PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO

RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and
RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for petitioners.
Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor
union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino,
Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo
Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in
protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2
P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively);
and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent Court
reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the parties parties
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass demonstration at
Malacaang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be participated by the
first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM
and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's
canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and
all department and section heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3)
Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass demonstration at
Malacaang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the union
panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be
cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with
Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized,
however, that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the
Company. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned the PBMEO representatives
that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved
by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall
fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a
violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked Company represented by
Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin
Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and
appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers may join the Malacaang demonstration,
the workers for the first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the
demonstration and should report for work; and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order
not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT NO STRIKE'. All
those who will not follow this warning of the Company shall be dismiss; De Leon reiterated the

Company's warning that the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of the mass
demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as
the Malacaang demonstration will be held the following morning; and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which was
received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST
EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8, Annex
"F", pp. 42-43, rec.)
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the
respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the
workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969,
respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court, a charge against
petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to
Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No
Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de
Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief
Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.)
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the
respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a
valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their
mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp.
31-34, rec.)
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order
dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio
Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and
Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence,
considered to have lost their status as employees of the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on
September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of said order
dated September 15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as asked for ten (10) days
within which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp.
57-60, rec. )
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent Company averred that herein
petitioners received on September 22, 1969, the order dated September 17 (should be September 15), 1969; that under
Section 15 of the amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five (5) days from September
22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to file their motion for reconsideration; and that because their motion for
reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs. Castillo, 1 which held among

others, that a motion for extension of the five-day period for the filing of a motion for reconsideration
should be filed before the said five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments dated October 11, 1969, in support of
their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners
for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which
herein petitioners received on October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on October 24, 1969 and addressed to
the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules
of the Court of Industrial Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within five (5) days from receipt of its
decision or order and that an appeal from the decision, resolution or order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for relief from the order dated October 9,
1969, on the ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time was due to excusable negligence and

honest mistake committed by the president of the petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto
the affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, herein petitioners filed on
November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).
I
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the issues posed by the case at bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality is the central core
as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected
to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person." 2
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of opportunism,
the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no
patience with general principles." 3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free press, freedom of
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections." 4 Laski proclaimed that "the happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the

criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits to the authority
it was entitled to exercise." 5
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the immunities reserved
by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than
the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the
majority who refuse to listen. 6 And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties

of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected. 7
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to
man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can
participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of
public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal
to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful
sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized. 8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our

society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application
of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow
specificity." 9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are
extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases
to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs
political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are
essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; 10 and such priority "gives these liberties

the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."

11

The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation
between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor
oppressive would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. 12 On the other hand, a

constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence

of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it has
been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the
writer of the opinion inImbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs.
Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 14 believes that
the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to
choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the
balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by
Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz. whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies
such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike,
concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners are guilty
bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine Blooming
Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by foregoing principles governing a democratic society, such conclusion cannot be
sustained. The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacaang was against alleged abuses of some
Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said demonstrate was purely and completely an
exercise of their freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances in
particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the municipality of
Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police
excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its
members fro the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the
defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or
peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein
respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself at
the expenses of its workers? Was it also intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex
its workers? Its failure to defend its own employees all the more weakened the position of its laborers the alleged oppressive
police who might have been all the more emboldened thereby subject its lowly employees to further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged
persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very
survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human
rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6
o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. Such
apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its
management. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed
they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found
themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as
that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken
in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to
humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised
tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress
of grievances over property rights has been sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted

boon at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming
ideal of our enlightened civilization becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning
at all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To
regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in
collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the
dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the
collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as
well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of
petition. 19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according to the respondent Court
Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the "duty ... to observe regular working hours." The strain construction
of the Court of Industrial Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to stage mass demonstration

against police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the workers and deserves
severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a slender ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally enjoined by any court,
such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal
picketing or strike. 20 The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that the mass

demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in any industrial dispute although
there is concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the demonstration and that they
suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or
damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed appreciate the sine qua non of an effective demonstration especially by
a labor union, namely the complete unity of the Union members as well as their total presence at the demonstration site in
order to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also immediately action on the part of the
corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is one
of the aspects of freedom of expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the

circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more
persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members
will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and
abet continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the company two days in
advance of their projected demonstration and the company could have made arrangements to counteract
or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for one day,
especially in this case when the Union requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will join
the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the Union reiterated in their telegram received by the
company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.).
There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request of
the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to
regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the
company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is
unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to
permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent
separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression,
freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice
defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or
protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent firm on March 4,
1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint
on the right of the employees to engage in such common action to better shield themselves against such alleged police
indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular shift should not
participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting
speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves at least equal protection as the concerted action of
employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging bank president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism an
discrimination in the appointment and promotion of ban employees. 23 We further ruled in the Republic Savings Bank

case, supra, that for the employees to come within the protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section
4(a-1) on Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective
bargaining be contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is for the furtherance of their interests. 24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of respondent Court dated September 15, 1969,
the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union guaranteed by the
Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal

operation of the company" and "warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts,
who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who are the organizers of
the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such
failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief).
Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining the mass demonstration. However, the issues that the
employees raised against the local police, were more important to them because they had the courage to proceed with the
demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's wage by reason of
their absence from work on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more especially if he has
a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their demonstration would bring about
the desired relief from police abuses. But management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their
right of free speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from the workers proof of the truth of the
alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby concedes that the evidence of such abuses should properly
be submitted to the corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom such complaint may be
referred by the President of the Philippines for proper investigation and action with a view to disciplining the local police
officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a large
extent the operations of the complainant company," the respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not make any finding as
to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only mean that the firm did not sustain any
loss or damage. It did not present evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for failure to comply with purchase orders
on that day; or that penalties were exacted from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that day of the
demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by the customers by reason of its failure to deliver the materials
ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or products were damaged due to absence of its workers on March 4, 1969.
On the contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water
and electric consumption that day. Such savings could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages it might
have sustained by reason of the absence of its workers for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of
grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and
consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these
lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure
the well-being and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6
of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor ...". Respondent Court of Industrial Relations
as an agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees
in favor of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless
constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the
law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to
self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic wellbeing." It is most unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very governmental agency
designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed to keep faith with its avowed mission its raison d'etre as
ordained and directed by the Constitution.
V
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a
consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of
constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment.
Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is convicted by final judgment through a
forced confession, which violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination; 25or who is denied the right to

present evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, 26even after the
accused has already served sentence for twenty-two years. 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these constitutional immunities of
petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and aggravated the inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers
claimed they had been subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these basic human rights of the laborers, the
Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity.
Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on all public offices including the courts 28 as well as private

citizens and corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by mere procedural

rule promulgated by the Court Industrial Relations exercising a purely delegate legislative power, when
even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. There
is no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of
one speech, the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to
be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses
to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would
be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a
race for time. And in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses
because he cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required
diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay for competent legal
services. 28-a
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for reconsideration of its order or writ should filed within five (5)
days from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said motion shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date of
filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules of procedure were promulgated by the
Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from notice on September 22, 1969 of
the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim that they could have filed it on September 28,
1969, but it was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat the rights of the petitioning
employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply with a mere Court of Industrial
Relations procedural rule governing the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases, promulgated
pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in the light of the
aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights
sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the Constitution
is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and logic. The
dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of
necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case does not implement or
reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected,' but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the
enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a
mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A
period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers, who
usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See.
10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for
reconsideration could have been only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the
unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27, 1969, is based on the ground that the
order sought to be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced during the hearing," and
likewise prays for an extension of ten (10) days within which to file arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the
Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.); although the arguments were actually filed by the
herein petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after the 10-day period required for the filing of such
supporting arguments counted from the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on October
28, 1969 the resolution dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for reconsideration for being pro forma since it was
filed beyond the reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, or where the arguments in
suppf such motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period provided for by the Court of Industrial Relations rules,
the order or decision subject of 29-a reconsideration becomes final and unappealable. But in all these cases,

the constitutional rights of free expression, free assembly and petition were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently available must be specifically raised in the
complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or defense not raised in such pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a
constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first time on appeal, if it appears that the determination of the
constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis mota of the case without the resolution of which no

final and complete determination of the dispute can be made. 30 It is thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or

of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural rule of the
Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the constitutional rights
invoked by herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them
and in their defense to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most compelling
reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such human rights. 30-a
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a particular
case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require." 30-b Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion

in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. 30-c reiterated this principle and added that
Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with all situations without concerning itself about
procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, in any case, without further loss of
time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired. Thus, this
Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa. In other words, when all the material facts are
spread in the records before Us, and all the parties have been duly heard, it matters little that the error of
the court a quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction. We can then and there render the appropriate judgment.
Is within the contemplation of this doctrine that as it is perfectly legal and within the power of this Court to
strike down in an appeal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or committed with grave abuse of
discretion, it cannot be beyond the admit of its authority, in appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain
proceed in any error of judgment of a court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of
jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether or not the errors this Court has
found in the decision of the Court of Appeals are short of being jurisdiction nullities or excesses, this
Court would still be on firm legal grounds should it choose to reverse said decision here and now even if
such errors can be considered as mere mistakes of judgment or only as faults in the exercise of
jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary return of this case to the lower court for the sole purpose of
pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal. (Emphasis supplied). 30-d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial Relations rule in this particular case at bar would an
unreasoning adherence to "Procedural niceties" which denies justice to the herein laborers, whose basic human freedoms,
including the right to survive, must be according supremacy over the property rights of their employer firm which has been
given a full hearing on this case, especially when, as in the case at bar, no actual material damage has be demonstrated as
having been inflicted on its property rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution renders more imperative the
suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash with the human rights sanctioned and shielded with resolution
concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law. It should be stressed that the application in the instant case
Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein respondent firm is unreasonable and therefore
such application becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the human rights of petitioning labor union and workers in the light
of the peculiar facts and circumstances revealed by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with reference to the case at is also
authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to
"act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms ..."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking for the Court, in
the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al., 30-e thus:
As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion for new trial is not "newly
discovered," as such term is understood in the rules of procedure for the ordinary courts, We hold that
such criterion is not binding upon the Court of Industrial Relations. Under Section 20 of Commonwealth
Act No. 103, 'The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt its, rules or procedure and shall have such
other powers as generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided, however, That in the hearing,
investigation and determination of any question or controversy and in exercising any duties and power
under this Act, the Court shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal
evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.' By this provision
the industrial court is disengaged from the rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said
court is not even restricted to the specific relief demanded by the parties but may issue such orders as

may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or dispelling any doubts
that may give rise to future disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila Trading
& Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We believe that this provision is ample
enough to have enabled the respondent court to consider whether or not its previous ruling that
petitioners constitute a minority was founded on fact, without regard to the technical meaning of newly
discovered evidence. ... (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v. Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578).
(emphasis supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to rule in effect that
the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert competent lawyer, can no longer seek the sanctuary of human freedoms
secured to them by the fundamental law, simply because their counsel erroneously believing that he received a copy of
the decision on September 23, 1969, instead of September 22, 1969 - filed his motion for reconsideration September 29,
1969, which practically is only one day late considering that September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when they ceased to be instruments of justice, for the
attainment of which such rules have been devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score, Mr. Justice Fernando,
speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:
As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910]. The Villamor
decision was cited with approval in Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano
v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, 14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.), decided as
far back as 1910, "technicality. when it deserts its proper-office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this
Court has remained committed. The late Justice Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of
a similar mind. For him the interpretation of procedural rule should never "sacrifice the ends justice."
While "procedural laws are no other than technicalities" view them in their entirety, 'they were adopted
not as ends themselves for the compliance with which courts have organized and function, but as means
conducive to the realization the administration of the law and of justice (Ibid., p.,128). We have remained
steadfastly opposed, in the highly rhetorical language Justice Felix, to "a sacrifice of substantial rights of
a litigant in altar of sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the sacred principles of justice."
(Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly put by Justice Makalintal, they
"should give way to the realities of the situation." (Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA
1016, 1019). In the latest decision in point promulgated in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing
McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier
formulation of Justice Labrador that rules of procedure "are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical
sense"; but are intended "to help secure substantial justice." (Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given effect, the dismissal or termination of
the employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence from work. The respondent
Court itself recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not include the dismissal of the other 393 employees who
are members of the same Union and who participated in the demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter of fact,
upon the intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the Union members who are not officers, were not dismissed and only the
Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named as respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed
against them by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent
firm insinuates that not all the 400 or so employee participated in the demonstration, for which reason only the Union and its
thirteen (13) officers were specifically named in the unfair labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were so,
then many, if not all, of the morning and regular shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969 and that, as a consequence, the
firm continued in operation that day and did not sustain any damage.
The appropriate penalty if it deserves any penalty at all should have been simply to charge said one-day absence
against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since
as aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as well as that of their respective families
aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty
tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously seek to destroy our
system of Government, but from men of goodwill good men who allow their proper concerns to blind
them to the fact that what they propose to accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.

... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember, however, is
thatpreservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has the same effect
whether the suppress or be a reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against misguided zeal is a
constant alertness of the infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in our Constitution. Each
surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment makes easier another, larger surrender. The battle
over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one.
... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
... But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel secure because we belong
to a group that is important and respected, we must recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play
for the less fortunate that we in all honor and good conscience must be observe. 31
The case at bar is worse.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic understanding of
the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the local police, It was more expedient for
the firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in their fight for their freedoms and security against
alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency resorted to by
the respondent company assaulted the immunities and welfare of its employees. It was pure and implement selfishness, if
not greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank dismissed

eight (8) employees for having written and published "a patently libelous letter ... to the Bank president
demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as
well as discrimination in the promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled:
It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents. Assuming that the latter acted
in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they
were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self organization that includes
concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act ...) This is the view
of some members of this Court. For, as has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even
by a small group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity
protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective
bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
xxx xxx xxx
Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their grievances.
xxx xxx xxx
The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the respondents' libel in
giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right of self-organization of employees is not
unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to
discharge for cause (Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29,
1960) is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal exercise of the right of the
employer to select his employees or to discharge them. It is directed solely against the abuse of that right
by interfering with the countervailing right of self organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S. 177
[1941])...
xxx xxx xxx
In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct, identified as an
interference with the employees' right of self-organization or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to
bargain collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and intendment of section
4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act. (Emphasis supplied.) 33

If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in the Republic Savings case, supra,
where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president no less, such recognition and protection for free
speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar,
where the mass demonstration was not against the company nor any of its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:
(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated September 15 and October
9, 1969; and
(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the date of their separation from the
service until re instated, minus one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources during
their separation from the service.
With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, C.J, took no part.
BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, respondents.
The City Attorney for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.

