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DOI 10.1007/s11007-008-9077-6
Abstract Feelings not only have a place, they also have a time. Today, one can
speak of a multifaceted renaissance of feelings. This concerns philosophy itself,
particularly, ethics. Every law-based morality comes up against its limits when
morals cease to be only a question of legitimation and begin to be a question of
motivation, since motives get no foothold without the feeling of self and feeling of
the alien. As it is treated by various social theories and psychoanalysis, the self is
not formed through the mere acquisition or change of roles, but rather through a
process that is susceptible to crises, a process shaped by affective bonds and separations. Learning, which is the theme of pedagogy, loses its hold whenever it is
confronted by disinterest and listlessness. In neurobiology, the increased significance of those zones of the brain that are connected with the realization of feelings
makes the brain, accordingly, no mere apparatus that processes data, but a living
organ that selects and evaluates what is important. Finally, cross-cultural
comparison shows the extent to which the one-sided preference for understanding
and willing, which is the mark of Western rationalism, arises from a typical, not to
mention a highly masculine attitude toward the world and life, as many different
studies on gender difference stress (In reference to this perspective, see Seethaler,
Gefuhle und Urteilskraft. Ein Pladoyer fur die emotionale Vernunft, 1997). The
following reflections provide a historical orientation directed toward a new determination of feelings. This new determination of feelings is phenomenological and
takes the pathetic character of experience, nourished by the corporeality of experience as its point of departure.
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Keywords
B. Waldenfels
1 Introduction
Feelings not only have a place, they also have a time. Today, one can speak of a
multifaceted renaissance of feelings. This concerns philosophy itself, particularly,
ethics. Every law-based morality comes up against its limits when morals cease to
be only a question of legitimation and begin to be a question of motivation, since
motives get no foothold without the feeling of self and feeling of the alien. As it is
treated by various social theories and psychoanalysis, the self is not formed through
the mere acquisition or change of roles, but rather through a process that is
susceptible to crises, a process shaped by affective bonds and separations. Learning,
which is the theme of pedagogy, loses its hold whenever it is confronted by
disinterest and listlessness. In neurobiology, the increased significance of those
zones of the brain that are connected with the realization of feelings makes the
brain, accordingly, no mere apparatus that processes data, but a living organ that
selects and evaluates what is important. Finally, cross-cultural comparison
shows the extent to which the one-sided preference for understanding and willing,
which is the mark of Western rationalism, arises from a typical, not to mention a
highly masculine attitude toward the world and life, as many different studies on
gender difference stress (In reference to this perspective, see Seethaler, Gefuhle und
Urteilskraft. Ein Pladoyer fur die emotionale Vernunft, 1997). The following
reflections provide a historical orientation directed toward a new determination of
feelings. This new determination of feelings is phenomenological and takes the
pathetic character of experience, nourished by the corporeality of experience as its
point of departure.
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there is a secret complicity; one blames or praises beyond all measure what one does
not easily endure. Heinrich Heine pours water into the wine of German feelings. In
one text, which he wrote in 1854 shortly before his death, he explains, It is
characteristic that our German rogues are always affixed to a certain sentimentality.
They are not cold clever rogues, but villains of feeling. They have the temperament
that takes the warmest interest in the fate of those whose destiny or fate they steal,
and one cannot get rid of them.4
The modern subjectivizing of feeling is reflected in the constant fluctuation
between appreciation and devaluation of feeling. This process correlates precisely
with being disenchanted with the cosmos. As the very quintessence of causally
explainable and controllable mechanisms, nature is henceforth not only free of
sense, but also free of feeling. The eternal silence of infinite space may trigger a
shiver, but this is a mere remnant of feeling that throws the observer back on
himself. As Husserl shows in his Crisis text, the reduction of the cosmic lifeworld to
a physical external world is made up for with the complementary abstraction of a
psychological inner world.5 From now on, everything that cannot be accounted for
cognitively as material properties, or practically as expediency, belongs to the realm
of feelings. In their elementary form, feelings are private states of a subject: I have
the feeling that ; how should I know that you feel something similar? Quasiphysical analysis leads to the acceptance of atomic sense-data, often called
sensation, which wanders around seeking a connection. As Lichtenberg quizzically
noticed, we treat affects like blemish make-up that deceives us about the rawness
of sensations.6 As long as they are left to themselves, feelings are considered to be
irrational, obeying no rules. Descartess separation of soul/spirit and body gives rise
to a dual sphere of feeling in which mental feelings such as pride and grief are taken
to be higher and are set off from base or low animal feelings such as lust or disgust.
