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To cite this article: Zvi Schwartz & Eli Cohen (1999) The Perceived Value of Value Meals, Journal of
Restaurant & Foodservice Marketing, 3:3-4, 19-37, DOI: 10.1300/J061v03n03_03
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1300/J061v03n03_03
Zvi Schwartz
Eli Cohen
ABSTRACT. This study provides a new explanation as to why restaurants frequently sell value meals along with the meals components
separately. We argue that beyond the traditional economic model of
extracting the surplus from customers with extreme valuation for particular dishes, mixed bundling unintentionally creates a decoy price
effect. With mixed bundling, the value meal might seem more attractive
than with pure bundling, generating more profits for the restaurant. The
combination of extracting additional consumer surplus and the increased
demand due to decoy pricing makes the mixed bundling strategy a
highly valuable marketing tool for restaurants. We test the theory by
measuring subjects willingness to pay for value meals while varying the
prices of the meals components that appear separately on the menu. The
results strongly support our prediction that customers willingness to pay
for a value meal can be manipulated by controlling the price of the
components. [Article copies available for a fee from The Haworth Document
Delivery Service: 1-800-342-9678. E-mail address: getinfo@haworthpressinc.
com <Website: http://www.haworthpressinc.com>]
INTRODUCTION
Value meals in fast food establishments and its table dhte analogous in table-service restaurants have gained increased popularity in
Dr. Zvi Schwartz is Lecturer and Dr. Eli Cohen is Senior Lecturer at the Department of Hospitality and Tourism Management, School of Management, Ben-Gurion
University of the Negev, Israel.
Journal of Restaurant & Foodservice Marketing, Vol. 3(3/4) 1999
E 1999 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.
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20
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tion prices for both items, R1 < P1 and R2 < P2, would not buy either
one. Figure 1 illustrates this market without bundling.
The reservation price for a bundle (steak and wine sold together) is
assumed to be equal to the sum of the reservation prices for the two
components, i.e., RB = R1 + R2. Figure 2 demonstrates how the pure
bundling price, PB, divides the restaurant clientele into two groups.
Customers with a bundle reservation price higher than the bundle
price of PB (RB PB) purchase the steak and wine deal, and customers who have a lower reservation price for the bundle (RB < PB) do not
purchase the bundle.
A mixed bundling strategy divides the restaurant customers into
four groups (Figure 3). Customers with R1P1 and R2PB P1 (area J)
buy only the steak and pay P1. Customers with R2P1 and R1PB P2
(area I) buy only the wine and pay P2. Customers with R1 + R2 PB,
R1(RB P2) and R2(RB P1) buy the package of steak and wine and
pay PB (area G). Customers with R1 < P1, R2 < P2 and RB < PB do not
buy the package nor its components (area H).
FIGURE 1. No Bundling: Customers in Area A buy both the steak and the
wine. Customers in Area B buy the wine only and customers in Area D buy
the steak only. Customers in Area C do not buy the steak or the wine.
R2 (Wine)
P1
R (Steak)
1
23
FIGURE 2. Pure Bundling: Customers in Area E buy the wine and steak
package. Customers in Area F do not buy the package.
R2 (Wine)
PB
R1 (Steak)
24
FIGURE 3. Mixed Bundling: Customers in Area G buy the wine and steak
package. Customers in Area H do not buy the package or either of the items.
Customers in Area J buy the steak only and customers in Area I buy the wine
only.
R2 (Wine)
I
P
P1
PB
R1 (Steak)
25
26
FIGURE 4. A positive decoy pricing effect imposed on the Adams and Yellen
framework.
R2 (Wine)
K
P
L
M
J
P1
PB
R1 (Steak)
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Price of soups
low
high
low
high
N/A
Price of salads
low
low
high
high
N/A
Number of subjects
12
11
12
11
11
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RESULTS
Table 2 summarizes the responses to the first question, that is, the
highest price that the subjects reported they would be willing to pay
for each of the three combos by menu type. Figure 5 provides a
graphical description of the data.
These data indicate that both Ha and Hb are supported. Subjects in
treatment 1 (mixed bundling with low price for both components)
demonstrated the lowest willingness to pay among all menu types.
