Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation vs Acibo

PETITIONER Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corp. (URSUMCO) is engaged in the sugarcane
milling business. Respondents Ferdinand Acibo and 21 others were hired by the petitioner on
various dates, in different capacities. At the start of their engagements, they signed contracts of
employment for a period of one month or for a given season. URSUMCO repeatedly hired them
to perform the same duties and for every engagement required them to sign new employment
contracts for the same duration.
Last Oct. 23, 2002, the respondents filed before the labor arbiter complaints for regularization,
entitlement to the benefits under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and attorneys
fees. The labor arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the LAs ruling and declared
respondents as regular URSUMCO employees and granted their monetary claims under the
CBA. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the NLRCs ruling finding respondents to be regular
employees of URSUMCO but deleted the grant of monetary benefits under the CBA. Did the CA
err?
The Supreme Court (Second Division) ruling: Yes.
Under the system, the plantation workers or the mill employees do not work continuously for one
whole year but only for the duration of the growing of the sugarcane or the milling season. Their
seasonal work, however, does not detract from considering them in regular employment since in
a litany of cases, this Court has already settled that seasonal workers who are called to work from
time to time and are temporarily laid off during the offseason are not separated from the service
in said period, but are merely considered on leave until reemployment. Be this as it may,
regular seasonal employees, like the respondents in this case, should not be confused with the
regular employees of the sugar mill such as the administrative or office personnel who perform
their tasks for the entire year regardless of the season. The NLRC, therefore, gravely erred when
it declared the respondents regular employees of URSUMCO without qualification and that they
were entitled to the benefits granted, under the CBA, to URSUMCOS regular employees.
xxx
We find that the CA grossly misread the NLRC ruling and missed the implications of the
respondents regularization. To reiterate, the respondents are regular seasonal employees, as the
CA itself opined when it declared that private respondents who are regular workers with respect
to their seasonal tasks or activities and while such activities exist, cannot automatically be
governed by the CBA between petitioner URSUMCO and the authorized bargaining
representative of the regular and permanent employees. Citing jurisprudential standards, it then
proceeded to explain that the respondents cannot be lumped with the regular employees due to
the differences in the nature of their duties and the duration of their work visavis the
operations of the company. The NLRC was well aware of these distinctions as it acknowledged
that the respondents worked only during the milling season, yet it ignored the distinctions and
declared them regular employees, a marked departure from existing jurisprudence.

This, to us, is grave abuse of discretion, as it gave no reason for disturbing the system of regular
seasonal employment already in place in the sugar industry and other industries with similar
seasonal operations. For upholding the NLRCs flawed decision on the respondents employment
status, the CA committed a reversible error of judgment (Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corp.
and Rene Cabati vs. Ferdinand Acibo, et. al., G.R. No. 186439, Jan. 15, 2014).

MARIWASA MANUFACTURING, INC., and ANGEL T. DAZO, petitioners, vs.HON. VICENTE

LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Minister of Ministry of Labor and Employment judgment,
and JOAQUIN A. DEQUILA, respondents.
Facts:
Joaquin A. Dequila was hired on probation by petitioner Mariwasa Manufacturing, Inc. as a general utility
worker. Upon the expiration of the probationary period of six months, Dequila was informed by his
employer that his work had proved unsatisfactory and had failed to meet the required standards.
To give him a chance to improve his performance and qualify for regular employment, instead of
dispensing with his service then and there, with his written consent Mariwasa extended his probation
period for another three months. His performance, however, did not improve and on that account
Mariwasa terminated his employment at the end of the extended period. Dequila filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal and contending that he becomes a regular employee.
Issue:
Whether or not, Article 282 of the Labor Code notwithstanding, probationary employment may validly be
extended beyond the prescribed six-month period by agreement of the employer and the employee.
Held:
Yes. For aught that appears of record, the extension of Dequila's probation was ex gratia, an act of
liberality on the part of his employer affording him a second chance to make good after having initially
failed to prove his worth as an employee. Such an act cannot now unjustly be turned against said
employer's account to compel it to keep on its payroll one who could not perform according to its work
standards. The law, surely, was never meant to produce such an inequitable result. By voluntarily
agreeing to an extension of the probationary period, Dequila in effect waived any benefit attaching to the
completion of said period if he still failed to make the grade during the period of extension. The Court
finds nothing in the law that by any fair interpretation prohibits such a waiver. And no public policy
protecting the employee and the security of his tenure is served by prescribing voluntary agreements that,
by reasonably extending the period of probation, actually improve and further a probationary employee's
prospects of demonstrating his fitness for regular employment.

