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XO CP
XO CP.............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 1
***1NC*** ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2
***Solvency*** .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 3
1NC EXT ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4
Oceans - Generic.......................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
Arctic/Drilling.............................................................................................................................................................................................. 7
Aquaculture.................................................................................................................................................................................................. 8
OTEC ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9
Coral .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 10
Fishing ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 11
OCS/Drilling .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 12
Sensors ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 13
***ATs*** .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 14
AT: Permutation ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 15
AT: Links to politics .................................................................................................................................................................................. 16
AT: Modeling ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 17
AT: Rollback ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 18
AT: Executive Rollback............................................................................................................................................................................. 19
AT: SOP .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 20
AT: Agent CP bad ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 21
***Aff*** ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 22
Permutation ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 23
Links to politics ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 24
Executive Rollback .................................................................................................................................................................................... 25
SOP ............................................................................................................................................................................................................ 26

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***1NC***
Text: The President of the United States should, via the appropriate administrative agencies, issue an
executive order to (plan)
Executive orders solve and bypass partisan debates - that's key with environmental legislation
Migliaccio 14 (Emily, Legal Extern at Vermont Supreme Court with J.D. from Vermont Law School, "The National Ocean Policy,
Can it Reduce Marine Pollution and Streamline Our Ocean Bureaucracy?" Vermont Journal of Environmental Law, 2014, pp. 646-647)
In the face of Congressional gridlock, executive orders may be necessary, particularly to advancing pro-environmental policies. As legal
scholar Sandra Zellmer argues, [t]he bitterly partisan nature of environmental issues in Congress today suggests that comprehensive,
thoughtful reforms tailored to the problems faced by modern society are unlikely.134 Further, Zellmer points out that even if todays
Congress were to take up the call to reform existing statutes, it may be more likely to dismantle provisions disliked by powerful, regulated
entities than to pass comprehensive, forward-thinking legislation designed to solve contemporary environmental problems. 135 Thus,
with an essentially incompetent Congress, Zellmer proposes that non-legislative action, such as issuing an executive order, may offer an
opportunity to work around the congressional logjam and move the environmental ball forward.136

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***Solvency***

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1NC EXT
The counterplan solves all of the case under a framework which is necessary to avoid congressional debate
surrounding environmental issues - see Migliaccio

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Oceans - Generic
Obama has done it before - the National Ocean Policy mandated changes in both decision-making and
regulation at the national level
Herzog 13 (Megan, J.D. from Stanford and an Emmett/Frankel Fellow in Environmental Law and Policy at the UCLA school of law,
"Obama Administration Releases National Ocean Policy Implementation Plan," Legal Planet - online resource and collaborative effort
between Berkeley and UCLA law, April 17, 2013, http://legal-planet.org/2013/04/17/obama-administration-releases-national-oceanpolicy-implementation-plan/)
But first, a quick rewind for readers who are not familiar with the history of the National Ocean Policy. President Obama established the
National Ocean Policy via Executive Order 13,547 on July 19, 2010. In essence, the National Ocean Policy endeavors to manage conflicts
between a growing number of ocean users (shippers, fishermen, military, renewable energy developers, etc.) while maintaining and
enhancing the environmental health of ocean and coastal ecosystems. The Executive Order created the 27-agency representative National
Ocean Council to share information and streamline federal decisionmaking under the 140 federal laws affecting coastal, ocean, and Great
Lakes resources. These laws and related programs have been enacted in piecemeal fashion over the course of many decades, resulting in a
fragmented and inefficient ocean management regime. The Council is charged with developing cohesive action plans for nine priority
ocean objectives, which address regulatory priorities like ecosystem-based management, coastal and marine spatial planning, the Arctic,
and climate change adaptation.

The NOP proves that Obama has broad regulatory power over the ocean
Sea to Table 13 (Sea to Table is an American organization which focuses on the interests of domestic local fishers and their
businesses, "Why we need a National Ocean Policy," written for Huffington Post Green, 04/24/2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/seato-table/why-we-need-a-national-oc_b_3149217.html)
Earlier this month the White House finalized the National Ocean Policy, a plan to manage the nation's oceans and reconcile the interests
of over two dozen federal agencies. Initiatives of the new plan include monitoring ocean acidification and pollution, regulating
aquaculture, improving access to renewable offshore energy, and protecting coastal communities. The policy also intends to improve
fishery management in order to meet the growing demand for sustainable seafood. Not everyone is happy about the new policy, arguing
that the Obama administration is overreaching. We disagree. If we want a sustainable future, the importance of managing our oceans,
arguably our most critical natural resource, cannot be underestimated.

The XO is effective - Federal agencies have authority over the management of almost all major ocean policy
Stokstad 09 (Erik, news staff of science magazine since 1997 - he covers environmental research and policy with a focus on natural
resources and sustainability, "U.S. Poised to Adopt National Ocean Policy," Science Magazine - Marine Sciences, 18 December 2009,
http://www.sciencemag.org.mutex.gmu.edu/content/326/5960/1618.full)
There's a pressing need for better planning. States control their waters out to 3 nautical miles; beyond that, some 20 federal agencies have
responsibilities for more than 140 laws that apply to federal ocean waters and the Great Lakes. Sometimes those agencies have conflicting
missions or don't communicate well. In the course of adjusting the shipping routes through Stellwagen, for example, the sanctuary staff
and the Coast Guard learned of a pending request to build two liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals that would have been dangerously
close to the proposed route. Both a 2003 report from the privately funded Pew Oceans Commission and a 2004 report from the
congressionally mandated U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy called for better coordination (Science, 23 April 2004, p. 496). Having an
intelligent approach to spatial planning could really fundamentally change the way we do things in the sea, says Elliott Norse of the
Marine Conservation Biology Institute in Bellevue, Washington.

