Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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NO. 14-60837
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
CAMPAIGN FOR SOUTHERN EQUALITY; REBECCA BICKETT;
ANDREA SANDERS; JOCELYN PRITCHETT; CARLA WEBB,
Plaintiffs-Appellees
v.
PHIL BRYANT, in his Official Capacity as Governor of the State of
Mississippi; JIM HOOD, in his Official Capacity as Mississippi
Attorney General,
Defendants-Appellants
________________________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi, Northern Division,
Civil Action No. 3:14cv818
________________________________________________
APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF
________________________________________________
Justin L. Matheny (MS Bar # 100754)
Paul E. Barnes (MS Bar # 99107)
Office of the Mississippi Attorney General
550 High Street, Suite 1200
Jackson, MS 39201
Phone: (601) 359-3680
Facsimile: (601) 359-2003
jmath@ago.state.ms.us
pbarn@ago.state.ms.us
Counsel for Defendants-Appellants
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
REPLY ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I.
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Page
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Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 8
DeBoer v. Snyder,
772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5, 9, 11, 16-17, 20, 28
El Paso Apartment Assn v. City of El Paso,
415 Fed. Appx. 574 (5th Cir. 2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Enquist v. Oregon Dept. Of Agr.,
553 U.S. 591 (2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc.,
508 U.S. 307 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Gillis v. Skinner,
2013 WL 1451366 (W.D. La. Feb. 25, 2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Gochicoa v. Johnson,
238 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297 (1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Hatten v. Rains,
854 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Heller v. Doe,
509 U.S. 312 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 8, 13, 15-16
iii
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Hicks v. Miranda,
422 U.S. 332 (1975). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Jacobs v. Natl Drug Intelligence Center,
548 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
James v. Hertzog,
415 Fed. Appx. 530 (5th Cir. 2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Johnson v. Johnson,
385 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24-27
Johnson v. Robison,
415 U.S. 361 (1974). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Kitchen v. Herbert,
755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 11
Lofton v. Secy of Dept. of Children & Family Servs.,
358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Madden v. Kentucky,
309 U.S. 83 (1940). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Malagon de Fuentes v. Gonzalez,
462 F.3d 498 (5th Cir. 2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
iv
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Robicheaux v. Caldwell,
2 F.Supp.3d 910 (E.D. La. 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477 (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-25, 27
Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173 (1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44 (1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Shelby v. Dupree,
574 Fed. Appx. 397 (5th Cir. 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs.,
740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Steffan v. Perry,
41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S.,
533 U.S. 53 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78 (1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528 (1973). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
United States v. Windsor,
133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 22-24, 27
vi
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Vance v. Bradley,
440 U.S. 93 (1979). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Victorian v. Miller,
796 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-21
Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29-31
Windsor v. United States,
699 F.3d 169 (2nd Cir. 2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374 (1978). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Constitutions, Statutes, and Laws
Miss. Code Ann. 93-1-1.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 24, 31
Miss. Code Ann. 93-1-5.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Miss. Code Ann. 97-29-13.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Miss. Code Ann. 97-29-27.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Miss. Const., art. 14, 263A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 24
U.S. Const., amend. XIV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
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REPLY ARGUMENT
I.
(1972) controls disposition of the claims here until the Supreme Court
says otherwise. A summary dismissal is a decision on the merits that
must be given full precedential effect by lower courts. Cervantes v.
Guerra, 651 F.2d 974, 981 (5th Cir. 1981).
Bakers binding effect in lower federal courts is not diminished by
its summary nature. As the Campaign points out, the Supreme Court
is not bound to treat summary dispositions the same as a decision on
the merits. Appellees Br. at 51. When it comes to all lower courts,
however, summary decisions are controlling until the Supreme Court
says otherwise. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 345 (1975); see also
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 500 (1981) (the
California Supreme Court was quite right in relying on our summary
decisions as authority for sustaining the San Diego ordinance against
First Amendment attack . . .. As we have pointed out, however,
summary actions do not have the same authority in this Court as do
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The fact that marriage laws address the consequences of sexual activity
distinguishes those laws from the sodomy law struck down in Lawrence v. Texas,
which only addressed private intimate conduct between consenting adults the
sexual act itself. 539 U.S. 558, 585 (OConnor, J., concurring) (That this law as
applied to private, consensual conduct is unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause does not mean that other laws distinguishing between
heterosexuals and homosexuals would similarly fail under rational basis review.
Texas cannot assert any legitimate state interest here, such as . . . preserving the
traditional institution of marriage. Unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex
relations--the asserted state interest in this case--other reasons exist to promote the
institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group.).
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would not be the case if couples could be stripped of their marital status
once they pass their presumptive child-bearing years.