CALS Poultry vs Roco

CALS Poultry Supply Corporation is engaged in the business of selling dressed

chicken and other related products and managed by Danilo Yap.i
On March 15, 1984, CALS hired Alfredo Roco as its driver. On the same date,
CALS hired Edna Roco, Alfredos sister, as a helper in the dressing room of CALS. ii On
May 16, 1995, it hired Candelaria Roco, another sister, as helper,iii also at its chicken

dressing plant on a probationary basis.

On March 5, 1996, Alfredo Roco and Candelaria Roco filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against CALS and Danilo Yap alleging that Alfredo and Candelaria were
illegally dismissed on January 20, 1996 and November 5, 1996, respectively. iv Both also
claimed that they were underpaid of their wages.v Edna Roco, likewise, filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal, alleging that on June 26, 1996, she was reassigned to
the task of washing dirty sacks and for this reason, in addition to her being transferred
from night shift to day time duties, which she considered as management act of
harassment, she did not report for work.vi
According to Alfredo Roco, he was dismissed on January 20, 1996 when he refused
to accept P30,000.00 being offered to him by CALS lawyer, Atty. Myra Cristela A.
Yngcong, in exchange for his executing a letter of voluntary resignation. On the part of
Candelaria Roco, she averred that she was terminated without cause from her job as
helper after serving more than six (6) months as probationary employee.
In their position papers, the complainants claimed that they were not given their
overtime pay, premium pay for holidays, premium pay for rest days, 13 th month pay,
allowances. They were also not given their separation pay after their dismissal. The
Labor Arbiter, however, denied their claims, stating that they had not substantiated the
same; on the other hand, CALS presented evidence showing that complainants
received the correct salaries and related benefits.

Issue: Whether or not the complainants are regular employees

Held:
From the facts established, we are of the view that Alfredo Roco has not
established convincingly that he was dismissed. No notice of termination was given to
him by CALS. There is no proof at all, except his self-serving assertion, that he was
prevented from working after the end of his leave of absence on January 18, 1996. In
fact, CALS notified him in a letter dated March 12, 1996 to resume his work. Both the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that Alfredo, as well as Candelaria Roco, was not
dismissed. Their findings of fact are entitled to great weight.
In Chong Guan Trading v. NLRC, et al.,vii we held:
After a careful examination of the events that gave rise to the present controversy
as shown by the records, the Court is convinced that private respondent was never
dismissed by the petitioner. Even if it were true that Mariano Lim ordered private
respondent to go and that at that time he intended to dismiss private respondent, the
record is bereft of evidence to show that he carried out this intention. Private
respondent was not even notified that he had been dismissed. Nor was he prevented
from returning to his work after the October 28 incident. The only thing that is
established from the record, and which is not disputed by the parties, is that private
respondent Chua did not return to his work after his heated argument with the Lim
brothers.

xxx
In this case, private respondents failure to work was due to the misunderstanding
between the petitioners management and private respondent. As correctly observed
by the Labor Arbiter, private respondent must have construed the October 28 incident
as his dismissal so that he opted not to work for many days thereafter and instead filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal. On the other hand, petitioner interpreted private
respondents failure to report for work as an intentional abandonment. However, there
was no intent to dismiss private respondent since the petitioner is willing to reinstate
him. Nor was there an intent to abandon on the part of private respondent since he
immediately filed a complaint for illegal dismissal soon after the October 28 incident. It
would be illogical for private respondent to abandon his work and then immediately file
an action seeking his reinstatement xxx. Under these circumstances, it is but fair that
each party must bear his own loss, thus placing the parties on equal footing.
xxx.

With respect to Candelaria Roco, there is no dispute that she was employed on
probationary basis. She was hired on May 16, 1995 and her services were terminated
on November 15, 1995 due to poor work performance. She did not measure up to the
work standards on the dressing of chicken. The Labor Arbiter sustained CALS in
terminating her employment. The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters ruling.
The Court of Appeals did not disagree with the NLRCs finding that Candelaria was
dismissed because she did not qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the
reasonable standards made known by the company to her at the time of her
employment.
We agree with CALS contention as upheld by both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
that Candelarias services was terminated within and not beyond the 6-month
probationary period. In Cebu Royal v. Deputy Minister of Labor,viii our computation of
the 6-month probationary period is reckoned from the date of appointment up to the
same calendar date of the 6th month following.