The National Ocean Policy makes agency and executive action the most feasible option for change
Migliaccio 14 (Emily, Legal Extern at Vermont Supreme Court with J.D. from Vermont Law School, "The National Ocean Policy,
Can it Reduce Marine Pollution and Streamline Our Ocean Bureaucracy?" Vermont Journal of Environmental Law, 2014, pp. 646-647)
The draft Plan was open for public comment until March 28, 2012 and on April 16, 2013, the NOC released the Final Plan.115 The Final
Plan is a relatively short document organized into five sections(1) The Ocean Economy, (2) Safety and Security, (3) Coastal and Ocean
Resilience, (4) Local Choices, and (5) Science and Information.116 The first three sections describe how the NOP will positively impact
Americas ocean economy, security, and ocean and coastal resilience. The fourth section describes the need for more localized efforts at
addressing ocean and coastal priorities, given that priorities vary across all regions within the United States.117 The last section addresses
the need for partners and stakeholders to make a scientific, technological, and educational commitment to addressing ocean and coastal
priorities.118 In the Plan, the NOC recognizes that completion of the actions is dependent upon the availability of funds and resources.

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The Plan is meant to be flexible: [The] Plan is intended to be a living document. It is designed to be adaptive to new information or
changing conditions, and will be updated periodically as progress is made, lessons are learned, new activities are planned, and as the
Nation continually strives to improve the stewardship of the ocean, coasts, and Great Lakes for the benefit of current and future
generations.120

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Arctic/Drilling
Arctic policy is largely governed by the Department of Interior, as solidified by previous executive order
Conley 13 (Heather, former senior adviser to the Center for European Policy Analysis, executive director of the Office of the Chairman
of the Board at the American National Red Cross and former deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau for European and Eurasian
Affairs, " The New Foreign Policy Frontier: U.S. Interests and Actors in the Arctic," Center for Strategic and International Studies Europe Report, March 2013)
But the Arctic is anything but new to U.S. policy; it has been an important element of American foreign and security policy since World
War II. Historically, U.S. Arctic policy has been supported by three main policy pillars: national security, development and science. These
priorities have been appropriately reflected in successive budgets of the Defense Department and the National Science Foundation for
decades. Today, U.S. Arctic policy is increasingly shaped by economic factors, primarily concerning oil, gas and mineral resource
development. The importance of these factors is demonstrated by the fact that the most senior-level U.S. interagency policy group
involved in the Arctic is the Interagency Working Group on Coordination of Domestic Energy Development and Permitting in Alaska.
This group, established by a White house executive order in July 2011 and chaired by the deputy secretary of the Department of the
Interior in Arctic policy-making is an example of the increased importance of Arctic mineral resources as well as off-shore and on-shore
natural resources. Therefore, it is the confluence of increasing U.S. economic, environmental, societal, and security interests, combined
with the rapid physical transformation of the Arctic, that has created a new frontier and a new operating environment in which U.S.
policymakers can develop Arctic policy.

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Aquaculture
The Executive regulates domestic aquaculture - the NOAA has broad legal power
NOAA 13 (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration - Marine Aquaculture Policy, correspondence and reports, June 18-20,
2013)
NOAA has a long history of conducting regulatory, research, outreach and international activities on marine aquaculture issues within the
context of its service, science and environmental stewardships. The National Aquaculture Act of 1980, which applies to all federal
agencies, states that it is "in the national interest, and it is the national policy, to encourage the development of aquaculture in the United
States." The statutory basis for NOAA's aquaculture activities includes the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the Endangered Species Act, the Coastal Zone Management Act, the National Marine
Sanctuaries Act, and the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act. Under these laws, in addition to the National Environmental Policy Act,
NOAA is responsible for considering and preventing and/or mitigating the potential adverse environmental impacts of planned and
existing marine aquaculture facilities through the development of fishery management plans, sanctuary management plans, permit actions,
proper siting, and consultation with other regulatory agencies at the federal, state and local levels. Other statues, including the National
Sea Grant College Program Act, the Saltonstall-Kennedy Act, the Anadromous Fish Conservation Act, the Interjurisdictional Fisheries
Act, the Merchant Marine Act and the Agricultural Marketing Act, authorize NOAA to enable and provide assistance for both public
and private sector aquaculture . In addition, the Oceans and Human Health Act calls for research related to aquaculture .

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OTEC
The NOAA has long had the power to license out OTEC efforts
Elefant & O'Neill No Date (Carolyn and Sean, CEO and President of the Ocean Renewable Energy Coalition, "COMMENTS OF
THE OCEAN RENEWABLE ENERGY COALITION (OREC) ON ALTERNATIVE ENERGY RELATED USES ON THE OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF," no date)
Traditionally, federal agencies authorize power plants through licenses, including NRC licenses for nuclear power plants, FERC licenses
for hydroelectric projects42 or NOAA licenses for OTEC plants.43 Both FERC and OTEC licenses grant developers an exclusive right of
use within the project boundaries set forth in the license,44 though under the FERC process, a developer must secure property rights
needed for operating the project,45 such as the land on which the project will be sited and any water rights needed for project operation.
FERC licensees can secure these rights through negotiating purchase or lease of lands with property owners or if necessary, by eminent
domain.46

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Coral
Executive orders innovate and set up a framework for coral reef policy
Davidson 02 (Mary Gray, Fellow, University of Iowa Center for Human Rights; J.D., University of Iowa, 2002, " PROTECTING
CORAL REEFS: THE PRINCIPAL NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS," Harvard Environmental Law
Review, 2002)
The federal coral reef initiatives have been piecemeal until just recently. Executive order 13.089 directly placed an affirmative duty on
federal agencies not to harm coral reefs. Equally important was its directive to the CRTF to determine the extent of the United States'
coral reef and map them. With that information in hand, and the necessary execu-tive and congressional will, bodies such as the CRTF
can devise and implement strategies to prevent further degradation of our coral reefs and make recommendations for more comprehensive
legislation to preserve our reefs for the long term.

