. 6 Mar 64, sub: Reorgani ....lllion ofSTRAF UnilS, No. 58, FY 64, AGAOO
( 19 Feb 64) DCSPER, all AG Reference lilcs, Historical Data Cards. Divisions. DAMHHSO; "8th
ln fill1lry Division."' SIJldiel.\ 39 (Jan 1985): 13- 14.
37 TOE 7E. Infantry Di vis ion. 1963; TOE l7 E, Armored Division, 196 3, T OE 37 E,
Mcc1mniled Infan try Division, 1963, and TOE 57E. Airborne Division. 1963, 'lIld subordinate
TOEs for each division: M idg ley, Dea(/I), IfIIISioJ/.~, p. I 16.
)8 AmlY News Sen'icc, " Reorganilation of Amly Forces," Rel ease No.4, 9 Jan 63. Division
Genera l lile. DAMHI-JSO: Memo. OColS for DeolS and other addrcsSt.'S. 9 Sep 61. sub: Review
of Plan to Reorganizc and Realign the Rcscn'e Components of the Army, 326 (9 ScI' 61). Memo.
AColS for Reserve Compone nts (ACS RC) for ColS. 13 Dec 61. sub: White lIouse Brieling,
ACSRCOTM&r (Orga nization ,lIId TminingMobilil.1tion and I'ersonncl), Ltr. Under SA to F.
Edward liebert, 20 Ju n 62. no subject. all Anny Reserve file. DAMHHSO.
39 Anny News Service, '"Anny Announces Plans for Reorganilation of Reserve Components."
Release Number 29. 5 Apr 62. nnd Msg 922374. Chief of Information, DA 10. CG, CONARC. and
other nddrcl>sel>. 0400072 Dee 62, 110 subjecl, both Army Rescn'e lilc, DAM H HSO; Llr, TAG 10
CGs, CONARC, (IUd First U.S. Arm y, 25 Mnr 63, sub: Reorg!Llli l Mioli of the 77t h In fantry
Division Under ROAD. AGAOO (M) (18 Mar (3) oeAR, Llr. TAG to CG~, CONARC, and
Second U.S. Amly. 27 Mar 63. sub: Reorganization of the 83d Inf.,nt ry Division Under ROAD,
AGAOO (M) (18 Mar 63) OCAR. Llr, TAG to CGs, CONARC, and Third U.S. Anuy. 26 Mar 93.
sub: Reorg:mil.1tion of 8 lsI Infantry Division Under ROAD, AGAOO (M) (18 Mar 63) DCAR.
Llr. TAG to CGs, CONARC. and other addresses. 22 Mar 63, sub: Reorgl1lli;mtion of the 90th
Inf.1ntry Division Under ROAD. AGAOO (M) (18 Mar 63) OCAR. Ltr. TAG to CGs. CONARC.
and Fiflh U.S. Anny. 26 Mar 63. sub: Reorganila tion of the 102d Inf.1nt ry Division Under ROAD.
AGAOO (M) (18 Mar 63) OCAR, Llr. TAG 10 CGs. CONARC. and Sixth U.S. Anny, 27 Mar 63,
sub: Reorg;m il.1tioll of63d Inf.,nlry Division Under ROAD, AGAOO (M) ( 13 Mar 63) OCAR, all
AG Refercnce liles, DAMH][SD; " ])A Publishes De tails on Reorgn nization of the Army
Reserve." Arm)' Uc.rc/"lis/9 (Mnr 1963): 6- 10; TOE 29- 70 IT. Command Headquarters. Divisional.
1963: Wilson, AI"llIies. CO/1J.~. DMs;ou.\. aud Se/JfI/"me 8rigades. PI'. 436. 523. 534; GO LX IV
U.S. Army Corps. 1963, 103d Inf Di v li le. DAMH JlSO: "'Cross of Lorrnine Di vision' 79 th
COlllmand HQ(Div)." Anny Reserve Magazine II (Nov 1965): 4 5.
40 "The Guard Goes ROAD," N(I/iOllflf GlIlIn/.\"I/IllII 17 (Feb 1963): 2-4: News Release No.
665- 63. "Amly Rcscn'e Componen ts Compl ete Reorganil.1Iion," 10 May 63. Army Resen'e file.
DAf-.'III IISO: 1///11//(/1 RCIJOIt oft"" Cllilf, Nmiol/af Glum! Burl!tlll. FY 1963. p. 27.
41 "The Gu:.rd Goes ROAD." PI'. 2-4; sec notes b.1SC<! on NG letters. 1963, cOl'ies in nulhor
files.
42 Memo. Cors for SA , IS Aug 62. sub: Sched ul e for Conversion of Army Di visions to
ROAD. 15 Aug 62, Anny News Sen'ice. ROAD Reorganilation of Army Forces. 9 Jan 63. Army
News Service. Rcorgnnilation of Army Di visions Begins thi s Month al F011 Benning. Release No.
8,22 Jan 63, all Division Gcnernllilc. DAMIlIlS0.
322
MANEUVER AND FIR EPOWE R
43 Ur, TAG \0 CG, U.S. Army Combat Dcvcloprncl1Is Command, 4 Dec 62 , sub: Chnnge in
SI<lIUS of Units, AOAO-O (M) (26 Nov 62) DeSPER, 194th AmId Ode file, Llr, TAG 10 CG, U.S.
Army, Alaska, 20 May 63, sub: Ch,lIlgc in Status of Units. AOI\O-O (M) (1 May 63) DeSPER.
171SIInf13dc file , Ur, TAG to CinC, USA RI' AC. 2 May 63, sub: ACli\'alion of 173d Airbomc
Brigade, I\OAO-O (M) (26 Mar 63) DeSPER, 173d Abn Ode file, and L1r, TAG \0 CinC,
USARI'AC. 31 Jul 63, sub: Rcorganiz:lIion of the 173<1 Airbomc Brigade, 1\01\0-0 (M) (28 lUll
63) OCSI'ER, 173d Abu Bclc file, all OAMH-HSO. As a Table of Distribution and Allowance unit,
the Berlin I3rigad c was not counlCd as a part of division and brigade forces.
44 "Reorganization of Amly Reserve," Arll/)' Rescn'iSI , p_ 7; "157th Infamry llrigadc." I lrilly
Rcscl'lie I'dagazillc. 12 (Jul- Aug 66): 4-5; Historical D,lta C<l rd. 1871h Inf Ode, GO I. Si;.;th U.S.
Am1Y, 1962, 191stlnrOdc file, GO I, XIV U.S. AmlYCorps, 1963, 205th Infllde file, all DAM HIISO, The design'lIion of each brigade was derived from the lowest numbered infantry brigade
associated with the division under the sqU:lrc structure.
45 AIIIIIIIII Reporl oflhe Chief No/iOllal GIIII,.d BIII"Cf1fl Relwrl. FY f963, p. 27: sec notes based
on NG lcl1crs, 1963, copies in author' s files.
46 AIIIII/ol Nepal" {)f fhe Chief N(lfiOlIllI GI/ortl BI/reall, 1965, p. 29: Reserve Component rrogram of the Amly. FY 1965, Annex II. Anny National Guard Unit Program, pp. 144- 53.
47 Barbara A. Sorrill and Constance J. Suwalsky, 11Ic Origills. Ddibemliolls. alld RecOllllllell(/a/iolls of /he
Arm)' Tacficol Mobilif)' Reqlliremcllfs Board (Howze 80(lrd) (Fort Leavenworth,
Kans. : U.S. Aml)' Combnt Developments Command, 1969), pp. 10- 11.
48 U.s. Army Tactical Mobility Requircments Board (Howze Board), Final Report, 20 Aug
62, p. 95. DAM H-I-ISR: Hamilton 11. Howze. Mcmoirs of (/ TlI'elllie,h-CCIIIIII), Arlll)' Geneml: II
C(IL'(IIi},IIIWI'S SIOIJI (Washington. D.e.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996), pp. 233- 57.
49 Howze 80ard, pp. 19.34-50 passim and Incl 5: Howze, A C(lWIII)'II/(/II'S SIOI:!'. p. 251:
Christopher e.S, Cheng, Air MobililY: The Dewdoplllelll of a Doell-illc (West port, Conn.: Prneger.
1994). pp. 179-80.
50 John 1. Tolson. Ail'llwbifily , 1961- 197f (W,lshinglon, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1973). pp. 50- 57.
SI Richard Fryklllnd. "Soldiers or the Sky:' National Gunrdsman 18 (March 19(4): 3-7+; SS.
ACSFOR (Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development) to the CotS, 25 Fcb 65, sub: Plan for
Jnlrochletion for an Air Mobile Division in the Active Army, and Memo_ SD 10 SA and Chaimlan.
JCS, 15 JUll 65, sub: Organization of AirnlObi le Division. bolh lSi Cav Div file , DAMH- HSO.
52 S5. ACSFO R for Col'S. 25 Feb 65. sub: Plan for Int roduction of an Air Mobilc Division.
Llr. TAG toCGs, Third U.S. Army. and othcr addresses. 22 Ju165. sub: Reorgani7.ation of lSI Cavalry Division (Amb) STRAF, No. FY 66. AGAO-O (M) (8 Jul 65) DCSPER. and GO 185, Third
U.S. Army, 1965, all 1st Cay Div lite, OAM H-HSO.
53 SS, ACSFOR lor Col'S, 25 Feb 65, sub: I' lan for Introduction of an Air Mobile Division:
TOE 67T, AirnlObi!c Division. 1965; Waiter G. HemlCs, Victn,1!ll l3uildul). ch. 5, p. 30, undated
Ms. DAMH -HD.
S4 TOE 67T, Aimlobile Di vision, 1965.
u.s.
CHAPTER 12
Flexible Response
General lVesllllore!wu/ It(/S ,lie lIlII/wril)' fa lise lite American/orees IIIl1I (Ire 11011' ill
Vie/-Naill ill Ihe 11'(1), which he cOl/sider:; l/Ios1 e.ff(clil'(1 /0 resist the COII/lllllllist aggressioll (/lid 'he lerror,hal i.~ faking place. ... I have ordered . .. AmericlIlI tmops asho/'e ill
ol"(ler 10 give IJI"OleClioll /0 /t1/l/(ll'e(ls of AmeriC(lIIS who (Ire slill ill Ihe Dominical/
RelJUblic. ... Oller fh e pasl 15 IIIOII/h.V 'he North Koreal/s have p l wsllel/ (/ sleppell- up
ClIlIIlJllig ll o/l'iolcl/{:e agail/sl Soulh Koreall al/d tIle Americal/ IrOOI)s. ... We (Ire laking
cerllli" precolllio//w)'
lIIe(lS Il,.e.~ f()
IIwke sure (hat 0111" mililm)' forces (Ire preparel/ fo r
allY COlllillgellc), Iflll/Illigh, arise.
President L yndon B. Johnsonl
Presidenl Lyndon B. Johnson orde red the first American combat units to the
Republic of Vietnam in 1965 . After the French abandoned Indochina, the 1954
Geneva Accords created two Vietna ms, South and NOrlh, using the 17th Pa rallel
as the demarcation line. Almost immediately the Army began <ldvising the Sou th
Viel"rmmese Army, and over the next decade the armed confli ct between North
and South Vietnam slowly esca lated, finally leadi ng to the direct participation of
U.S. Army divisions and bri gades alld the lise of the tail oring principles embod ied
in ROA D. In addition, Army divisions continued to stand vig ilant in Europe and
Korea agai nst Commu nist agg ress ion and restored order in the Dominican
Rcpublie fo ll owing a period of political unrest.
Th e Buildup of the Army

In May 1965 Pres ident Johnson committed Regula r Army combat unit s to
Sou th Vietnam to ha lt North Vietnamese in c ursion s and supp ress Natio nal
Liberation Front insurgents. The 173d Airborne Brigade from Ok inawa was the
Army's first combined a rm s un it to arr ive in Southeast As ia. In Jul y the 21
Brigade, ! sl lnfantry Di vision, and the 1st Brigade, 101 s1 Airborne Division, al so
deployed from the Un ited Slales. The bri gade fro m the 10I st was originally
planned 10 replace the 173d Airborne Brigade but, wilh thc need for additional
combat units, bot h brigades remained in Vietna m. Two months later the 1st
Cavalry Di vision , recently reorgani zed as an airmobi le unit , reported in country,
and the rema inder of the 1st In fa ntry Division arrived in Octobcr)
As the Army responded to its new mission, divisions were reorganized using
ROAD's tailoring concepts. Before the 1st Infantry Division deployed, it had fi e ld~
324
....... .
- .' ~!- . - .
ElelllelllS of Ihe J 73(1 A irhome Brig(l(le arril1e ill Vie/t/(llll, May /965.
cd five infantry, two mechanized infantry, and two armor b'lttalions. Wit h the
change in assignment from NATO reinforcement to counteri nsurgency in Vietn am,
the division was restructured. Honest Johns and Davy Crocketts disappeared while
requi rements for infantry rose. As no pool of unassigned maneuver batta lions existed, IwO infantry battalions from the 2d Bri gade, 5t h Infa ntry Di vision, at Fort
Devens, Massachusetts, were relieved and assigned to "The Big Red One." The 151
Di vision also reorganized two of its mechanized infantry battalions as standard
infantry, bringing the number of infantry battalions in the division to nine.3
The com mander of the I st Infantry Div ision, Maj. Gcn. Jonathan O. Seaman,
wanted to take a tank battalion to Vietnam, but Gencral Harold K. Johnson, Chief
of Staff since July 1964, overruled hilll . Tanks wcre too vulncrable to mi nes, and
no major enemy armor threat existed. Furthermore, Johnson thought that the
tempo of the battlefie ld might be slowed by the limitations of the tan k, whose
presence might foster a conventional war mentality rathcr than the lig ht , fastmoving, unconventional approach needed. Gcnernl Wil liam C. Westmore land,
commander of U.S. Army, Vietnam , agree{~ reporti ng that fcw places existed in
Vietnam where tanks could be employed. Johnson, however, g ranted Seaman permission to take the reconnaissance squadron's M48A3 tanks 10 test thc effectiveness of armor units.4
FLEXIBLE RESPO NSE
325
The decision 10 cOl11mit di visions and separate brigades to Vietnam triggered

a debate wit hin Ihe administration about the means of ex pandi ng the Army to
maintain the strategic force. Proposa ls ranged from ca ll ing lip Ihe reserves to
increasing the draft. On 28 Ju ly, however, President Johnson rejected usc of the
reserves and announced that the Army would base its expansion on volu nteers
and draftees. Shortly thereafter, Secretary o f Defense McNamara disclosed that
one infantry divi sion and three infantry brigades would be added to the Reg ular
Army in fiscal year 1966 (between 1 July 1965 and 30 June 1966),5
Expansion o f the Army began in September 1965, when the First U.S. Army
organ ized the 1961h Infantry Brigade. The 2d Brigade, 5th Infantry Division, less
its personnel, moved to Fort Ca rson, Colorado, where it was refilled, <lI1d the
remaining men at Fort Devens became the cadre for the 196th Infantry Brigade.
T he 196th eventually consisted o f threc infantry batta lions and the brigade base, a
recon naissance troop, an engi neer company, a suppo rt battal ion, and a field art illery
battalion. Recru its were assigned to the brigade under a " tru in and retain" program,
which lessened the imp..1ct oflimitcd mobilization on thc train ing base6
The brigade's infantry batta lions used a new light structure designed for
counterinsurgency warfare. Each ballalion consisted of a headquarters and headquarters company, three rifle companies, and a combat support compa ny. T he IMler organi zation, sim ila r to that in the airmobile infantry batta li on, had morta r,
reconnaissance, and antitank platoons. These lig ht battali ons fielded about ha lf
the nu mber of vehicles assigned to a standard infantry battalion, and the riflemen
carried M 14 rifles.7
T he Fifth U.S. Army activated the 9t h Infantry Div ision, the second unit in
the expansion program, at Fort Riley, Kansas, on 1 February 1966, also employing the "train and retain" concept. Filled in three increments, the division included one mechanized in fantry battalion and eight infant ry batl'alions. By the end o f
July the division had g raduated the last cycle of basic trainees, and it was ex pect
cd to be combat ready by the end of the yea r.8
While organizing the 9th Infantry Division, the Army decided to usc it as a part
of the Mobile Afloat (Riveri ne) Force in Vietnam. Brig. Gen. William E. DePuy,
who was serv ing on Westmoreland 's staff, had developed the idea of a j oi nt ArmyNavy force for use in Vietnam's Mekong River Delta. Army units were to include a
brigade-size element that would live and move on sh ips and work with two brigade
size shore con tingents. Learning of the riverine mi ss ion, Maj. Gen. George S .
Eckhardt, the 9t h Division's commander, requested perm ission to mechanize one
infantry balla lion, which would allow him to have one brigade (three infantry b..1ttal ions) aboard nav,,1 ships " nd two brigades (one mechanized infantry and two
infant ry batta li ons ellch) operat'ing from land bases. The Army Staff in Washington
agreed, and Eckhard t organ ized the second mecllll1lized infantry battal ion in
October. To take advantage of the dry season in Vietnam. the division began departing Fori Riley at the end of 1966 and by February 1967 clemen ts of the "Old
Rcliables" took part in the first U.S. Army-Navy riverine operation of the war.9
326
Shortly the reafle r, the Army's

buildup plan wen t awry. Army Chi ef
of S t<l ff Genera l J oh nson had
req uested his staff to consider forrn~
ing a d ivisionaltype brigade ( Le .,
w itho ut the sup porting units CO Ill mon to <l se parate brig<lde) to
replace the 25t h Infantry Division at
Sc hofie ld Barracks. Hawaii , which
was progr<lmmed for dep loyment to
Vietnam in early 1966. Re sourccs
sc hedu led for onc of the rema ining
brigade authorizations could then be
used for the Hawaiian unit. Another
propos<ll, ca ll ing for organizing both
t he
re maulin g
brigades
In
MeNmn<lr<l's expansion program in
Hawaii, was presented to the Army
Staff. However. the Army had <leti9,h 111/(1111/)' Division .~. fin" b(/se
vated the 199th Infantry Brig<lde at
Ct/lllP il/ Vie/lw/II, 1966
Fort Benning, Georgia, on I Jun e
1966 in response to a request from Westmoreland for a brigade to protect the
Long Binh- Saigon area. Units in Europe were ta sked to furn ish the cad re for
the brigade, wh ic h field ed three light infant ry battalions. In le ss than six
months it deployed to Vietnam. to
l'lavi ng authority to organize only one morc brigi.lde. the Army activated the
II th Infantry Brigade, a pre- World War II element of the 6th Infantry Division,
in Hawaii on I July 1966. Behind the selection of the II th was the assumption
that the 6th would be the next division to be activated. The II th consisted of three
infantry battalions, a suppor! ball<llion, a reconnaissance troop, and a military
police company. Because of a shortage of personne l and equ ipment, the brigade
lacked its field art illery battalion, engineer company, ,1I1d signal platoon authorized fo r an independent brigade. But despite the ir absence , training began and
the missing units were even tu<llly organized. Rather tll<ln remaining in Hawaii as
plan ned, the 11th Infantry Brigade deployed to South Viet nam in December 1967
in answer to an ever-growing need for forces there. I I
As the Army's involvement in SOlltheast Asia deepened, more units moved to
Vietnam. As noted, the 25t h Infantry Division was alerted for deployment in
December 1965. and al thai lime Geneml Johnson, Army chief of staff, directed
that two new infantry battalions be added to it. However, almost immediately
after their organization began, the battalions were inact ivated and replaced wit h
two existing battalions from Alaska, <l means of speeding the deparlure of the
division. When the division deployed in the spring of 1966 it fielded one mccha-
FLEXIBLE RES PONSE
327
Mell off/Ie Is! Brig{llle. 101.~f AirbQ/"IIC Dil'iJ'ioll.fireji-o/ll old Vief COllg 'rel/ches.
ni zcd infantry battali on and e ight infantry battalions. In addition, the commander,
Maj. Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, insisted o n laking the division'll tank balla lion.1 2
The 4th Infantry Division, the last Regular Army infa nt ry d ivision ava ilable in
the United Siales in 1965 fo r service in Vietnam, experienced similar turblilence.
T he Sixth U.S. Army relieved one tank baualion from the division, equ ipped the
other with M48 tanks, reorgan ized one mechanized infantry battalion as standard
infant ry, and added two morc in fa nt ry balt'alions, giv ing the divi sion the same
maneuver mix (1 - 1- 8) as the 25th Infantry Division. Shortly after the 4t h completed its reorgani zation in November 1965, the division received 6,000 recruits to
bring all units up to fu ll strength. From Ju ne through August 1966 the 4th al so
assisted forty-seven nond ivisiona lu nits in preparing for duty in Vietnam and helped
activate the tra in ing ce nter at Fort Lewi s, Washington. Neverthe less, the " Ivy
Division" deployed to Vietnam between August and October 1966.13
As the confli ct in Vietna m intensified, Westmoreland requested additional
in fantry for the 173d Ai rborne Brigade and the 1st Caval ry Di vision. When the
173d Airborne Brigade arrived in Vi etnam, it had only two ai rborne battalions
and was augmented with an Austra li an battalion , whil e the 1st C.wa lry Division
had only e ight airmobil e infan try battalions, whi ch left one of its brigades short a
328
femellis of 69,h II/filllll)' Brigade, pari of the Selected

Fori Riley, Kallsas, /966.
Re~'en'e
Force. /mill
(1/
maneuver e lement. Afte r considerable de liberat io n, the Co nti nental Army

Command activated one uirborne bnttal ion and o ne airmobile battal ion, using
person ne l drawn from the IOlst Airborne Division and the 5t h In fantry Div ision.
Both b<l ttalions deployed to Viet nam in the summer of 1966 to join the J 73d
Airborne Brigade and the 151 Cava lry Division, respectively.ltI
Wit h the depart ure o f units for Vietnam, the reserves look on a more signiriCant role. The nation needed a reserve contingent that could report to mobil ization stat ions o n a seven-day notice. T he Army, therefore, created the Selected
Reserve Force in the Army National Guard that included three infantry divisions
and six infantry brigades, one of which was mechanized. To assure the foree 's
equitable geographical distribution so that one section of the nation would not be
asked to bear the burden of a partia l mobilization , each d iv ision consisted of the
d ivision base and one brigade in one state, while the ot her two brigades were
divisiona l uni ts from adjacent states (7(lbfe 26). The Army selected Ihe 28th, 38t h,
and 47 th Infan try Divis ions for the force. For the separa te brigades, the stales
organized three new uni ts, and aga in their geogra phic d ist ribution played a role.
Elements from the 36th, 41 st, and 49th In fan try Div isions were withd raw n to
form the 36 th, 41st , and 49th Infan try Brigades . T he divis io ns themselves
remained active, but each lacked a brigade. T he force's other three brigades were
the 29th, 67th, and 69th Infantry Brigades, which had been orga nized earl ier.I S
To improve the readi ness of the Selected Reserve Force, the Army authorized
its units to be fu lly manned, increased their number of drill days, and ra ised their
priority for receiving new equipment. Because of shortages in personnel and equ ipment, McNamara ach ieved a long-standing controversia l goal of the Defense
Department, a reduction of the reserve troop basis. T hose reserve units that were
329
FLEX I BL E RES PONSE
TABLE 26
Divisions an d Brigades
Selected Reserve Force, 1965
VIIi,
28th Infa lltry Division

3d Brigade, 28th Infantry Division
SWle
PenllsylvaniA
Pennsylvania
3d Brigade, 29th Inf.1.ntry Division
Maryland
3d Brigade, 371h Infantry Division
Ohio
Indiana
Indiana
381h Infa ntry Division

76th Brigade, 38th Infantry Division
2d Brigade. 46th Infantry Division
3d Brigade, 33d Infantry Division
47th Infantry Division
2e1 Brigade, 471h Infa ntry Division

lSI Brigade, 32d Infantry Division
3d Orig'ldc. 451h Infantry Division
291h Infantry Brigade
361h InHl1Itry Brigade
41 sl Infantry Brigade
67th lnr<ll1try Briglldc (Mechan ized)

69th Infantry Brig:ldc
Michigan
Illinois
Minnesota
Minnesota
Wisconsin
Ok lah01lla
l'lawaii and California
Texas
Washington and Oregon
California
Iowa and Nebraska
Kansas alld Missouri
judged unnecessary and others that were undermanned and underequipped could
now be deleted with minimum controversy and their assets llsed to field contingency forces. Among the uni ts inactivated were the last six combat divisions in the
Army Reserve- the 63d, 77th, 8 1st, 83d, 90th, and 102d Infan try Divisions- and
the 79t h, 94th, and 96th Command Headquarters (Division). The 103d Command
Headquarters (Division) was converted to a support brigade headquarters. 16
In the spri ng of 1965 the Army also responded to a crisis in thc Cari bbean area.
To help restore political stability and protcct Uni ted States citizens and property,
Pres ident Joh nson sen t the 82d Airborne Divisio n a nd ot her forces to the
Dominican Republic. Subsequently, the Inter-American Peace Force was organi zed
there, and by the autumn the only United States combat force len \vas one brigade
of three battalions from the 82<1 Division. The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked that the
brigade be returned to the Un ited States so that the 82<1 could resume its place in
the strategic force as a full-strengt h unit. In response, the Army selected the 1961h
Infantry Brigade to replace the divisional brigade in June 1966. But by the time the
I 96th had completed its train ing. stability had returned to the Dominican Republic,
and the president withdrew all Un ited States forces from the country. I?
To meet Westmorel and's con tinuing demand for more troops in Vietnam,
President Johnson then approved the transfer of the 196th In fantry Brigade to
Sout heast As ia. As the unit had been trained for street fighting and riot control,
330
the 196t h had to undergo add itional training fo r co mbat in South east Asia .
Also, support units norma lly attached to sepa rate brigades in Viet nam had to be
organized, incl uding signal and mi lita ry police platoons and chemical , military
intelligence, Army Security Agency, m ilitary history, and public information
detachment s. The tra in ing process bega n in June. and by August 1966 the 1961h
had deployed to ViClnam .18
Expansion of the Force

After July 1966 no further increase look place in the number of divisions and
brigade s un til the s pring of 1967 . In Ma rc h of that year, respondi ng to
West moreland 's request for addit ional forces, the Army Sta ff considered organizing either an infantry or a mechanized infan try brigade for se rvice al ong the
demili tarized zo ne between Nort h Vietnam and SOllth Vietnam. The o rig inal
request ca lled for a mechanized infantry brigade with person nel d rawn mostly
from the I st and 2d Armored Divis ions at Fort Hood. Be fore the unit could be
acti vated, Westmore land decided that he needed a standard separate infantry
brigade. On 10 May the 198 th Infantry Brigade was activated using l>ersonne l
from the 151 and 2d Armored Divi s ions. Two days late r, at the insistence of
General Ralph E. Haines, Vice Chi ef of Staff and former commander o f the 1st
Armored Div ision , the brigade 's three infantry battalions and artillery battal ion
were inactivated and replaccd with lInits takcn from reg iments assigned to the 1st
and 2d Armored Di visions. In turn, new b'lual ions from those regiments were
activated to rcplace the units taken from the two divi sions.1 9
Westmoreland's plan to usc the 198th along the demil itarized zone between
the two Vietna ms went astray. Unable to wai t for the brigade to arrive, he established a blocking force in April 1967 wi th units already in the theater. Designated
"Task Force Oregon,"20 it included the 196th Infantry Brigade; the 3d Brigade,
25th Infantry Division; and the 1st Bri gade, IO lst Ai rborne Di vision.21
In August 1967 a complex organizational exchange took place in Vietnam due
in large part to the awkward location of units in relation to their parent divisions.
Both the 4th and the 25th Infantry Di visions had "orphan" brigades that operated
out side thei r parent div ision's areas. To correct the probl em, Headquarters and
Headq ua rters Company, 3d Brigade, 4th In fan try Di vision , and the brigade 's
non-color-bcari ng clements were transferred (less personnel and equipment) from
Tay Ni nh to Task Force O regon at C hu Lai ; Headquartc rs and Headquarters
Company, 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, and its non-color-bearing uni ts (less
personnel and equipment) concurrent ly joined the 25th Infantry Divi sion at Tay
Ninh . The color-bearing uni ts (i nfantry and art ill ery battalions) att achcd to the
brigades were relieved fro lll the di visions in place and reassigned. Thcse adm inistrat ive actions gave the commander of the 25th Infrllltry Division operational COlltrol of his 3d Brigade for the first time in Viet nam . The 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry
Division, however, remained under the operational control of Task Force Orcgon.22
FLEX IBLE RESPONSE
331
3d Brig(l(le. 25,h II/filii/I)' DiIj.\';OIl, engages 'he Viet Cong betweel/ 8al/ Me
TI/IIOI
(lilt!
Pleikll ,
Soon aficr form ing Task Force Oregon, Westmore land decided to replace it
wit h a d ivis ion. Fo r the un it's designat ion , he selec ted the Americal Di vis ion
bcclIlIse it was to be organized under circumstances simi lar to those in which tha t
division first had been for med d uring World War II wi th National Guard units
fro111 Task Force 68 14 in New Ca ledonia. Westmoreland had origina lly planned to
assign the 11th and 198th In fan try Brigades, then preparing to deploy, and the
1961h Infantry Brigade, already in Viet nam, to the division. The Army Staff
agreed but ins isted t hat the unit's officia l designat ion be the 23d Infan t ry
Division rather than "America l" (the America l Div ision had bcen redesig natcd as
the 23d Infan try Division in 1954). On25 September 1967 the division was activated to con trol the 196th In fantry Brigade; the 1st Brigade, IOlst Airborne
Division; and the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. T he division base was to be
activated as requirements were identificd .23
In December 1967 the 23d Infan try Division received its planncd brigades. In
add ition to the 196th Infant ry Brigade, the II th and 1981 h Infa ntry Brigadcs,
reorganized as light infantry un its , had arrived in Vietnam a nd repl aced the
brigades of the 4 th Infantry and 10 I st Ai rborne Divisions, which retu rned to their
parent units.24
To st rengt hen the fo rces in Viet nam, Westmore land h'ld requested the remaindcr of the 10 I st Airborne Division by February 1968. Because of ominolls intel ligcnce reports about thc encmy's ilctivilies, Westillore lillid pressured W,lshington
to advance the div ision's arrival clute. Thlls, by 13 December 1967 , follow ing the
longest troop movement by air in history, the "Sc rea ming Eagles" arrived in
Vietnam. The division fie lded len airborne infantry b'llIalions. the three that hnd
deployed with the l Si Brigade in 1965 and the seven that arrived in 1967.25
332
To replace the 10 I SI A irborne Division and the 11th Infantry Brigade in the
Army strategic contingency forces, the Army activated the 6t h Infantry Division,
with nine infantry battalions, on 24 November 1967. Initially all units of the division were to be organized at Fori Campbell , KentlLcky. but U.S. Army, Pac ifi c,
requested that one brigade be transferred 10 I-I awaii to take over the property and
nondcployab le perso nne l of the 11th Infantry Bri gade. Accord ing ly, the 6th
Infantry Di vision was sp lit between Fort C ampbell (the di vision base and two
brigades) and Schofield Barracks (one b ri g~l de), l-I awaii.26
With the allachmCllI of the I [Ih Infantry Brigade, originally a component of
the 61 h Infantry Division , to the 23d Infantry Division in Viet nam , a new designa
tion was needed for the 6th Infantry Division's third brigade headquarters. The
staff, in an unprecedented move, decided to lise the designation 4th Brigade, 6t h
Infant ry Division, until the lllh could be returned to the div ision.
January 1968 turned into a month of crises for the nation. On 23 Jan uary, afier
a series o f incidents in Korea, the North Koreans seized th e intell igence shi p
Pueblo in the Sea of Japan and incarcerated the crew. Thi s resulted in the strength
ening of United States air and naval forces there and the authorization of haz.1rdous
duty pay for elements of the 2d Infantry Division in Korea. Shortly thereafter the
North Vietnamese began their expected offensive during the Tet holiday in Vietnam,
shocki ng both Westmoreland and the nation with its intensity. President Johnson
ordered additional forces to Vietnam, including the 3d Brigade (three airborne
infantry battalions) of the 82d Airborne Division and a Marine Corps uni t. Those
units arrived in February, and eventually the 82d's 3d Brig<lde, organized as a sepa
rate brigade, became a part of the standing forces in Vietnam,27
Because of other contingency p lans the Ma rine un it had to return to the
United Stales, and Westmorel<l nd asked for a mechanized infant ry brigade to
replace it. Army C hief of Staff Johnson approved the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry
Division, as the replacement. The unit, reorganized as II separate brigade fielding
one battalion e<lch of infantry, mecha nized infantry, a nd armor, a rri ved in
Viet nam in July 1968 and was the last large Army unit to be sent to Southeast
Asia (Trible 27),28
T he seizure of the Pueblo, the Tet offensive, and the need to maintain the
strategic force prompted the president to call a lim ited number of National
Glia rd and Army Reserve units to active duty in the spring of 1968. The c,d l
included two bri gades from the Na tional Guard, the 29th In fant ry Brigade
(Hawaii), whi ch reported to Schofield Barra cks on 13 May, and the 69t h
In famry Brigade (Mechan ized) (Knnsas), which took up station at Fort Carson.
To case the burden of mobilization, the brigades acquired c lements not previ
o llsly associated with them. The 29th got the I DOth Battalion , 442d Infantry,
from the Army Reserve, and the 69th included the 2d Batta lion , 133d Infantry,
from the Iowa Nation,ll GU(lrd.21J
Fo ll owing the Tet offensive and the l imit ed reserve mobilizat ion , th e
Department of Defense ended the buildup of divisional and brigade units in the
FLEXI BL E RES PONSE
333
TABLE 27
Deployment of Divisions and Bri gades to Vietnam
Vllif
Isl Cavalry Division

181 Infantry Division
2d Brigade'"
4th lnfmllry Division
2d Brigade
I SI Brigade, 5th Infantry Division

2d Brigade-
23d Infantry Division

II th Infantry Brigade
[96th Infantry Brigade
198th Infantry Brigade'"

251h Infantry Di vision
2d Brigade
3d Brigade
3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division
IOlst Airborne Division

Isl Brigade
173d Airborne Brigade
D(//e ;/l'rive(1 ill Vietllam
September 1965
October 1965
Ju ly 1965
October 1965
August 1966
June
1968
December 1966
January 1967
September 1967
December 1967
August 1966
October 1967
April 1966
January [966
December 1965
February 1968
Deccmbcr 1967
July 1965
May 1965
December 1966
Arrived scpamlciy.
act ive Army. At peak strength the Army had 19 divisions (count ing the 3 brigades
attached to the 23d as I d ivision), with 7 divisions serving in Vietnam, 2 in Korea,
5 in Europe, and 5 in the United Sta tes, and I I brigades, of which 4 were in
Vietnam, 2 in Alaska, I in the Cana l Zone, and 4 in the continental United States.
Organizational Changes 10 Units in Vietnam

Airmobility gave com ma nders the ability to concentrate men and their fi repower on the Vietnamese battlefield quickly, and the Army planned to organize a
second airmobile division as early as 1966. These plans fo undered until 1968
becausc o f the aviation needs of other combat units in Vietnam and the gcnera l
shortage of aviation equipment . But after the 101 Sl Airborne Di vision arrived in
Sout heast Asia, U.S. Army, Vietnam, began a phased reorganization of the division into an airmob ile confi guration, which took over a year to cOlllpl ete.30
During the conversion of the 10 I st, the Army adopted a d ecentral ized
approach to aircra ft maintenance. Init ially the 101sl, like Ihe 1s t Cavalry
Division, was to have a la rge aircraft maintenmlcc battalion, bu t the need of COIllpany-, ballery-, and troop-size aviation units fo r Iheir own maintenance organiza-
JJ4
lions resulted in a cellular maintenance structure. In the lSI Cavalry Division and
10 lst Airborne Di vision an ai rcra ft maimcnance detachment was activated to
support each company-size aviation unit.3l
Whe n the IOl st was reorganized as an ainnobil c unit, confusion and COlltention reigned over its designat ion. Instructions from Washington renamed the
divi sion the IOl st Infantry Di vision (Airmobi le) beca use the designatio n was
thought to accurate ly desc ribe il s miss ion. Officers in Vietnam opposed the
change, and after much d iscussion the Army StafT sen t new instructions redesig nating bot h the IOl sl Airborne Di vision and the 1st Cavalry Division as "ai r
caval ry." In July 1968 Westmoreland replaced Harold K. Johnson as Army
Chief of Staff, and Westmoreland directed that the div isions retai n their histori c
designations. 32
Ever conscious of ways to save person ne l, U.S. Army, Vietnam , req uested
permission in September 1968 to reorgan ize the 23 d Infantry Di v isio n (th e
Ameri cal) along the lines of other in fan try d iv isions to save over 500 personnel
spaces. The request proposed that the 11th, I 96th, and 198 th Infan try Brigades
be redesignated as the 1st, 2d, and 3d Brigades, 23d In fa ntry Di visio n, and that
a co mpl ete division base be orga n ized. West mo re land, as chief of s taff,
approved the reorga nizat io n of the division but not the numerical redesignation
of the brigades. He di rected that the bri gades be attached rather than assigned
as o rga n ic elemen ts of the div is ion. Hi s reaso ns fo r reta inin g the se para te
brigade des ignations included th e com pl ex it y of the unit s' hi stories and the
desi re nOI to c ha nge the d es ig nat ion s of unit s se rv ing in Viet nam. On 15
Februa ry 1969, the 231 was thu s reorga ni zed with a di vision base resembling
that in ot her infantry divisions, except for the attached bri gade headquart ers
a nd the om iss io n of the o rga n ic cava lry squadron. The I st Squadron, 1st
Cavalry, an e le men t of the lsi Armored Di vision, had becn serving with the
"A merica l" because General Haines, the former l SI Armo red Division commander, had wanted the squadron to represent "Old Ironsides" in Vietnam . The
starTehose not to lamper wit h this arrangemen t)3
To increase rirepower, some divisions and bri gades received an additiona l
ba tta lion or batta li ons of in fantr y withou t upse tting their structure. As noted
above, the 1st Cavalry Divis ion and the 173d Airborne 13rigade each had an addi ti on al infantry batt alion ass ig ned in 1966. Th e fo llowing yea r the 173d was
assigned a fourth infantry ba tt alion, and after the 1968 Tet offensive the 9th
Infantry Division and the 11t h, 198t h, and 199th Infantry Brigades each ga ined
an additiona l infantry battalion. At the peak of the buildup the combined arms
teams in Viet nam fielded eighty-three infantry and armor batta lions.34
Di visions and brigades deployed to Vietnam wit h infant ry, light infantry, airborne in fantry, and airmob il e in fan try battalions but, respond ing to the demands
of the eonniet, U.S. Army, Vietnam, reorganized most of them under mod ified
li ght infant ry tabl es of organi zation. Each of these bat ta lions consisted of a h ead ~
quarters and headqua rters company, four rine compan ies, and a combat support
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
335
company. The fourth fin e company provided a uni t for base defense and allowed
the battalion to operate with three com pani es outside the base ca mp.35
Comb", brough t about several changes in the infantryman's weapons. The
light M 16 rine became the standard individual weapon, and a one-man light anti
tank weapon (LAW) onen replaced the heavy and awkwa rd 90-111111 . recoilless
rine. Because of the nature of the fighting, heavier infan try weapons, slich as the
ENTAC, 4.2-inch morlar, and IOG-mm. recoilless rifle, saw litt le service. When
used, both the 81-mm. and 4.2-inch mortars were usua lly "slaved" to fire direction centers at American fire bases. Uni ts did not suffer a loss of effect ive firepower because their mobilit y a ll owed them to concent rate thei r remai ning
weapons, while improved field rad io communications a ided in putting tremendous amounts of supporting fire at their disposa l. Given organic, altaehed, and
supporting aviation and signal units, all divisions and brigades had extensive airmobile and commun ications capabi lities.36
A lth ough only one armor compa ny, equipped with 90-mm. se lf-propelled
antitank guns, assigned to a brigade and three divisio nal armor battal ions ,
equipped w it h M48A3 tanks, se rved in Vietnam , di visions and brigades there
had considerable armor. Each divisiona l reconnaissance sq uadron, except for
the two in the airmobi le divisions, had tanks and reconnaissance vehicles. The
latter carried additiona l machine gu ns and gu n shie lds, permi tting the reconna issance squadrons to fu nctio n as armor. Also, the cight mechanized infan try
battal ions in Victnam frequen tly performed as light armor units, us ing modified
armored pe rso nnel carriers. By 1969 some reconna issan ce and mechanized
infa ntry units employed Sheridans. the M55 I armored reconnaissance assault
ve h icles , in place of the light tank and armored personnel ca rrie rs. The
Sheridan fi lled the need fo r a light tracked vehi cle wit h g reater firepower tha n
the M 113 armored personnel carri er.37
Artillery, the third combat ann assigned to divisions and brigades, also underwent modifications in Vietnam . In the two airmobile divisions. a 155-mln. howit zer battalion was perma nently attached aOer the 1st Cava lry Di vision demonstrated that the heavy howitzer could be moved by helicopter. Because of the large
operational areas of divisions and separate brigades. their d irect support artillery
battali ons often had fo ur firing batteries, which were created in various ways. In
the 173d Airborne Brigade. a fourth battery was authorized; in the 23d In fant ry
Division, each di rect support battalion consisted of two five-gull and two four-gun
batteries; and in the 1st Infantry Division, one or two 4.2-inch mortar platoons
were attached to direct support artillery battalions as Batteries D and E)8
By mid-I969 the seven divisions and four separa te brigades in Vietnam
reached their final configuration (Trible 28). T he ROAD building-block concept
worked well , particularly in a war that was fo ugh t by brigades with divisions
serving in a co rps- like rolc. T he Army, however. had difficu lt y meeti ng the
demands of cOlllmanders for more tactical maneuver uni ts because there was 110
pool o f separate batta lions to dnlw upon when needed for additional support.
336
TABLE 28
Maneuver Elements Ass igned to Div isions and Bri gades in Vietna m
30 June 1969
DivisiOi/IBI'igade
III!
Mech
[st Cnv'llry Di vision
1st Infantry Di vision

4[h Infan try Division
lSI Brigade, 5th Infan try
Division
9th Infa ntry Division
23d Infantry Di vision
25th In funtry Divi sion
9
9
7
8
10
3
11
6
10
11
10
1st Brigade, 82d Airborne

Division
10I sl A irborne Di vision
173d Ai rborne Brigade
Total
IJlIIWliolls
Mod Illf Armol' Total
fllf
10
4
4
70
10
4
4
83
A company.
Divisions and Brigades ill Other Commands

T he Army directed its major effort in the mid and latc- 19605 toward Viet nam,
Hnd di visions and brigades in olher commands supported that endeavor. All act ive
duty divisions and brigades in the United States fu rn ished unit s or men for service
in Vietnam , and as a resu lt most fell below combaHcady status. Ultimately the
maneuver clemcnt mix in the I st and 2d Annorcd Divisions was reduced to four
tank and four mechanized infantry batta lions, which was considerably below the
prototype of six tank and five in fantry battalions. To mai ntain thcm as fully manned
armored divisions, the Army des ignated one mechanizcd infantry and two armor
battalions from the National Guard as " round-out" units for each. Round-out units
maintained a close association wi th their designated divisions, cven taking annual
field training wi th them, but were not on active federa l scrvice.39
Although the Army did not withdraw any divisions fro m Eu rol>C for service
in Viet nam, U.S. Army, Europe. also contributed to the combat effort. As a lready
noted, the eadre for the 199th Inf;mtry Brigade hnd come from Europe. Begi nning
in February 1966 the Army levied the command in Europe for officers ;md enl isted personne l wi th spec ific sk ills, pa rt icularly j unior grude and noncommi ss ioned
officers. With in a year 1,800 soldicrs a month were departing for duty in Viet nam
to meet the levy. This drain on the European force s severely affected unit leadership and the readiness of the remaining forces.40
FLEX IBLE RESPONSE
337
In the armored a nd mechani zed infantry divisions designed to fight in

Europe, aviation battalions were eliminated after a study all the lise of aircraft
rationalized that heavy divisions did nol need extensive air lines of communications. Fifty-seven hel icopters remained in each divis ion, spread throughout the
reconnaissance squad ron, maintenance battalion, division arti ll ery, and div ision
and brigade headquarters co mpanies. T he operation of the divisional airfield
passed to a new transportation detachment attached to the supply and transport
battalion. Although not stated, the forty aircraft removed from each armored and
mechanized infantry division were needed in Vietn(lIll,41
Notwi thstand ing person nel and equipment problems in Eu rope, div isions still
had to be prepared to count er Soviet mechanized forces, primaril y thro ugh
increased firepowcr. In the 3(~ 8th, and 24th Infantry Divisions an armor battalion replaced a mechan ized infantry battalion in 1966. (Armor battalions required
fewer people than mecha nized infantry battalions but had more firepower.) The
change gave the div isions a maneuver mi x of four armor and six mechanized
infan try battalions. In those battal ions, as well as in the reconnaissance squadron
and the arti llery ballalions, an air defense section that used the new shoulderfired, low-alt itude, Rcdeye guided missi le was introduced. In the arti llery of both
the armored and mcchanized in fant ry divisions, se lf-propel led 155-mm . howitzers replaced I05-mm. pieces because the larger howitzers cou ld fire both convent ional and nuclear warheads and had a longer range. T he capability of firing
nuclear rounds from convent ional artillery tubes also eliminated the need for the
jeep-mounted Davy Crocketts.42
Although the military and poli tical leadership still perceivcd a Soviet threat in
Western Europe, the first reduction in the number of Army d ivisions stationed in
Europe since the beginning of NATO took place during the Vietnam conflict. The
desire of the Uni ted Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United
States to realign their balance o f payments precipitated the reduction. By mutual
agreement one divis ion (less one brigade) and some smal ler units in Germany
were to return to the Uni ted States but were to remain under the operational control of the commander in Europe and return periodically to Germany for tra ining
exercises. The divisional brigade that remained in Germany was to be replaced by
one from the United States during each training exercise. The sta ff named the plan
I~..EFORGER, "Return of Forces to Germany." During the first half of 1968 the 24th
Infantry Division, without its 3d Brigade, moved to Fort Riley.43
The following December the Department of Defense announced that the first
REFORGER exercise would take place in early 1969 but, to prevent personnel turbulence, no rotation of brigades would occur. Since the Warsaw Pact countries
had invaded Czechoslovakia the previous August, the timi ng of the exercise,
between 5 January and 23 March 1969, demonstrated to NATO that the United
States would honor its commitment s.44
Spec ial mission brigades throughout thc world also contri buted to the forces
in Vietna m. [n late 1965 an infantry battalion of the 197th Infantry Brigade,
JJ8
which supported the Infantry School, was inactivated at Fort Benning \0 provide
personnel fo r expanding the Army in Vietnam. [n a personnel-saving aCl ion, the
Combat Developments Command's 1941h Armored Brigade at ForI Ord was
replaced by a battalion-size combat team and reorganized at Fori Knox to support
the Armor School in place of the 16th Armor Group. Under the new configuration the brigade included one mechanized infantry and two armored battalions.
The [7 [51 and Ind Infantry Brigades in A laska each losl their aviation company,
and in the 193d Infantry Brigade in the Canal Zone, the airborne battalion was
replaced with a standard infantry battalion. (Tc,ble 29 shows the com pos ition of
divisions and brigades outside Vietnam in 1969.)45
In 1968 Secreta ry of Defe nse Clark Clifford decided 10 reduce forces in Ihe
con tinental United States to four divisions because the budget did not permit f illing and ma intai n ing five di visions. He directed the inactiva t ion of the 6th
Infantry Division , the activation of a brigade to replace Ihe 82d's 3d Brigade in
Vietnam, and higher manning leve ls for the 69th Infantry Brigade attached to the
5th Infant ry Division at Fori Carson and the 29th Infantry Brigade at Schofield
Barracks . T he 6th D ivis ion was inactivated on 25 J uly 1968, and the rest of
Cli ffo rd's proposals were accom pli shed by early 1969.46
Four weeks after the 6th Infantry Divi sion was inactivated, the Vice Ch ief
of Staff, General Bruce Palmer, J r., cons idered reactivat ing the divis ion in
response to the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Wa rsaw Pact armies. Lacking
men to organize the unit, the sta fTcon sidered the di vis ion 's reactivation a "show
the nag" action. The plan was eventua lly dropped because it was an empty geslure. Thus, the st rategic reserve forces in the United States stood at four divisions in September 1968 and remained at that level until the close of the
Vietnam era.47
During the 1960s the Department of Defense cont inued to scruti nize the
reserve forces and to question the number of divisions and brigades as well as the
redundancy of maintaining two reserve components, thc Nat ional Guard and the
Army Reserve. In 1967 Secreta ry of Defense McNamara deci ded that 15 combat
div isions in the Army National Guard were unnecessary and cut the number to 8
div isions (I mechanized infantry, 2 armored, and 5 infantry), but increased the
numbe r of brigades from 7 to 18 (I ai rborne, I armored, 2 mechanized infantry,
and 14 infantry). The loss of the divisions did not set well with the states. Their
o bj ectio ns included the inadequate maneuver element mix for those that
remained and the e nd to the practice o f rotating divisional COmmands among the
states that supported the m. Under the proposal, the remaining di vision com man ders were to reside in the state of the division base. No reduction, however, in
total Army National Guard strength was to take place, which convinced the governors to accept the plan.48
The states reorganized their forces accordingly between I December 1967
and I May 1968 . All remaining d ivisions were s hared by two or more states
(Table 30) . Di visional brigades located in states without the division base consist-
TOTAL
Hawaii
Alaska
Alaska
Canal Zone
Fort Knox, Ky.
Fort Bragg,) N.C.
Fort Riley,2 Kans.
Germany
Korea
Fon Carson) Colo.
Gcnmmy
Gennany
Fon Hood, Tex.