Alcira vs NLRC
Facts: The petitioner, Radin Alcira, was hired by the respondent Middleby Philippines
Corporation as engineering support services supervisor under probationary status for 6 months.
Afterwards, the service of the petitioner was terminated by the respondent on the ground that
the latter was not satisfied on the performance of the former. As a result, the petitioner filed a
complaint foe illegal dismissal in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against the
respondent.
Petitioner contended that his termination in the service tantamount to illegal dismissal since he
attained the status of a regular employee as of the time of dismissal. He presented the
appointment paper showing that he was hired on May 20, 1996, consequently, his dismissal on

November 20, 1996 was illegal because at that time, he was already a regular employee since
the 6-month probationary period ended on November 16, 1996.
The respondent, on the other hand, asserted that during the petitioners probationary period, he
showed poor performance on his assigned tasks, was late couple of times and violated the
companys rule. Thus, the petitioner was terminated and his application to become a regular
employment was disapproved. The respondent also insisted that the removal of the petitioner
from office was within the probationary period.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground that the dismissal of the petitioner was
done before his regularization because the 6- month probationary period, counting from May 20,
1996 shall end on November 20, 1996. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of NLRC. Hence, the present recourse.
Issue: Whether the petitioner was already a regular employee in respondents company at the
time of his dismissal from the service
Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The status of the petitioner at the time of his
termination was still probationary. His dismissal on November 20, 1996 was within the 6- month
probationary period. Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of years,
months, and days and nights, it shall be understood that years are of 365 days, months of 30
days, days of 24 hours and nights are from sunset to sunrise. Since, one month is composed of
30 days, then, 6 months shall be understood to be composed of 180 days. And the computation
of the 6- month period is reckoned from the date of appointment up to the same calendar date
of the 6th month following. Since, the number of days of a particular month is irrelevant,
petitioner was still a probationary employee at the time of his dismissal. Wherefore, the petition
is dismissed.

Mitsubishi Motors vs Chrysler Philippines

FACTS: Private respondent Nelson Paras first worked with Mitsubishi Philippines as a shuttle
bus driver on March 19, 1976. He resigned on June 16, 1982 because he went to Saudi Arabia

and worked there as a diesel mechanic and heavy machine operator from 1982 to 1993. Upon
his return, Mitsubishi Philippines re-hired him as a welder-fabricator at a tooling shop from
November 1, 1994 to March 3, 1995.
On May 1996, Paras was re-hired again, this time as a probationary manufacturing trainee at
the Plant Engineering Maintenance Department. He had an orientation on May 15, 1996 and
afterwhich, with respect to the companys rules and guidelines, started reporting for work on
May 27, 1996.
Paras was evaluated by his immediate supervisors after six months of working. The supervisors
rating Paras performance were Lito R. Lacambacal and Wilfredo J. Lopez, as part of the
MMPCs company policies. Upon this evaluation, Paras garnered an average rating.
Later, respondent Paras was informed by his supervisor, Lacambacal, that he received an
average performance rating but it is a rate which would still qualify him to be regularized. But as
part of the company protocols, the Division Managers namely A.C. Velando, H.T. Victoria and
Dante Ong reviewed the performance evaluation made on Paras. Despite the recommendations
of the supervisors, they unanimously agreed that the performance was unsatisfactory. As a
consequence, Paras was not considered for regularization.
Paras received a Notice of Termination on November 26, 1996 which was dated November 25,
1996. This letters intent is to formally relieve him off of his services and position effective the
date since he failed to meet the companys standards.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Paras termination was legal or not.
HELD: The Court holds that a company employer may indeed hire an employee on a
probationary basis in order to determine his fitness to perform work. The Court stresses the
existence of the statements under Article 281 of the Labor Code which specifies that the
employer must inform the employee of the standards they were to meet in order to be granted
regularization and that such probationary period shall not exceed six (6) months from the date
the employee started working, unless specified in the apprenticeship agreement.
Respondent Paras was employed on a probationary basis and was apprised of the standards
upon which his regularization would be based during the orientation. His first day to report for
work was on May 27, 1996. As per the company's policy, the probationary period was from
three (3) months to a maximum of six (6) months. Applying Article 13 of the Civil Code, the
probationary period of six (6) months consists of one hundred eighty (180) days. The Court
conforms with paragraph one, Article 13 of the Civil Code providing that the months which are
not designated by their names shall be understood as consisting of thirty (30) days each. This
case, the Labor Code pertains to 180 days. Also, as clearly provided for in the last paragraph of
Article 13, it is said that in computing a period, the first day shall be excluded and the last day
included. Thus, the one hundred eighty (180) days commenced on May 27, 1996, and ended on
November 23, 1996. The termination letter dated November 25, 1996 was served on
respondent Paras only at 3:00 a.m. of November 26, 1996. The Court held that by that time, he
was actually already a regular employee of the petitioner under Article 281 of the Labor Code.
His position as a regularized employee is thus secured until further notice.