VITUG, J.:
The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed into focus in this petition
for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to prohibit public
respondent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his
capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City
Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors
Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990)
within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA. 1 Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the

private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way
to the "People's Park". 2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a lettercomplaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late
CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr.,
of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores,
and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. 3 On 23 July
1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and
shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission"
and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. 4
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular
inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls, sarisari stores and carinderia, 5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of financial

assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to purchase light housing
materials and food under the Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist from

further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and
arrest." 6
A motion to dismiss, 7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also averred,

among other things, that:

1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-Agency Memorandum
of Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of
poor dwellers in Metro-Manila;
xxx xxx xxx
3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred to therein refers to
moratorium in the demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;
4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent business entrepreneurs
even this Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants are indeed,
vendors;
5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner
North Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and
6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and authority whether or not
a certain business establishment (should) be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to
revoke or cancel a permit, if already issued, upon grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance. 8
During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss set for
21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the courts.
On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that the Commission's
authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that
"the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their privilege to engage in business." 9
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution, along with the contempt charge that
had meantime been filed by the private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the ground that the
motion to dismiss was still then unresolved). 10
In an Order, 11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the

demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine
of P500.00 on each of them.
On 1 March 1991, 12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and supplemental

motion to dismiss, in this wise:

Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had jurisdiction over the
complaint filed by the squatters-vendors who complained of the gross violations of their human and
constitutional rights. The motion to dismiss should be and is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. 13
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper tiger limited only to
investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide
appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines . . . ." It added:
The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to life and to dignity. All these
brazenly and violently ignored and trampled upon by respondents with little regard at the same time for
the basic rights of women and children, and their health, safety and welfare. Their actions have
psychologically scarred and traumatized the children, who were witness and exposed to such a violent
demonstration of Man's inhumanity to man.

In an Order, 14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this recourse.
The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution 15 of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently reinstated, however,

in our resolution 16 of 18 June 1991, in which we also issued a temporary restraining order, directing the
CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 90-1580." 17
The petitioners pose the following:
Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls were demolished by
the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition.
In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from filing his comment for public
respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own comment, 18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its

Commissioners. The Court also resolved to dispense with the comment of private respondent Roque
Fermo, who had since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such comment.
The petition has merit.
The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987
Constitution. 19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No.

163, 20 issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so
superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on Human Rights. 21
The powers and functions 22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil
and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the
primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for
compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents
or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or
under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the intention of the members of
the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body. 23 This view, however, has not heretofore been

shared by this Court. In Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, 24 the Court, through then Associate
Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is "only the first of the enumerated
powers and functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance
can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:
. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court
or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence
and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must
be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals
or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this controversy and, its is, to
determine the extent of CHR's investigative power.
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to define it, albeit not a few
have tried, could at best be described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on human rights in the Philippines,
sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that has been propounded is "(w)hat do you
understand by "human rights?" The participants, representing different sectors of the society, have given the following varied
answers:
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. They are the same in all
parts of the world, whether the Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or
Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .
Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property; freedom of speech, of the
press, of religion, academic freedom, and the rights of the accused to due process of law; political rights,
such as the right to elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political associations
and engage in politics; and social rights, such as the right to an education, employment, and social
services. 25

Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact
of his humanity. . . . Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the
State but can only be recognized and protected by it. 26
(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights defined
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 27
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of
his natural birth, right, innate and inalienable. 28
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can be

understood to include those that relate to an individual's social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems
to closely identify the term to the universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is generally
considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.
Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986 Constitutional Commission in adopting
the specific provisions on human rights and in creating an independent commission to safeguard these rights? It may of
value to look back at the country's experience under the martial law regime which may have, in fact, impelled the inclusions
of those provisions in our fundamental law. Many voices have been heard. Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps
of the sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and an advocate of civil
liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of Human Rights in the Philippines," 29 observes:
But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights most of the human
rights expressed in the International Covenant, these rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of
Martial Law on 21 September 1972. Arbitrary action then became the rule. Individuals by the thousands
became subject to arrest upon suspicion, and were detained and held for indefinite periods, sometimes
for years, without charges, until ordered released by the Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The
right to petition for the redress of grievances became useless, since group actions were forbidden. So
were strikes. Press and other mass media were subjected to censorship and short term licensing. Martial
law brought with it the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost independence and
security of tenure, except members of the Supreme Court. They were required to submit letters of
resignation and were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture to extort confessions were
practiced as declared by international bodies like Amnesty International and the International
Commission of Jurists.
Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can see the following discussions during its 26
August 1986 deliberations:
MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view of the importance of human
rights and also because civil and political rights have been determined by many international covenants
and human rights legislations in the Philippines, as well as the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights
and subsequent legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such a wide territory in area, we might diffuse its
impact and the precise nature of its task, hence, its effectivity would also be curtailed.
So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission can be most effective.
MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights are very broad. The
Article on the Bill of Rights covers civil and political rights. Every single right of an individual involves his
civil right or his political right. So, where do we draw the line?
MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear in the language of human
rights advocates, as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a number of
articles on the right to life, the right against torture, the right to fair and public hearing, and so on. These
are very specific rights that are considered enshrined in many international documents and legal
instruments as constituting civil and political rights, and these are precisely what we want to defend here.
MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as defined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
distinguished this right against torture.
MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and economic rights, and there are
other violations of rights of citizens which can be addressed to the proper courts and authorities.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions, and, therefore, in doing that
the commission will be authorized to take under its wings cases which perhaps heretofore or at this

moment are under the jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the
government. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to define the specific
parameters which cover civil and political rights as covered by the international standards governing the
behavior of governments regarding the particular political and civil rights of citizens, especially of political
detainees or prisoners. This particular aspect we have experienced during martial law which we would
now like to safeguard.
MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what we are really trying to say is,
perhaps, at the proper time we could specify all those rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and defined as human rights. Those are the rights that we envision here?
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. They are
integral parts of that.
MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under the Bill of Rights covered by
human rights?
MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I would like to state that in
the past regime, everytime we invoke the violation of human rights, the Marcos regime came out with the
defense that, as a matter of fact, they had defended the rights of people to decent living, food, decent
housing and a life consistent with human dignity.
So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights. Is that the sense of the
committee, so as not to confuse the issue?
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.
MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised by the previous
speaker.
There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act effectively: 1) protection
of rights of political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public
trials; 4) cases of disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed against
the religious.
xxx xxx xxx
The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.
I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we should, in order to make the
proposed Commission more effective, delimit as much as possible, without prejudice to future
expansion. The coverage of the concept and jurisdictional area of the term "human rights". I was actually
disturbed this morning when the reference was made without qualification to the rights embodied in the
universal Declaration of Human Rights, although later on, this was qualified to refer to civil and political
rights contained therein.
If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, mentioned or linked the concept of human right with other human
rights specified in other convention which I do not remember. Am I correct?

MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture of 1985?

MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights of which we are signatory.
MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights here, I do not have a copy of the other covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there
are rights specified in that other convention which may not be specified here. I was wondering whether it
would be wise to link our concept of human rights to general terms like "convention," rather than specify
the rights contained in the convention.
As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the Committee, before the period of
amendments, could specify to us which of these articles in the Declaration will fall within the concept of
civil and political rights, not for the purpose of including these in the proposed constitutional article, but to
give the sense of the Commission as to what human rights would be included, without prejudice to
expansion later on, if the need arises. For example, there was no definite reply to the question of
Commissioner Regalado as to whether the right to marry would be considered a civil or a social right. It is
not a civil right?
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil and political rights that we felt
must be envisioned initially by this provision freedom from political detention and arrest prevention of
torture, right to fair and public trials, as well as crimes involving disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings
and collective violations. So, it is limited to politically related crimes precisely to protect the civil and
political rights of a specific group of individuals, and therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the
definite areas.
MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no longer linking his concept
or the concept of the Committee on Human Rights with the so-called civil or political rights as contained
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I was referring to an
international instrument.
MR. GUINGONA. I know.
MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific article therein, but only to
those that pertain to the civil and politically related, as we understand it in this Commission on Human
Rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the distinction between civil and social
rights.
MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International Covenant and Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The second covenant
contains all the different rights-the rights of labor to organize, the right to education, housing, shelter, et
cetera.
MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the committee to those that the
Gentlemen has specified.
MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx

SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human rights, I cannot stress more on
how much we need a Commission on Human Rights. . . .
. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very few lawyers will accept clients
who do not pay. And so, they are the ones more abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases
involved are very delicate torture, salvaging, picking up without any warrant of arrest, massacre and
the persons who are allegedly guilty are people in power like politicians, men in the military and big shots.
Therefore, this Human Rights Commission must be independent.
I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission, especially for the little Filipino,
the little individual who needs this kind of help and cannot get it. And I think we should concentrate only
on civil and political violations because if we open this to land, housing and health, we will have no place
to go again and we will not receive any response. . . . 30 (emphasis supplied)
The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the
Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).
The term "civil rights," 31 has been defined as referring
(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its
inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of the government. They
include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as
otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or
community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or
redressed in a civil action.
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable searches
and seizures, and imprisonment for debt. 32
Political rights, 33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the

establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the
right of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of
government. 34
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the delegates
envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights
violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2)
treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings
and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to
have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has
set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's
scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases
of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its
recommendation." 35
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-saristores
and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed
into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial
notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is
indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked,
if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances
obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and
political rights" intended by the Constitution.
On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure,
and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its
authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose
the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to

cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules
of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised
against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to
honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining
order) in the instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it
does not possess. In Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights, 36 the Court, speaking

through Madame Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino, explained:

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services
to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed
to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were
the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication.
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek
from proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the
CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by
the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of
Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is
available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interests of
a party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes omitted).
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and recommendations to any
appropriate agency of government. 37
The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the vendors affected by
the demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus standion the part of the
petitioners to question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with the appropriate administrative agencies
concerned to initially consider.
The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become moot and academic since
the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter is merely awaiting final
resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended
to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. 38 Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to

promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has been intended, among other
things, to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that. 39
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights is hereby prohibited from
further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary
restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason and Puno, JJ.,
concur.
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO
CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant.
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is whether Ordinance No.
4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. The lower court held that it is and adjudged it

"unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such judgment must be
reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an attack against its validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and
general manager of the second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity
as such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary
orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock
corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and
motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities, regularly paying taxes,
employing and giving livelihood to not less than 2,500 person and representing an investment of more than P3
million."1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance
No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the
City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond
the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the
revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged
ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose
P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; that the provision in the same section
which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to
refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons
without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the
surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of
stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with
data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person
signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or
duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and records kept and bound together, it also being provided that
the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor,
or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds,
not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for
the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged
ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels
such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due process clause
for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring
second class motels to have a dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person
less than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless
accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to
the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar
as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause the automatic
cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments,
there is once again a transgression of the due process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and
void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to
refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal circumstances regarding the respondent
Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila, of the
provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional grounds. After
setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation,
to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power and that only the guests or
customers not before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self
incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent
Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated September 28, 1964,
which reads:
1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar Inc. are duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the City of Manila, while the petitioner

Go Chin is the president and general manager of Hotel del Mar Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a
resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue and be sued;
2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of the City of
Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the
necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances;
3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and motels in Malate and
Ermita districts in Manila;
4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which was
approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence
of the respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the
ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar to the one
vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th Indorsement dated February 15, 1963
(Annex B);
5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with the proposed
ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex C;
6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from license fees paid by the 105
hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of Manila.
1w ph1.t

Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on the presumption of the
validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of conformity to the Constitution resting on the party who
assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable American authorities. Such a memorandum likewise
refuted point by point the arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February 4,
1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition, with citations of what
they considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for a judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null
and void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association, and referring to the alleged
constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court observed: "The only remaining issue here being purely a
question of law, the parties, with the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for
decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision passed
upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right and
proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels, and came to the
conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and
void." It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from
enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental
character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its
decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional
adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that
attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in
favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors
must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and
circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has
in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly
set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police
regulation.2
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is
unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere
better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,3 where the American
Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned
deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the
specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As

underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such
factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of
facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant to the due
process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover
petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is
immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold
otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the
most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, 4 extending as it does "to all the great public needs." 5 It would be,
to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be
deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the genera welfare. 6 Negatively put,
police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society.7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public
morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the
alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of
motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven
for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients
and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the
purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to
shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees
was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to
increase "the income of the city government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any
attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval, ordinances punishing vagrancy
and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant;8 provide a license tax for and regulating the maintenance or operation of
public dance halls;9 prohibiting gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and monte;12prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other
than Sundays or legal holidays;13 prohibiting the operation of pinball machines; 14 and prohibiting any person from keeping,
conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is smoked or otherwise used, 15 all of which are
intended to protect public morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the police power, which,
it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable
constitutional guaranties however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any
person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical,
unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for
correction by the courts.
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is raised to the question of due
process.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid.
What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the
challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its
doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is
ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not
outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack
of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of
fair play.17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of
reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought." 18 It is not a
narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," 19 decisions based on such a
clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." 20 Questions of due process are
not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases. 21
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body
considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. It would seem that what
should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of
an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the
need for a remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case must be found in

the records, and, as has been set forth, none is even attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of
nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance even of deceptive
plausibility to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such features as the
increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged
vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challenged ordinance for hotels and
motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter, first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and
second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far back as 1922 that municipal license fees
could be classified into those imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of
non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only. 22 As was explained more in detail in the above Cu
Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee
may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations
are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal
principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule,
declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might
otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the determination of the amount of
this kind of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld,
especially in of licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been declared unreasonable. 23
Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the American
Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's police power. Only the other day, this Court had
occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is
sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for public purposes, just
and uniform.25
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing licenses for
revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the
amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power
measure.26 The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent citation from another decision of
significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them of
their lawful occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the public markets. But it appears that
plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under certain
conditions is permitted x x x . And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their
present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in a
case, persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of the
police power embark in these occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that
power."27
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to
lease or rent room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be
charged, call for a different conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command
of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or
illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it
then be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable
situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation of conduct
amounts to curtailment of liberty which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One thought which
runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is
not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the
greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man
must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for
the common good x x x The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order
and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power." 28
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and
the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the state x x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority
because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the
individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through
education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order
and happiness for all.29