That means they solve best

Davidson 02 (Mary Gray, Fellow, University of Iowa Center for Human Rights; J.D., University of Iowa, 2002, " PROTECTING
CORAL REEFS: THE PRINCIPAL NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS," Harvard Environmental Law
Review, 2002)
Several Clinton proposals and executive orders should be continued during the current and subsequent administrations. The goal of
Executive Order 13.089, to create a coordinated system of coral reef MPAs, is important and should be realized as soon as possible.
Because of the interest in coral reefs generally, Congress's initial funding of the MPA project could be supplemented or replaced to
protect and sustain our coral reefs by "user fees, subscriptions, support societies, volunteer organizations, etc."

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Fishing
Obama has the ability to establish sanctuaries and will use it to legislate fishing, among other things
Goldenberg 7/16 (Suzzane, US environment correspondent for the guardian, "Obama to order protections with executive powers,
Kerry says," The Guardian, 7/16/14, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jun/16/kerry-ocean-security-issue-obamaoverfishing-pollution)
Barack Obama will once again use his executive powers as president on Tuesday to announce new efforts for ocean protection, Kerry
told the summit. State department officials and environmental groups said they expected Obama to declare additional marine protection
areas when he delivers a video message to the summit on Tuesday. Campaign groups said they were also looking to Obama to order a
new task force on illegal fishing. Obama is also expected to increase research funds for monitoring changes in ocean chemistry.

Agencies have the tech - they just need the initiative

Goldenberg 7/16 (Suzzane, US environment correspondent for the guardian, "Obama to order protections with executive powers,
Kerry says," The Guardian, 7/16/14, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jun/16/kerry-ocean-security-issue-obamaoverfishing-pollution)
State department officials, briefing reporters last week, said that some of the technology to detect illegal fishing, or monitor ocean
chemistry was already in existence. But it was not yet widely deployed. There are actual solutions that people are putting in place in
this realm today that can serve as catalysts to do it on a wider basis, Catherine Novelli, the undersecretary for economic growth, energy
and the environment. So we have the tools and that means you can attack it more easily. The missing ingredient, other officials said,
was political will and that was where Kerry stepped in on Monday.

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OCS/Drilling
The DOI has jurisdiction over drilling efforts on the OCS
Elefant & O'Neill No Date (Carolyn and Sean, CEO and President of the Ocean Renewable Energy Coalition, "COMMENTS OF
THE OCEAN RENEWABLE ENERGY COALITION (OREC) ON ALTERNATIVE ENERGY RELATED USES ON THE OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF," no date)
The Department of Interior has jurisdiction over oil and gas leasing on the Outer Continental Shelf pursuant to the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. 1331-1356. The 1978 OCSLA amendments created a process for OCS development that
comprises four phases: a five-year lease program, lease sale, exploration and development and production. In some instances, an EA or
EIS is prepared for each of these four phases, though some categorical exclusions exist for exploration and production.15

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Sensors
Last branch to legislate sensor policy was the executive - vested oversight in three agencies
FEMA 99 (Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Remore Sensing in federal disaster situations," Standard Operating Procedures,
1999)
Federal agencies which support the FRP may either be (1) recipients of remote sensing information; (2) providers (or processors) of remote
sensing information, or (3) both. In all cases, federal agencies are required to coordinate planned remote sensing activities (self-provided or laterally/commercially
tasked), with the Information and Planning Section, Technical Services Branch of the responding ERT. If an ERT has not been deployed, coordinate with the FEMA
Headquarters RSC. This requirement serves two primary functions: it eliminates potential duplication of effort, and it ensures that anticipated/generated remote sensing
products and information are made available to the maximum number of potential federal and State users. (Note: this coordination requirement applies only to those
agencies operating within or supporting a FRP activity or operation.) The following federal agencies/organizations have specific remote sensing

responsibilities or authorities under Executive Order , the FRP, and/or supporting or associated agreements: a. United States Department
of the Interior (DOI). DOI will, through the United States Geological Survey (USGS) EROS Data Center (EDC): (1) Function as FEMAs executive agent for the
acquisition and coordination of non-NTM and non-DoD aerial and satellite remote sensing during disaster response operations. Specifically, as executive agent, the EDC
will: (a) Upon receipt of a mission assignment from a designated FEMA authority, coordinate and manage the timely tasking, acquisition, processing, and delivery of
satellite imagery from commercial or (non-NTM) federal sources. Designated FEMA authorities are the Headquarters RSC, a Regional RSC, or ERT Information and
Planning Section Chief, Technical Services Branch Chief or RSC. For more information on mission assignments, refer to Job Aid 9344,1-VW, Mission Assignments
Overview.Remote Sensing Standard Operating Procedures 9321.1-PR June 1999 I-7 (b) Upon receipt of a mission assignment from a designated FEMA authority,
coordinate through the USGS/Mid Continent Mapping Center (MCMC) for the timely tasking, acquisition, processing, and delivery of aerial photogrammetric and
photographic products, from both commercial and federal sources. Designated FEMA authorities are listed in the preceding paragraph. (2) Archive and store, in a readily
accessible system, all imagery obtained by or through the USGS in support of FEMA disaster operations. (3) Be prepared to provide other remote sensing exploitation,
products, and data services, if requested and within the capabilities of the USGS. (4) Identify new remote sensing products and technologies which may improve or enhance
federal disaster response operations and capabilities, or which may be candidates for additional research. b. Civil Applications Committee (CAC). The CAC is

the federal interagency organization charged with validating and approving civil agency requests to use NTM satellite sensor systems in
support of non-intelligence activities or operations. In accordance with this authority, the CAC will: (1) Expeditiously process Domestic Imagery Requirements
(DIRs) submitted by the FEMA Headquarters RSC in support of federal disaster operations. (2) Immediately notify appropriate federal activities of approval/ disapproval. c.