Brent School Inc. vs Zamora

In Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora (G.R. No. L-48494, February 5, 1990), the Court, for the
first time, recognized and resolved the anomaly created by a narrow and literal
interpretation of Article 280 of the Labor Code that appears to restrict the employees
right to freely stipulate with his employer on the duration of his engagement. In this
case, the Court upheld the validity of the fixed-term employment agreed upon by the
employer, Brent School, Inc., and the employee, Dorotio Alegre, declaring that the
restrictive clause in Article 280 should be construed to refer to the substantive evil
that the Code itself x x x singled out: agreements entered into precisely to circumvent
security of tenure. It should have no application to instances where [the] fixed period of
employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties x x x absent any
x x x circumstances vitiating [the employees] consent, or where [the facts satisfactorily
show] that the employer and [the] employee dealt with each other on more or less
equal terms[.] The indispensability or desirability of the activity performed by the
employee will not preclude the parties from entering into an otherwise valid fixed term
employment agreement; a definite period of employment does not essentially contradict
the nature of the employees duties as necessary and desirable to the usual business or
trade of the employer.

BRENT SCHOOL vs. ZAMORA

BRENT SCHOOL, INC.DIMACHE vs. RONALDO ZAMORA and DOROTEO R.
ALEGRE
G.R. No. L-48494 February 5, 1990 en banc
FACTS:
Private respondent Doroteo R. Alegre was engaged as athletic director by petitioner
Brent School, Inc. at a yearly compensation of P20,000.00. The contract fixed a specific
term for its existence, five (5) years, i.e., from July 18, 1971, the date of execution of the
agreement, to July 17, 1976. Subsequent subsidiary agreements dated March 15, 1973,
August 28, 1973, and September 14, 1974 reiterated the same terms and conditions,

including the expiry date, as those contained in the original contract of July 18, 1971.
On April 20,1976, Alegre was given a copy of the report filed by Brent School with the
Department of Labor advising of the termination of his services effective on July 16,
1976. The stated ground for the termination was "completion of contract, expiration of
the definite period of employment." Although protesting the announced termination
stating that his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his
employer, and his employment lasted for 5 years - therefore he had acquired the status
of regular employee - Alegre accepted the amount of P3,177.71, and signed a receipt
therefor containing the phrase, "in full payment of services for the period May 16, to July
17, 1976 as full payment of contract."
The Regional Director considered Brent School's report as an application for clearance
to terminate employment (not a report of termination), and accepting the
recommendation of the Labor Conciliator, refused to give such clearance and instead
required the reinstatement of Alegre, as a "permanent employee," to his former position
without loss of seniority rights and with full back wages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended, have anathematized
"fixed period employment" or employment for a term.
RULING:
Respondent Alegre's contract of employment with Brent School having lawfully
terminated with and by reason of the expiration of the agreed term of period thereof, he
is declared not entitled to reinstatement.
The employment contract between Brent School and Alegre was executed on July 18,
1971, at a time when the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. 442) had not yet been
promulgated. At that time, the validity of term employment was impliedly recognized by
the Termination Pay Law, R.A. 1052, as amended by R.A. 1787. Prior, thereto, it was
the Code of Commerce (Article 302) which governed employment without a fixed
period, and also implicitly acknowledged the propriety of employment with a fixed
period. The Civil Code of the Philippines, which was approved on June 18, 1949 and
became effective on August 30,1950, itself deals with obligations with a period. No
prohibition against term-or fixed-period employment is contained in any of its articles or
is otherwise deducible therefrom.