It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue deprivation of freedom to
contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent
given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public
interest.31 What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the
standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at
the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider. 32 How justify then the allegation of a denial
of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by invoking the principles of vagueness
or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of the alleged
grievance is that the provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners, however, point to
the requirement that a guest should give the name, relationship, age and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite
and uncertain in view of the necessity for determining whether the companion or companions referred to are those arriving
with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room With him at about the same time or coming at any
indefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a
restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso which from their
standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means
a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on its face
for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it. From Connally v. General Construction
Co.33 toAdderley v. Florida,34 the principle has been consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to such a
charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would
prove illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no
canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." 35
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the arguments pressed with such vigor and
determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it.
Respect for constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a
reversal of the appealed decision.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. With costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., are on leave.
MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner,
vs.
HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA, respondents.
Angel C. Cruz, Gregorio A. Ejercito, Felix C. Chaves & Jose Laureta for petitioner.
Sotero H. Laurel for respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review tile decision dated September 17, 1968 of respondent Judge Francisco Arca of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, in Civil Case No. 72797, the dispositive portion of winch reads.
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondents, declaring
Ordinance No. 6 37 of the City of Manila null and void. The preliminary injunction is made permanent. No
pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, September 17, 1968.
(SGD.)
FRANCI

SCO
ARCA
J
u
d
g
e
1

The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and signed by
the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio J. Villegas of Manila on March 27, 1968. 2
City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:
AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES
TO BE EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF
TRADE, BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT FIRST SECURING
AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE MAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. 3
Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 4 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any

position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without
first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except
persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical
assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those working
in their respective households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination,
who are not paid monetarily or in kind.
Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less than three (3) months to six (6) months or fine of
not less than P100.00 but not more than P200.00 or both such fine and imprisonment, upon conviction. 5
On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition with the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch I, denominated as Civil Case No. 72797, praying for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a judgment declaring said
Ordinance No. 6537 null and void. 6
In this petition, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho assigned the following as his grounds for wanting the ordinance declared null and
void:
1) As a revenue measure imposed on aliens employed in the City of Manila, Ordinance No. 6537 is
discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation;
2) As a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful occupations,
imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of registration and that
it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the
fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers:
3) It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of
their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution. 7
On May 24, 1968, respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on September 17, 1968 rendered judgment
declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction. 8
Contesting the aforecited decision of respondent Judge, then Mayor Antonio J. Villegas filed the present petition on March
27, 1969. Petitioner assigned the following as errors allegedly committed by respondent Judge in the latter's decision of
September 17,1968: 9

I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING
THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE CARDINAL RULE OF UNIFORMITY OF TAXATION.
II
RESPONDENT JUDGE LIKEWISE COMMITTED A GRAVE AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN
RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLE AGAINST UNDUE DESIGNATION
OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE FURTHER COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN
RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION.
Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be declared null and void on the ground that it violated the
rule on uniformity of taxation because the rule on uniformity of taxation applies only to purely tax or revenue measures and
that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue measure but is an exercise of the police power of the state, it being
principally a regulatory measure in nature.
The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its principal purpose is regulatory
in nature has no merit. While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien shall secure an employment permit from
the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and approval or disapproval of applications for
employment permits and therefore is regulatory in character the second part which requires the payment of P50.00 as
employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who
have been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of
regulation.
The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences
in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does
not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a
reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every
employed alien whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid
executive
Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has
been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the
mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal,
and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of
building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an
activity per se lawful. 10
In Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price Stabilization Board, 11 where a law granted a government agency

power to determine the allocation of wheat flour among importers, the Supreme Court ruled against the
interpretation of uncontrolled power as it vested in the administrative officer an arbitrary discretion to be
exercised without a policy, rule, or standard from which it can be measured or controlled.
It was also held in Primicias vs. Fugoso 12 that the authority and discretion to grant and refuse permits of all

classes conferred upon the Mayor of Manila by the Revised Charter of Manila is not uncontrolled
discretion but legal discretion to be exercised within the limits of the law.
Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in the
exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the ordinance.
The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.

Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it
at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While
it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot
be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection
under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens. 13
The trial court did not commit the errors assigned.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Makasiar, Muoz Palma, Santos and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Castro, C.J., Antonio and Aquino, Fernando, JJ., concur in the result.
Concepcion, Jr., J., took no part.
RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,
vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.
D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.
MALCOLM, J.:
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History (Worcester vs. Georgia [1832], 6 Pet., 515),
Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary of American jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to the status of an Indian)
with words which, with a slight change in phraseology, can be made to introduce the present opinion This cause, in every
point of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest. The legislative power of state, the controlling power of the
constitution and laws, the rights if they have any, the political existence of a people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are all
involved in the subject now to be considered.
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first, to introduce the facts and the
issues, next to give a history of the so called "non-Christians," next to compare the status of the "non-Christians" with that of
the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the constitutional questions presented.
I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that
the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions
are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held
under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:
1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which is as follows:
The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following resolution:
"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the advancement of the non-Christian
people of Mindoro, which were all a failure,
"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure is taken for the Mangyan
work of this province, no successful result will be obtained toward educating these people.

"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one place in order to make a permanent
settlement,
"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and
approved by the provincial board.
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most
convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now, therefore be it
"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on
Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval
of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and
"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead
applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor."
2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was approved by the Secretary of
the Interior of February 21, 1917.
3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2 which says:
"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current series, has selected a site in the sitio of
Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.
"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior, on
February 21, 1917.
"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro, pursuant to the provisions of section
2145 of the revised Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the townships of
Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan
and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than
December 31, 1917.
"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed
in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code."
4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive order of the
governor of the same province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the protection of the
Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized
customs among them.
5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are
liable to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.
6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by the sheriff of Mindoro but if
he is so detained it must be by virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711.
It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in question
to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved
by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was
duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this
section of the Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court is called upon the
decide.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:

SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial governor. With the prior approval
of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to
take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial
board.
In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759 of the same Code, which read as
follows:
SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. Any non-Christian who shall refuse to
comply with the directions lawfully given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section two thousand one hundred
and forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation upon a site designated by said governor shall upon conviction be
imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.
The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. The genealogical tree of this section, if
we may be permitted to use such terminology, would read: Section 2077, Administrative Code of 1916; section 62, Act No.
1397; section 2 of various special provincial laws, notably of Act No. 547, specifically relating to the Manguianes; section 69,
Act No. 387.
Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This word, as will later be disclosed, is also
found in varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands. In order to put the phrase in its proper category, and in order to
understand the policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands with reference to the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it
is well first of all to set down a skeleton history of the attitude assumed by the authorities towards these "non-Christians,"
with particular regard for the legislation on the subject.
II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.
The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are compiled in Book VI, Title III, in the
following language.
LAW I.
The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21, 1551. Philip II at Toledo, on February
19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on November 10, 1568. Ordinance 149
of the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578,
THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES).
In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the evangelical law, and in order that
they may forget the blunders of their ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that they may live in harmony and in
a civilized manner, it has always been endeavored, with great care and special attention, to use all the means
most convenient to the attainment of these purposes. To carry out this work with success, our Council of the Indies
and other religious persons met at various times; the prelates of new Spain assembled by order of Emperor
Charles V of glorious memory in the year one thousand five hundred and forty-six all of which meetings were
actuated with a desire to serve God an our Kingdom. At these meetings it was resolved that indios be made to live
in communities, and not to live in places divided and separated from one another by sierras and mountains,
wherein they are deprived of all spiritual and temporal benefits and wherein they cannot profit from the aid of our
ministers and from that which gives rise to those human necessities which men are obliged to give one another.
Having realized that convenience of this resolution, our kings, our predecessors, by different orders, have
entrusted and ordered the viceroys, presidents, and governors to execute with great care and moderation the
concentration of the indios intoreducciones; and to deal with their doctrine with such forbearance and gentleness,
without causing inconveniences, so that those who would not presently settle and who would see the good
treatment and the protection of those already in settlements would, of their own accord, present themselves, and it
is ordained that they be not required to pay taxes more than what is ordered. Because the above has been
executed in the greater part of our Indies, we hereby order and decree that the same be complied with in all the
remaining parts of the Indies, and the encomederos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner and form
prescribed by the laws of this title.
xxx

xxx

xxx

LAW VIII.
Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10, 1618.
THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.
The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should have the facilities of waters. lands, and
mountains, ingress and egress, husbandry and passageway of one league long, wherein the indios can have their
live stock that they may not be mixed with those of the Spaniards.
LAW IX.
Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.
THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM.
With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated in reducciones. Provided they shall not be
deprived of the lands and granaries which they may have in the places left by them. We hereby order that no
change shall be made in this respect, and that they be allowed to retain the lands held by them previously so that
they may cultivate them and profit therefrom.
xxx

xxx

xxx

LAW XIII.
THE SAME AS ABOVE.
THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING, VICEROY, OR COURT.
No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the right to alter or to remove thepueblos or
the reducciones once constituted and founded, without our express order or that of the viceroy, president, or the
royal district court, provided, however, that the encomenderos, priests, or indios request such a change or consent
to it by offering or giving information to that en. And, because these claims are often made for private interests and
not for those of the indios, we hereby order that this law be always complied with, otherwise the change will be
considered fraudulently obtained. The penalty of one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the judge
or encomendero who should violate this law.
LAW XV.
Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO SHALL BE "INDIOS."
We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be an indio of the same reduccion; if
there be more than eighty houses, there should be two mayors and two aldermen, also indios; and, even if the
town be a big one, there should, nevertheless, be more than two mayors and four aldermen, If there be less than
eighty indios but not less than forty, there should be not more than one mayor and one alderman, who should
annually elect nine others, in the presence of the priests , as is the practice in town inhabited by Spaniards
and indios.
LAW XXI.
Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on May 8, 1581. At Madrid, on January
10, 1589. Philip III, at Todesillas, on July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on October 1 and December 17, 1646. For
this law and the one following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.
THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS, NEGROES, "MESTIZOS," AND
MULATTOES.

We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores, or mestizos to live to live in the reduccionesand
towns and towns of the indios, because it has been found that some Spaniards who deal, trade, live, and associate
with the indios are men of troublesome nature, of dirty ways of living; robbers, gamblers, and vicious and useless
men; and, to avoid the wrongs done them, the indios would leave their towns and provinces; and the
negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes, besides maltreating them and utilizing their services, contaminate them with
their bad customs, idleness, and also some of their blunders and vices which may corrupt and pervert the goal
which we desire to reach with regard to their salvation, increase, and tranquillity. We hereby order the imposition of
grave penalties upon the commission of the acts above-mentioned which should not be tolerated in the towns, and
that the viceroys, presidents, governors, and courts take great care in executing the law within their powers and
avail themselves of the cooperation of the ministers who are truly honest. As regards the mestizos and Indian and
Chinese half-breeds (zambaigos), who are children of indias and born among them, and who are to inherit their
houses andhaciendas, they all not be affected by this law, it appearing to be a harsh thing to separate them from
their parents. (Law of the Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve the condition of the less advanced
inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in "reducciones," is found in the Decree of the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as follows:
It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a territory recognized as an integral part of a
nation should respect and obey the laws in force therein; while, on other hand, it is the duty to conscience and to
humanity for all governments to civilize those backward races that might exist in the nation, and which living in the
obscurity of ignorance, lack of all the nations which enable them to grasp the moral and material advantages that
may be acquired in those towns under the protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws.
It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the separation and isolation of the nonChristian races from the social life of the civilized and Christian towns; to allow any longer the commission of
depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is located the seat of the representative of the Government
of the, metropolis.
It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied themselves with this most important question,
and that much has been heretofore accomplished with the help and self-denial of the missionary fathers who have
even sacrificed their lives to the end that those degenerate races might be brought to the principles of Christianity,
but the means and the preaching employed to allure them have been insufficient to complete the work undertaken.
Neither have the punishments imposed been sufficient in certain cases and in those which have not been guarded
against, thus giving and customs of isolation.
As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state of things, taking into account the
prestige which the country demands and the inevitable duty which every government has in enforcing respect and
obedience to the national laws on the part of all who reside within the territory under its control, I have proceeded
in the premises by giving the most careful study of this serious question which involves important interests for
civilization, from the moral and material as well as the political standpoints. After hearing the illustrious opinions of
all the local authorities, ecclesiastics, and missionaries of the provinces of Northern Luzon, and also after finding
the unanimous conformity of the meeting held with the Archbishop of Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and Cebu, and
the provincial prelates of the orders of the Dominicans, Agustinians, Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of
the meeting of the Council of Authorities, held for the object so indicated, I have arrived at an intimate conviction of
the inevitable necessity of proceeding in a practical manner for the submission of the said pagan and isolated
races, as well as of the manner and the only form of accomplishing such a task.
For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects, I hereby promulgate the following:
DECREE.
1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this date, to be governed by the common law,
save those exceptions prescribed in this decree which are bases upon the differences of instructions, of the
customs, and of the necessities of the different pagan races which occupy a part of its territory.
2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races which may be divided into three
classes; one, which comprises those which live isolated and roaming about without forming a town nor a home;
another, made up of those subdued pagans who have not as yet entered completely the social life; and the third, of
those mountain and rebellious pagans shall be published in their respective dialects, and the officials, priests,
and missionaries of the provinces wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the work of having these races