Fon Hood, Tex.
Korea
Germany
Location
17
I,,!
52
2
2
6
6
2
2
8
2
39
6
5
2
5
117
9
II
10
II
10
9
10
9
9
3
2
8
8
Armor Total
Abn In!
Balta/ions
Mech Ill!
! Does not include the 1st Brigade in Vietnam, but does include the 69th Infantry Brigade.
2 One brigade in Gennany.
3 Does not include the I st Brigade in Vietnam, but does include the 4th Brigade. 82d Airbome Division.
lSI Annored Division

2d Annored Division
3d Armored Division
4th Armored Division
82d Airborne Division
17lst Infantry Brigade
! 72d Infantry Brigade
193d Infantry Brigade
194th Annored Brigade
Unil
Maneuver Element Mix of Divisions and Brigades on Active Duty

Outside Vietnam, 30 June 1969
TABLE 29
340
TABLE 30
National Guard Divisions and Brigades, 1968

Vllil

30th AmlOrcd Division
30th Infantry Division (M)
381h Infantry Division

42d Infantry Di vision
50lh Armored Division
33d Infantry Bri gade
39th Infantry Br igade
40th Armored Brigade

41st Infantry Brigade
67th Infantry Brigade (M)*
71st Airborne Brigade
72d Infantry Brigade (M)'"
8[st Infantry Brigade

LocmioJl
Massachusetts and Connecticut

Pennsylvania. Maryland, and Virginia
Alabama, Mi ssissippi, and Tennessee
North Carolina, South Carolina,
and Georgia
Indiana , Michigan, llnd Ohio
New York and Pennsylvania
Illinoi s, Iowa, and Minnesota
New Jersey, New York, and Vermont
Hawaii and Californ ia
Wisconsin
Illinois
Texas
Arkansas
Cal ifornia
California
Oregon
Oklahoma
California
Florida
Nebraska
Kansas
TCXH S
Texas
Washington
Puerto Rico
Louisiana
"'Mechanized.
ed of the maneuver c lements, an artillery battalion, an eng ineer company, a medical co mpany, a forward support maintenance cOmpany, and an administrative
section. The remainder of each division was located in the state with the d ivision
base. Infantry divisions had ten maneuver battalions , as did the mechanized
infantry divisions, except the 47th, which had eleven. The 30th and 50th Armored
Divisions had ten and e leven maneuver battalions, respectively. A si ngl e state
maintained each of the eighteen separate brigades, except for the 29th (Hawai i),
wh ich had elements in the con tinental Uni ted States. 4?
The Army Reserve brigades also felt McNamara's axe. Initi 'llly the Defense
Department planned no combat forces for the Army Reserve, but congress ional
341
FLEXIBLE RESPO NS E
opposition saved the 157th (Pennsylvania), 187th (Massachusetts), and 2051h

( M innesota and Iowa) Infant ry Brigades . Al l the ir expensive armor and mechanized infantry battalion s, however, were e limina ted, leav ing each brigade with
only three standard infantry batta lions. [n the western part of the count ry, the
poorly manned [9 151 Infantry Bri gade fe ll out of the force, with its headquarters being inactivated in February 1968 al Helena, Montana. The foll owing June
an armor battalion was restored to the 1571h Infantry Bri gade to increase it s
capabil iti es,50
Concurrent with reorgani zing the rese rves, Secretary of the Army Stanl ey
Resar authori zed a new Se lected Reserve Force in 1967 to lessen the heavy
burde n of th e accc icratcd tra inin g prog ram. A ll units in th e o ri g inal force
retained the ir equipmcnt but lost th eir pri o rit y fo r new equipm ent. The new
"se lected rese rve" fo rc e, des ig ne d spec ifi ca ll y to rei nfo rce the Army in
Southeast Asia, consisted of the 26t h and 42d Infantry Di visions and the 39th,
40th , 1571h, and 2561h Infantry Bri gades. But two years late r the secretary
abo lished the forcc, see king to brin g all National Gua rd and Army Rese rve
units to the same readiness leve l.51
Thc Dc fense Department did not questi on the number of training div isions
in the Army Reserve, but they we re reorgani zed to conform to Regular Army
training centers. In 1966 th e Cont inenta l Army Command developed new tables
of organi zat ion that e liminated reg im ent s in trainin g divi s io ns and replaced
them with bri gades (Cllal'( 4/). The division fielded two bas ic combat train ing
bri gades, each con sisting of four ball<llion s with five training compani es each;
an adva nced indi vidual training brigade, three battalions with three to six compani es or batteries of fie ld artillery, armor, infantry, <lnd eng ineers each; and a
combat support trainin g brigade, two battalio ns of fiv e compa nies each, and a
COlllmittee d irectorate. A ll ba sic trai ning in stru ctors were con ce ntratcd in a
committee g roup. A long with the di vision headquarters and headqua rtcrs company, the d ivi sion had suppo rt and spec ia l lraining compan ies and a noncommiss ion ed oITi ce r/d ril1 sergeant academy. These changes enhanced the tra ining
di visio n's abi lity for se lf-susta inmen t in both reserve and active duty statu s, but
it could not tra in as many me n under the new structure. All thirteen divisions
were organi zed under the new tables by 1968.52
Retrenchment
On 8 June 1969, President Richard Nixon announced that 25,000 men would
be withdrawn from Vietnam as part of a " Viernami zati on" effort , which invol ved
transferring increased responsibility for conducting all aspects of the war to the
Rcpubli c of Vi etnam . An und erl yin g ca use wa s th e d is illu s ionm ent or th e
Amcrican people with a war that seemed permanently sla lemated. Popular sentiment favored the return of U.S. fo rces From Vietnam and a retrcnchment o r U.S.
invol vement in world affairs, parli cularly in Asia.53
, Each banalion will contain 36 of any of the following types of companies/batteries (All):
Infantry. Field Anillery. Armor. or Engineer.
CHART 4 I-Training Division, 1966
FLEXIB LE RESPONSE
343
fell/ems oflhe 9,h {lIftll1l1Y Divisioll begin (fepor/jllg Viellll/m, Jllty 1969,
General Creighton Abrams, commander of u.s. Army, Vietnam, desig nated

two brigades o f the 9th Infantry Division serving in the Mekong Delta to be the
first comb ined arms units \0 leave. In July 1969 the 2d Brigade, 9th In fantry
Di vis ion, de parted Vietna m a nd was inactivated at Fort Ritey. The fo llowing
month Ihe di vision base and the 1st Brigade moved to Hawaii to become a part of
the Pacific reserve. The 3d Brigade, 9t h Infantry Division, was reorgan ized as a
separate brigade and continued to serve in Vietnam.54
T he incre mental rede pl oy me nt s from Vietnam betwee n 1969 and 1972
caused considerable confusion, but less than in previous connicts where demobi~
lization had to be accompl ished rapi d ly. Sho rtly after the withdrawal began ,
Acti ng Secretary of the Army Thaddeus R. Beal announced a reduction in total
Army forces for econo mic reasons. One resu lt was the immediate inactivation of
the 9th Infant ry Di vision , except for ils brigade in Vietna m. To repl ace the 29th
Infantry Brigade in Hawaii, which was to be released from federal service along
wit h other reserve uni ts in December 1969, the U.S. Army. Pacific, activated the
4t h Bri gade, 25th Infantry Di vision , on 6 Dece mber and returned the 29 th
In fan try Bri gade to state control on 13 December. When disclosing the formation
of the new brigade, Secretary of Defense Clifford stressed that the 25 th Infant ry
Div ision was not returning from Vietnam, exp lai nin g that the designation was
selected only as a tribute to the di vision's service in Vietnam . Nevert he less, the
announcement caused some rumors that the 25th would soon be home.55
344
Meanwhile, in September 1969 President Nixon announced another troop withdrawal. The only large lInit in that increment was the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne
Division, wh ich returned to Fori Bragg in December to replace the division's 4th
Brigade. As note(~ the Army released the reserve units in December, including the
69th Infantry Brigade. To maintain a full division at Fort Carson, the Fifth U.S.
Army activated the 4th Brigade, 51h InFantry Division, a Regular Army unil.56
A pattern ofredcploymcill soon emerged.57 As one group of units left Vietna m
the president announced another reduction. Under redeployment policies, selecl'ed
units ceased to receive replacements sixty days before leaving the command; their
equi pment was turned in fo r stomge or red istribution; and personnel were genem lly
reassigned e lsewhere in Viet nam . Usua lly each returning unit had only a s mall
detachment to sa feguard its colors or flags and essential records. Few sold iers had
opportunity to part icipate in any welcome-home ceremonies. Unneeded companysize or smaller units were inactivated in Vietnam, while batta lion-size and larger
unit's, including divisions and brigades, returned to the United Stales fo r retention
or inactivation. T he Army genem lly followed these policies over the next two and
one-ha lf years as divisions and brigades left Vietnam (Tc/hle 31).58
To accommodate some redeploying units, the Army rearranged the local ion
of divisional designations in the Regular Army. In 1970 the I st Infantry Di vision
rcplaccd the 24th In fan try Di vision at Fort Riley and in Germany, and the 4th
Infantry Divi sion succeeded the 51h Infantry Division at Fort Carson. The 1st
Brigade, 25th Infantry Di vision, replaced the 4th Brigade, 25 th Infant ry Division,
in Hawaii. The 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions sim ultaneously became mechanized
infantry units, adapti ng to a NATO reinforcement role. In the 1st, the maneuver
elements consisted o f 4 armor and 6 mechani zed infimt ry battalions, whi le the
4th included I infantry,2 armor, and 7 mechan ized infa ntry baualions.59
Another complex exchange of d ivisio ns took place in 197 1 when the 1st
Cava lry Division returned to the United States. At that time the Army planned to
test a new air caval ry combat brigade in conjunction with a irmobile and armor
units. The sl'aff had prog mmrned the I st Armored Division at Fort Hood as the
test un it, but when the 1s t Cavalry Division returned fro m Southeast Asia it
replaced the armored division, which was to be inactivated. Protests by former
members of "Old Ironsides" aga inst taking the uni t designation out of the active
force led Westmoreland, now Army chief of staff, to rel'ain the div ision on the
act ive rolls by transferring it to Germany where it rep laced the 4th Armored
Div ision. The 1st Cava lry Divi sion, less it s 3d Brigade, whi c h re mai ned in
Vietnam , was reorganized at Fort Hood .6O
The 173d Airborne Brigade posed a problem for redeployment planners
because it had been the first large unit sent to Vietnam . They wanted to retai n it
in the force, but the brigade was no longer needed in Okinawa as negotiations
were under way to retu rn the islllnd to Japan. Westmorela nd decided to station
the brigade at Fort Campbel l until the IOlst Airborne Di vision returned and to
lise the ll11i t or so me o f' it s clements later to reorgani ze the IOlst. The 173d
Dale
December 1970
April 1970
August 1971
4th Infantry Division (less 3d Brigade)

3d Brigade
1st Brigade. 5th Infantry Division

3d Brigade
March 1972
\olsl Airborne Division (less 1st, 2d,

and 3d Brigades)
1st Brigade
2d Brigade
3d Brigade
173d Airborne Brigade
January 1972
February 1972
December 1971
August 1971
June 1972
December 1969
April 1971
October 1970
November 1971
November 1971
November 1971
December 1970
July 1969
3d Brigade. 82d Airborne Division
2d Brigade
April 1970
June 1972
Apri11971
Redeployed
1st Cavalry Division (less 3d Brigade)

3d Brigade
1st Infantry Division
Unit
Returned to Fort Campbell, Kentucky

Inactivated at Fort Campbell, 1972
Inactivated
Replaced the 1st Annored Division at Fort Hood, Texas

Replaced the 4th Brigade, I st Cavalry Division
Replaced the 24th Infantry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas,
and in Gennany
Replaced the 5th Infantry Division at Fort Carson. Colorado
Replaced the 4th Brigade, 5th Infantry Division.
al Fort Carson. Colorado
Inactivated
Inactivated
Inactivated
Inactivated
Inactivated
Inactivated
1st Brigade replaced the 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, at
Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; concurrently division headquarters
and 3d Brigade reduced to zero strength
Reduced to zero suength
Replaced the 4th Brigade, 82d Airborne Division at
Fort Bragg, North Carolina
Returned to Fort Campbell,Kentucky
Remarks
Redeployment of Divisions and Brigades From Vietnam
TABLE 31
346
arrived at its new post in September 1971 , and the following January the
brigade headquarters was inactivated whi le some of the brigade's elements were
reassigned to the 10l sl.61
In June 1972 the last two U.S. combat brigades, the 3d Brigade, lsI Cava lry
Division, and the [96th Infantry Brigade, left Vietnam. T he cavalry brigade
rejoined its parent unit at Fori Hood, replac in g the 4th Brigade, 151 Cava lry
Division , whi le the [96th was inactivated at Oakland, Californ ia. The last brigade
clement , the 3d Battalion, 2151 Infantry, departed Vietnam in August 1972, marking the end of U.S. Army divisions' <lnel separate brigades ' direct partici pation in
Ihe war in Vietnam.62

Shortly after the withdrawa l of troops from Vietnam had begun in 1969,
President Nixon adopted a new doctrine for milit<lry involvement in world affairs.
He based the "Nixon Doctrine" on several principles: the United States would
honor all treaty commitments; it would provide a shield if a nuclear power threatened one of its allies or a nation whose survival was considered vita l to U.S.
national intcrest; and it would offer military and economic assistance to its allies
whcn rcquested. But the United States expccted 11 nation directly threatcned to
assume primary responsibil ity for its own defense. Following these princip les,
Nixon d irected a 20,000-man reduction of A rmy forces in Korea by 30 June
1971. To accomplish that goal, the 7th Infan try Div ision concludcd its 2 I -year
stay in Korea and returned to Fort Lewis, whcre it was inactivated on 2 April. Its
departure left only the 2d Infantry Di vision, now reorganizcd to consist of two
armor and six infantry battalions, augmented by Korean forces.63
With a smaller Army the nation coul d no longer maintain two brigadcs in
Alaska , and Westmoreland decided to eliminate one. In September 1969 both
brigades had been reorganized from mechanized to light infantry as modernization and cost-saving measures. U.S. Army, Alaska, chose to inactivate the 171 st
Infantry Brigade and reorganize the I nd. Under the new alignment a light
infantry battalion and th e reconna issance troop were s tationed at Fort
Wainwright, while two lig ht infantry battalions and the remainder of the brigade
base were at Fort Richardson. The reduction of forces in Alaska was completed
by November 1972.64
By May 1972 post-Vietnam retrenchmen t had cut the active forces by about
650,000 men from its peak wartime fi gure of 1.5 million. The number of Regular
Army divisions fell to twelve, and only four special-mission brigades remained.
The divisions, particu larly those in the Un ited States, were far from being effective fighting teams . The viciss itudes of the war in Vietnam and the reductions in
the size ofthc Army com bined to erode combat effectiveness. The decline in unit
capabil ities had becn less abrupt than in 1919 or 1945--46 but just as alarming.
The years between 1965 and 1972 had been tumultuous for both the Army
and the nation. Organizationally, howevcr, the ROAD concept had proved sound.
The activc Army increased more than 66 percent during this period, and divisions
FLEX I BLE RESPONSE
347
and brigades had been tailored for various missions within variolls regional commands. Light units campaigned effective ly in Vietnam, heavy units continued to
meet NATO comm itments in Europe, and Army forces in the United States covered contingencies for all cOlllmands. T he major problem for the Army was the
acquisition of personnel and equi pment. Al l div isions and brigades, except for
those in Vietnam , suffered a decline in readi ness, th e price of meeting the
demands of the conflict. Soldiers were withdrawn from Vietnam as individuals,
and most units returned to the United States as paper organizations. The Army
appeared to have solved its organizational problems associated with flexible
response, but it had not come 10 grips with its perennial difficulty, shortages of
human and materiel resources.
348
Notes
I Public
l~lIpl!rs
of/he Presil/elllS oJlfle United Siales, L)'lIdo/! Il . .I0{IIISOII, /965 (Washing!Ol1.
D.C.: Govcnlmcnl Printing Office. 1966). I'p. 461. 736; 1969, p. 77.
2 John son, Pub/ic PU{Je/'s, f965, p. 495; U. S. O. Shllrp :l1ld W . C. Wcstillorclnnd, RelJOri 011 Ille
IVar ill Vietnam: 1964- 1968 (Washington , D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1969), PI'. 275- 76;
Henlles, "Vic1l1am Buildup," eh. 5, pp. 34-38.

3 Richard r. We inert. Tbe Rule of USCONA RC ill tile Army Buildup. FY /966 (Fort Monroe.
Va.: U.S. Continental Amly Command, 1967). PI'. 113- 18; UT, TAG 10 CGs. First (lnd Fifih US.
Amli cs. 30 SCI) 65. sub: Reorga ni zation orlhe l sI Infantry Division, AGAO-O (M) (20 Scp65)
DCS PER, l SI InfOi l' fil e, DAM H-I-ISO.
4 Donn A. Starry, M Ol/l/fed Combat ill ViCtlW III (Washington. D.C.: Gove mn\Cnl Prinling OtTtce,
1978). PI). 54-58.
5 John son, Public Papers. 1965, p. 795; Hemles, "VielmHll Buildup." ch. 5, pp. 2- 1\ ; "'!\nllY
Un its Phm Swifl Activmion:' JV(/shillgtol/ Posl. 6 Aug 1965.
6 Weinert. Arm)' Bllildllp. /966. Pl'. 82- 84: TOE 77- \OOT. Scparnte Light InflUltry Brigade,
1965; LIT, TAG to CG. Firsl U.S. AmlY, 7 Oct 65, sub: Chlltlge in Stntu s ofST RAF Uni ts, AGAO-O
(M) (2 1 Sep 65) DCSPER, and Fact Sheet (OSD 1078). ACS FOR for While House, The 1961h
Infilnt ry Brigade has achieved a Combat Read y Posture, 20 Jun 66, both 1961h Inf Bele file, DAMHHSO.
7 TOE 7- 175T, Infimtry Oa11alion. Lighl InfiHlt ry Di vision or Li g ht [nf.1l1t ry Brigade, 1965.
8 Msg. DCSPER 10 CG. CONARC. DA 748 172, 22 Jan 66. sub: Ac tivation of the 9th Infimtry
Division. Msg, ACSFOR to CG, CONARC. DA 748332, 24 Jan 66, sam e subject, Msg. CG, Fit\h
U.S. Amly. to CG, CONA RC, 161806Z Fcb 66. ~1 mc subject, Ur. TAG to CG, Fifth U.S. A11llY, 18
Feb 66, same subject, a1l91h Inf D]v file. DAMH-HSO; Richard I'. Weinert, The Role USCONARC ill
tile Arlll)' Blliftlllp. FY /96 7 (Fort Mo nroe. Vl1.: U.S. Continental Amly Command. 1968). p. 73-76.
9 William F. I'ullon, Rh'l'rilll' Opc/"{ltiolls. 1966- 1969 (Wa shingto n, D.C.: Govenlment Pri ntin g
omce. 1973). pp. 26-4 1. 5 1- 60: UT, TAG to CG. Fifth Anlly. and C ine. USA RPA C. 2 \ Mnr 67,
sub: Rcorgnni 7.<ltion ofElemellts of the 9 th In11:lI1try [)ivi~ion. AGSD-C (M) (21 Oel 66) ACSFOR. 2d
Bn, 47th [nf, file, DAMIH ISO,
10 Weinert. A,.",)' lJl/ifdu{I. 1966, pp. 97- 99; Henlle~, "VicttHlm Buildup," ch. 13. pp. 34-38; Ur,
T AG to CG, Third U.S. A rmy, 17 Jun 66. sub: Actil'lllion of the 1991h [nt:1nt ry Brigade, AGSD,C
(M ) (3 Jun 66) ACSFOR, and Thc 199th Li ght Infant ry Brigade (Sep) "Redcmcher:' undnted. Ms,
both 199th Inf fide fil e, DAM H-HSO; Sharp and Wcstmoreland. Report of tile War ill VietlwlII. p.
129.
II Ur. TAG to C inC, USA R I'A C, 2 I Jul 66. sub: Activation of thc I I th Infantry Brigade.
AGSO-C (M) (2 1 Jul66) ACSFOR, and Joe 1'. Gallc. "A History of the 11th Infanll), Brigade. I July
1966- 1 Mn y 1970" (3d Military History Dell1chmcnt. 1970?), p. 9. Ms, bOlh I 11h Inf Bdc fil e,
DAMH- HSO; SS, ACSFO R for Co15, I Apr 66. sub: Brigade AClivmions. FOR 1)1' TP, Memo, ACSFOR for VCofS. 16 Oct 67. sub: Activmion of th e 6th In11:1l1try Division, Ind I, FOR 1'1' 1"1'. and
Memo for Reco rd. OCMH, 29 Sejl67, Sllt11e subjecl, all 6th Inf Div file. OAMH-HSO.
12 Sta rry, MOil/lied Com/)(I/, p. 58; Ltr. TAG to C in C, USARI'AC. 26 Jan 66. su b:
Reorganiza tion or th e 25111 Inrantry Di vis ion. AGAO-O (M) (26 Jan 66) ACSFOlt and Llr. TAG to
Ci nC. USA RI'A C, 10 Mar 66, sub: ReorganiZ<llion ofElemcnls of the 25th Infnnh)' Divis ion, AGSOC (M) (10 Mar 66) ACSFO R, both 251h Inf Oi v fil e. DAM H-HSO; Ur, TAG 10 CG. U.s. AmlY,
Alaskn. 10 Jan 66, sub: Activation of Uni ts. AGAO-O (M) (10 Jan 66), AG Refe rencc files, OAM HI-ISO: HenlleS, '"Vie tnam Buildup," ch. 13. pp. 1- 13.
U LtT. TAG to CG. Si;t;th U.S. Army. 29 Dec 65. sub : Reorga ni zat io n of the 4th Infantry
Di\' ision, AGAO-O (M ) ( 12 Nov 65) DCSPER, 4th lnf Di \' file , DAMH- HSO; Weinert , " 1"1/1)'
Buildup. 1966. pp. 122- 25: Hermes, '"Vietnam Buildup:' ch. 13, pp. 27- 34.
14 Weinert. A,.",), Buildup. 1966. IIp. 99- 101; Henllcs. "Vietnam Buildup.'" ch. 13. pp. 14- 18:
Ltr. TAG to CGs. Third l1l1d Fifth U.S. Amlies. 20 Apr 66. sub: Activation of Aviation Units. AGSD-
FL EX I BLE RES PONSE
349
C (M) (13 Apr 66) ACSFOR, Slh fin, 7th Cav file. DAM I-I-HSO, The subj(."(;\ of the letter is lhe activat ion of:lvialion unilS, but il pertains \0 the act iva ti on o rinfanl ry and cay-,d ry uni ts.
IS Llr, TAG to Chief. NOB. and other addresses, 9 Oct 65. sub: Increased Readiness of the
Selec ted Reserve Component Force. AGAM-I' (M) (8 Oct 65) ORC (Office of Reserve Components)
OrT (Orgnni zlllion, Plans and Trnining)-OF. Sc lcctcd Reserve Force file. DAM II-I-ISO; "Reserve
Units [n Selected Reserve Force," Arm)' R('$cn'c M(lgm;illc II (Dec 1965): 4-6; Llr, NOB to AG,
California, I Nov 65, sub: Reorgani zation of Cali fomi a ARNG, 1965, \0 Include SR F Units. NOAROTD loo2-California. LIT, NO B 10 AG, Texas. 24 1an 66, sub: Rcorganil..1lion of Texas ARNG \0
Include SRF units, NG-AROTO [002-0[-Tellas. Ltr. NG B to AG. Washi ngton. 28 Oct 65. sub:
Reorganiza tion of the Washington ARNG. [965, to Include S RF Ullits. NG-A ROTO 1002-0 1Washington, and Ltr, NGB to AG. Oregon, 28 Oct 65, sub: Reorganization ar the Oregon ARNG.
1965, to Include SRF Units. NG-A ROTO IOO2-0 1-0rcgan. all NGB Reference fil es, DAMH-HSO.
16 Ltr. TAG ta Chief, Organizl'<i Reserve Camponents. [3 Nov 65, sub: Inactivation of USA R
Reinforcing Reserve Un ils, AGAM (M), Scl~ted Reserve Force file. DAMI-l-IiSO.
17 "Stability Ol'tralions Dominican Republic." pI. I. vol. I. eh. II. p. I. Ms. DAM II-IIS R;
Hennes, "Vietn;ull Buildup," ch. 2. pp. 34--36, ch. 15. pp. 1-4.
1ft Weinert. Army Ili/ift/up. 1966. pp. 85- 88; Depl/l"llIIelll {if Defellse Allnlllfl Reporl. 1967. p.
144.
19 Weiner!, Army Illlildllp. 1967. pp. 97- 101 ; Telep hon c infoflllation request sheets, sub:
Composition o f the ]98th Infantry Brigade, 2 ,md 5 May 1%7, Msg DA 813926 to CG. CONA RC, 9
May 67. sub: Org.mi7..1tion of the 198th Inf Bde. lmd Memo for Record, undated, sub: Evolution of
[98th Inrllde. alll98th InfBde fil e. DAMH-HSO.
20 Task Foree Oregon was named for Ihe home slnte of its co mmander, Maj Gen William E.
Rosson.
21 Wi lliam C. Westmoreland, A Soltlier Re1X)I"/~' (Garden City. N. J.: Doubleday and Co .. (976).
p.201.
22 Msg. USA RV 10 USA RPAC. 18 1303 May 6 7, sub: 3d Brigades, 4th an d 25th Infantry
Division. Msg. ACS FOR 10 Ci nC, USA RPA C. DA 824266. 192355Z Ju167, samc subject. GO [44.
USARPAC, 1967, Ltr, TAG ta CinC, USAR I'AC. [2 Sep 67, sub: Change in Stalus of USA RI'AC
Units. AGSD-C (M) (I Sep 67) ACSFOR. all 3d Bde. 25th InfOi v file, DAM I I-HSO.
21 SS, ACS FOR for Co lS, 7 Scp 67, sub: Ameri cal Division. FOR PP T I'. Memo for Rl'Cord. 29
Scp 67, sub: OrganiZ.11ion and Aetivalion o f the ZJd Inf.1nlry Division. and GO 175. USARPAC. 20
Scp 1%7, a1l23d InfDiy file. DAMII-HSO.
2.j Ltr. TAG 10 CinC, USA RPAC, 29 Sci) 67. sub: Ch:mge in Status of Units, AGSD-C (20 Scp
67) ACS FOR. Ltr. TAG to CG. CONARC, 28 Sep 67. sub: Rco rganiz.1Iion o f the 198th In r.U1 try
Brigade. AGSD-C (M) (21 Sep 67) ACSFOR. both AG Re ference files. DAMII-I-l SO; "For Freedom
Under the Soulhem Cross." Amedml I (Mny 1%8): 2-6.
25 Sh,lrp lmd Westilloreland, Reporl Oil Ihe lVl/r ill I'iell/ml/, p. 156; News Release. 1170- 67,
Arrival of IOl st Airbome Division in Viet nam. 13 Dec 67, and Llr. TAG to CG, Thi rd U.S. Amly. 30
Nov 67. sub: Reorga nization or Elements of the 10I st Airbomc Division. AGSD-C (M) ( IS Nov 67)
ACSFO R, bol h IOtst Abn Di y file. DAM H-IISO.
26 SS. ACS FOR ror CofS, 18 Oct 67. sub: Activation orthe 61h Inf.1ntry Division. FOR PI) Ti),
Msg. DA ACS FOR for CG. CONARC, and CinC. USARPAC. 837848. 26 1426Z Oct 67, saille subject. Msg. CinC, USAR PAC, to ACSFOR. 062056 Nov 67. same subjcct. and GO 358, Third U.S.
AmlY, 1967,a l161h InfDi v file, DAM I-I-IIS0 .
27 W. W. RoSIOw, rile Diffllsioll ofPoH"l'r(New York: Macmi llan Co., (972). p. 410: Report by
the 1- 1 to the JCofStatT on SI>ceial ray for Duty subj ecllo lIoslile fire in Korea, 2 1 Feb 68. JCS
2478/ 130. Korea. Special Pay for Ilostil e Fire fil e, DAMI-l-l [SO; Sharp and Westmoreland, Reporl (if
Ihe /I'll,. 11/ Viellllllll. pp. 157- 62, ] 83- 84.
21! Ltr. TAG 10 CG, Fillh U.s. Amly. 13 May 68. sub: Chan!:.'C in Status ofUnils. AGS D-C (M) (2
May 68) ACS FOR, 5th [nf Div file. DAMII-/ISO: Msg. DA 10 CG. CONARC, and olher addn.-sses.
866004. 28 M.ty 68. sub: Final Movement Direelive 68- 56, 1st I3de, 5th [nf Di y, file. DAM H-J[SO;
Unit History orthe 1st In f.,ntry Ilrig'tde. 5th Inf.1nt ry Division (Mec hanized), 191 7- 1971, M ~. Mi ll.
350
29 Lyndon Gaines Johnson, The VOllloge PO;J/1 (New York: 11011, Rinchard, and Winston. 1971),
pp. 385-415 passim; Msg. ACSFO R, OA. to JCS, and olher addresses. 8593 14. 11 Apr 68. sub:
Mobilization Order, Msg, ACSFOR. DA, to JC5, and other addresses, 860342. 18 Apr 68. sub:
Mobilization Station Change. 18 Apr 68, nnd ORC OPT. Fact Sheet. su b: 12 Apr 68, Selectioll of
Reserve Components for Mobili:r...1tion, ;tli Vicln;l111, Reserve C01111>OI1Clltlilc, DAMH-IISO.
30 Tolson, Airlllobifily, PI'. 195- 98; Msg, ACSFOR, DA, to CinC, U$ARPAC, 866236, 28 May
68, sub: Second AimlObilc Divisioll, 10lsi Ahl! Div file, DAMH-I-ISO.
l! Tolson, Airll/obilifY. p. 197: Msg, AC$FQR, DA. 10 CinC, U$ARI'AC, 907931, 6 May 69,
sub: Activation/Inactivation! Reorgmlil'.ation of Units in RVN. and GO 577. USA RpAC, 1969, both
1st Cav Div file. DAMI-I-JISO.
32 Drnfi SS, ACSFOR for Col'S. undated, sub: Redesigllation of IOlst Air Cavalry Division.
FOR Pi> Fl'. and Msg. ACSFOR. DA. to CinCo USARPAC. 877510. 26 Aug 68. sub: Rcdesignmion
of AimlObile Division. 10l si Abn Div file. DAMH HSO.
JJ Cover Sheet (OPS 28) ACSFOR. 15 Nov 68. sub: RC<1fglIni7.ation of the 23d Infantry Division
(Ameri eal), FOR OT OR 1'0. and GO USARV 113,69, both 23d InfDi v file, OAM H-HSO.
34 Richard p. Weinert. 17/C Role of uscONARC ill lite Arlll)' iJl/iltillp. FY 1968 (Fort Monroe.
Va.: U.S. Continental Anny Command. 1969). p.71; Llr, TAG to CG. CONA RC, and otheT address
es, 7 Mar 67, sub: Activation ofSTAR F Units, 7 Mar 67, AGS DC (M) (14 Mar 67) ACSFOR, Ltr,
TAG to CG, CONARC. 20 Oct 67. sub: Activation ofSTRAF Units. AGSD-C (M) (16 Ckt(7) ACSFOR. an d LtT, TAG to CinCo USARPAC, 2 Oct 67. sub: Aetiv,ltion of Units, AGS D-C (M) (22 Sep
67) ACS FOR, all AG Reference files, DAMHHSO. In add ition to the infantry ballalions assigned 10
divisions and brigades. one nondivisional infan try unit served in Vietnam in a military poliee role.
35 Mahon and Danysh. "ifill//IJ" I'P. 11 5- 16; Westmoreland. A Soldier Reports, p. 283.
36 Mahon and o-.Ulysh. hifilllll)', p. 115; George E. Ocxter. "Scarch and Destroy in Vietnam,"
hifill1/I)' 56 (Jul- Aug 1966): 36-42.
37 Starry, MOil/lied COlllbm, pp. 142.234- 37; John H. Hay. Jr.. Taclicallllul Mmeriei
Im/oWllioll.f (WaShington, D.C.: Goven11l1ent Printing Office, 1974), pp. 111 - 16: Army Concept
Team in Vietnam, Final Report: Optimum Mix of AmlOred Vehicles for Usc in Stability Operations,
p. 11- 20. casc Libmry, Fon Le,lVenwonh, Kans. Although nine rnc~hanil'.ed infantry ballalions
served in Vietna m. only eight served there at lIny given time. The assets of the 5th l3al1alion, 60th
Infantry, on clement of the 91h Infant ry Division, were used 10 organi..:e Ihe lSI Battalion. 161h
Infant ry.:111 clement of the 1st Infiltltry Division, in 1968.
38 David Ewing 011, Fielfl ArlillelJ' 1964- 197J (Washington, D.C.: Govcmment Printing Office,
1972).pp. I68- 73.
39 USCONARC/ARSTRIKE (AnllY Strike) "Annuall-listorical SUmn1..1ry. FY 1969:' p. 87.
40 Andrew P. O'Mearn, "Drnwdown for Viet.101m: How U$AREUR Makes Do," Army 16 (Oct
19(6): 73- 75+; James 11. Polk. "A Changing US Anny Europe: Building Coml>.1t Capability for
Tomorrow," Ar/ll)' 17 (Ckt 1967): 65 66+.
4t Aviation Requiremen ts for Combat Structures of the Army, Annex II . 1965; TOE 170,
Annored Division, 1966; TOE 370. Infantry Division (Mechanized), 1966; TOE 1- 87G, Division
Aviation SUJ)pon Det'L~hlllent. 1%0.
42 Msg. ACSFOR to CinC o USAREUR, DA 737567. 22 Oct 65, sub: Reorganizatioll of
USAREUR Division. Division Oeneml file. Ltr, TAG to CinCo USAREUR, 12 Apr 66. sub: Change
in Status of Units, AOSD-C (M) (12 Apr 66) ACSFOR. both (26 Sep 66), Ltr, TAG to CinC,
USAREUR.3 Oct 66, sub: Atti v,ltion of US AmlY Europe Uni ts. AOSD-C-C (MX26 Scp 66) ACS
FOR. AO Reference Iilcs. Msg, ACSf-'OR to CinC, USAREUR, lllW.1 CG, CONARC, 112158Z Feb
66, su b: Tmnsferofthe 5th Bn 32d Annor, DA 750634. 5th Bn. 32d Annor. Iile, all DAM II-liSa:
TOE 170. AmlOrcd Division. 1966; TOE 370, Mechanized Infantry Division. 31 Mar 1966: TOE
7-45G. Mechanized Infantry Battalion, 1966; TOE 17- 35G. Tank Battalion. 31 Mar 1966; John S.
Yakshe. REDEYE Ground to Air." "ifill/II)' 56 (Jul- Aug 1966); 22 23.
43 "US. UK, and Oenllany Conclude Tril3teml Talks," Depf///Illellt viS/me Bulletill 56 (22 Noy
(7): 788- 89; Richard 1'. Weinet1. USCONARC (lml Redeplo)'lIIellt oIF(J/"f.:e~I/"Q'" Europe ( R HOKGI:R)
(FOTt Monroe. Va.: U.S. Contin ental Anny Command. 1969).
35 1
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
44 Msg, DA 10 CO, CONARC, 889661, 6 Dt.'c 68, sub: J'ublic Announcement-Reforger 1, and
LIT. TAG to CO, CONA RC. and olher addresses. 28 May 69, sub: Aller Action Report , Exe rcise
Reforger I, AGAM-!, (23 May 69) FOR OT ur 69EOOI. bolh Rclorgcr file , DAMH-I-ISO.
45 Llr, TAG 10 CG. Third U.s. AmlY, 23 May 66, sub: lnaclivlLlion or the 2d Bal1alion. 291h
Infantry, AGSD-C (M) (3 May 66), 197[ h Inf Bdc file , DAMH -IIS0: Telephone or Verba l
Conversation Record. Mrs Stubbs and Lt Col Dcrlmy, II
J UIl
67, sub: An Anllored Brigade for Ft
Knox , and Llr, TAG 10 CG. U.S. ATmy Combat Developments Command. 24 Jan 68, sub:
Reorganization of Unit, AGSO-C (M) ACSFOR, both 1941h AmI d Bdc file, Llr. TAG to CO, US
AmlY, Alaska, 10 Jul 67, AOSD-C (M) (3 Jul 67) ACSFOR, 171st Inf Bde file. and GO 70, U.S.
Forces Southem Com mand, 1968. 3d Bn. 5th Inf file, all DAMH H$O.
46 Msg, OCINFO DA to CG, CONARC, and CinC, USARPAC 870873. 3 Jul 68, sub: Decision
by the Secretary of Defcllsc not to Activ~He the 6th Infan try Divisio n, and Ur, TAG to CG.
CONARC, and CinC, USARPAC, 18 No" 68. sub: Change in Status ofUnics. AGSD-C (M) (3 1 Jul
68) ACSFOR. bot h 6th Inf Di" file, DAMH HSO; Llr. TAG to CG. CONA RC. 7 Nov 68. sub:
Change in Status of Units, AGS D-C (M) (10 Oct 68) ACS FOR, 4th Bde. 82d Abu Oi v, file. alld Ed
Gerhardt, Unit History of the 69th Jnfarnry Origade (Mechanized) 1963- 1978, 15 Feb 79. Ms. pp.
10- 21. 691h Ode,. 35th Inf Div, file.
47 Memo for Rceord. Scc of the Gcneral Staff, sub: Meet ing with VCSA on Reexamination of
R~-dueti on of Forces in Europe and Reconstitution of the 6th Di vision (2 Brigades), 23 Aug 68. and
OI'S Foml 28. ACSFOR to Cots, 30 Scp 67, sub: Activation ofOivisiol1 Headquarters and a Origadc
size Foree of the 6th Infant ry Di vision (Show the Flag Concept), FOR 1'1' FP, 6th Inf Div file,
OAMII IISO.
48 Chief of Information, DA, Wily Merge (Washington, O.C,: Govemment Prin tin g Office,
1965): Llr, TAG to CinC, USAREU R, and other addresses, 14 Jun 67, sub: Reserve Componcnt
Reorga ni zatiol\, AGAMP (M) (13 Jun (7) O RCOPTOP, Ll r, TAG to Ci nC, USA REU R, and other
addresses, 20 Ju167, same subjcct, AGAM-P (M) (20 Ju1( 7) OReOPTOP, and News Release, 27
Nov 67, Amly Reserve Components Will Commence Reorgan ization. all Anny Reservc file, DAMI-II-I SO; "The President Reports to the 89th General Conference," Nmiollal GI/ardsmall, 2 1 (Oct 1967):
insidc frollt cover and pp. 36- 39; "Oivision Co mmand Rot ati oll Plan Set Aside," Na/ioll(ll
GlIfIrdSIll{/II, 22 (Mar 1968): 16; James F. Cantwell, "A Salute 10 Ihe ' Lost' Di vis ions," Na/iOllal
GII(II'"f/~'IIWII, 22 (Feb 1968): inside fronl cover. The Guard lVanted the maneuver element mix ror
mechanized inf.,ntry and annored divisions to be the same as the prototypc divisions under the 1966
tabl es of organi .....'Ition. but for infantry divisions it desired eight inf.'Illtry, two mcehani zed infiUltry.
and two annor ballalions; thus the infa ntry division would have beell larger than Regular Amly di visions.
49 Repon of /lte Chief Nil/iollal Gllal'(l Bllreall. 1968, pp. 33- 34: Keith E. McWilliams,
"O;\isions or Brigades for the Nationa l Guard." AHliwlJ' Re l'iew 5 I (Jan 1971): 37; also NG-AROTO
1002- 1 lellers 1967- 1968, cO]Jics in CMI I.
SO Office of Reserve Components, "Annual Historical Summary, 1 Jul 67- 30 Jun 68," p. 4,
OAMH-I-ISR; Historical Data Cards, 157th, 1871h, 191sl, and 205th InfUdes, DAM H-IISO.
SI LtT, TAG to CinC, USAREUR, 25 Apr 68. sub, S RF II Troop List, AGAM" (M) (16 Nov
67) ORC-OPTOP. Anny Reservc file , DAM II HSO; "CONARC Report on US Anny Reservc 68:'
Arm)' Reserve Magil:inc 25 (Mar 1968): 4-5; "SRF 130m 27 September 1965; Died September 1969,"
N(tJiol/af GII(/I'"fls/II(II/ 23 (Scp 1969): 12- 16: DepU/,/IIIt'lIf ofille , fnll)' His/or'ical SWIIIIIlII)'. 1970, p,
70.
S2 TOE 29- 7T- 3, Division (Trnining). 1966; "Things 10 Come: CONARC Present Plans fOT the
New Year," ..11"111)' Rt'sel1'/! Mtlg(dllt' 13 (Dec 1967): 8- 9; NOles, "Tl'llining Division Reorganization.
1967- 1968:' Division Gencml files, OAMHHSO.
Sl /)lIblic P(II)I!I"S oJlhe Preside/lls oflhe Ulli/ed Slates. Ric/wl'd Nixon. 1969 (WaShington, D.C.:
Go\'emment Printing Office, 197 1), p. 443.
S4 Wcslmorela nd, A Soldier RCI}()I'/S, p. 381: GO 236, Fifth US AmlY, 23 Ju l 1969; Ltt. TAG to
CinC, USARPAC. and other addresses, undatcO, sub: Letter of Instructi on for Redeployment of US
AmlY Forees from RVN (U), AGAM,], (21 Ju169) OPS 00 FE. Vietnam Redeployment file, Msg.
352
CINFO, DA, 10 CG, USAR I)AC ,lI1d other addresses, 919410. 8 Aug 69, sub: Inacti va tion 0(91h
Infillltry Division. 9th InfOiv file. GO 2434, USARV, 6 Ju169. 3d I3dc, 9th InfDi\', file. all DAM HI-ISQ.
H Msg. CINFO, DA, to CO, USAR I'AC and other llddrcsscs, 919410. 8 Aug 69, sub:
Inactivation of 9th Infml1ry Division; LIT. TAG 10 C inC, USAREU R lIl1d Seventh Amly lind Olher
addresses, [8 Dec 69, sub: Plan lor Release of Units and Individuals ordered to Active Dut y under the
Reserve Forces Mobiliz.1Iion, Ml1Y 68, AGAM-J> (M) ( 13 Dec 68) DeSPER-pLD. Vietnam, Reserve
Component, file. DAMH-I-\SO; Msg. [>CSQPS, DA, 922222. 2 Scp 69, sub: Dc mobiliz.1lion of the
291h Inf I3de, 29th Inf Ode file, OAMII-IIS0; LIT, NOll to AG, lIa waii , 12 Nov 69, sub:
Recstablishment and RCQfgo1ni ...ution orthe 29th [nI:1n1ry Brigade. NG-A RQTQ [OO2'()[Hawaii 291h
Inf 1.Jdc, DAMHHSO: GO 645, USARI'AC, 26 Aug 1969: Msg. SECDEF to C inC, Pacific Area
Command, 6 Nov 69, sub: Public AfT.,irs Guiduncc for Activation of Units in Hawaii, 41h Ode, 251h
InfDiv. filc, DAMI-IIISO.
SO Nixon, Public Papel'll', 1969. p. 7 18: Msg. CG, U.s. Anny. Victna m (USA RV). to CG. 3d
Bdc, 82d Abn Div, 13441 I [40847Z Oct 69. sub: Implementing Instmetions to USAR PAC Advanec
Movement Directivc 13- 69. and Ur, TAG to CG, CONARC. 9 Jan 70, sub: Approval of MTOE,
AGAOD (M) (17 Dec 69) ACS FOR . both 3d Bde, 82d Abu Div, fil e. DAM H-HSO: Ur, NGB to
AG, KanSlls, 2 1x.'C 59. sub: Reestabli shment of 69th [nf Ude ,111<1 995th Maint Co in Kansas A RNG.
NGAROTOOI, Kansas, Kans.1s NO file. DAMH[ISO.
57 Redeployment had a brrn,der meaning than just translcrri ng units from one command to
another. It included the inactivation of units in Vietnam, the transfer of units to olher commands for
rctentioll in the force. and the retun, of units to the United States for inactivation.
58 Msg, Ci ne. USAR[>AC. to DCS['ER, 12 134Z Dec 1%9, sub: [Icrsonnel Policics to Suppon
SubSC<llIent Redep[ oyment from RVN. as amended, Vietnam Redep[oyment file. DAMHHSO.
59 Msg, ACSFOR to CinC, USARPAC, 940715 9 Feb 70, sub: Inactivation/ roorganiz.1tionl activat ion, ACSFOR MF CRA. and Ltr, TAG to CinC, USARPAC, and other addresses, 14 Nov 70, sub:
Letter of Instmetion for the Fifth Increment Redep[oyment of US Am,y Forces from RVN, AGDA
(M) ([4 Nov 70) OI'S 00 T R, both Viehmm Redeployment file. DAM[I-IISO.
60 Ltr, TAG to CinC, USARI'AC, and other addresses, 17 Feb 71, ~ub : Lellcr of Instmction for
the Sixth Incre ment Redeployment of US Anny Forces from RV N, AG I' A-A (M) ( 12 Feb 7 1) OI'S
OD TR, Vietnam Redeployment file, OAMI-I-I-1SO; LIt. TAG 10 CinC, USA RPA C. 15 Apr 7 [. sub:
Letter o r [nstmction for the Rcorgani7.alionllnactivation of the 1st/4th AnnoTed Di vision. AGDA-A
(M) (8 Apr 7 1) 01' OD TR, GO 147, [[[ Corps and Fort 1-1000, 1971, and Llr. 1st Annd Div to U.S.
Anny Institute of Hern ld ry, 25 M:lY 7 1, sub: Request for Information, AETSKA, ors 28 Form. ACSFOR, sub: Rcdcsign.1tion of the 1st AnlloTed Division, OAI'DMFI'-T. 22 Scp 72: all 1st Annd Di v
file, DAMH HSO: Llr, Uruce C lark to Westmoreland, 26 Mar 7 1. and LIf, I-lal Pallison. C hief or
Military Il istOf)' to Clark, 3 I Mar 71. both 4th Annd Di v fi[c. DAMI1 HSO.
61 Memo for Record. Vincent M Russo. Asst Sec of the Gell Staff. 22 Jun 7 [, sub: Stationing of
th e 173d Airborne Brigade. lind Msg. ACSFOR to CG, CQNARC, 172206Z Dec 7 [ sub:
Organi ...alion of 10lst Abn Di v (Ambl) in CONUS, both 173d Abu Ode file, OAMHHSO.
62 Llr, TAG to CinCo USAR I'AC. and olher addresscs. 5 Jlln 72, sub: LCller of Instruction for th c
Twelflh Incremental Redcployment of US Anny Forees from RVN. DAAGI'AI'A (M)(24 May 72)
DAMOODT. and Ur. TAG to CinC, USA RI'AC, lind other addresscs, 10 Allg 72, sub: Lettcr of
Instruction for .he Thinecn th Incrementa[ Redep[oyment of US Anny Forees from RVN , OA AGI'AP-A (M) (2 Aug 72). DAMOODT. both Vietnam Redep[ oyment file, DAMI [-I ISO.
63 Nixon, Public Papers. 1969. pp. 905- 06: Llr. TAG to C inC, USARI'AC, and olhl"f addresses.
22 Jun 71, sub: Letter of Instruction for Redep[oyment of US Amly Forees from the Repub[ic of
Korea. A DG AA (M) (8 Jun 71) O I'S 00 TR. Korea. Redep[oyment of Un its 1971 - 1972 file.
DAMI-lJ[SO: GO 162, Sixth US Anny. 1971. 7th InfO! \' file. DAM] I-IISO.
6" US Amly Alaska, "Annual Historical Summary. I Ju168- 30 Jun 69," p. [4. 1 Ju[ 69- 30 Jun
70, p. 17, DAMH -HSR: Depllrtlllem o/Ifll' AI'III)' Hislorical SIIIIIIIWI)'. f972, Jl. 10; GO 657. US
Anny Alaska, 1972, 171st InfBde file, DAMIl [ISO.
CHAPTER 13
The Total Army