This holds true for all three combos. Subjects in treatment 4 (mixed
bundling with high price for both components) demonstrated the highest willingness to pay among all five menu types and for all three
combos. Subjects in treatment 5 (pure bundling) demonstrated willingness to pay that is somewhere between the previous two. Note that
for treatments 2 and 3 (high price for one component and a low price
for the second component) the results are not as consistent. Subjects in
treatment 3 are willing to pay more for combo 1 and combo 3 than
subjects in treatment 2. However, the same subjects are willing to pay
less for combo 2 than subjects in treatment 2.
TABLE 2. The highest price subjects are willing to pay for the combos in each
menu.
Treatment
(menu type)
Bundling
scheme
Components
price
1
2
3
4
5
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Pure
low/low
low/high
high/low
high/high
n/a
$ 6.20
$ 7.84
$ 7.70
$ 8.18
$ 7.57
$ 6.48
$ 7.91
$ 8.55
$ 8.83
$ 7.66
30
7.50
Low/Low
Low/High
High/Low
High/Low
Pure
7.00
6.50
6.00
5.50
5.00
Combo 1
Combo 2
Combo 3
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subjects who had menu 5 is significantly different from that of subjects who had one of the other four menus. We tested whether subjects
who had the pure bundling menu were willing to pay less than subjects
who had menu 4 (mixed bundling with high components price), and
whether their reservation price was higher than that of subjects who
had menu 1 (mixed bundling with low components price). Three of
these six tested pairs are significantly different at p < 0.10; willingness
to pay for combo 2 with mixed bundling (menu 4--high components
price) is significantly higher than that with pure bundling, and willingness to pay for combo 1 and combo 3 with pure bundling is significantly higher than that with mixed bundling (menu 1--low components
price).
The results indicate that the theory is supported. The prices of the
components of a mixed bundle affect the subjects willingness to pay
for the bundle. With appropriate pricing for the components on the
menu, a restaurant can get more customers to pay more for a value
meal compared to the same value meal where the components are not
offered separately on the menu.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This study combines the economic model of consumer surplus with
the consumer behavior model of decoys in a product line. We argue
that the combined approach provides a better explanation for the dominance of mixed bundling in restaurants menus. The theoretic model
along with the two numerical examples in Appendix 1 demonstrate
how the restaurants profitability may increase as a result of an increase in customers willingness to pay for a value meal. Our model
suggests that by manipulating the price of the meals component one
can induce a higher willingness to pay for the value meal, and consequently improve the profits of the restaurant.
The results of the controlled experiment strongly support the theory.
Subjects who faced high prices for the components had a higher willingness to pay for the value meal. Also, the decoy pricing element of
mixed bundling induced a reservation price that was different from
that of subjects who saw a pure bundle.
Our model and experiment provide a strong theoretical explanation
to the widespread use of value meals. Restaurateurs who set appropriate prices for the components enjoy higher profitability and are more
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likely to survive. However, more research is needed before this phenomenon is fully understood. Our model predicts that the decoy element will not always have a positive impact on willingness to pay.
Low price for the components may act as a negative benchmark
and most likely decrease customers willingness to pay for the value
meal. Mixed bundling induces higher willingness to pay and consequently higher profits only if the restaurant sets high enough prices for
the combo meals components. This was evident in the results of the
experiment. Hence, future research should be aimed at identifying the
appropriate components prices. Managers could greatly benefit from
clear guidance on which prices work and what the likely outcomes are.
Future research should also establish what factors affect the efficacy
of the decoy element. For example, it would be helpful to learn how
the overall price level of the menu influences the role of the decoy
element, and which external factors dictate upper and lower thresholds
to the range of useful components prices. Another promising avenue
for future research has to do with the type of research. This study
suggested a theory and tested it in a controlled experiment. This method of research is most appropriate for a first stage falsification procedure of a general theory. We followed the common approach and used
a sample that was homogenous on the non-theoretical variables (see,
for example, the excellent article by Calder, Phillips, and Tybout,
1981). After establishing the validity of the general theory, future
research could use procedures that are appropriate for the next two
stages of investigation. Specifically, the sample could encompass individual differences that might influence performances. Another extension could include a sample that is statistically representative of the
real world populations. A relevant operationalization of this approach
would be to sample subjects from a pool of various customer segments
of the same restaurant and of different types of restaurants.
REFERENCES
Adams, William and Yellen, Janet. (1976). Commodity Bundling and the Burden of
Monopoly. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, pp. 475-498.