Mississippis laws also encourage faithfulness and monogamy
even when either or both opposite-sex spouses are infertile.
Encouraging a lifelong commitment between a man and a woman even
when they may not or cannot produce children still encourages couples
who do produce children to raise those children in a committed, family
relationship.
Drawing the marriage line at fertility to correct alleged overinclusiveness, as apparently suggested by the Campaign, would also
create serious problems of its own. It is impossible to determine,
merely by the nature of the relationship, whether an opposite-sex
couple is fertile or infertile. Determining the fertility of potential
opposite-sex spouses before permitting marriage would require an
unwarranted and indefensible intrusion into the personal privacy of
opposite-sex couples. For example, such an intrusion would likely
violate the very right to privacy that protects the private, intimate
relations of consenting adults which the Supreme Court relied on in
Lawrence to strike down state sodomy laws, and in Griswold and
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For example, the district court offered several alternatives the State could
have chosen which might further the States interests and opined that [i]f the
purpose of state-recognized marriage is to protect families and children, then the
State should expand marriage rights to gay and lesbian couples, not bar them from
it . . . . There is no link between the States legitimate interest in promoting strong
families and healthy children, and its decision to prohibit same-sex marriage.
ROA.331, 333. In reaching this conclusion, the district court gave insufficient
weight to the biological distinction between same-sex couples and opposite-sex
couples, and the distinct consequences and procreative potential resulting only from
heterosexual unions. Even more fundamentally, under rational basis review, the
existence of other options does not foreclose a course chosen by a state: The fact
that other means are better suited to the achievement of governmental ends
therefore is of no moment under rational basis review. Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S.,
533 U.S. 53, 77 (2001) (OConnor, J., concurring) (citing Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S.
93, 103, n. 20, 99 S. Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 316).
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state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification,
and the burden is on the challenger to negative every conceivable basis
which might support [the classification].) (quoting Heller, 509 U.S. at
320).
The Seventh Circuit panels perceived problems with Indianas
and Wisconsins marriage laws, such as under-inclusiveness, see
Baskin, 766 F.3d at 661-62, are more properly considered questions of
the means/end fit between traditional marriage laws and state
interests, rather than the rationality of those laws. The Fourteenth
Amendment permits legislative line-drawing even when there is an
imperfect fit between means and ends and where the classification is
not made with mathematical nicety, Heller, 509 U.S. at 321, since the
question of fit is not an issue when a court applies rational basis
scrutiny. Closely examining the fit between an asserted state interest
and the method chosen to further that interest is one of the hallmarks
of heightened or intermediate scrutiny, rather than rational basis
review. See, e.g., National Rifle Assn of America, Inc. v. Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 212 (5th Cir.
2012) (heightened scrutiny requires a tighter fit between the
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despite the fact that the political process has been permitted to work in
those states choosing to recognize and permit same-sex marriage,
should be rejected. Appellees Br. at 34-35. The political process
should be allowed to work in all states, not merely in states which
enact measures proponents or judges consider good social policy.
Under rational basis review, courts must presume even improvident
decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that
judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely
we think a political branch has acted. Hatten v. Rains, 854 F.2d 687,
692 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Vance, 440 U.S. at 97).
Properly framing the issue asks whether Mississippi voters are
entitled to any fewer rights than voters in New York. In United States
v. Windsor, the Supreme Court emphasized the fact that New York had
voluntarily chosen to permit and recognize same-sex marriages,
primarily through the democratic process, in accordance with the
states almost exclusive jurisdiction over domestic relations. 133 S. Ct.
2675, 2689 (2013). Windsor was based, in large measure, on the fact
that DOMA would have stripped same-sex couples of marital status
and benefits which certain states had freely chosen to provide. Id. at
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2695-96.
Mississippi voters should not be barred from expressing their
views through the political process simply because, to date, Mississippi
voters have not elected the same social policy as states such as New
York. The constitutional issue boils down to whether the Fourteenth
Amendment requires every state to conform its social policy to that of
the states which have chosen to recognize and permit same-sex
marriages. There is no principled reason to conclude that the political
process should only be allowed to work if it yields a decision which
reflects what the courts consider good social policy.
III. Mississippis Marriage Laws are not Subject to any Form of
Heightened Scrutiny.
A.
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same-sex couples. See DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 408-13. Tersely equating all
Mississippians motivations for maintaining their marriage laws with
the Courts conclusions about Congress motivations for DOMA, as the
district court erroneously did, does not establish a constitutional
violation. The Campaigns response brief does not defend that flawed
approach.