learn these rules. These rules shall have executive character, beginning with the first day of next April, and, as to
their compliance, they must be observed in the manner prescribed below.
3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from now on, with all the means which
their zeal may suggest to them, to the taking of the census of the inhabitants of the towns or settlement already
subdued, and shall adopt the necessary regulations for the appointment of local authorities, if there be none as yet;
for the construction of courts and schools, and for the opening or fixing up of means of communication,
endeavoring, as regards the administrative organization of the said towns or settlements, that this be finished
before the first day of next July, so that at the beginning of the fiscal year they shall have the same rights and
obligations which affect the remaining towns of the archipelago, with the only exception that in the first two years
they shall not be obliged to render personal services other than those previously indicated.
4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands appropriate for cultivation, the
inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to move their dwelling-houses; and only in case of absolute necessity shall
a new residence be fixed for them, choosing for this purpose the place most convenient for them and which
prejudices the least their interest; and, in either of these cases, an effort must be made to establish their homes
with the reach of the sound of the bell.
5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be established an armed force composed
precisely of native Christian, the organization and service of which shall be determined in a regulations based upon
that of the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of the Guardia Civil).
6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns understand all the rights and duties affecting
them and the liberty which they have as to where and now they shall till their lands and sell the products thereof,
with the only exception of the tobacco which shall be bought by the Hacienda at the same price and conditions
allowed other producers, and with the prohibition against these new towns as well as the others from engaging in
commerce of any other transaction with the rebellious indios, the violation of which shall be punished with
deportation.
7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the territory of the rebellious indiosshall be
fixed; and whoever should go beyond the said limits shall be detained and assigned governmentally wherever
convenient.
8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of the Catholic Church, all by this
fact along be exempt for eight years from rendering personal labor.
9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued (aetas and mountains igorrots the
following advantages in returns for their voluntary submission: to live in towns; unity among their families;
concession of good lands and the right to cultivate them in the manner they wish and in the way them deem most
productive; support during a year, and clothes upon effecting submission; respect for their habits and customs in
so far as the same are not opposed to natural law; freedom to decide of their own accord as to whether they want
to be Christians or not; the establishment of missions and families of recognized honesty who shall teach, direct,
protect, and give them security and trust them; the purchase or facility of the sale of their harvests; the exemption
from contributions and tributes for ten years and from thequintas (a kind of tax) for twenty years; and lastly, that
those who are governed by the local authorities as the ones who elect such officials under the direct charge of the
authorities of the province or district.
10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the advantages offered, shall, in return, have
the obligation of constituting their new towns, of constructing their town hall, schools, and country roads which
place them in communication with one another and with the Christians; provided, the location of these towns be
distant from their actual residences, when the latter do not have the good conditions of location and cultivations,
and provided further the putting of families in a place so selected by them be authorized in the towns already
constituted.
11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the tribes, that, disregarding the peace,
protection, and advantages offered them, continue in their rebellious attitude on the first of next April, committing
from now on the crimes and vexations against the Christian towns; and for the this purposes, the Captain
General's Office shall proceed with the organization of the divisions of the Army which, in conjunction with the rural
guards (cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the territory of such tribes. On the expiration of the term, they shall
destroy their dwelling-houses, labors, and implements, and confiscate their products and cattle. Such a
punishment shall necessarily be repeated twice a year, and for this purpose the military headquarters shall

immediately order a detachment of the military staff to study the zones where such operations shall take place and
everything conducive to the successful accomplishment of the same.
12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities, and other subordinates to my authorities,
local authorities, and other subordinates to may authority, civil as well as military authorities, shall give the most
effective aid and cooperation to the said forces in all that is within the attributes and the scope of the authority of
each.
13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the provinces in the southern part of the
Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied to them.
14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-Royal Patron, a council or permanent
commission which shall attend to and decide all the questions relative to the application of the foregoing
regulations that may be brought to it for consultations by the chiefs of provinces and priests and missionaries.
15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to the foregoing, in brining about due
compliance with this decree, shall be promulgated by the respective official centers within their respective
jurisdictions. (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la Administracion, vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)
B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.
Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the best method for dealing with
the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one.
1. Organic law.
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American Government in the Philippines was President
McKinley's Instructions to the Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly approved and ratified by section 1 of the
Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions of these instructions have remained undisturbed by subsequent
congressional legislation. One paragraph of particular interest should here be quoted, namely:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course followed by
Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and
government and under which many of these tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by
civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments should, however, be
subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be
exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs.
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an Organic Act for the Philippines. The
purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to provide for a legislative body and, with this end in view, to name the
prerequisites for the organization of the Philippine Assembly. The Philippine Legislature, composed of the Philippine
Commission and the Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction over the Christian portion of the Islands. The Philippine
Commission was to retain exclusive jurisdiction of that part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916,
commonly known as the Jones Law. This transferred the exclusive legislative jurisdiction and authority theretofore exercised
by the Philippine Commission, to the Philippine Legislature (sec. 12). It divided the Philippine Islands into twelve senatorial
districts, the twelfth district to be composed of the Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Department of
Mindanao and Sulu. The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was authorized to appoint senators and representatives
for the territory which, at the time of the passage of the Jones Law, was not represented in the Philippine Assembly, that is,
for the twelfth district (sec. 16). The law establish a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes" which shall
have general supervision over the public affairs of the inhabitants which are represented in the Legislature by appointed
senators and representatives( sec. 22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line between the territory not inhabited by Moros or
other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which is inhabited by
Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
2. Statute law.

Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the Philippine Commission and Legislature.
The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province of Benguet and the Igorots; Act NO. 82, the Municipal
Code; ;Act no. 83, the Provincial Government Act; Act No. 183, the Character of the city of Manila; Act No. 7887, providing
for the organization and government of the Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the Special Provincial Government Act; Act No.
1397, the Township Government Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the organization of settlements; Act No. 1963, the Baguio
charger; and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The major portion of these laws have
been carried forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 an d1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the primitive peoples. Beginning with Act
No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United States Philippine Commission, having reference to the
Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 4111, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 4568, 1306
were enacted for the provinces of Abra, Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela. Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro,
Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As an example of these laws,
because referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:
No. 547. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL CIVIL GOVERNMENTS
FOR THE MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF MINDORO.
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Commission, that:
SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not progressed sufficiently in civilization
to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government, the provincial governor is authorized,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in dealing with these Manguianes to appoint officers from
among them, to fix their designations and badges of office, and to prescribe their powers and duties: Provided,
That the powers and duties thus prescribed shall not be in excess of those conferred upon township officers by Act
Numbered Three hundred and eighty-seven entitled "An Act providing for the establishment of local civil
Governments in the townships and settlements of Nueva Vizcaya."
SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial governor is further authorized, when
he deems such a course necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such Manguianes to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
Manguianes who refuse to comply with such directions shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not
exceeding sixty days.
SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his province to acquire the knowledge
and experience necessary for successful local popular government, and his supervision and control over them
shall be exercised to this end, an to the end that law and order and individual freedom shall be maintained.
SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement of Manguianes has advanced
sufficiently to make such a course practicable, it may be organized under the provisions of sections one to sixtyseven, inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven, as a township, and the geographical limits of
such township shall be fixed by the provincial board.
SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the passage of the same is hereby expedited
in accordance with section two of 'An Act prescribing the order of procedure by the Commission in the enactment
of laws,' passed September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.
SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, December 4, 1902.
All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Act No. 1396 and 1397. The last named Act
incorporated and embodied the provisions in general language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed by the Administrative
Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes retained the provisions in questions.
These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and consistent practice with
reference to the methods to be followed for their advancement.
C. TERMINOLOGY.

The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying forms.
"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to the Commission.
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes." These words are to be found in section
7 of the Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the Jones Law. They are also to be found in Act No. 253 of the Philippines
Commission, establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and in Act No. 2674 of the Philippine Legislature, carried forward
into sections 701-705 of the Administrative Code of 1917, reestablishing this Bureau. Among other laws which contain the
phrase, there can be mentioned Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397, 1639, and 2551.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been the favorite nomenclature, in
lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into being of a Filipinized legislature. These terms can be found in
sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative Code of 1916; sections 701-705, 2145, 2422, 2426, Administrative Code of
1917; and in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine Legislatures, as well as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine
Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall include Mohammedans and pagans. (Sec.
2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec. 2561, Administrative Code of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408, sec. 3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course result in giving to it a religious
signification. Obviously, Christian would be those who profess the Christian religion, and non-Christians, would be those
who do not profess the Christian religion. In partial corroboration of this view, there could also be cited section 2576 of the
last Administrative Code and certain well-known authorities, as Zuiga, "Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas," Professor
Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine Tribes and Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan Filipinos." (See
Blair & Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-Benitez, "Philippine Progress prior to
1898," vol. I. p. 107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further to ascertain what is its true meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be seen by the provisions of many laws.
Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the authority of the Philippine Assembly was recognized in the "territory" of the Islands
not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Again, the Jones Law confers similar recognition in the authorization of
the twelfth senatorial district for the "territory not now represented in the Philippine Assembly." The Philippines Legislature
has, time and again, adopted acts making certain other acts applicable to that "part" of the Philippine Islands inhabited by
Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. The first section of this article,
preceding section 2145, makes the provisions of the article applicable only in specially organized provinces. The specially
organized provinces are the Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These are the provinces
to which the Philippine Legislature has never seen fit to give all the powers of local self-government. They do not, however,
exactly coincide with the portion of the Philippines which is not granted popular representation. Nevertheless, it is still a
geographical description.
It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some of who are Christians and some of
whom are not Christians. In fact, the law specifically recognizes this. ( Sec. 2422, Administrative Code of 1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical conception is likewise inadquate. The reason it that
the motive of the law relates not to a particular people, because of their religion, or to a particular province because of its
location, but the whole intent of the law is predicated n the civilization or lack of civilization of the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words usually introduce the term. "The so-called
non-Christian" is a favorite expression. The Secretary of the Interior who for so many years had these people under his
jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact designation, speaks of the "backward Philippine peoples,
commonly known as the 'non-Christian tribes."' (See Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines, United States
Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third session on H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose of the People of the United States
as to the future political status of the Philippine Islands and to provide a more autonomous government for the Islands, pp.
346, 351; letter of the Secretary of the Interior of June 30, 1906, circulated by the Executive Secretary.)

The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is substantiated by reference to
legislative, judicial, and executive authority.
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and sections 701 et seq, and sections 2422 et
seq, of the Administrative Code of 1917. For instance, Act No. 253 charged the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to conduct
"systematic investigations with reference to non-Christian tribes . . . with special view to determining the most practicable
means for bringing about their advancement in civilization and material property prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. Tubban [Kalinga]
([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The question here arose as to the effect of a tribal marriage in connection with article 423 of the
Penal code concerning the husband who surprises his wife in the act of adultery. In discussing the point, the court makes
use of the following language:
. . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal marriage of so-called nonChristians or members of uncivilized tribes, celebrated within that province without compliance with the requisites
prescribed by General Orders no. 68. . . . We hold also that the fact that the accused is shown to be a member of
an uncivilized tribe, of a low order of intelligence, uncultured and uneducated, should be taken into consideration
as a second marked extenuating circumstance.
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who have been called upon to interpret and enforce
the law. The official who, as a member of the Philippine Commission, drafted much of the legislation relating to the so-called
Christians and who had these people under his authority, was the former Secretary of the Interior. Under date of June 30,
1906, this official addressed a letter to all governor of provinces, organized under the Special Provincial Government Act, a
letter which later received recognition by the Governor-General and was circulated by the Executive Secretary, reading as
follows:
Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people who were originally non-Christian
but have recently been baptized or who are children of persons who have been recently baptized are, for the
purposes of Act 1396 and 1397, to be considered Christian or non-Christians.
It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these islands which are not advanced far in
civilization, to hit upon any suitable designation which will fit all cases. The number of individual tribes is so great
that it is almost out of the question to enumerate all of them in an Act. It was finally decided to adopt the
designation 'non-Christians' as the one most satisfactory, but the real purpose of the Commission was not so much
to legislate for people having any particular religious belief as for those lacking sufficient advancement so that they
could, to their own advantage, be brought under the Provincial Government Act and the Municipal Code.
The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of civilization to which the person baptized
has attained at the time the act of baptism is performed. For practical purposes, therefore, you will give the
member of so-called "wild tribes" of your province the benefit of the doubt even though they may recently have
embraced Christianity.
The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain under the jurisdiction of regularly
organized municipalities or what form of government shall be afforded to them should be the degree of civilization
to which they have attained and you are requested to govern yourself accordingly.
I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who concurs in the opinion above
expressed and who will have the necessary instructions given to the governors of the provinces organized under
the Provincial Government Act. (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214.)
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this court, has the following to say on the
subject:
As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but while no other better classification has
as yet been made the present classification should be allowed to stand . . . I believe the term carries the same
meaning as the expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the Interior (of June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is
indicative of the degree of civilization rather than of religious denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of
religious denomination will make the law invalid as against that Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.
Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the Collector of Internal Revenue. The
question arose for ruling relatives to the cedula taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas. Thereupon, the view of the