Also, the world of feeling has its part maudite. There are indeed social feelings
but they are context-specific and can, if necessary, be set off against ones own
feelings. Possessive individualism extends to feelings. In this way, feelings
gradually lose their worldliness. Initially, feeling begins only with ones self. There
is a truth in this, but only a half-truth. It is just this impoverishment of the affective
world that Hegel campaigns against in his mediations. Of course, there is also the
contrary, as in Sternes Sentimental Journey whereby sensation becomes the
guidebook to an exciting journey. In this respect, literature and art often appear as
agents of something dying away and as harbingers of something to come. Moral
sense, which authors such as Shaftsbury hold in high esteem, is related to aesthetic
taste. Even with Kant, feelings try to find their way in the form of refined taste, but
this stands in the shadows of the laws of nature and law-based morality. This holds
true even more so for the moral feeling of respect that comes into actual practice
from reason itself.7 After all, a novel nobility of feeling grows from this moral
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B. Waldenfels
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in the ethical context of his major work Formalism in Ethics and the Non-Formal
Ethics of Value, leaves the Aristotelian hylomorphism behind from the outset; he
does this by replacing sensations [Empfindungen] that still function as constitutive
elements, with a sensing [Empfinden] that is to be characterized verbally, as a
process that opens and closes. Intentional feeling is founded in an emotional a priori
that is liberated from the dominance of the cognitive and the practical a priori. The
theoretical background of value, nevertheless, remains problematic. Value appears
as something perceptible and values are organized in a hierarchy that subordinates
lived-bodily sensuous feelings to mental and spiritual feelings. The pathetic event of
feeling is tracked according to a pre-given order of feeling.10 In Schelers later
cosmological anthropology, in the essay, The Human Place in the Cosmos, feelings
participate in two movements that run contrary to each other, the movement toward
spiritualization and toward vitalization; as the blind feeling-urge, they reach
down into the deepest depths of life; and as emotional acts like good, love,
repentance, or awe they soar to the highest heights of spirit.11 The erroneous selfdeification characteristic of Spinoza and Hegel, a self-deification that has its place
in human beings, eventually transforms all feelings into feelings of self. The
medical anthropologist Erwin Straus has a more modest assessment. He borrows
ideas from Scheler and also from Heidegger, but he works them out in his own way.
He takes sensing as an event, which belongs neither to objectivity nor to
subjectivity, since the process of sensing senses itself in and with the world.12 The
programmatic title Vom Sinn der Sinne points to an internal connection between
intentionality and affectivity, or as it is now calledbetween gnostic directednesstoward and pathetic being-struck-by.13 In Heideggers Being and Time, sensing is
transformed into the attunement of Da-Sein, a finding oneself-in-the-world that
assumes a varying tonality in moods like fear, joy, or boredom. In French
phenomenology the lived-bodily aspect of feelings is reinforced, as when Sartre
emphasizes the magic of the emotions and the emotional enchantment of self, and
when Merleau-Ponty describes sensing as an original, pre-objective and presubjective contact with the world, self, and other. An it feels in such and such a
way or an it touches me would correspond to the it perceives within me, that
Merleau-Ponty contraposes to subjective perceptual acts. The re-determination of
feelings already announces itself in this, namely, as something that comes to us.
Through this we gain a critical distance from the newer variety of a hyletic
phenomenology insofar as the latter grants self-affection a priority over every alien
affection.14
10
In addition, see my critical position: Wertqualitaten oder Erfahrungsanspruche? in Vom Umsturz
der Werte in der modernen Gesellschaft, ed. G. Pafafferott (Bonn: Bouvier 1997).
11
Scheler (1976, p. 70); The Human Place in the Cosmos, trans. Manfred Frings (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 2008, in press).