It is plain then that when the employment contract was signed between Brent School
and Alegre, it was perfectly legitimate for them to include in it a stipulation fixing the
duration thereof Stipulations for a term were explicitly recognized as valid by this Court.
The status of legitimacy continued to be enjoyed by fixed-period employment contracts
under the Labor Code (PD 442), which went into effect on November 1, 1974. The Code
contained explicit references to fixed period employment, or employment with a fixed or
definite period. Nevertheless, obscuration of the principle of licitness of term
employment began to take place at about this time.
Article 320 originally stated that the "termination of employment of probationary
employees and those employed WITH A FIXED PERIOD shall be subject to such
regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe." Article 321 prescribed the just
causes for which an employer could terminate "an employment without a definite
period." And Article 319 undertook to define "employment without a fixed period" in the
following manner: where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which
are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer,
except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the
completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement
of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and
the employment is for the duration of the season.
Subsequently, the foregoing articles regarding employment with "a definite period" and
"regular" employment were amended by Presidential Decree No. 850, effective
December 16, 1975.
Article 320, dealing with "Probationary and fixed period employment," was altered by
eliminating the reference to persons "employed with a fixed period," and was
renumbered (becoming Article 271).
As it is evident that Article 280 of the Labor Code, under a narrow and literal
interpretation, not only fails to exhaust the gamut of employment contracts to which the
lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly, but would also appear to restrict, without
reasonable distinctions, the right of an employee to freely stipulate with his employer the
duration of his engagement, it logically follows that such a literal interpretation should be
eschewed or avoided. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude
absurdity in its application. Outlawing the whole concept of term employment and
subverting to boot the principle of freedom of contract to remedy the evil of employer's
using it as a means to prevent their employees from obtaining security of tenure is like
cutting off the nose to spite the face or, more relevantly, curing a headache by lopping

off the head.

Such interpretation puts the seal on Bibiso upon the effect of the expiry of an agreed
period of employment as still good rulea rule reaffirmed in the recent case of
Escudero vs. Office of the President (G.R. No. 57822, April 26, 1989) where, in the fairly
analogous case of a teacher being served by her school a notice of termination
following the expiration of the last of three successive fixed-term employment contracts,
the Court held:
Reyes (the teacher's) argument is not persuasive. It loses sight of the fact that her
employment was probationary, contractual in nature, and one with a definitive period. At
the expiration of the period stipulated in the contract, her appointment was deemed
terminated and the letter informing her of the non-renewal of her contract is not a
condition sine qua non before Reyes may be deemed to have ceased in the employ of
petitioner UST. The notice is a mere reminder that Reyes' contract of employment was
due to expire and that the contract would no longer be renewed. It is not a letter of
termination.
Paraphrasing Escudero, respondent Alegre's employment was terminated upon the
expiration of his last contract with Brent School on July 16, 1976 without the necessity
of any notice. The advance written advice given the Department of Labor with copy to
said petitioner was a mere reminder of the impending expiration of his contract, not a
letter of termination, nor an application for clearance to terminate which needed the
approval of the Department of Labor to make the termination of his services effective. In
any case, such clearance should properly have been given, not denied.

Cielo vs NLRC

Facts:
The petitioner is a truck driver who claims he was illegally dismissed by the
private respondent, the Henry Lei Trucking Company. The Labor Arbiter found
for him and ordered his reinstatement with back wages. 1 On appeal, the decision was
reversed by the National Labor Relations Commission, which held that the petitioner's employment had
2
expired under a valid contract. The petitioner then came to us on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.

Under these arrangements, the private respondent hoped to be able to terminate

the services of the drivers without the inhibitions of the Labor Code. All it had to
do was refuse to renew the agreements, which, significantly, were uniformly
limited to a six-month period. No cause had to be established because such
renewal was subject to the discretion of the parties. In fact, the private