Secretary of the Interior was requested on the point, who, by return indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of the
Collector of Internal Revenue. This Construction of the Collector of Internal Revenue can be found in circular letter No. 188
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214):
The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from the payment of cedula taxes. The
Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted this provision of law to mean not that persons who profess some
form of Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and that all other person are exempt; he has
interpreted it to mean that all persons preserving tribal relations with the so-called non-Christian tribes are exempt
from the cedula tax, and that all others, including Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject to
said tax so long as they live in cities or towns, or in the country in a civilized condition. In other words, it is not so
much a matter of a man's form of religious worship or profession that decides whether or not he is subject to the
cedula tax; it is more dependent on whether he is living in a civilized manner or is associated with the mountain
tribes, either as a member thereof or as a recruit. So far, this question has not come up as to whether a Christian,
maintaining his religious belief, but throwing his lot and living with a non-Christian tribe, would or would not be
subject to the cedula tax. On one occasion a prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed to this office that he was exempt
from the cedula tax, inasmuch as he was not a Christian. This Office, however, continued to collect cedula taxes
from all the Jews, East Indians, Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large proportion of the cedula
taxes paid in this city are paid by men belonging to the nationalities mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs and other s are
quite widely scattered throughout the Islands, and a condition similar to that which exist in Manila also exists in
most of the large provincial towns. Cedula taxes are therefore being collected by this Office in all parts of these
Islands on the broad ground that civilized people are subject to such taxes, and non-civilized people preserving
their tribal relations are not subject thereto.
(Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD,
Collector of Internal Revenue.
On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No. 327, approved by the Secretary of
Finance and Justice, to all provincial treasurers. This letter in part reads:
In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers regarding cedula taxes due from
members of non-Christian tribes when they come in from the hills for the purposes of settling down and becoming
members of the body politic of the Philippine Islands, the following clarification of the laws governing such
questions and digest of rulings thereunder is hereby published for the information of all concerned:
Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by reason of the fact that they do not profess
Christianity, but because of their uncivilized mode of life and low state of development. All inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands classed as members of non-Christian tribes may be divided into three classes in so far as the
cedula tax law is concerned . . .
Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized mode of life, severs whatever tribal
relations he may have had and attaches himself civilized community, belonging a member of the body politic, he
thereby makes himself subject to precisely the same law that governs the other members of that community and
from and after the date when he so attaches himself to the community the same cedula and other taxes are due
from him as from other members thereof. If he comes in after the expiration of the delinquency period the same
rule should apply to him as to persons arriving from foreign countries or reaching the age of eighteen subsequent
to the expiration of such period, and a regular class A, D, F, or H cedula, as the case may be, should be furnished
him without penalty and without requiring him to pay the tax for former years.
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in determining whether or not a man is subject to
the regular cedula tax is not the circumstance that he does or does not profess Christianity, nor even his
maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with some of the well known wild tribes, but his mode of life,
degree of advancement in civilization and connection or lack of connection with some civilized community. For this
reason so called "Remontados" and "Montescos" will be classed by this office as members of non-Christian tribes
in so far as the application of the Internal Revenue Law is concerned, since, even though they belong to no well
recognized tribe, their mode of life, degree of advancement and so forth are practically the same as those of the
Igorrots and members of other recognized non-Christina tribes.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,
Collector of Internal Revenue,

Approved:
(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,
Secretary of Finance and Justice.
The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue Regulations No. 1, promulgated by
Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of Internal Revenue, and approved on April 16, 1915, by Honorable Victorino Mapa,
Secretary of Finance and Justice. Section 30 of the regulations is practically a transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of Constabulary request the opinion of the
Attorney-General as to the status of a non-Christian who has been baptized by a minister of the Gospel. The precise
questions were these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he entitled to the privileges of a Christian? By purchasing
intoxicating liquors, does he commit an infraction of the law and does the person selling same lay himself liable under the
provision of Act No. 1639?" The opinion of Attorney-General Avancea, after quoting the same authorities hereinbefore set
out, concludes:
In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that is probable that the person in question
remains a non-Christian, so that, in purchasing intoxicating liquors both he and the person selling the same make
themselves liable to prosecution under the provisions of Act No. 1639. At least, I advise you that these should be
the constructions place upon the law until a court shall hold otherwise.
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:
With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has in the provisions of the Administrative
code which we are studying, we submit that said phrase does not have its natural meaning which would include all
non-Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether Filipino or strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but simply refers to
those uncivilized members of the non-Christian tribes of the Philippines who, living without home or fixed
residence, roam in the mountains, beyond the reach of law and order . . .
The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines which live in
tribes as non-Christian tribes, as distinguished from the common Filipinos which carry on a social and civilized life,
did not intended to establish a distinction based on the religious beliefs of the individual, but, without dwelling on
the difficulties which later would be occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression which the Spanish
legislation employed to designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines.
The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077 and 2741 of Act No. 2657 (articles
2145 and 2759) should be understood as equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes of the Philippines, not only
because this is the evident intention of the law, but because to give it its lateral meaning would make the law null
and unconstitutional as making distinctions base the religion of the individual.
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than De. David P. Barrows, then "Chief of the
Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the population in the Christian or Civilized Tribes, and non-Christian or Wild Tribes.
(Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq). The present Director of the Census, Hon. Ignacio Villamor,
writes that the classification likely to be used in the Census now being taken is: "Filipinos and Primitive Filipinos." In a
Pronouncing Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, prepared in the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War
Department, a sub-division under the title non-Christian tribes is, "Physical and Political Characteristics of the non-Christian
Tribes," which sufficiently shows that the terms refers to culture and not to religion.
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different executive officials, specifically, join in the
proposition that the term "non-Christian" refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way , to geographical area, and, more
directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a law grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled
communities.
E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization. The Philippine Census of 1903 divided them into
four classes. Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro.
Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de los nombres de Rozas de Filipinas,
says:

In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage," "mountainer," "pagan," "negro." It may be that the use
of this word is applicable to a great number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it has been applied only to certain
inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in primitive times without doubt this name was given to those of that island who bear
it to-day, but its employed in three Filipino languages shows that the radical ngian had in all these languages a
sense to-day forgotten. In Pampango this ending still exists and signifies "ancient," from which we can deduce that
the name was applied to men considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were pushed back into
the interior by the modern invaders, in whose language they were called the "ancients."
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced beyond the Negritos
in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people. They number approximately 15,000. The
manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not
progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government. (See
Census of the Philippine (Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23, 460.)
III. COMPARATIVE THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the United States for the
Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippines Islands in its dealings with the so-called nonChristian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by the United States Government in its
dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian
policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state of pupilage." The
recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of guardian and
ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always
subject to the plenary authority of the United States.
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned, tells how the Congress passed an
Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane designs of civilizing the neighboring Indians." After quoting the Act, the opinion
goes on "This act avowedly contemplates the preservation of the Indian nations as an object sought by the United States,
and proposes to effect this object by civilizing and converting them from hunters into agriculturists."
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United States vs. Kagama ([1886], 118 U.S., 375).
Reference is herein made to the clause of the United States Constitution which gives Congress "power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." The court then proceeds to
indicate a brief history of the position of the Indians in the United States (a more extended account of which can be found in
Marshall's opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:
The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States, both before and since the Revolution,
to the people of the United States, has always been an anomalous one and of a complex character.
Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of American towards the Indians who were
found here, the colonies before the Revolution and the States and the United States since, have recognized in the
Indians a possessory right to the soil over which they roamed and hunted and established occasional villages. But
they asserted an ultimate title in the land itself, by which the Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or transfer it to
other nations or peoples without the consent of this paramount authority. When a tribe wished to dispose of its
lands, or any part of it, or the State or the United States wished to purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was the only
mode in which this could be done. The United States recognized no right in private persons, or in other nations, to
make such a purchase by treaty or otherwise. With the Indians themselves these relation are equally difficult to
define. They were, and always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserved
their tribal relations; not as States, not as nation not a possessed of the fall attributes of sovereignty, but as a
separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the
laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided.
The opinion then continues:
It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of Congress. These Indian tribes are the wards
of the nation. The are communities dependent on the United States. dependent largely for their daily food.
Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from the no protection.
Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies.
From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government

with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arise the duty of protection, and with it the power.
This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has
arisen . . . The power of the General Government over these remnants of race once powerful, now weak and
diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. it
must exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because the theater of its exercise is
within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can
enforce its laws on all the tribes.
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the question to be considered was whether the status
of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that Congress could prohibit the introduction of intoxicating liquor into those
lands notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico to statehood. The court looked to the reports of the different
superintendent charged with guarding their interests and founds that these Indians are dependent upon the fostering care
and protection of the government "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the court said "that during the Spanish
dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated as wards requiring special protection, where subjected to restraints and
official supervisions in the alienation of their property." And finally, we not the following: "Not only does the Constitution
expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the Indians tribes, but long-continued legislative and executive
usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized nation
the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian communities within its
borders, whether within its original territory or territory subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the limits of a
state."
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the power of the courts to overrule the
judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the subject has always been deemed political in nature, not subject to the
jurisdiction of the judicial department of the government. (Matter of Heff [1905], 197 U.S., 488; U.S.vs. Celestine [1909], 215
U.S., 278; U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra; Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; U.S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; the Cherokee
Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall, 616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S., 218; Thomasvs. Gay [1898], 169 U.S.., 264; Lone
Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553; Wallace vs. Adams [1907], 204 U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216 U.S.,
84; Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co. [1911], 221 U.S., 286; U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U.S.., 598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29
Okla, 281; 35 L.R.A. [N. S.], 795.) Whenever, therefore, the United States sets apart any public land as an Indian
reservation, it has full authority to pass such laws and authorize such measures as may be necessary to give to the Indians
thereon full protection in their persons and property. (U.S. vs. Thomas [1894], 151 U.S., 577.)
All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken line of judicial decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might result in the issuance of habeas corpus,
is that of United States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a hearing upon return to a writ of habeas
corpus issued against Brigadier General George Crook at the relation of Standing Bear and other Indians, formerly
belonging to the Ponca Tribe of Indians. The petition alleged in substance that the relators are Indians who have formerly
belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians, now located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time previously withdrawn
from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the general habits of the whites, and
were then endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or assistance from the general
government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the United States,
they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent, George Crook. The substance of the return to
the writ was that the relators are individual members of, and connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they had fled or
escaped form a reservation situated some place within the limits of the Indian Territory had departed therefrom without
permission from the Government; and, at the request of the Secretary of the Interior, the General of the Army had issued an
order which required the respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant
to the said order, he had caused the relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory.
The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment by habeas corpus. The second
question, of much greater importance, related to the right of the Government to arrest and hold the relators for a time, for the
purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory from which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In discussing this question,
the court reviewed the policy the Government had adopted in its dealing with the friendly tribe of Poncase. Then, continuing,
the court said: "Laws passed for the government of the Indian country, and for the purpose of regulating trade and
intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer upon certain officers of the Government almost unlimited power over the persons
who go upon the reservations without lawful authority . . . Whether such an extensive discretionary power is wisely vested in
the commissioner of Indian affairs or not , need not be questioned. It is enough to know that the power rightfully exists, and,
where existing, the exercise of the power must be upheld." The decision concluded as follows:
The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:
1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United States, and has, therefore, the right to
sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court, or before a federal judge, in all cases where he may be confined

or in custody under color of authority of the United States or where he is restrained of liberty in violation of the
constitution or laws of the United States.
2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the military department of the Platte, has the
custody of the relators, under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws therefore.
3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the Indian Territory, as the respondent
has been directed to do.
4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the more fortunate white race, and have the
inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," so long as they obey the laws and do not trespass
on forbidden ground. And,
5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws thereof, the
relators must be discharged from custody, and it is so ordered.
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as authority to determine that Rubi, the
Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the Philippine Islands, is a "person" within the meaning of theHabeas
Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine courts. (See also In re Race Horse [1895], 70 Fed., 598.)
We so decide.
As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case are not exactly identical. But even admitting
similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken
from different parts of the country and placed on these reservation, without any previous consultation as to their own wishes,
and that, when once so located, they have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general
good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn form the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the determination of this
policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts
should not interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as may forceful reasons exists for the
segregation as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not delegate this power to provincial
authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the Philippine Legislature has abdicated its authority and avoided its full
responsibility.
That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously protected, we agree.
An understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has not bee violated in his instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a
multitude of case, namely: "The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made."
(Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall
in Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official.
The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom t has committed the
execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the
decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of section 21454 of the
Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the
provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law? Is not this "necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to require the Secretary of the Interior to
approve the selection and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by the relator out of the lands ceded to the United States by
the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians. Section 463 of the United States Revised Statutes provided: "The Commissioner
of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President
may prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs, and of all matters arising out to the Indian relations." Justice

Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good deal, especially in view of the long established practice of the Department, before
saying that this language was not broad enough to warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of the rather helpless
people concerned. The power of Congress is not doubted. The Indians have been treated as wards of the nation. Some
such supervision was necessary, and has been exercised. In the absence of special provisions naturally it would be
exercised by the Indian Department." (See also as corroborative authority, it any is needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S.
[1907], 204 U.S.., 364, reviewing the previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court: U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232
U.S., 598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the general rule. sanctioned by
immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine
Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the
provincial board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are better qualified
to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order?" As officials charged with the
administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which have
the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine
Legislature to provincial official and a department head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his unknown clients, says that
"The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid English, and in words as plain and unequivocal as language can
express, it provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians' and none other." The inevitable result, them, is that the law
"constitutes an attempt by the Legislature to discriminate between individuals because of their religious beliefs, and is,
consequently, unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable the Legislature must be understood to mean what
it has plainly expressed; judicial construction is then excluded; religious equality is demanded by the Organic Law; the
statute has violated this constitutional guaranty, and Q. E. D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free to
discard the long continued meaning given to a common expression, especially as classification of inhabitants according to
religious belief leads the court to what it should avoid, the nullification of legislative action. We hold that the term "nonChristian" refers to natives of the Philippines Islands of a low grade of civilization, and that section 2145 of the Administrative
Code of 1917, does not discriminate between individuals an account of religious differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's instructions of to the Commission, the
Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." This
constitutional limitation is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and these provisions,
it has been said "are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick Wo vs.Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356.) The protection afforded the
individual is then as much for the non-Christian as for the Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:
Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible with the possession of like liberty by
every other. (Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.)
Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. That
authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and a refined idea, the offspring of high civilization,
which the savage never understood, and never can understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint;
the more restraint on others to keep off from us, the more liberty we have . . . that man is free who is protected
from injury. (II Webster's Works, p. 393.)
Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not being forced to do what one ought not do
desire. (Montesque, spirit of the Laws.)

Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to ac according to one's own will. It is only
freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others. (Field, J., in
Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S., 86.)
Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed
from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. On
any other basis, organized society could not exist with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each
one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist
under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in
respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others . . . There is, of course, a
sphere with which the individual may asserts the supremacy of his own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of
any human government especially of any free government existing under a written Constitution to interfere
with the exercise of that will. But it is equally true that in very well-ordered society charged with the duty of
conserving the safety of its members, the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the
pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of
the general public may demand." (Harlan, J., In Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.S., 11.)
Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright and honorable
conscience of the individual. (Apolinario Mabini.)
Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently with
the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to
exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom
from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with
which he has been endowed by this Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare. As
enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Liberty
includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live an work where he will; to earn his
livelihood by an lawful calling; to pursue any avocations, an for that purpose. to enter into all contracts which may be proper,
necessary, and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief elements of the guaranty
are the right to contract, the right to choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the right of locomotion.
In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily done by free men.
(There can be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277; Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829], 2 Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears
[1900], 179 U.S., 274; Allgeyer vs. Louisiana [1896], 165, U.S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 114 Wis., 530. See 6
R.C.L., 258, 261.)
One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: "Liberty" as
understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty regulated by law." Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good
of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do
exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to
reasonable restraint by general law for the common good. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if
exercises without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally natural, such assumed rights must
yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty of the citizens may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public
order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. (See Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U.S., 539;
Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs.Cruz [1914], 189 Al., 66.)
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel Webster, in the course of the
argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic literature, said
that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, an immunities under the
protection of the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial
proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is
especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases.
(See McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal
proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and customs, or newly devised in the discretion of the
legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must
be held to be due process of law." (Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due process of law" means simply . . .
"first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the
Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a
class." (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 1) "What is due
process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation."
(Moyer vs. Peablody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.)

The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute which is applicable to
all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature.
We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to be made later on.
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen Amendment to the United States Constitution
particularly as found in those portions of Philippine Organic Law providing "That slavery shall not exist in said Islands; nor
shall involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." It is
quite possible that the Thirteenth Amendment, since reaching to "any place subject to" the "jurisdiction" of the United States,
has force in the Philippine. However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with necessary modifications,
of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States Criminal Code, prescribed the punishment for these crimes. Slavery
and involuntary servitude, together wit their corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition of enforced, compulsory service of
one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906], 203 U.S., 1.) The term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has
been applied to any servitude in fact involuntary, no matter under what form such servitude may have been disguised.
(Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219 U.S., 219.)
So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for their freedom. Next must come a
description of the police power under which the State must act if section 2145 is to be held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at this moment is the farreaching scope
of the power, that it has become almost possible to limit its weep, and that among its purposes is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase
the industries of the State, develop its resources and add to is wealth and prosperity. (See Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113
U.S., 27.) What we are not interested in is the right of the government to restrain liberty by the exercise of the police power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly
termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to
prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill.,
191.) Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempt to dam the on rushing power of legislative
discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare
or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to exercise the sovereign police power
in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. "There can be not doubt that the exercise of the police power
of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and
those fundamental principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government." (Churchill and
Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580; U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before finally deciding whether any
constitutional provision has indeed been violated by section 2145 of the Administrative Code, we should endeavor to
ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting this section. If legally possible, such legislative intention should be
effectuated.
F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao reservation, it will be
remembered, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement of
the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige
them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4)
the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the
Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the motives for its selection, the following:
To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken together to Tigbao, the Secretary of the
Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918, made a trip to the place. There he found that the site selected is a good one; that

creditable progress has been made in the clearing of forests, construction of buildings, etc., that there appears to
be encouraging reaction by the boys to the work of the school the requirements of which they appear to meet with
enthusiastic interest after the first weeks which are necessarily a somewhat trying period for children wholly
unaccustomed to orderly behaviour and habit of life. He also gathered the impression that the results obtained
during the period of less than one year since the beginning of the institution definitely justify its continuance and
development.
Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation. Such was naturally to be expected. But
the Secretary of the Interior, upon his return to Manila, made the following statement to the press:
"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer to live a nomadic life and
evade the influence of civilization. The Government will follow its policy to organize them into political
communities and to educate their children with the object of making them useful citizens of this country.
To permit them to live a wayfaring life will ultimately result in a burden to the state and on account of their
ignorance, they will commit crimes and make depredation, or if not they will be subject to involuntary
servitude by those who may want to abuse them."
The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the non-Christian people, has adopted as
the polaris of his administration "the advancement of the non-Christian elements of our population to equality and
unification with the highly civilized Christian inhabitants." This is carried on by the adoption of the following measures:
(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of seminomadic race are induced to leave their wild
habitat and settle in organized communities.
(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public health throughout the regions inhabited by
the non-Christian people.
(c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate their development and the
extention of government control.
(d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among non-Christians, to promote social and
commercial intercourse and maintain amicable relations among them and with the Christian people.
(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially agriculture.
( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private capital in, the fertile regions of
Mindanao and Sulu.
The Secretary adds:
To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued among the non-Christian people.
These people are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions in order that they may fully appreciate
the benefits of civilization. Those of them who are still given to nomadic habits are being persuaded to abandon
their wild habitat and settle in organized settlements. They are being made to understand that it is the purpose of
the Government to organize them politically into fixed and per manent communities, thus bringing them under the
control of the Government, to aid them to live and work, protect them from involuntary servitude and abuse,
educate their children, and show them the advantages of leading a civilized life with their civilized brothers. In
short, they are being impressed with the purposes and objectives of the Government of leading them to economic,
social, and political equality, and unification with the more highly civilized inhabitants of the country. (See Report of
the Department for 1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called non-Christians, and to
promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development and advancement in civilization. (Note Acts
Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes, defines the aim of the
Government towards the non-Christian people in the following unequivocal terms:
It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work for advancement and liberty in favor
of the region inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and foster by all adequate means and in a systematical, rapid,
and complete manner the moral, material, economic, social, and political development of those regions, always

having in view the aim of rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between, and complete fusion of, all the
Christian and non-Christian elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago. (Sec. 3.)
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States, proper wards of the Filipino people? By the
fostering care of a wise Government, may not these unfortunates advance in the "habits and arts of civilization?" Would it be
advisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan, carefully formulated, and apparently working out for the ultimate good of
these people?
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is evident. Here, we have on the
Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making depredations on their more fortunate neighbors,
uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing nothing for the advancement of the Philippine Islands. What the
Government wished to do by bringing than into a reservation was to gather together the children for educational purposes,
and to improve the health and morals was in fine, to begin the process of civilization. this method was termed in Spanish
times, "bringing under the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing situation, has been followed with reference to the
Manguianes and other peoples of the same class, because it required, if they are to be improved, that they be gathered
together. On these few reservations there live under restraint in some cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few
thousands of the uncivilized people. Segregation really constitutes protection for the manguianes.
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we know that the axiom is not precisely
accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men are free, and they are not the equals of their more
fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are citizens, with many but not all the rights which citizenship implies. And true,
indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as surely, the Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who
are a drag upon the progress of the State.
In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in enacting the law,
and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops and persons protected
from predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is no argument to say that such crimes are punished by the Penal
Code, because these penalties are imposed after commission of the offense and not before. If immigrants are to be
encouraged to develop the resources of the great Islands of Mindoro, and its, as yet, unproductive regions, the Government
must be in a position to guarantee peace and order.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State. Illiteracy and thriftlessness are
not conducive to homogeneity. The State to protect itself from destruction must prod on the laggard and the sluggard. The
great law of overwhelming necessity is all convincing.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:
Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the manguianes) are engaged
in the works of destruction burning and destroying the forests and making illegal caigins thereon. Not bringing
any benefit to the State but instead injuring and damaging its interests, what will ultimately become of these people
with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve and for which they are now fighting in court? They will ultimately
become a heavy burden to the State and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make
depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty and does not practice liberty in a rightful
way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will going from one place to another in the
mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal caigins thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they allege that they are being
deprived thereof without due process of law?
xxx

xxx

xxx

But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law'
apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practise liberty in a rightful
way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as to what liberty
is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare and
advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this people should be let along in the mountains

and in a permanent state of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true
and noble sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been placed in the alternative
of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure was adopted as the one
more in accord with humanity and with national conscience.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more towards the education
and civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those people under the tutelage of
the Government is indeed encouraging and the signs of the times point to a day which is not far distant when they
will become useful citizens. In the light of what has already been accomplished which has been winning the
gratitude of most of the backward people, shall we give up the noble work simply because a certain element,
believing that their personal interests would be injured by such a measure has come forward and challenged the
authority of the Government to lead this people in the pat of civilization? Shall we, after expending sweat, treasure,
and even blood only to redeem this people from the claws of ignorance and superstition, now willingly retire
because there has been erroneously invoked in their favor that Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be
deprived of his liberty without due process of law? To allow them to successfully invoke that Constitutional
guaranty at this time will leave the Government without recourse to pursue the works of civilizing them and making
them useful citizens. They will thus left in a permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point to attack
by those who doubt, nay challenge, the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers.
The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There they are being taught and guided
to improve their living conditions. They are being made to understand that they object of the government is to
organize them politically into fixed and permanent communities. They are being aided to live and work. Their
children are being educated in a school especially established for them. In short, everything is being done from
them in order that their advancement in civilization and material prosperity may be assured. Certainly their living
together in Tigbao does not make them slaves or put them in a condition compelled to do services for another.
They do not work for anybody but for themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary servitude.
But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other places under penalty of
imprisonment. Attention in this connection is invited to the fact that this people, living a nomadic and wayfaring life,
do not have permanent individual property. They move from one place to another as the conditions of living
warrants, and the entire space where they are roving about is the property of the nation, the greater part being
lands of public domain. Wandering from one place to another on the public lands, why can not the government
adopt a measure to concentrate them in a certain fixed place on the public lands, instead of permitting them to
roam all over the entire territory? This measure is necessary both in the interest of the public as owner of the lands
about which they are roving and for the proper accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the government.
For as people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long to return to the mountains and follow a
wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is provinced for, you can not make them live together and the noble intention of
the Government of organizing them politically will come to naught.
G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.
Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections and to reach a general conclusion.
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to go where he pleases. Could be not,
however, be kept away from certain localities ? To furnish an example from the Indian legislation. The early Act of Congress
of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian reservation. Those citizens certainly did not possess absolute freedom of
locomotion. Again the same law provided for the apprehension of marauding Indians. Without any doubt, this law and other
similar were accepted and followed time and again without question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and defenseless people confined as in a prison
at the mercy of unscrupulous official. What, it is asked, would be the remedy of any oppressed Manguian? The answer
would naturally be that the official into whose hands are given the enforcement of the law would have little or not motive to
oppress these people; on the contrary, the presumption would all be that they would endeavor to carry out the purposes of
the law intelligently and patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus confined, there always exists the power of
removal in the hands of superior officers, and the courts are always open for a redress of grievances. When, however, only
the validity of the law is generally challenged and no particular case of oppression is called to the attention of the courts, it
would seems that the Judiciary should not unnecessarily hamper the Government in the accomplishment of its laudable
purpose.

The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may the right and liberties of the individual
members of society be subordinated to the will of the Government? It is a question which has assailed the very existence of
government from the beginning of time. Now purely an ethical or philosophical subject, nor now to be decided by force, it
has been transferred to the peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such an issue, the Judiciary must realize that the
very existence of government renders imperatives a power to restrain the individual to some extent, dependent, of course,
on the necessities of the class attempted to be benefited. As to the particular degree to which the Legislature and the
Executive can go in interfering with the rights of the citizen, this is, and for a along time to come will be, impossible for the
courts to determine.
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economics and political theory, are
of the past. The modern period has shown as widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of governmental
activity. The courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trial after the other two branches of the government in this
progressive march.
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has
exceeded its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic
remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say
that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the
law, there exists a law ; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt, would lead to the determination that
section 2145 is valid. it the attitude which the courts should assume towards the settled policy of the Government. In a late
decision with which we are in full accord, Gambles vs. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:
We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new question that comes before
the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not determined by differentiation of the principle of a prior
case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior case. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is
perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a
general rule or principle. But public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is wise enough to forecast its influence in all
possible contingencies. Distinctions must be made from time to time as sound reason and a true sense of justice may
dictate."
Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called non-Christians has been in vain, if we
fail to realize that a consistent governmental policy has been effective in the Philippines from early days to the present. The
idea to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may approach the highest conception of nationality. If all are to be
equal before the law, all must be approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich and powerful country,
Mindoro must be populated, and its fertile regions must be developed. The public policy of the Government of the Philippine
Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental
policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the country.
Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature, a coordinate branch, be
exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered case is toward non-interference on the part of the courts whenever
political ideas are the moving consideration. Justice Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly famous, said that
"constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take some chances." (Blinn vs. Nelson [1911], 222 U.S., 1.) If in the
final decision of the many grave questions which this case presents, the courts must take "a chance," it should be with a
view to upholding the law, with a view to the effectuation of the general governmental policy, and with a view to the court's
performing its duty in no narrow and bigoted sense, but with that broad conception which will make the courts as progressive
and effective a force as are the other departments of the Government.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his
liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in
reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the
opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the
Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue. This is the
true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against petitioners. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres and Avancea, JJ., concur.

MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and AGUSTIN B. DOCENA, respondents.
Semaco P. Sacmar & Associates for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
VITUG, J.:
Petitioner Marcelino C. Libanan, the incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar, was a member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of that province prior to the 11 May 1992 elections. He was among those charged before
the Sandiganbayan, on 25 May 1992, with having violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 in an information,
docketed Criminal Case No. 17756, stating
That on or about 08 January 1991, and for sometime thereafter, in Borongan, Eastern Samar, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Lutgardo B. Barbo, Governor of Eastern
Samar; Camilo A. Camenforte, Vice-Governor of same province; Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Members Marcos B. Alido, Nonato A. Gerna, Ismael G. Kho, Marcelino C. Libanan, Nicolas O.
Pimentel, and Generoso A. Yu, of the same province, conspiring with one another, did then and
there, wilfully and unlawfully, through evident bad faith and manifest partiality, prevent and
exclude Agustin B. Docena, a duly appointed and Qualified replacement of deceased
Sangguniang Panlalawigan member Luis A. Capito, from exercising his rights and prerogatives
as a member of the said body, by promulgating in their official capacities Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Resolution No. 01, Series of 1991, wherein accused expressed their recognition of
Atty. Socrates B. Alar as the official replacement of aforesaid deceased member, notwithstanding
the recall of his appointment by the Department of Local Government, to the damage and
prejudice of Agustin B. Docena.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
On motion of the prosecution for the suspension of the accused public officials pendente lite, and finding that said
accused were charged under a valid information, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution,
dated 26 July 1993, to the following effect:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Gov. Lutgardo Barbo, Vice-Gov. Marcelino C.
Libanan, and Sangguniang Panlalawigan members Nonato A. Gerna and Generoso A. Yu are
hereby suspended from their respective public positions, or from any other public office that they
may be holding, the same to commence upon their receipt hereof and for a period of ninety (90)
days thereafter.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Hon. Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, and the Hon. Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, for their information and
guidance and they are hereby directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof of any action they have undertaken on the matter.
SO ORDERED. 2
Accused Barbo and Libanan filed their respective motions for reconsideration, which the Sandiganbayan denied in
its resolution of 30 September 1993. From the orders, Libanan appealed.
Petitioner presents three grounds to support his appeal, to wit: That
I. THE ORDER OF SUSPENSION IF EXECUTED WOULD CONSTITUTE AN
AFFRONT ON PETITIONER(S) CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.

II. THE ORDER OF SUSPENSION ONCE IMPLEMENTED WOULD AMOUNT TO

AN ASSAULT OF THE SACRED COVENANT REPOSED ON PETITIONER VICEGOVERNOR, MARCELINO C. LIBANAN BY THE PEOPLE OF EASTERN SAMAR.
III. THE REASONS SOUGHT TO BE PREVENTED BY THE SUSPENSION
ORDERPENDENTE LITE NO LONGER EXIST.
The petition is without merit.
The amendatory provision of Section 13, Republic Act No. 3019, here applicable, provides:
Sec. 13. Suspension and Loss of Benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under title 7, book II of the
Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. . . .
Petitioner contends that the order of suspension, being predicated on his acts supposedly committed while still a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan, can no longer attach to him now that he is the duly elected and incumbent
Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar. The implementation of the suspension order, he further claims, would amount to
a deprivation of property without due process of law.
In Deloso vs. Sandiganbayan, 3 this Court rejected a similar argument advanced by Governor Deloso

who, at the time of issuance of the suspension order, was already occupying the office of
governor and not the position of municipal mayor that he held previously when charged with
having violated the Anti-Graft Law. Prior to Deloso, in Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, 4 the suspension
of then Cavite mayor Bayot was also sustained even as he was charged for acts committed as a
government auditor of the Commission on Audit. In both instances, this Court ruled that the term
"office" used in the law could apply to any office which the officer charged might currently be
holding and not necessarily the particular office under which he was charged.
Obviously, the suspension order cannot amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. Public
office is "a public agency or
trust," 5 and it is not the property envisioned by the Constitutional provision 6 which petitioner

invokes.
Libanans second contention neither holds water. His so-called "covenant" with the people of Eastern Samar is far
from being synonymous to, or the equivalent of, license, and it is not one that can cut athwart the long arm of the
law. In Oliveros vs. Villaluz, 7 we have said:
Since the criminal prosecution against petitioner-accused is concededly not abated by the fact of
his reelection, the pendency of such criminal case under a valid information under Republic Act
3019 may clearly be and supplies the legal basis for his suspension from office in a subsequent
term in the event of his reelection by virtue of the provisions of section 13 of the Act.
The third assigned error raised by petitioner need not be delved into. When the statute is clear and explicit, there is
hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law. Republic Act No. 3019 unequivocally
mandates the suspension of a public official from office pending a criminal prosecution against him. This Court has
repeatedly held that
such preventive suspension is mandatory, 8 and there are no "ifs" and "buts" about it. 9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

VICTOR ORQUIOLA and HONORATA ORQUIOLA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VIVENCIO S. BACLIG, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon
City, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY and HIS/HER DEPUTIES and PURA KALAW LEDESMA, substituted by
TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated January 28, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 47422, which dismissed the petition to prohibit Judge Vivencio Baclig of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
77, from issuing a writ of demolition against petitioners, and the sheriff and deputy sheriff of the same court from
implementing an alias writ of execution. Also assailed is the resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals dated December 29, 1999
which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Pura Kalaw Ledesma was the registered owner of Lot 689, covered by TCT Nos. 111267 and 111266, in Tandang Sora,
Quezon City. This parcel of land was adjacent to certain portions of Lot 707 of the Piedad Estates, namely, Lot 707-A and
707-B, registered in the name of Herminigilda Pedro under TCT Nos. 16951 and 16952, respectively. On October 29, 1964,
Herminigilda sold Lot 707-A and 707-B to Mariano Lising who then registered both lots and Lot 707-C in the name of M.B.
Lising Realty and subdivided them into smaller lots.
1wphi 1.nt

Certain portions of the subdivided lots were sold to third persons including herein petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata
Orquiola, who purchased a portion of Lot 707-A-2, Lot 5, Block 1 of the subdivision plan (LRC), Psd-42965. The parcel is
now #33 Doa Regina St., Regina Village, Tandang Sora, Quezon City. The other portions were registered in the name of
the heirs of Pedro, heirs of Lising, and other third persons.
Sometime in 1969, Pura Kalaw Ledesma filed a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12918, with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City against Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano Lising for allegedly encroaching upon Lot 689. During the
pendency of the action, Tandang Sora Development Corporation replaced Pura Kalaw Ledesma as plaintiff by virtue of an
assignment of Lot 689 made by Ledesma in favor of said corporation. Trial continued for three decades.
On August 21, 1991, the trial court finally adjudged defendants Pedro and Lising jointly and severally liable for encroaching
on plaintiffs land and ordered them:
(a) to solidarily pay the plaintiff Tandang Sora Dev. Corp. actual damages in the amount of P20,000 with interest
from date of filing of the complaint;
(b) to remove all construction, including barbed wires and fences, illegally constructed by defendants on plaintiffs
property at defendants expense;
(c) to replace the removed concrete monuments removed by defendants, at their own expense;
(d) to pay attorneys fees in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) with interest computed from the
date of filing of the complaint;
(e) to relocate the boundaries to conform with the Commissioners Report, particularly, Annexes "A" and "B"
thereof, at the expense of the defendants.3
As a result, in February 1998, the Deputy Sheriff of Quezon City directed petitioners, through an alias writ of execution, to
remove the house they constructed on the land they were occupying.
On April 2, 1998, petitioners received a Special Order dated March 30, 1998, from the trial court stating as follows:
Before the Court for resolution is the "Ex-Parte Motion For The Issuance of A Writ of Demolition," filed by plaintiff,
through counsel, praying for the issuance of an Order directing the Deputy Sheriff to cause the removal and/or

demolition of the structures on the plaintiffs property constructed by defendants and/or the present occupants. The
defendants-heirs of Herminigilda Pedro filed their comment on the said Motion.
Considering that the decision rendered in the instant case had become final and executory, the Court, in its Order
of November 14, 1997, directed the issuance of an alias writ of execution for the enforcement of the said decision.
However, despite the service of the said writ to all the defendants and the present occupants of the subject
property, they failed to comply therewith, as per the Partial Sheriffs Return, dated February 9, 1998, issued by the
Deputy Sheriff of this branch of the Court. Thus, there is now a need to demolish the structures in order to
implement the said decision.
WHEREFORE, the defendants are hereby directed to remove, at their expense, all constructions, including barbed
wires and fences, which defendants constructed on plaintiffs property, within fifteen (15) days from notice of this
Order; otherwise, this Court will issue a writ of demolition against them.
SO ORDERED.4
To prohibit Judge Vivencio Baclig of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City from issuing a writ of demolition and the
Quezon City sheriff from implementing the alias writ of execution, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
prohibition with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction on April 17, 1998. 5 Petitioners alleged that they
bought the subject parcel of land in good faith and for value, hence, they were parties in interest. Since they were not
impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-12918, the writ of demolition issued in connection therewith cannot be enforced against them
because to do so would amount to deprivation of property without due process of law.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on January 28, 1999. It held that as buyers and successors-in-interest of
Mariano Lising, petitioners were considered privies who derived their rights from Lising by virtue of the sale and could be
reached by the execution order in Civil Case No. Q-12918. Thus, for lack of merit, the petition was ordered dismissed. 6
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition, where petitioners aver that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q12918 CAN ALSO BE ENFORCED AGAINST THE PETITIONERS EVEN IF THEY WERE NOT IMPLEADED AS
PARTIES THERETO.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING PETITIONERS TITLE DESPITE THEIR
BEING BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH AND INNOCENT PURCHASER AND FOR VALUE.
III.
PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CONSIDERING THAT THEY STAND TO SUFFER
GRAVE AND IRREPARABLE INJURY IF ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION AND THE SPECIAL ORDER ISSUED BY
THE COURT A QUO IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-12918 FOR THE DEMOLITION OF ALL THE STRUCTURES ON
THE DISPUTED PROPERTY WERE ENFORCED AGAINST THE PETITIONERS WHO WERE NOT EVEN
GIVEN THEIR DAY IN COURT.7
For our resolution are the following issues: (1) whether the alias writ of execution may be enforced against petitioners; and
(2) whether petitioners were innocent purchasers for value and builders in good faith.
On the first issue, petitioners claim that the alias writ of execution cannot be enforced against them. They argue that the
appellate court erred when it relied heavily on our ruling in Vda. de Medina vs. Cruz8 in holding that petitioners are
successors-in-interest of Mariano Lising, and as such, they can be reached by the order of execution in Civil Case No. Q12918 even though they were not impleaded as parties thereto. Petitioners submit that Medina is not applicable in this case
because the circumstances therein are different from the circumstances in the present case.
In Medina, the property in dispute was registered under Land Registration Act No. 496 in 1916 and Original Certificate of
Title No. 868 was issued in the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). In 1949, Benedicta Mangahas and Francisco

Ramos occupied and built houses on the lot without the PRCs consent. In 1959, PRC sold the lot to Remedios Magbanua.
Mangahas and Ramos opposed and instituted Civil Case No. C-120 to annul the sale and to compel PRC to execute a
contract of sale in their favor. The trial court dismissed the complaint and ordered Mangahas and Ramos to vacate the lot
and surrender possession thereof to Magbanua. The judgment became final and executory. When Magbanua had paid for
the land in full, PRC executed a deed of absolute sale in her favor and a new title was consequently issued in her name.
Magbanua then sought the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. C-120. This was opposed by petitioner Medina who
alleged that she owned the houses and lot subject of the dispute. She said that she bought the houses from spouses
Ricardo and Eufrocinia de Guzman, while she purchased the lot from the heirs of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban. The latter held the land by virtue of a Titulo de Composicion Con El Estado Num. 4136, dated April 29, 1894. In
opposing the execution, Medina argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her, claiming that she was not a
party in Civil Case No. C-120, thus, she could not be considered as "a person claiming under" Ramos and Mangahas.
When Medina reached this Court, we held that the decision in Civil Case No. C-120, which had long become final and
executory, could be enforced against petitioner even though she was not a party thereto. We found that the houses on the
subject lot were formerly owned by Mangahas and Ramos who sold them to spouses de Guzman, who in turn sold them to
Medina. Under the circumstances, petitioner was privy to the two judgment debtors Mangahas and Ramos, and thus Medina
could be reached by the order of execution and writ of demolition issued against the two. As to the lot under dispute, we
sustained Magbanuas ownership over it, she being the holder of a Torrens title. We declared that a Torrens title is generally
conclusive evidence of ownership of the land referred to therein, and a strong presumption exists that a Torrens title was
regularly issued and valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any informacion possessoria, or other title existing prior
to the issuance thereof not annotated on the Torrens title. Moreover, persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens
certificate of title are not required to go beyond what appears on its face.
Medina markedly differs from the present case on major points. First, the petitioner in Medina acquired the right over the
houses and lot subject of the dispute after the original action was commenced and became final and executory. In the
present case, petitioners acquired the lot before the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-12918.Second, the right over the
disputed land of the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioner in Medina was based on a title of doubtful authenticity,
allegedly a Titulo de Composicion Con El Estado issued by the Spanish Government in favor of one Don Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban, while the right over the land of the predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners is based on a fully
recognized Torrens title. Third, petitioners in this case acquired the registered title in their own names, while the petitioner
in Medina merely relied on the title of her predecessor-in-interest and tax declarations to prove her alleged ownership of the
land.
We must stress that where a case like the present one involves a sale of a parcel of land under the Torrens system, the
applicable rule is that a person dealing with the registered property need not go beyond the certificate of title; he can rely
solely on the title and he is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. 9 It is our view
here that the petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, are fully entitled to the legal protection of their lot by the
Torrens system, unlike the petitioner in the Medina case who merely relied on a mere Titulo de Composicion.
Coming now to the second issue, were petitioners purchasers in good faith and for value? A buyer in good faith is one who
buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property. He is a buyer
for value if he pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some
other person in the property.10 The determination of whether one is a buyer in good faith is a factual issue which generally is
outside the province of this Court to determine in a petition for review. An exception is when the Court of Appeals failed to
take into account certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 11 The instant case
is covered by this exception to the general rule. As found by the Court of Appeals and not refuted by private respondent,
petitioners purchased the subject land in 1964 from Mariano Lising. 12 Civil Case No. Q-12918 was commenced sometime in
1969. The Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that the purchase of the land took place prior to the institution of Civil Case
No. Q-12918. In other words, the sale to petitioners was made before Pura Kalaw Ledesma claimed the lot. Petitioners
could reasonably rely on Mariano Lisings Certificate of Title which at the time of purchase was still free from any third party
claim. Hence, considering the circumstances of this case, we conclude that petitioners acquired the land subject of this
dispute in good faith and for value.
The final question now is: could we consider petitioners builders in good faith? We note that this is the first time that
petitioners have raised this issue. As a general rule, this could not be done. Fair play, justice, and due process dictate that
parties should not raise for the first time on appeal issues that they could have raised but never did during trial and even
during proceedings before the Court of Appeals. 13 Nevertheless, we deem it proper that this issue be resolved now, to avoid
circuitous litigation and further delay in the disposition of this case. On this score, we find that petitioners are indeed builders
in good faith.
A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he is building on is his, and is ignorant of any defect or
flaw in his title.14 As earlier discussed, petitioner spouses acquired the land in question without knowledge of any defect in
the title of Mariano Lising. Shortly afterwards, they built their conjugal home on said land. It was only in 1998, when the

sheriff of Quezon City tried to execute the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-12918, that they had notice of private respondents
adverse claim. The institution of Civil Case No. Q-12918 cannot serve as notice of such adverse claim to petitioners since
they were not impleaded therein as parties.
As builders in good faith and innocent purchasers for value, petitioners have rights over the subject property and hence they
are proper parties in interest in any case thereon. 15 Consequently, private respondents should have impleaded them in Civil
Case No. Q-12918. Since they failed to do so, petitioners cannot be reached by the decision in said case. No man shall be
affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by
the court. In the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have
his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment therein and by writs of execution and
demolition issued pursuant thereto.16 In our view, the spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola have valid and meritorious
cause to resist the demolition of their house on their own titled lot, which is tantamount to a deprivation of property without
due process of law.
1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 28, 1999, and its resolution
dated December 29, 1999, in CA-G.R. SP No. 47422, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are hereby enjoined
from enforcing the decision in Civil Case No. Q-12918 through a writ of execution and order of demolition issued against
petitioners. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, and Corona, JJ., concur.

