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Practical TortoiseRaising
SIMON BLACKBURN
In 1895 Lewis Carrollwrotehis famousMindarticle"Whatthe Tortoise
said to Achilles".The problemhe raisedcan succinctlybe put like this:
can logic make the mind move? Or, less enigmatically, how do we
describewhat is wrongwith the tortoise'sargumentthat,howevermany
premisesAchilles has him accept, he always has space to refrainfrom
drawingthe conclusion?
In thispaperI amnot so muchconcernedwithmovementsof the mind,
as movementsof the will. Butmy questionbearsa similarityto thatof the
tortoise.I wantto askwhetherthe will is underthe controlof factandreason, combined.I shall try to show that there is always somethingelse,
somethingthatis not underthe controlof factandreason,whichhas to be
given as a bruteextra,if deliberationis ever to end by determiningthe
will. Thisis, of course,a Humeanconclusion,andthe only noveltycomes
in the way I wish to arguefor it. I believe thatmanyphilosophersthink,
erroneously,thatHumerelieson a naiveandoutdatedconceptionof facts,
or on an even morenaive and outdatedconceptionof reason,in orderto
put passionon theirthrone.My tortoisedefendsHume:whatwe do with
ourpremisesis not itself construedas acceptanceof a premise.
As it standsthe projectis only describedmetaphorically.Presumably
everything,includingmovementof the will, is underthe controlof facts
in some sense, for even if they are only facts about our physiology or
chemistry,still, theymakeus move.I am interestedonly in cognitivecontrol, or controlby the apprehensionof fact andreason.
Day 1
Achilles, then,hadovertakenthe tortoiseandwas sittingcomfortablyon
its back. "Yousee", he said, "thedistanceswere constantlydiminishing,
andso-".
"Butif they hadbeen constantlyincreasing?",the tortoiseinterrupted,
"how then? ... Well now, would you like to hear of a race-course,that
mostpeoplefancythey can get to the end of in two or threesteps,while it
Mind, Vol. 104 . 416 . October 1995
696 SimonBlackburn
really consistsof an infinitenumberof distances,eachone longerthanthe
previousone? ... let us takea littlebit of an argumentfor acting."
(P) I wouldprefereatinglettuceto eatingsouvlaki.
(B) The momentof decisionis at hand.
(Z) Let me choose to eat lettuceratherthansouvlaki!
"Well",continuedthe tortoise,"thereis no questionof accepting(Z) as
true,buttheremay be a questionof acceptingit. Let us agreethataccepting (Z) amountsto actuallydoingwhateveris involvedin choosinglettuce
ratherthansouvlaki.We accept(Z) only if the will is determined,andan
intentionis formed.Are we to supposethatif we accept(P) and(B), then
we mustaccept(Z)?"
"Waita minute",saidAchilles, "I don't wantto rushyou. It occursto
me that some philosophersmake a distinctionbetweenwhat you prefer
andwhatyou thinkyou oughtto prefer,or wouldpreferif you were ideally placed,for a tortoise.Perhapsthis affectsthe issue."
"If you like",said the tortoise."I too hate this modernfad for rushing
past anythinglike that.Let us put it in."
(P) I wouldprefereatinglettuceto eatingsouvlaki.
(M) I thinkit is rightto preferlettuceto souvlaki.
(B) The momentof decisionis at hand,
(Z) Let me choose to eat lettuceratherthansouvlaki!
"That'sbetter!"saidAchilles. "Thatcertainlywrapsit up for (Z). Surely
you mustaccept(Z) if all those aretrue!"
"Idon'tquiteknow"saidthetortoisesadly."Sometimes,well, I am not
sure how importantrightnessis. I certainlyget these urgesto do what I
thinkis wrong,don'tyou know.I amreallyquitegood at whatyou Greeks
keep callingakrasia;in fact I ratherenjoy it."
"Ifthere
"Goodheavens",repliedAchillessternlyyet compassionately.
is one thing modernmoralphilosophywill tell you, it is that any such
behaviouris quiteirrational.The normsof reasonare foundationsfor the
normsof ethics."
"Andwe don'twantto be unreasonable,do we?"said the tortoise."In
fact, we hadbetteraddit, just to makesure."
(RM) I thinkit is rationalto do whatI thinkis right
"Therewe are",announcedAchilles in triumph."Reasonprevails!"