The Ulli/ed Slates
IIIlIsf COJI/ill lll!
10 //Iail/Illill (1(lequ(lle !>'frellgth to /IIect ils responsi.
bilifies. ... The clIpabilities of OUI" aClil'c fi}/ce.~
11111.\"
be improve(1 substantially ,hrollgh
moderl/ization lIlId ill/pro!'!!ll readilless. AI Ihe sallie lime, we lire placing increased
eml,llflsis 011 0/11' NlIIiolllll Gllarc! lIlIll Resen'c ('ompuI/ems so {11m we /lilly ol)(aill II/(Ixi11111111 defellse capaiJilifies frolll lite limiled resources aW/i/able. 1111! .~Irengl"ellillg of lite
Naif 01/01 GI/orr! alld Reserve Po/'ce,\' . .. is fill illlegml,JlIrI of ,he /OIaI fo rce plalllling.
Sccrclary of Defense Melvin R. Laird l
Disillusioned wi th the experience in Vietnam, the nation questioned and reexamined the role o f the United States in world affai rs. T he Army turned 10 a smaller,
all-vol unteer rorce ror the first time since the end or World War II. A smaller Anny,
however, req uired more convcntiona l firepower to prov ide a credible detcrrent
against Soviet aggression. A reexamination or d ivis ion and brigade organizations
began, resulting in the incoq>oration o r new, sophisticated weapons and equipment.
To meet the nation 's needs w ith rewer resources, planners re lied upon the concept
or "One Army" or "Tota l Army," depe ndi ng upon the jargon in vogue, wh ic h
st ressed the integration of th e Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army
Reserve. Although the three components had served the nation together in the past,
they had always remained separate and dist inct rrom one another in many ways.
The 21-Division, 2 I-Brigade Force

The Nixon doctrine and small er budgets drove Secretary or Derense Melvin
R. Laird to set an Army goal or 2 1 di visions, 13 in the Regular Army and 8 in the
National Guard, by 1973. Structured and equipped primari ly to de fend Western
Enrol>C, the divisions were designed ror conventional warra re aga inst the Soviet
Union's heavy armor rorces. To complement the divisions, the Army main tained
21 separate combi ned arms brigades, 18 in the Army National Guard and 3 in the
Army Reserve. In addition, the Regu lar Army continued to employ s pecia l mission brigades as theater derense rorees.2
In October 1969 the Army Staff s ll s r)(~nded all new work on revised tables or
orga ni 7..<ltion and equ ipment ror arrnorc(~ inrmllry, and mechanized inrantry divi sions because the proposed changes requi red too many men to fie ld them. Instead,
il directed the Comb..lt DevcJoprncnls Command to develop d ivisions or rewer than
354
17,000 men . The proj ect, entitled AIM

(armored, infantry, and mechani zed
infant ry di visio ns), would occupy
Army planners' attent ion for the next
several years and focus primarily on
the European battlefi eld )
In their final form the new AIM

tables ne ith er altered the ove rall
ROAD doctrine nor radically modi *
fied divisional s tru c ture s but
addressed ways to coun ler va rious
Iypes of Sov iet threats. To defend

aga inst low altitudc hostile a ircraft
and surface targets, the tables provided each div ision with an air defense
arti ll e ry ba tt a li on eq u ipped w ith
Chaparral missi les and Vu lcan guns,
\veapons that had been under developIllent si nce 1964. The new batta lion
gave divisions the first dedicated antiaircraft art illery unit since pen tomi c
reorga nization. Aviation companies
TOW (rllbe-Ialli/ched. oprically
reappeared in mechan ized in fantry
/racket/. lI'ire-gllifled) missile
and armored divisions to enhance ai r
support. In the divisional support command, adjutant general and fi nance companies replaccd the administration company to improve personnel services, and automatic dala proccss ing cquipmcnt was addcd to providc centra lized control of personnel and logistics. Eventually automat ic data processi ng lcd to the introduction of
a materiel (supply and mai ntenancc) management ccnter in each divisioll.4
In infantry, mcchanized infantry, and armor battalions, the tables concentrated combat support (SCOlltS, mortars, a ir defense and antitank weapons, ground
su rveillance eq ui pment , and maintenance resou rces) into a combat support company. Tube- lau nched, Optically trackc(~ Wire-guided missi les (TOWs) rcplaced
ENTACs and I06rnm. recoi llcss riflcs as anti ta nk wCllpons in the infantry and
mechanized in fant ry battalions. Sincc the TOW was only j ust emerg ing from its
developmental stage, the tables approved the retention of the 106ml11. recoi lless
rifle as a temporary measure.S
Modernization of armored, infant ry, and mechanized infa nt ry div ision s
becllme an ongoing process primarily to due to shortages of equipmen t. Because
of the need for ant iaircraft weapons in the divisional area, the Air Defense
Arti llery School at Fort Bliss, Texas, inaugurated a program in the spring of 1969
10 activate and train C haparra l- Vulcan battalions. which were assigncd 10 divisions
upon completion of training. After the new divisional tables were published in
THE TOTAL ARMY
355
1970, the Honest Joh n rocket battalions were eliminated as divisional units, and
new Lance missile units replaced them at corps level. The adjutant genera l and
finance companies were introduced in 1971, the aviation companies returned in
1972, the materiel management center appeared in 1973, and new combat intell igence companies were assigned beginn ing in 1974 (replacing the combat intelligence unit , which had been regularly attached to every division since the pentomic
reorganization of 1957). The company provided tl battlefield information coordinat ion center to plan and manage the collection of intell igence and consolidated
ground surveil lance radar and remote sensors lInder one commandcr. 6
The standard maneuver clement mix of the mechanized in fant ry d iv ision was
a lso adjusted for the European batt lefield. An additional armor batta lion was
added to the mode l divi sion, making the mi x five armor and six mechanized
infantry battal ions. Subseq uently the Army activated additional armor battalions
for the 3d and 8th Infantry Di vis ions stationed in Germany in 1972. That same
year the Con tinental Army Command replaced a mechanized infant ry battalion
with an armor battalion in the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado, and
in 1973 made a similar change, givi ng the division a maneuver clement mix of
four armor and six infantry battalions. [n the armored division the maneuver mix
rema ined at ri ve mechanized infantry and six armor battalions. Infantry divisions
fielded one armor, one mechanized infan try, and eight " foot" infantry battalions.1
To have thirteen Regular Army divisions, the Army Staff directed the 25th
Infant ry Divis ion, which fielded on ly one brigade afier leaving Vietnam, to be
reorganized at Schofie ld Barracks in the spring of 1972. Because of environmen.
tal issues surrou nding the use of Scho fi eld Barracks at that time, the d ivision had
only two brigades (six infantry batta lions), with the Hawaii Army National Guard
agreeing 10 " round out" the 25th w ith the 29th In fa ntry Brigade. S ince the
brigade included the 100lh Battalion, 442d Infantry. from the Army Reserve, the
division was truly representat ive oflhe "Total Army."8
For the thirteenth Regular Army division in the fo rce, the Continental Army
Command reactivated the 9th In fantry Division at Fort Lewis on 21 April 1972.
Over the next few months the divi sio n organized one armor, o ne mechani zed
infantry, and seven infantry battalions, which was one less infa ntry unit th<ln the
standard fo r an infantry division. The division b<lse had all its authorized elements
except for the Honest John battalion, then under consideration for eliminat ion in all
divisions. Two years later the Army Staff directed the 9th to establish one brigade as
an armored unit to support cont ingency plans, and when it became evident that the
active Army was unable to field an additional tank battalion, the Washington Army
National Guard agreed to furnish a tank battalion as a round-Ollt lInit.9
While organiz ing the thir tee n-division force, the Continenta l Army
Command dctermined that the 197t h Infantry Brigade, assigned to the In fantry
School at Fort Benning, Georgia, was overman ned for its training support mi s
sion in the post-Vietnam Army. To provide pcrsonnel needed for the school, the
command directed that the school support troops be reorganized and the 197th be
356
restructured as a unit in the Strateg ic Army Force. On 2 1 March 1973 the brigade
officia lly joined the strategic force, fi elding one battalion each of infantry, mechanized infantry, and armor, 10
The Regu lar Army also maintained three other brigades with special missions
in the ca d y 19705. The 172d and 193d Infantry Brigades se rved in Alaska and the
Canal Zone, respectively, as theater defense units. At Fort Knox, Kentucky, the
194th Armored Brigade was a bri gade in name only. It had been reduced to a
headquarters, and ils infmllry, armor, and field artill ery units had been ass igned
directly to the Armor School. The 1941h, however, remained at Fori Knox as a
co mmand a nd cont rol o rga ni zation for various un its ranging in s ize from a
finan ce section to a supply and service battalion. I I
In lat e 1972 the Arrny approved the reorganizat io n of the 10 I sl Airborne
Division using new ai rmobi le divi siona l tables. Si nce returning from Vietnam,
the IOl st had compri sed two airmobile bri gades and one airborne brigade, with
the airborne bri gade separat ely dep loyable. Defense planners had insi sted thaI
the division serve as a qui ck reaction force until the thirteen-division force was
combat ready. The existing d iv ision e mployed a conglomeration of old, new,
and test tables of organization and equipme nt, whic h cre,lted o rgan izational
problems in the divi s ion's combat and support unit s, parti cularly in s ig na l
rcsourccs and medium-range fi e ld artillery. Afte r ex tensive study Army Chief
of Staff Creig hton Abrams approved the reorgani zation of the division under
new tables, whi ch continued to provide two airmobi le brigades and one a irborne brigade, with it s supporting elements parachute qualified. S ig nal , engineer, ma intenance, and aviation resources were in creased; and an air defense
artillery battalion , adjutant ge neral and finance complUlies, and a materi e l
management center added. A 155-mm. howitzer battali on, wh ich had beell used
in Viet nam by the di vision, was made an organi c clement in the tables, but in
fieldin g the !lew structure, Abrams d irected that the 155- mm . towed howitzer
battalion be temporaril y elimi nat e d a s a wa y to re duce personn e l
req ui rements. [2
By early 1974 th e thirteen-division Regular Army rorce was deemed combat ready. and contingency plans no longer required an airborne brigade in the
10 I st. United Stat es Anny Forces Command, which in parI rep laced the United
Stal es Continental Army Com mand in 1973, reorganized the di vision as a completel y airmobile o rga ni za tion. The reorga nization al so e liminated int ernal
riva lries between the higher pa id paratroopers (soldi ers o n "jump status") and
the regu lar airmobil e soldiers. To compensate for its loss o r ai rborne status in
recruiting, Maj. Gen. Sidney B. Berry, the comma nder of the 10 I st, decided to
ca pitali ze on the divi sion 's air assault traini ng, req uest in g that the di vision's
parenthetica l designation be changed from "a irmobile" to " air assault" and that
the personnel who com pl eted air assault trainin g be authorized to wea r a speci al
badge . The Army Staff app roved the c han ge in des igna tion and eve ntually
authori zed the air assa ult badge. IJ
T HE TOTAL ARMY
357
The airborne division was the last
type of division to be modernized. As
in other divisions, the new tables pro
vided an air de fense artillery battalion,
adj utant genera l and fina nce compa
nies, and a materiel management cen
ler. Th e structure also continued to

include a much debated li gh t armor
battalion, equ ipped with reco nnai s

sanee airborne assault vehicles, which
had been assigned to the division in
1969. The most sign ifica nt ch an ge,

however, was the replacement of the
su ppl y co mpany wit h a supply and
service battal ion, which provided the
division with over 500 addi tional ser-
vice person nel. The one remaining

active airborne division, the 82<1, with
nine airborne in fantry btlUalio ns and
an armor battalion, adopted the new
Gel/emf Abrtlllls
structure by the fa ll of 1974.14
After returning from Vietnam the 1st Cava lry Di vision h<ld been given two
primary missions: eV<l luate th e interaction of armor, mechanized infant ry, air
mobi le infantry, and air cava lry (a rmed heli copters); and fill the ro le o f an
armored division in the st rategic reserve forcc. To covcr the second miss ion, the
divi sion con tinued to use Nati onal Guard round-out units, which had originally
been designated for the 1st Armored Div ision- the unit that the 1st Cavalry
Division rep laced at Fort Hood in 1971. To eval uate the interaction of armor, ai r
cavalry, and mechanized and ai rmobi le infantry, the "F irst Team" was organ ized
under new tables (Char' 42) that included resources fo r an air cavalry combat
brigade (ACCS). T his was not to be the type of bri g<lde the Howze Board had
suggested in 1962, which was to be a completely airfighting unit, but one that
troops in Vietnam and Europe had been testing under limited cond ition s as a
combined arms assault unit. With the di vision combin ing armor, infan try, and
ai r cavalry in o ne org<lll izatio n, Westmoreland co in ed t he te rm "T RI CA P"
(triple capability) to describe it.1 5
During the evaluation ofTR ICAP two views emerged about the structure of
an air cavalry combat brig'lde. Some planners saw it prim<lrily as a separate
anti armor brigade with infantry and air cava lry integrated into attack helicopter
squadrons without o rganic support. Ot hers desired the brigade to be a strong,
wel l balance(~ versati le organization wit h attack hel icopter, infant ry, recQlmais
sance, art illery, and combat support units that could perform a variety of missions, including an antitank role. Du ring the summer of 1972 Vice Chief of Stan'
THE TOTAL ARMY
359
Bruce Palmer noted that a brigade consisting of only attack helicopter squadrons
was an expensive organization. (The table for such a proposed squadron called
fo r 88 (45 attack , 27 observation, and 16 uti lity) helicopters. Therefore he did not
envision it as an independen t st rike force. Nevertheless, he d irected fur ther dcvel*
opment of an attack helicopter squadron because of concerns voiced by General
Michae l S. Davison, the commander of U.S. Army, Europe, and Seventh Army. In
Europe Soviet armor forces g reatly outnumbered their NATO counterparts, and
Davi son needed some sort of long-range capabi lity that could destroy, disrupt, or
at IC,151 delay enemy mechanized uni ts behind the ma in battlefield. Following the
development of the squadron, Palmer be lieved that the planners could sort out the
matter of whether the brigade should be assigned to a division or a corps.16
By the end of 1972 the cou rse of the TRICA P/ACCB studies appeared set.
The Combat Deve lop men ts Co mmand recomme nded reorga ni zing the 1st
Cava lry Di vis ion to consist of two a rmo red bri gades (w ith two mechanized
infantry and fo ur armor batta lions divided between them) and one a ir caval ry
combat brigade. The latter, 10 be em ployed as a part of the division or independently, was to consist of an ai rmobi le in fantry bau alion and two attack hel icopter
squadrons. The brigade was to have no orga nic sllPl>ort batta lion. Rou nd-out battal io ns con tinued to be assigned to the I st Cavalry Division so that it cou ld
deploy as a full armored div ision along with the ai r cavalry combat brigade.17
Before the ink dried on the new inst ructions, Abrams dec ided to reorga ni ze
the air cavalry combat brigade as a separate unit for e mployment at corps leve l
and to make the d ivision exc lusively an armored unit. With one organic brigade
organ ized as ai r caval ry, the 1st Cava lry Di vision with only two mecha nized
infa ntry and fo ur armor battalions lac ked the necesSllry g ro und -ga ini ng a nd
holding ability of a normal armored d ivision. On 2 1 February 1975 the Army
thus organized the 6th Cavlliry Brigade (Ai r Combat) at Fort Hood, Texas. The
fi rst of its Iype, the brigade consisted o f a headq uarters and headq uarters troop,
an ai r cavalry squadron (wit hout the armo red cavalry troop), two attack hel icopter batta lions, a su pport battalion , and a sig nal compa ny. St ri ct ly an air unit ,
the brigade's mission was to locate, disrupt, and destroy cnemy armored and
mechan ized units by aeri al com bat power. In the su mmcr of that ycar the 1st
Cavalry Division was reo rgan ized who lly as an armored di visio n with fo ur
armor and four mechan ized in fa ntry battal ions in the Regu lar Army. One mechanized infan try and two armor ba tt alions in the Na tiona l Guard contin ued to
rou nd o ut the d ivision.l8
Although the 21-divisio n, 2 I-b rigade fo rce did not a lter the numbe r of
reserve di visions and brigades, the reserve components underwen t numerOliS
changes aner the Army wit hd rew from Vietnam. Like the Regular Army, the
Guard bega n increasing its heavy fo rces in 197 1 wit h the 32d (Wiscons in) and
81s1 (Washington) In fan try Brigades being converted to mechan ized infantry.
[n 1972 the states began modern izi ng their div isions and br igades lI sing the
recently pub lished tables, bu t Ihey lacked the materie l 10 co mp lete the proccss.
The Chapal'ml shorf-range ail' defellse slIIj(lce-IO-ail' missile system: be low,

Ihe Vulcall (IiI' defellse ,\J'~'telll.
THE TOTAL ARMY
361
To field air defense artill e ry battalions, G uard units used " Du ste rs," M42
tracked vehicles w ith dual mollntcd 40-111111. antiaircraft guns, rllth er than
C haparral s and Vulcans. As on ly limited numbers of M60 tanks, M551 assau lt
vehicles (Sheri dans). and AH- I helicopters (Cobras) were avai lable, the G uard
contin ued to usc vintage equipment. 19
Shortly after the National Guard reorgan ized its div isions, a controversy
arose over the com mand of the 30th Armored Divis ion, a mullistalc unit supported by Tennessee, Mississippi , and Alaba ma . Tennessee was about to appoin t a
new divisional commander, and the governors of Mississippi and Alabama threatened to withdraw their units from the divi sion un less their officers had the opportunity to be the divisional comma nder. Governor Winfield Dunn of Tennessee
objected to rotation o f the commander's position, and Secretary of the Army
Robert F. Froehl ke supported him. Abr<lms there fo re directed Maj . Gen. Francis
S. Greenlief, C hief of the Na tional Guard Bureau, to review such command
arrangements in all Guard div isions.20
Before Greenl ie f could propose a solution , other events made the question
moot. The Department of Defense directed the Army to convert six reserve
brigades from infantry to armored or mechanized infantry as reinforcements for
Europe. In the mea ntime, Mississippi Governor William L. Wa ller dec ided to
withdraw hi s unit s from the 30th Armored Division . Given the requiremen t to
convert some brigades, the Army StatT decided to have Ten nessee, Mi ssissippi ,
and Alabama each organize an armored brigade and to move the al lotment of the
armored division to Texas, which could support the necessary units itself. After
much negotiating, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi agreed to org<lnize the
30th, 31 st, ilnd 155th Armored Brigades, and Texas took on the 49th Armored
Di vis ion in 1973. For the other three brigades, the Army replaced the 30th
Infant ry Di vision , another tri ~s tate div ision, with the 30th (Nort h C arolina), 48th
(Georgia), and 2 18th (Lou isiana) Infantry Brigades and reorgan ized the 40th
Infantry Division in California. A ll were mechanized infa ntry. The reorganil..ation
did not change the total number of reserve divisions or brigades, and the Na tional
Guard continued to field 8 di visions ( I mechanized infantry, 2 armored, and 5
sta ndard infantry) and 18 brigades (3 armored, 6 mechani zed infantry, and 9 stan~
dard infantry), wh ile the Army Reserve s upported 3 brigades (I mec ha nized
infantry and 2 infant ry).21
By 30 June 1974, the Army had attained the 2 1~div i sio n , 2 1~ bri gade force
(Tables 32 (ll/d 33). The 25t h Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks, wi th two
brigades, and the 197th Infantry Brigade at Fort Ben ning were regarded as eq lli v~
alent to one division in the Regular Army. Some Regular Army divisions in the
continental United States, however, had rOllnd~out battalions from the reserves to
meet mobil ization missions. More serious was the fact that reserve di vis ions and
bri gades co ntinu ed to expe rie nce rea din ess problem s. Recruitm e nt la gged
because of the end of the draft, and eq uipmen t shortages continued due to the
lack of money. The " total force" thus ex hibited significant weaknesscs.22
RA
RA
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
RA
RA
Harrisburg, Pa.
Indianapolis, Ind.
Cal ifornia
New York, N.Y.
St. Paul, Mich.
Austin, Tex.
East Orange, N.J.
Fort Bragg, N.C.
Fort Campbell, Ky.
Boslon, Mass.
8
8
6
S
S
I
I
5
I
I
I
5
I
I
I
I
4
I
I
5
4
5
I
6
6
6
7
2
6
Camp Casey, Korea

Frankfurt, Germany
Wuerzburg, Germany
Fort Carson, Colo.
Bad Kreuznach, Germany
Fort Lewis, Wash.
5
4
4
5
4
Fort Riley, Kans.

Fort Hood. Tex.
6
9
Maneuver Baualions
A,
Abn
Mech
Ansbach, Germany
In!
Fort Hood, Tex
Location of
Headquarters
1 Docs not include the 6th Cavalry Brigade units.

2 One brigade deployed forward in Germany.
3 Less roundoul unit or units assigned.
82d Airborne
10lst Airborne
50th Armored
25th Infantry3
26th Infantry
28th Infantry
38th Infantry
40th Infantry
42d Infantry
47th Infantry
49th Annored
4th Infantry
8th Infantry
9th Infantry
RA
RA
1st Annored
lSi Cavalryl&3
ISI Infamry2
2d Armored)
2d Infantry
3d Armored
3d Infantry
RA
RA
RA
RA
RA
RA
RA
CompOllellt
Division
TABLE 32
The 21-Division Force, June 1974
AAST
Fort Kobbc. Canal Zonc

Fon Knox, Ky.
Fon Benlling. Ga.
Fon Sllclling. Mill1l.
Newberry. S.C.
Lafayctte, La.
RA
AR
NG
NG
RA
RA
Wollaston, Mass.
AR
RA
Tupelo, Miss.
Horsham, Pa.
Fort Richardson. Alaska
Lincoln. Ncb.
Topeka, Kans.
Seatlle. Wash.
San Juan, Pueno Rico
Little Rock. Ark.

Ponland. Oreg.
Edmond. Okla.
Macon. Ga.
Tampa. Fla.
Chicago. Ill.
I
3
3
2
No assigned ballaliolls
1 Mechallized unit.
2 Special mission brigade.
J The brigade and the 25th Jllfanlry Division with two active brigades counted as a divisional equivalent.
157th Infantry (M)I

172d Infantry2
187th Infantry
193d Infantry2
194th Annorcd
197th JllfantryJ
205th Infamry
2J8th lnfalllry (M)l
256th Infantry
81s1 Infantry (M)I

92d Infantry
155th Annored
69th Infantry
67th Infantry (M)!
53d Infantry
48th Infantry (M)I
33d Infantry
39th Infantry
41st Infantry
45th Infantry
3
3
3
3
I
I
31s\ Annorcd
32d Infantry (M)I
30th Infantry (M)I
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
AR
Tuscaloosa. Ala.
Milwaukee, Wisc.
Honolulu, Hawaii
Jackson. Tenn.
Clinton. N.C.
NO and AR
29th Infantry
ManCllrer Bam/fiolls
A,
Mcch
Lt In!
30th Annored
In/
Headquarters
Brigade
Camponelll
Location oj
TABLE 33
The 2 I-Brigade Force, June 1974
364
A New Force- Greater Integration a/Regulars and /leserves

As the Army struggled to meet the 21-d ivision, 21-brigadc force, General
Abrams turned his attention to the nation 's ability to execute its mi litary strategy
without resorting 10 nuclear weapons and to the task of providing the resources
needed to deal with a variety of world situations. In testimony before congressional committees in 1974, he characterized the Regular Army's portion of the
21-d iv ision fo rce as a high-risk, " 110 room for error" force.23 He further test ified
that through more efficient management , cuts in nonessential su pport activities,
and reorganization of various headquarters throughout the Army, a 785,OOO-man
Regular Army could support sixteen divisions. Congress gave no opposit ion, and
the Department of Defense lent its support. T herefore, Abrams directed hi s staff
to pl an for th ree addi tiona l Regu lar Army divisions by 1980.24
Although some officers on Abrams' staff were th understruck at thc d irect ive,
since a 785,000-1113n force had not been suffic ient in the past to maintain 16
Regular Army divis ions, the Army Staff eventua lly developed plans involving
both regu lars and reserves to raise a 24-div ision force. A mcchanized infa ntry
d ivision and two infa ntry div isions were to be phased into the force over thc next
few years. The firSI increment was to include activating three new div isional
brigades, reorganizing the I sl Cava lry Division as an armorcd d ivision (as dcc ided ea rl ier), and adj usti ng the num ber of maneuver elements in other divisions in
the United States. Phase two was to provide the base and an additional brigade
for cach o f the three new divisions. Phase three was vague, but the divisions werc
to be completed using reserve round-oul units .25
During the Slllllmer o f 1974 Forces COlll mand began to implement the 24-division force. To provide some of the resources, various headq uarters throughout the
Army were reorganized, Cllts were made in nonessent ial s upport activities, and the
I sl and 4th Infantry Divisions each saw one of thei r Regular Army maneuver battalions inactivated and rep laced by a National Guard round-out unit. On 21 October
the command activated the 7th Infantry Division headquarters and the 1st Brigades
of the 5th, 7th, and 24th Infantry Divisions at Forts Pol k, Ord, and Stewart, respectively. T he 7th and 24th were standard, or " foot," in fantry d ivi sions, and the 5t h was
mechan ized infantry. Because Fort Polk , in Louisi ana, lacked adequate housing
facili ties, the brigade of the 5th fielded only two maneuver batta lions. The larger
faciliti es at Fort Orcl Californ ia, allowed the 7th to support four maneuver battalions, and the brigade of the 24th at Fort Stewart, Georgia, fielded three. As noted
above, Forces Command organized the 6th Cavalry Brigade (A ir Combat) as a separate corps-level aviation unit and reorganized the 1st Cavalry Divis ion as an
armored d ivision consisting of four armor and four mechanized infantry batta lions
in the Regular Army and three round-out battalions fro m the National Guard .26
Phase two of the program required organi zing the base and a second brigade
fo r eac h division. For thc 5th and 241 h Infantry Divisions clements of the 194th
Armored Brigade and the 1971h Infa ntry Brigade wcre to be used, but all cle-
TH E TOTAL ARMY
365
TABLE 34
Ro u nd~o ll t
Units, 1978
Divisioll
Ullil
CompOllell1
1sl Cavalry
2<1 Battalion, 120th Infantry
N.C.NG
N.C.NG
S.c. NO
I sl Infantry
2d Annorcd
2<1 Battalion. 252d Armor

1SI Battalion , 263d Annor
2d Battalion, J 36th Infantry
3d Battalion, 149th Infantry
1st Bultulion, 123d Armor
2<1 Battalion, 123d Armor

4th Infantry
1st 8l1l1alion, 117th Infantry
5th Infantry
7th Infantry
2561 11 Infantry Brigade
9th Infantry
24th Infantry
1SI Battalion , 803d Armor

25th Infantry
4151 Infantry Brigade

8th Battalion, 40th AmlOr
Minn. NO
Ky. NO
Ky. NO
Ky. NO
Ten n. NO
La . NO
Wash. NO
Army Reserve
Wash. NO
Ga. NO
Hawaii NO
und Army
Reserve
ments of the second brigade in the 7th Infantry Divis ion were to be newly organized. On 28 August 1975, however, the Army canceled the plans to use the 194th
Armored and 197th In fantry Brigades because of congressiona l pressure to
improve the ratio of combat to support troops. All units in phase two were to be
formed new in the Regular Army.27
Forces Command began activating phase two units in the fall of 1975, organizing all required Regu lar Army units within two years. While the Regu lar Army
units were being activated, Louisiana, Washington , and Georgia agreed that the
256th, 41 st, and 48th Infantry Brigades would be assigned to round out the 5th,
7th, and 24th Infantry Divisions, respectively. Because the 7th needed an armor
battalion, the 8th Battalion, 40th Armor, an Army Reserve unit, was assigned to
it. Hence, in order to raise the 24-division force, the rOlll1d-out concept was
extended to all divisions except those forward deployed in Germany and Korea
and the airborne and airmobi le units (Table 34).28
Although Forces Command did not use the 194th Armored and 197th
Infantry Bri gades to organize the new divis ions, both brigades were assigned
strategic missions after 21 October 1975. Responding to Genera l Abrams' congressional testimony to provide a bettcr balance o f combat to support units, the
Army StafT converted 4,000 general support spaces to combat positions in the
con tinental United States, <lI1d the command used some of them to reorga nize the
194th as a strategic reserve unit. The brigade eventually included one mechanized
infantry battalion and two tank battalions. In addition, it continued to support the
Armor School at Fort Knox.29
366
In 1974 congress ional dissatisfaction led Senator Sam Nutln of Georgia to

spon sor an amendment requiring the Army to reduce th e number of support
forces in Europe by 18,000 officers and enlisted personnel but permitting those
spaces to be lIsed to organize combat units there. The new units could include
battalions or smaller units of infantry, armor, field and air defense artillery, cavalry, engineers, specia l forces , and aviation, which were to improve the visibility of
the nation 's combat power in Europe.3 0
To execute the Nunn amendment U.S. Army Forces Command and U.S . Army.
Europe, and Seventh Army agreed to a plan for organizing a mechanized infantry
brigade and an armored brigade fo r Europe, wh ich were known as Brigade-75 and
Brigade-76. Under the plan the headquarters and a support battali on fo r each
brigade were to be stationed in Germany whi le the infantry, armor, and field
artillery banal ions, engineer companies, and cavalry troops from the United States
were to rotate eve ry six months. No prov isions were made for dependents to
accompany the sold iers since they were to be away from home on temporary duty
for only 179 days. The short duration of the assignment was to be a cost-saving
measure, which indirect ly also attacked the balance of payment problem between
the Un ited States and its allies, and a morale bOOSler. To support the rotation of
Brigade-75 , the first unit in the program , the Ar my selected the 2d Armored
Division, at Fori Hood, Texas. Belween March and June 1975 the 3d Brigade, 2d
Armored Division , deployed to Germany, wi th its headquarters at Grafellwoehr and
its clements scattered al various traini ng areas. A few weeks before each unit
d e parted Fort I-Io od, Forces Co mmand act ivated a similar unit , including
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 4th Brigade, 2d Armored Division, to
maintain the three-brigade structure of the division in the continental United Stales.
Duri ng the deployment the Army Staff approvcd a request from Forces Command
10 use a battalion from the I st Cavalry Division, rather than have all elements fi'()l11
the 2d Armored Di vision , in order to reduce perso nnel turbu lence in t!le 2d.
Because of the shortage of tank crews, the Army changed Brigade-75 from an
armored to a mechanized infantry unit. Another factor in the decision to deploy a
mechanized brigade was the shortage o f tanks resu lting from U.S. replacement of
tanks the Israelis had lost in their 1973 war against the Arabs. In September 1975
the fi rst rotation of brigade elements between Germany and Fort Hood began.3!
Forces Command selected the 4th Infantry Division to support Brigade-76
and in December 1975 activated the 4th Bri gade, 4th Infantry Division, at Fort
Carson, Colorado. Th e following year the brigade moved to Germany. To lighten
the burden of the 4th Infantry Di vision at Fort Carson, a mechanized infant ry battalion from the 1st Infantry Di vis ion at Fort Riley was included in the rotation
scheme. Fol lowing the procedu re used to send Brigade-75 to Europe, new organ izations were activated in the 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions to maintain their divisional integrity.32
As elements of the 3d Brigade, 2d Armored Division, and the 4th Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division, rotated, the Army monitored the effect on the budget , readi ness,
THE TOTAL ARMY
367
and morale. Evidence soon suggested that the rotation of the brigades improved
neither cost effect iveness nor readiness . Therefore, the Army dec ided thai the
brigades would be assigned permanent ly to U.S . Army, Europe, and Seventh Army.
The reassignment of the 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division , took place in the fall of
1976. At that lime the 3d Battalion, 28th Infantry, the element orlhe 1st Infantry
Division supporti ng the brigade, was reassigned to the 4th In fantry Di vision . To
improve the alignment of All ied forces in Europe, Army leaders dec ided to station
Brigade-75 (the 3d Brigade, 21 Armored Division) in northern Germany, where no
American combat unit had served since the end of World War I L Such problems as
th e lack of housing, particularly for dependents, and opposition from German
nationals over the impact of the troops on the environment, caused the elements of
the brigade to continue to rotate until the quest ion s could be resolved . Two years
later. after building a new military comp lex at Garlstedt, the 3d Brigade , 2d
Armored Division, became a permanent part of the European forces . At Fort Hood
the 4th Brigade, 2d Armored Di vision, and the batta lion of the I st Cavalry Di vision
that supported the brigade were inactivated. A new battalion was assigned to the 2d
Armored Division from its trad itional regiments to replace the 1st Caval ry Division
unit inactivated in Germany. The net result of the Nunn amendment on divisiona l
forces was two more brigades forward deployed in Germany but a reduction of one
brigade in the 21 Armored Divi sion in the United States .33
Readiness became the watchword for the seventies . Alt hough some Army
leaders believed that the firs t battle of any future war might be the last and final
ground battle, a high state of readiness served as a deterrent against aggression.
Improving readiness in the Army's 24-div ision force thu s became the primary
obj ective of Army C hi ef of Staff Fred C . Weyand, who was appointed after
Abrams died in office in September 1974. Weyand requested the National Guard
Bureau to explore the consolidation o f the 50t h Armored and the 26th, 28th, 38th,
42d, and 47th Infantry Divisions inlo single or bi-state configurations and to consider the possibility of forming five more brigades. T he latter were to be organized only with the secretary of defense's approval. In 1975 and 1976 the 50lh
Armored Division was reorgani zed in New Jersey and Vermon t, the 28th Infantry
Division in Pennsylvania, and the 42d Infantry Div ision in New York. Former elements of the 28t h from Maryland and Virgi nia supported the new 58t h and 11 6t h
Infantry Brigades, respectively. In 1977 Ohio d ropped out of the 38th Infa ntry
Division, leaving Indiana and Michigan to main ta in it. Ohio organ ized the 73d
Infa ntry Brigade. The only divisional element not concentrated within each div ision 's new recruit ing area was the air defense arti llery battalions. Wi th these
changes, the Army reached the 24-div ision, 24-brigade force (Tables 35 alld 36).
Also, the 36th Airborne Bri gade and 149th Armored Brigade headquarters were
organized and federally recognized in the National Guard, but they were headquarters only, without assigned clements.34
The Army Reserve continued to maintain three brigades within the total rorce.
These brigades were the least combat ready units in the Army. Without the draft, the
RA
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
RA
RA
RA
RA
RA
RA
RA
RA
RA
RA
RA
RA
RA
RA
RA
Camponelll
LOCaliOIl
Indianapolis. Ind.
Long Beach, Calif.
New York. N.Y.
SI. Paul, Mich.
Austin. Tex.
Somerset, N.J .
Fort Bragg. N.C.
Fort Campbell. Ky.
Boston, Mass.
Harrisburg, Pa.
Fort Stewart. Ga.

Fort Lewis. Wash.
Bad Kreuznach. Germany
Fort Ord, Calif.
Fort Carson. Colo.

Fort Polk. La.
,,
,
I
I
5
5
I
I
I
6
7
5
5
6
6
5
I
I
5
I
2
5
2
6
2
Fort Hood. Tex.

Camp Casey. Korea
Frnnkfun. Gennany
Wucrzburg. Gcnnany
6
7
J
Fort Riley, Kans.
9
9
Mom!/II'er Bmw/iolls
Mech A,
AAsl
Ab"
1"1
Ansbach, Gcnnany
Fort Hood. Tex.
of Headqlloners
lOne battalion supported the 3d Brigade, 2d Armored Division (Brigadc.75).

2 The 1st Infantry Division Forward was in Germany.
3 Supported 3d Brigade, 2d Armored Division (Brigadc 75) in Germany.
4 Supported 4th Brigade. 4th Infantry Division (Brigadc76) in Germany.
24th Infantry (-)

25th Infantry (-)
26th Infantry
28th Infantry
38th Infantry
40th Infantry
42th Infantry
47th Infantry
49th Armored
50th Armorcd
82d Airbornc
IOlst Airbornc
9th Infantry (-)
8th Infantry
3d Infantry
4th lnfantry4
5th Infantry H
7th Infantry (-)
3d Annored
1st Annored
lSI Cavalry I
1st Infantry2
2d Annored3
2d Infantry
Dil'isioll
TABLE 35
The 24-Division Force, 1978
See Table 34
See Table]4
Sec Table 34
See Table 34
See Table 34
See Table 34
Sec Table 34
See Table 34
Remarks
1491h Annored
l55th Annored
157th Infantry (M)
172d Infantry
187th Infanlry
193d Infantry
194th Annorcd
197th [nfanlry
205th Infantry
218th Infantry (M)
256th Infantry (RO)
1 16th Infantry
73d Infantry
81st Infantry (M)
92d Infantry
69th [nfantl)'
67th Infantry (M)
53d Infantry
58th Infantry
48th Infantry (M) (ROJ
41 SI Infantry (ROJ
45th Infantry
36th Airborne
39th Infantry
33d Infantry
32d Infantry (M)
31 SI Annorcd
29th Infantry (RO)

30th Annored
30th Infantry
Brigade
AR
NG
NG
RA
AR
RA
AR
RA
RA
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG&AR
Compollelll
J
J
Macon. Ga.
Tampa, Fla.
Pikesville. Md.
A,
2
2
2
2
No assigned battalions
2
I
2
I
I
I
J
J
J
Lincoln, Ncb.
Topeka. Kans.
Columbus, Ohio
Seattle, Wash.
Staunton. Va.
Bowling Green. Ky.
Tupelo, Miss.
Horsham. Pa.
Fort Richardson. Alaska
Fort Devens. Mass.
Fort Kobbe. Canal Zone
Fort Knox. Ky.
Fort Benning. Ga.
Fort Snelling. Minn.
Newberry. S.c.
Lafayettc. La.
Mech
Llln/
Mallelwer Bmfafiol!s
No assigned battalions
hif
Houston. Tex.
Little Rock, Ark.
Portland. Oreg.
Edmond. Okla.
Milwaukee, Wise.
Chicago. Ill.
Honolulu, Hawaii
Jackson. Tenn.
Clinton. S.C.
Northport, Ala.
of Headqll{ll"fers
Localion
TABLE 36
The 24-Brigade Force, 1978
Special Mission
Special Mission
Remarks
370
reserves continued to suffer m<ljor recruiting problems. When planning for the three
new Regular Army div isions, some A rmy Slaffmcmbers and Secretary of the Army
Howard Callaway had wanted to lI SC an Army Reserve infantry brigade as a roundoul unit , but Ilone of the com ponent 's brigades m el the req uired manning and
equipment levels. As an alternmive the staff considered moving either the 1571h or
the 187th Infantry Brigade, or both, to the sOllthern pari of the United Stales and
shifting the 2051 h Infantry Brigade to the West Coast, all areas where recrui ting
was thought to be better. But congressional opposition stopped these proposals, and
the units remained generally in thei r exist ing areas)5
Desp ite these difficulties, Forces Com mand wished to improve the read iness
of the Army Reserve brigades. At rirst it proposed reducing the number of llnits,
particularly in the northeast, the First U.S. Army's area, and in February 1975 it
inactivated a battalion in the 157th Infant ry Bri gade at Harri sburg, Pennsylvania.
Then, early in 1976, Maj. Gen. Henry Mohr, Chief of the Army Reserve, submitted a brigade improvement plan that retained the units in their recruiting areas but
elimi nated other units from the areas to limit the competition for scarce personnel
resources. As the Army Reserve staff developed the plan , Deputy C hie f of Staff
for Operations and Plans (DCSO PS) Lt. Gen. Donald H. Cowles selected the 41 st
Infantry Brigade, the only brigade with a northern Arctic mission , as the roundout unit for the 71h Infantry Divi sion. To rep lace the brigade in the contingency
plans, Moh r agreed to reorganize the 205th Infantry Brigade as a light unit. The
brigade assumed responsibi lity for the contingency mission on 4 July 1976.36
As the Army National Guard and Army Reserve shouldered a more active
role in the Total Army's deterrence plans, the Army Staff developed a plan in the
mid-1970s to upgrade the effect iveness of brigade- and battalion-size units.
Known as the Affiliation Program, the ini tiative had three goa ls: improving readiness; establ ishing a formal re lation sh ip between regular and reserve units; and
developing a system of pri orities for manpower, equi pment, training, funding, and
administrative resources . Wi lhin the program rive categories of combined arms
brigades existed: round-out units, which gave Regu lar Army d ivisions their full
organizational structure; augmentation units, which increased the combat potential of standard div isions; worldwide deployable units, which needed ass istance to
meet deployment sc hedul es; s peci al m issio n llnits , which se rved as th ea ter
defense forces ; and units to suppo rt the Army school system. Thus, each brigade
in the reserves was to have a mi ss ion and train for it in a "come-as-you-are for
war" mode, wh ich was a far cry from mobilization plan ning that had existed
before and after World War 11 .37
In 1970 the Army had revised the tables of organizat ion for the ,Idministrative
training division so that it could function more effective ly in reserve status. T he
div ision consisted of a di vision base, a headquarters and headquarters company, a
leade rship academy, and a s upport battal ion; a co mmitt ee g roup; a nd four
brigades- two brigades for basic training, one for advanced indiv idual training,
and one for combat support training (CharI 43) . Basic combat training brigades
, Includes the band.

2Structure of the Advanced Individual Training brigade
varied depending upon the type cftraining (infantry,
armcr, reconnaissance, field artillery, or engineer) cffared.
BRIGADE tBCn
DIVISION
CHART 43-Training Division, 1970
372
MANEUVER AN D FI RE POWER
and the committee group underwent little change, but significant modificat ions
were made in both ad va nced indi v idual tra ining and combat support training
brigades. T he com position of the adva nced individual traini ng brigade varied
with the type o f trai ning (infantry, armor, reconnaissance, artillery, or engineer)
olTered, and the combat support training brigade was rcorgani zed to consist of
admin istrati ve, food service/supply, automotive, and communications baualions.
Upon mobi li zation the div ision could train between 12,500 and 14,000 enlisted
personnel , depending upon the type of traini ng prov ided by each brigade. All thirteen training d iv isions had adopted the tables by the end of 1971 .38
Two years later, seeking again to improve read iness of the Army Reserve
units, Forces Command inactivated some training di vision elements. Advanced
individual training brigades in the 76th, 78th, 80th, 85 th, and 91st Divisions and
the combat support training brigades in the 89th and lOat h Divisions were i na eti~
vated and the spaces used to organi ze " mi ni" maneuver area comma nds. The new
commands planned, prepared, con d uctc(~ and cont ro lled company and batta lion
exercises for the reserves.39
As in other reserve units, rec rui ting d ifficultie s caused undermanning in
some training units. In 1975 Forces Command inact ivated the 89th Division. T he
personnel for merly assigned to it were used to strengthen other Army Reserve
units and to organize the 5th Brigade (Training), an <II'mor training unit with
headquarters at Li ncoln, Nebraska , that consisted of onc squad ron and two batt a l ~
ions. Wit h thc saving in personnel, a nond ivisional Army Reserve combat unit ,
the 3d Battalion , 87th Infantry, was organized at Fort Carson, Colorado, to sup~
port the 193d Infant ry Brigade in Ihe Canal Zone.40
The Army Reserve's 51h Brigade (Tra ining) and the training divi sions were
reorgan ized once again in late 1978. To save both time and money in train ing,
the active Army had earli er adopted the One Station Un it Training (OSUT ) p ro ~
gra m, under which recruits received both basic and advanced ind ividual train~
ing at the professional ho me of their arm or service . The program proved suc~
cessful, and Forces Command .. dopted it for the Army Reserve training divisions . In addition , the revised structure a llowed divisions to be tailored for speci fi c mobili zat ion stations. To renect these changes, the Depart ment of the
Army published new tables of organization , which retained as the division base
a leadership academy and a support batlalion but broke the bri gades and battalions down into cells th at filled together to meet specific train ing requirements.
Divis ional training brigadcs no longer cond ucted basic combat or advanced
indiv id ual training but carried out both, the same as in the Regular Army. The
fonn er divisional committee group and the committee g roup from the comb,1I
support brigade evolved into a training conunand.41
By October 1978 the Army was fielding the 24-division, 24~brjga de force
that Abrams had env isaged five years emlier. But organizational developments
had been eclipsed by even deeper changes in the fabric of the Army. Prior to its
T HETOTALARMY
373
withdrawa l from Vietnam, the Nixon admin istration had adopted an all voluntccr
force and imposed cuI's in money and personne l. To make up for these losses,
Army leaders drew the Regular Army and reserve componen ts closer together,
firs t through the round-out and then though the affiliati on prog rams. The Army
could no longer enjoy the luxury of gencralplLrposc forces. Every div ision and
brigade was e ither forward depl oyed 0 1' assigned a spec ifi c m ission within the
current contingency and mobili zation plans. The Regular Army's specia l mi ssion
combined arllls brigades included the J 93d Infantry Bri gade in the Cana l Zone
and the 172d Infantry Brigade in Alaska. The 1941h Armored and 197th Infa ntry
Bri gades served both as Strategic Army Force units and as support troops for Ihe
InFantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, and the Armor School at Fort Knox,
Kentucky, in the trai ning base. Changes in the Total Army since the withdrawal
from Vietnam stressed combat units at the expense of support unit s. The nation
d id not have the resou rces for both .
374
Notes
I Melvin R. Lain.!, Nafirmol Secwify Strafeg)' of Realistic Deterrence: AII//llot De/elIse
Del'(l1"/1II1:1II Report. FY 1973 (Washington, D.C.: Govcmmcllll'rinling Ollice, 1972), p. 24.
2 Ibid., pp. 86- 87.