Calder, Bobby J., Phillips, Lynn W. and Tybout, Alice M. (1981). Designing Research For Application. Journal of Consumer Research, 8, pp. 197-207.
Daniel, Wayne W. (1990). Applied Nonparametric Statistics, PWS-KENT, Boston.
Drumwright, Minette E. (1992). A Demonstration of Anomalies in Evaluations of
Bundling. Marketing Letters, 3 (4), pp. 311-321.
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APPENDIX 1
Example 1. This example builds upon Adams and Yellens Figure VIII. Prices
were modified to better resemble real restaurant menus. The decoy effect is
added to the mixed bundling option as follows: The sum of the steak and wine
prices sold separately is $50 (25+25). The price of the same two products sold
as a package is only $30. Since the bundle price is significantly cheaper (a
bargain of 40% discount) it seems more attractive. This psychological effect is
reflected in higher reservation prices for the bundle (column 5 of Table 1).
TABLE 1. Reservation prices for the prime steak, the wine, the bundle without
the decoy effect and the bundle with the decoy effect.
Steak (Rs)
Wine (Rw)
Bundle (RB)
25
25
25
10
35
37
17
25
30
15
12.5
27.5
33
12.5
12.5
25
30
12.5
15
27.5
33
10
25
35
37
17
25
30
25
25
30
The food cost is $11.25 for the steak and $11.25 for the wine. For each pricing
strategy the profits are given in Table 2.
TABLE 2. Profits with each pricing strategy for market 1.
Strategy
Pure Components
Price of
Steak
(P1)
25
Wine
(P2)
25
Bundle
P1+P2 (PB)
50
Pure Bundling
Steak
a, b
Wine Bundle
g, i
35
55
b, g
25
b, d, f, g
47.50
Mixed Bundling
25
25
50
27.5
25
25
50
30
i b, c, d e, f , g
h,
80
When the decoy effect is ignored, the most profitable strategy is pure
components with a profit of 55 (compared to a profit of 25 with pure bundling
and 47.50 with mixed bundling). Allowing for a 19% increase in the bundle
price due to the decoy effect, the mixed bundling becomes the best strategy
with a profit of 80--an increase of over 65%.
1425--411.25=55;
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Steak (Rs)
Wine (Rw)
Bundle (RB)
36
40
16
32
48
52
32
16
48
52
36
40
44
The profits for each pricing strategy are given in Table 4 (assuming no
production cost).
TABLE 4. Profits with each pricing strategy for market 2.
Strategy
Pure Components
Price of
Steak
Wine
Bundle
(P1)
(P2)
P1+P2
32
32
64
Pure Bundling
Steak
Wine Bundle
(PB)
c, d
a, b
40
128
a, b, c, d
160
Mixed Bundling
36
36
72
48
b, c
168
36
36
72
52
b, c
176
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APPENDIX 2
We consider adding the Soup & Salad Value Combo category to our menu and would appreciate your input on
the appropriate pricing. Please, answer the following three questions.
What is the HIGHEST price YOU would be willing to pay for each of the three combos? (fill in the blank)
Combo 1: $ ____ -- ____
Combo 2: $ ____ -- ____
Combo 3: $ ____ -- ____
In your opinion, how much should the MENU PRICE of each of the three combos be?
Combo 1: $ ____ -- ____
Combo 2: $ ____ -- ____
Combo 3: $ ____ -- ____
Assuming that the price is appropriate, how likely are you to order one of the combos?
1
5
very likely
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Appetizers
French Garlic Bread--French bread with garlic butter & feta cheese . . . $2.95
Spicy Buffalo Wings--A large plate of spicy buffalo wings . . . $2.95
Super Nachos--Tortilla chips with chili, cheddar, jalapenos and guacamole . . . $3.75
Soups*
Chowder -- . . . $2.25
Minestrone -- . . . $2.25
Soup of the day -- made fresh daily . . . $2.25
Combo 2 --
Combo 3 --
Beverages
Coca Cola, Diet Coke & Sprite . . . $1.50
Iced Tea . . . $1.50
Fresh Squeezed Lemonade . . . $1.75
Mineral Water . . . $1.50
Brewed Coffee, Decaffeinated Coffee & Hot Tea . . . $1.50