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Eva Brann
Philosophy and Literature, Volume 38, Number 1, April 2014, pp. 30-40
(Article)
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DOI: 10.1353/phl.2014.0010
Eva Brann
Socrates: Antitragedian
o no one will it be news that Socrates is a philosophos, a philosophical man, in the preprofessional sense, when the word was still fully
felt as a modifying adjective and was not yet a noun denoting a member
of an occupational category, such that philosophia, the love of wisdom,
could pass into a dead metaphor. Dead metaphors are figures of speech
whose figurativeness has been sedimented, covered over by the sands
of time, so that their metaphorical force is no longer visualized or felt
in passing speech. Their desedimentation and revitalization can be a
source of wicked fun; heres an example: A truck rear-ended him, a
case of usage-worn metonymy, a part-for-whole figure in which the passenger is said to be butted by a vehicular fender-bender. I want to claim
that, by and large, philosophy is, in current usage, understood to be
a metaphorsince all academic philosophers know enough Greek to
know that it once meant the love that desires wisdomand a dead one,
since it is now the polemic that defends positions.
But is it even right to take Socratess philosophia as a metaphorthat
is, to take this love as a figurative exaggeration for interest, concern,
Philosophy and Literature, 2014, 38: 3040. 2014 The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Eva Brann
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engagement, the cool if tenacious love we all feel for our work, our
vocationa sentiment that grows pale in the face of erotic passion? Is
Socratic philosophia a metonymic metaphor of the full blown for the
skimpy type?
No, its no metaphor at all. In the Gorgias Socrates speaks, entirely
without shame, of my boy-love, philosophy (ta ema paidika, 482a),
and that locution (which might in the context be taken as an accommodation to the tastes of his company) achieves full standing in the
Phaedrus, where the wisdom-loving man is called, in the same breath,
a beauty-loving and a kind of musical and erotic man (248d), and the
soul itself is presented in a figure of erotic arousal, which is a figure
only because there is no way to speak of the soul that is not a somatic
metaphor (25152). Here philosophos goes into erotikosophos, an erotic
lover of wisdom, and this is, I think, how the person of the Platonic
Socrates becomes pivotal in philosophy. It is this view of him I wanted
first to establish.
There is another view of him, and it is too germane to the issue of
Socratic passion to omit: There is the Socrates of Nietzsches Birth of
Tragedy, the antitragic Socrates invented in modernity. This portrait
happens to be a brilliant travesty. Here is what the Nietzschean Socrates
looks like: He turns his great Cyclopean eye . . . on tragedy, that eye
in which the lovely madness of artistic enthusiasm has never glowed.
Monocular vision, recall, precludes full depth perception, and Nietzsche
goes on: Let us imagine how it was denied to that eye to look into the
dionysian abysses of delight (Wohlgefallen, para. 14).1 This Socrates is
the man that hath no music in himself.
What, then, was tragedy to this Nietzschean Socrates and to his disciple
Plato, whom he seduced into burning his own early tragedies?
Something pretty irrational, with causes that seem to be without effects
and effects without causes; add to this that the whole is so colorful and
various that it must repel a thoughtful disposition, but be a dangerous
tinder to irritable and sensitive souls. (para. 14)
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And so also in the earlier discussion, its Homer and the other poets
(387b, 388a). That he is speaking of the tragedians will be obvious when
he begins to specify them.
And he specifies them in a very original way: by diction (lexis, 392c).
Epic Homer might be called a seminarrative poet (394b). Sometimes he
tells what happens in his own person and, without concealing himself
(393b), reports what is said inthis is a latter-day termindirect discourse. Sometimes, however, he imitates his characters speech directly.
In drama all speech is direct; there is no narration (diegesis), only
dramatic diction. Thus on the stage, when the narrator has disappeared,
the actors are entirely impersonators, totally given over to imitation.
This holds, Socrates says, equally of tragedy and comedy; they are close
to each other (395a), though neither actors nor writers can succeed in
both at once. Recall that at the end of the Symposium Socrates says that
the same man who is by craft (tei technei) a tragedy-maker can also be
a comedy-maker (223d).
I think this ispartlyan issue of could and should; the same
writer can, by his skilled use of direct diction, make stage plays of any
sort, any dramata, doings. But, in the setting of the best city, should
he be conceded such versatility? But, what matters more, should the
specialized tragic actor be allowed to impersonate empatheticallywhat?
Socrates answers: the sensibility of women, caught up in calamity as
well as sufferings and weepings (395e).
Here, as so often, Socrates is presented as critiquing Aristotle before
the fact. For he asks Adeimantus if he hasnt noticed how imitation
[mimesis, 395d], when engaged in from childhood on, settles down
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knew of. For it means the extirpation of the true lie, . . . the ignorance
in the soul about the highest matters (382ab).
