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Review of Metaphysics.
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EXPLORATION
in
Interwoven
the
complex
are
system
(1752-1800)
of his avowed
theories
texture
strands
creditors.
of
of
thought
Maim?n
Solomon
's
Maim?n
originating
is one of
in the
the
first
modern
who
and
Hume,
Kant.
In interweaving
from Leibniz
and Hume,
aspects of thought
from the earlier synthesis of their posi
takes his departure
Maim?n
But
tions, wrorked out by Kant in the Critique
of Pure Reason.
theories
of
Maim?n
the
critical
goes beyond Kant, by interlacing
the web Kant had woven
of strands from
itself, with
philosophy
to
Maim?n
link
What
the seemingly
Leibniz and Hume.
permitted
In the
and the sceptic?
systems of the rationalist
incompatible
to establish
first place, both thinkers
of the
the validity
sought
the two pillars of knowledge,
relation between
concepts and sense
to ac
that
the way
data.
both
believed
Secondly,
philosophers
was
one
to
aim
of
derive
their
knowledge
component
complish
the other.
from
According
to Leibniz,
factor can be
the empirical
to Hume,
"ideas"
according
1
Solomon
the difference
On Maimon's
Maim?n
relation
(Jerusalem,
see S. H. Bergman,
to Spinoza
1967),
pp. 216 ff.
The
Philosophy
of
535
Leibniz maintains
they are copies of impressions;
a
it constitutes
factor can be explained hecause
that the empirical
a
in
the
monad.
context
Both
in
continuous
originating
stage
in opposite directions?a
Leibniz and Hume,
then, sought?albeit
are valid because
the heterogeneous
between
transition
continuous
component
fac
tors of human
Kant
knowledge.
rejects this method
from
Taking his departure
ity.
no continuous
transition between
to the
that the function of relating and ordering pertains
Arguing
nature
of
and
that
into
very
concepts,
only by being incorporated
a
a
determined
structure
does the datum occupy
log
conceptually
ical position.
Kant establishes
the interrelatedness
of the two fac
from the other.
that one can be derived
tors, without
assuming
relation in which
Leibniz, who posits a genetic
intelligible
a
find empirical
and unlike Hume, who posits
realization
sense
relation
which
in
find
their
genetic
impressions
conceptual
copies, Kant posits a relation based upon the synthetic nature of
a relation
between
i.e.,
knowledge,
subsisting
heterogeneous
Unlike
truths
factors.
Both
Leibniz
and Hume
measuring
hand, Maim?n
applies
against
2
Hague,
See
my
furnish
with
Maim?n
criteria
solution
Kant's
factor
its
criterion
abolished
Kant,
as a realization
independence.
On
the
and
its
Leibniz
Systemalization,
repre
factor?
he
hand,
the empirical
factor
to which
according
nor reduced to another
Experience
of the rational
for
the one
other
factor.
It is not
that Maim?n
raises his
Studies
in Kant
1965).
(The
NATHAN ROTENSTR?ICH
536
For
objections.
translate
's objection
to
is this:
is
truths
empirical
impossible
residuum
of experience
established
by
of the factors is ultimate?so
's
Maim?n
truths
intelligible
to the irreducible
owing
Hume.
of Maim?n
the burden
into
If the heterogeneity
solution
Kant's
criticism
runs?then
as the foundation
for
sent duality
that the question
pretend
itself
is unsatisfactory.
one's
solution,
is an answer.
To repre
to
is merely
as a weapon
rather than as a target
to
Leibniz
the only
Maim?n,
According
provides
a
the
of
relation
between
solving
problem:
empirical
possibility
data and intelligible
concepts can be established
only by eliminating
that is to say, only by making
the empirical
factor
the former,
a
In
connection
be
intelligible.
thoroughly
assuming
synthetic
But Maim?n
uses Leibniz
for criticism.
tween
a new
to
the factors, Kant transfers
the problem
and its solution
a
But
the
of
the
factors
is
sphere.
problem
heterogeneity
as well.