12
13
See the entirely Francophonic debate that is carried out in the journal: Etudes Phenomenologiques,
Nos. 3940 (2004): Commencer par la phenomenologie hyletique?
14
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B. Waldenfels
3 Feeling as Pathos
Bruchlinen der Erfahrung15 is the title of the book that concerns a radicalization of
experience. Radical experience means that there is nothing and no onean, it, he,
or shethat would precede the event of experience as a finished instance. It also
means there are no ideal essences, no universal regulations, and no adequate
grounds by which experience as an event of experience would be made possible or
justified. In the fruitful pathos of experience of which Kant already speaks in the
Prolegomena,16 feelings find their place absolutely released from the province of
the merely subjective. I characterize the foundation and the background against
which all intentional and well-ordered behavior stands out as pathos or af-fection,
literally, as doing.
The Greek word pathos has a three-fold meaning. In the first instance, it means
an experience that befalls us [Widerfahrnis]. This experience that befalls us is an
occurrence of a special kind. It is not a datum, not an objective occurrence, but even
less is it a personal act or a subjective condition, like we still assume today.17 Pathos
is something that happens; it happens by something nudging us, touching us,
striking us, by something exerting an influence on us. It is not that pathos happens
without our effort, but it goes beyond our doing by overcoming us. The grammatical
form of the passive is related to pathos, only this must be understood as a primordial
passive, not as a mitigated stage or as a reversal of the active. Furthermore, pathos
means something adverse, something that is allied with suffering, but also
something that admits of the proverbial learning through suffering [pathei mathos].
The central theme of the experience of pain belongs here, including the inflicted
pain that reaches its perverse apex in torture.18 Finally, pathos designates the
exuberance of passion that leaves behind the habitual and leaves us like the platonic
Eros that stands outside human concerns and draws close to the divine
(Phaedrus 249 c-d).
The pathos which overcomes us stands out from a pathetic background that
points to a chronic character in relation to an acute occurrence.19 In a certain
respect, we are attuned [eingestimmt] when something surprises us. This already
applies to the bare impression; without even the slightest deviation from what is
expected, without the development of an affective relief,20 we would only resign
ourselves to experiences, but not be complicit in having any new experiences.
15
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002. I articulate there what I can only suggest here.
16
17
See the definition that Hinrich Fink-Eitel suggests: Affects are inner states that are shaped in a
propositional-cognitive manner, that are mediated in a life-historical and psychical manner, and are
founded in a bodily manner; moreover, they are subject to super-individual relations of social and cultural
determinants. See Fink-Eitel and Lohmann (1994, p. 57).
18
19
The polarity of immediate emotion and habitual attitudes of feeling belongs to the basic tenets of the
classical doctrine of affect. Paul Ricur accordingly differentiates between emotion as surprise, emotion
as shock, and emotion as passion in Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary, trans.
Erazim V. Kohak (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007, pp. 250280).
20
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Affective dissonances arise when deviations from what is familiar get out of hand. It
is these affective dissonances that first give cognitive dissonances their sharp
focusdissonances of which social psychology speaks.
What is decisive for the emergence of pathos is that it is a matter of a genuine
temporal displacement, a jetlag of sorts, a diastasis, that allows the alien
influence to be separated out from ones own initiative, and that binds them to one
another in and through this rupture. Pathos is surprise par excellence. It always
comes too early, as that which we could overlook; our answer always comes too late
in order to be completely at the height of experience. This does not mean that
something precedes ones own experience in the manner that it presents itself for an
outside observer; it does not mean that two events follow each other like stimulus
and response in accordance with the view of behaviorism. Rather, it means that the
one experiencing precedes itself. Experience, which comes from that which befalls
us does not begin with itself, in the self-same, but from elsewhere, in the alien.
Every deed and word that arises from a pathos is shaped by the essential feature of
responsivity. It follows from this that I do not have a pathos in the way I have
feelings; I am given over to a pathos. Further, in contrast to feelings peculiar to
Modernity, pathos is no accompanying phenomenon that steps in as third class
in addition to representing and willing, as Heidegger critically remarks.21 It is no
mere component of experience; rather it is situated in the heart of the experience
like the balance spring of a clock. Whoever believes he is the master of his
feelings (an outspoken masculine expression) forgets his own origin.