respondent did not even have to wait for the expiration of the contract as it was
there provided that it could be "earlier terminated at the option of either party."
By this clever scheme, the private respondent could also prevent the drivers from
becoming regular employees and thus be entitled to security of tenure and other
benefits, such as a minimum wage, cost-of-living allowances, vacation and sick
leaves, holiday pay, and other statutory requirements. The private respondent
argues that there was nothing wrong with the affidavit because all the affiant
acknowledged therein was full payment of the amount due him under the
agreement. Viewed in this light, such acknowledgment was indeed not necessary
at all because this was already embodied in the vouchers signed by the payeedriver. But the affidavit, for all its seeming innocuousness, imported more than
that. What was insidious about the document was the waiver the affiant was
unwarily making of the statutory rights due him as an employee of the trucking
company.
And employee he was despite the innocent protestations of the private
respondent. We accept the factual finding of the Labor Arbiter that the petitioner
was a regular employee of the private respondent. The private respondent is
engaged in the trucking business as a hauler of cattle, crops and other cargo for
the Philippine Packing Corporation. This business requires the services of
drivers, and continuously because the work is not seasonal, nor is it limited to a
single undertaking or operation. Even if ostensibly hired for a fixed period, the
petitioner should be considered a regular employee of the private respondent,
conformably to Article 280 of the Labor Code providing as follows:
Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions
of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and
regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an
employment shall be deemed to be regular where the
employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessarily or desirable in the usual business or trade
of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed
for a specific project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee or where the work or services to
be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for
the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not
covered by the preceding paragraph; Provided, that, any
employee who has rendered at least one year of service,

whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be

considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in
which he is employed and his employment shall continue
while such actually exists. (Emphasis supplied)
In Brent School, Inc. vs. Zamora, the Court affirmed the general principle that
"where from the circumstances it is apparent that periods have been imposed to
preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be struck
down or disregarded as contrary to public policy, morals, etc." Such
circumstances have been sufficiently established in the case at bar and justify
application of the following conclusions:
Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the
development of legislation culminating in the present Article
280 of the Labor Code clearly appears to have been, as
already observed, to prevent circumvention of the employee's
right to be secure in his tenure, the clause in said article
indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written or oral
agreements conflicting with the concept of regular
employment as defined therein should be construed to refer to
the substantive evil that the Code itself has singled out:
agreements entered into precisely to circumvent security of
tenure.
The agreement in question had such a purpose and so was null and void ab
initio.
The private respondent's argument that the petitioner could at least be
considered on probation basis only and therefore separable at will is selfdefeating. The Labor Code clearly provides as follows:
Art. 281. Probationary employment. Probationary
employment shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the
employee started working, unless it is covered by an
apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The
services of an employee who has been engaged on a
probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when
he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with
reasonable standards made known by the employer to the
employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is
allowed to work after a probationary period shall be
considered a regular employee.

There is no question that the petitioner was not engaged as an apprentice, being
already an experienced truck driver when he began working for the private
respondent. Neither has it been shown that he was informed at the time of his
employment of the reasonable standards under which he could qualify as a
regular employee. It is plain that the petitioner was hired at the outset as a
regular employee. At any rate, even assuming that the original employment was
probationary, the Labor Arbiter found that the petitioner had completed more than
six month's service with the trucking company and so had acquired the status of
a regular employee at the time of his dismissal.
Even if it be assumed that the six-month period had not yet been completed, it is
settled that the probationary employee cannot be removed except also for cause
as provided by law. It is not alleged that the petitioner was separated for poor
performance; in fact, it is suggested by the private respondent that he was
dismissed for disrespect and insubordination, more specifically his refusal to sign
the affidavit as required by company policy. Hence, even as a probationer, or
more so as a regular employee, the petitioner could not be validly removed under
Article 282 of the Labor Code, providing as follows:
Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may
terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust
reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against
the person of his employer or any immediate member of his
family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
In refusing to sign the affidavit as required by the private respondent, the
petitioner was merely protecting his interests against an unguarded waiver of the
benefits due him under the Labor Code. Such willful disobedience should

commend rather than prejudice him for standing up to his rights, at great risk to
his material security, against the very source of his livelihood.
The Court looks with stern disapproval at the contract entered into by the private
respondent with the petitioner (and who knows with how many other drivers). The
agreement was a clear attempt to exploit the unwitting employee and deprive him
of the protection of the Labor Code by making it appear that the stipulations of
the parties were governed by the Civil Code as in ordinary private transactions.
They were not, to be sure. The agreement was in reality a contract of
employment into which were read the provisions of the Labor Code and the
social justice policy mandated by the Constitution. It was a deceitful agreement
cloaked in the habiliments of legality to conceal the selfish desire of the employer
to reap undeserved profits at the expense of its employees. The fact that the
drivers are on the whole practically unlettered only makes the imposition more
censurable and the avarice more execrable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission is SET ASIDE and that of the Labor Arbiter
REINSTATED, with costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.