3 U.s. Army Combat Developments Command (CDC), "Annual Historical Summary. FY
1970." p. 116, DAMH-HSR; OF, ACSFOR 10 DeSPER and other addresses, 9 Jan 70, sub: 1-1 Series TOE, FOR OT OM TO, Division General file, DAMH-HSO.
" U.S. Army CDC, "Historical Summary. FY 66," p. 362, FY 70, pp. 116- 17; TOE 7H.
Infantry Di vision. 1970; TOE 171-1. Armored Division. 1970; TOE 371-1. Mechanized Infantry
Division. 1970; TOE 44-3251 r, Air Defense Arlillcry Bul1nlioll, 1970; TOE 29- 1H. TOE 29- 11 H,
and TOE 29- 21 1-1, Division SUPl>Ort Command, 1970; TOE 17- 87H, Division Aviation Company,
Amlorcd Division, 1970; TOE 37- 871-1, Division Aviation Compnny, Mechnnized Division, 1970:
TOE 29- 3H, Division Mnteriel Mnnagetllent Center, 1975.
5 TOE 7- 15H, Infant ry Bn1tlllion, 1970; TOE 17- 15H, AmlOr Ba1taJion, 1970; TOE 7-45H,
Mecimnilcd Infhntry Battalion, 1970; Jnllles Stone, "TOW Rcnlly Works," "ifilllll)1 64 (Sep- Oet
1974): 12- 13. The tnbles provided two vllrintions of the infimtry nnd mech,mized inflUltry bllttalions: one vnriation nuthorized the unit to be equipped with TOWs, the other with 106-111111. recoilless rifles.
6 Ch:lllges I nnd 2, TOE 71-1, Infanoy Division. 1970; Changes I nnd 2, TOE 17H , Armored
Division, 1970: Changes I nnd 2, TOE 37 1-1 . Mechanized Infant ry Division, 1970; TOE 6- 1001-1,
Infantry Division Arlillery, 1970; Change I, TOE 6- 3001-1 , Armored or In f.1ntry Division Arlillery
(Mechanized), 1970; TOE 29- 11-1, hlfantry Division Support Command, 1970, and changes 1- 3;
TOE 29- I IH, Infan try Division Support Command (Mechanized), 1970. mId ehnnges 1- 3; TOE
29- 211-1, Armored Di vision Support Command. 1970; TOE 30- 17H, Militllry Inte lli gence
Company ( Di vision). 30 Nov 1970; TOE 30- 19T, Combat Intelligence Company, Armored
Division or Infnntry (Mcelmnizcd) Division. 1975; Msg, ACSFOR to CG, CONARC, DA 892 178,
3 1 Dee 68, sub: Activation Order. 1st Bn. 59th Air Defense Artillery (A DA) file. Msg, ACSFOR 10
CO, CONARC. and other addresses, 201544 Apr 72. sub: DA SmfT Review of I-I Series Conversion
Schedule. and Assignmcnt of ADA units, Rcorganizution of Divisional Administrnlivc Companies
ns Adjutnnt General nnd Finance Compnnics. Activa tion of Di visiomll Materiel M(l11<lgcmellt
Ccnters and Militilry Intelligence Units. and Inactivation of Divisional Honest John Units. author's
notes. :111 G/1-I TOEs file. DAMH-HSO.
7 U.S. AmlY CDC, "Historical SUlltmary. FY 70," p. 116; Llf, TAG to CinC, USA REUR . 17
Aug 72. sub: Approval of MTOE, DAAG-ASC-D (M) (15 Aug 72) DA FD, AG Reference files.
Msg, DALO-SMS-D (Deputy CofS for Logislies, Distribulion Branch) to Cdr, CONA RC, 201946
Dec 72. sub: Medium Tnnks M60Al for Uni t Aetivntion. 1st Un. 77th Amlor: Msg. DA 10 CO.
CONARC, 12 12152 Apr 72, sub: Movement Directive 72- 10, 6th Bn. 32d Annor; file. Historical
Dntfl Cards. 3d and 8th InfiUltry Divisions, nil DAMH-HSO.
8 Msg, ACSFOR to CinC, USA RI'AC. DA IOt 815Z Nov 7t, sub: Organization and Stnlcture
of 25th Infantry Division and Suppon Units. Msg, ACSFOR to CinC, USARPAC, DA 172209Z
Feb 72. sub: Rcorganizalion of 25th Int' Di v and lS I ( Initial Sustnining Increment) units. Msg,
DCSOI'S to Cdr, 25th II1 f.1ntry Division, DA 101930Z Nov 72, sub: Rendiness I~el'orting of 25th
Inf Div, Msg, DSCOI'S to CinCo USARI'AC, DA 272141Z Nov 72_ sub: Stntioning and
Organization of 251h Inf Dill in Ha waii, and Memo of Agreemcnt. sub: Command and Staff
Relationship Between the 25th Infnntry Division and the 29th I3rigade (HlARNG) nnd thc 100th
l3attalion, 442d InfiU1try Regiment (USAR), 2 Aug 73, all 25th InfDill file. DAM I-I-HSO .
9 Msg. CG, CONARC, to CG, Sixth U.S. Army, 212039Z Jan 72, sub: Planning Data for
CONUS/Ac ti va ti on. and Msg. U.S. Army Training Center, Infand Fort Lewis. Wnsh., to CG, Sixth
U.S. Anny. [00018 Feb 72, sub: Proposcd News Release ACliv:llion ofthc 9th Infant ry Division.
both 9th Inf Oiv filc, DAMH-I-ISO; 9th Infant ry Division, "Annual Historical Supplement," t974,
PI). 43-44. DAMI-I-I-ISR.
T HE TOTA L A RMY
375
1055, ACSFOR to Cors, 22 Ju n 72. sub: Force Structure, Fon Benning. DAFD-MFP. Msg,
ACSFOR to CG, CONARC, 161845Z Oct 72. sub: Uni t Designation 1971h Bdc, DAFD-MFI'-T,
Llr, CG, CONARC. to Cdr. Third U.S. Army, 18 Oct 72. sub: FOnllalioli of n School Support
Qrgllniz.1Iion and Conversion or lhe 197th Infantry I3rigade. ATFOR- FS-SR. <tnd Msg, U.S. Army
Inf<um y Cenler to Cdr. Third, U.S. Army, 22 1427Z Mar 73, same subject, all 1971h Inf Bde !He,
DAM1 1 11SO.
11 U.S. Amlor Center lWei Fon Knox, "Annua l Historica l Supplement;' I JIltJ- J I Dec 74, l) f Cf.
ace, DAMB-i-ISR.
1255. ACSFOR to CotS, 28 Nov 72. sub: Reorganization of 10I si Airbomc Div (Ambl), DO
DArT-MFP, IOl sl Abn Div liIe, DAM H-HSa. The omission of the ISS-mm. towed howi tzer battalion reduced the di vision by 546 officers and enlisted men.
13 SS. TAG Center to ColS. 13 Sep 74. su b: Proposed Change in Nomenclature, 10I s t
Airborne Division (Ainllobile), DAAG-AMO, and U r. TAG to Cd r, IOlst Airborne Divis ion. 16
Oct 74, sub: Change of Parenthetical Iden ti fier, both IOlst Abn Oiv file. DAM H-HSO: "lOlst
AirbonlC Division I-listorical Summary. 1974," pp. 10-12. DAMI I-I ISR: " Interview of LTG John
Will n Mc Emery, II Apr 83, p. 16, IOl st Abn Div file , DAM I-I -HSO j A R 672- 5- 1, Military
AW;lrds, 1984.
14 TOE 57 1-1 , Airbome Division, 1974 : TOE 29-5 11-1, SUPl)Ort Command, Airborne Di l'ision,
1973: TOE 29-451-1, Supply and Service Battalion, 173: TOE IO-37 F, Supply Company (Airbome
Division). 1965: TOE 17215 11 , Annor Battalion (Airbomc), 1973. GO 600, 603. 605, 608, U,S,
Arnly Forel'"S Command (FORSCOM. 174. 4071h Spl Bn file, DAM H-I-ISO: and 11uthor's nOle GI ll
Tables File, DAM I-I- IISQ,
15 Fact Sheet. ACS FOR 10 SofA , 15 Jan 7 1, Fonnat ion o f the TR.rCA I' Division. FOR OS
TRICA I', News Release. New Arm y Test Division Announced, 25 Mar 7 1, Msg. SECDEF to
Supreme Allied Commander. Europe. DA 252110Z Jan 71. sub: Redcsignation and Reorganization
of First Armo red Divi sion : Msg. ACSFOR to CG , CONARC, DA 292217Z J a n 71, s ub:
Contingency Planning for TRICAI' Oi l': Msg, OC INFO to CG, CONA RC, :111d other addresses,
2321 14Z Mar 7 1, sub: TRI CAI' Division, documents located in TRI CA]' file, DAMH- I-1 S0: TOE
47T. TR ICAI' Di vision. 15 Febnmry 197 1: Cheng. Air M obility. p. 180: John Norton, "TRICAI':'
Arll/)' 21 (Jun 197 1): 14-19.
16 Memo for Record, ACS FQ R, undated, sub: Conferencc 15 June 1972 on TRICA P/ACCB
Orga nization and Testing, OAF D, TR ICA I' fil e: TOE 17-285T, Attack Helicopter Squadron. TRI CA P Division or Attack Helicopter Squadron Air Cavalry Combat Brigade. 1972.
11 U.S. Anny CDC. " R~onfigu rn t ion or the TRICA P Division," E:o;~uti\'e Summary, 151k-c
72, CGSC Library; Msg, ACS FO R to Cdr. CONARC, DA 13 1807Z Ma r 73, sub: Unit Designalion,
lSI Cav Div, DAFD-MFP-T, O I'S 28, ACS FOR, 30 Sep 73, sub: Reorganiz,'\Iion o f the lsi Cavalry
Division. DAFO-MI'F-M. both in TRICA P file, DAM H-HSO.
18 "TRI CA P Shortcomings Bare d," .1/1'111)' Tillles, 5 J un 1974: News Rc lease. 1st Cavalry
Division Reorganizat ion, 10 Mn y 1974. TRI CA I' fil e; GO 200, FORSCOM, 13 Feb 75, 61h Cal'
Ode file, both DAM H-HSO: TOE 17-20011, Air Cal'alry Combat Brig;lde, 1975; Ch:lllge I, TOE
17-205H. Air Cav,llry Sqund ron, Infantry Division , 1975.
19 Allllual Repol"'. G1liej NaliOllal Gual'll 8ul'('(/I/, 1971 , pp. 32, 38-40.1972, p. 32, 3841;
TO 44-85G, Air Defense Artillery Au tomatic Weapons Battalion. Self. 1'ropelled, 1966.
ro Dmllhr, Chief, Nal iollal Guard Ourcau. 10 Wi nfield Dunn, NGD-ZA. and Memo, NG B for
SA, sub: Aller Action Reports, 13 Dec 73, NG B-A RO, both 30th Annd Div file. DAMH-HSO,
2t Memo, NG B for SA, 2 1 Nov 73, sub: After AClion Reports, NG U-A RZ-A, 30 InfOi v fil e.
DAMH HSO; L1r, NG B for SA, sub: After Ac tion Report. 13 Dec 73.
22 LaVen! E. Wcber. " For the Minu temen of the '70s: The Guard: ' A Long Way'" Arlll)' 24
(Oct 1974): 65-7 1: Mil nor Robert. "Strong Reserve Boosted by Total Foree Im petus:' Ar",), 24
(Oct 1974): 76-79.
23 I'oint ]'npcr, DAMO-RQr: (Del)uty Chief of StnlT for Opemtions und I'I;ms-Requiremenis
Direclorme), sub: Why a 16-Divisio n Active Army, 27 Sep 74. 16-Div Force fil e, DAMH-HSO.
24 Ibid.: Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. , "The Si:o;leen Di vision Fo rce: An:ltomy of a Dceision:'
376
thesis. Command and General Staff College. Fort Leavenworth, Kans .. 1975; 5S, ACSFOR to
CofS, 16 Apr 74, sub : Revised FY Force Structure Actions. DA FDMFD (ACars for Force
Development-Manpower and Forces Directorate), IG-Div FOr<:c file. DAM I-I-I-ISO.
25 Robert Sorley, nWl/{lerbo!l: General CreighlOil A{)mllls find the Army His Tillie.\" (New
York: Simon ,LI1d Schuster. 1992). pp. 36264: LIT. TAG 10 Cdrs. FOR-SCOM. and TRADOC. 7
May 74, sub: Revised FY 75-80 Force Structure Guidance, DAAG-AMM DAFO-MFI', 16 Div
Force file, DAMH-HSO.
2(' Ibid; Msg. Cdr. FORSCOM, \0 DSCOPS. 041800Z Mn y 74, sub: itmClivalion of Infantry
l3al\;llions (Mech) in FY 75. 2d I3n. 16th Inf file, DAMH-HSO; OI'S 28 DAMO-RQD, FirepolVer
Division, for DeSOI'S. sub: ACCIl. 13 Jan 75. DAMO-RQD, TR1CAI' file; --AmlY Guard AT' 75
Highlights;' Na/ioll(ll Cl/urd.ml(lJI 29 (May 1975): 2- 5: Notes Based on FORSCOM GOs. 16-Div
Forcc filc. DAMI-l-HSO.
27 Cors Memo 75- 10 for Heads of Anny Staff Agencies. 12 Feb 74. sub: Action Required to
Attain a 24-Divisiol1 Total Force Prior to FY 77, and Msg. DSCOl'S to Cdrs. FORSCOM. and
TRADOC. DA 28210lZ Aug 75. sub: Activatiol1 of the 5th and 24th Infantry Division and
Rcdcsignation of the 1941h and 1971h Brig:u1cs. both 16-Div Force file. DAMH-HSO.
2R "Separate Brigade Plnn Out:' Arlll)" Tillles. 3 Dec 1975; NOlcs Based on FORSCOM GOs.
16-Div Force file: Robcrt F. Fairchild. "Training Guard and Reserve Divisions." Arlllor 86
(Mar- Apr 1977): 47-48.
29 U.s. Army FORSCOM. "Annual Histo rical Review. I July 1975- 30 Sep 1976:' pp.
198- 05; Msg, DSCOr's to Cdrs, FORSCOM. and TRADOC, DA 28210 lZ Aug 75. sub: Aclil'.l1iol1
of the 5th and 241h Infantry Divisions and Redesignalion of the 194th and 197th Origades: "Ode to
Become 1lcavy; Arlll)' Tillles, 12 Nov 1975; Historical Data Card. 194th Armored Brigade.
DAMH-HSO. Also sec notes in 194th Am1(] Ode file. DAMH-HSO.
30 Cors Memo 74-5-70 for 1leads of Anny Staff Agencies. sub: Increased Combat Cnpability
in Europe. 2 Aug 74. Ode-75 file. DAMH-HSO: Frank W. Pew. The
Arlll)' Forces Comlll(lud
alld I{U: Del'cloplllelll of Ihe Brigade 75/76 COIICCpI jor Ille Supporl of E/I/"Ope (Fort McPherson,
G<I.: U.S . Anny Forces Command, 1980), pp. 1-4.
Jt How DOD Is Improving lhe COl11b<lt Proporlions of US Forces in Europe: COllllllandel"
Djgesl 19 (20 Nov 1975): 2- 3: Msg, Cdr. FORSCOM. to Cdr, III Corps and Fort Hood. Tcx ..
032207Z Dec 74. sub: Reorganization of Units at Fort Hood! Selected FY Activations. Msg.
DAMO-FDP-T to Cdr, FORSCOM, DA 162021Z Apr 75. sub: Involvemell1 of lSI Cavalry Division
in Origade 75. both Ode-75 file DAMH-HSO; Pcw. Brigade 75176 COllcepl. pp. 74-109. The Nunn
<lmendmcnl limited the additional combat units to balllliion or smallcr size units. thcrefore the
Amly SIMI considered the headquaners and headquarters comp<lny of each brig:lde as onc of thc
smaller units.
32 Msg. DAMO-ODO to Cdr, FORSCOM. and CinC, USAREUR. DA 131830Z Ju176, sub:
Movemcnt Directive 23- 76. Ode-75 file. DAM H-HSO: U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army.
fir
u.s.
S/rcnglhcllillg NATO (Norlll Alfrllllie nea/)' Orgolliza/ioll): S/(lliollillg oil/ie 2(/ Arllloret/ Dil'jsioll
(Forward) ill NOr/llel"/I Cent/wI)' (n.p .. 1980), p. 3; Pew. Brigade 75/76 CD/leepl, pp. 184-20l~.
33 Cors Memo 75-570-94 for Heads of Army Slaff Agencies. sub: Conversion of Rotational
Brigadcs 10 PCS, 10 Dec 75, Msg, DAMO-ODO to CinC, USAREUR, DA 241942Z Sep 75, sub:
Declassification of Ode 76 stationing. and Msg. DAMO-ODO to Cdr, I'ORSCOM. an d other
addresses. DA 131515Z May 76. sub: Termination of Unit Rotations. all Brigade 75176 file,
DAMH-I-ISO: PO 48- 1 and 52- I, 1st Infantry Division and Fort Riley. 24 Sep 1976. 3d an, 281h
Inf fi le, DAMH-IISO: Msg, DAMO-ODO to Cdr, FORSCOM. and Olher addresses. 201845Z Apr
78. sub: Movement Directivc 24-78. <Iud PO 63- 2, FORSCOM. 21 Apr 1979. bolh 5th On. 7th Cav
file. DAMH-HSO; USAREU R and Seventh Anny. S/rellgl//CI/illg NATO, pp. 2- 7.
34 FM 100- 5. OpeN/lioI/S, p. I- I; Cors Memo for Heads of Anny Swff Agencies, 5 Fcb 75,
sub: Realignment of ARNG Spl1l Divisions. Infonmlion Paper. NUO. same subjcct. 24 Nov 74,
NGI3-A RO-O. Memo. NGO to Sec of Army. undated. same subject. NGll-ARO. all National
Guard Rcorg<lllization. 1975. file. DAM H-HSO; Amlllal Repon. Chief. Nmj(lI/a/ Gllard BlIl"c(/I/. FY
/975. p. 32; AII/llwl Rel 'je", (jorllled), Rel'(}rl). Chief. Nwio//(/I CuW"d Bureoll. FY /976 alld TQ. IJ.
THE TOTAL A RMY
377
30; Ltr, NOB 10 AG, Ohio, 25 Feb 77, sub: Rcorgalliz<ltioll orOhio ARNG Units, NCi13-A RO-O
207- 02. Ohio N:"ional Guard file. DAMI I-HSO: Reserve COnll>Ollcnls Troop Basis of the Army
Annex I: Anlly Nat ion:.! Guard Unit ProgrJIll, 28 Feb 1977, DAM II-HSO.
35 Telephone or Verbal Conversation Record (DA rOml 751), Mr. Bart, FORSCOM. and
author, sub: 187th lnflJdc (Mass). 13 JUII 75, and DA Fonll 751, Mr. Smith, TAG, and author, IS
JUIl 75, both 1871h Inf I3dc file. DAMII - I-ISO: "Callaway, Thurmond : Brigade Affiliation 10
Involve Politics?" , /1"/1/) ' TiIllCS, 3 Sep 1975. Congressional leaders traditionally have \x.'cn protective of miliwry uuits and inSlali ations in their districts because they arc a source of jobs and
income.
36 U.s. Army FQRSCOM. "Annual Ilis!Orical Revicw, I Jul 7S 30 Sep 76," p, 226- 27: Ur,
OCAR!O Maj Gell Gordon 1. Duqucmin. 29 Jan 76, "Taking A Ca ndid Look." H('.\('I"I'l! 22
(Nov- Dec 1976): 18- 19; Msg, DA 07 144 52 May 76, sub: 205th Infantry Brigade, Msg, DA
251520Z May. same subject. and PO 6- 2, Fifth US Amly, 1976, all 205th Inf Bde file. DAMHII SO.
n AR 11- 29, Affi liation Program. 1975; Infommtion I'aper, NOll. sub: Affi liation ['rogroml,
13 lun 78, NGB-A RO-T, Roundout/ Afliliation file. DAMIII ISO: U.S. Army FORSCOM,
"Annual Historical Review, I Oct 76 30 Sell 77," pp. 238-42.
J~ TOE 97, Division (Training), 1970: Ltr, Org:LIlization :LIld Directory Branch to TAG, sub,
jeet: Change in Status of Uni ts, AGAOD, 18 Feb 71, AG Refe rence files, also sec Training
Division General files. 1970-71. DAMH ,IISO.
39 J. Milnor Robcns. "USAR Movcs into 1973," AmI)' H('sc/1'e Maga:ille 19 (Mar 1973): 4- 5.
40 GO 174, Sixth US Army, 1915, 5th Brigade (Trailling) filc. DAMH-USO, U.s. Anny
FORSCOM, "Annual Historical Review, FY 1915," p. 181. GO 64, U.S. Sixth Amly. 3d Bn, 87th
Inffile, DAMII-IISO.
4t Dep,/rlmeul /Jjllw / 1/"111)' lIi.I'lorie(l! SIIm/l/(I/")'. !974.1l. 32.1979, p. 16; U.S. Army
FORSCOM, "Annunillistorical Review, I Oct 77- 30 Sep 78," p. 166: TOE 97-500118, Recruit
Training Organization, 1978; "It's No Easy Job Retaining Trainers liS the USAR's I081h Division
Outdoes Itself," Rcscrve 25. No. I. (1979): 20- 2 1,
CHAPTER 14
A New Assessment
us
711t~ lIIosl (tell/alldillg challellge collfrol/lillg rhe

mili(my ill the ,/('<:{I(/e of'he 1980s
is 10 (lel'Clop lIml demOllSfl'lIIe 'lte l..>tllXlbiliry to !!'"//cces.'iflllly meel ,IIl'eals /0 \!;/a/ US iI/Ie/,eSI.~
olll,l'ide oj Europe. Wilhoul compromisillg lite decisil'e thelller ill Cellll'lll Ellrope.
General Edward C. Meyer l
Foll owing the conflict in Viet nam the Army undertook a concerted program
to achieve parity with the heavy forces of the Soviet Union. Various schools,
commands, and agencies devised divisional models from wh ich they argued the
need fo r new weapons, equipment, tact ics, and doctrine, a process si milar to that
which had produced the pentamic and ROAD divisions. Yet even as the Army
retooled for a European batl l c ri c l (~ its senior leaders also tried to anticipate what
ot her contingencies wou ld have to be faced in the future. By 1990 the effectiveness o f thi s work in sea rching for o rganizationa l des ig ns that wou ld give the
Army even greater fl ex ibility wou ld be put to a severe test.
The Division Restructuring Study

The ligh tning war between the Arabs and Israelis in 1973, when the Egyptian
and Syrian armies lost more tank s than the Uni ted States had in Euro pe at the
time, causcd the Army to rethink its doctrine and the structure of its divisions and
brigades. An examination of the seventeen-day confl ict led to new ideas about
how to prepare for war and how to fig ht. Known as the "Acti ve Defense," the new
doctrine stressed defense as the principal mode of combat. Other fac tors embedded in the new approach were the speed wit h which dec isive act ions would take
plaee and an awareness of the increased lethality of modern we<lpons on the b<lttle ri eld . Both considerations put added pressure on the Army to improve the combat capabi lit ies of forwa rd-deployed act ive forces and the speed wit h which effective reserve components units could be del ivered to overseas batt legrounds)
Si nce the A rmy was on the thres ho ld of adoptin g new equipme nt and
weapons that increased mobil ity, firepowe r, and maneuver, the Army's schools,
commands, and agencies examined such issues as m il itary in tell igence o rgan iz<ltio ns; signal and aviat ion req ui rements; and chemica l, bio logica l, <lnd nuclea r
de fense, seek ing better ways to max imi ze the new tec hno logy and not just provid in g " tag alongs" in ex istin g orga nizatio ns. Fire support team s for artill ery;
380

bifunctional staffs (the unit commander se rving as a ch ief of siaff
w ith two deputies , one for operati ons and mili tary intelligence and
th e other for personnel and logistics); rearmament , refue l ing , and
main tenance in the fo rward area of
the battlefield; and consolidati on of
ad mini stration at the battalion level
al so came under scrutiny)
I n March 1975 Chief of Staff
General Fred C. Weyand suggested to
Deputy Chief o f Staff for Operations

and Pl ans Lt. Gen. Donald H. Cowles
Ihal the st ructure of divisions should
be reexa m ined. Weya nd was co nce rn ed that new tech nolo gy had
resulted in o nly "add OilS" to di viGel/eml Weyal/d
sions. increasing their weight and complexity and decreasing their overall flexibility. Cowles turned to General Will iam
E. DePuy, comma nd er of th e U.S. Army Trainin g and Doctrine Com mand
(TRA DOC), establi s hed in 1973 spec ifica lly to address tra ining and doctrine
issues, for his views . De Puy assembl ed a group of officers from his com mand
and the Army's schoo ls and centers to conduct a division restructuring ana lys is
focllsed on finding the optimum antiannor capabi lity for divisions. Among the
areas considercd were the employment of the new armored vehicles coming into
serv ice and the problems associated with ex pl oiting new arti ll ery and ta rget
acq uisition systcms whose range had been g reatly incrcased.4
Th e major p rodu ct of the Divi sion Restructuring Study ( DR S) was th e
" heavy division" (Char' 44), an organization des igncd to replace both mechanized infantry and armored divisions. Headed by Co l. (latcr Gcncral) John Foss,
from the Traini ng and Doctrine Command, the planning group believed that the
princi ples underlying the new organi zation could be applied to all divisions.
The heavy d iv ision inc luded th ree brigades, each consisting of a permanent
combat team of two mechanized infantry and three tank battalions. Infantry battalions consisted of one combat support, one TOW, and three sma ll riOe companies;
tank battalions, similar in structurc to the mechanized infantry un its, fielded thrce
tank compa nies and maintenancc, TOW, and combat support companies. A tank
company had three tank platoons with each platoon having only three tanks. The
prccise location of the TOW antitank missi le launchers posed the old problem of
centralized vcrsus deccntral ized control for the planners, much as had the introduction of other ncw weapons and equipment , s uch as the machine gun, tank, antitank
gun, airplanc, and helicopter. For now they remained under contro l of the battalion.S
382
MANEUVER AN D FIRE POWE R
To increase fi repower, the number of 155-mm. how itzers in each d irect support
artillery battery was increased from six to eight, and the number of firing batteries
in a battalion rose from three to four. T he number of batteries in the 8-inch howitzer
battal ion was a lso increased to fOll f. Since the group foresaw a larger divisional
combat area in both width and depth, the artillery's counterfirc (destroyi ng enemy
artillery) capabi liti es moved from the corps level to the division, with a target
acqu isit ion battery added to the division artillery to locate those targets. A smaller
caval ry squadron fielded only three ground troops, with the air cavalry troop moved
to a new divisional aviation battalion. For antiai rcraft defense, the study gave the
heavy d ivision an air defense arti ll ery brigade comprising two batta lions, one for
the forward area of the batt lefield and another for the rear.6
With smaller di visiona l infant ry and armor battalions, planners envisioned
integrat ing the combat arms at the battalion ra the r tha n at the company leve l.
Under the ROAD concept a company team had been the princi pal combat formati ol1 . For example, a mechanized infantry com pany was normally rei nforced with
eng ineers, forwa rd artillery observers, and possibly tanks, antitank weapons, and
helicopters. But the company commander who integrated these forces had no
staff and probably lacked the experience to achieve the most effective use of all
these resources. A change of focll s therefore appeared necessary.7
Combat support within the new divi sion also underwent rad ica l changes. A
combat electronic warfare intelligence (CEW I) battalion was organi zed from military intelligence and Army Secu rity Agency resources. Consisting of an electronic warfare company and a g round surve illance company, along with a headquarters and operations company, the batta lion greatly expanded the division's intelligence co ll ec tio n and ana lysis c apab ilili es. As noted, t he reco n naissance
squadron 's aviation troop was moved to a new divisional aviation battalion, which
consol idated the attack helicopter company and the division 's command and control aviation resources in one unit. All mess resou rces were grouped at battalion
level, and a personnel service company merged finan ce and personnel services
in to one company, whi ch was inc luded in the support command. T hat command
also fi e lded a s upply and transport battalion, a maintenance battal ion , and a su pport operations center. A chem ica l company prov ided th e d ivis ion wit h smokegenerating resources and t he ability to ass ist in defense agai nst b iolog ica l,
nuclea r, and chemica l weapons. In the past no chem ica l unit had ex isted in a d ivision, and all units had been expected to defend against those weapons as a primary responsib ility. Finally, the study moved the divisional med ica l battal ion and the
bridge company from the engineer battali on to the corps level. 8
A fie ld test o f the new structure at Fort Hood by a brigade o f the 1st Caval ry
Di vision in 1979 produced mixed resu lts. Lt. Gen. Marvin D. Ful ler, the III Corps
comman de r, who oversaw the test , foun d the divis io n ove .- m a nne d and
overeq uipped in many areas, g iving commanders resources to cover every possible deficiency or contingency. He thought the additional costs in personnel and
equi pmen t would pri ce the division out of reac h. He al so found that radios had
A NEW ASSESSMENT
383
proliferated to the exte nt that co mmunication s we re hampe red rather than

improved, that bifu nCliorull staffs filtered information needed by commanders,
and that ai r defense coverage was st ill inadequate. However, the test validated the
belief that tank and mechani zed infantry battal ions should be the foca l poin t for
the integration of the combined arms.9
During the evaluation of the division restructuring concept, the Army Staff
approved selective improvements in existing divisions based on lessons learned
from the 1973 Arab~Jsrac l i War. A target acquisition battery was placed in the
division artillery to identify targets up to 50 kilometers in front of the forward
edge of the battle arca. Chemica l companies were added to divisions to provide
nuclear, biological, and chemica l reconnaissance and decontamination support.
Because of the need to acquire and evaluate information about the enemy, divisiona l military intelligence batta lions of the CEW I ty pe werc organized beginning in 1979. In the armored and mech ani zed infantry di visio ns, aviation
rcsou rces were again pooled to form aviation battal ions. The a irborne division
was assigned th ree antitank TOW companies, one for each brigade, while the
infantry division in Korea was assigned only a company. When the aerial field
artillery battalion was inactivated in the air assault d ivision, antitank resources
were concentrated in an aviation battalion. to
Along with upgrading ex isting divisions, the Department of De fen se directed
the Army to increase its mcchani zed forces. In September 1979 the 24th Infantry
Division converted from infantry to mec hanized infantry, and the fol lowing yea r
clement s were assigned to the prev iously unmanned l49t h Armored Brigade in
the Kentucky Army National Guard, raising the number of brigades in the total
force to twenty-five. By 1980 the Texas Guard had eliminatcd its unfilled 36th
Airborne Bri gade, using iI's personnel 1'0 organize a corps- level combat engi neer
battalion. Planners also considered reorganizing all infan try divisions, except the
airborne and the airmobile forces , as mcchanized units. t t
Division-86
Before the 1st Cavalry Division completed its eval uati on of the heavy division in 1979, the new co mmandcr of the Training and Doct rine Command,
General Donn A. Starry, began to develop another divisional concept thaI bui lt
upon the Division Restructuring Study. From his experience as the V Corps COIllmander in Europe, Starry bel ieved that Foss' Division Rest ructuring Study group
had worked too quickly. Units had conducted tests without proper training, and
the opposing forces lacked adequate knowledge of Soviet tactics. Therefore, he
judged that the test rcsults could not be totally ascribed to deficiencies in tacti cs,
leadership, or organizatioll .12
The Div ision Restructuring Study had concentrated on the active defense, the
lethality of the batt lefield, and the need to win the first batt lc, but Starry stressed
the o ffense and "centra l battle" where all aspects of firepower and maneuver, air
384

and g round, wou ld co me toget her
over a w ide area to produce a decisive action. He believed that annlysis
of those e lements in the baule m"cn,
including th e range of weapons and
the ir rates of fire , th e size of the
opp os ing forces , the terrain ove r

whi ch they wou ld ad va nce, and the
speed of thaI advance, would permit
development of morc effect ive operational co nce pt s . In add ition , he
thought considerati on had to be given
to "force generati on," the task of concen trating the combat power of the
division for the centra l battl c. T hese
id eas evo lved into the "AirLan d
Battle" doct rine, w hi ch was publi shed in 1982 in th e rev ised Fie ld
Manual, 100- 5, Opel'Clliolls.I J
Analysis of com bat wi thin the
framework of the AirLand Batt le con*
Genemf Stan),
cept le d to th e development of
" Divi s io n*86," so na med because
1986 was as far out as General Meyer and his advisers could project the threat.
Because of the importance of Europe to national security, Di visi ol1*86, like the
Division Restructuring Study, emphasized a standardized heavy division , which
combi ned both armored and mechanized infantry d ivisions, and focused on max i*
mizi ng the new equipment entering the invcntory. In October 1979, fo ur months
aftcr General Edwa rd C. Meyer beca me C h ief of Staff, Star ry prese nted h is
Div is ion*86 proposa l, which Mcyer approved in princi ple on the 18th of that
month. Hi s final decision about fiel d ing such a divis ion depended upon studies to
be conducted for light divi sions (i nfantry, airborne, and airmobile), corps, and ech*
elons above the corps level.14
Di visio n*86, as presented to General Meyer, retained th e fl ex ible ROAD
structure. The new heavy division consisted of a headquarters and headq uarters
compa ny; three brigade headquarte rs; a m ilitary police company; sig nal , air
defense artillery, engineer, and mi litary intelligence battalion s; a recon nai ssance
squadron; division artillery; an air cavalry attack brigade; a division support COI11*
mand ; and a number o f maneuver c leme nts to be determ ined, possi bly four or
five mechani zed infant ry battalions and five or six armor battalions. The division
would total approx imately 20,000 officers and cnli sted men (Chart 45).15
Under the "come-as*you-a re, figh t-as-YOlHlre" approach to war, combat service support had to be immediately available in the battle area. To meet the new
CHART 45- Heavy Division (Tank Heavy)

As Brie fed to General Meyer on 18 October 1979
386
MA NE UV ER AN D FI REPOWER
log isti ca l re q u ire m e nt s , t he stud y

called for a radical reorganization of
the di v ision support command, pri marily to address the fo rward area of
the battle fi eld. T he command incl uded a mat eri e l man age me nt ce nt e r,
adjutant general and finance companies, a supply and transport battalion ,
a maint enan ce battalion , a nd th ree
support battalion s, one for each divis ion a l bri gade. S up port ba ttali o ns,
wh ich were to " arm , fue l, fix , a nd
fe ed forward," included headquarters
and headquart ers, suppl y, m a int e na nce , and me di ca l co mpani es . A
small medical batta lion supported the
rest orthe d ivision. Planners had d iffi c u lt y decidin g whe t he r to pla ce a
chemical company at corps, division,
o r d iv ision support command leve l,
but gave it to the supply and transport
Gelleral /Heyer
battalion in the support command .1 6
Evidcnce o f fu ndamental change exi sted within the combat arms. Each tank
battalion consisted of a headquarters element and four tank companies, and each
tank company ri d ded three platoons of four tanks each. Mechani zed in fantry batta lions contained a headquarters element along with one TOW and four rifle companies, with the riflemen to be mounted on new Bradley infantry fighting vehi cl es. To COlLnt er the Sov iet Union 's hi g h de ns it y o f a rtille ry a nd imp roved
weapons, the Di vision-86 study, like its predecessor, sig nificantly increased the
d ivision artil lery. It fi elded three batta lions of 155-mm. self-propell ed howit zers
organi zed into three batteri es, each having e ight pi eces; one battali on o f sixteen
8- inc11 howitzers and nine multiple launch rocket systems (MLR S) mounted o n
vehicles ; and a target acqui sitio n batta lion. 17
The reconna issance squadron called fo r three troops, each having two platoons equ ipped with cavalry fighting vehicles- similar to the Bradl ey fig hting
vehicle-and a platoon o f motorcycles. A new organi zation, an a ir cavalry attac k
brigade (later designated as an aviation bri gade), which resulted from the pioneer
work of the I st Cavalry Di vision and the 6th Cava lry Brigade at Fori 1-1001 and
others, appeared in the di vision to prov ide helicopters for an antitan k role. Two
attack battalions, each con sisting of four companies with six he licopters eac h,
and a combat support aviation battalion, whi ch provided resources for command
aviati on, a irc ra ft maintenance, and the mil itary intel li gence battal ion , made lip
the brigade. The brigade fi elded 134 aircrafl.l8
The Bradley fighting vehicle (flld, below, mlllliple Iflllllch /'Odet
~J'slellls
CHA RT 46-Heavy Di vision, 1 October 1982
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HOlE'VI1;al;On l-t tank. 4 mOth.ni,ed infantry bon.lion,IM t 13118.954.

V.fi.l;"" 2-5180k. 5 mochaoiled inlantry banalion" (Ml13119.302.
VOli.l;"" :l-61.nk. ( meehl"iled inlanlf'! b.naroon$ (8fVSI19.(I(Q.
Vorl.,;"" (-5laok. 5 meehaniled iolanlf'! b.It.r.on$ (BfVSI19.407.
V.rl,tion 5-6 tank. (meeh.niltd iolanlf'! bini lions (BfVSI20.(59.
HOlE. Suppon b.n.li(}lls ".ry in thl numb., 01 "mor and mechlni'ed
inflntry iOtwa,d $UPPOl1 t.. ms: 2 .,mar "nd I infoot,v. 377; 2 .,mol
and 2 ;nllnny. Wl: and I . rmOr and 2 inlantty. 363.
A NEW ASSESSMENT
389
T he di stribution of air defense weapons had haunted the planners. Because of

th e breadth and depth of the battle f ield one commander could not casily supervise a ir defense in the division's forward and rcar areas, with each area requiring
unique weapons. An air defense artillery bri gade seellled to be one so lution , but
personnel constraints ruled it OLlt. T herefore, the division was authorized an air
defense artillery battalion outfitted wi th a mix of short-range (man-portable
Stingers) and mid-range (Chaparral) mi ss iles, to be supplemented by the still
experimental Sergeant York gun system,l?
The Training and Doctrine Command publ ished tables of organization and
eq uipment fo r this second try at the heavy division concept on I October 1982
(Chari 46). One set of tables covered bot h the mechanized infantry division and
the armored division, but with five variations. Five or six armor and four or five
mechani zed infantry battalions wcre to be assigned to an armored d ivision, and a
mec han ized infa ntry division was to have five armor and five mechanized
infantry battalions. Variations in the tables also covered d ilTeren t eq uipment, M60
tanks and M I 13 armored person nel carriers or thc new M I Abrams tank s and
Bradley in fantry fighting vehiclcs. Given the variation s, the strength of heavy
divisions ranged between 19,000 and 20,500 olTicers and enlisted men)O
The published tables differed somewhat from the proposed heavy divis ion
that Meyer had approved three years earl ier. Cavalry fighting vehicles replaced
tanks in the reconna issance squadron, and the squadron, consisting of two ground
and two air troops, had no motorcycles. Rather than being a divisional unit, it was
a part of the av iation brigade. The finance unit moved to the eorps level , and thc
reorganized military intell igence battalion fielded electronic warfare, surveillance, and service companies. In the support command, the medical battalion
reappeared, but the chemical company was returned to divisional level, and the
target acquisition element was red uced to a battery)!
The Army fa ced complex problems in fielding Division-86. Over forty major
weapons or new pi eces of eq uipment needed to be procured, and some were still
in deve lopmental stages . Doctrina l li terature and training programs required revision, and budgetary limi tat ions had to be considered. The solution approved by
the Army Sta ff, as in the past , was to adopt the heavy division concept but with
interim organizations lIsing obsolete equipment until new weapons and equipment were available. Delivery of many new items was expected to begin in 1983.
Therefore, organizational and eq uipment modernization was 10 begin in January
of that yea r. The number of mancuver elements for a heavy armored division was
set at six armor ,lIld four mechanized infantry ballal ions, wh ile Ihat for a heavy
mechanized infantry division was p laced at five a rmor a nd fi ve mechan ized
infantry battalions.22
T he Army a lso fa ced another problem in fie lding the new heavy division, a
shortfall in personnel. The Training and Doctrine Com mand esti mated that a
st rength of 836,000 was required to field Army-86, but only 780,000 was authorized for the foreseeable fut ure . Therefore to provide manpower spaces for Illod-
390
crni zing the force s in Germa ny, the 4th Brigade, 41h Infantry Division, was inactivated in Europe in 1984 a long with olher units throughout the Army. Shortly
thereafte r the moderni za tion plan went aw ry. Becau se of various problems
involved in funding and procuri ng equipment , the Army leadership slipped the
completion date for modernizing heavy divisions to the mid- [990s)3
Early in the planning process for modernizing divisional force s, Meyer also
decided to adopt a new regimental system. It was to address one aspect of the
" hollow Army" (t he problem of having su ffi c ient personnel and equipment to
support and sustain the for.vard-deployed Army), un it cohcsion.24 Patterned aOcr
the Co mbat Arms Regime ntal System (CARS), the new United States Army
Regi mental System assigned eac h armor, air defense artillery. cava lry, fi e ld
arti llery, and infa ntry regiment- later avi ation regimen ts and special fo rces25
were <Idded- a home base from which regimental clements would rotate between
conti nental and overseas assignments. A soldier could affi liate with a regi men t
and expect to serve in it for most of hi s or her career. By necessity the new system broke traditiona l regimental associations with divisions since fewer regiments cou ld be accommodated in the system because of the linking of clements
between overseas and eontincnta l stations. Meyer beli eved thaI the benefits of
unit cohesion outweighed the loss of divisional affi liation. He tied implementation of the new regimenm l system to moderniz.."Ition of the force . By 1985 implementation of Ihe regimen ta l system was sepa rated from force modernization
bccause of production delays, and uni t rotation was abandoned because of personnel turbulence and its adverse elTect on readi ness. Nevertheless, designating
regi ment s as part of the system contin ued, paced by the number of flags that the
U.S. Army Support Activity, Philadelphia , could manufacture each month. The
nags were needed when the battal ion designations were changed.26
Elusive Light Divisions

In 1979, when Meyer had approved the heavy d ivision, he a lso had directed
Sta rry to sta ndardi ze infan try, ai rborne, and ai rmobile d ivisions- now ca lled
" ligh t divi sio ns." Meye r, who op posed th e total heav y force envisioned by
Depn rtment of Defense planners, wanted the Training and Doctrine Command to
focus on the in fantry division; airborne and airmobile d ivisions were to be co n ~
sidered later. He parti cularly wanted to know if the infantry division could be
designed to move and fig ht in con tingency areas, sueh as the Asiat ic rim . and sti ll
have sufficient resources to dclay and fight Soviet forces in Central Europe. This
question posed the dilemma that had plagued the airborne division com munity
since World War II- how to give a unit strategic mobility and sti ll have it possess
the firepower and the resources to sustain itself in combm. Meyer thought the
an swer to the problem lay in the usc of new technology. which included advanced
radar, intelligence, and satellit e resources; containerized food and equipment;
li ghtweight, high power cOllllllunications; new lightweight vehicles; highly aee ll ~
A NEW ASSESS MENT
391
rate an d powerful , but lightweight, weapons; advanced he li copters; and other

developm ent s. Two interna tiona l eve nt s in 1979, the widening of the conni e!
between the Soviets and the Afghans and Iran's se izure of American hostages,
spurred Ihe need fo r lig ht, versati le unils.27
An effective structure for the " non-heavy" infantry di vision, however, proved
elusive . Initia lly Sta rry set restrictions on the division. Its size was nol to exceed
14,000 soldi ers, it was to be without organic tank or mechani zed infantry units,
and it was to be depl oyable in Air Force C- 141 aircraft . A ftcr four tries and a
re laxation o rthe strength req uirement, Starry recommended a division of 17,773
officers and enlisted men, which Meyer approved for furth er development and
testing 011 18 September 1980)8
As planners deve loped various ideas for a li ght d ivision, th e Army Staff
se lected the 9th Infant ry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington , to serve as a "test
bed," or a f ield laboratory, for equipment, organi zation , and ope rations. One
objective was to shorten the equ ipment developmental cycle-typically from five
to seven years- wh ich had frustrated Meyer and others. Although Meyer obviously wanted the di vision to experiment wi th new equipment, d iffi culties in fu nding hobbled the e ffort from the start. Some o f these problems were overcome
through the d irect intervention of the Army Staff, but oth ers were never surmounted. In 1982 Meyer thus changed the emphasis of the 9th Di vision's mi ss ion
fro m testing highly techni ca l equipment to developin g innovative organizational
and operational concepts . The result was the design o f a motorized division of
13,000 men and capable of being airlifted anywhere in the world. Before the 9th
Infantry Division compl eted its new assig nment , however, the Army set off in a
new direction for the light divi sion )9
The Army a/Excellence