Rather, on appeal the Campaign urges this Court to adopt a
different animus rationale that fuses rational basis review with the
process for evidence gathering, burden shifting, and applying
heightened levels of scrutiny in disparate impact and discriminatory
intent cases such as Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) and Personnel
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
Appellees Br. at 22-27.
The novel analytical framework the Campaign proposes should be
rejected. Approaches lifted from disparate impact cases only apply
when a facially neutral law allegedly discriminates against a suspect
class, such as race (Arlington Heights), or quasi-suspect class, such as
gender (Feeney). Meanwhile, enactments allegedly discriminating
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23
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Like Windsor and Romer, the Courts other two rational basis animus
decisions, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) and
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), examined
laws said to be motivated entirely by animus and lacking any rational relationship
to any legitimate governmental interest. In Moreno, a statutory amendment reclassified persons eligible for food stamp benefits, according to a statement in its
legislative history, to deny benefits to hippies. That finding, and the absence of
any legitimate interests served by the re-classification, led to the conclusion that
the amendment failed rational basis review. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534-35. Later, in
Cleburne, the Court invalidated a city-enacted zoning regulation targeting a home
for intellectually disabled persons that could not be justified as advancing any
legitimate state interests. Nothing other than irrational prejudice could explain
the governmental action as a result. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448, 500. Both Moreno
and Cleburne found that not just some animus, or some allegation of animus,
justifies striking down a challenged law. Rather, only animus could explain the
laws at issue since the enactments were not rationally related to any legitimate
governmental interest, and therefore the laws were unconstitutional. See Garrett,
531 U.S. at 367 (recognizing Cleburne does not stand[] for the broad proposition
that state decisionmaking reflecting negative attitudes or fear necessarily runs
afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . [for] [a]lthough such biases may often
accompany irrational (and therefore unconstitutional) discrimination, their
presence alone does not a constitutional violation make.).
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suspect or quasi-suspect class. 385 F.3d 503, 532 (5th Cir. 2004)
(Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has recognized sexual
orientation as a suspect classification [or protected group];
nevertheless, a state violates the Equal Protection Clause if it
disadvantages homosexuals for reasons lacking any rational
relationship to legitimate governmental aims.) (citing Romer, 517 U.S.
at 631-32) (alteration in original).
There is no question Johnson preempts the Campaigns invitation
to establish sexual orientation as a suspect or quasi-suspect
classification for purposes of strict or intermediate equal protection
scrutiny on this appeal. A panel of this Court cannot overturn the
decision of a prior panel absent an intervening change in the law, such
as by statutory amendment, or a decision by the Supreme Court, or
our en banc court. Jacobs v. Natl Drug Intelligence Center, 548 F.3d
375, 378 (5th Cir. 2008); see also Victorian v. Miller, 796 F.2d 94, 96 (5th
Cir. 1986) (it is a firm rule of this circuit that a panel cannot overrule
a prior panel decision). The Campaign cannot identify any qualifying
intervening change in the law that calls Johnson, or the Supreme
Courts decision in Romer on which it relied, into question.
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See DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 413-16; Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 375 n. 6
(4 Cir. 2014); Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 61 (1st Cir. 2008); Price-Cornelison v.
Brooks, 524 F.3d 1103, 1113-14 & n. 9 (10th Cir. 2008); Citizens for Equal Protection
v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 865-66 (8th Cir. 2006); Lofton v. Secy of Dept. of Children
and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 818 (11th Cir. 2004); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677,
704 (D.C. Cir. 1994). But see SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d
471, 481 (9th Cir. 2014); Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 180-85 (2nd Cir.
2012).
th
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S/Justin L. Matheny
Justin L. Matheny (MS Bar # 100754)
Paul E. Barnes (MS Bar # 99107)
Office of the Mississippi Attorney General
550 High Street, Suite 1200
Jackson, MS 39201
Phone: (601) 359-3680
Facsimile: (601) 359-2003
jmath@ago.state.ms.us
pbarn@ago.state.ms.us
Counsel for Defendants-Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Undersigned counsel certifies that this brief has been filed via the
Courts CM/ECF System and thereby served on counsel of record
registered to receive electronic notification of filings, and also served on
the following persons via US Mail, properly addressed and postage
prepaid, or overnight mail service where indicated:
Roberta A. Kaplan (via overnight mail)
Andrew J. Ehrlich
Jacob H. Hupart
Jaren Janhorbani
Joshua D. Kaye
Warren Stramiello
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garrison, LLP
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019-6064
Robert B. McDuff
Sibyl C. Byrd
McDuff & Byrd
767 North Congress
Jackson, MS 39202
Dale Carpenter
University of Minnesota
Law School
229 Nineteenth Ave. South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
Diane E. Walton
Walton Law Office
168 S. Liberty Street
Asheville, NC 28801
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