Finally, the pathetic separates itself from the pathological which can take on
various and even completely opposite forms. In its being at the mercy of pathos, the
possibility of ones own response diminishes, while trying to shut oneself off from
pathos, the response solidifies itself to a repertoire of responses. Shock and
stereotypes mark the extremes of an event that finds its last stop neither in an outside
nor an inside. The boundaries between normal and pathological feelings remain
fluid as is shown again and again by the fact that this fluidity is not only accepted by
Freudian psychoanalysis, but also by phenomenologically inspired doctors,
including Ludwig Binswanger, Wolfgang Blankenburg, Henry Ey, Kurt Goldstein,
Eugene Minkowski, Herbert Plugge, or Hubert Tellenbach.
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B. Waldenfels
ones own reflection in the mirror or hearing ones own voice.22 The withdrawal of
the self refers not only to the functioning lived-body but also to the materiality of
our physical body, binding us with nature and carrying with it the traces of a natural
history. The enigma of my brain also belongs to this together with the neural
zones of feeling of the limbic system, which functions as a central system of
evaluation.23 My brain is as puzzling as my lived-body which according to
Descartes is only due to a particular privilege that is mine to name.24 Indeed, who
should issue me this special authorization if it is not inscribed with indelible letters
on my body? Even the feeling of the self participates in this material physicality that
belongs to us without our ever being able to appropriate it. The foreignness of ones
own lived-body makes us receptive to the foreignness of others. We are only able to
be approached, touched, affected, insofar as we are never totally with ourselves.
Without this abyss in ourselves whichas Plato assertsborders on madness, there
would only remain a half-hearted contentment.
The lived-body that we are and that we do not fully possess circumscribes a
sphere of feeling that is opposed both to a dualistic split as well as to a univocal
hierarchicalization. However, this sphere in no way presents itself as homogenous.
We can differentiate between different ranges and polarities. Thus, there are
peripheral sensations like pain that arise if I cut my finger and central complexes of
sensation, such as heart trouble, that effect our entire state of health. We experience
recurring feelings of satisfaction and feelings of happiness that radiate through life.
Affects can appear with a greater or lesser intensity, for example, as a calm selfassurance or as a boundless egoism and as insatiable ambition. Active upsurges of
feeling like anger, which erupt when the opportunity arises and again subside when
the situation changes, are opposed to the enduring lust for revenge that poisons life
or to a reconciliation thatas one so beautifully puts itlooks the other way
[funf gerade sein lasst]. This corresponds to the dual character of the active and
habitual lived-body, and it makes possible a culture of feeling that goes beyond the
moment. Related to this dual character is the difference between a focal feeling that
is affixed to certain events or experiences and a total feeling, like the global pain or
the joy of life that spreads out atmospherically, and that for this reason are hard to
produce and just as difficult to overcome. While the lived-bodily self feels
addressed in different ways, it is always only more or less involved. Similar to the
case of intentionality, we are to distinguish different modes and qualities in the
sphere of affects, only that these are by far more difficult to apprehend because they
do not concern the way in which something as something is grasped or re-evaluated,
but rather the way in which we are struck by something without replacing this
something with its effect. One can place the affects under the aegis of an
objective correlate, like T.S. Eliot suggested in his poetics; but this does not mean
that our feelings are directed toward objects. The rationality of feelings, which are
in vogue with authors such as Ronald de Sousa or Martha Nussbaum, can always be
22
23
In addition, see Roth (1997, p. 194). However if meanings and evaluative activities are attributed to
the brain directly, we end up with a neurological homunculus.
24
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an indirect rationality; and this is not, for instance, because feelings are something
especially dark or deep, but rather because they are not something at all that we,
for our part, can comprehend or manage, but something that forestalls our own
efforts.
5 Dimensions of feelings
We encounter basic forms of a corporeal pathos in all aspects of our experience.