National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). NIMA will, through their Disaster Response Team (DRT): (1) Upon request from the
FEMA Headquarters RSC, and following DIR approval by the CAC and NIMA Policy office, coordinate and manage the timely tasking,
acquisition, analysis, and delivery of satellite imagery or imagery-derived products from NTM sources. These activities and sources may involve
non-NIMA facilities or resources. (2) Provide expert analysis of imagery to determine damage levels and other elements of essential information (EEI). (3) Provide technical
expertise (in the form of briefings or analytical reporting) to FEMA Headquarters. (4) Provide technical experts (specifically, imagery analysts) to support deployed ERTs
that require on-site imagery exploitation

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***ATs***

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AT: Permutation
It's competitive
1. Executive action is a different mechanism - perm severs out of the plan's agent - that warrants rejection
because it steals core Neg ground, which is key given the poor CP ground on this topic
2. Also key to education
Schuck 99 (Peter H., Professor at Yale Law School and Visiting Professor at New York Law School Delegation and Democracy
Cardozo Law Review http://www.constitution.org/ad_state/schuck.htm)
God and the devil are in the details of policymaking, as they are in most other important thingsand the details are to be found at the
agency level. This would remain true, moreover, even if the nondelegation doctrine were revived and statutes were written with somewhat
greater specificity, for many of the most significant impacts on members of the public would still be indeterminate until the agency
grappled with and defined them. Finally, the agency is often the site in which public participation is most effective. This is not only
because the details of the regulatory impacts are hammered out there. It is also because the agency is where the public can best educate
the government about the true nature of the problem that Congress has tried to address. Only the interested parties, reacting to specific
agency proposals for rules or other actions, possess (or have the incentives to ac-quire) the information necessary to identify, explicate,
quantify, and evaluate the real-world consequences of these and alternative proposals. Even when Congress can identify the first-order
effects of the laws that it enacts, these direct impacts seldom exhaust the laws policy consequences. Indeed, first-order effects of policies
usually are less significant than the aggregate of more remote effects that ripple through a complex, interrelated, opaque society. When
policies fail, it is usually not because the congressional purpose was misunderstood. More commonly, they fail because Congress did not
fully appreciate how the details of policy implementation would confound its purpose. Often, however, this knowledge can only be gained
through active public participation in the policymaking process at the agency level where these implementation issues are most clearly
focused and the stakes in their correct resolution are highest.

3. Net benefit proves it's competitive and supported in the literature - the perm still links to politics because
it involves legislative action
4. Independently, perm fails - still results in lost PC and a do-nothing congress
Williams 00 (Douglas, Associate Professor of Law at Saint Louis University School of Law, Saint Louis University Public Law Review,
19 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 75, 2000)
There are number of reasons to question this logic. First, it is precisely on issues "of particular local interest" that legislators are unlikely
to delegate, preferring instead to push for the favored position in order to gain credit. 127 Delegation is most likely the product of intense
conflict among constituencies - a circumstance in which a delegation allows legislators to blame agencies for adverse constituent effects,
while at the same time claiming credit for delivering the goods to benefited constituencies.

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AT: Links to politics

No PC loss
Sovacool 09 (Benjamin, Research Fellow in the Energy Governance Program at the Centre on Asia and Globalization and Assistant
Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, Preventing National Electricity-Water
Crisis Areas in the United States, Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, 2009)
Executive Orders also save time in a second sense. The President does not have to expend scarce political capital trying to persuade
Congress to adopt his or her proposal. Executive Orders thus save presidential attention for other topics. Executive Orders bypass
congressional debate and opposition, along with all of the horse-trading and compromise such legislative activity entails. n292

The threat of executive order alone spurs congress into action - no need for bargaining
Fine 12 (Jeffrey, assistant professor of political science at Clemson University, Presidential Studies Quarterly, "Circumventing
Adversity: Executive Orders and Divided Government" June 2012)
We also should expect presidents to prioritize and be strategic in the types of executive orders that they create to maneuver around a
hostile Congress. There are a variety of reasons that can drive a presidents decision. For example, presidents can use an executive order
to move the status quo of a policy issue to a position that is closer to their ideal point. By doing so, presidents are able to pressure
Congress to respond, perhaps by passing a new law that represents a compromise between the preferences of the president and Congress.
Forcing Congresss hand to enact legislation might be a preferred option for the president, if he perceives Congress to be unable or
unwilling to pass meaningful legislation in the rst place. While it is possible that such unilateral actions might spur Congress to pass a
law to modify or reverse a presidents order, such responses by Congress are rare (Howell 2003, 113-117; Warber 2006, 119). Enacting a
major policy executive order allows the president to move the equilibrium toward his preferred outcome without having to spend time
lining up votes or forming coalitions with legislators. As a result, and since reversal from Congress is unlikely, presidents have a greater
incentive to issue major policy orders to overcome legislative hurdles.

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AT: Modeling
CP is perfectly capable of setting legal precedent through action alone - drone policy proves
Twomey 13 (Laura, Trinity College Dublin, "Setting a Global Precedent: President Obama's Codification of Drone Warfare", Cambridge
Journal of International and Comparative Law, 14 March 2013, http://www.cjicl.org.uk/index.php/cjicl-blog/setting-a-global-precedentpresident-obamas-codification-of-drone-warfare)
It is clear that, as the first State to deploy remote targeting technology in a non international armed conflict, the legal framework forged by
the US during President Obama's second term will set significant precedent for the future practice of the estimated 40 States developing
their own drone technology. On 7 March 2013, members of the European Parliament expressed deep concern about the unwelcome
precedent the programme sets, citing its destabilising effect on the international legal framework that destroys ... our common legal
heritage. This 'destabilising effect' arises from the classified and seemingly amorphous substantive legal basis for the programme and the
apparent lack of procedural standards in place. It remains to be seen if the classified 'rulebook' will be released for public scrutiny, and
allay these concerns. Reliance on international law in world order is based on consent, consensus, good faith and, crucially in this
instance, reciprocity. The US programme may harbour short term gains in the pursuit of al-Qaeda operatives, however, if the
aforementioned substantive legal justifications continue to be invoked, it risks engendering long term disadvantages. Pursuing this policy
encourages other States to adopt similar policies. Administration officials have cited particular concern about setting precedent for Russia,
Iran and China, all of which are developing their own remote targeting technology. It is therefore suggested that the Administration
should take this opportunity to codify the rules, clarify terms where ambiguity may currently allow for broader interpretations, and to
bring its regulations in line with the existing framework of international law. This legal framework should then be made available to the
public, with covert operational necessities redacted. This could set a valuable legal precedent, of particular importance at this turning
point wherein international law must adapt to the 21st century model of warfare, a model which lacks a clear enemy and a demarcated
battlefield.