Kant assumes
that he has overcome
by synthesis
posed
the acute
form of heterogeneity
which might
the possi
preclude
a
of
to
connection.
is analogous
This, however,
bility
synthetic
one
extreme
the assumption
that by bringing
in contact with
the
between
them.
Like Hume,
other, we cancel the polar opposition
to be, Maim?n
he purports
the ir
spokesman
emphasizes
the
datum.
But
of
whereas
Hume
maintains
the
reducibility
whose
its independence
vis-?-vis
primacy of the datum, Maim?n maintains
a Kantian
In this respect, Maim?n fights Kant with
the concept.
for it was Kant who taught that the empirical-perceptual
weapon;
than the conceptual
factor.
factor is no less independent
Accord
if the empirical
ing to Maim?n,
is
impossible.
synthesis
factor
is independent,
then
even
resembles
the one hand,
Kant's
then, Maimon's
position
and Hume's.
it lies midway
between
Leibniz's
On the
from Kant in using Kant's
Maim?n
other hand, however,
diverges
as
of solving
the
the problem
evidence
that
system
impossibility
of realizing
the solution
raised by Hume
implies the impossibility
another
he con
To
it
because
Leibniz.
way,
put
proposed
by
On
in that
he proposes
within
the limits of
confines
the solution
sciously
between
finite understanding,
Kant draws a distinction
archetypal
and ectypal
Maim?n
understanding.
understanding
apparently
agrees with
Kant
is confined
within
the limits
of
537
PHILOSOPHY
finite
For
understanding
the ultimate
Hume
and Kant?
First of all, because
Leibniz,
the background
Kant's
system constitutes
against which Maim?n
of Kant by
develops his theory, we can increase our appreciation
we
one
Maim?n.
that
may
expect
studying
Secondly,
problem
will be the nature of valid
with which Maim?n will be preoccupied
Finally, we may assume that the other problem with
knowledge.
from
elements
which
Maim?n
which
prevent
will
be preoccupied
will be the nature
the realization
of valid knowledge.3
of the factors
II
are the distinguishing
marks
of valid knowledge?
What
To
answer this question
to recall that in classical philos
it is necessary
the intelligible world on the
ophy a distinction was drawn between
one hand,
on the other.
and the empirical world
The first step
toward
cancelling
this
of knowledge.
within
the
realm
was
taken
by Kant.
By
sensation
for
and
and
world
understanding
intelligible
substituting
sensible world, Kant transformed
what liad hitherto
been a differ
ence in the structure
of the world,
into a difference within
the
limits
factors
intact.
3
Critical
The cognitive
See
to
(The Hague,
the
most
Speculative
distinction
But
the enclosure
of the diverse
despite
of knowledge,
remained
their duality
significance which Kant assigns to the differ
recent
study
comprehensive
The
Idealism:
Philosophy
Samuel
of
From
Atlas,
Solomon
Maim?n
1964).
NATHAN ROTENSTREICH
538
ence between
and sensation?as
from
understanding
distinguished
it
had
been
in
the ontological
classical
assigned
philosophy
validity
of Kant's
the logical condition
?can,
perhaps, be said to constitute
Maim?n goes beyond Kant by asking:
if under
idea of synthesis.
are
indeed
elements
sensation
of
and
then
standing
knowledge,
be maintained?
If understanding
their duality
and
why must
are
indeed
constituents
of
then
sensation
knowledge,
they ought to
a
as
of
rather than as two
be understood
elements
single system,
one of which
is based upon the other.
systems,
In abolishing
the ontological
and in substituting
difference,
a difference between
two sources of knowledge,
Kant took the first
second
toward
The
toward
rationalization.
rationaliza
step
step
between
the
is taken by Maim?n, who abolishes
the difference
a
sources
two
in
of knowledge
and substitutes
immanent
duality
a duality
in the process
of
immanent
the sphere of knowledge;
overcomes
which
the
and progressively
rationalization
perpetually
tion
irrational
factor,
of
i.e.,
irreducibility
rationalization,
which
would
Integration
substituted
process
into
the
into the
absorbed
By being
irrational
factor is robbed of its
a stable
status.
otherwise
arrogate
the datum.
the
continuous
status
of rationalization
process
of knowledge.
of the components
is
change undergone
by the datum entails a new view both
connected
them.