By 1983 planners had reassessed the nature and direct ion of world events and
the types of connicts that could be expected. As Meyer saw a need fo r a balance
between heavy and light d ivis ions, so did hi s replacement, Chief of Staff General
John A . Wi c kh am. The s uccessful operation s of the Brit is h in th e Fal kl a nd
Islands, the Israelis in Leba non, and the United States in Grenada all drove home
the poillt that credible forces did nol have 10 be heavy forces. To have li ght di visions within the Army's limited resources, Wickham ordered the replacement of
the 16,000-man standard infant ry division wi th a new light infantry un it o f about
10,000 men and the adaptati on of light concepts to airborne and airmobi le divisions. He also wanted the design applied to the motorized division under developmen t at Fort Lew is. Furthcrmore, Wickham desi rcd ligh t di visions 10 have an
improved "Iooth-Io-tai l" (i .e. , combat strength 10 logistics) ratio and to be deployable three ti mes faster than cx isti ng infantry div isions. With these changes he
a nti cipated that th e corps would be strengthe ned and made th e focus of th e
AirLand Battle doctrine.30
392
MANEUVER AN D FI RE POW ER
91h ("fan/I)' Dil risiOJl "dlll/e bl/ggy ,. IIsel/ ill {milling
Under Wickham 's guidance the Army specified that corps were to plan and
conduct major operations, whi le div isions were to concentrate on the tactical battlefield. The revised Fie ld Manual 100- 5, Opera/jolls, of 1986 defin ed the corps
as the Army's largest tact ical unit. Tailored for a particular theater and mi ssion,
the corps was 10 contain all combat, combat support , and combat service support
required for sustained operations. In add ition to variolls types of divis ions, the
corps was 10 have available an armored caval ry reg im ent ; field arti ll ery, air
defense arti llery, eng ineer, signa l, av iation , and m ilitary intell igence brigades;
and a mi lita ry pol ice group. Infan try and armored brigades and psycho logical
operations, special opera tions forces, and civil affairs units could be attached as
needed. When organi zed for a part icular theater and mi ssion, the corps was thus
to be a re lati vely fixed organization with area as well as combat responsibil ities.
The newly defined corps was rea lly a throwback to the begin ning of the centu ry
when Field Service Regulations described a prototype corps) I
Wick ham 's guidance resulted in the development of units for the "Army o f
Excel1ence."32 Within that rubric, the tables o f organization and equipmcnt ca lled
for a 10,220-l11an light infantry div ision , which comprised a headquarters and
headq uarters com pany ; a mi litary po lice company; signal, air defense artillery,
and engineer battalions; three brig,lde headquarters; nine infantry battalions; divisio n artillery; ,Ul aviation brigade; a support cOlllmand; and a band. Shortly thereafter a mili ta ry intelligence battalion was added and add itional personnel autho-
A NEW ASSESSMENT
393
rized for the sli p port comllla nd,

which ra ised the division's strengt h to
10,791 (Cha!'f 47). All men and their
eq uipm en t were transportab le in
fewer than 550 C- 141 sorlies in less
than four days , a key feature in
Wick ham's guidance for the design
o f the light division )3
The light div is ion g reatly
improved the ratio of combat Iroops
to support personnel. Infantry battalions fielded three rifl e companie s
and a headquarters com pany, a tolal
of 559 officers and enli sted mell. The
battalion headquarters com pany
included a "foot rnobil c" reconnaissance platoon (no vehicles in it), an
anl iarmor platoon (follr TOW launchers), and a heavy mortar platoo n
(four 4.2-inch mortars). The only
veh icles in the battalions were the
Gel/em/ Wick/Will
new " high mobility multi-purpose
wheeled vehicles" (HMMWVs, or " Hummers") and motorcycles. Brigades provided mess and maintenance for battalions. The division artillery cons isted of
three towed IOS-tnln. howitzer battalions, three batteries wi th six howi tzers each
and one battery of ISS-tnm. howitzers fie ld ing eight pieces. A command aviation
company, an attack helicopter battalion, and the reconnaissance squadron comprised the aviation brigade. The air defense arti llery battalion fielded 20-mm.
mu ltibarrel, electrically driven Vulcan guns and the Stinger missiles fired from a
shoulder position, and the engineer batta lion had no bridging equipment. Support
elements followed the funct ional ideas of ROAD, with the divis ion having a
maintenance batta lion , a su pply and transport battalion, a med ical battal ion , and a
transportation ai rcraft maintenance company, along wi th the command headquarters and materiel management center. Support troops totaled about 1,3 00 men.34
The light div ision met several needs of the Army. It cost less and was simp ler
to ma intain and support than the heavy infantry division. It was well suited for
rear area operations if provided with air and ground transport and could easily
adapt to urban operations, heavily fores ted or rugged areas, and adverse weather
condi tion s- all c ircumstances found in Weste rn Europe. Easily deployed, the
divis ion enhanced the Army's strategic response options. The division's weak nesses included lack of organic ground and air transport and an inability to face
heavy forces in open terrain becausc it lacked armor. Also, thc division was vulnerable to heavy artillery, nuclear, and chemical attacks and had only minimal
A NEW ASSESSMENT
395
indirect fire support. To compensate for those deficiencies, the div ision was to
look to the corps for reinforcements.35
Plans to introduce light divisions sen t reverberations throughout all Regular
Army divisions since there was to be no increase in strength. Wickham directed
reductions in the size of heavy div isions to about 17,000 officers and enl isted
men, with armored d ivisions ma intaining six armor and four mechanized battalions while mechanized divisions con ti nued to field five armor and five mechanized infantry batta lions. Cuts were therefore made in the combat support and
service support elements. As noted, the motorized division was limited to 13,000
men. He ordered the reorganization of the 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord and
of the 25th In fantry Division at Schofield Barracks as li ght di visions without
round-ou t brigades and the activation of the 10th Mountain Division at Fort
Drum , New York, and of the 6th Infantry Division at Fort Richardson, Alaska.
The 10th was to have a Guard round-out brigade, and the 6t h was to draw its
round-out un its from both the Nationa l Guard and the Army Reserve)6
With the plans to reorganize two standard infantry divisions as untested light
divisions, the Defense Department decided to add another mechanized infan try
division to the Nationa l Guard force. [n August 1984 the Guard's 35t h Infantry
Division, organized from three exist ing brigades, returned to the active rol1s under
the new tables as a mechanized d ivision. Five states- Colorado, Kansas, Kentucky,
Missouri, and Nebraska-contributed units to the division, including a mechan ized
infantry brigade each from Kansas and Nebraska and an armored brigade from the
Kentucky National Guard. The headquarters of the ncw mechanized infantry division was at FOit Leavenworth, Kansas. To preclude the command and control problems that some multistate divisions experienced after their reorganizations in 1967
and 1968, the five states supporting the d ivision agreed that a division council (the
adjutant generals from the five states) was to select the division commander and
key personnel, who would serve a maximum of three years)7
The 7th In fan try Division began to transition to light divis io n structure in
1984, and it was fo llowed by the convers ion of the 25th Infantry Division and
the activation of the [Oth Mountain and 6th In fantry Divis ions. Because Fort
Drum lacked facilities to hOllse even a small division , one Regular Army
brigade of the 10th was stationed at Fort Benning, Georgia, for three years . A
new brigade, the 27th Infantry Brigade fro111 the New York Army National
Gliard, compl eted the 10th. The 172d Infantry Brigade in Alaska was inactivated, and its personnel provided the nucleus for the 6th Infa ntry Di vision. To
retain an airborne capability in Alaska, one company in each of the ini tial three
infantry battalions assigned to the 6t h remained airborne qualified. Eventua lly
all airborne assets were concentrated in one divisional battalion. Al though the
chief of Army Reserve agreed to have the 205th Infantry Brigade round out the
6th Infantry Division , the Regular Army still lacked all the resources to complete the divis ion. Thereforc, <ldditional round-out uni ts from the A[aska Army
National Guard and the Army Reserve were assigned. The 6th Di vision, howev-
;(
...
- --
j
,rf-J
,
,,
.. .- "'
Willie,. Imining. 205111 II/filllll)' Brigade, 1986: below, 291h l/lfilllliJI Di\li~'i(J1I
re(/Cril'llfioll cerelllOlly.
1985.
.J
A NEW ASSESSMENT
397
cr, never met the approved des ign for a light d iv ision , as one light infant ry battalion was not organized because of the want ofresources.38
In addition to the Regular Army di visions, the Department of Defense authorized the Nationa l Guard to organ ize one light di vision, raising the total number of
such divisions to five. The 29th Infantry Di vision returned to the active force in the
Maryland and Virginia Army National Guard as a light division in 1985. Resources
from the 58th and 1161h Infantry Brigades provided the nucleus for the new division, which was headquartered al Fort Belvoir, Virginia. With the activation of light
infantry divisions, the number of divisions in the forc e rose to 28 (18 Regular Army
and 10 National Guard) and the number of brigades fell to 23 (16 in the National
Guard, 4 in the Regular Army, and 3 in the Anny Reserve).3?
As part of the Army of Excellence prog ram, Wickham's directive included
cutting and standard izi ng a irborne, airmobile, and motori zed div isions. As a
result , the Training and Doctrine Command publi shed tables for a sma ller ai rborne division, with its strength plummeting from over 16,000 offi cers and enlisted men to approximately 13,000 (CharI 48). The new division was built on the
li ght di vision base with three brigade headquarters and nine infantry batta lions as
its maj or components. However, it was stripped of both its armor battalion and its
separate TOW-equipped infantry compan ies. Each infantry battalion consisted of
a headquarters and headquarters company, three rifle companies, and an antitank
compa ny fielding five platoons, each eq uipped with four TOWs. The one div isional addi tion, an av iation brigade, conta ined the reconnai ssa nce squadron, an
attack helicopter battalion, and two combat aviation compani es. T he target acquisition battery was elimil1<lted from the div ision artillery, and its three 105-mm.
howitzer battal ions were orga nized simi larly to those in the li ght d iv ision. No
155-m l11 . howitzers were assigned .40
The great est personnel economy in the airborne division took place in the
support comma nd. It embodi ed a headquarters and headquarters com pany ; a
materiel management center; medical , supply and transport, and maintenance
battalions; and an aviati on maintenance company, a tota l of about 1,75 0 soldiers
rather than 2,500 . Mi litary police and chemi ca l companies and sig nal , military
intelligence, a ir defense artillery, and engineer batta lions comp leted the airborn e
division. As in the li ght infantry division, it had to be reinforced from corps level
when engaged in sustained operations. The 82d Ai rborne Divis ion began adopting the new struct ure during fiscal year 1986 and compl eted it the following year
when the quartermaster airdrop equi pmen t company, which had been a nondivisional unit at Fort Bragg since 1952, was added to the supply and transport battalion, a lmost doubling its size.41
Along wi th the airborne div ision, the Training and Doctrine Command standardi zed the air assault div ision, which was decreased by abou t 25 percent (Char'
49). It also was sim ilar to its old organization, but with a li ght division base. The
division consisted of three brigades, nine airmobile in fantry battalions, d ivision
arti llery, a s upport cOlllmand, and divisional Iroops . The one exception was the
:!; i-lr------, g I:
"C
0-
c"
";;;
:~
Cl
400
replacemen t of the aviation group by an aviation brigade; the taller consisted of a

command aviation battalion , a combat aviation battalion, a medium nviati on battalion, and four attack aviation battalions. Artillery units were patterned after
those in the airborne division, having three [OS-mm. towed howitzer battalions,
and th e support command retained medi cal, supp ly and transport, and maintenance battalions, along with an av iation maintenance battalion. The reconnai ssance squadron had a headquarters and four Iroops plus a long-range surveillance
detachment. The latter was a military intel ligence un it manned by infantrymen
who were dependent on the cavalry squadron for transportation; doctrinally its
location created a problcm, and the planners had no easy sol ution for its position
within the division. Each air assault infantry batta lion fielded threc rifle companies and an antiannor company.42
In 1986 Forces Command began to phase the new structure into the 10I st
Airbornc Di vision; by 1990, howcver, the Training an d Doctrine Command
changed the aviation brigade. T he recon naissance squadron, which had been a
divisional elcment, moved to the brigade, which fielded one command, one med ium, two assault, three attack battalions, along with the recon nai ssance unit. A
fourth attack batta li on was planncd for the brigade, but not active.43
The one typc of division that failed to win a place in the Army of Excellence
was the motorized infantry division (a lso re ferred to as the middleweight rather
than li ght di vision). Motorized ex periments conduc ted by the 9th Infantry
Division had produccd unsatisfactory results because of funding problems created by going outside normal combat development channels. The kinetic cnergy
assault gu n, the division's primary weapons system, and the fast attack vehicle
never got beyond the experimenta l slage. In 1988 a reduction in the size o f the
Army forced the inactivation of the 9th Div ision's 2d Brigade. To maintain the
integrity of the division , the 81st Infantry Brigade, from the Washington Army
Nationa l Gua rd, was assigned as a round-out un it. Also, Forces Command transferred the I st Battalion , 33d Armor, a Regular Army unit, from I Corps to the
division. It s new maneuver element mix, including rou nd-out units, cons isted of
two light attack infantry, two mechanized infantry, three armor, and four combined arms (motori zed) battalions. The lalter included two rine companics and an
assault gun company equi pped with TOWs mounted on HMMWVs.44
With the reorganization o f the Army into heavy and light divisions, only the
2d Infantry Di vision in Korea and the 26t h, 28th , 38th , 42d, and 47th Infantry
Divisions in the Army Nati onal Guard remained org,mi zcd under the dated standard infantry division's tables of organization and equipment. Wick ham exempted
the 2d Infantry Division from conversion to either the heavy or lig ht configuration because of its mission in Korea, the absence of a corps organ ization there,
<lnd Korean augmentation assigned to it. Working with tlte Training and Doctrine
Command, Eight h Army devised a unique structure for the 2d thai increased its
firepower, especia lly the artil lery <l nd the anti armor capabi lities, and provided a
mix of light and heavy maneuver battalions. The d ivision was planned to field
A NEW ASSESSM ENT
40 1
two armor, two mechanized infantry, and two air assault infantry battalions, while
the other maneuver elements were to come from the Korean Army. By September
1990 the 2d Infant ry Division had adopted ilsArmy o f Excel lence strtlcturc.45
The reorganization of the Nat io nal Guard div isions unde r the Army of
Excellence concepts, except for the 29th Infantry Div ision, wh ich rch,lmed to the
active force in 1985 as a light d ivision, proved to be a challenging endeavor. In
1985 the 49th and 50th Armored Divisions and 35th and 40th Infantry Divisions
were reorganized as heavy d ivisions with the same maneuver element mix as the
Regu lar Army divisions. Because o f recruiti ng problems the areas that supported
the Guard divisions were expanded, usually to adjacent states. One exception to the
expansion was the 50th Armored Division, which was headquartered in New Jersey
but had the allotment of one of its brigades moved to the Texas Army National
Guard in 1988. Thus the future of the division in the force was uncertai n.46
The Guard's rive infantry divisions carried on under modified versions of the
" 1-1 " series tables of organizat ion and equi pment, wh ich were nearly twenty years
old. Strengths for those d iv isions ranged from 14,000 to 17,000. Wit h uncertainty
about the need for more light d iv isions, the need for state troops, which the loca l
authorities were unwilling to lose, and the lack of funds, which did not material
ize, the reorga nization of the units was held in abeyance. The Nat ional Guard
d ivisions were, however, truly a part o f the "Tota l Army." Because of concerns
over sensi tive equi pment in the mili tary intell igence battalion, the Army Reserve
provided that unit for each Guard division except the 29 th Infant ry Division,
which organized wi th its guardsmen. 47
As the Army modern ized its heavy d ivisions, it continued to rev ise their
structure. In 1986 the 8ineh how itzers were transferred from the heavy division
to corps level, but the Ill ultiple launch rockets, organized as separate batteries,
remained a pa rt of the division artillery. The sallle year the division's support
com mand was reorganized. T hree forward suppo rt battalions (one for each
brigade), a ma in support battal ion , a nd an avia tion maint ena nce com pa ny
replaced the div isiona l mcdical , support and transport, and main tenance balta]
ions in the support command. The fu nct ions and serv ices prov ided by the dis
placed units were performed by mixed area support batta lions . Thc d ivisional
adjutant general company was inactivated, and its functions moved to the corps
leve l where they were reorganized as a personnel service company, and the divi
sional materiel management center was absorbed by the headquarters company in
the support command. The reorganization of the support command saved over
400 personnel spaces. In the National Guard heavy divisions, the air defense
art ill ery battalions were e liminated beca use spare part s for ant iquated M42
Dusters were not available. On mobilization the corps was to provide antiaircraft
resources for these divisions.48
By the end of 1989 the on ly Army of Excellence structure that the Training
and Doctrine Command had developed fo r separate brigades was for the heavy
one- armored and mecha nized infant ry. Like th e tables of organiza tion and
402
equipment for heavy divi sions, they included variations for the types of equipment and the number of ma neuver elements that the brigades fie lded. Each
bri gade, authorized approximately 4, 100 so ldiers, included a headquarters and
headquarters com pany, engineer and mili tary intellige nce com panies, a cavalry
reconnai ssance troop, a fie ld artillery battalion (three batteries of six se lf-prope lled I55-mill. howitzers each), a support battalion, and a com bination ofannar
and mechanized infantry ballalions.49
The reorgani zation of reserve brigade fo rces, both separate and round-out
units, al so became an ongoing process. For the 9th Infantry Di vision (Motorized),
the 151 Cavalry Division, and 5th and 24th In fantry Divisions the maneuver element mix of thei r Nati onal Gua rd round-ollt brigades was increased from three to
four battalions, two armor and two mechani zed infantry. The light round-ou t
brigades for the 6th Infantry and 10th Mountain Di visions continued to field
three maneuver battalion s. Th e 27th In fantry Brigade, round ing out the 10th
Mountain Division , however, did not have all of its brigade base units. Fi ve other
heavy brigades in th e National Guard were a lso orga nized under A rmy of
Exce llence tables, while the e ig ht Nat iona l Guard and the two Army Reserve
infantry brigades, like the National Guard infantry divisions, employed a mishm<lsh of old and new structures. Although eight Guard in fantry brigades were not
modernized, each had the same number of assigned maneuver clements, except
for the 92d In fantry Brigade in Puerto Ri co, which had fou r .... ther than three
infantry battalions. The 157 th Infantry Brigade, the only mechanized infantry
brigade in the Army Reserve, fiel ded only three maneuver c lements as did the
1871h Infantry Brigade. 50
The Regular Army brigades continued to lack uniformity. In 1984 Fo rces
Comm<lnd reorganized the 194th Armored and 1971h Infantry Brigades under Ihe
he<lvy brigade configuration. The 193d Infan try Brigade, the spec ial miss ion
brigade in Panama, was reorganized as a light un it consisting of two in fantry battalions (one being airborne qualified), <I fie ld artillery bauery, and a support battalion.
The 3d Battalion, 87th Infantry, from the Army Reserve was identified as a roundoul unit for the brigade. An addi tional table of ol'ganiz.1t ion brigade was added to
the Regular Army in 1983 when United States Army, Europe, and Seventh Army
orga ni zed the Berlin Bri gade under a standard sepa rate in fantry brigade table,
which provided resources for improved command and control of its assigned units.
It had thrce infa ntry battalions, a field artillery battery (eight 155-mm. self-propel led howi tzers), a tank company, and a newly activated support battalion. 51
The ce llular organiz.1tion adopted in 1978 for the twelve training divisions
and two training brigades (a new brigade, the 402d, had been o rga nized in 1985
for field arti llery training) in the Army Reserve crcated problems, particularly in
accounting for the personnel assigned to the units. Some positions were authori zed within divisional tables of organization and eq ui pment cell s and others were
provided for as a part of the Uni ted States Army Reserve centers to which the
d ivisions and brigades werc assigned. Between the two documentat ion sources,
A NEW ASSESSMENT
403
or
Forces Command found it d ifficult to tel l which parts

the reserve centers were
dedicated to support the training units. The command eventually recommended a
so lution, which the Army Staff approved on 11 December 1986. The training
divisions and brigades were to be reduced to zero strength to keep the units active
and the n backfilled lIsing tables of di st ribution and allowance. The change
.. Il owed Forces Command to identify specific billets for each division, brigade,
and reserve center for its specifi c mission. The lineage, honors, and history orthe
divisions and brigades continued to be represented in the reserve forces. Units
began adopting the syste m in Se ptember 1988 and comple ted the process
September 1990.52
A New Direction
With its lig ht and heavy di visions and brigades, the Army of Exce ll ence
reorganization was ex pensive, and ultimate ly the high cost forced the Army to
move in a new direction during the late 1980s. All clements of the military
establ ishment , Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, competed for modern izat ion monies, which helped drive the national debt to unacceptable levels.
In 1988, as a part of its share in reducing defense costs, the Army inactivated
one brigade from the 9th Infantry Div is ion , as already noted, and replaced it
wit h the 81 st Infantry Brigade from the Washi ngton Army National Guard. The
following year the 2d Brigade, 4th In fantry Divi sion, was inactivated, crea ting a
gap that was closed by the I I 6th Cavillry Brigade from the Idaho, Oregon, and
Nevada Nat ional Guard. The Guard 's 116th and 163d Armored Cavalry regiIllcnts had bcen reorga nized by 1989 as armored brigades because no requirement existed for those regi ment s in the force. By the end of fiscal year 1989 the
Army had twenty-e ight divisions and twen ty-five brigades (Tables 37 alld 38)
in the active Army and reserve components comb ined.53
During the summer of 1989 the Warsaw Pact bega n to disinteg rate. Economic
and social isslles fired the changes, and nations in Eastern Europe wrenched control of their affairs from the Soviet Union. By the end of the year most Soviet
client states were set on a path of self-determination. Given this change, the rationa le for the North Atlan tic Treaty Organization, the basis for hav ing Uni ted States
forces forward dep loyed in Europe, and much of the Army doctrine for fighting
the AirLand Battle came under close scrutiny.
Before any reassessment of the defense establishment in light of these events
was complCled, in December 1989 the Army was ca ll ed upon to deploy the 7th
Infantry Division and the 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, to Panama as ,\ pilrt
of Operation JUST CAUSE, an effort to restore democracy to that Latin American
republic. Several mon ths later American div isions and brigades participated in
Ol>cration DESERT SHIELD/ DESERT STORM, a multinationa l endeavor to halt Iraqi
aggression in Sout hwest Asia and to restore the independence of Kuwait (fflble 39
lists the divisions and brigades that deployed to Soutlnvcst Asia).
Fon Polk, La.

Fon Richardson, Alaska
RA
RA
NG
NG
NG
Infantry
Infantry
Infantry
Infantry
25th
26th
28th
29th
RA
8th Infantry
9th Infantry
10th Mountain
24th Infantry
7th Infantry
6th Infantry
Fon Lewis, Wash.

Fon Drum, N.Y.
Fon Stewart, Ga.
Buzzards Bay, Mass.
Harrisburg, Pa.
Fort Belvoir, Va.
Bad Krcuznach, Germany
Fort Ord, Calif.
S
S
Fon Carson, Colo.
RA
RA
RA
3d Infantry
4th Infantry
5th Infantry
RA
RA
RA
Frankfurt, Germany
Wuerzburg, Germany
RA
RA
4
4
3d Annored
2d Infantry
lSI Infantry
2d AmlOred
Ansbach, Germany
Fort Hood, Tex.

Fort Riley, Kans.
Fort Hood, Tex.
Korea
1st Cavalry
RA
RA
RA
RA
RA
2
1
6
3
6
;
2
6
5
5
3'
2
6
9
4
Manellver Baltalion
Mech A, Abn AAST LI CAB
1st Annored
Inf
Compo"en!
Division
LocUlion
of Headquarters
Divisions, 1989
TABLE 37
81 st Infantry Brigade
2d Bn, I20th Infantry

155th Annored Brigade

2d Bn, 136th Infantry
2d Bn, 251d Armor
Round-Ollt Unit
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
35th Infantry
38th Infantry
40th Infantry
42d Infantry
47th Infantry
49th Annored
50th Annored
82d Airborne
IOlst Airborne
Fort Leavenworth, Kans.

Indianapolis, Ind.
Los Alamitos, Calif.
New York, N.Y.
SI. Paul, Minn.
Austin, Tex.
Somerset, N.Y.
Fort Bragg, N.C.
Fort Campbell, Ky.
Location
of Headquarters
l One air assault battalion inactivated in September 1990.
RA
RA
Component
Division
In!
1
6
6
4
4
1
5
3
1
1
A,"
Mech
Maneu~'er
TABLE 37-Continued
9
9
Battalion
Abn AAST
LI
CAB
Round-ollt Unit
AR
RA
RA
RA
187th Infantry
193d Infantry
194th Armored
197th Infantry
205th Infantry
218th Infantry
256th Infantry
Berlin
Horsham. Pa.
Bozeman, Monl.
Fon Devens, Mass.
Fon Clayton, Canal Zone
Fort Knox, Ky.
Fort Benning, Ga.
FOri Snelling, Minn.
Newberry, S.C.
Lafayette, La.
Berlin, Gennany
Tupelo. Miss.
Seattle, Wash.
Boise, Idaho
Edmond, Okla.
Macon, Ga.
Tampa, Fla.
Columbus. Ohio
Jackson, Tenn.
Clinton, S.C.
Northport, Ala
Milwaukee, Wise.
Chicago, III.
Liuie Rock Ark.
Ponland, Oreg.
Honolulu, Hawaii
Syracuse, N.Y.
A,
l
l
l
l
3
l
31
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
23
Abo Lt In!
ManczweT Bal/alion
Illf Mech
Loca/ioll
of Headquaners
lOne Anny Reserve and two National Guard Battalions.

2 Reorganization of the I I 6th Annored Cavalry as the I I 6th Cavalry Brigade not complete.
3 One Anny Reserve and one Regular Anny banalion.
RA
NG
NG
AR
AR
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
Compollen!
1161h Cavalryl
[55th Armored
[57th Infantry
163d Armored
92d Infantry
45th Infantry
48 th Infantry
53d Infantry
73d Infantry
8 1st Infantry
4151 Infantry
39th Infantry
33d Infantry
32d Infantry
3 [st Armored
29th Infantry
30th Armored
30th Infantry
27th Infantry
Brigade
TABLE 38
Brigades, 1989
407
A NEW ASSESSMENT
TA BLE 39
Divisions and Brigades in South west Asia, 1990- 9 1

Ullil
H Ollie S/(I(ioll
l SI Armored Di visioll (less

1st BTi gad!!)
Germany
I SI Cavalry Division (less 2561 h
F0I1 Hood, Texas
Infant ry Brigade)
1st Infantry Di vision (less
1st Infa ntry Division Forward)
1st Brigade, 2d AmlOTcd Division
3d Brigade, 2d Annorcd Di vision
3d AmlOTcd Di vision
3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division
24th Infantry Di vision (less 48th
Infantry Brigade)
82d Airbome Di vision
101 s1 A irbom e Division
Fort Riley, Kansas
Fort I-Iood, Tcxus

Gemlany
Gennany
Gennany
ForI Stewart , Georgi;!
ForI Bragg, North Ca rolina
Fort Campbell. Kentucky
Fort Benning, Georgia
The nat ion and the Army reached a watershed in 1990 with the di sintegration of Soviet Union and the deploymen t o f fo rces to So uthwest Asia. Since the
end of the confli ct in Vietnam , national leaders had focused on the coun tering
of the Soviet menace, and the Army's Division Restruct uring Study, the Airland
B<lttl e doctrine, and the Army of Excell ence heavy di visions, fi rs t and foremost ,
had addressed that th rea t. Although the need for ot her types of divisions and
separate brigades was recognized, limit ed resources bridl ed fu ll implementation
of the Army of Ex cell ence desig n. Aggression by the small Iraqi natio n introduced a series of new questio ns about the size, type, and location of division
and separate brigade forces needed. The answers to these questions arc len to
the future, but an ever-changi ng world and ongoi ng revolution in weapo ns and
information tec hnology wi ll cont inue to challenge the designers of the Army
force structure in years ahead.
408
Noles
I E. C. A-/e)'el". Gel/erlli. UIli/e(1 Slflle,\" , lmlJI, ChiefofSI{/ff. ./lme /979- JI/IIC 19(13 (n.p., 1983).
p.52.
2 John r . Rose, Tile EI'Qflllioll of
ArlllY Nlie/CIII' Doc/rille. 1945- 1980 (Boulder. Colo.:
WcslvicwPrcss. 1980), PI). 11 5- 16.
3 f' M 100- 5, Opel"(/Ii()ll.l", 1976, pp. 1- 1- 5; Kevin P. Sheehan, " Preparing for an [Illilginary
War: E;I{amining Peaceti me FunClions and Changes of AmlY Doctrine," Ph. D. thesis, Harvard
Unil'crsil Y. 1988, pp. 75- 76: U.S. TRADOC. "Annual 1-lislOric,11 Review, FY 1976," pp. 38-47;
Memo, CG, TRADOC, unoalt:d, sub: Outline Concept Paper Division Rcslnlcluring Study (DRS)
ATCG R. TRADOC. Exccutive Summa ry: dmn, Phase I: Division Reslmeltlring Study (DRS). 20
D<x: 76. bot h DRS file, DAMI-I-IIS0; John W, Foss, Donald S. Pih]. and Thomas E. Fitzgcrold,
"The Division Rcstructuring Stud y: Thc 1lcavy Division," Milit(lry R CI 'jew 57 (Mar 1977): I 1- 2 1.
4 Ltr, DCSOPS to TRADOC, 2 1 Mar 75, no subject, DR S file; Foss et aI. , "The Hcavy
Division," I)P. 11- 21: TRADOC, E:'Iccutivc Summary. DRS.
S TRADOC, E:'Iccutivc SlIIllIl1<uy, DRS.
6 Ibid.; Foss ct al., "The I !cavy Di vis ion," PI'. 11 - 2 1.
7 Foss ct al.. "Thc !Ieavy Division," PI). 11- 2 1.
II TRADOC, E:'Iecu t ive Summary, DRS ; John I'. Finncgan. "Mili tary Intclligenee. An
Ovcrview, 1885- 1987:' Ms, 1988, pp. 20 5- 0 7, DAMH II S0. Also sec TRADOC. "Annual
lIistorieal Review, FY 1977 ," I>P. 170- 73 for a discussion of thc lIew di vis ion.
9 Llr. CG. III Corps and Fort Hood. to FORSCOM . 16 Aug 79, sub: Letter of Transmittal
DRS Report.Phase Ill. and DRS. Urigadc Evaluation, 2d Ildc. 1st Cav Div. Phase III Final Report.
\'01. 1.3 1 Aug 79, both DRS filc.
to FORSCOM, "Anl1ual ll istorieal Revicw, I Oct 1977- 30 Scp 1978," pp. 155-56, and I Oct
1978- 30 Sep 1979, pp. 16 1- 66: John L. Romju c. A HisfQlJ' of Arll/)' 86, vol. I, Divisioll 86: Thc
f)cI'c/opmellt of tile Hem'), Oi,,;s;/II/ (Fort Monroe, Va.: U.S. Army Training and Doctr inc
Command, 1982). pp. 42- 48; Changc 2, TOE 6- 3001-1 . Armored Division or Infantry Divis ion
(Mec haniZed) Artillery. 1976: TOE 6- 30711, Target Acquisition Battery, Airborne, Armored.
InrMl1 ry, and Mechanized l.. rantTY Div isiou, 1976; TOE J - 87 H, Nuclear. Biological. Chemic,,1
Ocfense Compan y. 1977: OPS 28. Dir, Foree Management, DCSOI'S, to DCSOI'S, 18 Apr 79, su b:
C BR JA Teams, DAMOR DI'. Chemica l General file, DAMII HSO; TOE 1785 H, Combat
Av iation Battalion, Armored or Meehanizcd Infantry Division. 1977; TOE 34- 1651-1, Combat
Elcetroni e Warfare Intelligence Ilattal ion, 1979: TOE 7- 1071-1. Antiarmor Com pan y. 1977: sec
aut hor's notes for implementation date, Di" Rcorgan; 7..,I;on 1976- 1980, DAMH HSO.
II iJeplIrtlllcllt of thc Arlll)' NisfOl'iclil SIIII/I11(// )'. FY 79, p. 13: I>() 64- 7, FORSCOM , 1978,
24th Inf Div file, LtT, NOB to AG, Kentucky. 30 Sep 80, sub: Reorganization of KY ARNG Uni ts,
NG BA ROO 207- 02, No. 195- 80, Kentuck y NG file, Ltr, NGUto AG, Texas, I Apr 80, sub:
Reorga nization of Texas ARNG Units, NGBAROO 207- 02, No. 7 1- 80, Texas NG file. nil
OAMI I I-ISO: John L. Romju e, A I-liSfOl')' of A 1'11/)' 86, vol. II, Thc f)(:I'C/OPIII CIII ofthc Light
f)i1isioll. the COIPS. all(1 Echelons aluJI'c Corps ( Fort Monroe, Vlt.: U.S. Army T r"inin g and
Doc trine COlllmand. 1982), p. 25.
t2 Romjue, Thc HI'(lIIY DiI'ision, p. II.
Il Ibid., pp. 11 - 16: iJep<lr/IllCIII of the Arlll)' Historic,,/ SIIIIIIII(II),. FY 79, p. 18: C lyde J. Tatc
lmd L. D. 1I0ider, "New Doc trine ror the Ocrense," .Hilitm)' Rel'iew 59 (Ma r 1981): 2- 9; Donn A.
Swrry, "Extend ing the Ball ie field," MilitlllJ' Rel'iew 59 (Mar 198 1): 3 1- 50; FM 100- 5, Opcmt;QI/.f,
1982. pp. 2- 1- 10: John L. Romjue. FI'OIII Actil'e f)(,fellse to Ai,.LiIIlfl HallIe: The f)el'C!oplIIl'lIt of
Anll)' /)(x'trille /973- 1981 (Fort Monroe. Va.: U.S. Anny Training and Doctrine Command. 1984),
PI'. 51 73.
t4 LuAnnc K. Leven and l3e njnmin F. Schemmer. "AFJ Interview: 'Now everybody can shoot
nt mc,'" Armed Forcc.\' JOl/l'lIalllltel'lwtimwl (Mar 1980): 46: Romjue, TIle Hem,)' f)h 'isioll, pp.
42-46,48-49, Ill. 128. Betwee n pages 50 and I JO of this work is a detnil ed disc ussion of the evo
u.s.
A NEW ASSESSMENT
409
IUlion of Division-86.
IS "'eyer, Chief o/Slaff. p. 55; Romjuc. The /-Iem'Y D;I-;:";Oll, I). 112.
16 Romjuc, The /-Iem'Y DiI'isioll. I'p. 8 1- 85, 89: Paul A. Uigclman, "Force Designs for the
Future," Anll)' 31 (Jun 198 t): 22- 33.
17 Romjuc. rhe l-/em')I Dil'i~'iOIl, pp. II ), 116.
18Ibid.,p(l.115,117.
19 Ibid .. pp. 119- 20.
20 TOE 87. Heavy Division, 1982. and associated TOEs. The Ml tank was named the
"Abrams" in memory ofOcncrnl Creighton Abr.uns, Chief of Staff, who died in office in J 974.
21 TOE 87, to/cavy Division, 1982, and associated TOEs.
22 John L. Romjue. The Ugh' Dil'isiQII, pp. 17- 24: U.S. Amly TRADOC. "Annual Command
History. I Oct 82-30 Sep 83," Pil. 2%- 302: USA REUR , "Historical Review, I J:1I1 82- 3 1 Dec 83,"
PI),20- 22.
21 Romjuc, The Ugh' f)il'i.~;OIl, p. 17; John L. Romjue, The Arlll)' of E.I'ce ffellce: The
DewdoplllclIl oflhc 1980$ Army (Fort Monroe, Va.: U.S. Artny Tr:lining and Doctrine Command,
1993), pp.20- 21: John A. Wickham. Jr., Collecled Works of I/Ie n,;nielli Chief of Siaff. UII;feI/
Sillies Am,)' (n.p., 1987), pp. 157- 60.217 18; PO 58- 5. USAREUR and Seventh Army, 1983,4th
lldc, 4th InfDiv, file. OAMH-H SO.
24 Meyer. ChicfofSlaJJ; p. 174
2S The 1st SI>ccial Forces regiment under CARS was considered a pan ofinr.mtry, but in 1983
they were made a separate ann.
26 AR 600--82. The Us. Anl/)' Rl.'g;melllal Syslcm 1986; Llr. ODCSOPS to TAG and other
addresses. 8 Feb 83, sub: Regimental Implementation Plan-Initial Regiments, DAMO-ODO, and
Memo ror Record. DCSPER, Chief. New Manning System Division, 29 Mar 85, sub: CSA
Guidance on U.S. Artny Regimental SystemICOHORT, DAPEPSll. USARS file. both DAMl1IISO.
21 ROllljue. The Lighl Dil';s;on, I)P. 25- 27; Joseph R. Bo ngiovi. " I Corps: Light Infantry
Dillision," Ms, p. 8, DAMII-I-ISR.
211 Romjuc, 71,e Lighl Dil'i.l'irlll, pp. 26- 55.
29 Stephen L. Bowman, John M. Kendall, and Jmnes L. Saunders. MO/lwizcfl Experiellce aflhe
91h "!frlllll)' Di",'~'ion (Fort Lewis, Wash.: n. p., 1989), I'p. 8- 13, 30- 41; FORSCOM. "Annual
History Review, FY 1982,"I)P. 175- 76: Glen R. Hawkins, Us. Anny Force S/I'IICII/re wul Fon'c
Desigll Inilialil'C. 1939-1989 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Amly Center of Military Ilistory, undaced),
PI'. 76- 78.
30 Wickham, "White Paper 1984. Light Infantry Division." COflet'/el/IVO/ks. pp. 3 11 - 12:
TRADOC, " Historical Review, 1 Oct 83 to 31 Dec 86," 1'. 108; FORSCOM. "Annual Historical
Review, I Oct 83- 30 Scp84." p. 178.
31 FM 100- 5, Opel'fl/ions, 1986, p. 185.
32 The tCrtll "Art11y of Excellence" npl>cars to have been an outgrowth of the ArtllY'S lheme,
"Excellencc." for 1983. All briefing slides l)reparcd by the U.S. Army Combincd Arms Combal
Dellelolllllent AClillity al ForI Leallenworlh, Kansas, had the logo "Army of Excellence," which
was adopted for the new organi1.a1ional initiali... c.
J) John L. Romjue. Tile Army of .rce flellce, pp. 46-47. 52: TOE 77, lnfam ry Oillision. 1984,
and associated tablcs.
l4 Vclocci, "The New Ligh t Di llision, Will it Work,!,' "I/ml/ly 74 (Jan- Fcb 1984): 56- 60;
Jamcs J. Lindsey, "The Inr.,ntry Dillision (Light)," II/fmlll)' 74 (Jan- Feb 1984): 2- 3 and (Mar- Apr
1984): 14- 16.
3S Dallid H. Petraeus. "Light lnfamry in Europe: Strategic Flexibi lilY and COllllentiona l
Deterrence." ,Hi/iu,,)' Rel';cw 64 (Dec 1984): 35- 53.
36 1JelX/rImCIII oflhe Arm)' /Iislorie(d SIIII//11(//)'. FY 1985, PI'. 59 60; TRADOC. "Historical
Rell;ew, I Oct 83- 31 Dec 86," pp. 11 3- 14; Wickham, "White Pape r 1984, Light Infantry
Dillisiolls." Although the 10th Moul11ain Dil'ision was ligll1 infantry, the Secre1llry of AmlY, John
O. Marsh. decided to usc the designation that the unil foughl under during World War II .
410
J7 Llr, NOB to AG, Kans.1S, 9 May 84, sub: Reorgani7.ation of KS ARNG Unit, 9 MOly 84.
NOO-A RO-O 207- 2, No. 13- 84. LIT. NO B to AG. Kansas. 23 Aug 85. sub: Organiz.1Iion of 35th
Infant ry Division Units in Kansas. NOB-A RD-O No. 73- 85. Llr. NOB to AG. Kentuck y. 14 SCI'
85, sub: Organization of units of the 35th Infantry Division (Mcch) and Rcorgn ni zl1l iou and
Consolidat ion or Co I), 20 1s1 Engineer Bn in Kentllcky, NGI3-AI{O-O No. 72- 85, Llr. NO B to
AG, Misso uri , 14 Jun 85, sub: Organization of 351h Inr;1I11fy Division (Mechanized) uni ts in
Missouri, NGB-ARO-O No. 70 85, LIT, NOB to AG. Nebraska, 27 Scp 85, sub: Organinllion of
IInits of the 35th Infantry Division (Mcch) and JOSth Person nel Service Co in Nebraska. NOBARO-O No. 71 - 85. Llr, NG B 10 AG, Colorndo, 27 Scp 85, su b: Organi7.alion of units of the 351h
A"ialion Battalion and Del I, 2 11 31h Trnns Co in Colorndo, NGO-ARO-O No. 69- 85, Memo of
Understanding between Adjutants Gencrnl of Colorndo, Kallsas, Kentucky, Missouri, Ncbrnska,
and the Ch ief. National Guard Bureau, 6 Dec 83. sub: Command and Control 35th Infanlry
Division (Mechanized). al1351h InfDiv lile, OAMH-HSO.
311 Wickham, "While I'a pcr 1984, Lighl Infantry Oi\' isiolls": Depflrlmelll oflhe Arm)'
Ilis/oric(I/ SIIIIIIIIW)'. Fiscli/ I'em' /9l'f6, pp. 65--66; Romjue, The Arm)' of Excel/ellce, pp. 62- 65:
Activalion Ceremony 10th Mountain Division ( Li ght Infantry) 13 Feb 1985. 10th Mountain
Division file, DAMH-HSO; Bulletin oflhe Chief. AmlY Reserve. CAlrNOTES. Sep- Oet 1985.
39 Lt r, NGB to AGs Maryland and Virginia, 30 SCI) 85, sub: Organi zation oflhe 29th Infillllry
Division ( Light). NG B-A RO-FD-207- 02, No. 125- 85, 29th InfDi v file, DAM H-HSO.
010 Com bined Arms Combat Development Agency (CACDA), Ughl IlIflll1tlY Dil'isioll: Hie
Arm)' 0/ Ercel/ellce: Film/ R('pon, I Oct 1984, ch. 9. pp. 1- 7: I'OR$COM, "Annual Historical
Rcvicw, 1983- 1984:' p. 182: TOE 57L. Airborne Division. 1985.lmd associaled tables, publislu:d
I April 1987. Earlier versions of TOE omilled thc chemical company and con tained a smaller avialion brigade ::Ind a military intclligence OOllalion.
01. CACDA, LightlllflmllY IJil'isioll. ch. 9, pp. 1- 7: FORSCOM, "Annual Hislorieal Review.
1983- 1984.'" p. 182; TOE 57L, Airbonlc Division, 1985, and associated tabl es; IJepllrtlllcllt o/tlte
Anll)' /1istQricol SIIIIIIII(II)', Fi.\c(I/I'ew 11)87, I'. 30: PO 88- 19, FO I~SCOM, 1987, 4071h Supt Bn
file ,DAM Il-HSO.
42 CACDA, Ughtll/jill/II)' Dil-i.violl, ell. 9. pp. 1- 7; TOE 67L, Airborne Division, 1986, and
associaled tables.
013 Departlllellt of Ihe Arm)' /-lis/orico/ SI/II/II/(//)', Fisc(II Yew' 1986. p. 66: TOE 1- 200L.
Division Aviation Brigade (AASL T), I October 1990; l sl- 8lh Battalions, 10 1st Av iat ion, ass igned
to the di vis ion in September-October 1987, sec 10Isi Aviation file. DAM II-IISO.
44 Romjuc. Tlte Arll/)' 0/ ExcellellCt!. pp. 74- 76: Bowman et aI., Mmori:t.'11 '\1Je1'icllce of lite 9th
"tfimtl)' Dill.fioll. pp. 38-44. 285 86: TRADOC. "Historical Review. I Oct 83- 31 Dec 86:' JlP. 115:
FORSCOM, "Annual 11istOficai Rcview, FV 88," p. 4-3; FORSCOM, "Anllua] llistorical Revicw,
FV 89:' p. IV- 27: PO 56-19, FORSCOM, 1988; The lsi Battalion, 803d AmlOr, which earlier had
been designated as a round-olll unit to the division, was m::ldc an clement of the 8 1st Int:1ntry Brigade
at Ihis time. Reserve Components Troop Basis of Ihe AmlY. Anne:rt I, Anny National Gua rd Unit
Program, 31 March 1989, pI. Ill. pp. 16 17; TOE 7- 95L, Infant ry Bal1a]ion (CAB-L!), 1987.
015 TRADOC, " Historical Review, l OcI 83- 3 1 Dec 86:' p. 114; 1'0 100- 2, Eighth Army,
1990, 2d Bn, 503d Inf, file, DAM H-HSO.
46 L1r, NOB 10 AG, Te:rtas. 28 May 88. sub: Reorgani za tion of Te:rtas ARNO Uni ts. NO BA RO F 31 0-4ge, 50th Armd Di v filc. DAMII-IISO; Amlllal Rel'iew 0/ lite C/tilf. Natiol/al Gluml
8111"('(111. 1985, p. 26: Reserve Components Troops Basis of the AntlY, Annex 1, Anny Na tiollal
Guard Unit Program, 30 Sep 1989, pp. 11 1- 5- 15, 111--6 1-66.
017 Romjue. Arm)' of .rcl'l/ellce, PI). 79- 80; Rcserve Componen ts Troops Basis of the Anny.
An nex l. Anny Na tional Guard Unit Program. 30 Sep 1989: Memo. Cc ntral SeeurilY Service for
Sec of Def. 29 Feb 88, sub: Signal IlItclligenee Capabi lity for Anny National Guard Units. and
Memo. Office Sec of Oer for Dir Cenlral Security Serv ice, 26 Apr 88. no su bject, 629th MI fil e.
DAM II-HSO; PO 66-5 and 66- 12. First U.S. Anny, 1986. 126lh and 128th M[ Un files , PO 69-4
ll1ld 82- 8, Fourth U.S. Army. 1986. 147th and 1381h MI Bn file s, Ilnd 1'0 24- 1, First U.S. Anny.
1987. 542d Mll1n file. all DAM H- HSO.
A NEW ASSESSMENT
4 11
48 TOE 63- IOOL. Support Command {-Icavy Oi \'ision, 1986. and assoc iated tables; TOE
6- 300L, Division Artillery, {'!cavy Division, 1986. and associated tables: The institute of Land
Warfare, AUSA. " Di\'isions of the Uni ted Stales Army," I Oct 1989; "Air Defense Artillery
MOderniza tion," Nmiolllli Gill/ttl 63 (Jan 1989): 101.
49 TOE 87- IOOL, I-Icav), Scpamlc Brig(lde. 1986. and associated \;tblcs.
50 Llr, NCB 10 AG. New York, I Oc t 85, sub: Reurgani za tion of 27th Inf Odc, NGIl-AROFD, 141 - 85, 27th Inf Bdc file , DAMIIHSO: Reserve Components Troop Basis of the Army,
Annex I, AmI)' Nati onal Guard Unit Program. 30 Sep 1989, Anllex II, US Army Reserve Unit
Alloca tion, 1989, pp. 29- 30.
51 FORSCOM, "Annu"l Hi stori cal Review, I Oct 84- 30 Sep 85:' p. 141 ; PO 132- 5,
FORSCOM, 1983, 197th Inf Bde file, PO 132--4, FORSCOM, 1983, 194th Amid Bdc file, and Ltr.
CG, Ilcrlin Brigade to CinC, USAREUR, 4 Jan 80, sub: Concept Plan for Reorganization of the
Berlin Brigade, AEBA-GA-M. PO 59- 6. USAREU R and Seventh Ann)" 1982. Berlin Brigade file,
all OAMII-HSO. From 1961 to 1983 Ihe Berlin I3rigade had been orgnnized under n lable of distri
bution and allowance, which did not provide ndequnte resources 10 COl1lllllmd nnd conlrol its fire
support and service support units.
S2 1'073- 2, Fifth U.S. Ann)" 1985, 402d Brigade (Training) file; Infonnall0n Paper, 24 Ma)'
83, sub: Training Organizlllion Structurc, FORSCOM , DCofS Operations, Force Structu re and
Stationing Divisioll, Rcserve (AFOP-FS R), Ltf, 1'0RSCOM 10 Ch, Ann)' Rescrve, 7 Nov 1986,
sub: Reorgani7..1tion o f USA R Tl";linilig Division, AFOP-I'S R, Ur, TAG to CG, FORSCOM, II
1)(:(; 86, same subject, Ch, Ann)' Reserve, Force Mobilization and Illans (DAAR-FMP). Division
General file, DAMH-IISO; September 1988 reorganization of training divisions and brigades based
on POs from First. Second, Fourth, Fifth. and Si:'lth Amlies. 1988- 1990 PO file. DAMII HSO.
53 PO 56- 10, FORSCOM, 1988, 2d Bde, 9th Inf Div file, PO 78 10, FORSCOM, 1989, 2d
Bd e, 4th fnf Di v file, Llr, NGIl to AGs, Idaho, Oregon, and Nevada, 18 Aug 88, sub:
Rcorganizalion of Idaho. Oregon, and Nevadll ARNG Units, NGB-AROF, 310--4ge, No. 183- 88,
I 16th Cav Ode fil e. UT. AG Monta na, Wyoming, 25 Aug 88. sub: Rcorgnnization of Montana and
Wyoming ARNG Uni ts, NGB-ARO-F 3 10--49c, No. 189- 88, 163d Cnv Bde file, all DAMH-USO.
Under the fixed cor]JS concel)! outl ined in I'M 100- 5, Operations, 1986, the AmlY maintained the I,
III , V, and VI I Corps and Ihe XV III Airbome Corps, which required five armored cavalry regi.
ments. The Regular Anll)' fielded three and Ihe Anny National GU:lrd four, for a tolal of seven
armored cavalry regiments. With Ihe reduced requirement, the Guard convcl1ed two of its regiments to brigades.
CHAPTER 15
Conclusion
flllla), be ,akelt (M' ({II axiolllllial the org{lIIizalio ll oJ lIllil~' comprising armies should
be adapted /0 fhe ferraill ... 'he probable ,hcaler oj II 'a/" ((lid /0 fhe c/wl"{lclerislics of Ihe
enemies to be encoul/tered
Maj. Nathan iel F. McClurel
In 191 2 Maj. (Ialcr Brig. Gen.) Nat haniel F. McCl ure, a future instructor in
military art at the Serv ice School s at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, li sted terrain ,
theater of war, and the enemy as issues that planners should consider in developing mili tary organizations. These ideas h"d particular appl ication to di visions and
separate combined arms brigades, and over the last eighty-odd years have been
ex pressed in va rious ways. Yet other fa ctors have 'll so had significant im pact on
military organ izations. The rapid evolution of military technology is perhaps the
most obv iolls. Ot hers include the manner in which the nation has raised its mi litary manpower- a comb ination of active, reserve, and expansion components;
the aptitude of that manpower to harness the new technology; and the political
and economic constraints that create the environmental parameters with in which
mili tary structu res must operate. This study has attempted to show the infl uence
of these broad and interrelated factors on the chang ing organi zation of the Army's
large, combined arms tactical units.
Prior to the twentieth ccntury the Anny did not lise one specific command level
at which to organizc infantry, artillcry, and caval ry units into combi ned arms teams.
Brigades and divisions often comprised a single arm, while the army corps was the
combi ned arms unit, with its size vary ing g reatly according to the mission and the
forces available. Renecting the Army of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, little speciali zation existed withi n the Army's corps, divisions, and brigades beyond
the traditional combat arms. Fi eld units for signal, medical , transportation, military
police, ordnance, and other supporti ng branches simply did not exist. Often civilians were hi red to undertake those dUlies, sold iers were detailed from the combat
regi ments to perform them, or entire regiments were reorganized for new missions,
such as infantry units' service as engi neers duri ng the Civil War.
By the beginning of the twent ieth century, tcchnological developments, primarily in the range and lethality of weapons, greatly expanded the size of the bat I McClure, 'The In f,1ntry Division and lis COmposilion: p. 8
414
MANEUVE R AN D FI REPOWER
tlefield, making the coordinat ion of fire and maneuver exceed ingly complex. To
simplify and regularize that coordinat ion , the Army organized its fi eld units into
permanent combined arlns teams, termed divisions, capablc of independent operations. Included in Stich organization, in increasi ngly larger numbers, were combat su pport and combat serv ice support units that co ntributed to the combat
power and self-sufficiency of lite division on both the battle field and the traini ng
ground. The organization of permanent divisions, with their fixed requirements
for personnel and equ ipment, training, and research and development, also g reatly facilitated the expansion ort he Army upon the outbreak of war.
From the turn of the century until American intervention in World War I, the
Army defended the nation and its modest insular possessions with what was basica lly a constabula ry force. To some limited extent the Army tested the infan try
d ivision as a basic combined arms uni t in field exercises or maneuvers. The cavalry div ision, although not totally neglected, remained more or less a theoretical
orga n izatio n. In 1916 and 191 7, when the A rmy pursued bandit s al o ng the
Mexican border, a provis ional division was organized. Heavy in cavalry and light
in infantry, it was tai lored to meet an elusive, mobi le enemy.
Mobil ization for the cri sis on the border and observation of trends in foreign
arm ies d uring the initial campaigns of World War I caused na tiona l leaders to
become increasingly concerned about the need to create permanent tactical divisions. Congress approved their organization in 1916, but the Army en tered World
War I before any such units had been organized, and the ensuing mobilization and
battlefield experiences witnessed constant cha nges in both their theoretical (i.e. ,
authorized) and their actual composition.
The Army created the square infantry di vision during World War I in response
to the German usc of entrenched posi tions that blocked flankin g movements. The
d ivision was designed to punch through the enemy's posi tion using oven vhcl ming
manpower and tremendous firepower. Strong in staying power. the di vision lacked
the mobi lity and fl ex ibility to conduct highly mobile operations. But the nature of
the war also pUI a premium on coordination between the combat arms and combat
support organ izations within the infantry division. Not infantry and not artillery but
coordi nation o f all Ihe branches held the key to success. Infantry could not move
fonvard without engi neers and artillery; artillery cou ld not provide adequate fire
support wi thout a constant supply of ammunition; quartermaster troops supplied
food and clot hing; signalmen served as the link between the arm s and support
units; and medi cal personnel cared for casua lties of all types. This complex combined arms interact ion, or synerb'Y, became both necessary and possible because of
advances in weapons, communications, and transportation .
World Wa r I pose d probl e ms that military plan ners wo ul d face for th e
remainder of the cent ury. They had to ba lance military requ irements against those
of the horne front , which provided the materie l for war. Mobilization for total war
theoretically demanded the maximum amount of the nation's best manpower for
ils military forces, but without the civilian manpower to provide the logistica l
CONCLUSION
415
base for Ihal force, it wou ld soon collapse of its own weight. A re lated question
concerned the size and readiness of the peacetime active and reserve forces ,
which innucnced the preparation for a swift industrial and manpower mobilization without bankrupting the nation. Military planners in the United States also
had to confront the problem in the twent ieth century of how best to deploy their
military forces abroad in the face of limited means, because the number of ships
ava il able for what was termed "strategic mobil ity" would always constrain the
speed wit h which the Army could bring its major combat organizations to bear on
far-away battlefields.
Although memories of the Army's helter-skelter mobilization during World
War I cast a long shadow over the interwar period, 1919- 39, isolationist sentiment caused a certain mala ise in organizational development. Nevertheless, Army
leaders recognized that infantry and cava lry divisions, rathcr than regiments or
smaller units, had become the pillars that supported a future mobi li zat ion.
Officers examined the structure of various types of divisions , and the Army
adopted in the post- World War I era a modified but powerful square infantry
d iv ision designed for a straight forwa rd frontal attack, and a smaller cavalry division for recon na issance. Alt hough the lessons of World War I influenced the
structure of these divisions, the traditional nineteen th cen tury criterion of d istance or road space still dom inated their design.
Once permanent divisions were establishe(~ any reorganization of them was
controversial. Because no foreign threat or opponent could be identified, divisions were initially designed to fi ght on the North American continent, and their
organizations stressed firepower over mobility. And once that organizational
structure bceame embedded in both the Regular Army and the reserve com ponents, it became exccedingly difficult to alter it in any substanti al way. Although
many Army leaders viewed the situation with increasing mi sgivi ngs, major
changes ultimately depended on changes in the political climate of the nation.
Before any major reorganization of its divisions could be effected, the Army
needed more specific gu idance from its political leaders rega rding futu re mi ssions and the availabi lity of COlllmensurate resources.
From the fall of 1937 to the su mmer of 1943 the Army slowly fashioned the
divisional designs it used to fi ght World War II. Not only revised infantry and
cavalry divisions, but also armored, motorized divisions and airborne divis ions
appeared. T he concept of having t hree reg imental combat tcams w ithin the
infantry and ai rborne div isions a lso solid ified. Other trends in c luded steady
increases in firepowe r- with mobility or maneuvering capabili ty, always trying
to catch ul>-and the increasing standardization of div ision base clements. In the
entire process, the horse cava lry and motorized d ivisions di ed, while the armored
division, designed initially as a two-clement organization, was often comm itted
on the battlefield as small task forces.
One princ iple holds that military units shou ld be organized to counter the
characte ristics of the enemy they ex pect to face on the battlefield, whcther
4 16
German foot-soldiers or tanks, Ph ilippine or Vict Cong guerri lla s, or an army