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AT: Rollback
Durable fiat is reciprocal if the aff gets to fiat the plan won't be rolled back the negative should get to do the
same - that's also good for education, ensures the debate remains centered around the desirability of the
plan's mechanism instead of its workability
Executive Orders are widely accepted by the courts and face little risk of overturn
Moe and Howell 99 (Terry, Sanford University political science professor and WG, Harris School of Public Policy political science
professor, The Presidential power of Unilateral Action, 1999, Oxford Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization)
In this article we highlight a formal basis for presidential power that has gone largely unappreciated to this point, but has become so
pivotal to presidential leadership and so central to an understanding of presidential power that it virtually defines what is distinctively
modern about the modern presidency. This is the president's formal capacity to act unilaterally and thus to make law on his own. Our
central purpose is to set out a theory of this aspect of presidential power. We argue that the president's powers of unilateral action are a
force in American politics precisely because they are not specified in the Constitution. They derive their strength and resilience from the
ambiguity of the contract. We also argue that presidents have incentives to push this ambiguity relentlessly to expand their own powers and that, for reasons rooted in the nature of their institutions, neither Congress nor the courts are likely to stop them. We are currently
in the midst of a research project to collect comprehensive data for testing this theory - data on what presidents have done, as well as on
how Congress and the courts have responded. Here we provide a brief history of unilateral action, with special attention to the themes of
our theoretical argument. We also make use of some early data to emerge from our project. For now it appears that the theory is well
supported by the available evidence. This is a work in progress, however, and more is clearly needed before definitive conclusions can be
justified.

Congress isn't willing to reign in "imperial" presidents

Howell 03 (William, Sydney Stein Professor in American Politics at the University of Chicago, Powers without Persuasion: The
Politics of Direct Presidential Action, 2003, JSTOR)
The real world, obviously, is much more complicated than the unilateral politics model supposes. Uncertainties abound, and presidents
frequently set policies without any assurance of congressional acquiescence. It is worth considering then, how presidents fare on those
occasions when Congress does respond to a presidential directive. Do presidents tend to win most of the time? Or does Congress
consistently crack the legislative whip, effectively enervating imperialistic presidents? Our theoretical expectation are relatively clear.
Because the president has access to more (and better) information about goings-on in the executive branch, members of Congress will try
to change only a small fraction of all status quo policies in any legislative session, and we should anticipate that members will leave alone
the majority of unilateral directives that the president issues. While the president may occasionally overreach on a particularly salient
issue, provoking a congressional response, in most instances Congress either will do nothing at all or will endorse the presidents actions.

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AT: Executive Rollback

Executive orders set legacies and are rarely turned over
Murray 99 (Frank, correspondent for the Washington Times on issues of the Supreme Court, Clintons Executive Orders are Still
Packing a Punch: Other Presidents Issued More, but His are Still Sweeping, The Washington Times,
http://www.questia.com/library/1G1-55543736/clinton-s-executive-orders-still-are-packing-a-punch)
Clearly, Mr. Clinton knew what some detractors do not: Presidential successors of the opposite party do not lightly wipe the slate clean of
every order, or even most of them. Still on the books 54 years after his death are 80 executive orders issued by Franklin D. Roosevelt.
No less than 187 of Mr. Truman's orders remain, including one to end military racial segregation, which former Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman Colin Powell praised for starting the "Second Reconstruction." "President Truman gave us the order to march with Executive
Order 9981," Mr. Powell said at a July 26, 1998 ceremony marking its 50th anniversary. Mr. Truman's final order, issued one day before
he left office in 1953, created a national security medal of honor for the nation's top spies, which is still highly coveted and often revealed
only in the obituary of its recipient.

Once executive orders become cemented into public policy they become almost impossible to reverse
Branum 02 (Tara, JD and Fulbright Jarworski associate President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern Day
America, 2-2002, Journal of Legislation)
Congressmen and private citizens besiege the President with demands [*58] that action be taken on various issues. n273 To make
matters worse, once a president has signed an executive order, he often makes it impossible for a subsequent administration to undo his
action without enduring the political fallout of such a reversal. For instance, President Clinton issued a slew of executive orders on
environmental issues in the weeks before he left office. n274 Many were controversial and the need for the policies he instituted was
debatable. n275 Nevertheless, President Bush found himself unable to reverse the orders without invoking the ire of environmentalists
across the country. n276 A policy became law by the action of one man without the healthy debate and discussion in Congress intended
by the Framers. Subsequent presidents undo this policy and send the matter to Congress for such debate only at their own peril. This is not
the way it is supposed to be.

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AT: SOP
It's inevitable - information sharing means the executive will always have an advantage
Marshall 08 (William, Law professor at the University of North Carolina, Eleven reasons why presidential power inevitably expands
and why it matters, Boston University Law Review, 2008,
http://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/bulr/documents/MARSHALL.pdf)
6. Presidential Access to and Control of Information If, [i]n the information age, information is power62 then most of that power rests
with the executive. Because of its vast resources, the executive branch has far greater access to information than do the co-branches of
government.63 In addition, the executive branch has far greater ability and expertise to gather, examine, and cull that information than
do the transitory legislative staffs in the Congress. Congress, for example, does not have at its disposal the information gathering
capabilities of the intelligence agencies or the technical expertise of the military in determining when there is a threat to national
security.64 Instead, it must rely on the executive for that appraisal and therefore must continually negotiate with the executive from a
position of weakness and dependence.65 Moreover, this disparity in access and control of information is only likely to worsen as the
world becomes more complex, because complexity necessarily requires increasingly sophisticated methods of information collection,
analysis, distillation, and dissemination. And because only the executive branch is likely to have the expertise and the resources to
perform these functions, its relative powers will again increase.