From
with
of concepts
and of the syntheses
are
intuitions
observation
that concepts without
Kant's well-known
are
intuitions
without
it
follows
that
and
blind,
concepts
empty,
The
contents
constitutes
are created
between
ing the difference
the content into the concept
the elements
of
the absorption
as
endowed
into the concept
entails
itself, i.e.,
of
the power
with
As endowed
the power of explication.
no
content.
is
the
the
itself
longer
concept
Synthesis
explication,
to
and their application
of concepts
denotes
the self-transcendence
is implicit, to begin
intuitions.
The fullness furnished by intuition
is but the fullness of the con
and synthesis
in the concept;
with,
for
not
to
upon intuition
depending
begin with,
cept.
Being full
an
as
a
can
serve
for
the concept
its fullness,
starting
point
the problem
in which
i.e., for a genetic process
process,
explicative
be said that
It may
finds
its solution.
of validity
accordingly
with
goes beyond
tenet of each:
central
Maim?n
undertakes
from understanding
539
and denied
Leibniz
meaning
concepts
as the content
of the universe.
Ill
of synthesis
's new interpretation
leads him
of
of
the
universe.
the
rationality
conception
Rationality,
consists in the creation of the datum out of the
maintains,
not in the explanation
of the datum by means
of the
Maim?n
to a new
Maim?n
concept,
concept.
is realized
in the generation
of the datum.
Maim?n
Rationality
concrete
for this concept
in the
of rationality
sought
expression
:
facets
of
his
system
following
in
Conspicuous
is
the
noncognitive
sphere
In Kant's
thing-in-itself.4
(A)
its absence
factor
from
the
epistemological
the
posited
by Kant, namely
the thing-in-itself
fulfills the
system,
of (a) supplying knowledge
with the datum;
and
that the datum will not be eliminated
from
(b) guaranteeing
as it were,
Kant's
the ten
frustrates,
thing-in-itself
knowledge.
function
twofold
a cognitive
to the thing
function
by assigning
a cognitive
there is neither room nor reason for allotting
to a factor which
subsists beyond
the sphere of knowl
its fullness
Hermann
Cohen
edge.
Anticipating
that
the
cannot
argues
thing-in-itself
an
based upon
analysis of the nature
and his
bear
Maim?n
followers,
the brunt of criticism
and constituent
elements
knowledge.
See Bergman,
op.
cit.,
pp.
7 ff.,
and
Atlas,
op.
cit.,
pp.
20
ff.
of
NATHAN ROTENSTREICH
540
Elimination
of
is entailed
the
by the
of concepts ; but no
concerning
assumption
of synthesis
is illuminated
positive characteristic
by its elimination.
The synthetic character of concepts finds positive
in the
expression
(B)
thing-in-itself
the synthetic character
of all knowledge,
is not an arbitrary act of
This function must necessarily
in
formal assertion.
be anchored
the meaning
and structure of the concepts
it combines;
it is not
of the assertion,
but also from the per
only from the perspective
a
a pred
term
of
must
that
constitute
content,
spective
particular
function
icate of a particular
be the measure
Or, as Maim?n
puts it, the content
subject.
of whether
the subject is determined
by the
and whether
the predicate
is the determination.
The
must
predicate,
combination
in the assertion
of the known
tion
in
tional
"This
"This
content;
assertion.
the
is accordingly
based upon the clarity
content guides the combina
and the known
the formal
facets of the proposi
Not
contents
to say
the known
permit us
but
structure,
is a right-angled
and
triangle,"
is a right-angled
truth."