equ ipped with chemical and nuclea r weapons. Such problems inevitably brought
soldiers from the theoret ical realm orthe schoolhouse into conflict with those living in the reali ty of the army in the rield. Doctrine, which dictated how units
should be organized, fell within the domain of the service schools, while employment of the units rested wit h field commanders. To both, such seemingly esoteric
matters as the best span of control, the number of command echelons, the composition of the siaff, the balance between infantry and artillery, the location of the
reconnaissance clement, the role of engineers, and the organ ization of the supply
system were recurring subjects of exploration and argument in designing divisions and separate brigades. No final determination emerged as to whether the
schools or the field commands should perform organi zational studies, but one
aspect of the Army's experience became clear. The Army cou ld not solve all its
organizational issues in a single study. The quest ions were- and still arc- too
enormous and com plex for one group of plan ners to address. The reorganizat ion
study of 1936, PENTANA 1955, and MOMAR 1959 all failed because the issues
they addressed were too broad and varied . After the Army came to terms with its
div isional echelon, as in the triangu lar, ROAD flexible response, and Army of
Excellence st udies, the remainder of the force somehow fe ll into place.
Ult imately nothing infl uenced Army pla nners in thei r search for the ri gh t
combined arms units more tha n the desire to ensure mobility and maneuverabil ity
on the battlefield. The disappearance of operational flcx ibility on the Western
Front in World War I convi nced many officers that the rcsulting stalemate had
caused unacceptable losses in men and equipment for both the victors and the
vanquished. The square d ivision was adopted for the peacetime Army because
Army leaders relied upon their World War I experience and believed that the unit
coul d be adapted to maneuver and mobility.
The evolution of technology eventua lly brought aboltt more mobile and flexible forces, which included various types of infantry divisions (airborne, airmobi le, light , and motori zed), the replacement of obsolete horse cavalry divisions
with armored and mechanized uni ts, and the introduction of separate combined
arms brigades. Infantry divisions dominated World War II , due primarily to the
influence of such Icaders as Chief of Sta ff General George C. Marsha ll and Lt.
Gcn. Lesley J. McNair, the chief of Army Ground Forces, who believed that it
was vita l to standardi ze, at least for the moment, the size and structure of the
fiel d army to ass ist in both manpower and materiel mobilization plann ing.
However, in the postwar era the regular "fool" or " leg" infant ry di vision was
slow ly replaced by variotls types of armored, mechanized, airborne, and airmobile
orga ni zat ions developed to serve spec ial needs. Tanks stopped tanks; airborne
troops intimidated and threw the enemy's rear area into disarray; and helicopters
inserted and ex tracted units with precision on the battlefield . Given the specialization of div ision and brigade forces , planners had to decide how many of each
type the Army needed and how many it could afford. Since each specialized unit
CONCLU SION
41 7
crea ted difTerent requi re ments for equipment and training, advocates of stich
organ izat io ns were pitted against those who favored more universal formations
that performed a variety of mi ssions. As always, permancn t solutions proved elusive, and planners cont inued to balance the number and type of divisions and separate brigades required to meet Ihreats, both real and perceived . By the 1990s the
trend was toward two types of divisions and bri gades, light and heavy. but within
those two Iypes were variations that allowed the Army to build tailored forces for
specific missions with armored, infantry, mechanized in fantry, li ght infantry, ai rborne, and air assault units.
New weapons often presen ted probl e ms for planners o f divisions and
brigades. First, they had to decide the level at which a weapon belonged- army,
corps, division, or brigade- and where it fit w ithin the chose n organization.
Examples of this dil emma were the tank and machine gu n in World War I, the
tank destroyer in World War II , the Honest John rocket in the atomic fie ld army
and pentomi c divisions, and the TOW in the Army of Excellence . This recurring
problem also mani fested itse lf in the conni ct between centrali zation and decentralization o f reso urces . Whe n introduced into a division, new weapons we re
often put under centralized contro l, usually in a battalion or cOlllpany-size unit,
and attached to the user only when needed. Si nce such practices violated the principle of command and cont ro l, eventually new weapons were reassigned to the
primary user. Certain divisional items, however, were better used under central ized con trol. Aircraft, for example, which used a COlllmon airfield and required
sophist icated maintenance, sti ll require centralized organizatio n.
As wcapons evo lved, dispe rsion wit hin and between units o n the battlefield
became more necessary, espec ially as more lethal weapons, incl uding those with
nuclear warheads, became avai labl e. The probl em within the division was how to
separate divisional e lements physica lly yet maintain effective command and contro l over them. Improved communi cation systems and the use of airplanes and
he licopters aidcd such di spersion , but the need fo r the division to operate in a
widely dispersed nuclear environment fortunately h<ls never arisen.
Pcrhaps it is endemic to a democracy that in peacetime its army suffers from
neglect. The econom ic and finan cia l wherewithal for personnel, equipment, training, research , and development are ofte n availabl e on ly when a th rea t to the
nation's security is readily apparent. The Army's divisions, separate brigades, and
other units in peacetime were seldom fully manned and trained and at times were
on ly paper organizations. This neglect manifested the Amc ri c an people's
ingrained d isdain for standing armies, which dated from the beginning of the
Il<ltion. After Worl d War II , althoug h begrudging ly, the nation improved the
Army's susta ining base, which lessened the time reqll ircd fo r mobilization.
Neve rth eless, during the fort y yea rs of the Cold War many units, parti cularly
those ill the reserve com ponents, were only marg inally ready for combat.
After World Wars I and II and thc Korean War, the Anny's di visional forces, as
well as the Army itself, were devastated by a tidal wave of turbulence caused by
418
dcmohiliZ<'ltion, or force reduction. Following each period the Army struggled to

rebuild and maintain a mobilization force of standing and reserve forces before the
next crisis struck. On each occasion military planners designed a mobilization force
requi ring morc divisions and brigades than the nation needed or was willing to SllP~
porI. Also, political pressure, particu larly from the reserve components, often influenced the size of that force more than defense requ irements. The result was what
many called a "hollow army," with some units deteriorating into paper organizati ons, some serving as training units, and others lacking so much of their personnel
and equipment that they had little ability to conduct either combat or training.
Following major con fli cts the poor manning and eq uipping levels that characterized most Army units resulted partly from a lack of resources and partly
from unreasonable expectations. Obv ioll sly, funding limited the number of sold iers, bot h officers and en li sted personne l, in the Regu lar Army and the reserve
components. In the Organized Reserves, between 1921 and 1948 no system was
even ava ilable to recruit untrai ned e nlisted personnel; Congress simp ly expected that reserve enlisted personnel would be unpaid volunteers with prior service. Few former enl isted pe rson ne l, however, volunteered to se rve in th e
Organized Rese rve, and reserve officers came into the A rmy th rough the
Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). Alt hough Cong ress funded officers
and enlisted men in both reserve compo nents after World War II , interest in
serving as reservists lagged. Between the end of World War II and the ea rly
1970s, when conscripti on was e liminated, the d raft served as a stimulus fo r
serving in the reserves . With the eliminati o n of the draft, recruitm ent in the
reserves suffered fur ther, and the ir division and separate brigade forces underwent an almost conti nuous series of realignments.
Tim e and agai n after the disappeara nce of any immediate threat Congress
or thc administration cut the Army 's fundi ng d rastically. At times money was
available only to p rovide ske lc ta l uni ts in the Regula r Army. Th ese unit s
manned ga rri sons, su pported limited reserve training, and provided the overhead to opcrate the Army. Few men were availablc fo r combat units or for occupation forces overseas. Scattercd throughout the nat ion on small posts o r scrving overseas, the Army o ft cn had neither the moncy nor the opportunity fo r
combined arms training. Under the "come as you arc, fight as YOll arc" philosophy adopted In thc 1970s, only the Regu lar Army divisions in Europe were
maintaincd at ful l strength. Regular Army divis ions in the Unitcd Statcs wcre
rounded oul by reserve units, and the division in Korea relied upon KAT USA ,
or Korean Army person nel.
During periods of scant resources for the defense establi shment, the largcst
share ofthc military budget \Ven t to the other services. Both the Navy and the Air
Force required sophisticated, expensive equipment whose construction a lso provided civilian jobs and valuable investments in advanced technology. The Army,
in contrast, is thc most labor-intensive of the services . To gain support from thc
executive and legis lat ive branches, its leaders lIsed divisional models to justify
419
CONCLUS ION
fu nding requests for the research, development, and production of new equipment
and weapons. Looking at the division as a weapons system rather than merely as
a personnel organ ization has in fact proved lIse ful in conceptuali zing what the
Army needs and what it does for both Congress and the genera l pUblic.
The end of the Cold War has prompted another examination o f divis ions and
bri gades as the Army adapts to new threats and new national missions. Whatever
direction the changes may take, divisions and brigades will be organized for a
parti cu lar mission, against a part icular enemy, at a particular time, and in a particular place. The search for better combined arms units will continue unabated as
new lessons and ex perienccs are weighcd. and the search to integrate new technology into existing organizational concepts will likewise present an ongoing
challenge in the immed iate future.
A Look Forward
In 1990 the U.S. Army began deploy ing major units to Southwest Asia as pari
of a coa lition effort to counter the military aggression of the Iraqi armed forces.
But even before that, maj or c hanges in the Army's organization had begun.
Between 1989 ,md 1991 Ihe Soviet Union collapsed and with it the Communi st
Warsaw Pact all iance system that had posed a major threat to the United Slates
and it's West European NATO all ies for nearly fifty years. In the wake of those
momentous event s, the national leadershi p began to tra nsform the Army from a
"forward-deployed" force to a " power-projection" force based in the United

States, with the wa r in Southwest Asi a the first test of that concept. But at the
same time, the Army assumed a host of major humanita rian and peacekeepi ng
missions that soon took it to new areas of the g lobe, many of which it had never
visited previollsly in any major way. A lthough an objective assessment of these
developments is premature, some brief observations about what happened during
the years between 1990 and 1996 are appropriate.
Even before the successful 100-hour Persian Gulf War in February 1991 ,
Army plans called for a significan t reduction in the number of di visions and
brigades. Without the threat posed by the Sov iet Union, the nation no longer saw
the need to field twenty-eigh t di v isions and twenty-seven combined a rms
brigades. Both po litical pundits and national leaders expected that the American
"victory" in the Co ld War would result in what was termed a "peace dividend,"
allowing the government to sh ift its economic priorities from military readiness
to ot her programs, including the pressing need to reduce the an nual deficit. One
of the first Army units to feel the axe was the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis,
Washi ngton, with one of its two remaining brigades inacti vated in Septem ber
1990, and then the entire division the following year. Wi th what remained, the
Army organi zed the independent 199th Infantry Brigade, but tha t unit would
enjoy only a short existence.
As di visions and brigades returned fro m Southwest As ia in the summer of
199 1, the force underwent furthe r change. Readiness concerns had prevented the
deployment of the National Guard round-alit brigades to the Gulfregion with the
24t h Infantry Division and [st Cava lry Division. Consequently, to fi ll, or round
out , these divisions, the active duty 197th Infantry Brigade from Fort Benning,
Georgia , and I st Brigade, 2d Armored Division, at Fort Hood, Texas, had taken
their place. Now these brigades were inactivated, with the ir personne l and equi p-
422
men I Llsed to organize third maneuver brigades in the 24 th Infantry and 151
Cavalry Divisions. At the same time, the fa ilure to deploy the reserve component
rou nd-oul units set off a debate over the utility of the twenty-year-old concept,
which remained to be settled in 1996.
Meanwhile, U.S . Army, Eu rope, resumed its plans to inactivate two d ivisions
and two brigades and to real ign its two remaining divisions as a pari of the
expected peace dividend. In August 1991 the 1st Infant ry Div ision Forwa rd (a
reinforced brigade) left the active forcc. Five months later the 8th Infantry
Division was inactivated, followed by the 3d Armored Di vision in August 1992
and the 3d Brigade, 2d A rmo red Division (the forward~ d eployed brigade in
Garlstedt, Germa ny), in December of that year. About the same time, Ihe V II
Corps, one of the two corps headquarters in Europe, also was inact ivated, with its
armored cavalry regiment , the 2d A rmored Cavalry, returning to the Un ited
States. The reduction left only the V Corps headquarters in Europe, along with
the 1st Armored Division, the 3d Infantry Di vis ion, and one armored cavalry regiment, the 11 th Armored Cavalry.
Forces in the United States also took their sha re of cuts ill 1992. The 2d
Armored Division, the only armored division continuollsly active si nce the organizat ion of the Armored Force in 1940, was slated for inactivation but, to keep it
on the active rol ls, it replaced the 5th Infantry Div ision, which was scheduled to
move from Fort Polk, Louisiana, to Fort Hood, Texas. In the summer or 1992 the
199th Infantry Brigade was inactivated when the 2d Armored Cavalry moved to
Fort Lewis, Washington. In addition , forces in Korea felt the reduction kni re, wi th
the 2d Infant ry Division fo rced to inactivate one of its brigades. Less tha n two
years after fight ing in Southwest Asia, the Regular Army had thus lost four divisions, one div isional brigade, and two separate brigades.
The precipitolls decl ine in the number of Regu1<lr Army divisions and
brigades continued after 1992, with Congress tentatively setting the st rength of
the active Army at 495 ,000 by end of 1996. In 1994 the 6th and 7t h Infantry
Divisions were inactivated, with one brigade of each div ision remaining active at
Fort Richardson, Alaska, and Fort Lewis, Wash ington, respectively. In Germany
the 2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Div ision , was e liminated, and the 3d Brigade, 1st
Armored Division, the only di visio nal unit to redeploy wit h its personnel and
equipment, moved from Germany to Fort Lewis, Washi ngton . These Cllts reduced
the A rmy 's forward ~de ploye d European maneuver force to the 1st Armored
Div ision and the 3d Infantry Division , both with only two brigades each, and the
11 th Armored Cavalry.
To meet the projected end strength of 495 ,000, political as well as economic
factors had to be considered, and a series of flag and des ignation cha nges began
in 1995. Th ree factors drove the decision of which flags would continue to fly:
the desire to retain historic div isions in the active force; the decision to field all
div isions wi th a full comp lement o f maneuver brigades; and the advantages o f
maintaining a regional distribution of divisional troops in the United Slates. In
A LOOK FORWARD
423
April 1995 the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Di vision, rep laced the 3d Brigade, 1st
Armored Di vision, at Fort Lewis, Wash ington, with the latter's flag movi ng to
Fort Ril ey, Kansas. A lso, the flag of the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Divi sion,
moved to Fort Lewis from Sc hofiel d Barracks, Hawaii , to dislodge th e 1st
Brigade, 7th Infantry. which was inactivated. In November 1995 the 1st Brigade,
6th Infantry Division, in Alaska was associated wi th the 10th Mountain Division
at Fo rt Drum, New York, but without a change in the brigade's designation . The
fo llowing month the 4th Infantry Division (less ils 3d Brigade, which remained at
Fort Carson, Colorado) relocated to Fort I-Iood, Texas, where it replaced the 2d
Armored Division, which was c liminated from the act ive force.
A signifi cant change took p lace in Jan uary 1996, when the 1st Infantry
Div ision (Icss it s 3d Bri gadc) transferred its nags and co lors from Fort Ril ey,
Kansas, to Germany, where it succceded the 3d Infantr y Division ; concurren tly
the 3d Infantr y Division shifted its d ivision and brigade nags and colors to Forts
Stewa rt and Benning, Georg ia, to replace the 24th Infantry Division, which was
inactivated . In order to have three maneuver bri gades in the I st Infantry Division ,
its 3d Brigade, inactivated in 1991 , returned to the active rol ls. Upon com pletion
of the programmed changes the Regular Arrny force had been pared down to 10
div isions- I airborne, 1 air assault , 2 light, and 6 heavy di vision s. Only the 1st
Cava lry Division at Fort Hood, Texas; thc 82d Ai rborne Divi sion at Fort Bragg,
North Ca ro lina ; and th e 10l st Airborne Div ision at Fort Ca mpbell , Kentucky,
were concentrated; all of the others were split bctwcen two or more installations.
T he independent bri gades in the active Army sutTered more severe red uctions. When the 199th Infantry Brigade was inactivated in 1992, only the Berlin
Brigade, the 193d Infantry Brigade, and the 1771h and 194th Armored Brigades
remained in the forc e. For almost fifty years the Army had units stationed in
Bertin, but with the end of the Cold War and the return of the city of Berlin 10 the
German government, the Berlin Brigade fell from the force in the summer of
1994. Nex i to go was the 193d Infantry Brigade, stationed in the Panama Canal
Zone. In anticipation o f the Panamanian government 's taking over complete control of the Cana l Zone in 1999, the 193d Infantry Brigade was inactivated in
1994. T hat same year the 11th Armored Cava lry, which cou ld not be s upported
withi n U.S. Army, Europe, troop strength, returned to the Un ited States. To reta in
it in the force, the chief of staff approved replacing the l77t h Armored Brigade at
the Natio nal Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, wit h the armored caval ry
regiment in October 1994. Red uctions al so required the inact iva tion of the 194th
Armored Brigade at Fort Knox, Kentucky, in 1995, leaving th e Regul ar Army
without any separate combined arms brigades.
T he reserve components also underwcnt turmoi l caused by fo rce reduction. In
1993 the Natio nal Gu a rd lost two d ivisio ns, th e 26th Infantry and the 50t h
Ar mored. Both had been ex periencing rccruitment problems over the past twentyfive years. At the same time, to maintain heavy forces in the Nationa l Guard, the
28th and 42d Infantry Divisions were reorganized as heavy divisions. The 42d, now
424
an armored division, reta ined its tradi tional designation for historical and esprit de
corps reasons. To strengthen the 28th Infantry Division, the 37th Infantry Brigade,
Ohio Nat ional Guard, was reorgan ized as a brigade of that division, but a year laler
the brigade was transferred to the 38th Infantry Division. To make room for the unit
in the 38th, the 76th Brigade, 38th Infantry Division, Indiana National Guard, was
withdrawn from the di vision and reorganized as the 76th Infantry Brigade. T he net
result of these changes was that the National Guard fielded 8 divisions- I light, 2
infantry, 2 armored, and 3 mechanized infantry div isions. At the same time, the
Guard cont inued to field 20 separate combined arms brigades. Although these units
provided the Army with the flexibili ty to ta ilor forces upon mobi lization, planned
reductions would leave only 14 enhanced and 2 theater defense brigades in the
force by 1997 (with an armored cavalry regiment often counted as the National
Guard's fifteenth "enhanced brigade").
Following the "Bottom-Up" review, an assessment of all military requi rements
by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin in 1993, the Army Reserve agreed to g ive up its
combat arm s units and foclls on maintaining combat support and combat service
su pport fo rmations. Conscq uent ly, the Army inactivated the 157t h, 187 th , and
205th Infantry Brigades in 1994. To improve the readiness of the rema ini ng reserve
units prior to mobilization, the U.S. Army Forces Command developed the "exercise division," an organ ization designed to both conduct and assist the trai ning of
Army Reserve combat support and combat service s upport un its. T hrough the use
of simulations and simul ators, the new organization also prov ided exerciscs to
improve unit proficiency and cOl11mand and staff tra in ing. In 1993 the 78th, 85th,
and 91 st Divisions (Tra ining) were reorganized as exercise divisions. At the same
time the 75th and 87th Maneuver Area Commands were discontinucd and the 75 th
and 87th Infantry Divisions reactivated as the 75th and 87th Divisions (Exercise).
In 1996 the fu nctions of training divisions were expanded to include inst itutional as
well as basic and advanced traini ng under the Total Army T raini ng Strategy.
Although the functions of the training div isions were expanded, two unneeded
training brigades and two surplus training divisions were eliminated, leavi ng the
Army Reserve with the 80th, 84th, 95th, 98th, 100th, 104th, and 108th Divisions
(Training). By the l11id-1990s the Army Reserve had no combined arms units, but
fielded five exercise and seven tra ining divisions. In su m , as the Army moved
toward the end of the century, the total force had been pared down to e ightcen
combat divisions (ten Regu lar Army and eigh t National Guard), with plans to
reduce the number of National Guard independen t combined arms brigades from
twenty to six teen. As noted above, the Army Reserve had five exercise and seven
training divisions.
Although the number of divisions and separate brigades decreased rapidly in
the 1990s, the story of the post- Cold War era encompassed more than just tHunbel'S of units. The divisions and separate brigades that remained in the force continued to be constructed from building blocks, a pract ice that provided the flexibility to tailor units for specific missions and for different regions of the world.
A LOOK FORWA RD
425
Such methods a lso made it easier to introduce new technol ogies and new capabil ities into the ex isti ng force organi zation .
Under the Force XXI prog ram , the Army's current effort to guide the modern ization of the Army into the early twenty- fi rsl century, Army leaders wanted even
more fl ex ible divisions rather than more specialized but ri gid ones. In June 1996
General Wi ll iam W. Hartzog, the commander of the U.S. Trai ning and Doctrine
Co rnma n(~ noted that the Army no longer could send only its light units, such as the
10th Mountain Division and the 82d Airborne Division, to every unconventiona l or
low-intensity operation . Elements of th e 82d A irborne Div ision had served in
Pan a ma (Op eration J UST CAUSE ) in [ 98 9 , in S ou th wes t As ia (D ESERT
SI I1 EW/STORM) in 1990 and 199 1, and in south Florida aftcr Hurri cnnc Andrcw in
1992. Elemcnts o f the 10th MOllntain Divi sion had al so served in south Floridn in
1992 nnd deployed to Somalia (Operation RESTORE HOPE) in 1992 and 1993 and to
Hniti (Operation UNIOlD DEMOCRACY) in 1994. Hence forth, like the 1st Armorcd
Div ision in Bosnia (Operalion JOINT ENDEAVOR) in 1995 and 1996, all divisions in
thc force had to be prepnred to undertake humanitnrian and peacekeeping missions.
To meet the need for fut ure contingencies and stil l provide forc es for conventional operations, the Training and Doctrine Command began taki ng a new look
at the Army's heavy d ivision. Previously it had sel the maneuver elemcnt mix fo r
an armo red division at fi ve tank and fo ur mechanized infantry batta lions whi le
reversing those numbers in the meclla nized infant ry division. Proposals in 1996
envisioned e liminating about 3,000 soldie rs from organi zationnl tables o f the
heavy division wh ile increasing the maneuver e lement mix to fi ve tank and fi ve
mechanized infantry battalions. The proj ected change would add abou t 300 dismounted in fant rymen to each mecha nizcd infantry unit , eliminate the an titank
com pany of each infantry battali on , and move suppo rt function s from eac h
infantry battalion to the division s upport battalions. The eng ineer brigade wi th
three engineer batta lion s, whi ch was tcsted in Southwest Asia and added to di visi on s shortly therea ft er, was to lose one battalion , and one of the heavy d ivision 's
two attack aviation batta lions would al so d isappear. In the latter case, planners
expected that new " Long Bow" Apache and Comanche helicopters would provide
greater combat power to makc up for the loss. Also, a newly improved, self-propelled ISS-mill . howit zer, the Paladin, was to be fi e lded in three battcries of six
weapons each, repl ac ing the ex isting batta lions, whi ch had three batteries of eight
pieces eac h of older weapons . T he d ivisiona l target acqui sit ion and multipl elaunch rocket batteries were prog rammed to bc combined in a single artill ery bat ta lion , giving the division greater fl exibil ity in engaging closc- up and d istant targets. In addit ion, the manCllver brigades in the d ivision were g iven increased
scouting capability in the fO l"m o f a reconnaissance troop. Fi nally, the key to thi s
smaller but more deadl y division was to be a dig ital comm uni cati on system, or
what was referred to as dig italization. Us ing new informatio n technology, Army
leaders wanted to provide engaged commanders with immed iate data rcgarding
avai la ble resources and the encmy they fa ce(~ enabling them to bring a wide va ri -
426
ely of forces to bear on the foe as quickly as possible and to sustain them until
final victory. A test oCthe new division was sched ul ed for 1997 .
S ix years aftcr the war in Southwest Asia, many quest ions regarding the
Army's future fo rce structure remain. The failure to implement the round-out
concept during that con nie! is only the first of many. I-I ow well did the Army's
divisions and separate brigades perform in Southwest Asia against a confused and
g reatly weakened adversary? Has the Army cut 100 many div isions from the force
100 qui ckly; will it attain the right balance of divisions in the act ive and reserve
forces; and how radically can the heavy and light div isions be redesigned 10 meet
conti ngencies of the future within budgetary const raints that appear ever changing? How seriously has the el imination of the separate combined arlllS brigades
hindered flexibil ity in des igning the active fo rce? A more basic quest ion was also
left unanswered . Is the divis ion the best vehicle to organize the combat arms for
the future or should it be the brigade, as some have argued? If hi story has shown
us anything, it is that the future is always unpredictable and that the basic ing redi ent of success will contin ue to be a mind-set that a llows the g reatest speed and
flexibility in adopting new technologies, new missions, and new constrai nts to the
Army's ever-changing organizations for combat.
Bibliographical Note
When George Washington organized the first American army in 1775, Ihe
orga ni zation of divisions and brigades almost immediately became a subject for
di scuss ion , but no comprehensive study has ever been pu blished about thei r
evol ution in the United States mili tary. Th is st udy, prepared from a wide ra nge
of sources, was intended to fi ll that gap. Ma ny of the so urces consu lted arc pari
of the archiva l holdings of the National Archives and Records Admin ist ration
(NARA) , Washington , D.C. Alt hough many record g roups in the Na tional
Archives were searched, the following groups were particularly usefu l: 165 ,
records of the Wa r Department and specia l sta tTs ; 168, records of the Nationa l
Guard Bureau; 177, records of the Chief of Arms; 94 and 407, records of the
Adjutant Ge nera l; 393 and 394, records of the U.S. Army Con tinental
Command s; and 337, record s of Headquart ers, Army Ground Forces. At the
Military History In stitute (MHI), Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania , the records
of the Army War College, 1920- 40, were a rich source of information. Also
va luable were the holding s in th e Manusc ript Divisio n o f the Library of
Congress, Washington , D.C., which house the papers o f Leonard Wood, Joh n J.
Pershi ng, John McA uley Palmer, George Van Horn Mose ley, John L. Hinds,
Charles L. Scott, and others. The George C. Marshall Foundation , Lexi ngton,
Virginia; the Command and General Staff College Library, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas; the Infantry Center and School Library, Fort Benni ng, Georgia ; the
Institute o f Herald ry Li brary, Fort Belvoir, Virgini a; and the Patton Museum,
Fort Knox, Kentllcky, all we re helpfu l in locating and providing documen ts.
Since World War II, the wee kly newspa per A,.my Tim es has becn a source of
informa tion about the Army, and routi nely information abou t di visions and
brigades has been culled from it by members of the Center of Mi litary History.
The official publications of the War Department and the Department of the
Army were essential to the study. They incl uded the periodic General Regulations
of the United SIMes Army; Field Service Regulations, Ulliled Slales Army; and
Official Army Registers; and War Department and Department of the Army regulations, general orders, circulars, bull etins, and fi eld manuals. Anot her coll ection
of o ffi cia l material that proved to be invaluable in preparing the work was the
publi shed Annual Reports of the War Department. Within those reports, the most
frequently cited were the Report C?l the Secret(ll}1 of '11"11: Report of lite Major
428
Geneml COli/mol/ding file Arlll)" Repal'l of 'he Chief of Slaff, Report of ,lie
Adjll/Ollf Generaf, and Report of rhe Chief of 'he Militia Bureall, later the Repor'
of 'he Chief of the Na/iollal Guard B/lreoll. Between 1920 and 1941 the reports
were basical ly limi ted to those of the Secretary of War, the Chief of Siaff, and
Chief of the National Guard Bureau (the last sti ll being published annually).
Between 1948 and 1968 the reports pertaining to activities of the Department of
the Army were published in the Department of Defellse Reports. After 1968 the
Depar(mel1l oflhe Anll)' His/aricol SlImmaries carried on the tradition of the official Neparls of rhe J.1Ic",r Deparlmelll. Since 1939 reports of the Chief of Staff of
the Army have been published intermittently under variolls titles. All of the official publications listed in the notes arc in the library of the U.S. Army Center of
Mil itary Hi story (DAMH), Washington, D.C. , and when cited in th e notes no
location was given.
The third category of documents that proved particularly significant was the
unpublished ann ual summari es or reviews that the major commands have prepared since World War II. They included documents prepared by the Office,
C hi e f of Army Fiel d Forces (OCAFF) , U.S. Continental A rmy Co mm a nd
(CONARC), U.S. Army Comba t Developments Command (CDC), U.S. Army
Forces Command (FORSCOM) , U.S. Army Trai ning and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC), U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC),
and others, which arc a part of the holdings of the Historica l Records Bra nch,
U.S. Army Center of Mili tary Hi story, cited as DAMH- HSR.
Although many types of documents have been consulted, tables of organization and equipment (TOE) published in the twentiet h cen l'Ury served as the
skeleton for the study. The Army first published TOEs in 1914 as an aid to
mobilization planning, and many are required to describe a div ision or separate
comb ined arms brigade. To list all used in preparing this study is prohibitive,
but those cited in the notes are avai lable in the Organizational History Branch
of the Center, cited as DAMH -HSO. Along with the TOEs, the su bj ect fil es in
the Organizationa l History Branch pertaining to such topics as the National
Guard, Army Reserve, mobilizations, and other areas involv ing units; the adjutant general reference files and the unit historical data cards, both of which
contain data about the changes in status of units, were indispensable. T he last
group or files in the Organizational History Braneh without which the st udy
could not have been prepared was the unit files. They a lso contain letters of
instructions for changes in status of units, general orders from the commands
implementing those instructions, studies prepared by statT officers concerni ng
the organizations, newspaper articles about the unit s, and sundry miscellaneous
papers about them.
The se lect ive bibliography that follows has been divided into books,journals,
and unpublished manllscripts.
429
BIBLI OGRA PH ICAL NOTE
Books
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York: W. W. Norton and Co. , \969.
Adler, Julius O. His/ol)' oj ,he Sevellly-Sellellfh Divisioll. New York: Wynokoop
Hallenbeck Crawford Co., 1919.
Alger, Russe ll A. The Spanish-America/l h,.. New York: Harper and Co. , 1901.
Allen, Henry T. The Rhineland Occupali oll. Indianapolis: Robbs-Merri ll Co.,
1927.
Americall Archives: A Col/ection of Alithell lie Records, Slate Papers, alld Lelfers
alld Olher Notices of Public Affairs. 9 vats. Scr. 4. Washington, D,C.: M. $ 1.
Cla ir and Peter Force, 1839- 53.
Alllericoll Slale Papers. Mili/(II), Affairs. 7 vols. Washington, D,C.: Gales and
Seaton, 1834.
Appleman, Roy E. SOlit" to the Nak/ollg. No rth /0 tite Yalu. United States Army in
the Korean War. Washi ngton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961.
Balck , Will iam. Taktik (Tactics) , vol. 3, Kriegsgliedenll1g, Nacitrichten, Bejehle,
Marschdiellst (Mili/lII)' Organization. Commlfllica/iolls, Orders, Marches).
4th cd. Berli n: R. Eiscnsch midt, 1907.
Barnett , Corrclli. Bri/ain and Her Army 1509- 1970. Warmondsworth, England:
Allen Lane, Penguin Press, 1974.
Bcnwell, Harry A. HistOJ)' of the Yankee DivisioJl. Boston: Cornh ill Co., 1919 .
Birk hi mer, Wi ll ia m E. His/orical Skefch of the Organization, Admillistration,
Maleriel, alld 7(lctics of the ArlillelJI, United Slates Army. Washington, D.C.:
James J. Chapman , 1884.
Blumcnson, Mart in . Salemo 10 Cassino. United States Army in World War II.
Washington, D.C.: Govern men t Printing Offiec, 1969.
Bowman, Step he n L. , John M. Kenda ll , and Ja mes L. Sau nders. Motorized
E.\ periellce of/he 9th IlIjallflJI Division. Fort Lewis, Wash .: N.p ., 1989 .
Brown, Sevellon. The StOlJI of Ordnance ill the World W(II . Washington , D.C.:
James William Bryan Press, 1920.
Bu tterfield, Jul ia Lorri lard, cd. A Biographical Memorial of General Dalliel
Blltlerfield. New York: Grafton Press, 1904.
Ca llan, John F., comp. The Milil(ll), Laws oftlte Ullited States. Philade lphia: G.
W. Chi lds, 1863.
Chambers, John Whiteclay II. To Raise an Army: Tlte Draft Comes to Model'll
America. New York: Free Press, 1987.
Cheng, Christopher C.S. Air Mobility: The Developmelll of a Doc/rille. Westport,
Conn.: Pmeger, 1994.
Chin, George M. The Machine GIIII . 3 vols. Wash ington, D. C.: Gove rn ment
Printing Office, 195 1.
Clendenen, Cla rence C. Blood 011 tlte Border: The Ullited Slates Army and the
Mexican Irregulars. London: Macmi lla n and Co., \969.
430
Clinger, Fred, Arthu r Johnson, and Vincent MaseL The His/ol)' oflhe 71st
Infilll"Y Divisioll, Augsburg, Germany: E. Kieser KG, 1946.
Coakl ey. Robert
and Richard M. Leig hton . Global Logislics lIlId Srrflfegy:
1943- /945. United States Army in World War II. Was hi ngton , D.C.:
Government Print ing O ffi ce, 1968.
Coffman, Edward N. rhe Hi/I of 'he SlVord. The Career of Peyloll C. March .
Madison: University of Wise OilS in Press, 1966.
- - -. The 1#11'10 ElldAII ~11lrs. New York: Ox ford University Press, 1966.
Co leman, J. O. Pleikll: The DawlI of Helicopter Wm/are ill Vietnam . New York:
$1. Martin's Press, 1988 .
Conn, Stetson, Rose C. Engelman , and Byron Fairchi ld. Gllart/illg rile Ullired
Slates (lnd IfS OIlIPO.l'ls. United States Army in World Wa r II. Washington,
D.C.: Government Prin ting Office, 1964.
COl'l'espolldellce Relaring 10 Ihe Wal" lI'ilh Spain. 2 vo ls. Washington, D.C:
Government P ri nting Offi ce , 1902. Reprinted. Was h ington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1993.
Cosmas, Graham A. All Al"lIIy fOI" Elllpire, The Vlliled Slates ill Ihe Spalli.l"h~
Americall 1#1r. Col umbia: University of Missouri Press, 1971.
Cronin, Franc is D. Ullder the SOli/item Cross, Tlte Saga o/lheAmerical Division.
Washington, D.C: Combat Forces Press, 1951 .
Cross1alH~ Richard 8., and James T Currie. 7ivice tlte Cifize1l: A HistOJY of the
Vllited SUlles Ar/lly Reserve, 1908- 1983. Washington , D.C.: Office of the
C hief, Army Reserve, 1984.
Department of the Army Chief of Information , Why Merge. N. p., March 1965.
Da strup, Boyd L. Killg of Baffle: A Bmlle" NiSfOI}1 of the U.S. A/'II/yj' Field
Al'fiffelJI. Fort Monroe, Va.: U.S . Army Training and Doctrine Com mand, 1992.
Delaney, Jo hn P. The BIlle Devils ill I(aly: A HislOJY o/the 881h IlIjilllllJl Division
ill World mil II. Washington, D.C: Infantry Journal Press, 194 7.
Devlin, Gerard M . Pomlmopers: The Saga of Parachllte alld Glider Combal
Troop, 1914 fO 1945. New York: SI. Martin 's Press, 1986.
Diamond, Maynard L. , Willard E. Simms, Edward B. Bald inger, and Meyer
Siegelbaum. The 8911, III/OIIII Jl Division, 1942- 1945. Washi ngton, D.C.:
Infantry Journal Press, 1946.
Dicki nson, John. The Bllildillg 0/ {/II AI'lIIy. New York : Century Co ., 1922 .
DoJcater, Max W. 3d IlIfilllllY Divisioll ill Korea. Tokyo: Toppan Printing Co., 1953.
Doughty, Robert A. The Evaillalioll of Ihe
Arllly Ttlctical Doctrille. 1946- 76.
Leavenworth Papers. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Inst itute,
w.,
us
1979.
Duane, Will iam. A liand Bookfor InfilllIIY. Philadelphia: Wi lliam Duane, 18 14.
Dye r, Frederick H. A CompendiulJI of Ihe War o/Ihe Rebellion . Des Moines,
Iowa : Dyer Publ ish ing Company, 1908.
88,h Divis iol/ ill fhe World War of 1914- 1918. Tlte. New York: Wynkoo p
Hallenbeck C rawford Co., 1919.
BIBLI OGRA PHICA L NOTE
43 1
Eisenhower, John D. So Far From God: The Us. Hf,,. Wi,h Mexico 1846-1848.
New York: Random HOllse, 1989.
Ellio tt , C harl es W. Winfi eld SCOII: The So ldier (jlld fh e M(lll. New Yo rk :
Macmillan Co. , 1937.
Fe hrcnback, T. R. This Killd of War: A Study ill Unpreparedness . New York :
Macmil lan Co. , 1963 .
Finnegan, John P. Agaillsl the Specler of (I Dragon . Westport , Conn.: Greenwood
Press, 1974 .
Flanaga n, Edward M. Th e AI/gels: A HisfOlY of 'he Illh Airborn e Divisioll
1943- /946. Washington, D.C.: Inrantry Journal Press, 1948.
For(~ Worthington c., cd. JOl/rnals of 'he COlllinellwl COl/gress, 1774- / 789. 34
vo ls. Washi ngton, D.C. : Government Printi ng O ffi ce, 1904-37.
Full er, J. F. C. British U ght Ill/a l/ Iry ill 'he Eigllleellfh e e" flIlY. Lon do n:
Hutch inson, [925.
Fu lt o n , Willi a m F. Rive rill e Opemtiolls. /966- /969. Wa shi ngto n , D.C. :
Government Pri nting O ffi ce, [973.
Gabel, C hristopher R. Th e U. S. Army GHQ Mal/ el/vers of 1941 . Washi ngton ,
D.C.: Government Printi ng Offi ce, [992.
Gavin, Ja mes M. 011 to Berlill: Bailie of (III Ail'bome COlIIlI/fII/{le/; 1943- /946.
New York: Vik ing Press, [978.
Genesis of the Americ(l1/ First Army. Washington, D.C.: Gove rn ment Printin g
Offi ce, [938.
Gi llett , Ma ry C. TheA/my Medical Deparlment. 1818- 1865. Washington , D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1987 .
G illie , M i[dred Han son. FOI g illg the Thullderbolt. Harr is burg, Pa.: Military
Service Publi shing Co. , [947.
Greenfi eld, Kent Roberts, Robert R. Palmer, and Be llI. Wiley. Th e Orgallizalioll
oJGround Combat Troops. United States Army in World War II. Washington,
D.C.: Government Pri nting Office, 1949.
G uderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. New York : E. P. Dutton and Co., [nc., 1952.
Gunshurg, JefTery A. Divided alld Conquered: The Frellch High COlI/lJI(llId (llId
'he Defeat of lhe West. 1940. Westport, Conn. : Greenwood Press, 1979 .
Hagood, Jo hn. Th e Ser vices of Supply. A Memoir oj Ih e Greal War. Bosto n:
Houghton Mimin Co ., 1927.
Harbord, James G. Th e America ll Army ill Frallce. 191 7- / 9/ 8. Boston: Li tl le,
Brown and Co ., 1936.
/-Im 1JerS Pictorial History of Ihe litll' Willi Spaill. New Yo rk: Harper and Co.,
1899.
Ha y, Jo hn H., Jr. T(l c tical a lld Malel'iellllllovlItio lls. Wa s h in g to n , D.C .:
Government Printing Offi ce, 1974.
['Ie itman, Francis B. His/orical Regisler (llId Dicliol/m y of the V lliled S/{/Ies A rilly
From lIs Olgallizalioll . September 1779 to Marcil 2. 1903, Washington, D.C.:
Government Print ing O lTi ce, 1903.
432
Hermes, Walter G. Tl'lfce Tellt al/d Fighlillg Frollt. Uni ted States Army in the
Korean War. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966.

Hewes, Ja mes E. , Jr. From Rool to McNamara: Army Organizatioll lIlId
Administration, /900- /963. Washington, D.C.: Govern ment Printing Office,
1975.
Historical (llId Pic/orial Review Second Cava/J)' D;II;.\';OIl , Unired Slates Army.
Bman Rouge, La.: Army Navy Publishing Co., 194 1.
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Index
Ahrmns, General Creig hto n: 343. 356, 359, 36 1,
364.365,367.372- 73.4091120
Adju tant general companies: 354-55,356,357,
386, 401
Adj utants ge neral: 12,14,17,20112.24--25,28,
55,98, 99. 11 7,284,286,306-07

Administration companies: 267,270,272,274.
276-77,28 1,296- 97,354

Admi nistrati ve sections: 338, 340
Aero sq uadron s: 38, 181
Affi liation Program: 370,373

AIM projcct: 353- 54
Ai r Assa ult D ivis ion, 11th: 3 16
Air assnul! divisions: 3 14,31 6,383,397, 400

Air assault infa ntry banalions: 400-401
Air cavalry nllack brigadcs: 384.386

Air cava lry comb.1t brigndcs: 3 14, 3 16. 357, 359
Air c:lVnlry squadrons: 359

Air cav:Llry troops: 309,382
Air de fen se arti llery battalions: 354- 55,356,
357,36 1, 367.384,389, 392- 93,397,401

Air defense artillery brigades: 382,389,392
Air ~efe n se Artillery School: 354- 55
A ir sq uadrons: 49,53,85, 94. 112
AirTTllnsport Brigade, 10th: 316
AirtTllus()Ortbrigades: 3 14,3 16
Air units (divisional): 35.49
Airborne battalions: 327- 28,338
Airborne brigades: 190, 196,300.303,309,356
36th : 367,383
173d : 3 12,323,327- 28,334.335.344.
345- 346
Airborn e Command: 190
Airborne Corps, XVI II: 194
Airborne Division, 82d
:md Dominican Republic: 329
clements of used to test regimenta l
01'go1niZllIion: 264
and Korean War: 240,242, 249
alld Opemtion JUST CAUSE: 403,425
orga nized: 167
I>ost- Korea n War: 250
post- World War II: 212- 13 ,232
reorganized: 193- 94, 276, 357, 397
Airbome Di vision, 82d- Continued

and ROAD: 308
used to tcst airbome divis ion st nlcture: 229
in Victnam: 332.338,344
and World War 11 : 193. 194. 196
Ai rborne Division, IOlst
inactivated: 250
organizcd: 167
post- Worl d War [I : 2 12- 13
reactivated: 25 1
reorganized: 243.274,276.333- 34,356,
400
and ROAD: 308
used to test pentomic division: 274
in Vietnam: 328.330-32,333.344,346
and World War II : 194, 196,200
Airbome di\isiotls
ai rcraft for : 248
battle groups: 272,274
development o f: 166-67, 169, 188, 190
need to be air- tr.U1sportable: 229,272.274
and nuc lear weapons: 272.274
in Orga nized Reserve Corps: 2 17
reorganized forcomb., t: 193- 96
strength: 167, 169, 196,229,272.274,39 7
tables of organi zati on: 167, 169
tablcs of organi zatio n and equipment:
194- 96,223- 24.229,272,274,276- 77,
298,300,308,356- 57
in World War IJ : 193
Airborne divis ions, comjlOsition of
1970s: 357
1980s: 390- 91
ATFA- 1: 265,267
pentomic: 276- 77
ROAD: 308
ROTA D: 272. 274
Airborne di vis ions (units)
11th: 190.1%.232,240,242.253.274.279.
31.
13th:
15th:
17th :
80th:
190. 196
204,,36,2 17
190, 196
255
446
Airborne di visions (un ils)-Contin\lf.:d

82d. &'C Airborne Di vision, 82d.
841h: 2 17.255
981 h: 217
991h: 2 17
100th : 2 17.255
IOI.~t. See Airborne Di visio n, 101 st.
1081h: 2 17,255
Airborne Infalltry. 187Ih: 240--41
Airbomc infantry baualions: 307,308,) 12,
33 1.332,334-35.357
Airbome infantry brigades
1st: 190
2d: 190, 196

Airbomc unils
in ai rmobile di visions: 318.356 57
in infantry divisions: 279

Airallfi
for airborne di visions: 248
for an norcd divisions: 227,248,261,3 14,

316
for field anill cry units: 18 1, ISS, 196,227
for inf.1n1ry di visions: 30, 181 , 199. 227.
248.267,3 14,) 16
for inf.1nlry regiments: 227
for mec hanized infant ry di vis ions: 3 14,3 [6
role of in Aml Yunits: 31 4,3 16,318,417

used for rccon n;li SSMICC: 30
Aircra ft nminl cn;mcc baltaliolls: 333- 34,386
Aircra ft maintcnancc companics: 393
Airernft maintcl1<mce det:lChl11 cnts: 333- 34
Airfi eld opera tion : 333
AirLand l3allle doctrine: 384, 386, 39 1, 403,
407
Ai nllObile brigades: 356
Ai nnobilc companies: 309
Ai nllObile di visions: 333- 34,335,356,
390- 9 1,397
Ainllobile illfa lltry batt;lIions: 3 18,327- 28.
334- 35,359,397, 400
AinllObility: 3 14, 3 16, 3 18, 333
Alabamll Nat ional Guard IIllits: 100- 101 ,243,
361
Alaska: 309,326,333,338,346,356,373,
395,397
Alaska Nationa l Guard units: 395
Alelltian Isla nds: 180
Alger, Ru ssell A.: ]8
All-volunteer Anny: 353,372- 73
Allen, Maj. ]lar.'eyG.: 1411146
Allen. Maj . Ge n. Robert II .: 126
Ambu lance com pani es: 28,30, 94
Ambulance Company, 337th; 69
Ambulance tra ins: 55
Ambul'l1lce units in di visio ns: 52- 53,55
Ambu l ~ nces; 28,67

Americal Di vision: 159- 60, 187, 214, 252,
331. 334. s.:.'C (ilso ]nl:lntry divisions, 23<1.
American Expeditionary Forces: 49,52,
55- 57,67,68,83- 86,87, 1051117

Ammunition column: 24,25,28
Ammunition resupply, responsibilit y for: 129,
131 - 32, 198- 99
Ammunition tmins: 29,30,33,38,52- 53,55,
84,92, ] 15,1 22, 129
Ammunition wagons: 5
Amph ibious operations: 187- 88
Anderson, Lt. Col. Edward D.: 74/11}
Andrews, Maj. Gen. Fronk M.: ]45,147, ]49,
173 /111
Animals
cav" lry: 147, 153. 172,191.2 13
in light div isions: 188, 190
numbers of: 28
problems shil)pin g: 55
shortages of: 7 1, 12 1
IISC o fbcl wccn the world wars: 90.92, 12 ],
126
Antiaircraft artillery battalions: 130,166, 167,
184-85, 194- 96, 223,224,227.239, 240,
267, 277.354
Ant iai rcraft artillery batteries: 269
Antiaircraft artillery detachments: 122
Ant iaircraft wcallOns: 16 1,354-55
in airbonl e briglldcs: 303
Chaparrnl: 354- 55,389
Duster: 36 1,40 I
machine guns: 67
in Na tional Gunrd un its: 36 1, 40 ]
placement of: 185.267.269. 389
Sergea nt York gun system: 389
Vulcan guns: 354
Antia nnor com panies: 400
Antia nnor platoons: 393
An titank bal1alions: 130. 13 1. 154-55, 185.
196, 198- 99
Antitankcollll)anics: 130, 131, 144,194-96.
198- 99,223.397, 425
Antitank force s
place mcnt of: 154- 55, 166, 172. 18 1, 185.
19'
weal)()ns for. St!e Antitank weapons.