"Well,thatis certainlya change"saidthe tortoise,"andyet sometimes,
well, I amnot surehow importantrationalityis. I certainlyget theseurges
to act againstreason,don'tyou know.I am reallyquitegood at thatkind
of akrasia;in fact I ratherenjoy it."
"HolyApollo!"exclaimedAchilles."Doyou meanyou havebeenreading the Romantics,so manymillenniabeforetheirtime?Areyou in favour
Day H
"Youknow"resumedAchilles, "thiswhole businessis off on the wrong
foot. We have been talkingas if there is a gap between preferenceand
actualchoice. WhereasI now readthatin the best circles the thing is to
believe in the theoryof revealedpreference.Whichmeanswe readyour
preferenceback from your choice. It is not an antecedentstate whose
apprehensiondetermineschoices I admitthatyesterday'sconversation
madethatideapuzzling butsimplya logical constructfromthe choices
you make!"
"Pardonme"said the tortoise."Imusthavemisunderstoodsomething.
Don't these economistsand game theoristsget paid for giving advice
advice aboutwhatto do?"
"Absolutely",saidAchilles. "Theyare very rich andregardedas very
good at it."
"Tellme more",said the tortoiseadmiringly.
"Well"respondedAchilles puttingon his lecturer'sgown, "it seems to
go like this.
"The reasoningbehind talking of revealedpreferencecomes in two
parts.I In the bad old days, it goes, it was thoughtthat 'utility'will be a
Benthamite,empiricalquantitywhichhappenedto be the objectof desire,
or ought to be the objectof desire.But utilitiesso conceivedproveboth
empiricallyand philosophicallybogus, as indeed Benthammight have
learnedfromBishopButler(1953, especiallySermonsI andXI). It is neithertruenor usefulas an approximation
thatpeople or tortoisesact so as
to maximizethe intensityor durationof some state of themselves.They
do not even alwaysactwiththeirown interestsin mind,wherethese interests are construedas statesof themselves.Rather,we see themas having
aninterestin someobjectwhenthatobjectfiguresin theirdecisionmaking.
Butobjectshereincludestatesthatarenotstatesof the subject:the survival
of the whales, or the relief of the famine,or the deathof the blasphemer,
or the success of a friend.Indeed,notoriously,unless this is so the life
resultingis apt to be unenviableand the selfishnessis self-defeating.So
let us insteadreversetheequation:utilitiesareno longerempiricallygiven,
tractableways of handling
butaresimplyconstructsfrommathematically
preferences.Givenvery weak assumptions,an agentwith an orderingof
preferencesover each of some set of optionscan be representedas if she
hadattachedmeasurable'values',calledutilities,to thoseoptions.Theprovision of a scale is similarin principleto thatof providingnumericalmea' A forcefulrecentpresentationby a leadingpractitioneris Binmore(1994,
Vol. 1). See also Kreps(1990, p. 26), andDawes (1988, p. 154 ff).
700 SimonBlackburn
Hawk
1,1
0,3
Dove
3,0
2,2
702 SimonBlackburn
704 SimonBlackburn
t,
(Adam'spayoffis representedfirst)
E
A
O'At2
Dove
1,2
Dove
2,11
Hawk
*-t
| Hawk
0,0
"Thestory is thatbeforethe game startsEve has committedan indiscretion. If Adamdoes nothing(doveish)he has 1 unitof utility,andEve 2. If
he blackmails Eve (hawkish)and she submits (doveish) he takes 1 of
Eve's units. But if she does not submit(hawkish)she blows the gaff on
him, revealinghim as a blackmailer,butalso revealingherown indiscretion, leavingthembothworseoff, in the 0,0 finale.
"Orthodoxdecisiontheoryhas us reasonas follows. In Blackmail,eligible Eve will not play the finalhawkishoption.For doing so represents
simple loss. EligibleAdamknowsthatthis is so. Hence he plays hawk,
and since she thenplays dove, his blackmailis successful.
"Supposenow thatAdamknowsin advancethatthis is the matrix.Then
he knowsin advancethateligible Eve will not choose to be a hawkwhen
contraststhepursuitof "selfinterestandindividualvalues"withthe "rationalpursuitof the interestsof societyas a whole",andsees gamesas modellingthe former
interest.The pointis thatin suchapproaches,an empiricallygiven aim or type of
aim is contrastedwith othersof a person'soverallinclinationsor concerns.Of
course,anyresultantadviceis thenhypotheticalin form:if you wantto maximize
only these specificconcerns,act as follows.