Whereas,
prevent
us
from saying
to the realistic
according
is valid because
it copies the clear structure
solution,
knowledge
it is
of the world,
to Maim?n,
is valid when
according
knowledge
in
formulated
the
structure
Maim?n
function
assertions
which
a determinable
reflect
its
own
clear
structure,
i.e.,
its determinations.
subject
an ordering
is not merely
also maintains
that the concept
but also a fullness of content, because its very nature leads
us to bring
minations.
of
and
ness between
As
ceptual
content.
541
PHILOSOPHY
and accident.
substance
and accident
substance
between
the relation
represents
explicitly
a structure which has
as displaying
the determined
sphere : he correlates
to the logical
as being
substance
been
transferred
of its determination;
independent
as being
the determination
with
the accident
subject with
and he correlates
upon
dependent
the
determined
to
subject.
Maim?n
's transfer
of
the
categories
sphere
logical-conceptual
clearly
to abolish the duality of the spheres.
Also
tendency
related
reflected in this transfer is Maimon's
that
argument
closely
or
structure
cannot
of substances
be transparent
the
rational, unless
it is at the same time the structure of concepts.
ontological
reflects his
To understand
stance
and accident
to understand
transfers
the structure
of sub
why Maim?n
same
to the conceptual
at
the
is
time
sphere,
he criticizes
the notion
that the category
of
why
Were
constitutes
the supreme principle
of knowledge.
causality
we to represent as a central metaphysical
motif
the conflict between
the principle
of substance
and the principle
of causality, we would
to
the
include Maim?n
of the
have
among
leading proponents
former:
measuring
Maim?n
rationality,
effect
rather
the principle
that
argues
is not meaningful,
than explication?it
the related
terms.
The
as the
thinkers
represent
represented
by Maim?n
kind,
of causality
by his standard of
cause and
relation between
a
relation
of
because?being
implication
is not based upon the inner content of
assertion
and determination
which many
Maim?n
the
of the causality
strength
principle
as its weakness.
A connection
of
is external
and meaningless.
are
this
Maimon's
argues,
founda
ideal, then, is to find an immanent-meaningful
cognitive
even when
tion for the interconnectedness
of elements,
their con
occurs merely
in time.
nection
This ideal cannot be satisfied by
the merely
Maim?n
temporal relation of succession.
consequently
tries to correlate the principle of causality with a type of continuous
transition based upon the content of the phases which
follow one
another,
not upon
their position
in a temporal
sequence.
NATHAN ROTENSTREICH
542
The
(D)
rationalization
reflects the
by Maim?n
employed
in
his
teaching.
per
predominant
Particularly
in this respect,
is the term "differential,"
which Maim?n
tinent,
uses to denote
the process of creating
the datum out of the con
the
the conceptual
of
elements.
cept,
being
perceptions
integrals
As S. H. Bergman
has shown,3
the position
occupied
by the
very
concept
of differential
toward
rationalization.
terminology
in Maimon's
system is parallel to the position
of
in Kant's
the
schematism
Yet this
concept
by
occupied
system.
not
of
Maimon's
need
detain
since
it
to
us,
concept
aspect
pertains
of his system, rather than to its main
the technical machinery
trend
be worthwhile
light on that trend, it might
the relations between Formal Logic, which
to
pertains
the structure of judgments,
and Transcendental
which
per
Logic,
was among
tains to objects.
Maim?n
the first philosophers
to
take issue with Kant on this central matter.
Unlike Kant, Maim?n
of Transcendental
maintains
the primacy
and its inde
Logic
To throw
further
to examine
of Formal
In thus diverging
from Kant, Maim?n
Logic.
to
invest
content
of
with
all,
sought,
thought
and, secondly,
to make Formal Logic?which
and abstracts
disregards
deliberately
an abstraction
from content?merely
of the full, and consequently
Once we admit that the concept
is dynamic,
creative,
concept.
pendence
first
the datum
IV
If Maimon's
toward
ality
Rationalization
is obstructed
elements
component
scribed in Kant's
See Bergman,
op.
Rotenstreich,
14 ff.
pp.
6
Kant,
See
cit.,
pp.