An titank platoons: 325
An titan k troops: 147, 161
An titank wcapons: 198
37-mm.: 55,122- 23, 144, 147,154-55
57-mm.: 182. 198- 99
90-mlll. sel f-prope lled: 300,335
ENTAC: 297,335
LA W (light anliwnk weallOn): 335
INDEX
Antil:mk \\,capons- Continucd
M56 SPAT: 300
nUl1lbc~ of: 264
placement of: 380,382
TOW: 354,374115,380,382,383 , 386,393,
397,400
Arizona National Guard units: 36,217,284.
314
Arkansas Nati onal Guard units: IOG- IOI
Armies (U.s.)
First: 71,217,306,325,370
Second: 71 , 211
Third: 79- 80,167,281,307
Fourth: 120, 159, 252,306
Fifth: 184,217,284,306,325,344
Sixth: 254,327
Sc.:vcnlh: 217, 25),366-67,402
Eighlh: 241,271 - 72.400--401
Armor
33<1, lSI BaUalion; 400

401h. 81h l3analion: 365
803d. lsi Battalion: 4101144
An110f ballalions: 296,297.306.307,334-35,
336,337,338,34 1, 344, 3511148, 354,

355,357,359.366,380,382,384,389,
397,400-402
Annor companies: 281,335
AmlOrGroup, 161h: 338
Armor School: 271 . )38, 356, 365. 373
Armored brigades
301h: 361
31sl: 361
53d: 314
86th: 314
149th: 367,383
1551h: 361
I 77lh: 423
194th: 312.338,356,364-65,373.402,423
Annored brigades, composition of: 149- 50,
163,359.366
Amlorcd car squadrons: 115
AmlOred car Iroops: 122- 23, 125, 161
AmlOrcd cavalry regiments: 392,4111153,424
2d: 422
1 I th: 422, 423
1161h: 403
163d: 403
Anllorcd cavalry unils: 123,125
Armored Division, 1st
andATFA- J: 267, 269
and Bosnia: 425
in Gcrnlllny: 344,422
and Korean War: 243
in the 1990s: 422- 23
organized: 150,154
447
Armored Division, Ist-Continued
post- Korean WUf: 279
post- World War 11 : 213
as reinforcement unit for NATO: 250
reorganized: 187,306,307
round-out units for: 357
and U.S. Constabulary: 2 11
in Vietnam: 330,334,336
and World War II: 184.200
Annored Division, 2d
in Germany: 246-47, 305, 366-67,422
inactivated: 423
organized: 150, 154
posl- Worid War JJ: 212- 13,232, 242
in Southw<;sl Asia: 421 - 22
in Vietnam: 330,336
and World WarJJ: 184.187,198
ArnlOred divisions
airerafl for: 248
ATPA- I ' 265, 267
designations of brigades in: 307
missions: 149- 50, 184
nuclear weapons for: 277
number of: 170
organized: 147.149- 50
Orgllllized Reserve Corps: 217
post- World Wilr 11 : 224
reorganized: 182,187,196,277,279,309
strength: 149- 50,154,185,196,224,225.
267.269,277,282,284,353- 54
tables of organi zation: 150,184- 85,196,
225,227,277,279,284.286,298
tallks for: 248-49
tmins: 163, 185
in World War 11 : 193,196, 198- 99
Armored divisions, composition of
AIM: 354.355
AmlyofExcellcnec: 395
ATPA- I: 267.269
Division-86: 389
in Europe: 336
penlomic: 277.281 - 82,284, 286
post- World War 11 : 224
ROAD: 296-98.308
ROCA D: 282, 284,286
World War II : 163.184- 85
AmlOrcd divisions (unils)
3d: 154,187.198.213,222.252, 279,422
4th: 154.211.213.252,279.344
51h: 154,243, 254
61h: 154, 170, 243, 254
7th: 170,243,250
8th: 170
91h: 170, 172
101h: 170
MANEUVER AND FI REPOW ER
448
AmlOrcd div isions (Ullils)- Colllinucd
11th: 170
12th: 170
13th: 170, 220- 21, 255

14th: 170
16th: 190
18th: 2041136
19th: 2041136, 217, 220- 21
20th: 190
21st: 2041136, 217,255
22d: 20411J6, 217, 255
30th; 256, 340, 361
49th: 214,220- 21,305,307. )61,401
501h: 214-15, )40, 367,401,423- 24
Annorcd Force: 150,153, 154,163, 170.172

Anllorcd groullS: 198,2051154,224
Annorcd infantry battalions: 184- 85,227,261

Annorcd inf,lIllry regiments: 224
Armored motorcar machine gun ("tank")
panics: 5],55
COI1l-
Armored personnel carriers: 150,163,182,
276-77, 282, 305

M I 13: 286, 305, 308, ]35. 389
Armored rcconna iss.1l1cc cars: 122- 23, 127
Armored regiments: 149- 50,163,224

Antlored rinc banalions: 224
Armorers: 4- 5
Arms chests: 5
Armst rong, John: 9
AmlY, U.S. Dep:lrtlllClll ofthc: 225
Anny-86: 389- 90
Amly Air Co'Vs: 111
Amly Air Forces: 180,227
Amly Arc:ls: 87,97,101
Amly Field Forces: 217, 229,243,263- 65,
267, 269
AnllyGround Force~: 170,172,173112.
17511J8, 180, 185, 187- 88, 190- 91,
198-99, 217,224-25.227,229
Amly Ground Forces Reduct ion Board:
180-82, 184- 85, 187
Amly group: 117
AmlY NatiOnal Guard. See National Guard.
Amly ofExcellcnce: 391-403, 407, 4091132,
416,417
Amly of the 1'0tOIll:lC: 12- 15
AmlY of the United StlltCS: 190, 213
Anny Reserve: 255. See (liso Organized
Reserve COIl)S.
combat service support units: 424
combat SUP1}Ortlinits: 424
number of divisions and brigadcs: 284, 286,
309.328- 29, 338,340-41,353, 359,361 ,
367.370,397,423- 24
officcr billcts: 284
Amly Reserve- Continucd

and pentomic ~tructures: 284, 286
and volunteers: 256
Artny Reserve brigades. St.'C by IJ'pe o/brigade.
Amly Reserve eentcrs: 402- 03
AmlY Reserve divisions
ordered to ac tivc duty: 305, 332
reorg;mized: 284, 312, 341, 372, 402
an d ROAD: 309, 312
strength: 284, 286
AmlY Rcserve units
readiness of: 367, 370,372, 424
round-out units: 395,402-03
training lor: 424
ArtilY School of the Linc: 27- 28
Artny Sccurity Agency dctllchmcn ts: 330,382
Army Servicc Forces: 180
Army Service Schools: 33
Army St:llT. See a/~'o War Dep:lnment GCllcral
St:llT.
and :lir mobility: 3 I 6, 318
lind Amly Reserve: 309.365
:lnd General Rcserve: 250
:111(1 mobili7A1tion for World War]: 55,57- 58
and numbcrs of divisions: 355, 364
O]lCnltions Division: 187- 88
org:lniz:ltion of: 140llJ2
and post- KOrc:lll War period: 252, 284
and troop b:lsis: 2 14
and unit desigll:ltions: 331
and unit rcp i:lcelllent system: 252- 53,366
Amly War Col1ege: 135,214-15.270-71,
319117
Artificers: 4-5
Artil1cry batterics: 12.13- 14.16,24,25.123,
307.335
Artillery b:lllcries, weapons for: 223.276.
337,382, 425
Artillery coordination centers: 284
Artillery School: 271
Aspin, Les: 424
Assault avintion battalions: 318
ASSllllh gun companics: 400
Assauh gun (tank) ballalions: 308
Assault gun troops: 185
Assault SlI1)port battalions: 318
Assanlt wC<1pons platoons: 282
Atomic Field Army (ATFA- I). See Amored
divisons; Infautry divisions.
Atomic weapons, See Nuclear weapons, tacticaL
Attack helicopter bnl1alions: 359, 382.386,
387,393, 397.425
Allaek helicopter squadrons: 357. 359
Aultman, Col. Dwight E.: 741112
INDEX
449
Australia: [91. 327- 28

AlISlria: 208
Aviation bat1aliolls: 309,337,382,383,386,
397, 400,425
Aviation brigades: 386, 389, 392- 93. 397, 400,
4101140
Aviation companies: 248.265,267,269- 70,
272,276- 71,282,284,296,338,354-55,
393,397
A viation
Aviation
A viatioll
Aviation
A vialion
A vialion
Aviation
groups: 318, 397,400

llluinlCnancc battalions: 400
mailllcnancc companies: 397,401
observation squadrons; 149
sections: I 12, 1 15
suppon companies: 318
unils: 314,316,333- 34,335
l3adges
niT assault personnel: 356
Union corps (Civil Wa r): 16
War with Spain: 18
Bailey. Mllj. Gen. Charles J,: 72
Baker, Col. Chauncey: 52,53,55,741112
Baker, Newton D.: 52,57,60,62,63,64,65,
66,761/32,86,90, III
Baker Board: 52- 55,741114
Balloon companies: 85
Ballou, Brig. Gen. Charles c.: 63
Bands: 125, 131 , 132,133, 181,194-96,239.
269,274,277,284,296,392~93
Barc, Col. Walte r E.: 1071150

Barkcr, Maj. Alvin: 52
Battle groUI)S (divisional)
airbome: 272, 274, 305
eomposilion of: 272,274,276-77.282,297
lmd unit mOl11le: 281
Battlefield infomlation coordination centers:
355
Bazookas: 167.180-81 ,182.247-48
Beal. Thaddeus R.: 343
Bell. Maj. Gen. Jllllles Fr;l1lklin: 28~29
Berlin. Gemlany: 303,305- 06,309,312
Berlin Brigade: 312, 3221143, 402. 4111151.
423
Berry, Maj. Gen. Sidney B. : 356
"Big Red One. The." See Infantry Division,
l sI.
Black soldiers: 15, 154. 170, 182. 249~50
Black units: 62~63, 66, 97, 99,1071153.154,
170, 182, 191.217,220,239.249- 50
Bliss, Maj. Gen. Tasker H.: 49.54-55.57.60,
62
Bloomfield, Brig. Gen. Josel)h: 7~8
"BoHom-Up" rev iew: 424
Br<1dky. Geneml Omar N.: 225,229
Bradson , Col. Fay W.: 1411146

Brees, Maj. Gen. Herbert 1.: 132. 133
Brigade, 1st Hawaiian: 31
Brigade-75: 366--67
Brigade-76: 366- 67
Brigade inspectors: 5.6--7,8- 9
Brigade majors: 3,5,6- 7.8- 9
I3 rigade (Training)
5th: 372
402d: 402- 03
Brigades (1913)
2d: 34
4th: 34
5th: 34
6th: 34
8th: 34
Brigading together of Regular Amly and Illilitia
units: 8, 16
British Army: 121 - 22,125,166, 184
Brown, Brig. Gen. Lytle: 83
Brown, Maj. Gen. Preston: 115
Browning, John M.: 67
Bmeker, Wilbe r M.: 281
Bryden. Maj. William: 1071/50
Buckley, Col. Michael: 188
Buelw Vista, Battle of: 10
Bull, Brig. Gen. Harold R.: 170, 172
Burnside, Maj. Gen. Ambrose: 13
Califomia National Guard units: 115,221.243,
255- 56,361
Callaway, Howard: 370
ClImps. See (I/so Forts.
Beauregard. La.: 154
Breekinridge, Ky.: 243
Campbell, Ky.: 208
Carson, Colo.: 188
Chaffee, Ark.: 243
Claibome, La.: 166,167
Clark, Tel':' : 191
Eustis, VlI.: 123
Fremont, Cali f.: 60,62
Funston, Kans.: 57.63
Greene, N.C.: 60,62
Hale, Colo.: 188
Hood. Tex.: 232
Henry Knox, Ky.: 123.125
Lockett, Calif.: 191
Losey, P.R.: 242
Mills, N.Y.: 60
Roberts. Calif.: 243
Cimnoneornpanics: 160- 61,180,182,196,198,
202118, 223. &>e also lnt:1ntry regiments.
Caribbean Defense Command: 153
Carter. M'ti. Gen. William 1-1.: 34-35
450
Cavalry
mechanized: 123
missions of: 48-49,64,85,123
and Modcmiz:l(ion Board: 127
and War with Spain: 18
and World War I: 48- 49,54,64,85

Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat), 6th: 359,364,
386
Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized), 7th: 123.125,
143-45. 147, 150

Cavalry brigades
composition of: 25.33- 34.35,38,95,115,
123.125,145.147, 161,2881124.359
dcsignmions for: 51- 58
Cavalry brigades (units)
1st: 64,98
2d: 64,98
3d: 64
41h: 172
51st: 116
52<1: 116
53d: 116
541h: 116
55th: 1 [6
561h: 116,15],191 - 92
57th: 116
58[h: 116
591h: 116
116th: 403
1st (1913): 34
2d (1913): 34
3d ( 1913): 34
41h (1913): 34
Cavalry corps: 13, 117, 120, 145,147, 149
Cav:tlry Division (1913): 31
Cavalry Division, lsI
between Ihe world wars: 112, 115. 120. 135
clements in Gennany: 366,367
in Japan: 21 1- 12, 232, 239
in Korea: 240,245-46,2581117,279,284,308
organizcd: 98
post- World War II: 213
reorganized: 316, 318, 344, 357, 364, 402
in Southwest Asia: 421 - 22
and training Illiltleuvers: 112, 143- 45, 147
units ofsc1l1to North Africa: 172.190- 91
used for organizational studies (TRICA!'):
344,357,359,382- 83,386
and World War II: 172, 190- 91
Cavalry Division (Ainnobile), lst: 316,318,
323,327- 28,333- 34,335,344,346
Caviliry Division (Infantry), 1st: 213
C;\valry Division, Special, 1st: 191
Cav:llry div isions
between the world wars: 86- 87,95,97,98,
Cavalry divisions- Continued

101,1071145,116
Civil War: 13,16
composition of: 25,28,33- 34,38,85- 86,
95, ! 15,133,135, 137, 145, 147, 161
designations for: 28,57
mcchanizcd: 172
National Guard: 87, 97,101, 116
Organized Reserves: 87, 170
road space: 38, 95
stalT for: 25, 28
strength: 33- 34,38,85- 86.95,1071145, 115,
137, 147,161
tables of or gani zillion: 37- 38, 95,101,115
Cavalry divisions (units)
2d: 98, 120, 154, 172, 190- 92
3d: 117, 120
15th: 64,771144
21st: 101 , 116, 153
22d: 101,116,153
23d: 101,116, 153
24th: 101,116, 153
6lst: 101
62d: 101
63d: 101
64th: 101
65th: 101
66th: 101
Cllvalry fighting vchicles: 386,389
C(/wdl), jQUl"lw/; 95
Cavalry Rcconnaissancc Troop, 82d: 167

Cavalry Rcconnaissance Troop. Mechanized,
56th: 19 1- 92
CllValry rCCOlmaiSSllncc troops: 402
Cavalry regiments: 5- 6,8, 12,24,28
composition of: 54.95. 112, 115, 125, 135,
137, 145, 147, 161
Caviliry rcgimcnts (units)
1st: 123.125
1st, 1st Squadron: 334
6th: 64
9th: 99
10th: 99
15th: 64
Cavahy School: 99
Cavalry sqUlldrons; 13, 211135, 223, 382, 400
Cavalry troops: 6- 7,366
ChalTee, Maj. Gen. Alina R.: 23- 24,25
ChalTcc, Brig. Gcn. Adna R. 1401135, 147.149,
150,154
Chaparral-Vulcan ballalions. Sec A1l1iaircrall
weapons.
Chapillins: 4- 5,8- 9.10
Chemical companies: 122.382.383,386.389,
397.4101140
INDEX
Chemica! detachments: 330
Chemical platoons: 122,281,307
Chemica! warfare detachments: 135, 137
Cheney, U, Col. Sherwood fl.: 74/11 2
Chickamauga National Park, Ga.: 16
Chief of artillery, divisional: 49,55
Chief of Staff's Advisory Group: 236//41
China, U.S. forces in: 99
Chippewa, l3al11c of: 7- 8
Chynoweth, Maj. Bradford G.: 126
Civil War: [2- 16
Clark, Maj. Gell. Mark W.: 172,2591129
Clarke. Lt. Gen. OruceC.: 253 ,29 1.293
Clitrord, CI<lrk: 338,343
CO,ISI Artillery Brigade, IOlst: 153
Coast Artillery COIVS: 29- 30
Coast artillery districts: 31
Coilier, LI. Cen.John 1-1.: 269
Collins, Maj. Gen. )'la rry 1.: 190
Coilins, Gcncml J. Lawton: 240,247
Colorado National Guard units: 217, 395
Columbus, N. Mcx.: 35
Combat AnllS Regimental System (CA RS):
281, 2901/49, 390, 4091/25
Combllt ellr squlldrons: 125
Combat eomnmnd headquaners in annored
divisions: 163. 185,2051/54.224,225,
227,265,267
Combat Dcvelopments Commnnd: 306, 312,
338.353- 54,359
Combat electronic IVnrtiue intelligence
(CEW I) bauaiions. See Military intelligence bnllalions.
Combat scrvice support system
armored divisions: 185
infantry div isions: 223
Modcmization Board: 127.129,130, 131
World War 11 : 181 - 82
Combined arms (motorized) battnlions: 400
Command and control battalions (airbomc
div isions): 272.274.277
Comnmnd and Gcnernl StntTCollcge: 265,
270,27 1
Command nnd Gcnernl StatT Sehool: 135
Command hcadquarters (division): 309, 312
34th: 312
35th: 312
4]d:]1 2
51st: 312
55th:] 12
79th: 3 12,329
94th: 312, 329
96th: 312, 329
103d: ] 12, 329
Commissarics: 4- 5, 10,17,24- 25,28
451
Commiss.1ries of muster and subsistence: 14
Commissaries of subsistence: 12, 14
Communications, divisionnl: 28,84,94, 129,
131,132,198- 99,267,270,272,335. See

also Sign.1lunits.
Communications equipmcnt: 30,35,84,
122- 23,267,335,] 82- 8],425- 26
Conductors ofmilit.1ry stores: 5
ConfcdernteArmy: 15- 16
Connecticut National Guard units: 24],312
Conner, Maj. Gen. Fox: 52,90.94, 130
Conrad, Col. C.1sper 1-1.: 80
Continental AmlY: 3- 6, 20112
"Continent.11 Anny" phm: 37
Continental Congress: 6- 7
Cook, Maj. Gen. Gilben R. : 1411146,2361141
Corps: 9,12- 13.14,15- 17,2 11134,24,49,54.
67- 69,7 1.117.120, 181- 82,]92
1: 68
V:422
VI I: 422
X (Civil War): 15
XVlll (Civil W3f): 15
XXV (Civil War): 15
IV (Wnr with Spain): 17- 18
V (War with Spain): 17- 18,422
Corps area commanders: 100.101. 109- 10
Corps areas: 87,97,99,100, 116
Second: 99, 110
Founh: 100, 120
Eighth: 98- 99, 132, 1]5
Ninth: 99
Cowles, Lt. Gcn. Donllid 1-1.: 370,380
Cmig, Gencral Malin: 109, 126, 127,129.
130,132, 13] ,2]61141
Crosby, Maj. Gen. Hcrbcn S.: 112,115
Cubll: 18, 307
Dnhlquist, General John E.: 252- 53.271. 276
D:1IIford. Maj. Gen. Robert M.: 160-61
Davidson, Mnj. Gcn. Gnrrison 1-1. : 270
Dnvis, Dwight F.: 115, [22, 123
Dnvis, Brig. Gen. Richmond P.: 110- 11
Dnvison, GencmJ Michael S.: ]59
D.1 vy Crocketts. See Nliclenr wealXlns. tacticaL
Dearborn, Maj. Gen. Hcnry: 7- 8
Decker, Gene"ll George H.: 296,298.300,
307- 08
Defense, U.S. Depanment of: 305,308, 309,
3]8, 340-41, ]6 1, 364, 383. 397
Demobilization
allcr the Civil War: 16
aller Ihe Korenn War: 250- 51
allcr the war in Vietn<lrn: ]43-44
aller lhcWarorl812: 9
452
DCrlIobili:wtion- Colltinllcd
after World War I: 79,80- 81,83,97
after World War II : 199- 200,207- 08,211 - 13
Departments
Central: 3 1, 34
Eastem: 3 1
I'anam:l Canal: 115
Southern: 31.34,35, 36-37
Westen!: 31
Depol brigades: 60, 76//32
Depot divisions: 68- 69,71,13
DePuy, General William E.: 325,380
Devers, GCllcrallacob L.: 163,184,187,201,

224
Dick Act of 1903: 25
Dickinson, Jacob M.: 29
Dickman, Maj , Gen. Joseph T.: 23- 24,79,83
District or Columbia National Guard: 431112
Division, 2d (Provisional): 132
Division , H,lw,Liian: 99, 112, 121 , 155
Division, Panama Canal: 99, Ill, 112, 115
Division. Jlhilippinc: 99,111 - 12, 158,212
Division-86: 383- 84,386,389- 90
Division urtillery
aircraft for: 199,227,337
AT FA- I: 265,267
headquarters baueries for: 144.159,
169- 70.181 , 269
in heavy divis ions: 382.383,384.386,401
in light divisions: 392- 93, 397.400
ROAD: 296- 97
ROClD: 277
ROTA D: 274
World War II: 181 , 194-96,198
Division Restnleturing Sludy ( DRS): 379- 80,
382- 84,407
Division trains. See by IJpe uJ dilisiOlI .
Divisions ( 1913)
1st: 34
2d: 34
3d: 34
Divisions (World War I). See also by Iype oj
dilisiQII.
10th: 65.99,213,250,251,253,279
11th: 65.99
121h: 65, 99
14th: 65
17th: 65
20th: 65
Divisions, base ilnd training: 54,65,67.68
Divisions, heavy: 380, 382- 83,384,386,389.
395.400-403.407, 417.425
Divisions, light: 390- 91. 392- 95 . 397.
400-403,4091136,417
Divisions. light (World War 11): 187- 88. 190,
Divisions, light (World War 1I)- Col1tinued

203// 27
10th: 188, 190
7lst: 188, 190
89th: 188, 190
Divisions, Nntional Anny
designations of: 57- 58
as sources o f manpower for Regular AflIlY:
62
Divisions, replacement and school: 65
" Doctrinal and Organizational Conccpts for
AtomicNonatomic Amly During the Period of
1960- 1970": 270- 72,281. 291
Dominican Republic: 323, 329
Douglas. Ariz.: 98
Doycn, I3 rig. Gen. Charlcs A.: 61
Draftees. See also A1l11y orthe Uni ted States;
"National Army" units.
Black: 62- 63,66, 170
Civil War: 15
and Korean War: 243
Puerto Rican: 64
reserve service requirements for: 222
training of: 57,60, 170,243
in Vietn,Jln: 325
World War I: 55,57,58,60,62
Dragoon regiments: 10, II
Dragoons: 211123
Dragoons, 2d: 10
Drum, Maj. Hugh A.: 52.90.94. 110. 111
Duane. William: 9
Dunn, Winfield: 361
"'Dusters." See Ant iaircra ft wellpons.
Eckhardt, Maj. Gcn. George S.: 325
Eddlcman, Gcncral Clyde D.: 253,277,293,
297,298,300,303,319//7
Edwards, I3rig. Gen. Clarence E.: 60
Edwards, Maj. Gen. ldwal: 181 - 82
Eiscnhowcr, Gencral Dwight D.: 200,213.
225,229,250
Electronic warfare companies. See Mili tary
intelligence battalions.
Ellison, Maj. Frederick A.: 7411/2
Ely, Lt. Col. lranson E.: 74/112
Enginecr battalions (divisional)
I990s: 425
foramlOreddivision: 149- 50,163
Army of Excellence: 392- 93,397
AT FA- I : 265.267,269
Division Restructuring Study: 382
Ficld Scrvice Regulations of 1905: 24
Field Service Regulations of 1910: 28
Modemi;'.ation 130ard: 127, 131.132,133
pcntomic div isions: 276-77
INDEX
453
Engineer battalions (divisional)-Colllinued

post- World War II: 225.227,229
ROAD: 296,300.384
ROTAD: 272
World
\Vllf
I: 49
World War II: 181 , 185,194-96,199

Engineer battal ions (nol1divisiol1al): 383
Engineer bridge comp:LIlic~; 163, 185, 269,
300,382
Engineer brigades (corps): 392,425
Engineer companies: 25, 35, 122- 23, 185, 28 1,
303,307,325,326,338,340, 366,402
Engineer officers: 24-25,28,55
Engineer regiments: 38.52- 53,54,84, 85. 92, 223
Engincersqundrons; 135 , 137, 147, 172

Engineer trains: 33,38,84,92
Engineer units: 54.68
Engineers: 12, 14, 17
Engineers. 3101h: 69
Enlisted Reserve Corps: 37
Equipment shortages: 8,58,64,122- 23,152,

172 , 309, 326,328- 29,333,337,347,
354- 55,361,366,3 70
Estridge. Col. Oliver: 122
Evans, Brig. Gen. Roben K.: 29
Exercise divisions: 424

Exercises
BLUE llOLT: 267
FOLLOW ME: 267
REI'O RGER: 337
S,\GEURUSII: 267, 269, 270
Expeditionary Division, lsI. Sce Inf~lI1try
Division, 1st.
Experimental Mechanized Force: 122
Far East Command: 2 [ I , 212, 239, 240, 242,
247-48,249- 50,2591129
Fanlswol1h, Col. Charles S.: 90
Fie[d anllics: 27,28- 30
I:ield AmlY, First: 28- 29
Field Arti[lery, 6th: 52
Fie[d anillcry ba1talions (units)
63d: 24 [
32[sl: 167
907th: [67
Field anillcry bancrics: 225, 227, 229, 239.
274,276
Ficld al1illery brigades: 14,28,38,49,52- 53,
54,55, 57- 58,68,69,84-85, 120. [59. 392
Field anillery brigades (units)
2d: 61
71sl: [53
Field anil[ery eompnnies: 6-7, [0- [ I, 12
Field anillcry guns
3,inch: 38, 48. 52- 53, 65
Ficld al1illcry guns- Continued

37-mm.: 85, 131
75-mm. : 67,71,85,112,120, 121,130-31,
144,16[
Civil Wnr: 13- 14,16
horse-drawn: 65,85
Mexicnn War: II
" Napoleon": 13- 14
Revolutionary War: 4,5
stock-tr,lil gun carriage: II
truek,mounted: 65, 121
Field al1i1lery regiments: 24,28- 29,38, 43118,
48, 52- 53,65,7 1,84-85, 115- 16, 149- 50
Field hospi1al companies: 94
Field hospital units: 52- 53
Field hospilnls: 24,25,30
331st: 69
337th: 69
Field Manual, 100- 5, Open/lions
1982: 384
1986 392,4111153
Field SeI1'ice Regulalions. Ullile(/ Stales Army:

121
1905: 23- 24,25
1910: 27- 30,31
19[4: 34
Finance companies: 354-55,356,357,386
Fire direction conlrol centers: 144, 196,198,
277,335
" First Team." Sce C"vlllry Division, 1st.
Flngs
Civil W"r units: 16,18
divisional: II I , 2 15. 422- 23
National Guard units: 2 15
regimental: 390
War with Spain: 18
Florid" National Guard units: 100- 10 I. 215,
255- 56, 312
Fonesca, Pfe. David: [60
Food service companies: 274
Forage mastcrs: 4- 5
Foreign garrisons. military personnel needed
for: 87
Forges, traveling: 4-5
Fons. See also Camps.
Amador, Panmlla Cana[ Zone: 252
Belvoir. Va.: 397
Benning, Ga.: 99,126,150, 159,232,243,
251 , 253, 279. 281 , 306- 07, 316, 326,
337- 38, 355- 56, 36 1, 373, 395, 421 , 423
Bliss. Tex.: 64,98, [47,354-55
Bragg. N.C.: 167, 212,232,344,397,423
Campbell, Ky.: 208,212.232,253, 274,
332.344.423
Carson, Colo.: 25 [, 284, 305. 325, 332, 338,
454
Forts- Continued
344.355,366,372.423
Ch;llT.:C, Ark.: 254,305,307
Devens, Mass.: 232, 28 1, 306, 324. 325
DnUll, N.Y.: 154,395, 423
llood, Tex,: 2 12,232,305, 306.307.330.
344,346,357,359,366.367,382- 83,
386, 421 , 422, 423
Sam Houston, Tex,: 64,99, 1]2
Ilullchuca, Ariz.: 170
Invin, Calir.: 306.423
JAckson. S.c.: 243
Knox. Ky.: 123, 125,150,338,356,365,
373,423
LCll\'Cllworth, Kans.: 25,27- 28,33,395,
4091132
Lewis, Wash.: 2 12,232.25 1, 327,346,355,
39 1, 421,422. 423
George G. Meade, Md.: 122
Or<!, Calif.: 180.243,253.279.312.338,

364,395
Polk, La.: 305.364,422
Richardson. Alaska: 252.312.346.395,422
Riley, KMS.: 57,99, 154,25 1,325.337.
343.344,366.423
D.A. Russell, Wyo.: 112
Sill. Okla.: 232

Stcwllrt, Ga.: 307,364,423
Wninwright, Alaskn: 312,346
Leonard Wood. Mo.: 243
Foss, General John: 380,383
Fmnce
army. See French Amly.
and weapons for U.S. un its: 67,68
French AmlY: 7411'1
and mechanization: 12 1- 22, 125
as model for World War 1 nnny corps: 68- 69
Frochlkc, Robert F.: 36 1
Fuller. J. F. C.: 120,122
Fuller, LI. Gen. Marvin D.: 382- 83
Flills ton. Maj. Gen. Frederick: 35,36-37
Galveston. Tex.: 29- 30,34
Garriso n. Li ndley M.: 37
Gcnerul Board. U.s. Europea n Thenter of
Operations (ETO): 222- 24
General Hcndquartcrs (G I-IQ), Unitcd States
AmlY: 117. 120
General Organization Project (World War I):
52- 53,54- 55,65
Ceil/mil Polide.f mlf/ Rcgulmi(}l1.~ for Ifle
Organize(/ Reserves (Special Regulations No. 46):

101
C/;III:m{ Regu/(llioll.r for tile Ulliled Siaies
IIl'lIIy( 1821): 9
General Reserve: 2 12- 13.242-47.250.252

General Serv ice Schools: 87, 90
General Sta lTColiege: 87.90
Georgia Na tional Guard units: 100-101. 215,
255- 56. 361. 365
Germ an Army: 125, 184
Gemlany
equipment stockpiled in: 305
occupation forees in: 208,2 1 I, 232
U.S. forces in: 99.246-47,249,253,279,
303,305.308,337.344,355,365.
366-67,389- 90,422- 23
and World War I: 65
Gillem, Col. Alvan C.: 147
Glen Springs. Tex.: 36
Glider artillery battnlions: 196
Glidcr fie ld anil1ery battalions
32 1st: 167
907th: 167
Glidcr infhntry. 327t h: 167
Glider infantry regimen ts: 193,194-96
Gmves, Col. William A. : 74/1 12
Gren! Britain, and World War I: 47-49.53.
64,65,68,69
Grccnlief, Maj. Gen. Francis S.: 36 1
Griswold, LI. Gen, Oscar W.: 225
Ground survei llance companies. See Military
intelligence battalions.
Guadalca nal: 187
Gulick, Lt. Col. John W.: 90, 1071150
Gun regime nts: 52- 53. 65
GYRO$tOI'r: program: 252- 53,254,274. 279
Haines. General R;ll ph E.: 330,334
Haislip. LI. Gen. Wade n .: 236,,4/
Hall, Brig. Gen. William E.: 2361141
Hammond, Col. Greed G.: 1071150
Harbord, Mnj. Gen. James G.: 71, 99
Hannon. Maj. Gen. Emest N.: 184
Hamey. Col. William S.: I I
Hartzog, Ge nerul Will iam W.: 425
Hawaii: 31,99, 107,,49
infantry regiments from: 65
National Guard units: 65,155 . 284,332.
340,355
uni ts sent to: 159.25 1.305,326.332,343,
344.355
Hawaiian Department: 155
Headquarters. anllored groups: 198,205,,54,
224
Headquarters. specia l troops: 94,95. 135.
137,182,227
Headquarters defe nse platoons: 18 I, 182
I-Ieavy weapons COnl l)anics: 144. See a/so
Infa nllY regimen ts.
INDEX
I-Ieavy weapons troops: 191. See also Cavalry
regiments.
Heintzelman, Maj. Stuart 90,94
I-IclicOI)\crs. See ((Iso by type of m'il/lioll I/llil.
AI-J- I (Cobra): 361
in Korean War period: 248

in Vietnam: 335
Hersey, Col. Mark L.: 741112
Hibbs, Maj. Gen. Louis E.: 212
Hickey. Lt. GCIl. Thomas F.: 274,276
High mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles
(HMMWVs): 393,400
Hines, Maj. Gcn.lohn L.: 110
Hitler, Adolph: 125
j'lodges, Maj. Gen. Courtney H,; 160- 61
Holbrook, Maj. Gen. Willard: 64

Honest Johl1 rockets: 271,274,277,282,
296-97,298,300,)05,307.308,309,
324,354--55
I-looker, Maj. Gen. Joseph: 13
Hospitab: 129, 132. Sec a/so Medical
regiments.
Howitzer companies: 92. See also lnfhrl1ry
regiments.
Howitzers
J.S-inch: 38
4.7inch: 54,65
6-inch: 48. 65
8-inch: 277, 282. 296, 298. 300, 382, 386,
401
75-mm.: 67,122- 23. 125,127.130- 31,145,

147, 167, 180,188,191,196.202118
75-111111. (horse): 95
105-mm.: 122- 23,127,129,130- 31,1 44,
145,147.163, 172, 180- 81, 191, 196.
198, 199,202118,223, 224,227.239,265.
267,269,272,274,276,277,282,296,
298,303,307,314,337,393,397,400
155-mm.: 52- 53,54,71,85,92, 112,
115- 16,120,130- 31,144,161,181,191.
199,223,227,229,269,274,276,277,
282,296,298,300,307,3 14,335,337,
356, 3751112. 382. 386, 393, 397,402
British: 54
French: 54
mobility of: 54,92,112,196,198
motorizcd: 65,71 , 771145,84- 85,1 12
self-propelled: 122- 23, 125, 163, 180, 198.
202118, 223, 227, 267, 282, 296, 298, 386,
402
towed: 180- 81, 191. 223, 282, 298, 300,
3751112,393.400
Howze, Lt. Gen. Hamilton 1-1.: 314
Howzc. Maj. Gcn. Rober! L. : 269
Howze Board: 314,316,318
455
Hughes, Maj . Gen. John 1-1.: 126.127, 129.
1411146
Hull, General John E.: 255
Humphreys, Maj. Gcn. Andrew A.: 27
Idaho National Guard units: 403
111inois Na tional Guard units: 159- 60, 214- 15,
243-44,246,251.255- 56
Independent Cavalry Brigade ( 19 11 ): 29- 30
Indiana Na tional Guard uni ts: 367,424
Indiantown Gap Military Reservation, Pa.: 244
Indi vidual replacement systcm: 252- 53
Infantry battalions: 4.11 1- 12, 122,144,265,
269,296,297,298,300,307- 08,309,
323- 24,325,326- 27,330,332,334- 35,
336,337- 38,341,344,346,3501134,
3511148, 354, 355, 366, 374115, 380, 382,
392- 93,397.400
Infantry Board: 126
Infantry brigadcs
composition of: 3- 5,6- 7,8- 9,10- 11,12,
16- 17,24-25,28,29- 30,35,38,47-48,
52- 53, 84,120,281.284.325,326.
355- 56
design:ltions for: 5, 12, 14, 16,28, 57- 58
c1imin:lted from division structure: 127
numbers of: 286,309,353- 59,361
provisional: 24
reinforced: I 17. 120
staffs for: 3,4-5, 6- 7, 8- 9, 10, 12, 14, 17,
49,55,84
Infantry brigades (units)
lsI: 281,306. SeeillsfJ Airborne i!\f,1ntry
brigades, 1st.
2d: 281, 306. See (/1;;0 Airbome inr.1ntry
brigades, 2d.
41h: 98,1061142
8th: 98.109..... 10, 111- 12
10th: 98, 109- 10,111 - 12
11th: 326,331 - 32,334
12th: 98,109- 10.111 - 12
14th: 98,109- 10.11 1- [2,117
16th: 99.109- 10,111 - 12,117
18th: 99,109- 10,111 - 12,117
27th: 395,402
29th: 284,312,328,332,338,343,355
30th: 361
32d: 359,361
361h: 329
37th: 424
39th: 341
40th: 341
41 st: 328, 365, 370
48th: 361,365
49th: 328
456
Infan, ry brigades (unils)- Collii nucd
51st: 159- 60
S3d: 3 12,3 14
58.h: 367,397
671h: 3 12,3 14,328
69th: 3 12, )28, 332, ]38, 344
73d: 367
76t h: 424
8 1sl: 359.361 ,400.403,41 01144
86th: 3 12,314
91d: II S. 153, 284. 3 12, 402
93d: 11 5. 153
1161h: 367,397
1571h: ] 12, 340-41, 370, 402, 424
171st: 3 12, 338, 346
l72d: 3 12, 338, 346, 356, 373, )95
1851h: 63
186th: 63
187th: 3 12. 340-41 , 370, 402, 424
1915. : 3 12,34 1
193d: 307.312.338,356,372- 73,402,423

1961h: 325.329- 30.33 1.334.346
197th: 306-07,3 12,337- 38,355- 56, ]6 1,
364-65,373.402.42 1- 22
198th: 306-07,330- 3 1.334
1991h: 326,334, 336,42 1,422.423
205.h: ) 12,340-41,370, ] 95, 424
2 181h : ]61
2561h : 341. 365
2581h : 284,3 12,3 14
Inf:ul1ry Center: 307
Inf.1111ry Division, lSI

be,ween the world wars: 79.81.98. 109- 10.
111.112.1 17
in Gennany: 227,232.246-47.366- 67.423
as mechanized di vision: 344
n:organized (1939): 133, 143
rou ndout units for: 364
and tmining maneuvers. 1940: 143- 4 5
in Vietnam: 323- 24,335.3501137
(lnd World War I: 52, 57- 58. 60- 61. 67. 68.
72
Infant ry Division, 2d
between the world W:lTS: 79.8 1. 98. 99.
1061142,1 12,1 17. 120, 126
composit ion of: 61.98
c lcments of inactivated: 422
clements movt:d: 423
in Korea: 240-41.246.249- 50.251.346.
400--40 1
orglmized: 60-6 1
[KJst- Korcnn Wnr: 279,332
post- World War 1[ : 212- 13.232
reorgan ized: 133. 143. 346
and tmining manellvers. 1940: 143-45

Infa ntry Division. 2d- Continucd
used for organiz.1lional studies: 126. 130-31.
132.3 16
lmd World War I: 67.68
Inf.1 111ry Di vision, 3d
I 990s: 422- 23
andA TFA- l : 267.269
between Ihc world wars: 79,8 1,98. 109- 11 ,
11 2.1 17. 120
in Europe: 253.279,303.305,337.355
and Korean War. 24 1-42.246,249- 50.25 1
org.1nizcd: 62
post- World War II : 208.2 12- 13,232
reorganized: 133. 143
and World War II: 187
Infant ry Division. 4th
19905: 423
between the world wurs: 79, 81. 98, 11 7,
120. 121
in Gcnllnny: 24647,305.366-67,389- 90
inactivated: 98
motori zmion of: 12 1. 150. 163, 172, 182
organi7.cd: 62
reactivated : 147.222
reorgani zed: 182. 184,243.327.344,355,
403
round-out units for: 364
in Viet nam: 327,330- 31
and World W"r I: 68
1nfmmy Division, 5th
19905: 422
acti vation of: 133, 143,222,244
bctwecn thcworld wa rs: 79,8 1.98, 117. 120
clcments o f scnt to Vietnam: 324, 325, 328,
in Europe: 251, 253

in"ctivated: 98,250,279
motoriz"tion of: 121
or"nizcd: 62
post- World War II : 208,2 12- 13
reorgmlized: 306- 07, 364-65, 402
and tmining mancuvers, 1940: 143--45
units ofllcti valed: 344
units :lUached 10: 338
Infant ry Division, 6th
199Os: 423
ac ti va ted: 133.143,332
~twecn the world \\~lrs: 79,8 1, 98. 11 7.120
e lemcnt o fllctivated: 326
inacti\'med: 98, 232. 254, 338. 422
ill Korca: 211
motorized: 172
orga nized: 62
rcnctivlltcd: 243,395,397
reorgani zed: 182. 402
INDEX
Infantry Division, 6th- Continued
and tmining maneuvers, 1940: 143-45
Infl11llry Division, 7[h
199Os: 423
between the world wftrs: 8[,98,117,120
inactiva ted: 98,346,422
in Jal'an; 232,239,240,241
in Korea: 211. 241-42, 246, 251. 279. 284,
308,346
!!lotorized: 172
and Opemlion JUST CAUSe: 403
organized: 62
reactivated: 147
reorganized: 308, 364- 65, 395
round-oulunits for: 370
World War II : 180
Infantry Division. 8th

1990s: 422
between the world wars: 99,117. 120
in EUTOJlC: 279,303,305,308,337,355
motori zed: 172
organized: 62
post- Korean War: 2S 1
rcacth'atcd: 147,243
reorganized: 159, 182
and Siberian Expedition: 66
and World War I: 73
Infantry Division. 9[h

between the world wars: 99,117,120
in EUTO\>C: 251
innclivatcd: 208, 284, 421
organi<:ed: 65
rc:lclivntcd: 147,222,325,355
reorganized: 402,403
used for org.lnizntiollnl tests: 39 1, 400
in Vietnam : 334,343,3501137
Infantry Division, 241h. See a/so Division,
Ila waiian.
1990s: 423
in Genml1lY: 279,303,305.308,337,344
in J;,p:m: 232,239. 240
in Korea: 240,241,245-46,247-48.251,
2581117,279
organi zcd: 155
reorganized: 364-65,38],402
in Southwest Asia: 421 - 22
Infantry Division, 25th
19905: 423
in Bawaii: 251,252,326,36 1
in Japan: 232, 239
in Korea: 240,246,249- 50
organi1.cd: 155,156
rC;1(liness of: 305
457
Inl:,ntry Division, 25th- Continued
reorganized: 279. ]55, 395
in Victrmm: 326 27,330,343,344
Infantry Division Forward, 1st: 422
Infantry divisions
c0I11111andm,d control of: 83,84,1 27,129,
130.13 1,132,133, 144-45,185, 198,
224,227,269,282,297
motorizcd: 150, 172, 179, 180, 182, 184
road sp..lce required for: 24.33- 34,38, 40,
92
stationing of: 3 1,98- 99, 112,117,120.133,
150,212,243.252,306,338.340,344,
422- 23
lnl:,ntry divisions. composition of
AIM: 355
Annyofthe Potomac: 12- 13, 14
AH A- I : 265,267.269
between the world wars: 120, 135, 144-45
Division Rcstmcturing Study: 380, 382- 84
Field Se""ice Regufllliolls o f 1905: 24- 25
Field Se,.";<:e Regufflfiolls of 1910: 27- 28,
29-30
Infan try School propos:,1 (I 950s): 264
KOI'Cnl1 Wnr period: 247
Lassiter Committee: 91 - 92,94- 95
Mexican War: 10,11 - 12
Modemization Board: 127.129- 33
pentomic: 276- 77.281- 82.284,286
Pershing 1'1'0I>OS.1I: 87.90
l)Cst- World W.,r 11 : 223,4 16- 17
Punitive Expedition: 35
Revolutionary War: 3,5
ROAD: 296-98.308.309,3 14, 335,346- 47,
353- 54, 382, 384
square: 47-48,55,57,58,60,72- 73.83,
85- 86.87,90,91- 92.94-95,125- 26.
127,4 14.4 15,416
Stimson Plan: 33
Superior Uo:rrd recommendations: 84-86
triangu lar: 24,33.90.94.1 25- 26. 127.135,
143-44,161, 170,247,264,415- 16
in Victn:rm: 326- 27
Warofl81 2: 7- 8
War with Spain: 16- 17
World War I: 47- 49.52- 53,54,55.83
Infnntry di vis ions, designations for
air 3ssault divisions: 356
ainnobilc divisions: 334-35
Civil War: 14,16
and designations ror brigades: 57- 58,
306- 07, 3221144
Field Se/'vice Regll/miolls of 1910: 28
Mc;>(iclU' Wa r: 12
post- World W;t rl l: 2 12- 13,2 17
458
Inf..111'ry di visions, designations for- Continued
priorities for: 213,422- 23
territorial: 99
used for rep lace ment traini ng ce nters: 222
World War I: 57- 58
World War II : 156
Infmllry divisions. numhcrs of: 364- 65,403,
42 1- 24
aOcr the war in Vietnam : 325,332- 33
between Ihe world wars: 86-87,97- 98, 101,
104
posi- Korean War: 252.254,279.284,286

posl-Victnam : 346,353- 57,36 1
po5l- World War II : 207,208,2 12
World War I: 55.57- 58, 64, 73
World War II : 169,179, 192.193.207
Infantry di visions, stalT
ATFA- I: 265,267,269
chief of staff: 24-25. 28, 49. 55
Civil Wa r: 12. 14
Ft.-dend Service R'1:lIhlliOl/s of 1905: 24-25
Federal Sen'ice Regll/miolls of 1910: 28
Mexican War: 12
Modcmi zation Board: 129, 132
orguni1..1tion of: 67
posl- Revolutionary War: 6- 7
Rcvoluliona ry Wa r: 3
ROClD: 282
Warof l81 2: 9
WlI r wi th Spain: 17
World War 1: 49,55,67
World War 11 : 18 1
Infantry divisions, strength

1917: 38
1940: 144-45, 150,155,161
1943: 180-82
1945: 1%, 199
1946: 2 11- 12
I970s: 353- 54
AH A- I : 265,267,269
between the world wars: 8 1,98, 1061142,
127, 132, 133
Federal Service Regula/ialls of 19 10: 28
lind Ge nernll30ard (ETO): 223
Inr.,ntry School proposlIl ( 19505): 264
in Japan : 239
and lassiter Committee: 91- 92, 95
Mexican border buildup, 191 1: 30
Mode nlizntion Board: 127, 132, 133
motori zed divisions: 166
pe ntomic di visions: 276-77. 282
Pershiug proposal: 87.90
post- Korean War: 252
post- World War 11: 2 12
Revolutionary W:lr: 5
Infantry di visions, strength- Continued