A powerful executive is a key component of the balance of inter-branch power

Calabresi 95 (Calabresi, Associate Professor at Northwestern University School of Law, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary
Executive, 1995, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 23)
The goal, of course, is to ensure that ambition [will] be made to counteract ambition. N61 This is accomplished in two ways. First, it is
necessary to ensure that each department will have a will of its own. This can be done in part by creating separate electoral channels for
each of the three departments back to the ultimate fountain of authority, the peoplen62 Second, it is necessary to guarantee that
those who administer each department, will have the necessary constitutional powers of those offices and the provision for defence
must in this, as in all other [*46] cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. N64 This in turn, leads necessarily to the idea of
a unitary executive. The reason for this is because it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self defense as in
republican government the legislative, necessarily, predominate. N65 Madison explained that the remedy for this inconveniency is, to
divide the legislature into different branches: and to render them by different modes of election, and different principles of action, as little
connected with each other as the nature of their common function; and their common dependence on the society, will admit. N66 But
just as key to Madison as the weakening of the legislature was the concomitant strengthening of the executive. Thus, he stated that as the
weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand
that it should be fortified.

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AT: Agent CP bad

1. CP is obviously key to neg ground - the majority of all counterplans violate your interpretation
2. No Aff ground loss, there are plenty of agent specific DAs and we should be able to debate the mechanism
through which your plan is passed
3. It's predictable, there are only three branches of the U.S. government and solvency advocates only exist
for well supported agents of action
At worst reject the argument and not the team

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***Aff***

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Permutation
Permutation: do both - the plan text says USFG that could include the executive

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Links to politics
Still inks - sets of partisan debates and violates SOP
Risen 4 (Clay, M.A. from the University Of Chicago, Managing editor of Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, The Power of the Pen: The
Not-So-Secret Weapon of Congress-wary Presidents, July 16 2004, The American Prospect,
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_power_of_the_pen)
The most effective check on executive orders has proven to be political. When it comes to executive orders, The president is much more
clearly responsible, says Dellinger, who was heavily involved in crafting orders under Clinton. Not only is there no involvement from
Congress, but the president has to personally sign the order. Clinton's Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument executive order
may have helped him win votes, but it also set off a massive congressional and public backlash. Right-wing Internet sites bristled with
comments about dictatorial powers, and Republicans warned of an end to civil liberties as we know them. President Clinton is running
roughshod over our Constitution, said thenHouse Majority Leader Dick Armey. Indeed, an unpopular executive order can have
immediate--and lasting--political consequences. In 2001, for example, Bush proposed raising the acceptable number of parts per billion of
arsenic in drinking water. It was a bone he was trying to toss to the mining industry, and it would have overturned Clinton's order
lowering the levels. But the overwhelmingly negative public reaction forced Bush to quickly withdraw his proposal--and it painted him
indelibly as an anti-environmental president.

Executive orders magnify PC loss

Cooper 97 (Phillip, Professor of Political Science at University of Vermont, Administration and Society, 1997, Lexis)
Interestingly enough, the effort to avoid opposition from Congress or agencies can have the effect of turning the White House itself into a
lightning rod. When an administrative agency takes action under its statutory authority and responsibility, its opponents generally focus
their conflicts as limited disputes aimed at the agency involved. Where the White House employs an executive order, for example, to shift
critical elements of decision making from the agencies to the executive office of the president, the nature of conflict changes and the focus
shifts to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue or at least to the executive office buildings The saga of the OTRA battle with Congress under
regulatory review orders and the murky status of the Quayle Commission working in concert with OIRA provides a dramatic case in
point. The nature and focus of conflict is in some measure affected by the fact that executive orders take administrative action outside the
normal rules of administrative law. And although there are tensions in that field of law, the fact is that it has been carefully developed
over time with the intention of accommodating the needs of administration and the demands for accountability by agencies filled with
unelected administrators who make important decisions having the force of law in the form of rules and administrative adjudications. On
one hand, administrative law requires open, orderly, and participative decision processes, but it also creates significant presumptions in
favor of administrative agencies. The courts provide legal support in the form of favorable decisions as well as assisting agencies in
enforcement through orders enforcing subpoena and other investigative authority while also ordering compliance with agency decisions
once the investigations and decision processes are complete. Administrative law also provides a vehicle for integrating administrative
decisions having the force of law with the larger body of law and policy. The use of executive orders to confound or circumvent normal
administrative law is counterproductive and ultimately dysfunctional.

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Executive Rollback
Executive orders are messy and ultimately prove to be weak policy initiatives
Cooper 97 (Phillip, Professor of Political Science at University of Vermont, "Administration and Society," 1997, Lexis)
Even if they serve temporary goals, executive orders can produce a significant amount of complexity and conflict and not yield a longterm benefit because the next president may dispose of predecessors orders at a whim. It may be easier than moving a statute through
Congress and faster than waiting for agencies to use their rule-making processes to accomplish policy ends, but executive orders may
ultimately be a much weaker foundation on which to build a policy than the alternatives.