Already the simplest sensuous experience goes beyond a mere registration and
coding of data and beyond processing such data. Corresponding to the red or blue
that radiates toward us or surrounds us, is a red or blue behavior that is characterized
by changing forms of turning-toward or avoidance, through flexible or stiff
movements, by faster or slower rhythms. Blue or green favor the muscular activity
of flexing (adduction) that is associated with voluntary ego-related performance,
while the color red allows the extension (abduction) and thus involuntary forms of
world-relatedness to emerge. We can see a fundamental relationship with the world
and the self in the behavior of colors, a relationship that precedes the representational and practical orientation.25 As Kurt Goldstein shows in his
neuropathological studies by appealing at the same time to Goethe and Kandinsky,
the physiology of color coincides with the symbolism of color. If we differentiate
between warm and cold colors, we can see that when someone becomes red with
anger or green with envy, it is no mere metaphor, as it would be if raw data were
covered with an affective lacquer. There is an ethos of the senses that grows out of
pathos before its systematic instructions are put into action. In this sense,
Nietzsches physiology of morality with its sign language of the affects26
contains various antidotes to every kind of superstructure of morality that
embellishes itself with its all too sublime feelings.
Attention, without which there would be literally nothing noteworthy or
desirable, does not begin with acts of observation that illuminate a dark area like
a floodlight; they begin with what attracts our attention or strikes us, with something
that awakens our sympathy and generates excitement. Everything new has an
affective value, and not a mere informational value, and this even applies to neural
processes. Paying attention, in which what is conspicuous takes shape, is already a
kind of response.27 To cite again from Lichtenbergs Aphorisms: When sometimes
I had drunk a lot of coffee, and was consequently startled by anything, I noticed
quite distinctly that I was startled before I heard the noise: we thus hear as it were
with other organs as well as with our ears.28 The current debates that were kindled
25
See Goldstein (1934, pp. 167170, 307312). Merleau-Ponty resorts back to these studies repeatedly
in his early work, for instance, in particular in his treatment of sensation in the Phenomenology of
Perception, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Routledge, 1962).
26
27
I refer to my recent work Phanomenologie der Aufmerksamkeit (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004),
that is based entirely on the resonance between the process of something becoming noticed [Auffallen]
and the process of taking notice of something [Aufmerken].
28
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B. Waldenfels
31
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137
belong to body language that is marked in a pathetic manner. In the tone that makes
music, what speaks to us, stimulates us, excites us, comes to expression before it is
put into words or put into practice. In addition, extra-linguistic body language is
articulated in facial expressions, physiognomy, attitude, gait, clothes, and the way
one adorns the body. We can see how someone is situated in self-presentation, in the
manner of appearing and in affected behavior. Wittgensteins dismantling of private
language results in a sphere of expression in which there are indeed niches, angles,
folds, and cracks, but which does not exhibit a protected interior or a bodily reserve
that would admit of a pure feeling of self.
Body language is carried forth in a body conversation. It begins with the affective
dialogue between the infant and the maternal parent. Virgils risu cognoscere
matrem, the early childlike smile of the mother that Rene Spitz cited in his study of
infants, opens a sphere of intimacy that develops graduallyor even fails to
develop, as in the case of hospitalism.32 Exploratory, motor, and affective moments
are intertwined in the cultivation of trust and intimacy, but also in the absence of an
enduring relationship of trust that finds its auto-erotic expression in the child who
rocks himself in solitude.33 Becoming intimate, which at first allows a certain binary
sphere of ownness to develop, has as its flipside a becoming alien, which usually
manifests itself in the eighth month as an acute shyness of strangers. One could be
tempted to speak of an original situation of embarrassment.34 In any case, brute or
primitive feelings are out of the question. The early childlike conversation of the
body is carried forward in adult life, a life that is never free from syncretistic
elements of an interpenetration that belongs to the intercorporeality of feelings.35
All this goes far beyond intro-pathy or an em-pathy that continues to evoke a kind of
Cartesian framework. Whoever is exposed to alien influences and appeals does not
arrive at the other by putting himself in the place of the other and in his situation.