GOVERNOR AMOR D. DELOSO, petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner.
The Office of the Solicitor General for public respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated February 10, 1989 in
Criminal Cases Nos. 9200 to 9204 which preventively suspended petitioner Amor D. Deloso (accused in the criminal
cases) pendente lite from his position as provincial governor of Zambales and from any office that he may be holding.
The petitioner was the duly elected mayor of Botolan, Zambales in the local elections of November 1971. While he occupied
the position of mayor, a certain Juan Villanueva filed a letter complaint with the Tanodbayan accusing him of having
committed acts in violation of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act 3019) in relation to the award of licenses to operate fish
corrals in the municipal waters of Botolan, Zambales during the period 1976 to 1978 and the issuance of five (5) tractors of
the municipality to certain individuals allegedly without any agreement as to the payment of rentals.
The complaint with respect to the award of licenses to operate fish corrals was dismissed. As regards the other complaint,
the Tanodbayan filed five (5) separate informations, all dated May 30, 1984 accusing the petitioner of violation of Section
3(e), of the Anti-Graft Law with the Sandiganbayan. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9200-9204. Except
for the names of the individuals who were allegedly favored by the petitioner and the dates when these favors were made,
the informations uniformly alleged:
That on or about 3 February 1978 in the Municipality of Botolan, Zambales, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused AMOR D. DELOSO, a public officer being then the
Municipal Mayor of the Municipality of Botolan, Zambales, taking advantage of his public and official
position, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously give unwarranted benefits to Daniel Ferrer
thru manifest partiality and evident bad faith in the discharge of his official functions by issuing to him a
tractor purchased by the Municipality of Botolan thru a loan financed by the Land Bank of the Philippines

for lease to local farmers at reasonable cost, without any agreement as to the payment of rentals for the
use of tractor by Daniel Ferrer thereby causing undue injury to the Municipality of Botolan. (Rollo, p. 30)
A motion to quash the informations was denied by the Sandiganbayan. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
The petitioner then filed a petition before us (G.R. Nos. 69963-67) to annul the Sandiganbayan's resolutions denying the
petitioner's motion to quash and motion for reconsideration.
In a resolution dated July 28,1988, we dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The resolution became final and executory on
October 17, 1988.
The petitioner was arraigned on January 6, 1989 before the Sandiganbayan. He pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges
against him.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor then filed a motion to suspend the petitioner pendente lite pursuant to Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019.
On February 10, 1989, the Sandiganbayan issued the questioned resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the accused Amor D. Deloso is suspended pendente lite from his
position as Provincial Governor of Zambales and from any other office that he may now be holding.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Local Government for
implementation and for him to inform this Court of the action he has taken thereon within five (5) days
from receipt hereof. (Rollo, p. 94)
The day following his receipt of the resolution, or on February 16, 1989, the petitioner filed the instant petition.
On February 17, 1989, the petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Sandiganbayan requesting that the execution and
implementation of the February 10, 1989 suspension order be held in abeyance pending determination of the merits of the
petition. The motion was denied prompting the petitioner to ask the Court for an earlier setting of the trial of the cases which
was denied in an order dated February 22, 1989.
In denying the plea for an earlier schedule of the trial of the cases, the Sandiganbayan said:
The Court notes that these cases have already been set for May 15, 16 and 17 as well as June 5, 6 and
7, 1989 at 8:00 o'clock in the morning and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. While the accused claims that
this period is ordinately far, the Court must also be contend with its own calendar. It will be easy enough
for this Court to give the accused an earlier setting. However, such a setting will be best a pretence since
other cases have already been set between now and May 15 where in many instances the accused
themselves are also under suspension by reason of the same provision of law. Under the above
circumstances, no other earlier setting can be granted to the accused without making that setting merely
a sham since other cases which have been set earlier will naturally have a right to expect priority. (Rollo,
p. 135)
In view of this development, the petitioner filed an urgent supplemental application for temporary restraining order and/ or
writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the Sandiganbayan, the Secretary of Local Government and Community
Development, and all those acting in their behalf from executing and implementing the February 10, 1989 resolution of the
Sandiganbayan.
We treat the respondent's Comment as an answer and decide this petition on its merits.
The petitioner questions the constitutionality of the suspension provision of Section 13 of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act
No. 3019).
This same issue was raised in the case of Layno v. Sandiganbayan (136 SCRA 536 [1985]). After considering the facts as
well as the merits of the case, the Court ruled that the petition need not be resolved through a ruling on the validity of the
provision on mandatory suspension. We instead, decided the case in relation to the principles of due process and equal
protection of the law.

Faced with similar factual circumstances in the instant petition, we apply anew the ruling in the Layno case and decide the
instant petition in relation to the principles of due process and equal protection without having to declare categorically
whether or not the suspension provision of Republic Act 3019 should be struck down as invalid. We limit ourselves to
ascertaining whether or not, under the circumstances of this case, an indefinite suspension becomes unreasonable.
As early as 1974, then Justice Fred Ruiz Castro expressed in a separate opinion the mischief which would result if the Court
allows the indefinite suspension of elective local officials charged with violations of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act:
The central point of Senator Padilla's position is that the penalty of suspension is definitely much lower
than that of removal and it would be incongruous if we give to the penalty of suspension more serious
consequences than are attached to the penalty of removal. Senator Padilla opted for the immediate
restoration of the respondent to his position once the favorable result of the election is known.
Parenthetically, it must be stated that while there was an exchange of views between Senator Ganzon
and Senator Manglapus on the Anti-Graft Law, the exchange was limited to the matter of the
commencement of the investigation of the charges, which, according to Senator Ganzon, cannot be
made within one year prior to an election.
And so it is that, on the basis of my discussion above, I bewail the apathy of the majority of the Court
toward efforts to seek enlightenment on legal issues of grave importance from the deliberations of
Congress upon the said issues. It is not quite becoming of judicial magistrates to shunt aside a
suggestion that the interplay of legal provisions be carefully studied and analyzed.
In the deliberations of the Court on this case, I suggested that we examine the possible delimiting effects
of the provisions of the first sentence of section 5 of the Decentralization Act on the provisions of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act insofar as the suspension from office of an elective local official is
concerned. In no uncertain words did I focus the attention of the Court on the serious ever-present
possibility of harassment of an elective local official taking the form of the filing of a valid information
against him under the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act after his exoneration in an
administrative case involving the same offense.
I also pointedly brought out the matter of the notorious delay in the courts of justice which could
effectively frustrate an elected or re-elected local official from discharging the duties of his office for the
entire term of his office, and thus nullify the will of the people who elected him. I likewise asked the Court
to consider the situation where an elective local official runs for the National Assembly and is elected
despite the fact that he is under suspension under the authority of the provisions of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, and sought a definitive answer to the question. What then would happen to the
suspension meted out to him since it is the National Assembly that determines whether he should
assume and continue in office?
All these and other germane questions were brushed aside by the majority of the Court with the
sweeping statement that the provisions of the Decentralization Act apply only to administrative cases. It is
the ex cathedra attitude, this kind of slothful thinking, that I find abhorrent and therefore deplore "
(Oliveros v. Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163, 197-198 [1974])
Petitioner Deloso was elected governor of the Province of Zambales in the January 18, 1988 local elections. The regular
term of a governor is only 3 years although he shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992 by special provision of the
Constitution. (Section 8, Article X, Section 2, Article XVIII, Constitution). He was, however, ordered suspended from
performing his duties as governor by the Sandiganbayan pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 by virtue of the
criminal charges filed against him. The order of suspension does not have a definite period so that the petitioner may be
suspended for the rest of his term of office unless his case is terminated sooner. An extended suspension is a distinct
possibility considering that the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner's plea for earlier dates of trial of his cases on the ground
that there are other cases set earlier which have a right to expect priority.
Under these circumstances the preventive suspension which initially may be justified becomes unreasonable thus raising a
due process question. As we ruled in Layno, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, (supra):
Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not expire
until 1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according
to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full discharge of his
functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has

been unable to. It is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the
people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance,
any of them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In
either case, his culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to
the constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance,
however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he
were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in
such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on
the people of Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor.
In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension
had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite
manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted.
Moreover, in the earlier case of Garcia v. The Executive Secretary, (6 SCRA 1 [1962]) we ruled on the issue as to whether
the preventive suspension beyond the maximum period of 60 days, provided in Section 35 of the Civil Service Act of 1959
(Republic Act 2260) is illegal and void. Paulino Garcia, the petitioner in the cited case was the Chairman of the National
Science Development Board appointed by the President of the Philippines. He was charged with electioneering and
dishonesty in office. Pending investigation of the administrative charges against him, he was suspended by the Executive
Secretary by authority of the President. In view of his indefinite suspension, he filed a petition praying in effect that the 60day period prescribed in the Civil Service Law for preventive suspension having already expired, he be reinstated in the
service pursuant to Section 35 of the said Act. The respondents opposed the petition on the ground that the petitioner was a
presidential appointee and therefore not covered by the 60-day preventive suspension limit under Section 35 of the then
Civil Service Act. The respondents maintained that the petitioner could be indefinitely suspended. In ruling in favor of the
petitioner, the Court stated:
To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the President, facing administrative
charges can be preventively suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation where the
preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing,
contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution (No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law. [Art. XII, Sec. 4, Constitution of the
Philippines]) and the Civil Service Law (No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law and after due process). ... In the guise of a preventive
suspension, his term of office could be shortened and he could, in effect, be removed without a finding of
a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution ... (at pp. 8-9)
The question that now arises is whether or not the ruling in the Garcia case where the suspension was ordered by no less
than the President of the Philippines is applicable to an elective official facing criminal charges under the Anti-Graft Law and
suspended under Section 13, thereof.
The guarantee to an equal protection of the law necessitates the application of the ruling in the Garcia v. Executive
Secretary. Thus, we explained in the Layno case, to wit:
... If the case against petitioner Layno were administrative in character the Local Government Code
would be applicable. It is therein clearly provided that while preventive suspension is allowable for the
causes therein enumerated, there is this emphatic limitation on the duration thereof; 'In all cases,
preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.' (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337, Section 63 (2), last sentence. The first sentence reads as follows: 'Preventive
suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground to
believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability
is strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the
respondent influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence'). It may be recalled that the principle against indefinite suspension applies equally to national
government officials. So it was held in the leading case of Garcia v. Hon. Secretary (116 Phil. 348
[1962]). According to the opinion of Justice Barrera: 'To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer
appointed by the President, facing administrative charges, can be preventively suspended indefinitely,
would be to countenance a situation where the preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself
without a finding of guilt after due hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution and the
Civil Service Law.' (Ibid. 351-352) Further: 'In the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office
could be shortened and he could in effect, be removed without a finding of a cause duly established after
due hearing, in violation of the Constitution.' (Ibid. 352) Clearly then, the policy of the law mandated by
the Constitution frowns at a suspension of indefinite duration. In this particular case, the mere fact that
petitioner is facing a charge under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not justify a different rule
of law. To do so would be to negate the safeguard of the equal protection guarantee. (at p. 542)

The application of the Garcia injunction against preventive suspensions for an unreasonable period of time applies with
greater force to elective officials and especially to the petitioner whose term is a relatively short one. The interests of the
sovereign electorate and the province of Zambales cannot be subordinated to the heavy case load of the Sandiganbayan
and of this Court.
It would be most unfair to the people of Zambales who elected the petitioner to the highest provincial office in their command
if they are deprived of his services for an indefinite period with the termination of his case possibly extending beyond his
entire term simply because the big number of sequestration, ill-gotten wealth, murder, malversation of public finds and other
more serious offenses plus incidents and resolutions that may be brought to the Supreme Court prevents the expedited
determination of his innocence or guilt.
The order dated February 10, 1989 suspending the petitioner without a definite period can not be sanctioned. We rule that
henceforth a preventive suspension of an elective public officer under Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 should be limited to
the ninety (90) days under Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service Decree, which period also appears
reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances of this case.
The petitioner also questions the applicability of Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 as amended by Batasan Pambansa Blg.
192 to him. He opines that the suspension provision as amended which qualifies the public officer as incumbent does not
apply to him since he is now occupying the position of governor and not mayor, the position wherein he was charged under
the Anti-Graft Law.
This argument is untenable. The issue was settled in the case of Bayot v. Sandiganbayan (128 SCRA 383 (1984), in this
wise:
... Further, the claim of petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is presently occupying a
position different from that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly
states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information
under Republic Act 3019 or for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or
property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage or execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Thus, by the use of the word office the
same applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office
under which he was charged.
One last point. Should the purposes behind preventive suspensions such as preventing the abuse of the prerogatives of the
office, intimidation of witnesses, etc., become manifest, the respondent court is not bereft of remedies or sanctions. The
petitioner may still be suspended but for specifically expressed reasons and not from an automatic application of Section 13
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The preventive suspension imposed on petitioner Amor D. Deloso by