Adeimantus doesnt follow. Socrates says its because he thinks hes
being told something solemn, semnonthe very word Socrates had used
ironically of tragic diction in the Gorgias. In fact what he is soberly saying
is this: What all people would not accept and do especially hate is to
have and possess the lie in the soul, to let it in and tolerate it therein
effect to lie to themselvesabout the things that are, ta onta. And so,
many, many hours later the dialectical part of the dialogue culminates
in an ontology of poetry, for poetry puts the lie into the soul.
Thus Socrates is no naive cynic (as Nietzsche calls him), contemptuously looking down on the instinct-driven, logic-lacking crowd (as
Nietzsche describes them). Indeed Socrates has just attributed ontological longing to everyone, and he will later accord ontological capability
to all, arguing that the power by which everyone learns is already within
the soul of each human being (518c).
In what is for us book 10the last book, reporting a conversation that
has gone late into the night, way past the time for beda bed becomes
the exemplary item for Socratess imitative cascade of onta, of beings.
Ill summarize, since the hierarchy is well known; its the particular
application of that Divided Line that diagrams the image-descent of
levels of Being into levels of Becoming (book 5, 509d511e). Socrates
begins in the usual way (methodos, 596a). He posits:
1. the one form or ideal aspect, the invisible look or eidos, the true being
by naturefashioned, well say, by god,
2. the many bodily beds made by a carpenter, imitating the one divine form,
3. the multiform images of beds, produced by a maker, poietes, who
paints beds, tertiary image-beds.
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The long and short of it is that tragedians just dont have the genuine
knowledge either of the crafts or of the virtues that some people are
heard to attribute to them (598de). Someone who understood in truth
what it was he was imitating would much rather apply himself to real
works than to imitations (599b)as Plato did when he met Socrates
and burnt his tragedies.
So that is what Socrates calls a certain ancient difference [palaia
diaphora] between philosophy and the poetic art (607b)though
probably he means more original than ancient. For how old could
the quarrel be, when the Presocratics were poets themselves, except
for one, Heraclitus, who attacked Homer along with everyone else?
Socrates cites some lines, probably from lost comedies, in support of his
quarrel claim. He might have introduced a personal note: he himself
was the protagonist of a comedy published only twelve years before 411
BCE, the putative dramatic date for the Republic, namely Aristophaness
Clouds. This old comic Socrates and his thinkaterion (phrontisterion,
l. 94), his sophistical think tank, are as much a witty travesty as will be
the passionate distortion that produced the modern antitragic Socrates
and his all-conquering rationalismonly, as he himself thought, the
Aristophanic comedy was immediately harmful to himself (Apology 18b),
while the Nietzschean travesty perhaps even enhanced his significance.
But all that is merely circumstantial, and the true crux of the difference between philosophy and poetry for Socrates is that the latter is
ontologically debased: neither knowledgeable in the crafts, nor very
reliable about the conduct proper to the workaday world of variable
appearance, nor closely enough related to the contemplated realm of
unitary beings for truth telling. For this is, I think, the basic and surely
the truly scandalizing maxim of his ontological optimism: The cosmos
is so structured that its lower levels do in fact hold us by the turbulent
excitement of colorfully variable (poikilon, e.g., 558c, 605a), beingdeprived abstractions, when its upper reaches should attract us by the
lucid stability of its beautifully formed, fully vital beings.
It could, of course, be otherwise:
For in much wisdom is much grief:
and he that increaseth knowledge
increaseth sorrow. (Ecclesiastes 1:18)
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Adapted from a paper presented at the Conference on Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of the
Tragic, sponsored by the Department of Philosophy of the University of Crete at Rethymno, Crete,
June 2012.
1.Nietzsche references apply to all editions; translations from German are mine.
2. E. S. Thompson, The Meno of Plato (London: Macmillan, 1901).
3.Charles de Saint-vremond, Of Tragedy, Ancient and Modern, 1672.
4.David Hume, Four Dissertations and Essays on Suicide and the Immortality of the Soul
(South Bend: St. Augustines Press, 1992), p. 185.
5. To complete its triumph, philosophy turns out to have in Socrates the very poet of
Being that he himself was seeking for his kallipolis (608a). The cosmological part of the
Myth of Er, Socratess prose poem with which the Republic ends, is a highly colorful image
of the dialectical diagram called the Divided Line. In particular, I think, the Idea of the
Good (509b), the principle of a cosmic polity, the source of unity and wholeness from
beyond Being, that both infuses and encompasses all levels of Being, is depicted as a
light-shedding pole traversing the cosmos within, connected to the luminous meridianlike understrapping that comes together at its tips, having enclasped the cosmos from
beyond (616bc).
There is yet another way in which Socrates the philosopher triumphs: as himself the
very model of the antitragic hero. For he stages his death (death being the hallmark
culmination of many a tragedy) as a most deliberate antitragedy. He proves with his own
blithe end that to give oneself to the love that is philosophy is to be liberated, above
all, from tragedy and its deathbound Muse (Plato, Phaedo, trans., intro., and glossary
Eva Brann, Peter Kalkavage, and Eric Salem [Newburyport: Focus Publishing/R Pullins
Company, 1998], p. 25).