Moreover, the interpenetration of a body-conversation is not to be equated with a
sympathy that is extracted from antipathy. Experiences that befall us do not
converge, and it is precisely for this reason that they surprise us. In his essay, Uber
die allmahliche Verfertigung der Gedanken beim Reden, Kleist refers to the look of
a listener that announces to us an incompletely expressed thought as already
32
Translators note: Hospitalism is a pediatric diagnosis that describes infants who wasted away while in
the hospital. It is now thought that this wasting away was due to a lack of social contact since those
infants in poorer hospitals that could not afford incubators did not die as often since they were held by the
staff.
33
See Emde (1983). Not only Sigmund Freud, but also the trained author Anna Freud regards the
affective experiences from the early childhood period as a pioneer for the development within all other
ranges.
34
I refer here to the remarks of Guy van Kerckhoven, who follows Hans Lipps, in In Verlegenheit
geraten. Die Befangenheit des Menschen als anthropologischer Leitfaden in Hans Lipps Die
menschliche Natur, Revista de filosofa 26 (2001): 5584.
35
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B. Waldenfels
understood.36 With this he recalls the continual birth of sense and of our self out of
pathos. That there are miscarriages with this continual birth, that to this look also
belongs the look of control and persecution, does not change anything about the way
the experience of the alien emerges from experiences that befall us, experiences that
go beyond every unity and discord directed toward sense and rule.
37
38
39
Let me refer here to my critical remarks in Grenzen der Normalisierung (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1998b), 112 and 247, or to my Bruchlinien der Erfahrung, 55, 382.
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humanity from becoming confused by its own simulations. Were this not so, there
would be no such thing as a fabricated pathos.
Related to the changing intensity of feelings is the manner of their integration and
disintegration. In his theory of affects, Freud separates the affective behaviors that
are bound from those that are free moving. Similarly we can differentiate between a
bound pathos that forms the background of our habitual behavior, and thus can
occur inconspicuously like an everyday greeting, and a released pathos that pulls us
out of our habitual relations. Pathos itself would then only be indirectly graspable as
a deviation from the usual, as a surplus of what is non-learnable in learning, as what
is alien in ones own self. If the pathetic surplus were leveled out by normalization,
we would encounter the normal man of which Nietzsche warns, who is only
acquainted with normal feelings. The human as undetermined animal would
approach the status of an animal that is determined artificially. The anti-human
that comes to expression here is not based on the fact that the human remains
arrested by brute beginnings; rather, it stems from the fact that logos splits itself
from pathos, to which it owes its momentum.
7 Philosophy of feelings
For the philosopher and certainly for the phenomenologist, the question concerns
how feelings can be grasped, how they can be described and conceptualized without
compromising their status as feelings. Husserls well known demand, to bring the
pure and so to speak still mute experience to an expression of its own sense40
reaches its limits when we are confronted by experiences that befall us
experiences that rupture the coherence of sense and in this respect have no sense.
Already in the natural-communicative attitude we must distinguish between the
pathic expression, which comes from a pathos (e.g., the expression of astonishment,
uneasiness, indignation, affection, the cry that erupts in limit-situations), and the
pathetic expression, which endeavors to give pathos itself an intensified expression.
A cry is, in this sense, never pathetic. At most, what is pathetic is the cry that the
actor lets out on stage, or the cry that Edvard Munch captures in his painting. In a
diary entry from 1893, which directly refers to the origin of this well-known motif,
the painter describes how while walking along the street with two friends at sunset,
all of a sudden the sky was dyed a bloody red color and in the clouds, blood and
swords flared up: [] I stood there trembling with anxietyand I felt like a long
cry went through nature. The bridge between the pathic eruptive expression and
the intensified pathetic expression forms the uneasiness of the experience that
increases up to the point of horroran experience that finds its place in the painting
and continues as the uneasiness of its gaze.41 To be sure, the artistic design of the
painting leaves the ground of the natural attitude by putting out of play our habits of
expression and our habits of seeing. In this way, the autobiographical note breaks
40
41
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B. Waldenfels
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Translators Acknowledgements I wish to express my deepest gratitude to Dr. Anthony Steinbock for
all of his help in revising this translation. I would also like to thank Dr. Douglas Berger for his comments
on an earlier draft of this translation.
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