XOs are easily rolled back or modified

Burrows 10 (Vanessa, Legislative Attorney for Congressional Research Service, "Executive Orders: Issuance and Revocation,"
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS20846_20100325.pdf)
Illustrating the fact that executive orders are used to further an administrations policy goals, there are frequent examples of situations in
which a sitting President has revoked or amended orders issued by his predecessor.37 This practice is particularly apparent where
Presidents have used these instruments to assert control over and influence the agency rulemaking process. President Ford, for instance,
issued Executive Order 11821, requiring agencies to issue inflation impact statements for proposed regulations.38 President Carter altered
this practice with Executive Order 12044, requiring agencies to consider the potential economic impact of certain rules and identify
potential alternatives.39 Shortly after taking office, President Reagan revoked President Carters order, implementing a scheme asserting
much more extensive control over the rulemaking process. Executive Order 12291 directed agencies to implement rules only if the
potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society, requiring agencies to prepare a cost-benefit
analysis for any proposed rule that could have a significant economic impact.40 This order was criticized by some as a violation of the
separation of powers doctrine, on the grounds that it imbued the President with the power to essentially control rulemaking authority that
had been committed to a particular agency by Congress.41 Despite these concerns, there were no court rulings assessing the validity of
President Reagans order. In turn, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12866, modifying the system established during the Reagan
Administration.42 While retaining many of the basic features of President Reagans order, E.O. 12866 eased cost benefit analysis
requirements, and recognized the primary duty of agencies to fulfill the duties committed to them by Congress. President George W. Bush
issued two executive orders amending E.O. 12866, E.O. 13258, and E.O. 13422, both of which were revoked by President Obama in E.O.
13497.43 President Bushs E.O. 13258 concerned regulatory planning and review, and it removed references in E.O. 12866 to the role of
the Vice President, replacing several of them with a reference to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) or the
Chief of Staff to the President.44 E.O. 13422 defined guidance documents and significant guidance documents and applied several parts
of E.O. 12866 to guidance documents, as well as required each agency head to designate a presidential appointee to the newly created
position of regulatory policy officer.45 E.O. 13422 also made changes to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRAs)
duties and authorities, including a requirement that OIRA be given advance notice of significant guidance documents.46 President
Obamas executive order revoking E.O. 13258 and E.O. 13422 also directed the Director of OMB and the heads of executive departments
and agencies to rescind orders, rules, guidelines, and policies that implemented those executive orders.

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SOP
Unchecked executive action threatens separation of powers
Slonim, 06 (Nancy, American Bar Association spokewwoman, Blue-ribbon task force finds president Bushs signing statements
undermine separation of powers, 24, 2006, American Bar Association, Embargoed for AM Editions.
http://www.abanet.org/media/releases/news072406.html)
Presidential signing statements that assert President Bushs authority to disregard or decline to enforce laws adopted by Congress
undermine the rule of law and our constitutional system of separation of powers, according to a report released today by a blue-ribbon
American Bar Association task force. To address these concerns, the task force urges Congress to adopt legislation enabling its members
to seek court review of signing statements that assert the Presidents right to ignore or not enforce laws passed by Congress, and urges the
President to veto bills he feels are not constitutional. The Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements and the Separation of Powers
Doctrine was created by ABA President Michael S. Greco with the approval of the ABA Board of Governors in June, to examine the
changing role of presidential signing statements after the Boston Globe on April 30 revealed an exclusive reliance on presidential signing
statements, in lieu of vetoes, by the Bush Administration. In appointing the special task force Greco said, The use of presidential signing
statements raises serious issues relating to the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. I have appointed the Task Force to take a
balanced, scholarly look at the use and implications of signing statements, and to propose appropriate ABA policy consistent with our
Associations commitment to safeguarding the rule of law and the separation of powers in our system of government. The task force
report and recommendations will be presented to the ABAs policy-making House of Delegates for adoption at its upcoming Annual
Meeting Aug. 7-8. Until the ABA House has taken formal action, the report and recommendations represent only the views of the task
force. The bipartisan task force, composed of constitutional scholars, former presidential advisers, and legal and judicial experts, noted
that President George W. Bush is not the first president to use signing statements, but said, It was the number and nature of the current
Presidents signing statements which compelled our recommendations. The task force said its report and recommendations are
intended to underscore the importance of the doctrine of separation of powers. They therefore represent a call to this President and to all
his successors to fully respect the rule of law and our constitutional system of separation of powers and checks and balances. The task
force determined that signing statements that signal the presidents intent to disregard laws adopted by Congress undermine the separation
of powers by depriving Congress of the opportunity to override a veto, and by shutting off policy debate between the two branches of
government. According to the task force, they operate as a line item veto, which the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled unconstitutional.
Noting that the Constitution is silent about presidential signing statements, the task force found that, while several recent presidents have
used them, the frequency of signing statements that challenge laws has escalated substantially, and their purpose has changed
dramatically, during the Bush Administration. The task force report states, From the inception of the Republic until 2000, Presidents
produced fewer than 600 signing statements taking issue with the bills they signed. According to the most recent update, in his one-and-ahalf terms so far, President George Walker Bush ... has produced more than 800. The report found that President Bushs signing
statements are ritualistic, mechanical and generally carry no citation of authority or detailed explanation. Even when [a] frustrated
Congress finally enacted a law requiring the Attorney General to submit to Congress a report of any instance in which that official or any
officer of the Department of Justice established or pursued a policy of refraining from enforcing any provision of any federal statute,
this too was subjected to a ritual signing statement insisting on the Presidents authority to withhold information whenever he deemed it
necessary. This report raises serious concerns crucial to the survival of our democracy, said Greco. If left unchecked, the presidents
practice does grave harm to the separation of powers doctrine, and the system of checks and balances, that have sustained our democracy
for more than two centuries. Immediate action is required to address this threat to the Constitution and to the rule of law in our country.
Greco said that the task forces report constructively offers procedures that consider the prerogatives both of the president and of the
Congress, while protecting the publics right to know what legislation is adopted by Congress and if and how the president intends to
enforce it. This transparency is essential if the American people are to have confidence that the rule of law is being respected by both
citizens and government leaders. The bipartisan and independent task force is chaired by Miami lawyer Neal Sonnett, a former Assistant
U.S. Attorney and Chief of the Criminal Division for the Southern District of Florida. He is past chair of the ABA Criminal Justice
Section, chair of the ABA Task Force on Domestic Surveillance and the ABA Task Force on Treatment of Enemy Combatants; and
president-elect of the American Judicature Society. "Abuse of presidential signing statements poses a threat to the rule of law," said
Sonnett. "Whenever actions threaten to weaken our system of checks and balances and the separation of powers, the American Bar
Association has a profound responsibility to speak out forcefully to protect those lynchpins of democracy."