706 SimonBlackburn
But in gametheoryas
whatit is rationalto do in the samecircumstances.7
it is now being conceived,nothingcan be translatedinto advice.Forsuppose we are 'advised'to follow the dominantstrategy.This is null advice,
equivalentto: behaveso thata tautologyis trueof you. So if we don'tfollow the advice,then our choice revealsthatit wasn'tthatgame. But if it
wasn't thatgamethenthe advicewas inapplicable,and if the advicewas
inapplicable,thentherewas no pointin followingit in any event,for the
game theoristhad failedto modelthe situationproperly.As Wittgenstein
might have said, anythingcould accordwith the advice, and thatmeans
thatno advicewas given. The economists'slogan 'Maximize!'turnsout
not to be an injunctionat all, for nothingcould countas failingto follow
by these
it.8 So the promisethatwe can learnsomethingaboutrationality
meanscollapses.Or,if we preferit, the ideathatthe notionof rationality
gains any purchasehereis refuted.It is inevitablethatso-calledcountertheoreticalactions do not revealthe irrationalityof the players,but the
inadequacyof this applicationof the theory."
"Youalwaysdid catchup fast"saidthetortoiseadmiringly,"Andit also
suggeststhatthe questionis not so muchone of whetherit is rationalfor
Eve to be vicious, as whethershe has been educatedso thatshe and her
peersthrivein the situationsin whichthey will be put. Some have, some
haven't",he addedsententiously,and sat down,which is also quitedifficult for a tortoise,andate some morelettuce.
Day III
"Look"saidAchilles,forlornlycontemplatinghis bonfireof bookson The
Theoryof RationalChoice,"decisionmakingis at leastunderthe control
of fact and reasonin anotherway. Therewill come afterus one greater
thanus, who will show thatit is a dictateof purepracticalreasonthatwe
treateverypersonas an end in themselves.And his name shall be called
Immanuel.But let's not starton that",he addedhurriedly.
"Andeverytortoise",I hope addedthe tortoise.
"If they arerational",assuredAchilles,mutteringsomethingunderhis
breath.
"Tellme", said the tortoise,"it soundsnice and impartial.Must I be
he asked,innocently.
impartial?"
I Unless"rational"
is beingusedin an irrelevant,restrictedsensein whichwhat
is r4tionalcontrastswith spontaneousor emotionallysatisfying.
8 Gauthier(1987, p. 27) points out the futility of this injunctionon similar
grounds.But his own views arenot disentangledfromthe problem.
"Absolutely",said Achilles piously. "EvenHume, whom you somewhatresemble,realizesthatwe haveto takeup a commonpointof view.
In a conversationwithanyoneelse aboutwhatto do, thereis a pointwhere
we must cease speakingthe languageof self-love, and correctour sentimentsby invokingcommonstandards,wherebywe judge thingsandperthem."
sons as they affectthose surrounding
"Andthe penaltyif we don't?"askedthe tortoise.
"Well,practicalreasoningcouldnotgo forward"saidAchilles,"andwe
wouldlose the benefitsof cooperation,or of puttingthe firstpersonplural
in placeof the firstpersonsingular(Postema1995).Wecouldn'tevenrow
boatstogether."
"Wewouldn'twantthat",saidthe tortoisesociably."ButI remembera
coupleof daysago we thrashedoutwantsandpreferences,andI am afraid
I remainedunmoved,if you remember.So whatis new?"
"Heshows
"KantimprovesuponHume"saidAchillesenthusiastically.
how purepracticalreasondictatesrespectfor the law. For impartiality,
fairness,andall that.All sortsof good things"he finishedlamely.
"Itsoundsappetizing"agreedthe tortoise,"buttell me aboutthis dictation andthisrespect.Whatis my awfulfateif I findthisrespectis notactually dictated?"
"Wellif you don'trespectthe law"saidAchilles,"youwill not be free,
not an autonomousself-governingtortoise."