ROC ID: 282
Stimson Plan: 33
SU[lCriof Bo,\rd recommendations: 85
War lIIilh Sp:li1l: 17
World War I: 49,52- 53,67.7 1
World War II : 180- 81
In fantry divisions, t"blcs of organi za tion
1917: 37- 38
1940: 169-70
1942: 161
1943: 180-82
1945: 96, 198- 99
lassiter Committee: 92. 95
post- Korean War: 252
post- World WHf II : 222- 23,225,227,252
ROAD: 298
ROCID: 276- 77,279.282,284,286
World War I: 49,55
Inr:lI1lry divisions (units)
101 h: 250, 25 1. 253. 279. See also
Mountain Division, 10th.
23d: 252. 254, 33 1, 332, 334, 335
241h, See Infantry Divis ion, 24th.
25th. See Infantry Division. 25th.
26th: 58.60.67. 68, 100. 159- 60,2 14,341 .
367, 400, 423- 24
27th: 68, 100, 159, 2 14,255- 56
28th: 68, 100. 159,214, 243,246-47,250- 5 I.
328,367,400.423- 24
29th: 2 14, 340, 397, 40 I
301h: 68, 100, 152, 159,2 14,255- 56, 36 1
] l s1: 58.69.71.100, 101 , 159,21 4,24].
250- 51
32d: 58,68,79, 100, 159. 2 14,305.307
33d: 58,68,79. 100, 159- 60, 214
34th: 58,7 1, 100,187.214,3 12
35th: 58.68. 100,2 14,312,395, 401
36th: 58, 100,1 59, 2 14, 328
37th: 58, 100, 159,2 14.243-44,246,250- 51
38th: 58,71,100,2 14,328,367,400, 424
39th: 58.69,71,100- 101 ,2 14
40th: 58,69,7 1, 100,115,2 11 ,2 14, 243,
244-46.249,255- 56,36 1, 401
41st: 58.60.62.67,68.69.7 1, 100,1 52,
159,2 14,328
42d: 60,67,68.79. 100, 190,208,214,341.
367.400, 423- 24
43d: 100. 159.2 14.243,246-47,250-51.
312
441h: 100, 12 1, 152,2 14- 15.243-44,246,
250,251,255- 56
451h: 100,1 52.2 14,215.243.244-46,249.
250
46th: 2 14
INDEX
Infantry divisions (units)- Continucd
47th: 214,243.251,328, ) 40. 367, 400
48th: 214,215,255- 56
491h: 328
51st: 214,215,312
52d: 214.220- 21
S3d: 312
551h: 312
61sl: 204//36
62d: 2041136
63d: 190,255, )09, 329

671h: 2041136
68th: 2041136
69th: 190,251. 254
70th: 190,255
71sl: 252.254
72d: 2041136
73d: 204//36
74th: 2041136
75th: 190,255.424
76th: 58,60,69.7 1.101 ,179,217,255.372
77th: 58,60,68,101, 169.2 17,309,329
78th: 58,60,68,101, 179.255,372.424
79th: 58, 60, 67, 101, 217. 309, 312, 329
801h: 58,60,67,68,10 1. 217,255,372,
424. See als/) Airbomc divisions, 801h.
8 lst: 58,60,72,101,217,309,329
82d: 58,60.68,101.166-67. Seea/so
Airbomc Division, 82d.
8ld: 58.60,69,7 1,101,217,309.329

84lh: S8. 60, 71. 101. 255.424. Seed/SO
Airborne divisions, 84th.
85th: 58,60,69,7 1, 101. 217, 255, 372. 424
86th: 58,60,7 1, 101 ,200,208,2 17
87th: 58,60,71,101,217,255,424
88th: 58,60.101,21 1- 12.217.232
89th: 58,60,79.101, 188,2031127,217,
255.372
90th: 58,60,79,101,172,182,217,309.329
9lst: 58,60,10 1,217,255,372,424
92d: 62- 63,81,1071153,170.220
93d: 170.220
94th: 63- 64,101, 107115J, 217, 309, 312, 329
95th: 66, 101,200,217,255,424
96th: 66.101,217,309.312,329
97th: 66.101,170,179.190.200,217
98th: 66, 101, 217, 255. 424. See a/so
Airbomc di visions. 98th.
99th: 66,10 1,217,306- 07
100th: 66. 101, 255. 305 , 307, 372. 424.
See (I/so Airbo111c div isions, 100th.
101st: 66.101,166- 67. Sec (llsQ Airborne
Division.lO l st.
102d: 66,101.217.309,329
103d: 101.107//53.169.217.309,312,329
459
Infantry divisions (units)- Continued
104th: 101,1071153,200,2 17.284, 424
105th: 170
100th: 190,221
107th: 170
108th: 255,424. See 1I1S() Ai rbome divisions,
108th.
Infantry fighting vchicle, Bradley: 386,389
Infantry regimcnts: 3- 7, 14,20113,28,29.33,
38,48,53,54,55,57.8 1,92,1 11- 12.
127,130- 3 1, 160- 61. 163, 180-8 1,
182,198,199,225.227.247 48
Infantry regiments (units)
5th: 188, 241
6th: 147,150
91h: 61
91h, 3d Ballal ioll: 249- 50
14th: 188. 249- 50
15th, 3d Batlalion: 249- 50
16th: 52
161h, Isi llallalion: 3501137
18th: 52
21sl, 3d Battalion: 346
23d: 61
241h: 99,239,249- 50
25th: 99
26th: 52
28th: 52
28th, 3d Ballalion: 367
34th: 121,159,241.249- 50
60th, 5th Ballalion: 350l/J7
65th: 242
86th: 188
87th: 188
87th. 3d B:l!lalion: 372, 402
121st: 159
1241h: 159
132d: 159- 60
133d, 2d Bal1alion: 332
161st; 159
182e!: 159- 60
325th: 264
3271h: 167
332d: 69
339th: 69
373d: 64
3741h: 64
3751h: 64
376th: 64
442d, 100lh Battalion: 332,355
503d, Ist and 2d Battlc Groups: 3 12
Infantry School: 87,90, 126,159
divisional studies: 263-64
suppon brigade: 281 , 337- 38, 355- 56. 373
InOucn7.a cpidcmics: 771159
460
Ingk-s, U . Col.l-lany: 133,1411146
Insignia: 58,62,72, 111,222
InSj>CClors general: 17,24--25.28,30. 5S
InlerAmerican Peace Force: 329
JOWll
Army Reserve units: 340-4 1
N:ltionul Guard units: 2 17.] 12. 332
Italy: 69.198.208,21 1- 12.217,232

Ives, Maj. J. Ross: 1071150
" Ivy Division." See Infantry Division, 4th.
Japan: 208,211- 12,232,239,240-41,244-46,
249,279
Johnson, Gencl1lll-larold K.: 324.326 27,334
Johnson, Louis: 243, 332
Johnson, Lyndon 13.: 323.325.329- 30,332

Joint Chie fs ofStalT
and ainnobilily of Amly units: 316
and Dominican Republic: 329
and Korean War: 240,243- 44
Jones, Maj. Gen. Lloyd E.: 188
Joyce, Uri g. Gen. Kenyon A.: 135.145,147
Judge advocates: 9, 25.28.55
Kansas Na tional Guard units: 3 12, 332, 395
Kennedy. John F.: 291,303,3 18
Kentucky Na ti onal Guard units: 383,395
Kibl er, Brig. Gen. A. Franklin: 222- 23
Kilooumc, Brig. Gcn. Charlcs E.: 120
King, Maj. Campbell: 90.94
Knox, HCIJl"y: 7
Korc"
miliulI)' advisory group in: 2 11

occupation forces in: 208.211,232
U.S. forces in: 239- 56,258,,/7,279,284,
286,305,308.3 16. 318.323.332- 33,
400-401,422
Korean Augmelltation to the Uni ted States
Aml y ( KATUSA) program: 240, 242,
284.286,308,400-40 1.418
Knlcger, Maj. Gen. Walter: 132, 133
L"ird. Mc lvi n R. : 353
Lane. Capt. Anhur W.: 90
Lassiter. Col. William: 31, 87, 90
Lassiter Committee (1920): 90- 92. 94-95
Leadcrship academics: 370.372. See(llso
Training divisions.
Lee. Maj. Gell. Charles: 3- 4
Lce. Brig. Gen. William c.: 166
Legion of the Uni ted Slates: 6-7
Liddel1l1arl. Basil: 120,122
Liggell. Maj . Cell. Hunter: 60
Light dragoons: 5- 6
Light (Pack) Di vision. 89th: 188,190. See
Lighl ( I'llck) Division, 89th- Contin ued
(llso Infantry di visions, 891h.
Lincoln, Abraham: 12,13
Liller b..111:11ions: 85. St.'!! (liso Medical regiments.
Little John roc kets: 300, 305, 314, 3 16, 3 18
Lock, Maj. Morris E.: 741112
Logan, Maj. James A.: 34
Lanning, Col. St:lIlley N.: 263
Louisiana Na ti ol1;ll Guard units: 100-101.
361,365
Lynch. Maj. Gen. Gl'Orge A.: 130
Lynch. Maj. Gen. Gcorge E.: 269
MacArthur. General Douglas: 60
as Chier ofStnO': 117. 120, 123, 126
and Korean Wllr: 240-42
and World War II : 156, 158, 187, 19[
McC[el[an, Maj. Ge n. Georgc B.: 12- 13
McC[ure, Orig. Gen. Nathaniel F.: 33, 41 3
McElroy, Neil l L: 284
Machinc Gun Battalion, 3d: 60
Machinc Gun Ballalion [Marines), 6th: 61
Machine gun b.1ualions: 52, 55,67, 84, [27,
145.147
Machine gun com panies: 33,38,48,53,67,
7 1,84,90,92. 122, 130.131
Machine gun squadrons: 95,115,135
Machine gun troops: 211,1 12, [ 15, 125,135,
137, 145, [61
Machine gu ns
.30-ealiber: 13 1. [67
.50-ca[i ber: 13 1, 144 . 161
air-cooled: 126
an tiai rcraft: 67
M60: 286. 305
McKinley, Willia m: 16-17
McNair, LI. Gen. Lesley J.: 130-3 1, 159.
160- 61. 163, 166- 67, ISO. 181 - 82,
184-85. 187- 88,20 1,4 16
McNamara, Robert S.: 303,305- 06,307,314,
316,3 18,325,326,328- 29,338,340-4 1
McNamey, Gcncra[ Jose ph T.: 169, 182, [88,
213- [4
Magruder. Brig. Gen. Bnlce: 147, 149,150
Maintcnance battalions: 163, [85,223,267.
269,272.296-97.337,382.386.393,
397.400,401
Maintenance cOIllp.1nics: 229.265.338,340,
380,386
Maneuver arca commands: 372
751h: 255, 424
871h: 255, 424
Mancuvcr Division (1911): 29- 30.34
Mancuver clements, intcrch;1I1gability of: 29 [,
296,297- 98,303.308,309
INDEX
461
M:LIlcuvcrs,lmining
1902: 25
1904: 25
1927: 112
1940: 143-44
General Hcad<[uartcrs (O HQ): 143-45, [47,
153, [54-55, 160, 161 , 163, 173111
Louisiaml: 143-45, 147, 173112
National Guard: 100- 101,361 ,365

Mallll, James Robert: 151131
Mann, Brig. Gen. Willinlll A.: 40 , 60,751131
March, Gencrol Peyton C.: 62,80- 8 1,83,86.
92,95,97.98,99
Marine Brigade, 4th: 60, 98
Marines
5th: 60-61, 98
61h: 61
Marsh, John 0.: 4091136
M:'lrShall, Gcncml George
c.:
90,94, 130,
133,137 . 1~ , 1~150,15 3, [54,1~
158- 59,160- 61,166,179,180.181 - 82,

190,192, 194,21 2,4 16
Maryland National Guard units : 2 15 , 367, 397
Massachusetts
Amly Reserve units: 312,340-41
National Guard units: 159- 60
Mnlcricl l1111nagcl11cnt centers: 354-55, 356,
357,386.393.397,401
Mt,(;hanization: 120- 23,125,149
Mechanized Force: 123, 124
Mechanized Force 13oard: 122, 1401/35
Mechanized infantry baualions: 365, 366- 67,
402
and AIM: 354,355
and AmlY of Excellence: 400-40 I
in Army Reserve: 341
nnd Division-86: 389
and Division Restructuring Study: 380
in Europe: 337
National Gunrd: 309,336,3511148
in Regular Anny divisions: 344
reorganized as infantry ballalions: 324,327
and ROAD: 296,297,306,307- 08,309,
384,386
and TRJCAP/ACC13 : 359
in Viet nam: 325, 326- 27,332,335,336,
3501/37
wCll po ns for : 374115
Mechanized inf.1llt ry divisions: 149- 50,293,
296- 98,306,308,336,344.353- 55,364.
380,383.389,395
Medie,llbauulions: 49,1 19, 144, ISO, 181,
185,225,277,296- 97,382, 386,389,
393,397.400,401
Medical companics: 194- 96.225,265,269,
Medical companics- Continucd

272,274,28 1,338,340,386
Medical detachments: 129.194-96.225.239.
269
Medical regiments (divisional ): 94, 11 2
Medical squadrons : 115,135, 13 7, 147. 191
Medical units (early): 28,30.35.115
Mediterranean theater: 190.191
Meuse-A rgonne campaign: 7 1, 72- 73
Mexican Revolution: 29- 30
Mcxican Wllr: 10- 12
Mexi!':o: 10- 12,29- 30,34- 37,64,99
Meyer. General Ed ward c.: 379.384, 389,
390.391
Michig,lll Nlltional Guard units: 367
Miles. Maj. Gen. Nelson A.: 17
Military districts: 27
Military history detachments: 330
Military intelligence baualions: 384.386,389.
392- 93.397,401,4101140
Military intelligence briglldes: 392
Militnry intclligence companics: 355,402
Miliwry intclligencc detachments: 276,330
Military personnel, shortages of
for Amly-86: 389- 90
bctwecn the world wnrs: 81,111 - 11, 120,147
post- Korean War: 252, 256, 308
post-Vietnam period: 361, 366
post- World Wnr II: 212.22 1- 22
reserve units: 221 - 22, 367. 370, 372
Rcvolulionnry Wa r: 3,5
in Vietnam: 326.328- 29.347
World War J: 71
World War I I: 172, 180, 182. ! 92, 198, 199
Militllry 1}()lice
ATF A- I: 267
sources for: 33, 3501134
World War J: 52- 53,84
Military police companies (divisional): 159
AmlyofExccllence: 392- 93 . 397
ATFA- l: 267,269
in brigades: 326
Gencral 130,lrd (ETO): 223
in Japan: 239
Lassiter Committee: 94
Modernization Board: 131 , 132
motorized divisions: 163.166
I}()st- World War II: 227,239
ROAD divisions: 296.384
World War II: 198- 99
Military police groups: 392
Military police platoons: 161 , 167. 181. 182.
194-96.330
Militia brigades: 6- 8. 10, 12, 16. See also
NllIional GUllrd.
462
Militia Bureau: 40,57, 115,116
Millikin, MlU. Gen. John: 188
Minnesota
Amly Reserve \lnil~: 312,340-41
Naliolllli Guard units: 115.153, 217,243
Missiles
Chaparral: 354-55,389
ENTAC: 297
Lance: 354-55
Rcdcyc: 337
Stinger: 389,393
TOW: 354,374115,380, 382,383, 386, 393,

397, 400
Mississippi Na ti ona! Guard units: 100- 101 ,
24],361
Missouri Nlltional Guard units: 312, 314, 395
Mi tchell, Co1. William (Billy): 91
Mobile, Ala.: 16
Mobile Afloat (Riverine) Force: 325
Mobility Requirements l3oard: 314
Mobilization planning: 414- 15
1970s: 370,371 - 72
aficr the War with Sp,Lin: 23- 24
bCllI'ccnthcworldwMS: 87,98,99.101,
104,115,117,120, 143-44,
"comc-as-you-arc for \VnT" mode: )70,384,
386
Korean War: 24).--45,254
lack of: 30
pre-World War I: 34-35,38
post- World War II : 214
Stimson l'I,m: 31- 34
Moderni;.:ation Board: 127,129- 33.135.137.
1411146
Mohr, Maj. Gen. Henry: 370
MOMAR- I (Modern Mobile Arnly 1965):
291,293
Montana ArnlY Reserve units: 312
Monterrey, Mexico: 10
Moore, Maj. Dan T.: 48.52
Moore, Lt. Gen. James E.: 282
Mortar batteries: 272, 276, 277. See al,\'o
Baltle grOUI)S.
Mortar platoons: 282, 325.335,393
Mortars
4.2-inch: 247-48,265, 272, 282.286.335,
393
60-m111.: 167
81-lnm.: 127, 131. 144. 147, 167,247-48.
335
Slakes: 54,55, 67,84-85
Moseley, Cap\. George Van Horn: 31.32
Motor repair sections: 112. 122
Motor vehicles
arnlOrcd: 122- 23,127.150, 161,163,198
Motor vehicles-Continued
nrmorcd personnel enrricrs. See ArnlOrcd
personnel cnrriers.
halfwlck: 150
HMMWVs: 393
maimenance of: 129,132
nUl11bcrsof: 95, 121 , 150,161,182,184,
277,314, 318,325
repair of: 161. 163
scou t cars: 150
variety of: 184, 185
Motorcycles: 95, 121 , 161, 184, 185, 386,
389,393
Motori zation: 120- 23,126,133,172,182,184
Motorized divisions
1940s: 163, 166
1980s: 395, 397,400
41h: 172,182,184
6th: 182
8th: 182
9th: 391
90th: 182
Mountain Division. 10th: 190,193,200, 213,
395,402,4091136,423,425. See also
Int:1 ntry divisions. 10th.
MUTl11ansk Expedition: 69
Mustcrofficers: 24- 25,28
Naco. Ariz.: 34
"National ArnlY" units: 55 , 80, 81
Na tional Defel1~e Act of 1916: 37,55,57, 65,
83
National Defense Act of 1920: 86- 87,95, 97.
99- 100, 1071149.109,213- 14,2341116
N;nional Guard
allotment of units: 99- 10 I. 214-15, 309
command headquarters maintained: 312
undCongress: 4311/2, 213- 14
districts: 32, 36
federalization of: 36,37,55,58,65,152- 53,
243-44.246.249,250-51.305.332
officer billets: 153, 214
and pentomic divisions: 284,286
post- World War 11 reorgan ization o f: 213- 17
roun d-out units. See Round-out units.
Selected Reserve Force: 328- 29, 341
state units. Sce by ill(/il'i(/II(1ls/(l/c.
troop basis: 214.255- 56
National Guard Association: 213- 14, 215- 16
Na tional Guard Bureau: 100, 116,153, 214,
215.367
National Guard divisions
between the world wars: 87, 97,99- 100,
101. 104. 115- 16
geographic bases for: 57
INDEX
National Guard divisions- COlltinued
rnulti~talc; 2 15, 3 12, 338, 361, 367, 395
numbers ofdivisiolls and brigades: 32,37,
40, 57, 97, 152- 53,2 14, 246, 254, 284,
286, 309, 338, 340-41, 353, 359, 361,
367,397,423- 24
463
Nuclcnr weapons, tactical-Continued
Little John: 300, 305. 314. 316, 318
placement in military organizations: 263,
267,271,272,274,276- 77,279.282,
293,296- 97,308,316.318,417
Nunn 1Ullendmcnt: 366- 67,3761131
sl<lIC. See by illlliv;dlwi sUlle.
National Guard of the United Slales: 214,246,

251
National Guard units
command arrangements: 215, 312, 338, 36 1,
395
deSignations of: 57- 58,246
dndlccs assigned 10: 152- 53
tederal recognition of: 115,215
and Field Service Regll ia/iolls of 1905: 25
missions of: 25. 32, 97, 2 14
mobilization of( 1940): 152- 53
preservation of hi slOrical continuity in:
214- 15
reorganized: 1 15- 16, 158- 60, 215, 220- 22.
284,309.312,314,338,340-41,359,
361,367,395,401 - 02
replacements for fcdeTlllized units: 246
state. See by ;,,(/;v;((II(l1 stale.
"National" regiments: 29
National Security Act of 1947: 227
Ncbraska National Guard units: 312.395
Ncvad:1 National Guard units: 403
New Calcdonia: 159
New Guinea: 187- 88,191
New Jcrscy National Guard units: 214- 15,
367,401
New Mcxico National Guard units: 36,217
New Orleans, La.: 16
New York National Guard units: 27.32.36,
115,153,2 14,255- 56,367.395
New York Timcs: 130
Nixon. Richard M.: 341,344.346
Nison Doctrine: 346,353
North African theater: 172, 179,18 1- 82, 184,
187- 88,190- 91
North Atlan ti c Treaty Organization (NATO):
207,246-47, 250.307,337.344.347.
359.403
North Carolina National Gunrd units: 255- 56,
361
North Dakota National Guard units: 217, 243
Nuclear battlefield: 263.267.270- 71. 281- 82,
286.291,293,297,298
Nuclcar wcapons, tactical: 207,263,270
Davy Crockctt: 297.298,308,324,337
doctrinc for thc lise of: 272. 298
I-lonest John: 271,274.277,282,296- 97,
298,300,305,307,308,309.324,354- 55
Obscrvation S{IUadrons: 125,135, 137

Occupation forces: 207- 08
Austria: 208
Germany: 208, 211
Italy: 208
Japan: 208
Korca: 208, 21 1,232
Philippine Islands: 208
Officcr billcts
AmlY Rcservc: 284, 309, 312
brigades: 28 1, 312
divisions: 91.129,132, 133, 144-45, [85.
223,224,227
Gcncral Board (ETO): 224-25
Modernization Board: 129.132,133
Natio nal Guard: 153 ,2 14
post- World War II: 224-25,227
ROAD: 296- 97,309,3 12
ROCID: 282
ROTAD: 276
shortagcs or: 17,58
tmining of: 58
Officers, lack of: 54-55
Ohio National Guard units: 243-44,367.424
Okinawa: 305,309,3 12,323,344
Oklahoma Na ti onal Guard units: 215.243
"Old Ironsides." See AmlOred Division, 1st.
'Old Rcliablcs." See Inflmtry Division. 9th.
Olivcr. Robert Shaw: 27
Onc Station Unit Training program: 372
Opcrations
B IG Ltn: 305
DESERT SfllELO/ DESERT STOR"t: 403,
407,421 , 425
JUST CAUSE: 403, 425
TORCIl : 179
Ordnancc battalions: 150,247,277
Ordnancc companies; 94, 125, [3 [, 132, 150.
163,166, 167, 181,182.194-96.281
Ordnance light maintcnance company: 161
Ordnancc rnaill1enance companies: 94, 95
Ordnance maintenance pla toon: 122
Ordnanccofficers: 12.14,17,24-25,28.55.
92,94
Ordnance troops: 135,137
Oregon National Guard uni ts: 403
Organized Reserve Corps: 37,2341116
cavalry divisions: 97- 98, 101, 120. 170
MANEUVER AN D FIREPOWE R
464
Organized Reserve Corps-Continued
illf:mlry divisions: 97- 98.169- 70,217,254

missions: 97, 214
organization of units: 101. I 16- 17, 169- 70
post- World War II reorganization of: 213- 17
strength: 87,97- 98.109
troop basis: 215,217
units: 166.169- 70.215- 17.220- 22.229.
232
usc of dcsignntions for independent brigades:
306-07
Pack IT:lins: 24,25,28,33
I
Page, Maj. J . Walt: 1071150
Paladin: 425. See also Howitzer.;, 155-111111.

I'almer, Gcncmll3rucc, Jr.: 338,357,359
I'almer, Lt. Co1.10hn McAuley: 31,48,52
)';mama Canal ZOlle: 99, 1071149
infantry regiments from: 65
U.S. forces in: 252,307,309.333,338,356,
372- 73,402, 403,423

l'anzcrdivisions(Gcrman): 147, 149- 50
Paper orglmiznlions
field annics: 28- 29
inf.111lry divisions: 98.101. 104. 109- 12,
120,208,344,347,356, 417- 18
Pnnlehute field artillery battalions: 193
PiH'<lchute Infuntry Brigade, 1st: 169
I'nf:tehute infnntry regiments: 166-67,193,
194--96
502d: 167
504th: [67
Parachute maimcnancc companies: 194--96,229
I'nfkcr. Maj. Gcn. Fmnk: 122,125- 26
Pa rson. Maj. Gen. James K.: [30
P,ltch, Maj. Gen . A[exilllder M.: 159- 60
Pathfinder teams: [93, 229
Pnttcrson, Robert 1'.: 199
PaxolI, Frederic L.: 81
Paymllsters: 20112
Pennsylvania
Anny Reserve units: 3 [2. 340-4 [
Nationa[ Guard units: 32,36,243.367
I'ENTANA. See "Doctrina[ illld
Orgllnizationll[ Concepts for AtomicNonatomie Amly During the Period of
1960- 1970."
Pentomic divisions: 270- 77,279. 281 - 82, 284,
286. 2881124. 1127, 291,297,303,307-08,
31S
Pershing, General John J. : 35, 36- 37, [051117
:IS chicf of stll1T: 94- 95, 11 I
<lnd Lassiter Commillee: 90,91,92,94,95
lind Superior Bonrd: 83.85- 86.87.90,
105/112
Pershing, Genera[ 10hn 1.- Continued

lind World War I: 49,52,53,54--55,58,
60-6 [ ,64,65,67-69.71 - 72. 761132, 79, 81
Personnel service companies: 265, 267, 382,
401
Peyton, Co1.l'hilip B.: 1411146
Philippine Islands: 18, 99,1071149
militia in: 66
occupation forces in: 208
and Philippine Seoll1s: 99.158,212
and World War I: 65- 66
and World Warl l: 152, 156,158,[59
Photogmphic sections: 85, 112
Pioneer infantry: 27,54,66
Porter, M:lj. Gen. R:ly E.: 2 16
Powell, Genem l Herbert B.: 293.296,298,
300,303,306
Preparedness movcment: 32
Provisioual lnf.1ntry Division (1'1 0): 130
l>rovisiOllal Tank Brigade: 147.149,150
[>rovost marshals: 24- 25, 28, 33, 129, 131
Public infomlation detaehmcnts: 330
Public Works Administration: 121
Puerto Rican Mobile Force: 153
PuerlO Ricans. segrega tion of: 63- 64. 242
Puerto Rico: 18, 99
infantry regimcnt frolll: 57,242
Niltiona[ Guard uni ts: 153 , 221, 284, 402
U.S. forces in: 252
Punitivc Expedition: 35- 37
Q uakcmcyer, Cal)!. John J.: 7411J2
Quartcrmastcr airdrop equipmcnt companies:
397
Qu<lt1crmasterbal1alions: 131- 32,133.150,
161,223,227
Quartcrmaster compllnics: 125, 161, 18 [, 182.
194- 96,229,277.281
Q uartermastcrCorps: 33,57, ISO
Quartennaster light maintenance comp,mies:
129, 132
QUllrtennasler service comp..1nies: , 27, 129, 131
Quartermaster squadrons: 135,137, 147
Quartcrmastcrtrains: 92, 112
Quarccrmastcrs: 4--5, 8- 9. 10, 12, 14, 17.
20n2. 24--25, 28, 55
Rac ial integr:ltion of the Army: 249- 50
Radar sec tions: 281
Radio intelligence platoons: 181. Sce ats()
Signal com panics.
Radiological centers: 284
Ibdios: 30,84,335
cxeess of: 382- 83
I'M: 267
465
INDEX
Radios- Continued
tIl'O-wlly: 122- 23
"Rainbow Division": 60. See (I{SO lllf.1l1try
divisions, 42d.
Ready Reserve: 255

Receiving companies: 284
Reckard, Maj. Gen. Milton A.: 1071150,215- 16
Reconnaissance
air squadrons used for: 38,85,94

aircraft used for: 30
as cavalry mission: 48-49,1 23, 127
Reconnaissance airoomc assault vehicles: 300.
357
Reconnaissance and SlIIVCilllll1CC ]>lnloon5: 277,
282,284
Reconnaissance battalions: 149, [63,227,267,
269,277
Reconnaissance COml)anics: 163, 225, 229, 239,
265
R("~ollnais~ancc
platoons: 194- 96, 282, 297,
325,393
Reconnaissance s([lmdrons: 127, 13 1. 135,
137, 161, 172, 185, 248-49, 276- 77, 282,
284,2881124,296- 97,298.300.309.324,
335,337,382,384,386,389,393.397,
400
Rcconnaiss.1nce Troop, 99th: 306
Reconnaissance troops, brigades: 281, 303,
325,326.346
Rcconnaissance troops, divisional: 144.159.
161,169- 70,182,185,191,198- 99.272.
276,425
Reed. Maj. Gen. George W.: 64
Regimental combat teams
as basis of divisions: 252, 415
eliminated: 281,284
Modemization Board: 129.131
WorldWarll: 144- 45, 172
Regimcntal combat teams (units)
4th: 281
5th: 241
65th: 242
187th: 274
508th: 274
Register ojthe Ar/lly. The ( 1813): 8-9
Reillforcement bnHalions: 223
" Reorganizati on Objcctive Amly Divisions
(1961- 1965)" (ROAD). See by type oj
divisioll.
Replacement and school divisions: 54,67.68
Rep];lcclIlcnt eOlllp:lIIies: 225.227.229.239
Replacemcnt personne!
post- World War II : 223,270
World War I: 62, 63, 68. 69. 71, 73, 761132
World War 11: 179, 198
Replacement systems: 240, 241, 252- 53. See

(1150 GVRoscorr.; program.
l{eplacementtraining centers: 222,249,
254- 55,284,286
Reporl 01/ the Orgallizmioll oj Ltllld Forces oj

Ihe Ullited States (Stimson ['[an): 31
Repub[ic of Korea Amly: 240,250.251,
271 - 72
Rescrve command (amlored divisions): 185,
227
Reserve Omcer Training Corps (ROTC): 222,
418
Reservists, individual: 87,97,243
Resor, Stanley: 341
Return of Forces to Europe (REFORG IOR): 337.
See also Exercises.
Revolutionary War: 3- 7
Rhode Island National Guard units: 243
Ri ch, Lt. Gen. Charl es W. G.: 316
Richards, Col. George c.: 1071150
Ridgway, General MaHhew 13.: 166, 193- 94,
249- 50,252,264- 65,270- 71
Rines
automatic: 53.67.741114, 180- 81,247- 48.
305,318,325,335
Browning(BAR): 67,74/114
Garand: 129
M 14: 286,305,318.325
MI6(MX16 EI ): 318,335
reeoillcss: 198,2051157,247-48,286,300,
335,354,374115
semiautomatic: 122- 23.126.129
Riverine operations: 325
ROAD divisions. See by Iype ojdivisioll.
ROCAD (Reorganiz.1tion of the Current
Annorcd Di vision). See AmlOrcd divisions.
Roehcnbaek.l3rig. Gen. Samuel 0.: 91
ROCID (Rcorganiza ti on of the Current
Infantry Division). See Infantry divisions.
Rockets
air-to-ground: 314
Honest John: 271,274,271. 282, 296-97,
298,300,305,307,308,309,324,354-55
Littlelohn: 300,305.314,316.318
Illultiple.launeh: 40 1,425
Sllrfaee-to-surfhcc: 27 1
Rooscvelt, Franklin D.: 154,169
Root , Elihu : 23,25
Rosson. Maj. Gen. William E.: 3491120
ROTAD (Reorganization of the Airbomc
Division). See Airborne divisions.
Round-out units: 337,355,357,359,361,
364-65.370,373.395,400,402,403,
4101144,418,421 - 22,426
Rumbold, Col. Frank M.: 1071150
466
Russia: 65,69,74117
Russian Amly: 125
S~n
Antonio, Tex .: 29- 30
San Diego, Calif.: 29- 30

Sanitary (collecting) baUalion~: 94. Sec (l/:m
Medical regiments.
Sanitary trains: 38,67,85,94

Saxe, Marshal Mau rice de: 7
Schofield Barracks, Hawaii: 99, 112,252,
326,332,338,355,361,395,423
SCOII, Brig. Gen. Charles L.: 150
Scon, Maj. Gen. !-Iugh L.: 47-48,49,52,62,
74117
Scotl. Maj. Gen. Winfield: 7- 8,9,10- 11
"Screaming Eagles." See Airbomc Division,
IOlst.
SC;lman, Maj. Gen. Jonathan 0 .: 324
Section V committee: 99- 100, 1071150,
213- 14, 254-55.2601142

Segregation. racial
blacks: 62- 63,66,154,170
C ivil War: 15
Korean War: 242,249- 50
Puerlo Ricans: 63- 64
Selected Reserve Force: 328- 29,341
Service batteries: 181 , 182

Scrviceconlpanies: 13 1- 32,163,184-85
Service troops, cavalry regiments: 95, 125
Service troops command, divisional: 129, 130,
131, 132
Services of Supply: 68, 69. 71
Sheriilim, M551 amlOTC<1 n:~onnaiss..1nce vehicle:
300, 335, 361
Sheridan, Maj. Gen. Philip n .: 13
Ships, shonages of
World War I: 55, 68
WorldWarll: 180,182,187- 88,191,193
Shon, Lt. Gen. Walter C.: 155
Siberian Expedition (1918): 66
Siben, Brig. Gen. Willimn L.: 52
Sicilian eilmpaign: 193
Signal baualions: 28,38, 49,52- 53,198- 99,
265,267,269,272,276- 77.296,384,
392- 93,397
Signal brigades: 392
Signal companies: 24, 25, 28, 94, 127, 131.
132, 149- 50, 181. 182, 359
Signal detachments: 127, 130
Signal officers (division stall): 24-25,28,55, 67
Signal platoons: 28 1, 326,330
Signal troops: 95,115,135,137
Signal units: 35, 68,84,335
Simonds, Maj. Geo rge S.: 7411 12
Snow. Maj. Gen. William J.: 64
Snyder, Maj. Gen. Howilrd M.: 2361141

Solomon Islands: 187- 88
Soulh Carolina Natiorml Guard uni ts: 215, 3 12
South Dakota National Guard units: 217
South Vietnamese Anlly: 323
Southwest Asia: 403,407. 421
Southwest l'acific Area Command: 188, 190,
191
Sparks, Lt. Col. Leo nard
1411146
Special Forces Regiment. 1st: 4091125
Specialwcaponstroops: 135,137, 145,161
Spragin. Brig. Gen. Roben L.: 188
Starry, General Donn A.: 383- 84.390- 91
SllI/elllclll uf IJmper Mili/llry Policy (1915):
37.38
Steuben, Maj. Gen. Frederick Wilhelm von: 7
Stimson, Henry L. : 31, 32, 172, 190- 91
Stimson PI,m: 31 - 34,36,40
Stoncman.Brig. Gcn. George: 13
Stratcgic Army Force (ST RAF): 305- 06,307.
3191121,325,332,338,355- 56,357,373
Strategic rescrve units: 365
Stratcgic Striking Foree: 212
Strength. See by fype of dil'isioll (/lid brigade.
Sturgis, Lt. Gen. S<lnluel D. , Jr.: 271
Summerall, Maj. Gen. Charles P.: 54.741112,
110,112,117.122,123.126
Superior Board (AEF); 83- 86,87,90,94
Supply and service battalions: 357
Supply and lranspon b<lltalions: 267,269,
296-97,337.382,386,393,397,400,401
Supply and transport companies: 265.267,
269,272
Supply battalions: 163, 185.227
Supply columns: 24.25,28,29.30,33
Supply companies: 33,38,48,53,92.386.
Sec nlso Infantry regiments.
Supply system, Modernization Board: 127,
129.131- 32
Supply trains: 38, 55, 121 . See olw Supply
eolUnlns.
Suppon bntlalions: 303,325,326.359,370.
372,386,401 - 02,425
Support command (divisional): 265,267,
269- 70, 296- 97, 298,354.382,384.386,
389,392- 93,397.400
Suppon groups, divisional: 272,274,276
Surgeons: 10, 12, 17, 20112, 24-25, 28
Surles, Maj. Gen, Alexander D. : 2361141
Swing, Maj. Gcn. Joseph: 196
c.:
Tables of distribution and alloWilllces: 312,

3221143
Tables of organization. See also Airborne
divisions; Annored divisions; Cavalry
INDEX
Tnblcs oforganizalion- Colltinucd
divisions: Cavalry regiments: Infantry
divisions; Infantry regiments.
creation of: 32- 34
motorized divisions: 150,163
Tables of organi1..lllion and c(tuipmcnt:
20211 J4. See ii/SO Ai r assault di visio ns;
Airoomc divisions; Armored divisions;
Atomic Field Army; Infantry divisions:

Training divisions.
Taft, William Howard: 25,34
Tank battalions
ATFA- I: 265,267,269
Division-86: 386
and Division Rcstmcturing Study: 380
GCllcmll30ilrd (ETO): 224
heavy: 227,229,248--49,267,269
li!;ht: 122,163,184-85
medium: 163,166.227,267,269
post- World Wa r [I: 225,227,239
ROAD: 296,297,300,306, )08, 309, 365
ROCA D: 277
ROCID: 276-77
as round-out units: 355
in Vietnam: 324,327,336
World War II: 196,199
Tnnk eompnnies: 92,94,115, 121 - 23,
184-85, 191, 198- 99,239,240,303,380,
382,386.402
Tank destroyer b:lualions: 154- 55, 161, 166,
184, 196, 224
Tnnk guns
7S-mm.: 277
90-mm.: 248,252,277
120mm,: 248
Tnnk units: 85
T,lIlks: 55,122- 23, ISO, 184, 185,277
M I Abmms: 389,4091120
M24: 239
M41 : 248-49
M47: 248
M48: 252
M48A3: 324,327,335
M60: 286,305,361,389
M103: 248
1'43: 248
Target acquisition balleries: 382,383,386,
389,397,425
Tnrget aequisilion systems: 380
Task forees
6814: 159- 60
"A": 179
Oregon: 330- 31.3491120
Smith: 240,252
Taylor. Genend Maxwell D.: 194,270.27 1- 72,
467
Taylor, Geneml M~xwell D.- Continued
274,276- 77,279,286, 288n27, 291, 303
Taylor, Brig. Gen. Zachary: 10, II
Tennessee National Guard units: 255- 56,36 1
Te;t;as: 10, 34
as division test site: 130, 135, 143-44
National Guard: 36, 153. 361, 383, 40 1
Texas City, Tex,: 34
Tompkins, Maj. Gen. William F.: 199
Total Army Training Strategy: 424
TOW banalions: 380
TOW companies: 383, 386
Toyahvale, Tex.: 135
"Train :lIId retai n" programs: 325
Training
advanced individual: 253.254,34 1, 370.372
air assault: 356
airborne: 166, 167, 169,190
amphibious: 180, 187- 88
annored divisions: 150,372
Army Reserve units: 424
artillery units: 68, 69
artillerymen: 13,52. 115
basic: 152,253,254,256,286,305,325,
341,370,372
eomb,lt support: 370,372
combined anns: 25,86, 117
conducted by divisions: 253,254
corps area respons ibility for: 87
draftees: 57, 60, 325
in Frnnee, Worl d War I: 52,60,68
at garrison schools: 25
Inck offacililics for: 217
lack of funding for: 2 12
light divisions: 187- 88
machine gu n units: 68,84
National Gunrd units: 25,27,87, 152- 53
officers: 24, 58,222, 418
One Station Unit Tmining (OSUT) program:
372
Organized Reserves: 116- 17.170,217,222
recruits: 52,372
of Regulllr and National Guard units together:
21
for reservists: 11 6- 17,170,2 17,222,256
Scott's Regular Anny brigade: 8
and stationing of divisions: 117, 133
usc of Regular Amly personnel for: 57,87,97
War with Spain: 17- 18
Training areas, World War 1: 57,58,62
Training brigndes: 372,402-{)3
Training eC1l!ers: 243, 250, 254, 305, 307,327
Training divisions: 243,244,249,254,255,
256,284,286,2901149,305,307,309,
34 1,370,372.402-03,424
468
Training regiments: 284,286,2901149
Tral1spor1mion
animals used for. See Animals.
llSSctS: 28, 35, 95, 167, 169, 180,298

shortat;cs of: I 1, 30, 71, 180, 182
Transportation aircraft m:linlcnancc companies:
393
Trnnsportation battalions: 276- 77. 282
Tr:msportnlion companies: 281
Trench mortar ballcrics: 52- 53,54,84- 85

Trench mortars: 48
TRICAP. See Cavalry Division, lsI.
Troopbnsis: 169, 170,1761155, 190-92,200

Amly Reserve: 255, 328- 29
National GLiard: 214- 15,255- 56,309
Tnlck bal1111iolls (divisional): 127, 129

Tnlck companies, divisiolllll: 131- 32, 182, 282
Tnlcks: 121,161,163,181,188
Tmman, Harry S.: 212,215.239, 240,
241-42,243, 246-47, 249

Twaddle, Brig. Gen, I-larry L.: 154,158- 59,
163, 169. [72
Union AmlY: 12- 16
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and Cold War: 207, 242-43,303,305
and Cuba: 307
and Eu rope: 246-47, 248, 353- 54,359,386,
403,407
Unit rcplacement systcm. See GYROSCOPE
program.
Uni ted Nations forces in Korea: 240-41, 242
U,S.AirForcc: 316,318
U.S. Arrny, Alaska: 312,346
U.S. AmlY, Caribbean: 254
U.S. Army, Eu rope: 253, 279, 336, 359,
366- 67, 402,422, 423
U.S. AmlY, Pacific: 312,332,343
U.S. AmlY, Vietnam: 324 . 333,334-35,343
U.S. Anny Airborne Command: 166- 67, 169
U.s. Amly Combined Arms Combllt
Development Activity: 4091132
U.S. AmlY Forces, Far East: 250,2591129
U.S. Amly Forces Command: 356,364-65,
366,370.372,400, 402- 03, 424
U. S. Anny Regimcntal System (USA RS): 390
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC): 380, 383, 389- 90,397,
400-402,425
U.S. Amly Training Center, Ficld ArtillelY:
254
U.s. Congress
and Anny Reserve: 256
and m1illery regiments: 43118
andtheCivilWar: 12,211134
U.S. Congress- Continucd

and Korean War: 244-45,246
and Mexican War: 10
and National Gua rd: 43///2,152- 53
;md Org,mized Rescrve Corps: 222
and post- Revolutionary War military estab
lishment: 6- 7
and Stimson Plan: 31
;md universal military tmining: 221- 22
andWarofl812: 7- 8
U.S. Constabulary: 211 , 213
U.S. Continental Amly Command
(CONARC): 253,269- 70,272, 274,
276-77,279,28 1- 82,284,286, 291,293,
298,300,303,314.316,328,341,355- 56
U.S. EUT01lCan Command: 196,200,211
U.S. Euro1lCan Thcatcr of Opcr.,tions, Gcncml
Board: 222- 24
U.S. Marine Corps: 60- 61 , 332
U.S. Navy, joint operations with: 325
Universal military training: 86,87,221 - 22
Van Voorhis. Col. D:miel: 123, 124
Vance, Cynls R.: 307,308, 309
Vera Cnlz, Mexico: 34
VemlOllt National GU<lfd units: 243,312,367
Veterinary companies: 94,95
Veterinary troops: 33,94,191
Vietnam: 323-47
rcdeploymcnt from: 343-44, 346,3521157
U.S. forees in: 323- 35,337- 38,346-47,
3501/34,1/37, 357
Vietnam, Republic of: 323,341
Virginia National Guard units: 314,397
Volunteers: 7- 8. 10-11. 12, 17- 18, 2011 / 3,325
divisions: 10- 11
and Korean War: 243
and National Gu:mi: 256
as souree for reserves: 222, 256
Wagner, Col. Arthu r L.: 27
Wagon com panics: 112, 121
Wagon drivers: 33
Wngon masters: 4-5,8- 9
Wnlker, Le. Col. Kirby: 74/112
Walker, Le. Gen. Walton 1-/,: 225, 241,248-49
"Walker Bulldog." See Tanks. M41.
Wallace, Brig, Gen. Fred C.: 163
Waller, William L.: 361
Walsh, Maj. Gcn. Ellard A.: 213- 14.215- 16
War. Col. Franklin W.: 1071150
War Department
nnd black divisions: 220
Circulars: 185, 187
and Organized Reserve Corps fL"{lrganization.
469
INDEX
Wnr
Dcparllllcnl~Conlinllcd
1946: 2 15- 17
imd post- World War II policy: 213- 14
Wa r Department General Stilff(WOG S)
crea tion of: 23
Opcmlions Division (01'0): 159- 60,1751138
Orga nization and Training Di visio n: 229
nnd r(.~ rgll1li:wlion of 191 0: 27- 28
reo rga ni za tion of 1942: 1751138, 1140
Special Plans Division: 199
War College Division: 47-48, 49,55,57,

58,63- 64,761132
War Plans Division: 63- 64,65,80,87.95,
97,99, 120
Warof18 12: 7- 9
War wilh Spain: 16- 18
Washington, George: 3- 5,6,2011 2
Washington Na tional Guard units: 355.359,
36 1, 365, 400, 403
Weapons. See by specific type.
Wee ks, John W.: 98,101
Wcibir, L1. Ge n. Wah cr L.: 254
Weils, Col. Briant H.: 48,52,90.1071150

West German AmlY: 293,296
Wes tem hemisphere, defense of: 143-44
Weslmoreland. Generul Willinm C: 323.324,
325,326,327- 28,329- 30,33 1. 332,334,
344,346.357
Weyand, General Frederick C.: 326-27,367,
380
Wickhnm, Generul John A.: 391 - 93,395.397.
400-401
" Wildeal." See Infantry di visions, SIst.
Wilso n, Ll. Col. Clmlmer R. : 1071150
Wilsoll. Charles E.: 250- 5 1. 252,279
Wilso n, Lt. Col. Guy M .: 1071150
Wilso n, Woodrow: 34,36,52,65,66
" Wilson Di visions": 252
Wisconsin National Guard unils: 359,36 1
Wood, Maj. Gen. Leonard: 29,30
Woodring, l'larry W.: 11 7
Young, Maj . Gen. Rober! N.: 252- 53,264
PIN
07501 1-000

Maneuver and Firepower. The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades by John Wilson

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ARMY LINEAGE SERIES

MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER

CENTER OF Mi LiTARY HISTORY

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Dala

VA25. W554 1997

CM H Pub 60- 14-1

ARMY LINEAGE SERIES

Mic hael J. Kurtz

Brig. Gen. Fle tcher M. Lamkin, Jr.

Maj. Gen. James J. Cravens, Jr.

e" fol A. Reardon

Col. Everett L. Roper, Jr.

George C. He rring, Jr.

Univers ity o f Vermont

Brig. Gen. Joseph R. Inge

LI. Gen. Frederick E. Vollrath

U.S. A rmy Command and Genera l

u.s. Army Cel/ler ofMililwy HislDlY

Chief, Fie ld Programs and

Brigadicr Gcnera l, USA

tions, and many o f those works we re known to military leaders in co loni al

I. EARLY EXPE RIENCES

War Wilh Spain.

2. GENES IS OF PERMANENT DIVIS IONS

The Baker Board and Pers"ing SraifOrgalliz(lliollof Study

Organizing the Divisio1ls . .

4. T HE AFTERMAT H OF WORLD WAR I

Occupation and Demobilization

TheAEF Evaluates World mw I Divisional Organizatiol/s

5 A RETURN TO H IE PA ST; A LOOK TOT HE FUTURE

7. T HE CRUC IB LE- COM BAT.

Expansion a/the Force. . . . . . . . .

D. THE TOTAL ARMY . . . . . .

14. A NEW ASSESSMENT

BIBLI OGRAPH ICAL NOTE

I. National Guard Infantry Divis ions, 19 14

Infantry Division, 1917 . .

8. The Mechanized Force, 1928 . . . .

Cava lry Division, 1938

15. In fantry Division, I August 1942

19. Infantry Di vision, 15 July 1943 .

Armored Division, 15 September 1943

47. Li ght Divi sion, 1 October 1985

Superior BOHl'd Members, 1919

General Matthew B. Ridgway . . . . . . . . .

MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER

Soldi ers orlhe AmcriC<ln Revolution, Trellton, December 26, 1776,

MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER

MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER

" brigadcd " togethe r. Because the

EA RLY EX PERI ENCES

71,e Banle of Palo AIIO

MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER

CiI/l/fJ Humphreys. Virgi,,;a, he(lt!ql/{WferS of AI/aback's Brig{/(Ie. Pellnsylvania

Basica lly th e Army of the Poto mac served as th e mo de l for all Un io n

War With Spain

Staffo/the 2d Dil'isioll. I Army COI1Js. 1898

Camp Alger. Virginia, 1898

EARLY EX PER IENCES

MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER

EA RLY EX PER IENCES

Genesis of Permanent Divisions

Reforms Following the War With Spain

GEN ESIS OF PERMANENT OIV ISIONS