SOP prevents nuclear war

Forrester 89 (Ray, Professor at Hastings College of the Law, University of California, Former dean of the law schools at Vanderbilt,
Tulane, and Cornell, Presidential Wars in the Nuclear Age: An Unresolved Problem George Washington Law Review, August 1989, 57
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1636, Lexis)
A basic theory--if not the basic theory of our Constitution--is that concentration of power in any one person, or one group, is dangerous to
mankind. The Constitution, therefore, contains a strong system of checks and balances, starting with the separation of powers between the

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President, Congress, and the Supreme Court. The message is that no one of them is safe with unchecked power. Yet, in what is probably
the most dangerous governmental power ever possessed, we find the potential for world destruction lodged in the discretion of one
person. As a result of public indignation aroused by the Vietnam disaster, in which tens of thousands lost their lives in military actions
initiated by a succession of Presidents, Congress in 1973 adopted, despite presidential veto, the War Powers Resolution. Congress finally
asserted its checking and balancing duties in relation to the making of presidential wars. Congress declared in section 2(a) that its purpose
was to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress
and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such
situations. The law also stated in section 3 that [t]he President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing
United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated. . . . Other
limitations not essential to this discussion are also provided. The intent of the law is clear. Congress undertook to check the President, at
least by prior consultation, in any executive action that might lead to hostilities and war. [*1638] President Nixon, who initially vetoed
the resolution, claimed that it was an unconstitutional restriction on his powers as Executive and Commander in Chief of the military. His
successors have taken a similar view. Even so, some of them have at times complied with the law by prior consultation with
representatives of Congress, but obedience to the law has been uncertain and a subject of continuing controversy between Congress and
the President. Ordinarily, the issue of the constitutionality of a law would be decided by the Supreme Court. But, despite a series of cases
in which such a decision has been sought, the Supreme Court has refused to settle the controversy. The usual ground for such a refusal is
that a "political question" is involved. The rule is well established that the federal judiciary will decide only "justiciable" controversies.
"Political questions" are not "justiciable." However, the standards established by the Supreme Court in 1962 in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, to determine the distinction between "justiciable controversies" and "political questions" are far from clear. One writer observed that
the term "political question" [a]pplies to all those matters of which the court, at a given time, will be of the opinion that it is impolitic or
inexpedient to take jurisdiction. Sometimes this idea of inexpediency will result from the fear of the vastness of the consequences that a
decision on the merits might entail. Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARV. L. REV. 338, 344 (1924)(footnote omitted). It is
difficult to defend the Court's refusal to assume the responsibility of decisionmaking on this most critical issue. The Court has been
fearless in deciding other issues of "vast consequences" in many historic disputes, some involving executive war power. It is to be hoped
that the Justices will finally do their duty here. But in the meantime the spectre of single-minded power persists, fraught with all of the
frailties of human nature that each human possesses, including the President. World history is filled with tragic examples. Even if the
Court assumed its responsibility to tell us whether the Constitution gives Congress the necessary power to check the President, the War
Powers Resolution itself is unclear. Does the Resolution require the President to consult with Congress before launching a nuclear attack?
It has been asserted that "introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities" refers only to military personnel and does not include
the launching of nuclear missiles alone. In support of this interpretation, it has been argued that Congress was concerned about the human
losses in Vietnam and in other presidential wars, rather than about the weaponry. Congress, of course, can amend the Resolution to state
explicitly that "the introduction of Armed Forces" includes missiles as well as personnel. However, the President could continue to act
without prior consultation by renewing the claim first made by President [*1639] Nixon that the Resolution is an unconstitutional
invasion of the executive power. Therefore, the real solution, in the absence of a Supreme Court decision, would appear to be a
constitutional amendment. All must obey a clear rule in the Constitution. The adoption of an amendment is very difficult. Wisely, Article
V requires that an amendment may be proposed only by the vote of two-thirds of both houses of Congress or by the application of the
legislatures of two-thirds of the states, and the proposal must be ratified by the legislatures or conventions of three-fourths of the states.
Despite the difficulty, the Constitution has been amended twenty-six times. Amendment can be done when a problem is so important that
it arouses the attention and concern of a preponderant majority of the American people. But the people must be made aware of the
problem. It is hardly necessary to belabor the relative importance of the control of nuclear warfare. A constitutional amendment may be,
indeed, the appropriate method. But the most difficult issue remains. What should the amendment provide? How can the problem be
solved specifically? The Constitution in section 8 of Article I stipulates that "[t]he Congress shall have power . . . To declare War. . . ."
The idea seems to be that only these many representatives of the people, reflecting the public will, should possess the power to commit
the lives and the fortunes of the nation to warfare. This approach makes much more sense in a democratic republic than entrusting the
decision to one person, even though he may be designated the "Commander in Chief" of the military forces. His power is to command the
war after the people, through their representatives, have made the basic choice to submit themselves and their children to war. There is a
recurring relevation of a paranoia of power throughout human history that has impelled one leader after another to draw their people into
wars which, in hindsight, were foolish, unnecessary, and, in some instances, downright insane. Whatever may be the psychological
influences that drive the single decisionmaker to these irrational commitments of the lives and fortunes of others, the fact remains that the
behavior is a predictable one in any government that does not provide an effective check and balance against uncontrolled power in the
hands of one human. We, naturally, like to think that our leaders are above such irrational behavior. Eventually, however, human nature,
with all its weakness, asserts itself whatever the setting. At least that is the evidence that experience and history give us, even in our own
relatively benign society, where the Executive is subject to the rule of law. [*1640] Vietnam and other more recent engagements show
that it can happen and has happened here. But the "nuclear football"--the ominous "black bag" --remains in the sole possession of the
President.