Experience
65
ff.; Atlas,
and
its
op.
cit.,
pp.
Systematization,
between
the
structure
de
scepticism
109
is
ff.
Studies
in
543
PHILOSOPHY
two different
based upon
he measures
of Kant's
Kant's
be described
to solve.
Maimon's
system may accordingly
designed
and factual scepticism.
rationalism
as a combination
of fundamental
factual scepticism?
other reason is there for Maimon's
What
an
in Kant's
of
is
element
that
recalled
there
will
be
It
ambiguity
of
connotes
the domain
"Experience"
sense
that Kant says
It is in this
data.
7
when he says
to experience."
to
Yet
has
left
be
else
"Everything
as grounded
and
both in perception
that he deals with experience
as a synthesis
and not
he refers to experience
in understanding,8
concept
sensuous
as
a mere
of
experience.
encounter with
case
In any
encounter.
Kant
does
not
an
offer
exhaustive
of expe
the two meanings
of the relation
explanation
more
seems to have been
in this matter;
rience.
Maim?n
precise
a particular
that
he
maintained
Kantian
terms,
sense-impres
using
the total system of knowledge
while
sion is an actual experience,
are
that concepts
This
implies
experience.
represents
possible
and
in
to
qua possible
experience,
general
knowledge
applicable
to actual experience
that they are not applicable
qua this or that
between
is no internal connection
There
particular
impression.
between
in its ultimate
factuality and the system
impression
of the system to the impres
Hence the applicability
The question
sion is not demonstrated
quid facti remains
by Kant.
the datum from
of
rationalization
unsolved;
through generation
this particular
of knowledge.
the concept
remains
within
unattainable
the limits
of finite
under
standing.
In the history
factual scepticism
of sceptical ideas, Maimon's
a
aware
is
His scepticism
of, and mea
special position
occupies
sures itself by, a criterion of knowledge
immune against scepticism.
on the
are
and
relativism
Both
challenged
scepticism
generally
7
Kritik
(London,
8
Peter
der
1950),
Prolegomena
and Lucas
reinen
p.
Vernunft,
B,
p.
218.
In
trans,
by
Kemp
Smith
208.
zu einer
(Manchester,
jeden
k?nftigen
1953).
Metaphysik,
etc.
S 20,
trans,
by
is beyond
to Maimon's
doubt.
Neither
of these
objections
seems
Maim?n
restricts
pertinent
scepticism.
explicitly
as he
doubt within
the limits of empirical
Doubt,
knowledge.
to
the existence
of thought
in
puts it, applies
concerning
objects
to the a priori conditions
of knowledge.
Such doubt
conformity
not
itself because
cancel
it applies
of
only to knowledge
not
to
structure
of
the
of
Further
knowledge
objects,
knowledge.
is explicitly
such scepticism
to a
formulated
more,
by reference
ideal.
Such
cognitive
definite,
crystallized,
scepticism
accordingly
or
of the ideal, not the self-contradiction
implies the nonrealization
of knowledge.
self-destruction
does
character of Maimon's
Janus-faced
system carries decisive
from
the
of
the
of philosophy.
We
weight
viewpoint
development
formulated
the program
of nine
may venture to say that Maim?n
aware
teenth century idealism,
not be
that
the
could
program
fully
as a
carried out.
Nineteenth
idealism
be
described
may
century
or
movement
which
to
undertake
endeavors,
dares,
philosophical
The
the execution
of Maimon's
as a limitation
finite mind
of infinite
represent
as
he represents
infinite mind
an immanent
of
explication
does
Hegel
mind;
9
1948),
"Analysis
p. 99.
of Meaning,"
in Essays
in Science
and
Philosophy
(London,
finite mind.
system
justifies
not
only
is why
Hegel
to the Phenomenology
his daring venture.
that
Maimon's
a central
assigns
for
of Spirit;
Here he undertakes
program
can
be
in his
position
it is here that he
realized
to demonstrate
as
a matter
of
The Hebrew
University
of Jerusalem.