"AndI expectat least you are going to tell me thatI wouldn'twantto
be anythingelse" chimedin the tortoise,"butthatis not going to get us
much further,is it? Presumablyyou reallywould like to tell me thatit is
contraryto reasonnot to respectthe law, therebyachievingfreedomand
self-respect.And I doubtif I am going to believeyou. ForI fearthatKant
will one day tell us that
The realmoralityof actions,theirmeritor guilt, even thatof our
own conduct,thusremainsentirelyhiddenfromus. Ourimputations can referonly to the empiricalcharacter.How muchof this
characteris ascribableto the pureeffect of freedom,how muchto
mere nature,that is, to faultsof temperamentfor which thereis
no responsibility,or to its happyconstitution,can neverbe determined ... . (Critique of Pure Reason, A55 1/B579)
I
"And am afraidmy own self-respectas a just and caringtortoiseis not
facts.And",he addeddropbeholdento any such murkytranscendental
ping his voice a little, "I ratherdoubtwhetheryourself-respectas a hero
is, either."
"But you are a just and fair and compassionatetortoise",reminded
Achilles.
"You'retoo kind",said the tortoiseblushingmodestly."Butit is true.
Youwill knowhowAdamSmithwritesthat
Day IV
"Listen",beganAchilles, his locks disheveledby what appearedto have
been a sleepless night. "At least you respectmeans-endsreasoning,do
you not?And quitepossibly thereexists an argumentthatif you do that
then you cannot remainunmovedin otherways. Once you have some
muststhenyou haveto allow others."
"Respectmeans-endsreasoning?",queriedthe tortoise,"Explainto me
whatyou mean."
"Well,supposeyou wantsome of thatlettuceacrossthe road.And you
apprehendthatthe only way to get it is to cross the road,since lettuceis
even less likelyto movethanyou are.Inotherwords,you knowthatif you
wantthe lettuce,you mustcross the road.So it follows thatyou conceive
yourselfundera necessityto cross the road.Therewould thenbe a kind
of inconsistencyin not crossingthe road."
"IthinkI only knowone kindof inconsistency",saidthe tortoise."The
kindthatgoes p & np. Do you meanI am contradictingmyself?It doesn't
feel as if I am."
"Butdon't you agree that if you want the lettuceyou must cross the
road?And you wantthe lettuce(andthe momentof decision is at hand)
... so you must cross the road."
710 SimonBlackburn
Day V
"But look", said Achilles, "you have resistedall the argumentsI could
muster.And yet I notice thatthis pile of lettucehas steadilyshrunk.So
what is going on?"
"Oh, didn't I tell you?" said the tortoise, pausing surprisedin midmouthful."Ihavean absolutepassionforthe stuff.In fact,I scarcelyever
resist it. Wouldyou like some too?"'0I
Department of Philosophy
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27599
USA
e-mail ublack@gibbs.oit.unc.edu
SIMON BLACKBURN
REFERENCES
Binmore, Ken 1994: Game Theory and the Social Contract. Cambridge,
Massachusetts:MITPress.
Butler,Joseph1953:FifteenSermons.London:G. Bell & Sons.
Carroll,Lewis 1895:"Whatthe TortoiseSaid to Achilles".Mind,4, pp.
278-80.
Dawes, Robyn M. 1988: Rational Choice in an Uncertain World.
Orlando:HarcourtBrace.
Gauthier,David 1986:MoralsbyAgreement.Oxford:OxfordUniversity
Press.
Conceptionof
Hampton,Jean 1995:"Does HumeHave an Instrumental
PracticalReason?".HumeStudies,21, pp. 57-74.
Harsanyi, John1977: Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in
Games and Social Situations. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
I0 Thispaperwas readat a conferencein GlasgowUniversitycommemorating
the centenaryof Carroll'spaper.I amgratefulto Nick ZangwillandJimEdwards
for the invitation,and to Pat Shaw,JamesDreier,GilbertHarman,andothersin
the audiencefor valuablecommentary.
OxfordUniversityPress.
Milgram,Elijah 1995:"WasHumea Humean?".HumeStudies,21, pp.
75-93.
Massachusetts:HarvardUniversityPress.
Sen, Amartya 1982: Choice, Welfare and Measurement. Cambridge,
Massachusetts:MITPress.
Smith, Adam 1759: The Theo;y of Moral Sentiments. Reprinted 1976,
Oxford:ClarendonPress.
von Neumann,J. and Morgenstern,0. 1944: The Theoryof Gamesand
EconomicBehaviour.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.